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On 16 January 2017, British American Tobacco p.l.c. (“BAT”) and 
Reynolds American Inc. (“RAI”) entered into a merger agreement, subject 
to the approval of a majority of the RAI shareholders other than BAT (the 
“Merger”).  That agreement provided for RAI’s shareholders to receive a 
combination of cash and BAT stock that, at the time the merger 
agreement was signed, was worth $59.64 per share—a 26.4% premium 
over the $47.17 per share trading price of RAI before BAT’s first merger 
-3- 
 
offer became public.  The Merger resulted from three months of arm’s-
length negotiations between BAT and a committee of independent RAI 
directors (the “Transaction Committee”) empowered by RAI’s Board of 
Directors (the “RAI Board”).  During the negotiations, the Transaction 
Committee rejected several BAT offers, and BAT raised its offer four 
times, resulting in approximately $4 billion in additional consideration 
for RAI’s shareholders.  RAI’s shareholders, including those unaffiliated 
with BAT, voted overwhelmingly in favor of the deal.  The Merger closed 
on 25 July 2017 (the “Transaction Date”). 
This appeal arises out of demands by certain former RAI 
shareholders (“Dissenters”) for payment of what they contend to be the 
“fair value” of their RAI shares.  Most of the Dissenters are hedge funds 
that first acquired RAI stock after BAT’s offer to buy the company became 
public.  Rather than accept the merger consideration paid to other RAI 
shareholders, Dissenters demanded substantially higher payments.  
When the parties were unable to reach agreement, RAI paid each 
Dissenter $59.64 per share, plus interest from the closing of the Merger, 
and this litigation followed. 
-4- 
 
By statute, the Business Court below was charged with 
determining the fair value of the shares owned by Dissenters on the 
Transaction Date.  N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(a).  After full consideration of the 
evidence presented at a nine-day trial, the Business Court concluded that 
the $59.64 per share that RAI had already paid was equal to or greater 
than the fair value of RAI shares as of the Transaction Date, such that 
no further payment was due. 
The Business Court’s decision that Dissenters received fair value, 
if not more, for their shares of RAI is supported by a mountain of 
mutually reinforcing evidence.  All evidence of value presented at trial, 
including the stock market’s contemporaneous assessment of RAI’s 
value; the deal price negotiated by an independent, sophisticated and 
properly motivated Transaction Committee and approved by 99% of the 
shares voted by shareholders other than BAT; the contemporaneous 
judgments of analysts and even one of the Dissenters themselves; the 
real-time discounted cash flow (“DCF”) valuations performed by three 
independent and experienced financial advisors; various other real-time 
and expert valuations to cross-check the reasonableness of the DCFs—
all of it lined up to establish that the fair value of RAI at the time the 
-5- 
 
Merger closed was no more than the $59.64 that Dissenters already 
received. 
The only outlier was Dissenters’ valuation of $92.17 per share—
which, if accepted, would imply that RAI’s Board, RAI’s management 
team, three independent financial advisors, numerous stock market 
analysts, and the market at large all mispriced RAI stock by 
approximately $50 billion.  To support this extraordinary valuation, 
Dissenters asked the Business Court to ignore all other evidence of value 
in the record and rely exclusively on a DCF model prepared for this 
litigation by their expert.  The Business Court’s decision to reject 
Dissenters’ valuation and instead credit the contemporaneous evidence 
was well justified and should be affirmed.   
To begin with, Dissenters do not challenge the Business Court’s 
findings of fact.  Instead, on appeal, Dissenters proceed largely as if trial 
had not happened.  Their brief presents the same version of the facts that 
they offered at trial, notwithstanding that the Business Court authored 
over 100 pages of detailed factual findings expressly rejecting Dissenters’ 
factual narrative.  Rather than challenge the Business Court’s findings 
as clearly erroneous or insufficiently supported, Dissenters barely 
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acknowledge that the Business Court’s findings exist.  Dissenters do not 
get a do-over of the facts.  The Business Court’s factual findings are well-
supported and conclusive on appeal. 
Those findings definitively preclude Dissenters’ valuation.  The 
Business Court found that each of the inputs into Dissenters’ analysis 
was not supported by the record.  Most critically, their expert’s DCF relies 
on a set of financial projections that the Business Court found to be based 
on simple straight-line extrapolations of existing business trends, and on 
a growth rate that assumes there would be no material adverse 
developments in the future.  As the Business Court aptly observed, “[a] 
valuation predicated upon the theory that a tobacco company like RAI 
will suffer no significant adverse regulatory, tax, or competitive effects in 
the future is simply not credible or reliable”.1  (R p 256 ¶ 254.) 
Rather than simply accept Dissenters’ made-for-litigation DCF, the 
Business Court properly recognized that there is no single path to 
determine fair value.  It is common and appropriate for courts to use 
multiple valuation concepts and techniques in appraisal proceedings.  
                                      
1 Citations to “R p [ ]” are citations to the Record on Appeal and citations to 
“T p [ ]” are citations to the trial transcript.  Citations to “DB [ ]” are citations to 
Defendants-Appellants’ Brief, dated 21 September 2020. 
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When multiple methods are considered, each can serve as a sanity check 
on the other.  That is what the Business Court did here, finding that all 
contemporaneous evidence of value pointed in the same direction.  The 
Business Court was not required to jettison all of this evidence in favor 
of what it determined to be a flawed DCF model based on unreliable 
inputs put together by Dissenters’ expert after the fact, solely for 
litigation purposes.  Doing so would conflict with North Carolina cases, 
appraisal cases in other jurisdictions and the Official Comments to the 
Model Business Corporation Act (“Model Act”) on which the North 
Carolina statute is based—not to mention plain common sense. 
Dissenters’ other criticisms of the Business Court and its opinion 
are meritless.  Dissenters claim incorrectly that the Business Court failed 
to value RAI as of the closing date of the Merger, despite the Business 
Court’s clear explanation that it did just that.  Dissenters claim 
incorrectly that the Business Court’s fair value opinion relied solely on 
the deal price, despite extensive factual findings regarding the numerous 
other valuation concepts and techniques previously described—market 
evidence, DCF analyses, precedent transactions, and even one of the 
Dissenters’ own valuations—that support the Business Court’s 
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conclusion.  Dissenters’ request to be awarded a “control premium” is 
based on long-discredited cases from Delaware and contrary to their own 
expert’s testimony.  And Dissenters’ various evidentiary challenges fare 
no better; they rely on legal rules of their own invention seemingly 
designed to strip the record of all evidence of value, except their expert’s 
outlier calculation.  The Business Court was right to reject those 
arguments.   
The Business Court’s judgment is thoughtful, comprehensive and 
legally sound.  Dissenters have offered no basis to disturb it. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. GOVERNING STATUTE 
This is an appeal from an appraisal proceeding governed by 
N.C.G.S. §§ 55-13-01 through 55-13-31.  When a corporation is acquired, 
these statutory provisions allow shareholders that do not support the 
transaction to assert appraisal rights and to seek payment of fair value 
for their shares.  The current appraisal statute was enacted in 1989 as 
part of an overall revision to the North Carolina Business Corporation 
Act, which used the Model Act as its basis.  See Beam v. Worldway Corp., 
1997 NCBC 3, 1997 WL 33463602, at *5 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 1997) 
(“The use of the Model Act as a basis for the revisions to the Business 
-9- 
 
Corporation Act was purposeful.  It helped to bring North Carolina’s 
corporation law in closer conformity with the majority of other states.”). 
The statute lays out a detailed set of procedures that shareholders 
and corporations must follow in connection with an assertion of appraisal 
rights.  To initiate the process, a shareholder must:  (i) “[d]eliver to the 
corporation, before the vote [on the merger] is taken, written notice of the 
shareholder’s intent to demand payment if the proposed action is 
effectuated”; and (ii) “[n]ot vote, or cause or permit to be voted, any shares 
of any class or series in favor of the proposed action”.  N.C.G.S. § 55-13-
21(a)(1)-(2). 
The next step in the process is assigned to the corporation.  Within 
10 days after the merger becomes effective, the corporation “must deliver 
a written appraisal notice and form [meeting certain requirements] to all 
shareholders who satisfied the requirements of G.S. 55-13-21”.  Id. § 55-
13-22(a).  If the shareholder signs and returns the appraisal form 
certifying “that the shareholder did not vote for or consent to the 
transaction”, the corporation must pay the shareholder within 30 days 
“the amount the corporation estimates to be the fair value of their shares, 
plus interest”.  Id. §§ 55-13-22(b)(1), 55-13-25(a).   
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A shareholder dissatisfied with the amount the corporation has 
paid “must notify the corporation in writing of that shareholder’s 
estimate of the fair value of the shares and demand payment of that 
estimate plus interest”, less any payment the corporation has already 
made.  Id. § 55-13-28(a).  A corporation that receives such a demand must 
either pay the additional amount demanded or file a complaint against 
the shareholder within 60 days, asking the court “to determine the fair 
value of the shares and accrued interest”.  Id. § 55-13-30(a).  A 
shareholder made a party to such a proceeding is entitled to judgment 
“for the amount, if any, by which the court finds the fair value of the 
shareholder’s shares, plus interest, exceeds the amount paid by the 




II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Dissenters are former RAI shareholders consisting primarily of 
hedge funds in the appraisal arbitrage business2 who acquired their RAI 
stock following the public announcement of BAT’s offer to acquire the 
company.  Prior to the Transaction Date, Dissenters notified RAI that 
they did not wish to accept the Merger consideration and instead asserted 
appraisal rights under N.C.G.S. § 55-13-21 for payment of what they 
contended to be the “fair value” of their RAI shares.  (R pp 5-7 ¶¶ 3-25, 11 
¶ 40.)  In compliance with N.C.G.S. § 55-13-22, RAI sent a written 
appraisal notice and form to each Dissenter on the Transaction Date, 25 
July 2017.  (R p 11 ¶ 41.)  The appraisal notice stated that RAI estimated 
the fair value of each share of RAI common stock to be $59.64.  (Id.)  In 
                                      
2 The practice of “appraisal arbitrage” involves “a strategy in which investors 
purchase shares in order to pursue appraisal”.  In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., Consol. 
C.A. No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *23 (Del. Ch. July 13, 2015).  Many of the 
appellants here are repeat appraisal dissenters.  See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Solera 
Holdings, Inc., Consol. C.A. No. 12080-CB, 2018 WL 3625644, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 30, 
2018) (appellants Blue Mountain Credit Alternatives Master Fund, L.P., 
BlueMountain Summit Trading, L.P. and BlueMountain Foinaven Master Fund, 
L.P.); In re ExamWorks Grp. S’holder Appraisal Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 12688-VCL, 
2018 WL 1008439, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2018) (appellants Magnetar Capital Master 
Fund Ltd. and Third Motion Equities Master Fund Ltd.); In re Dole Food Co. S’holder 
Litig., 110 A.3d 1257, 1259 (Del. Ch. 2015) (appellants Magnetar Capital Master 
Fund Ltd. and Spectrum Opportunities Master Fund Ltd.); Merion Cap., L.P. v. 3M 
Cogent, Inc., C.A. No. 6247-VCP, 2013 WL 3793896, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013) 
(appellant Magnetar Capital Master Fund Ltd).  
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September 2017, in compliance with N.C.G.S. § 55-13-25, RAI paid each 
Dissenter $59.64 per share, plus statutory interest that had accrued since 
the Transaction Date.  (R pp 136-37 ¶¶ 20-25.)  Dissenters thereafter 
notified RAI pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 55-13-28(a) that they were 
dissatisfied with the amount paid and demanded amounts ranging from 
$81.21 to $94.33 per share.  (R pp 32 ¶ 46, 61 ¶ 48.) 
On 29 November 2017, RAI filed a Complaint for Judicial Appraisal 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30, seeking a determination that the fair 
value of RAI shares as of the Transaction Date was no more than the 
$59.64 per share that it already paid each Dissenter.  (R pp 144 ¶ 4, 146 
¶ 9.)  The case was designated as a mandatory complex business case and 
assigned to the North Carolina Business Court on 1 December 2017.  
(R pp 23-24.) 
After extensive discovery, including the production to Dissenters by 
RAI of over 30,000 documents consisting of over 280,000 pages and the 
depositions of 13 current and former RAI employees, the matter was tried 
to the Business Court, sitting without a jury, over nine days from 10 June 
2019 through 25 June 2019.  (R p 145 ¶ 5.)  The Business Court admitted 
into evidence 177 exhibits and received testimony from witnesses 
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appearing at trial—including nine fact witnesses and four experts—as 
well as from additional fact witnesses appearing by video deposition 
testimony.  (Id.)  The parties submitted voluminous post-trial briefs and 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the Business Court 
heard a full day of post-trial oral argument on 2 October 2019.  (Id.) 
After 130 pages of factual findings, the Business Court ultimately 
determined that “[t]he evidence at trial of all ‘valuation concepts and 
techniques’, ‘excluding any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation 
of the’ merger and ‘without discounting for lack of marketability or 
minority status’, establishes the fair value of RAI’s shares as of the 
Transaction Date to be no more than $59.64 per share”.  (R p 313 ¶ 382 
(quoting N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5)).)  On appeal, Dissenters’ lengthy 
Statement of Facts substantially disregards the Business Court’s 
findings and seeks to substitute their own alternative version of the facts, 
which is often unsupported or even directly contradicted by the Business 
Court’s findings.  A summary of the Business Court’s findings relevant 




III. TOBACCO INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 
At the time of the Merger, RAI was a predominantly domestic 
tobacco company whose primary product was cigarettes.  (R pp 147-48 
¶¶ 12-13.)  The U.S. cigarette market and RAI’s cigarette sales were in 
“structural decline”, with cigarette demand and the number of cigarette 
consumers decreasing steadily for over 30 years.  (R pp 150-52 ¶¶ 19-22.)  
Through price increases, acquisitions and divestitures, cost-cutting, and 
sound financial management, RAI “weathered the decline of the U.S. 
tobacco industry reasonably well”.  (R p 150 ¶ 17; see also R p 159 ¶ 33.)  
“The evidence showed, however, that, at the time of the Merger, the 
mechanisms RAI had previously employed to increase profitability and 
meet its [earnings per share] targets were less likely to be available in 
the future.”  (R pp 153-54 ¶ 24; see also R p 162 ¶ 40.) 
 In addition to the cigarette industry’s structural decline, RAI’s 
limited opportunities for growth and constraints on RAI’s ability to 
increase prices and profits, “extensive evidence was introduced showing 
that RAI faced a number of other serious risks that had the potential to 
undermine the Company’s future profitability or, depending on their 
nature and magnitude, have devastating effects on RAI’s future business 
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prospects”.  (R p 166 ¶ 50.)  Among these risks were heightened 
regulation of tobacco products, increased taxation, and the threat of 
costly litigation.  (R pp 166-75 ¶¶ 51-74.)  The Business Court found that 
the “evidence shows that the existing and future regulation of tobacco 
products had the potential to substantially affect RAI’s ability to increase 
future profits”.  (R p 166 ¶ 51.)  For example, both sides introduced 
testimony regarding the potential impact of heightened regulation of 
menthol cigarettes on RAI’s business, after which the Business Court 
found that “RAI’s fears of future regulation were well-founded” (R p 169 
¶ 57), and that Dissenters’ arguments and proffered evidence on menthol 
regulation (see DB 33-34) were unpersuasive.  (R p 169 ¶¶ 58-59.)  The 
Business Court also found that potential increases in taxation and the 
potential for increased litigation and settlement costs posed meaningful 
risks to RAI.  (R pp 172-75 ¶¶ 68-74.) 
IV. RAI’S PRE-MERGER TRANSACTIONS 
Prior to the Merger, RAI was involved in several significant 
corporate transactions, most notably with Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corporation (“B&W”) in 2004 and Lorillard Tobacco Company 
(“Lorillard”) in 2015.  (R pp 175-76 ¶¶ 75-78.)   
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 In the 2004 B&W transaction, RAI was formed as a holding 
company for the newly combined assets of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Company and the U.S. assets, liabilities and operations of B&W, a wholly 
owned subsidiary of BAT.  (R pp 175-76 ¶¶ 76-77.)  Through the B&W 
transaction, BAT became a beneficial holder of approximately 42% of 
RAI’s common stock.  (R pp 175-76 ¶ 77.)  Contemporaneously with that 
transaction, RAI and BAT negotiated a set of contractual restrictions 
appearing in a “Governance Agreement” that were “designed, among 
other things, to maintain RAI’s independence and strictly limit the 
influence BAT and its subsidiaries could exert over RAI”.  (R p 176 ¶ 79.)  
These restrictions included BAT’s being allowed to nominate a maximum 
of five out of RAI’s 13 directors, three of whom were required to be 
independent of BAT.  (R p 177 ¶ 80.)  For the remaining eight seats, BAT 
had no say on how to vote; it was required to vote its shares as directed 
by the RAI Board’s Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee.  
(Id.)  The Governance Agreement also prevented BAT from engaging in 
any material transaction with RAI without the approval of a majority of 
the independent directors on the RAI Board not nominated by BAT.  
(R pp 177-78 ¶ 82.)  RAI also instituted a “Related Person Policy” “to 
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foster transparency and proper governance which required various levels 
of review before RAI could enter into any transaction with BAT”.  
(R p 180 ¶ 88.)  This Court previously has observed, in a divided 
pleading-stage decision, that “the Governance Agreement placed 
‘contractual handcuffs’ on BAT that prevented it from controlling the 
Reynolds board”.  Corwin v. British Am. Tobacco PLC, 371 N.C. 605, 619, 
821 S.E.2d 729, 739 (2018).  Here, following a full trial, the Business 
Court found that “notwithstanding BAT’s substantial holdings in the 
Company, RAI had the freedom to make decisions independently from 
BAT”.  (R p 180 ¶ 87.) 
 Dissenters nevertheless state that in the present Merger, BAT 
exerted “substantial influence over RAI”.  (DB 23.)  As support for this 
claim, Dissenters cite documents and testimony suggesting merely that 
BAT’s shareholdings in RAI “could” influence matters submitted to a vote 
by RAI shareholders.  (Id.)  Dissenters’ theorizing about possible 
influence by BAT is flatly contradicted by the Business Court’s post-trial 
finding of fact that, in actuality, based on the evidence, “RAI’s ability to 
act independently of BAT, and even in a manner contrary to BAT’s 
wishes, was demonstrated in practice”.  (R p 180 ¶ 89.) 
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In the Lorillard transaction in 2015, RAI acquired Lorillard, 
including its largest brand, the menthol cigarette Newport, and 
simultaneously divested certain other cigarette and vapor products to a 
third party.  (R p 176 ¶ 78.)  In support of their valuation of RAI, 
Dissenters place great emphasis on the idea that the Lorillard 
transaction had a “transformational” impact on RAI’s business.  
(DB 25-28.)  The effect of the Lorillard transaction was not lost on the 
Business Court.  Its findings took account of the Lorillard transaction’s 
effect on RAI from a valuation perspective.  In the period of time after the 
Lorillard transaction and before BAT’s 20 October 2016 offer, RAI’s 
weighted average stock price was still only $46.26, substantially below 
the $59.64 deal price.  (R p 230 ¶ 198.)  Additionally, “[b]y the time of the 
Merger negotiations in October 2016 . . . it appeared that RAI would no 
longer be able to rely on meaningful future mergers and acquisitions to 
overcome the effect of declining cigarette sales volumes and to increase 
its profitability and [earnings per share]”.  (R p 155 ¶ 27.) 
 The investment bank Lazard Ltd. (“Lazard”), which served as a 
financial advisor to RAI in connection with the Merger, also represented 
RAI in the Lorillard transaction.  (R p 151 ¶ 19 n.10.)  At trial, Dissenters 
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argued that the valuation work Lazard had done during the Lorillard 
transaction supported their proposed fair value.  (R p 272 ¶ 297.)  
Specifically, Lazard conducted a valuation of the combined post-
transaction RAI/Lorillard entity using a DCF analysis that resulted in a 
valuation ranging from $60.15 to $93.39 per share.  (R p 272 ¶ 296.)  
However, after this analysis was done, in August 2015, RAI effected a 
two-for-one stock split (R pp 272-73 ¶ 297)—so if a single share of RAI 
was worth (hypothetically) $80 before the split, it was converted to two 
shares worth $40 each.  Accordingly, taking the split into account, 
Lazard’s pre-split valuation actually equated to a range of $30.08 to 
$46.70 per share by the time of the BAT Merger.  (Id.)  Further, in 
performing this DCF analysis, Lazard used a projected long-term growth 
rate range for the combined RAI/Lorillard entity of negative 0.50% to 
positive 0.50%.  (R p 272 ¶ 296.)  Although RAI was a buyer in the 
Lorillard transaction but a seller in the BAT Merger, Lazard stayed 
consistent; its valuation work for the BAT Merger continued to use the 
same projected perpetual growth rate range of negative 0.50% to 
positive 0.50% for the same RAI/Lorillard entity (R p 262 ¶ 270)—
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demonstrating that those projected growth rates were based on Lazard’s 
best judgment rather than a desired valuation result.   
 Prior to the Merger, RAI met periodically with several investment 
banks, including the three investment banks that would eventually serve 
as its financial advisors in connection with the Merger.  (R pp 182-83 
¶¶ 92-95.)  The investment banks included Lazard, Goldman Sachs 
Group, Inc. (“Goldman”) and JPMorgan Chase and Co. (“JPMorgan”) 
(collectively, the “Financial Advisors”).  These meetings covered topics 
including, among other things, potential transactions involving BAT.  
(R p 182 ¶ 92.)  Contrary to Dissenters’ suggestions otherwise 
(DB 36-37, 40-41), the Business Court found that “there was nothing 
sinister nor nefarious concerning these meetings” (R p 182 ¶ 93) and that 
“[t]here is no evidence anyone at RAI acted to further his or her own 
personal interest ahead of the Company’s in the time period prior to the 
Merger and, in particular, in RAI’s pre-Merger meetings with Lazard, 
Goldman, and JPMorgan” (R p 183 ¶ 96).  For example, the Business 
Court found specifically that “[n]o credible evidence” was offered to 
support Dissenters’ claim that RAI’s CFO, Andrew Gilchrist, had “sought 
the investment bankers’ perspectives on the amount BAT might be 
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willing to pay in an acquisition of RAI to manipulate a potential future 
valuation of RAI to a value within BAT’s perceived price range”.  
(R p 184 ¶ 98.)   
 Ultimately, the Business Court found that: 
“RAI’s separate pre-Merger meetings with Lazard, Goldman, 
and JPMorgan were a prudent step taken by RAI 
management to be better prepared for a potential offer from 
BAT and to be better positioned to advocate for a higher price 
if such an offer materialized.  Rather than evidence a 
conspiracy to facilitate acceptance of an artificially low price, 
these meetings between the Financial Advisors and a variety 
of individuals from RAI reflect prudent scenario planning on 
the part of RAI’s management and routine business 
development efforts on the part of these investment banks.”   
 
(R pp 185-86 ¶ 101.)  Dissenters’ claims to the contrary ignore the well-
supported factual findings of the Business Court, which rejected the key 
narrative advanced by Dissenters at trial (and reasserted in their brief 
on appeal) as untrue and unsupported by the evidence. 
V. THE MERGER PROCESS 
The Business Court found that, together with a variety of other 
corroborating evidence of value, the $59.64 deal price was entitled to 




 “months of arm’s-length negotiations between sophisticated 
parties”; 
 “a fully independent and well-informed transaction committee, 
which showed a willingness to walk away from a deal entirely and 
continue operating as an independent company if a fair price could 
not be obtained”; 
 “[t]hree highly respected financial advisors [that] separately 
concluded that the deal price was fair to RAI’s shareholders”; and 
 “RAI’s non-BAT shareholders voted overwhelmingly in favor of the 
Merger”.   
(R p 186 ¶ 102; see also R pp 297-98 ¶ 347.) 
A. BAT’s Initial Offer 
On 20 October 2016, BAT made its initial offer of a mix of cash and 
stock then worth $56.50 per share of RAI common stock, a nearly 20% 
premium to RAI’s closing stock price on that day (R p 186 ¶ 103) and 
exceeding RAI’s all-time high trading price (R p 187 ¶ 104).  Dissenters 
state that BAT timed its offer opportunistically after a drop in RAI’s stock 
price, based on “material non-public, value-relevant information.”  
(DB 36-37.)  However, RAI’s stock had been trading “at a peak multiple 
in the marketplace” prior to BAT’s October 20 offer, and its stock price as 
of that date “did not represent a substantial deviation” from its 52-week 
trading average and exceeded its volume-weighted average price since 
the closing of the Lorillard transaction.  (R pp 229-30 ¶¶ 197-98.)  The 
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Business Court also found that the supposedly “non-public, value-
relevant” information identified by Dissenters either was already 
publicly available or otherwise would not have meaningfully affected 
RAI’s stock price if made public.  (R pp 233-35 ¶¶ 203-07.)  Even 
Dissenters’ own expert admitted that he did not have an opinion whether 
this information “on balance, was more negative or more positive”.  
(R p 234 ¶ 203.)  Contemporaneous commentary from financial research 
analysts viewed the proposed transaction positively for RAI’s 
shareholders.  (R p 189 ¶ 109.) 
The letter containing BAT’s 20 October 2016 offer acknowledged 
that any transaction would require approval by a majority of RAI’s 
independent board members and a majority of the votes cast by non-BAT 
shareholders.  (R p 187 ¶ 106.)  Despite BAT’s statement that it would 
not support an alternative transaction, the Business Court was satisfied 
that RAI’s Board did not feel constrained by BAT from seeking 
alternatives.  (R p 188 ¶ 108.)  The RAI Transaction Committee and 
Board “reviewed alternatives to negotiating a merger with BAT” with 
their Financial Advisors (R p 219 ¶ 176) and “seriously considered 
strategic alternatives, including remaining independent from BAT” 
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(R p 220 ¶ 177).  Among other things, the RAI Board believed that a 
sufficiently attractive offer from another buyer would persuade BAT to 
change its mind.  (R p 188 ¶ 108.)  
In response to BAT’s offer, the RAI Board created the Transaction 
Committee, comprised solely of fully independent, non-BAT-affiliated 
directors with full authority to evaluate, negotiate and, ultimately, accept 
or reject the proposed BAT transaction, or any other strategic alternative.  
(R pp 189-90 ¶ 111.)  The Transaction Committee appointed Goldman as 
its financial advisor (R p 191 ¶ 115), while JPMorgan and Lazard were 
hired as RAI’s financial advisors (R p 192 ¶ 117).  Dissenters suggest that 
the Financial Advisors’ compensation structure, in which the bulk of 
their payment was a percentage of deal price payable on the 
consummation of a transaction, incented them to support the sale of RAI 
at a price below fair value.  (DB 39-40.)  The Business Court’s findings 
directly reject this, stating that the format of the Financial Advisors’ 
compensation “was typical in the industry” and that “there is no credible 
evidence that any of the Financial Advisors took any action in connection 
with the Merger to cause a transaction with BAT at less than fair value”.  
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(R p 193 ¶ 119.)  Once again, Dissenters ignore this well-supported 
finding of the Business Court that rejects their version of the facts. 
B. The Information Provided to the Financial Advisors 
Dissenters’ statement of the facts surrounding the information RAI 
provided to the Financial Advisors has little in common with the 
Business Court’s findings.  Instead, Dissenters spend many pages 
reiterating the same conspiracy theory and unsubstantiated assertions 
that the Business Court rejected expressly.  Dissenters do not challenge 
the Business Court’s findings as insufficiently supported by the evidence; 
rather, they act as if the Business Court’s findings on this central issue 
do not exist.  Because Dissenters’ valuation arguments depend entirely 
on the information that RAI supposedly withheld from the Financial 
Advisors, Dissenters’ misstatements must be addressed. 
After BAT’s 20 October 2016 offer, RAI management spent several 
weeks conducting diligence calls and sending information to the 
Financial Advisors (see, e.g., R pp 207 ¶ 147, 216 ¶ 170), providing them 
with “whatever information they requested” (R p 223 ¶ 186).  Among the 
information provided were projections of RAI’s future financial 
performance.  (R pp 205-06 ¶ 145.)  On a monthly basis, RAI management 
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created financial projections.  (R pp 195 ¶ 124, 198 ¶ 130.)  These 
financial projections were “assumption-based” (R p 196 ¶ 126), meaning 
that they were “not designed to take into account the large looming risks 
to the industry” (R p 196 ¶ 127) and “expressly assumed that the risks 
would not occur during the projection period” (R p 197 ¶ 128).  
Assumptions that were unknown or unquantifiable were identified as 
“risks” or “sensitivities”, consideration of which was “critical in 
determining whether the projections could be reasonably relied upon”.  
(R p 197 ¶ 129.)   
Dissenters’ assertion that “RAI attempted to disown its projections 
at trial” (DB 33) is baseless and was rejected by the Business Court.  
Dissenters’ statement disregards the contemporaneous documentary 
evidence and extensive trial testimony establishing that the forecasts did 
not attempt to quantify the risks and sensitivities facing RAI’s business. 
(R pp 200-01 ¶ 135.)  For example, when RAI management presented the 
forecasts to the RAI Board, it expressly identified in writing and orally 
“the key assumptions underlying” the forecasts and it included a detailed 
set of “[p]lan risks & sensitivities”.  (Id.)  The Business Court found that 
the exclusion of these risks and sensitivities from the projected numbers 
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rendered the forecasts optimistic, and that ignoring those risks and 
sensitivities when valuing RAI would be unreasonable.  (R p 197 ¶ 129.)  
For example, Dissenters state that the threat to RAI’s business of 
increased regulation of menthol cigarettes (including RAI’s best-selling 
brand) should be disregarded because RAI’s ordinary course financial 
projections did not attempt to quantify that risk for purposes of the 
company’s day-to-day business operations.  (DB 33-35.)  The Business 
Court found otherwise, stating that “it is not credible for a valuation of 
RAI to assume that a menthol ban is impossible or that such a ban would 
have no effect on RAI’s future cash flows”.  (R p 266 ¶ 278.) 
For some of the year, RAI’s monthly projections focused on the 
current year plus the two subsequent years.  (R p 198 ¶ 131.)  In October 
of each year, as part of creating an “operating plan”, the projections 
extended out for five years.  (R p 199 ¶ 133.)  The latter three years were 
not used to set RAI’s budget or to set financial performance and 
marketplace objectives.  (R p 199 ¶ 134.)  Instead, they were “generally 
used ‘as a check to make sure things are still on track’”.  (R p 200 ¶ 134.)  
Every year in June, in preparation for an annual “Strategy Day” held by 
the Board, RAI management prepared a set of ten-year projections.  
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(R p 202 ¶ 138.)  In preparing these projections, “the finance team 
applied a ‘broad brush approach’ [and] used a ‘much higher’ materiality 
threshold for forecasting years three through ten”.  (Id.)  In fact, “the very 
foundational elements of the forecast . . . were generally extrapolations 
in years six through ten”.  (R p 203 ¶ 141.)  The projections themselves 
show “straight-line extrapolations” of key data: 
 
(Id.)  Indeed, “[t]he fact that extrapolations provided the most 
fundamental inputs to years six through ten of the ten-year projections 
was not contradicted”.  (R p 204 ¶ 142.)  “RAI management and the Board 
considered the forecasts for years three through five to be of ever-
decreasing reliability and years six through ten to be extrapolations 
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intended to provide information about whether a continuation of existing 
trends would allow the Company to meet its [earnings per share] 
targets.”  (R p 203 ¶ 140.)  RAI used the ten-year projections only for very 
limited purposes.  (R p 202 ¶ 138.) 
For the Financial Advisors’ valuation analyses, RAI management 
provided the Financial Advisors with its most recent financial 
projections.  Because BAT’s offer came in October, the most recent 
projections available were the five-year “operating plan” projections from 
October 2016.  (R p 206 ¶ 145.)  RAI management also made adjustments 
to the October 2016 projections to account for events that had transpired 
since the projections had been prepared, as well as certain management 
decisions about restructuring part of the business that had not yet been 
made known within RAI (the “Top-Side Adjustments”).  (R pp 206-07 
¶ 146.)  The Top-Side Adjustments had the effect of increasing RAI’s 
projected performance and therefore increasing any resulting valuation 
the Financial Advisors might reach.  (R p 258 ¶ 259.) 
The core of Dissenters’ factual narrative—indeed, the core of 
Dissenters’ entire case—relates to the ten-year financial projections 
created in June of 2016.  (DB 29-31.)  Dissenters contend that RAI 
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management deliberately withheld the ten-year projections from the 
Financial Advisors as part of a scheme to ensure that RAI’s valuation 
would be low enough for BAT to afford.  (DB 40-41, 44-50.)  In particular, 
Dissenters contend that the Financial Advisors were not provided with 
sufficiently detailed cash flow information regarding the ten-year 
projections that showed 7-8% growth in years six through ten, and that 
this knowledge would have changed the Financial Advisors’ valuations.  
(DB 46-48.)  The Business Court found this conspiracy theory “contrary 
to the evidence” (R p 207 ¶ 148), explaining that: 
“[L]ess than two weeks after the October 20 Offer, RAI 
management provided each of the Financial Advisors with the 
financial information given to the Board at the July 2016 
Strategy Day, including projections of operating income and 
growth rates for years six through ten of the June 2016 
Strategic Plan.  (DX0069.0021; DX0169.0040; DX0234.0021.)  
The Financial Advisors were thus aware of the forecasted 
compound annual growth rates of 7% to 8% for the out years 
of those projections.  A management team intent on hiding the 
ten-year projections would not have provided the Strategy 
Day presentation with the ten-year operating income and 
growth rates.  At that point, the supposed conspiracy would 
have been exposed because all three Financial Advisors knew 
the projected trajectory and could have insisted on further 
detail if they believed it was necessary.  That simply did not 
happen here.” 
 
(R pp 207-08 ¶ 149 (emphasis added).)  What did happen was that, rather 
than providing its Financial Advisors with outdated ten-year projections 
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from June, RAI provided them what they asked for:  RAI’s most recent 
and most reliable projections.  (R pp 205-06 ¶ 145, 208 ¶ 150, 222 ¶ 185.)  
Because BAT’s offer came in October, management provided the October 
projections, which were the most up-to-date projections at the time.   
Dissenters’ statement that the June 2016 ten-year projections 
ought to have been provided because they were RAI’s “most recent ten-
year projections” (DB 46-47 & n.14) was also rejected by the Business 
Court, which found that the Financial Advisors were comfortable using 
the five years of projections provided by RAI management, and that there 
was “no magic to ten years, seven years, five years as long as it forms a 
reasonable and best view”.  (R p 209 ¶ 153.)  The Business Court also 
found that years six through ten of RAI’s June 2016 financial projections 
“were less informative than the projections in the October 2016 
Projections because the later years, based in large part on extrapolations 
of existing trends, were developed with a ‘broad brush approach[,]’ and 
used a ‘much higher’ materiality threshold”.  (R p 208 ¶ 151.)  Finally, 
the Business Court found that “the evidence does not indicate that the 
Financial Advisors needed detailed ten-year projections to adequately 
perform their valuation analyses” (R p 208 ¶ 152) and that it was “typical 
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when performing valuation work to receive and use five-year projections 
from management”.  (R p 210 ¶ 155.) 
 Dissenters’ conspiracy theory also is rendered implausible by the 
fact that RAI management included the Top-Side Adjustments in the 
projections provided to the Financial Advisors.  These adjustments 
increased RAI’s projected cash flows by a total of approximately $1.4 
billion.  (R pp 206-07 ¶ 146, 234 ¶ 204.)  This runs counter to Dissenters’ 
conspiracy theory that RAI management sought to withhold favorable 
information in order to depress RAI’s valuation so that BAT could afford 
to buy RAI.  If that theory were true, why would RAI management 
include adjustments that added $1.4 billion to RAI’s cash flows?  
Dissenters offer no explanation.  (DB 41.) 
Dissenters’ characterization of the Financial Advisors’ requests for 
ten-year projections from RAI management is based on cherry-picked 
portions of the record that, again, disregard the Business Court’s 
findings.  (R pp 207-12 ¶¶ 148-59.)  Indeed, the Business Court 
specifically found that Dissenters’ cited evidence “does not warrant a 
conclusion that the Financial Advisors’ use of five-year projections was 
unreasonable; it indicates only that the Financial Advisors considered 
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whether ten years of projections were available.”  (R p 257 ¶ 258.)  
Nonetheless, Dissenters state that Lazard and JPMorgan requested ten 
years of financial projections and expected RAI to provide them, only for 
RAI management to mysteriously withhold them, with the end result 
being that the Financial Advisors undervalued RAI by tens of billions of 
dollars.  (DB 43-50.)  However, as previously stated, RAI’s Board and the 
Financial Advisors were provided with materials showing the 7-8% 
projected annual growth rate from RAI’s June 2016 ten-year projections 
that Dissenters emphasize; the Financial Advisors could have insisted on 
receiving further information if they felt it was needed—but they did not 
make any such request.  (R pp 207-10 ¶¶ 148-55.)   
To summarize, the Business Court found that: 
“Considering all of the evidence, including the credibility of 
the relevant witnesses, the Court cannot conclude that RAI’s 
decision to provide the Financial Advisors with the five-year 
October 2016 Projections rather than the ten-year projections 
from the June 2016 LE was calculated to deprive the 
Financial Advisors of important information to drive down 
their valuations of RAI to a range affordable to BAT.  All 
credible evidence is to the contrary.  Ultimately, the record is 
clear that the Financial Advisors received all the information 
they believed they needed for their valuation work . . . and no 
credible evidence was offered at trial supporting any effort by 
RAI management to hide information to depress the resulting 
valuation of the Company.” 
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(R pp 211-12 ¶ 159.)3  
C. RAI’s Deliberations and Negotiations 
After receiving BAT’s 20 October 2016 offer, the Transaction 
Committee met numerous times with its lawyers and Financial Advisors 
and reviewed strategic alternatives to the BAT transaction, including 
whether potential alternative buyers existed (R p 219 ¶ 176), and the 
pros and cons of remaining independent from BAT (R p 220 ¶ 177).  In 
November 2016, the Transaction Committee rejected BAT’s offer without 
making a counterproposal.  (R pp 217 ¶ 173, 220 ¶177.)  In December 
2016, BAT submitted an increased offer, which RAI again rejected 
without a counterproposal.  (R p 217 ¶ 173.)  Ultimately, BAT raised its 
offer four times before a final deal was reached in January 2017, after 
months of negotiations.  (Id.)  The final agreement provided for RAI’s 
shareholders to receive a combination of cash and BAT stock that, at the 
                                      
3 In their brief, Dissenters hypothesize that the Business Court would have 
reached a different conclusion if it had been able to review BAT’s internal valuations 
of RAI, but that Dissenters were somehow thwarted in obtaining this discovery.  
(DB 13.)  They cite nothing in the record to support this speculation.  To the contrary, 
Dissenters sought and obtained the Business Court’s permission to take discovery of 
BAT in the UK.  (R pp 109-14.)  Having failed to pursue the opportunity the Business 
Court granted them, Dissenters cannot now challenge the Business Court’s findings 




time the merger agreement was signed, was worth $59.64 per share.  
(R p 221 ¶ 181.)  The negotiations by RAI’s Transaction Committee 
achieved approximately $4.5 billion in additional consideration for RAI’s 
shareholders, and a 26.4% premium over RAI’s 20 October 2016 stock 
price.  (Id.)  Dissenters’ characterization of these negotiations as “tepid 
back-and-forth” (DB 39) is not founded on the facts.   
Dissenters emphasize that RAI’s Transaction Committee did not 
conduct an auction or actively solicit bids from third parties.  (DB 38.)  
However, the Business Court found that “there were few (if any) 
companies in the world” that could have made an offer for RAI (R p 218 
¶ 175), and that “there was no admissible evidence at trial from any 
source that any third party was interested in purchasing RAI with or 
without BAT’s support”.  (R p 218 ¶ 174.)  While Dissenters state vaguely 
that one company, Japan Tobacco International, had interest in 
acquiring RAI (DB 38), the Business Court found that Dissenters’ lone 
hearsay statement “reporting what an unnamed person at Japan Tobacco 
allegedly said” was “hardly persuasive” evidence of the company’s 
willingness to pay tens of billions of dollars to acquire RAI.  (R p 294 
¶ 340.)  In contrast, the Business Court identified evidence indicating 
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that Japan Tobacco was not interested in acquiring RAI (R pp 219 ¶ 176, 
293-94 ¶¶ 339-40), none of which Dissenters acknowledge in their brief.   
Prior to the RAI Board’s vote on the Merger, each of the Financial 
Advisors separately evaluated BAT’s final offer of $59.64 and determined 
that price was fair from a financial point of view to the holders of RAI 
stock other than BAT.  (R p 222 ¶ 183.)  Lazard stated that it was a 
“landmark price”, and JPMorgan described it as a “homerun 
transaction”.  (R p 226 ¶ 187.)  Within the financial analyst community, 
there was no indication that RAI was substantially undervalued; to the 
contrary, some analysts “expressed concern that BAT was overpaying”.  
(Id.)   
The Financial Advisors’ fairness opinions were supported by 
numerous valuation techniques that were meant to be examined 
together.  (R pp 221-22 ¶¶ 182-84.)  As illustrated by the “football field” 
slides that were presented by each of the Financial Advisors to the 
Transaction Committee and/or Board in January 2017 and are 
reproduced in the Business Court’s opinion (R pp 223-26 ¶ 186), these 
mutually reinforcing valuation techniques included, among others: 
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 comparable companies analysis, which “involves comparing a 
company’s valuation multiples to those of its peers” (R p 237 
¶ 212);   
 
 precedent transactions analysis, which “involves comparing a 
company’s multiple to the multiples of the prices paid for 
selected peer companies” (R p 243 ¶ 225); and 
 
 discounted cash flow analysis, which involves estimating the 
present day value of RAI’s future free cash flows (R p 250 ¶240). 
 
RAI’s shareholders overwhelmingly approved the deal reached by 
RAI’s Transaction Committee.  Of the non-BAT-owned shares that voted, 
99% were in favor of the Merger.  (R p 227 ¶ 189.)  The Merger closed on 
25 July 2017.  (R p 227 ¶ 191.) 
VI. ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OF VALUE 
The Business Court found that there was a wide variety of mutually 
corroborating evidence demonstrating that the $59.64 per share that RAI 
already paid Dissenters equaled or exceeded the fair value of RAI shares 
as of the date of the Merger.  (R p 228 ¶ 193.)  It also found that 
Dissenters’ proposed valuation—which rested entirely on their expert’s 
litigation-driven work—was a $50 billion outlier, and that Dissenters’ 
proffered reasons for ignoring all contemporaneous evidence of value 
were unsupported by the record.  (R pp 228-29 ¶ 195.) 
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A. RAI’s Unaffected Stock Price 
The Business Court found that RAI’s stock price prior to BAT’s 20 
October 2016 offer was “persuasive evidence of underlying fair value”.  
(R p 229 ¶ 196.)  On 20 October 2016, RAI’s common stock closed at 
$47.17 per share (the “Unaffected Stock Price”).  (R p 229 ¶ 197.)  RAI’s 
Unaffected Stock Price “did not represent a substantial deviation” from 
its 52-week trading average of approximately $49.00, and represented a 
significant gain from the years leading up to BAT’s offer.  (R pp 229-30 
¶ 197.)   
The Business Court also found that the evidence indicated that 
RAI’s stock traded in an efficient market, and that there was no material 
non-public information that would cause RAI’s fair value to differ 
significantly from its stock price.  (R pp 232-35 ¶¶ 202-07.)  As discussed 
further below (see Part II.D.2), the Business Court’s market efficiency 
finding was based on a substantial factual record and the testimony of 
both sides’ experts.  (R pp 231-33 ¶¶ 199-202.)  No evidence was 
introduced indicating that RAI’s stock possessed characteristics 
indicating that it did not trade efficiently.  (R pp 231-32 ¶ 201.)  The 
Business Court’s factual findings supporting market efficiency included: 
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 RAI’s stock being publicly traded in high volumes and with high 
liquidity on the New York Stock Exchange; 
 
 RAI’s very large ($67.3 billion) market capitalization; 
 
 Wide availability of information about RAI; 
 
 RAI’s stock price moving in response to the release of new 
information and market-wide trends; 
 
 Coverage by 16 well-informed analysts who frequently published 
information about RAI; and 
 
 The absence of a controlling shareholder. 
 
(R pp 232-33 ¶ 202.) 
B. RAI’s Adjusted Unaffected Stock Price 
To account for developments occurring between the Unaffected 
Stock Price date of 20 October 2016, when BAT made its first offer, and 
the 25 July 2017 closing of the Merger on the Transaction Date, RAI’s 
expert, Professor Paul Gompers, calculated an “Adjusted Unaffected 
Stock Price”.4  He started with RAI’s stock price on 20 October 2016, and 
indexed it to the performance of RAI’s closest competitor, Altria, from 
that date through 24 July 2017.  (R pp 236-37 ¶ 210.)  Given the increase 
                                      
4 It would not have been appropriate to use RAI’s actual trading price in July 
2017, because the stock was at that point trading based largely on the price of the 
Merger.  (R pp 235-36 ¶ 208.) 
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in Altria stock over that period, that analysis led to an implied 
Transaction Date trading price of RAI stock of $55.33 per share.  (Id.)  
Gompers also indexed RAI’s 20 October 2016 stock price to the 
performance of the S&P 500, which led to an implied Transaction Date 
trading price of $53.78 per share.  (Id.)  These analyses were reasonable 
proxies for how RAI stock would have traded because “no evidence was 
offered of a material, value-relevant event between October 20, 2016 and 
July 25, 2017 that affected RAI separately from the tobacco industry or 
the market as a whole”.  (R p 236 ¶ 210 n.38.)  The Business Court found 
that Gompers’s Adjusted Unaffected Stock Price analysis provided 
evidence that “while RAI’s stock price may have appreciated to some 
degree in the time between the October 20 Offer and the Transaction 
Date, RAI’s stock would still have traded 7% to 10% below the deal price 
as of July 24, 2017” and thus persuasively “suggests that the deal price 
is consistent with, and Dissenters’ proposed valuation is inconsistent 
with, RAI’s fair value on the Transaction Date”.  (R p 237 ¶ 211.) 
C. Comparable Companies Analysis 
The Business Court found that comparable companies analyses 
performed by Lazard and JPMorgan, and by RAI’s expert Gompers, 
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provided helpful context in checking the results of other valuation 
techniques.  (R pp 242-43 ¶ 224.)  Comparable companies analysis 
involves comparing RAI’s trading multiple to those of its peers.  (R p 237 
¶ 212.)  Lazard’s and JPMorgan’s comparable companies analyses 
resulted in valuation ranges below $59.64 (R p 238 ¶ 215), and Gompers 
demonstrated that Dissenters’ proposed $92.17 valuation implied an 
unrealistic multiple for RAI that was double its closest peer, Altria 
(R p 242 ¶ 223).  The Business Court ultimately found that “comparable 
companies analyses performed by RAI’s Financial Advisors and by 
Gompers provide relevant information that, when considered in 
connection with other valuation concepts and techniques, support a 
conclusion that [Dissenters’] $92.17 per share valuation is excessive”.  
(R pp 242-43 ¶ 224.)   
D. Precedent Transactions Analysis 
The Business Court also considered precedent transactions 
analyses conducted by the Financial Advisors.  (R p 247 ¶ 233.)  
Precedent transactions analysis “involves comparing a company’s 
multiple to the multiples of the prices paid for selected peer companies”.  
(R p 243 ¶ 225.)  Each Financial Advisor independently performed a 
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precedent transaction analysis that resulted in a valuation range 
consistent with the $59.64 deal price.  (R pp 243-44 ¶ 226.)  Indeed, 
Lazard found that the price RAI received from BAT was at a higher 
multiple than any other prior transaction involving a U.S. tobacco 
company.  (R pp 246-47 ¶ 233.)  While the Business Court ultimately 
determined that, for purposes of its valuation, precedent transactions 
analyses performed by the Financial Advisors and Gompers were of 
limited value due to “differences in the selected transactions”, it 
nonetheless found that these analyses “provide[d] support that the deal 
price of $59.64 was at or above RAI’s fair value and that [Dissenters’] 
valuation was clearly excessive”.  (R p 247 ¶ 233.) 
E. Financial Analyst Price Targets 
The Business Court found that financial analysts’ price targets for 
RAI’s stock supported the $59.64 deal price; no analyst indicated that 
BAT was “getting a steal” at that price.  (R p 247 ¶ 234.) 
F. Mason Capital’s Valuation 
Absent from Dissenters’ Statement of Facts is a valuation that one 
of the Dissenters, Mason Capital, sent—twice—to RAI’s Transaction 
Committee in November 2016.  (R p 248 ¶¶ 235-36.)  At that time, Mason 
Capital valued RAI at $54.44 per share.  (R p 248 ¶ 236.)  A 
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representative from Mason Capital testified at trial that this $54.44 
valuation represented its best view of the actual value of a share of RAI’s 
stock (R p 249 ¶ 237) and that this valuation was not depressed on 
account of any overhang or minority discount (R p 249 ¶ 238).  The 
Business Court found that “[t]he substantial discrepancy in Mason 
Capital’s contemporaneous and litigation-driven valuations of RAI’s 
shares undermine[s] the credibility and reliability of the latter”.  
(R pp 249-50 ¶ 239.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“When a trial court sits without a jury, findings of fact are 
conclusive on appeal if supported by any substantial evidence.”  Farm 
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cully’s Motorcross Park, Inc., 366 N.C. 505, 512, 
742 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Winston Affordable Hous., LLC v. Roberts, 374 N.C. 395, 402, 841 
S.E.2d 267, 273 (2020) (“When reviewing a judgment entered following a 
bench trial, ‘the trial court’s findings of fact have the force and effect of a 
jury verdict and are conclusive on appeal if there is competent evidence 
to support them.’”  (quoting Bailey v. State, 348 N.C. 130, 146, 500 
S.E.2d 54, 63 (1998))). That is true even where “the evidence could be 
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viewed as supporting a different finding”.  Winston, 374 N.C. at 402, 841 
S.E.2d at 273.  When a party has failed to challenge the findings of fact, 
the findings are binding on the appellate court.  See Scarborough v. 
Dillard’s, Inc., 363 N.C. 715, 722, 693 S.E.2d 640, 644 (2009).  “The trial 
court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.”  Winston, 374 N.C. at 403, 
841 S.E.2d at 273. 
As recognized by other appellate courts reviewing fair value 
determinations under appraisal statutes that, like North Carolina’s, are 
patterned on the Model Act, “[a] fair value determination is necessarily a 
fact-specific process”, HMO-W Inc. v. SSM Health Care Sys., 234 Wis. 2d 
707, 729, 611 N.W.2d 250, 260 (Wis. 2000), and “[a]n appellate court does 
not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court in a factual dispute 
over the valuation of property”, EagleView Techs., Inc. v. Pikover, 192 
Wash. App. 299, 309, 365 P.3d 1264, 1270 (Wash. App. 2015).  
Accordingly, while “the determination of whether a given fact or 
circumstance is relevant to fair value . . . is a question of law” reviewed 
de novo, “the ultimate determination of fair value is a question of fact” 
subject to deference on appeal.  Swope v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 243 F.3d 
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486, 491, 494 (8th Cir. 2001) (reviewing fair value determination under 
Missouri’s appraisal law). 
ARGUMENT 
The Business Court determined, based on an extensive evidentiary 
record, that the fair value of RAI shares as of the Transaction Date was 
“no more than” the $59.64 that RAI had already paid Dissenters (plus 
interest) in September 2017 pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 55-13-25.  The 
Business Court’s detailed factual findings powerfully support its fair 
value determination and show Dissenters’ $92.17 valuation—an 
approximately $50 billion increase over the transaction price—to be 
entirely unrealistic.   
Rather than challenge the Business Court’s factual findings, 
Dissenters largely ignore them.  They instead base their appeal on their 
own alternative version of the facts, without any acknowledgement that 
they presented the same factual contentions at trial and that the 
Business Court repeatedly found Dissenters’ view to be unsupported or 
contradicted by the evidence.  As one key example, Dissenters’ valuation 
rests entirely on their expert’s discounted cash flow (“DCF”) model, which 
uses a perpetuity growth rate derived from the ten-year projections from 
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RAI’s 2016 Strategy Day.  But the Business Court expressly found those 
ten-year projections to be unsuitable for use in valuing RAI, based on 
exhaustive findings as to the manner in which those projections were 
prepared and the limited purpose for which they were intended to be 
used.  Dissenters’ failure to challenge those factual findings, which are 
amply supported in the record, dooms Dissenters’ DCF model and by 
extension dooms their case.  Dissenters cannot sidestep the Business 
Court’s factual findings by pretending they do not exist.  (See Part I 
below.) 
Dissenters’ other main strategy on appeal is to mischaracterize the 
Business Court’s analysis.  They repeatedly accuse the Court of doing 
things it did not do.  For example, as shown below, the Business Court 
did not value RAI as of the wrong date, did not “defer[] entirely” to the 
negotiated deal price and did not “confuse” fiduciary duty law with 
appraisal law.  (DB 4, 16.)  These unfounded criticisms of the Business 
Court’s analysis should be rejected.  What remains are an assortment of 
arguments about economic theory and challenges to evidentiary rulings, 
none of which warrants disturbing the judgment below.  (See Parts II-III 
below.)  Dissenters also advance a truly frivolous claim for a windfall of 
-47- 
 
over $100 million in supposed “interest”, which they say they are owed 
even if (as the Business Court found) RAI paid them, in a timely fashion, 
an amount equal to or exceeding the fair value of their shares.  (See 
Part IV below.) 
I. THE BUSINESS COURT MADE A WELL-SUPPORTED 
DETERMINATION OF FAIR VALUE USING CUSTOMARY AND 
CURRENT VALUATION CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES. 
The careful and thorough opinion that the Business Court issued—
as contrasted with the caricature of that opinion depicted in Dissenters’ 
brief—is firmly grounded in the North Carolina appraisal statute, 
customary and current valuation concepts and techniques and the trial 
record. 
A. The Appraisal Statute Does Not Limit the Customary and 
Current Valuation Concepts and Techniques a Court May 
Use. 
Appraisal is, by design, a flexible process.  Under N.C.G.S. 
§ 55-13-01(5), fair value is to be assessed as of the closing of the 
transaction (i) “excluding any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation 
of the corporate action unless exclusion would be inequitable”; (ii) “using 
customary and current valuation concepts and techniques”; and 
(iii) “without discounting for lack of marketability or minority status”. 
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As noted by the Business Court, the statute “does not limit or 
prescribe the specific ‘valuation concepts and techniques’ that the Court 
may use, and requires only that they be ‘customary and current’ and 
‘generally employed for similar business in the context of the transaction 
requiring appraisal’”.  (R p 283 ¶ 321 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5)).)  
In the words of the Supreme Court of another state with an appraisal 
statute that, like North Carolina’s, is patterned on the Model Act:  “As 
we have observed on prior occasions, there is no predominant formula for 
arriving at fair value.”  Sieg Co. v. Kelly, 568 N.W.2d 794, 798 
(Iowa 1997).  The notes to the Model Act expressly recognize this flexible 
approach to valuation: 
“Clause (ii) of the definition of ‘fair value’ . . . adopts the view 
that different transactions and different contexts may 
warrant different valuation methodologies.  Customary 
valuation concepts and techniques will typically take into 
account numerous relevant factors, and will normally result 
in a range of values, not a particular single value.”   
 
Model Bus. Corp. Act § 13.01 cmt. 2 (1969) (Am. Bar Ass’n, 
amended 2016). 
Given the capacious definition of “fair value” and the absence of 
binding North Carolina authority determining fair value under N.C.G.S. 
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§ 55-13-30,5 the Business Court sensibly considered case law from other 
states that have adopted appraisal statutes patterned on the Model Act, 
as well as Delaware, which has a large body of appraisal law and to which 
North Carolina courts often look for guidance in the corporate law 
context,6 to survey “customary and current” valuation concepts and 
techniques:   
“In the merger context, courts, economists, and valuation 
professionals customarily and currently use a wide range of 
valuation concepts and techniques, including but not limited 
to assessing market evidence of the value of the shares, 
assessing whether the transaction process was one in which 
the resulting deal price is a reliable indicator of value, 
reviewing internal valuations performed by the company 
prior to consideration of the merger, estimating the net 
present value of the company’s expected future cash flows (a 
DCF analysis), comparing the company’s trading multiples to 
the trading multiples of similar firms, and comparing the 
multiples paid in the merger to the multiples paid in similar 
transactions.”   
 
                                      
5 (See R p 277 ¶ 312 (citing Russell M. Robinson, II, Robinson on North 
Carolina Corporation Law § 27.04 (7th ed. 2017) (“There is no reported appellate 
North Carolina decision determining the fair value of shares in an appraisal 
proceeding.”)).) 
6 See, e.g., Energy Invs. Fund, L.P. v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 351 N.C. 331, 
334-35, 525 S.E.2d 441, 443 (2000) (noting that the Chancery Court of Delaware is 
“generally recognized as an authority in the interpretation of business law”); Corwin 
v. British Am. Tobacco PLC, 371 N.C. 605, 613, 821 S.E.2d 729, 735 (2018) (finding 
Delaware caselaw to be persuasive). 
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(R pp 283-84 ¶ 322 (citing Sieg 568 N.W.2d at 798, and In re Appraisal of 
Dole Food Co., 114 A.3d 541, 550 (Del. Ch. 2014)).) 
 The Business Court’s conclusion as to what constitutes “customary 
and current valuation concepts and techniques” was well grounded in the 
factual record and in the law.  In terms of the factual record, both the 
Financial Advisors and the parties’ experts testified as to the valuation 
analyses and methods that are used in the ordinary course of business by 
practitioners.  For example, there was evidence that valuation 
professionals and financial economists regularly consider market-based 
metrics, such as the trading price of a company’s stock and the value an 
asset receives in an arm’s-length transaction.  (See, e.g., T p 784:3-6 (“if 
the market is efficient and there’s no material, nonpublic information, 
then the market price will be the best estimate of a firm’s . . . intrinsic or 
fundamental value”); see also R pp 228 ¶¶ 193-94, 229 ¶ 196.)  There was 
also evidence that valuation professionals and financial economists 
regularly consider more theoretical approaches, such as DCF valuations, 
comparable companies analyses and precedent transactions analyses.  
(See, e.g., T pp 227:25-229:14, 771:7-24, 779:25-780:16, 1287:8-21; see 
also R pp 237 ¶ 212, 243 ¶ 225, 250 ¶ 240.)  The evidence showed that 
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properly conducted valuations require consideration of multiple 
approaches.  (See, e.g., T pp 813:22-814:4 (expert testimony that a DCF 
valuation is “only as good as the inputs” and “without doing an analysis 
of checks [on those DCF inputs], you can’t be certain that your inputs are 
correct”); T p 1449:3-8 (JPMorgan representative’s testimony that 
JPMorgan conducted valuations of RAI using a DCF valuation, 
comparable companies and precedent transactions “as a means of being 
complete and looking at as many accepted valuation methodologies in the 
context of looking at the value of a publicly-traded company” and that “it 
would be atypical for us to do anything but look at all three of those 
valuation methodologies in the context of providing an opinion”); see also 
R p 222 ¶ 184.)  There are “various sanity checks that Dissenters’ experts 
agree are a typical part of the valuation process”.  (R pp 274-75 ¶ 302 
(emphasis added).) 
As a legal matter, there is extensive support for considering, as part 
of an appraisal proceeding, valuation methods other than the expert-
driven DCF that Dissenters tout as the only permissible means of 
conducting an appraisal.  For example, appraisal courts consider the 
trading price of a corporation’s stock.  See, e.g., Verition Partners Master 
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Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 138 (Del. 2019) (“[T]he 
price a stock trades at in an efficient market is an important indicator of 
its economic value that should be given weight.”); In re Appraisal of 
Jarden Corp., Consol. C.A. No. 12456-VCS, 2019 WL 3244085, at *27 
(Del. Ch. July 19, 2019) (“When the market is efficient, the trading price 
of a company’s stock can be a proxy for fair value.”), aff’d, 236 A.3d 313 
(Del. 2020).  As discussed further below (see Part II.C), appraisal courts 
also consider the deal price arrived at by an independent, diligent and 
properly motivated board of directors.  See Dole, 114 A.3d at 559 (“[T]he 
fact that a transaction price was forged in the crucible of objective market 
reality (as distinguished from the unavoidably subjective thought process 
of a valuation expert) is viewed as strong evidence that the price is fair.”). 
While Dissenters contend that the structure of the North Carolina 
appraisal statute makes it inappropriate to consider a negotiated deal 
price (DB 9-10, 73-74), the notes to the Model Act, on which North 
Carolina’s appraisal statute is based, state otherwise.  The notes provide 
that “[a] court determining fair value . . . should give great deference to 
the aggregate consideration accepted or approved by a disinterested 
board of directors for an appraisal-triggering transaction”.  (R p 285 ¶ 324 
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(quoting Model Bus. Corp. Act § 13.01 cmt. 2 (1969) (Am. Bar Ass’n, 
amended 2016)) (emphasis added).)  The Business Court was correct to 
reject Dissenters’ contention that an assessment of deal price in 
determining fair value is not a “customary and current valuation concept 
technique” under § 55-13-01(5), finding that argument “has no support in 
North Carolina case law and is squarely refuted by the legislative history 
reflected in the Model Business Corporation Act commentary”.  (R p 285 
¶ 324 n.46.)  Dissenters acknowledge the relevance of the Model Act 
commentary as a general matter, because they rely on it for other 
purposes elsewhere in their brief on appeal (see DB 62), but they ignore 
it here.  Their insistence that deal price is categorically irrelevant in 
North Carolina cannot be reconciled with this legislative history.  In fact, 
Dissenters have not identified any authorities supporting their novel 
interpretation of the statute.7 
Courts may also consider more theoretical “valuation concepts and 
techniques” such as analyses of comparable companies, comparable 
                                      
7 Dissenters’ broadside challenge to the relevance of deal price is also 
contradicted by appraisal cases from other Model Act states in which deal price was 
given substantial if not dispositive weight.  See, e.g., TWC I, LLC v. Damos, 870 
N.W.2d 274, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (finding no error in the trial court’s 




precedent transactions and DCF analyses, but the weight and utility of 
these methodologies will depend on the specific circumstances of the case. 
They are generally given less weight in cases like this one where there 
was an active public market for the stock and a robust deal process. See, 
e.g., DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 370 
(Del. 2017) (“[A] singular discounted cash flow model is often most helpful 
when there isn’t an observable market price.”); Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar 
Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 37-38 (Del. 2017) 
(“Although widely considered the best tool for valuing companies when 
there is no credible market information and no market check, DCF 
valuations involve many inputs—all subject to disagreement by well-
compensated and highly credentialed experts—and even slight 
differences in these inputs can produce large valuation gaps.”); In re 
Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Grp., Consol. C.A. No. 12736-VCL, 2019 
WL 3778370, at *51-52 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 2019) (“Dell and DFC teach 
that a trial court should have greater confidence in market indicators and 
less confidence in a divergent expert determination . . . .  Consistent with 
the Delaware Supreme Court’s observations in Dell and DFC, 
[petitioners’ expert’s] DCF valuation had many inputs, and [the 
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company’s expert] questioned a number of them.  The proper choices were 
matters of legitimate debate, and the outcome of those debates generated 
large swings in the valuation output. . . .  The wide swings in output that 
result from legitimate debate over reasonable inputs undermine the 
reliability of [petitioners’ expert’s] DCF model.”); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. 
P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 359 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“In 
view of the market’s opportunity to price UFG directly as an entity, the 
use of alternative valuation techniques like a DCF analysis is necessarily 
a second-best method to derive value.”). 
Moreover, “those knowledgeable about valuation recognize that the 
field is as much art as science”.  Dole, 114 A.3d at 553 n.7.  It is therefore 
appropriate to cast a skeptical eye on the use of any one approach to the 
exclusion of all others, particularly when that approach purports to 
identify with precision a value that is far out of line with all other 
evidence.  Id. at 557 (“Rather than supporting the petitioners’ idealized 
depiction of valuation as a scientific process that should be reserved 
exclusively for neutral opiners, the martial metaphor suggests the need 
to consider other evidence as a check on the warring experts’ models.”).  
Even where the parties have retained credible experts, the court should 
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consider “factual evidence relating to valuation as a cross-check, or 
reality-check, on the litigation-driven figures generated by [those] 
experts.”  Id. at 550.  That is all the more important here, where 
Dissenters’ DCF model produces a valuation that is so out of line with all 
other evidence of value in the record and implies a mispricing of RAI 
that—so far as either side has been able to determine—would be larger 
than in any other reported appraisal case, anywhere in the country, ever.  
(See R p 274 ¶ 302.) 
 Dissenters’ interpretation of the statute, which would limit the 
contemporaneous information the Court can consider and would force it 
to rely exclusively on expert calculations performed after the fact for 
litigation, is formalistic, wooden and divorced from the reality of 
valuation.  There is no single scientific way to get to one number when 
assessing fair value.  As the Business Court properly concluded, there are 
multiple “customary and current valuation concepts and techniques” that 
a reviewing court can and should consider. 
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Business Court’s Factual 
Findings Relevant to Value.  
As the Business Court found, every credible indicator of value in 
the record supported RAI’s valuation and showed Dissenters’ valuation 
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to be an “extreme outlier”.  (R pp 274-75 ¶ 302.)  The evidence on this 
score is overwhelming and described at length in the Business Court’s 
opinion, which includes nearly 300 paragraphs of comprehensive and 
meticulously cited factual findings.  Rather than grapple with these 
findings, Dissenters attempt to discredit the indicators of value on which 
the Business Court relied by rehashing factual contentions that the 
Court squarely rejected.  But the Business Court’s post-trial “findings of 
fact . . . are conclusive on appeal if there is competent evidence to support 
them”.  Winston, 374 N.C. at 402 (quoting Bailey, 348 N.C. at 146).  In 
this case, there is a wealth of such competent evidence to support each of 
the indicators of value identified by the Business Court. 
At trial, RAI introduced evidence using several customary and 
current valuation concepts and techniques, including: 
 the real-time discounted cash flow (“DCF”) valuations performed by 
three independent and experienced sets of financial advisors, along 
with various other real-time and expert analyses to cross-check the 
reasonableness of the DCFs; 
 
 the stock market’s contemporaneous assessment of RAI’s value, 
taking into account the events between the signing of the deal and 
the Transaction Date;  
 
 the deal price negotiated by an independent, sophisticated and 




 the contemporaneous judgments of analysts, shareholders and even 
one of the Dissenters. 
 
In arriving at its conclusion, the Business Court evaluated all of this 
evidence carefully and found it to be consistent and mutually reinforcing, 
with Dissenters’ litigation-driven analysis the sole and clear outlier. 
1. Discounted Cash Flow Analyses and Cross-Checks 
The parties agree that a DCF valuation is an appropriate method 
for valuing a company’s shares.  (R p 250 ¶ 240.)  The parties likewise 
agree that the primary inputs into a DCF valuation are (i) projections of 
the company’s financial performance for a period of years, (ii) an 
estimated rate of growth for the period of time following the years covered 
by the projections, and (iii) a discount rate to bring the projected future 
cash flows back to a net present value.  (Id.; DB 107 n.30.)  Where they 
disagree is on the appropriate inputs to use in valuing RAI—an issue that 
was the subject of extensive factual development at trial and detailed 
findings by the Business Court.  On each input, the Business Court made 
factual findings that support the contemporaneous DCF analyses relied 
on by RAI and dismantle the supposed reliability of the made-for-
litigation DCF presented by Dissenters’ expert—which is the only basis 
for their valuation. 
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This alone should be dispositive of Dissenters’ appeal.  Their sole 
valuation method is based on inputs that the Business Court found to 
lack factual support, and they do not challenge the Court’s factual 
findings on that score.  By contrast, RAI presented at trial the 
contemporaneous DCF analyses conducted by its three Financial 
Advisors, which in one case yielded per-share value ranges of $45.16 to 
$72.17, with a midpoint of $55.74; in another case yielded per-share value 
ranges of $47.54 to $68.63, with a midpoint of $56.26; and in the third 
case yielded per-share range values of $50.03 to $73.38, with a midpoint 
of $59.59.  (R p 251 ¶ 243.)  The Business Court found that the inputs 
into these DCFs were well-supported by the record and that the analyses 
are “reliable and constitute persuasive evidence that the fair value of 
RAI’s shares as of the Transaction Date was at or below the deal price of 
$59.64 per share”.  (R p 305 ¶ 363.)  There was ample evidence for that 
finding, as shown below with respect to each of the inputs into the 
Financial Advisors’ DCFs. 
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(i) The Business Court’s Factual Findings Support 
the Financial Advisors’ Use of the October 2016 
Projections. 
The first input into a DCF analysis is a set of projections of the 
company’s future financial performance.  The Financial Advisors’ DCFs 
used five-year management projections prepared in October 2016, as 
supplemented by additional “Top-Side Adjustments” that had the effect 
of increasing the projections by approximately $300 million per year and 
therefore increasing the DCF value.  (R p 253 ¶ 247; R pp 205-06 
¶¶ 145-46.)  The Business Court found that “the Financial Advisors’ use 
of the October 2016 Projections as an input in their DCF calculations was 
reasonable”.  (R p 259 ¶ 262.)  Those projections “were RAI’s most current 
financial projections at the time, and RAI management supplemented 
those projections with a wealth of additional information for the 
Financial Advisors’ consideration”.  (Id.)  
Indeed, the evidence showed that, if anything, the October 2016 
Projections were optimistic.  The financial projections “used in a DCF 
analysis must be probability-weighted, or risk-adjusted, to reflect the 
expected value of the future cash flows”.  (R p 251 ¶ 244.)  As the Business 
Court found, however, “RAI’s regular financial projection process was not 
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intended to create a probability-weighted value of future cash flows, but 
instead expressly assumed that current industry trends and dynamics 
would continue without substantial change”.  (R p 252 ¶ 245.)  RAI’s 
projections “were subject to specifically identified sensitivities that were 
not reflected in the numerical forecasts.  These sensitivities included 
major competitive, regulatory, litigation, or other exogenous shocks.”  
(R p 254 ¶ 250.)  While some of these sensitivities might have led to 
increased cash flow, “the evidence was clear that the upside and the 
downside to the management forecasts do not ‘offset each other’, because 
the downside was much more serious, meaning that the forecasts are 
more optimistic than the expected cash flows”.  (R p 256 ¶ 255.)  “For 
these reasons, the RAI Board and management recognized that the 
projections were optimistic and biased upwards.”  (R p 255 ¶ 251.) 
On appeal, Dissenters respond with a series of factual contentions 
already rejected by the Business Court’s findings.  First, they argue that 
the Financial Advisors wanted and needed ten years of projections to do 
their DCFs, but that RAI management “withheld” that information in 
order to cause the Financial Advisors to arrive at a lower valuation.  
(DB 40-50.)  The Business Court definitively rejected this outlandish 
-62- 
 
conspiracy theory.  “[T]here is no evidence to support Dissenters’ 
contention that RAI deliberately withheld ten-year projections to drive a 
lower valuation within BAT’s price range.”  (R p 256 ¶ 256.)  On the 
contrary, “the evidence shows that RAI management was actually 
advocating for a higher valuation and the highest possible purchase price 
for the Company”.  (R p 258 ¶ 259 (emphases in original).)  For example, 
not only did management provide the Financial Advisors with the value-
increasing Top-Side Adjustments, but “when negotiations between RAI 
and BAT had reached an impasse in December 2016, RAI management 
assisted the Financial Advisors in providing information to BAT intended 
to support a higher valuation than BAT’s models showed”.  (R p 258 
¶ 261.)   
Moreover, “[d]espite Dissenters’ arguments to the contrary, the 
record is clear that the Financial Advisors received all the information 
they believed they needed for their work”.  (R p 257 ¶ 258.)  “[E]ach 
Financial Advisor testified unequivocally that the information it received 
from RAI management, including the five-year October 2016 Projections, 
was entirely sufficient to adequately and competently perform the 
Advisor’s valuation analysis.”  (R pp 256-57 ¶ 256.)  In addition, contrary 
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to Dissenters’ repeated assertions that the Financial Advisors were 
unaware of the growth reflected in the ten-year Strategy Day projections, 
the Business Court found the exact opposite:  “[L]ess than two weeks 
after the October 20 Offer, RAI management provided each of the 
Financial Advisors with the financial information given to the Board at 
the July 2016 Strategy Day.”  (R p 207 ¶ 149.)  On this basis, the Business 
Court concluded that the Financial Advisors “were . . . aware of the 
forecasted compound annual growth rates of 7% to 8% of the out years of 
those projections” and they “could have insisted on further detail if they 
believed it was necessary”.  (R pp 207-08 ¶ 149.)  Instead, “the evidence 
does not indicate that the Financial Advisors needed detailed ten-year 
projections to adequately perform their valuation analyses.  Indeed, 
representatives from Goldman, Lazard, and JPMorgan each testified 
that such information was unnecessary.”  (R pp 208-09 ¶ 152.)  
Dissenters’ brief does not challenge or even mention any of these factual 
findings. 
There is yet another fundamental problem with Dissenters’ 
insistence that the Financial Advisors should have used the June 2016 
ten-year projections:  the factual findings of the Business Court 
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demonstrate that the ten-year projections were “unsuited for valuation 
analysis”.  (R p 305 ¶ 364.)  This point bears repeating.  Dissenters 
repeatedly characterize the ten-year projections as “critical value-
relevant information” that should have been used in valuing RAI.  (DB 49 
(emphasis in original); see also DB 11.)  Dissenters’ valuation depends on 
accepting those ten-year projections as reliable estimates of RAI’s future 
cash flows.  Argument after argument in Dissenters’ brief hinges on the 
ten-year projections.  (See, e.g., DB 90 (claiming that “the unaffected 
market price of RAI stock could never have been a fair measure of 
inherent value because it failed to incorporate” the growth projections in 
years six through ten of the ten-year projections); DB 114 (asserting that 
Dissenters’ expert used the most appropriate long-term growth rate 
because it was based on the ten-year projections).) 
But after hearing the evidence at trial, the Business Court made a 
series of factual findings that render Dissenters’ reliance on the ten-year 
projections unsustainable.  “In preparing the June LE [the ten-year 
projections], the finance team applied a ‘broad brush approach’” (R p 202 
¶ 138), and “RAI management and the Board considered the forecasts for 
years three through five to be of ever-decreasing reliability and years six 
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through ten to be extrapolations intended to provide information about 
whether a continuation of existing trends would allow the Company to 
meet its [earnings per share] targets” (R p 203 ¶ 140 (emphasis added)).  
Indeed, “[t]he fact that extrapolations provided the most fundamental 
inputs to years six through ten of the ten-year projections was not 
contradicted”.  (R p 204 ¶ 142.)  Nor could it have been contradicted; as 
shown above (p 28), simple straight-line extrapolations of key metrics 
like share of cigarette shipments are easily visible in the graphs included 
in the projections themselves.  (R p 204 ¶ 141.) 
Moreover, like the five-year projections, the ten-year projections 
“were based on certain identified assumptions that there would be no 
significant changes from the status quo”.  (R p 205 ¶ 144.)  They “assumed 
business as usual without accounting for major downside risks”.  (R p 253 
¶ 248 (internal quotation marks omitted).)  They were therefore unduly 
optimistic.  As the Business Court found, “[a] valuation predicated upon 
the theory that a tobacco company like RAI will suffer no significant 
adverse regulatory, tax, or competitive effects in the future is simply not 
credible or reliable”.  (R p 256 ¶ 254.) 
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Second, Dissenters argue that the October 2016 projections were no 
longer current as of the Transaction Date in July 2017, and that any DCF 
valuation for appraisal purposes would need to be based on RAI’s 
July 2017 projections.  But the Business Court found that “for the periods 
that overlapped, the October 2016 Projections were a bit more optimistic 
than the July 2017” projections used by Dissenters’ expert (R p 254 ¶ 249 
(emphasis added))—meaning that the July 2017 five-year projections 
that Dissenters prefer would lead to a lower DCF value. 
Third, Dissenters dispute the idea that the RAI projections 
(whether five-year or ten-year) had an upward bias, arguing that the 
various risks facing RAI, such as increased menthol regulation or 
increased excise taxes, were “both unknown and unquantifiable”.  
(DB 112 (emphasis omitted).)  Dissenters’ expert made the same 
argument at trial, and the Business Court found that his “approach 
disregards the expressly stated assumptions and sensitivities to RAI’s 
financial projections. . . .  The evidence indicates that if one or more of 
these risks were to materialize, it would have a dramatic, negative effect 
on the Company’s growth and profitability.”  (R pp 255-56 ¶ 254.)  
Although these risks “were not incorporated into the numerical 
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projections . . . , that does not mean that they can be ignored when 
valuing the Company”.8  (Id.) 
Dissenters’ challenges to the Financial Advisors’ use of the 
October 2016 five-year projections (and to the optimistic nature of those 
projections) are squarely foreclosed by the Business Court’s factual 
findings. 
(ii) The Business Court’s Factual Findings Support 
the Financial Advisors’ Growth Rate Ranges. 
The second input into both sides’ DCF analyses is a perpetuity 
growth rate (“PGR”), which is “the rate at which a company’s expected 
free cash flows are assumed to grow indefinitely after the period for which 
there are year-by-year forecasts”.  (R p 259 ¶ 263.)  Two of the Financial 
Advisors’ contemporaneous DCF analyses used PGRs that ranged from 
-0.5% to 0.5%, and the third used a range from 0.0% to 1.0%.  (R pp 259-60 
                                      
8 Dissenters also seek to diminish the significance of the risks that RAI 
identified by asking the Court to apply hindsight and consider their unsupported 
assertion as to what has (or has not) happened in the industry after the Transaction 
Date.  (DB 113.)  Setting aside that there is nothing in the record on this issue, this 
request directly contradicts their stance at trial.  “Dissenters objected at trial to RAI’s 
effort to introduce evidence relating to the period after the Transaction Date as 
irrelevant to the determination of fair value.”  (R p 328 ¶ 20 (footnote omitted).)  The 
Business Court sustained Dissenters’ objection, so Dissenters should be estopped 




¶ 264.)  The Business Court found that these PGR ranges “were based on 
research into, and their [the Financial Advisors’] own experience and 
knowledge regarding, the tobacco industry and RAI’s competitive 
position within the industry, including their understanding of the threats 
and potential upsides facing the Company and tobacco companies 
generally”.  (R p 260 ¶ 266.)  The Business Court found the reliability of 
the Financial Advisors’ PGR ranges enhanced by the fact that one of 
them, Lazard, used the same PGR range in valuing RAI in this 
transaction (where RAI was the seller) as it did when valuing RAI in the 
2015 Lorillard Transaction (where RAI was the purchaser).  (R p 262 
¶ 270.)  The Financial Advisors also “checked their analyses using 
terminal exit multiples, among other things, as a ‘sanity check’”.9  (R p 
261 ¶ 268.)  Based “on its review of the evidence, the Court [found] the 
PGR ranges used by the Financial Advisors to be reasonable and 
reliable”.  (R p 268 ¶ 282.) 
                                      
9 A “terminal exit multiple” is a measure of a company’s growth in the 
“terminal period”, i.e., after the end of the year-by-year projections.  In the ordinary 
case, a company’s terminal exit multiple should be near but below the current 
multiple because most companies’ growth rates in the future can be expected to be 
lower than the current growth rate.  (R p 261 ¶ 268.) 
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In response, Dissenters again press arguments that are contrary to 
the facts found by the Business Court after trial.  First, Dissenters argue 
that the Financial Advisors’ PGR ranges are too low because they are 
below the rate of inflation (DB 114-17), but the Business Court found—
citing the testimony of three fact witnesses and an expert—that “it is not 
unusual to see a zero or negative PGR used for companies or industries 
that are in structural decline, like the tobacco industry”.  (R p 259 ¶ 263.) 
Second, Dissenters criticize Lazard for being consistent—for using 
the same PGR when valuing RAI in the Lorillard transaction as when 
valuing it in the Merger.  (DB 116.)  They argue this was inappropriate 
because the combined RAI/Lorillard entity was projected to have higher 
growth than standalone RAI.  (Id.)  As the Business Court found, 
however, “Lazard’s work on the Lorillard Transaction included a 
valuation of the pro forma combined ‘new and improved’ RAI—the exact 
same company that was then sold to BAT—meaning that any 
‘fundamental change’ had already been considered in the valuation 
performed for the Lorillard Transaction”.  (R p 262 ¶ 270.)  Lazard’s 
consistency across different transactional contexts (RAI as buyer and as 
seller) was a virtue, not a vice. 
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Third, Dissenters argue that the Financial Advisors’ PGR ranges 
do not take account of the 7-8% growth rates in years six through ten of 
the ten-year projections from the June 2016 Strategy Day.  (DB 114.)  But 
as shown above, the Business Court found that the latter years of the ten-
year projections were “broad brush” extrapolations of current trends that 
did not account for the possibility of material disruptions to RAI’s 
business.  (R p 202 ¶ 138.)  Those factual findings preclude Dissenters’ 
argument that a PGR in this case must take the ten-year projections into 
account. 
In fact, Dissenters’ insistence on using the ten-year projections is 
one of the key problems with their expert’s DCF model.  Their valuation 
expert, Mark Zmijewski, did not estimate a PGR of his own and had “no 
opinion on growth rates for this company”.  (R p 266 ¶ 277.)  He instead 
“relied entirely on the PGR calculated by” a different expert, Fredrick 
Flyer.  (Id.)  Flyer “was asked by Dissenters’ counsel to use a 1% or 1.25% 
PGR in conjunction with the growth rates extracted from the last five 
years of” the ten-year projections, to calculate a “blended” PGR.  (R p 265 
¶ 275 (emphasis added).)  “This blended rate is simply a mathematical 
calculation in which Flyer converted his 1.0% PGR and the growth rates 
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for the years covered by the [ten-year projections] into a single flat rate.”  
(Id.)  Zmijewski then took this “blended” PGR, which amounted to 2.24%, 
and plugged it into his DCF model.  (R p 265 ¶ 276.)  The Business Court 
found that “the vast majority of Zmijewski’s valuation is dependent on 
the PGR that was used”—meaning that Zmijewski’s valuation depended 
largely on Flyer’s PGR, about which Zmijewski had no opinion.  (R p 266 
¶ 277.)  “[S]imply changing the PGR from 2.2% to 0%, the midpoint of 
Goldman and Lazard’s PGR ranges, in Zmijewski’s DCF analysis 
decreased his valuation from $92.17 to $58.00 per share.”  (Id.) 
Thus, Dissenters’ DCF valuation is driven entirely by their PGR, 
and pursuant to instructions from Dissenters’ counsel, their PGR 
incorporates the growth rates in years six to ten of the ten-year 
projections.  But the Business Court found, based on uncontradicted trial 
evidence, that those growth rates were unreliable and not a sound basis 
for valuation.  The Court found that “Flyer’s PGR analysis ignores . . . 
the substantial evidence showing that these ten-year projections were 
not intended to create a probability-weighted value of future cash flows, 
disregarded significant assumptions and sensitivities that could 
dramatically impact RAI’s business, and were largely extrapolations of 
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current industry trends and dynamics without substantial change”.  
(R p 267 ¶ 280.)  Given those factual findings—which Dissenters do not 
challenge as lacking support—Dissenters’ PGR is unsustainable.  As a 
result, their DCF valuation, which is the only valuation evidence they 
offer, comes crashing down. 
Fourth, Dissenters argue that it is unreasonable to assume that 
RAI’s growth would “experience a ‘cliff-like’ drop” at the end of the 
forecast period.  (DB 117.)  The Business Court’s factual findings address 
this too, explaining that a PGR “averages over the time with maybe some 
positive and then negative in the future and averages across scenarios[,] 
some of which may be very large negative events that happen”, meaning 
that “a company with a 0% growth rate could continue to see positive 
growth for some time, which would then be balanced out by negative 
growth and/or by the possibility of a major adverse event”.  (R p 264 
¶ 274.)  Dissenters insist on describing a 0% PGR as a “cliff” but never 
challenge (or even acknowledge) this contrary finding. 
Fifth, in a reprise of their argument that the Financial Advisors 
should have used the ten-year extrapolated projections from Strategy 
Day, Dissenters argue that the Financial Advisors’ PGR ranges are too 
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low because they were applied after five years of explicit projections 
rather than after ten years.  (DB 47.)  This too ignores the Business 
Court’s factual findings.  In particular, based on “JPMorgan’s 
contemporaneous documents” and the trial testimony of a JPMorgan 
representative, the Business Court found that “[t]he evidence suggests 
. . . JPMorgan used a higher PGR than it otherwise would have used if it 
had begun applying the PGR after ten years of projections”.  (R p 263 
¶ 272 (emphasis added).)  Indeed, if it were to use ten years of projections, 
“JPMorgan discussed internally changing the range of PGRs to a 
negative range”, rather than the positive 0.0%-1.0% range it actually 
used after five years.  (Id.)  In other words, the Business Court rejected—
as a factual matter—Dissenters’ contention that applying the PGR after 
five years rather than ten would lead to a lower valuation, because 
Dissenters’ implicit assumption that the same PGR would be used in both 
instances was unfounded.10 
                                      
10 This also dispenses with Dissenters’ false assertion that “[i]t is undisputed 
that the failure to account for the expected growth in years six through ten reduced 
the value of RAI by $20 per share”.  (DB 13-14 (emphasis omitted).) 
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(iii) The Business Court’s Factual Findings Support 
the Financial Advisors’ Discount Rates. 
The third main input into a DCF analysis is a discount rate, which 
is a way to take account of the time value of money.  It is “a rate of return 
used to discount future cash flows back to present value”.  (R p 268 
¶ 283.)  The Business Court concluded there was “very little 
disagreement” among the discount rate calculations performed by the 
Financial Advisors and both parties’ experts.  (R p 268 ¶ 285.)  Based on 
the record, the Business Court concluded that the rate calculated by 
RAI’s expert “has greater evidentiary support” (R p 269 ¶ 286), and 
Dissenters do not dispute that conclusion on appeal (DB 107 n.30). 
2. Market Indicators of Value 
The Business Court’s factual findings in support of the Financial 
Advisors’ DCFs, and against Dissenters’ DCF, are enough to sustain its 
fair value determination based on a valuation tool that Dissenters 
concede was appropriate for the Business Court to rely on.   
But here, there is much more.  The Financial Advisors’ DCFs are 
corroborated by numerous other valuation methods, whereas Dissenters’ 
DCF stands alone as vastly higher than any other indicator of RAI’s 
value.  As the Business Court explained, a DCF analysis “is only reliable 
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when it can be verified by alternative methods to DCF or by real world 
valuations”.  (R p 304 ¶ 362 (quoting S. Muoio & Co. LLC v. Hallmark 
Entm’t Invs. Co., No. 4729-CC, 2011 WL 863007, at *18 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 9, 2011), aff’d, 35 A.3d 419 (Del. 2011)).)  Every piece of 
contemporaneous evidence of value supports the Business Court’s fair 
value determination of no more than $59.64 and further demonstrates 
that Dissenters’ litigation-driven $92.17 valuation is an extreme outlier 
with no factual basis or corroboration. 
First, the “unaffected” trading price of RAI’s common stock prior to 
BAT’s initial offer supported the Business Court’s fair value 
determination.  On 20 October 2016, the day before BAT’s initial offer 
was announced, RAI’s stock closed at $47.17 per share.  (R p 229 ¶ 197.)  
Its “52-week trading average prior to BAT’s initial offer was 
approximately $49.00”.  (Id.)  The volume weighted average trading price 
of RAI stock from the closing of the Lorillard Transaction in June 2015 
until BAT’s October 2016 offer was $46.26.  (R p 230 ¶ 198.)  And RAI’s 
all-time high trading price was $54.48.  (R p 229 ¶ 197.)  All of these 
prices were consistent with the Business Court’s fair value determination 
of no more than $59.64. 
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Second, an analysis of the likely unaffected trading price of RAI’s 
common stock after the date of BAT’s initial offer further supported the 
Business Court’s fair value determination.  As the Business Court 
recognized, the appraisal statute required it to value RAI stock as of the 
Transaction Date in July 2017, rather than when BAT made its offer in 
October 2016.  But it was not feasible to consider RAI’s stock price in 
July 2017 as a relevant proxy for fair value because it was then trading 
primarily by reference to the likelihood of, and price of, a transaction with 
BAT.  (R pp 235-36 ¶ 208.)  Accordingly, to take account of intervening 
developments such as the increased possibility of corporate tax reform 
after the 2016 election, RAI’s expert, Paul Gompers, calculated an 
“Adjusted Unaffected Stock Price” as of the Transaction Date.  (R p 236 
¶ 210.)  He indexed RAI’s stock price on 20 October 2016 to the stock price 
performance of its closest competitor, Altria, and to the performance of 
the S&P 500 generally from 20 October 2016 through 24 July 2017.  (Id.)  
That analysis led to implied Transaction Date trading prices of $55.33 
per share based on the performance of Altria’s stock, and $53.78 per 
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share based on the performance of the S&P 500.11   (R pp 236-37 ¶ 210.) 
As the Business Court found, this Adjusted Unaffected Stock Price 
analysis was “persuasive evidence that suggests that the deal price is 
consistent with, and Dissenters’ proposed valuation is inconsistent with, 
RAI’s fair value on the Transaction Date”.  (R p 237 ¶ 211.)  
Third, the negotiated deal price supported the Business Court’s fair 
value determination.  As the Business Court explained, there were 
“numerous objective indicia of a robust deal process that led to a deal 
price that reliably reflected RAI’s fair value”.  (R p 289 ¶ 332.)  The 
evidence includes the following facts found by the Business Court, none 
of which Dissenters challenge on appeal: 
 The members of the Transaction Committee “were fully 
independent of BAT and able to consider the proposed transaction 
(and any alternatives) free of any conflicts, focused only on the best 
interests of the RAI shareholders other than BAT”.  (R p 190 ¶ 113.) 
 
 The Transaction Committee included sophisticated executives with 
substantial experience in considering and negotiating complex 
mergers and acquisition transactions (id.), and was delegated the 
power and authority to, “among other things, evaluate, discuss and 
negotiate the terms and conditions of, approve, recommend, and/or 
reject the October 20 Offer, any other potential transaction with 
                                      
11 “At trial, no evidence was offered of a material, value-relevant event between 
October 20, 2016 and July 25, 2017 that affected RAI separately from the tobacco 
industry or the market as a whole.”  (R p 236 ¶ 210 n.38.) 
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BAT, and any potential alternative strategic transaction” (R p 191 
¶ 114). 
 
 The Transaction Committee had as its Financial Advisors three 
“highly sophisticated and respected investment banks with 
extensive experience advising large companies in corporate 
transactions, including in the tobacco sector”.  (R p 192 ¶ 118.)  
There was “no credible evidence that any of the Financial Advisors 
took any action in connection with the Merger to cause a 
transaction with BAT at less than fair value”.  (R p 193 ¶ 119.)  “To 
the contrary, there was credible testimony that the Financial 
Advisors’ long-term reputations were more important to each of 
them than the compensation to be earned on the Merger and that 
attempting to depress the merger price would tarnish that 
reputation.”  (Id.)   
 
 “[T]he record is clear that the Financial Advisors received all the 
information they believed they needed for their valuation work, and 
no credible evidence was offered at trial supporting any effort by 
RAI management to hide information to depress the resulting 
valuation of the Company.”  (R p 212 ¶ 159 (citation omitted).) 
 
 “Multiple witnesses testified that RAI seriously considered 
strategic alternatives, including remaining independent from BAT” 
(R p 220 ¶ 177), but “there was no admissible evidence at trial from 
any source that any third party was interested in purchasing RAI 
with or without BAT’s support” (R p 218 ¶ 174).12 
 
 “[T]he Transaction Committee twice rejected BAT’s merger offers 
without making a counterproposal—showing the Transaction 
Committee thoroughly explored the viability of RAI’s remaining 
independent as an alternative to executing a transaction with 
BAT.”  (R p 220 ¶ 177.) 
                                      
12 The Business Court found the only evidence offered by Dissenters to suggest 
that Japan Tobacco would have been interested in purchasing RAI (see DB 38)—an 
“internal email within Goldman reporting what an unnamed person at Japan Tobacco 




 “As a result of the Transaction Committee’s efforts, BAT increased 
its offer to purchase RAI’s common stock four times from a per-
share value of $56.50 in the October 20 offer to a per-share value of 
$59.64 when the transaction was announced on January 17, 2017, 
amounting to an additional $4.5 billion in deal value for RAI’s 
shareholders and a 26.4% premium over the Unaffected Stock 
Price”.  (R p 221 ¶ 181.) 
 
 Each of the Financial Advisors separately evaluated the final BAT 
offer and determined that it was “fair from a financial point of view 
to the RAI shareholders other than BAT”.  (R p 222 ¶ 183.) 
 
 “At the shareholder vote on the Merger, RAI’s shareholders 
overwhelmingly approved the deal, by both a majority (83%) of the 
outstanding shares and by a majority (71%) of the non-BAT-owned 
outstanding shares.  Nearly 72% of the non-BAT-owned shares 
were voted in the Merger, and 99% of those shares were voted in 
favor of the Merger.”  (R p 227 ¶ 189.)  
 
Fourth, stock market analyst commentary supported the Business 
Court’s fair value determination.  Analyst price targets for RAI as a 
standalone company ranged from $47 to $62 per share.  (R p 247 ¶ 234.)  
In addition, when the acquisition by BAT became public, “not a single 
analyst . . . said that BAT was getting a steal”.  (R p 247 ¶ 234.)  On the 
contrary, analyst commentary on the deal price was uniformly positive.  
No contemporaneous analyst reports indicated that the deal price 
dramatically undervalued RAI.  Some analysts commented that the deal 
price was high from BAT’s perspective given that it was on the upper end 
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of equity analyst price targets and because RAI was trading at a 
relatively high multiple at the time.  (R pp 226 ¶ 187, 189 ¶ 109.) 
Fifth, the Business Court’s fair value determination is consistent 
with the pre-litigation assessment of one of the Dissenters.  In November 
2016, after BAT had made its initial offer to purchase RAI, Dissenter 
Mason Capital sent the RAI Transaction Committee a letter intended to 
persuade the Transaction Committee to seek a higher price from BAT.  
(R p 248 ¶ 235.)  The letter included a multiples-based valuation of RAI 
that arrived at a “Market Value of Equity” of $54.44 per share.  (R p 248 
¶ 236.)  Mason Capital’s representative at trial testified that this $54.44 
value was “how we, Mason Capital, think that [RAI’s] stock should be 
valued on its own”.  (R pp 248-49 ¶ 237.)  She also testified that this did 
“not include any sort of overhang from BAT’s holdings” and did “not 
include any sort of minority discount”.  (R p 249 ¶ 238.)  This was simply 
how Mason Capital valued RAI’s stock at the time.  The Business Court 
found that “[t]he difference between Mason Capital’s contemporaneous 
$54.44 valuation and its litigation valuation of $92.17 cannot be 
explained by the discovery of nonpublic information in the litigation 
process” and concluded that “[t]he substantial discrepancy in Mason 
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Capital’s contemporaneous and litigation-driven valuations of RAI’s 
shares undermine[s] the credibility and reliability of the latter”.  
(R pp 249-50 ¶ 239.)  Dissenters’ brief makes no mention of their own 
contemporaneous valuation of RAI. 
Sixth, JPMorgan, Lazard and Gompers conducted “comparable 
companies” analyses that compared financial multiples implied by the 
deal price with multiples derived from the trading prices of other 
companies in the tobacco industry, which were selected because they are 
subject to a similar set of regulatory risk and consumer trends.  
(R pp 237-38 ¶ 213, 238-39 ¶ 216.)  Of the peers considered, Altria was 
the closest fit to RAI because, like RAI, its primary business is the sale 
of cigarettes in the United States.  (R p 239 ¶ 217.)  Based on this 
analysis, JPMorgan came to a range of values between $36.50 and $51.75 
and Lazard came to a range of $40.86 to $49.67.  (R p 238 ¶ 215.)  Using 
the median multiples of his full set of peers, Gompers came to $49.70 
(using the next 12 months’ projected earnings) and $51.76 (using 
projected earnings for the 12 months after that).  (R p 240 ¶ 218.)  Using 
Altria’s multiple, he came to $46.18 and $48.52, respectively.  (Id.) 
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Although the Business Court ultimately gave these analyses “no 
weight” in assessing fair value, it found that “[o]ne purpose for 
calculating the multiples of comparable companies is to check the results 
of other valuation techniques”.  (R pp 238 ¶ 216, 243 ¶ 224.)  It therefore 
found them to be “relevant information that, when considered in 
connection with other valuation concepts and techniques, supports a 
conclusion that [Dissenters’] $92.17 per share valuation is excessive”.  
(R pp 242-43 ¶ 224.)  Among other things, if the $92.17 valuation were 
correct, it would lead to financial multiples that would suggest that RAI’s 
“prospects are twice as good as . . . the other peer companies in the 
industry”, which “would be an unrealistic conclusion not supported by the 
evidence presented at trial and raises significant doubt concerning the 
reliability of [Dissenters’] valuation”.  (R p 242 ¶ 223.) 
Seventh, the Financial Advisors and Gompers conducted “precedent 
transactions” analyses using financial multiples derived from prior 
transactions similar to the Merger, which resulted in implied valuation 
ranges for RAI from $38.12 per share to $60.00 per share.  (R pp 243-44 
¶ 226.)  Although the Business Court found the precedent transactions 
analyses to be “of limited value because of the differences in the selected 
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transactions, the specific values generated by the various precedent 
transactions analyses performed contemporaneously by the Financial 
Advisors, as well as by Gompers in his analysis, provide support that the 
deal price of $59.64 was at or above RAI’s fair value and that [Dissenters’] 
valuation was clearly excessive”.  (R p 247 ¶ 233.) 
Eighth, Dissenters themselves repeatedly urged the Business 
Court to rely on a valuation analysis that (when all the facts were 
revealed at trial) strongly supported the Court’s finding that the fair 
value of RAI was no more than $59.64.  In connection with RAI’s 
acquisition of Lorillard in 2015, Lazard conducted an analysis that 
implied a valuation range for the combined RAI/Lorillard entity of $60.15 
to $93.39 per share.  (R p 272 ¶ 296.)  Dissenters “relied on the high-end 
of this valuation in pre-trial briefing and at trial as evidence supporting 
the reasonableness of their proposed $92.17 per share valuation”.  
(R p 272 ¶ 297.)  However, as was revealed at trial, Dissenters failed to 
account for the fact that, following the close of RAI’s acquisition of 
Lorillard, RAI effected a two-for-one stock split in August 2015—
doubling the number of outstanding shares of RAI common stock.  
(R pp 272-73 ¶ 297.)  Thus, when Dissenters compared Lazard’s 2015 
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analysis to their DCF valuation in this case, they were not comparing 
apples to apples—they were comparing “one apple to two apples”, and 
were therefore wrong by a factor of two.  As a result of the stock split, 
Lazard’s valuation from the Lorillard deal in 2015 equates to a range of 
between $30.08 and $46.70 per share at the Transaction Date in 2017.  
(R p 273 ¶ 297.)  The Business Court reasonably concluded that rather 
than supporting Dissenters’ DCF valuation, “[Lazard’s 2015] valuation 
(which Dissenters themselves touted as an appropriate benchmark) 
strongly undermines it and instead supports the deal price as fair value 
for RAI’s shares”.  (R p 273 ¶ 297.)  Neither at trial nor on appeal have 
Dissenters offered any reason for changing their mind on the reliability 
and persuasiveness of the Lazard analysis.  It is obvious that they walked 
away from that analysis solely because additional facts were uncovered 
at trial showing that the Lazard analysis—like all other 
contemporaneous evidence in the record—supports the Business Court’s 
fair value determination. 
In sum, competent—indeed, overwhelming—evidence supports the 
Business Court’s findings that Dissenters’ valuation of $92.17 was “an 
extreme outlier” and that “the fair value of RAI as of the date of the 
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Merger was no more than the $59.64 per share that Dissenters have 
already been paid”.  (R pp 274-75 ¶¶ 302-04.) 
II. DISSENTERS’ CRITICISMS OF THE BUSINESS COURT’S 
ANALYSIS ARE WITHOUT MERIT. 
Dissenters’ various criticisms of the Business Court’s opinion rest 
largely on mischaracterizing its analysis or ignoring its findings of fact.  
None of those criticisms has any merit, much less warrants disturbing 
the Business Court’s judgment. 
A. The Business Court Valued RAI as of the Closing Date. 
Dissenters claim that “the Business Court committed legal error by 
failing to value [RAI] as of the Transaction Date”.  (DB 64-65 (emphasis 
omitted).)  That is a gross misstatement of the Business Court’s opinion.  
The Business Court clearly understood that it was required to determine 
the fair value of Dissenters’ shares as of the Transaction Date, and that 
is precisely what it did.   
To begin with, the Business Court accurately stated the law, noting 
that “[t]he North Carolina appraisal statute provides that fair value must 
be determined ‘immediately before the effectuation of the corporate 
action as to which the shareholder asserts appraisal rights’”.  (R p 283 
¶ 320 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5)).)  The Court also accurately 
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understood what the statute means, noting that it “must determine fair 
value as of the Transaction Date rather than when the Merger Agreement 
was signed in January 2017”.  (Id. (emphasis added).)  And if there were 
any doubt, the Business Court went on to observe that “[i]f the value of 
the corporation changes between the signing of the merger agreement 
and the closing, then the fair value determination must be measured by 
the operative reality of the corporation at the effective time of the merger”.  
(Id. (emphasis added) (quoting In re Appraisal of Stillwater Mining Co., 
Consol. C.A. No. 2017-0385-JTL, 2019 WL 3943851 (Del. Ch. 
Aug. 21, 2019), aff’d, ___ A.3d ___, 2020 WL 6038341 (Del. Oct. 12, 
2020)).) 
The Business Court did not only explain the law correctly; it also 
did what that law requires.  Consistently throughout its opinion, the 
Business Court made clear that its fair value determination was as of the 
Transaction Date.  For example, it found that “the fair value of RAI as of 
the date of the Merger was no more than the $59.64 per share that 
Dissenters have already been paid” (R p 275 ¶ 304 (emphasis added)), 
that “the $59.64 per share that RAI has already paid Defendants equals 
or exceeds the fair value of RAI shares as of the date of the Merger” 
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(R p 143 ¶ 3 (emphasis added)), and that “the fair value of RAI at the 
Merger closing on July 25, 2017 was no more than the deal price of 
$59.64” (R p 228 ¶ 194 (emphasis added)).   
Moreover, the Business Court expressly recognized that “in the 
time between the October 20 Offer and the Transaction Date, events took 
place that may have affected RAI’s standalone value”, such as the 
outcome of the 2016 U.S. elections.  (R p 236 ¶ 209.)  For example, the 
Court noted “speculation that the Republican-led Congress would pass a 
tax bill that would lower the corporate tax rate and that there would be 
a more benign regulatory climate for the U.S. tobacco industry”.  (Id.)  
The Court expressly considered Gompers’s Adjusted Unaffected Stock 
Price analysis, which was intended to “estimate the effect that these and 
other market industry developments would likely have had on RAI’s 
stock price between BAT’s October 20 Offer and the closing of the Merger 
on July 25, 2017”.  (R p 236 ¶ 210.)  There can be no doubt that the 
Business Court valued RAI as of the Transaction Date. 
Despite this extensive discussion and analysis by the Business 
Court to arrive at a Transaction Date fair value, Dissenters insist that 
the Business Court did not do what the Business Court said it did.  
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Instead, Dissenters contend that “the Business Court elected to value 
RAI based on the value of the deal price” as of the signing of the Merger 
Agreement in January 2017.  (DB 65.)  Specifically, Dissenters argue that 
because the Court found the fair value of RAI to be no more than $59.64 
per share, it pegged fair value to “the amount of the merger consideration 
determined six months earlier [than the Transaction Date] when the deal 
was struck on the underlying transaction”.  (DB 64.)  That argument is 
refuted by the same paragraph of the Business Court’s opinion on which 
Dissenters rely, which states that “[t]he evidence at trial . . . establishes 
the fair value of RAI’s shares as of the Transaction Date to be no more 
than $59.64 per share”.  (R p 313 ¶ 382 (emphasis added).) 
Nevertheless, Dissenters insist that because the Business Court 
referred to $59.64 per share, which was the cash value of the merger 
consideration as of signing in January 2017, that means the Business 
Court must have done a valuation as of that date.  They observe that the 
stock portion of the merger consideration appreciated in value between 
January 2017 and the Transaction Date in July, and they contend they 
should have received, at a minimum, the $65.87 per share that the 
merger consideration was worth as of the Transaction Date.  (DB 70-71.) 
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There are three fatal flaws in this argument.  First, as noted, in 
reaching its fair value determination, the Business Court expressly took 
into account the very events between signing and closing that Dissenters 
say caused the increase in the value of the merger consideration over that 
period.  Compare DB 67-68 (arguing that the Court should have 
considered increases in equity markets and the value of other major U.S. 
tobacco companies) with R pp 236-37 ¶ 210 (considering the stock price 
“performance of [RAI’s] closest competitor, Altria” and “the performance 
of the S&P 500 generally”).  Compare DB 69 (arguing that the Court 
should have considered “the increased likelihood of corporate tax reform 
and an accommodative regulatory climate” for tobacco in the U.S.) with 
R p 209 ¶ 209 (considering the prospect of “a tax bill that would lower the 
corporate tax rate” and “a more benign regulatory climate for the U.S. 
tobacco industry”). 
Second, the Business Court did not determine RAI’s fair value to be 
$59.64 per share—and it certainly did not peg fair value to the specific 
cash/stock mix comprising the merger consideration.  Rather, as the 
Business Court repeatedly stated, based on the totality of the evidence, 
it found the fair value of RAI as of the Transaction Date to be “no more 
-90- 
 
than” $59.64.  (R pp 228 ¶ 194, 275 ¶ 304, 313 ¶ 382, 314 ¶ 384.)  This 
takes the legs out from under Dissenters’ argument.  Dissenters proceed 
as though the Business Court found fair value to be $59.64 as of 
January 2017 and then neglected to take account of subsequent 
appreciation.  In reality, the Business Court found that, even accounting 
for events between January and July, RAI’s fair value as of the 
Transaction Date was still no higher than $59.64 per share.  Indeed, the 
Business Court made this clear on the very first page of its opinion, 
finding that “the $59.64 per share that RAI has already paid Defendants 
equals or exceeds the fair value of RAI shares as of the date of the Merger”.  
(R p 143 ¶ 3 (emphasis added).)  Dissenters may disagree with that 
finding, but there should be no dispute that is what the Business Court 
in fact found.13 
Third, Dissenters overlook the true significance of $59.64 per share.  
It was not just the cash value of the merger consideration at signing.  In 
addition, as the Business Court repeatedly noted, it was the amount that 
                                      
13 This also shows the falsity of Dissenters’ repeated statements to the effect 
that the Business Court “simply deferred to the value of the merger consideration” 
(DB 3-4) or “adopt[ed] the price negotiated by RAI and BAT” (DB 9).  As discussed 
further below, the Court considered the deal price as one of many indicators of value, 
as part of the overall body of evidence in the record.  (See Part II.B.) 
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“RAI ha[d] already paid” to Dissenters for their shares.  (R p 143 ¶ 3; see 
R p 275 ¶ 304 (“the $59.64 per share that Dissenters have already been 
paid”).)  Under the appraisal statute, upon receiving a signed appraisal 
form from a dissenting shareholder, a corporation is required to pay that 
shareholder “the amount the corporation estimates to be the fair value of 
their shares, plus interest”.  N.C.G.S. §§ 55-13-22, 55-13-25(a).  Here, in 
September 2017, after receiving Dissenters’ signed forms and before the 
initiation of this case, RAI estimated fair value to be $59.64 per share 
and paid all Dissenters that amount, plus interest from the Transaction 
Date.  (R p 228 ¶ 192.)   
Accordingly, in this case, if the Business Court found the fair value 
of RAI’s shares to be $59.64 or less, then no further payment would be 
due.  See N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(e).  Because RAI did not seek, and the 
statute does not provide for, any refund of amounts already paid to a 
dissenting stockholder, there was no need for the Business Court to 
assess how far below $59.64 the Transaction Date fair value may have 
been.  To discharge its responsibility under the statute, it was enough for 
the Business Court to find, as it did, that the fair value of RAI as of the 
Transaction Date was “no more than” $59.64 per share. 
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While it is true that Dissenters ultimately received less for their 
shares than other RAI shareholders who did not seek appraisal (DB 71), 
that is a risk that these sophisticated investors chose to accept when 
they, unlike other shareholders, requested an independent judicial 
determination of the fair value of their shares. 
B. The Business Court Did Not “Rel[y] Solely on the Value of the 
Merger Consideration”. 
Dissenters claim that the Business Court “failed to conduct an 
independent valuation using generally accepted valuation techniques”.  
(DB 72-73.)  In their telling, “the Business Court did not value RAI at all, 
and instead relied solely on the value of the merger consideration”.  
(DB 72.)  Dissenters are doubly wrong.  First, they take an unduly narrow 
conception of what type of valuation techniques an appraisal court may 
employ.  Second, their assertion that “the Business Court relied solely on 
the value of the merger consideration” (id.) is a misstatement of what the 
Court actually did. 
Contrary to Dissenters’ claim, the Business Court did not simply 
defer to the deal price and adopt it as fair value.  As the Business Court 
stated, “the court cannot adopt at the outset an ‘either-or’ approach, 
thereby accepting uncritically the valuation of one party, as it is the 
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Court’s duty to determine the core issue of fair value on the appraisal 
date”.  (R p 282 ¶ 319 (internal quotation marks omitted).)  Accordingly, 
in its comprehensive opinion, the Business Court carefully considered 
evidence presented at trial under each of the “customary and current” 
valuation concepts and techniques described above.  The Court then 
grounded its conclusion as to the fair value of RAI in far more than just 
the deal price.  In addition to explaining why the deal price had sufficient 
indicia of reliability as to fair value, the Court also pointed to other 
evidence of value, including: 
 Market price.  “The market valued RAI stock at well under 
$59.64 prior to BAT’s first offer and likely would have 
continued to do so through the Transaction Date if the 
Merger had not occurred.”  (R p 313 ¶ 383.) 
 Discounted cash flow analyses.  “Properly conducted DCF 
analyses, including three separate analyses conducted by 
RAI’s highly regarded, independent, and conflict-free 
financial advisors, support a fair value of $59.64 or less.”  
(R pp 313-14 ¶ 383.) 
 Precedent transactions and comparable companies as cross-
checks.  “The acquisition multiples in precedent 
transactions, while of less value, suggest a fair value below 
$59.64, and when considered together with the trading 
multiples for comparable companies, at a minimum and 
with all other evidence of value introduced at trial, provide 
a useful market or sanity check . . . .”  (R p 314 ¶ 383.) 
 Financial analyst price targets.  “The $59.64 per share deal 
price, measured as of January 16, 2017, was at the upper 
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end of the unaffected analyst price targets for RAI as a 
standalone company.”  (R p 247 ¶ 234.) 
 Mason Capital’s contemporaneous valuation.  “Mason 
Capital’s letter to the Transaction Committee [valuing RAI 
at $54.44 per share] is persuasive evidence of Mason 
Capital’s pre-litigation views of RAI’s value.”  (R p 249 
¶ 238.) 
In dismissing all of this evidence and asserting that “an 
independent judicial determination” was especially necessary in this case 
(DB 73), Dissenters revert to their discredited conspiracy theory and 
again ignore the Business Court’s factual findings.  They contend that 
the deal price and Financial Advisor analyses should be disregarded 
because the Transaction Committee and the Financial Advisors “were not 
in possession of material, value-relevant information:  RAI’s detailed ten-
year cash projections”.  (Id.)  But the Business Court expressly found that 
“RAI management provided each of the Financial Advisors with . . . 
projections of operating income and growth rates for years six through 
ten of the June 2016 Strategic Plan”.  (R p 207 ¶ 149.)  “The Financial 
Advisors were thus aware of the forecasted compound annual growth 
rates of 7% to 8% for the out years of those projections”.  (R pp 207-08 
¶ 149.)  While Dissenters claim that the Financial Advisors were in the 
dark without the underlying spreadsheets supporting those numbers 
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(DB 46-47), the Business Court found otherwise, determining that “all 
three Financial Advisors knew the projected trajectory and could have 
insisted on further detail if they believed it was necessary”.  (R p 208 
¶ 149; see also R p 212 ¶ 159 (noting that “the Financial Advisors received 
all the information they believed they needed for their valuation work”).)  
Moreover, the Business Court found “little relevance in RAI’s year 
six through ten projections for valuation purposes” (R p 308 ¶ 371), as 
“[t]he fact that extrapolations provided the most fundamental inputs to 
years six through ten of the ten-year projections was not contradicted” at 
trial (R p 204 ¶ 141).  Dissenters do not even challenge the Business 
Court’s findings on this point.  They instead repeatedly urge that the 
Court should have used these projections, in the face of extensive 
evidence about the extrapolated content of the projections, the broad 
brush manner in which they were created and the very limited purposes 
for which they were used—all of which properly led the Business Court 
to find that they were inappropriate for a DCF or any other valuation 
purposes. 
Ultimately, the “independent judicial valuation” sought by 
Dissenters is nothing more than a request for this Court on appeal to 
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throw out all of the other indicators of value in the record (and the 
factfinding by the Business Court) and rest everything on their made-for-
litigation DCF model, which the Business Court found was an extreme 
and unreliable outlier based on the facts established at trial (which are, 
again, factual findings the Dissenters ignore on appeal). 
C. The Business Court Properly Considered Deal Price as a 
Reliable Indicator of Fair Value. 
Dissenters next argue that the Business Court’s supposed decision 
to “defer to deal price” was an “incorrect[] appli[cation of] Delaware law 
to the North Carolina appraisal statute” (DB 75).  That is wrong in a 
number of respects. 
First, the premise of the argument is inaccurate.  As explained 
above, the Business Court did not “defer to deal price”.  Instead, the Court 
considered the negotiated deal price as one of many mutually reinforcing 
indicators of the fair value of RAI.14  (See Part II.B above.)   
                                      
14 Nor is it correct to say, as Dissenters do in this section of their brief, that the 
Business Court “conclud[ed] that the fair value of RAI as of the Transaction Date was 
the value of the merger consideration on the Deal Date”.  (DB 74.)  That is not what 
the Court held.  As explained above, it held that the fair value of RAI as of the 
Transaction Date was no more than the $59.64 per share that RAI had already paid 
to Dissenters, such that no additional payment was due for Dissenters’ shares. 
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Second, to the extent Delaware law is relevant, Dissenters are 
wrong to argue that Delaware courts would not consider deal price as a 
reliable piece of evidence of fair value in the circumstances of this case.  
They contend that “no Delaware court has deferred to deal price without 
a market check”.  (DB 82.)  In fact, however, the Delaware courts have 
declined to impose “minimum requirements for . . . sale processes to meet 
before the deal price can be considered as a persuasive indicator of fair 
value”.  In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Grp., C.A. No. 12736-VCL, 
2019 WL 3778370, at *42 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 2019); see also LongPath 
Cap., LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., C.A. No. 8094-VCP, 2015 WL 4540443, 
at *21 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (“I am not aware of any case holding that 
a multi-bidder auction of a company is a prerequisite to finding that the 
merger price is a reliable indicator of fair value.”).  The courts instead 
review the deal process “as a whole”.  Columbia Pipeline, 2019 
WL 3778370, at *42.   
As the Business Court explained, “the persuasiveness of the deal 
price depends on the reliability of the sales process that generated it”.  
(R p 286 ¶ 326 (quoting Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *21.)  “A deal 
price serves as a persuasive indicator of fair value where the sale process 
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bears objective indicia of fairness”, such as “negotiations at arm’s-length; 
board deliberations without any conflicts of interest; buyer due diligence 
and receipt of confidential information about the company’s value; and 
seller extraction of multiple price increases”.  In re Appraisal of Panera 
Bread Co., C.A. No. 2017-0593-MTZ, 2020 WL 506684, at *19 (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 31, 2020) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).   
Here, the Business Court found there to be “numerous objective 
indicia of a robust deal process” (R p 289 ¶ 332), including each and every 
one of the indicia identified in Panera.  (R pp 289-92 ¶¶ 333-38 (detailing, 
on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis, six of the indicia on which the Court 
relied).)  After marching through this analysis, the Court found  
“based on the evidence presented . . . that the Merger was 
negotiated at arm’s length by independent, fully informed, 
and deeply knowledgeable directors with the assistance of 
independent and experienced advisors, all of whom had 
extensive experience in the tobacco industry and a deep and 
impeccable knowledge of RAI and its potential opportunities, 
challenges, and future prospects.  The Committee and the 
Board acted with full transparency and in relentless pursuit 
of value, rejected two BAT offers outright, indicating their 
seriousness in continuing as an independent entity, and 
extracted four price increases from BAT resulting in an 
additional $4.5 billion for RAI’s shareholders.”  
(R p 297 ¶ 347.)  Dissenters do not challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support any of these findings.  As further objective indicia of 
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the reliability of the deal price as a measure of fair value, the Business 
Court also found (again without challenge from Dissenters) that “[t]he 
non-BAT shareholders voted overwhelmingly (99% of shares voted) in 
favor of the Merger, a transaction that had received widespread favorable 
reaction from industry observers and analysts”.  (R p 297 ¶ 347.)  Based 
on these unchallenged findings and others, the Business Court reached 
the permissible conclusion that “under the circumstances present here, 
even without more aggressive outreach and a competitive auction, the 
resulting deal price is reliable evidence of RAI’s fair value”.  (R pp 297-98 
¶ 347.) 
Dissenters respond by contending that the Business Court’s 
approach was foreclosed by the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in 
Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 11 
A.3d 214 (Del. 2010), which they describe as “controlling law”.  (DB 80.)  
As they interpret it, Golden Telecom requires ignoring all of the objective 
indicia of fairness identified by the Business Court because BAT was 
unwilling to sell its shares in RAI to a third-party bidder.  Even setting 
aside that Golden Telecom is not “controlling” in North Carolina, the case 
is distinguishable.  The special committee of the acquired company’s 
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board in that case treated the deal like “a merger proposal by a 
controlling stockholder”, 993 A.2d at 508, but as shown above, the 
Business Court found that was not the case here: the RAI Transaction 
Committee “negotiated at arm’s length” (R p 297 ¶ 347), “rejected two 
BAT offers outright, indicating their seriousness in continuing as an 
independent entity” (id.), and “seriously considered strategic alternatives 
to a merger with BAT” (R p 290 ¶ 334).  Further, in Golden Telecom, “the 
weight of the evidence suggest[ed] that the market believed that [the 
buyer] was getting a bargain”, 993 A.2d at 509, but the Business Court 
found that here “the market believed the Transaction Committee 
succeeded in negotiating a fair price” (R p 298 ¶ 348).  As a further 
distinction from Golden Telecom, the Business Court found here as a 
matter of fact that even if BAT had been willing to sell its RAI shares, 
“there were few (if any) companies in the tobacco industry or adjacent 
industries that could have made an offer for RAI” (R p 293 ¶ 340), such 
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that “[n]othing in the record suggests that increased competition would 
have produced a better result” (R p 297 ¶ 347).15  
Moreover, as the Business Court recognized, the relevance of the 
deal price is not an on-off switch.  (See R pp 285-89 ¶¶ 324-32.)  Even 
when a court does not use the deal price as the dispositive determination 
of fair value, it can still be relevant evidence and carry substantial 
weight.  See, e.g, Jarden, 2019 WL 3244085, *4 (finding the fair value was 
consistent with the “less reliable, but still relevant, deal price less 
synergies value”); see also Blueblade Cap. Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft 
Cos., C.A. No. 11184-VCS, 2018 WL 3602940, at *39 (Del. Ch. July 27, 
2018) (even if the merger price by itself is not a reliable indicator of value, 
“[t]hat does not mean, however, that the Merger Price is irrelevant for 
purposes of the Court’s fair value determination”).  Dissenters offer no 
authority at all for the proposition that an appraisal court must 
completely ignore the deal price, particularly when there are so many 
                                      
15 In the Delaware Supreme Court’s latest word on appraisal, from just last 
month, Brigade Leveraged Capital Structures Fund Ltd. v. Stillwater Mining Co., ___ 
A.3d ___, 2020 WL 6038341, at *5 (Del. 2020), the Court did not even mention Golden 
Telecom, while affirming the Chancery Court’s determination that certain “objective 
indicia” of fairness present in that case provided “a cogent foundation for relying on 
the deal price as a persuasive indicator of fair value”.  Id. at *6. 
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objective indicia of fairness supporting its reliability as an indicator of 
fair value. 
Third, Dissenters unfairly accuse the Business Court of 
“fundamentally fail[ing] to understand” the difference between appraisal 
law and fiduciary duty cases.  (DB 15.)  Indeed, they go so far as to charge 
the Business Court with “holding that a transaction that does not 
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty need not be independently 
appraised”.  (DB 87.)  The Business Court did no such thing, and 
Dissenters are once again ignoring what the Business Court actually 
wrote.  The Business Court expressly noted the distinction between the 
fiduciary inquiry and the appraisal inquiry, stating that in an appraisal 
“it is not sufficient for . . . directors to achieve the best price that a 
fiduciary will pay if that price is not a fair price”.  (R p 281 ¶ 317 (internal 
quotation marks and bracket omitted).)  Furthermore, the Business 
Court clearly recognized the nature of its task, observing that “[u]nder 
the North Carolina and Delaware appraisal statutes, ‘[t]he trial court’s 
ultimate goal in an appraisal proceeding is to determine the fair or 
intrinsic value of each share on the closing date of the merger’”.  (R p 278 
¶ 313 (quoting Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *19).) 
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To make matters even worse, Dissenters’ basis for accusing the 
Business Court of being “confus[ed]” is misleading.  Dissenters point to 
one paragraph of the Business Court’s opinion and say that “the only 
Delaware Supreme Court decision cited by the Business Court” for a 
particular proposition was a fiduciary duty case called Barkan v. Amsted 
Industries, Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989).  (See DB 85-86 
(discussing R pp 287-88 ¶ 329).)  Dissenters neglect to observe that the 
Business Court, in that same paragraph, also cited three Delaware 
Chancery Court decisions, all of which were appraisal cases.  (R pp 287-
88 ¶ 329.)  Moreover, in a recent appraisal case that the Business Court 
relied on in its opinion, which Dissenters do not mention, the Delaware 
Chancery Court cited Barkan for the same proposition for which the 
Business Court cited it in this case.  See Panera, 2020 WL 506684, at *24 
(citing Barkan and noting that “[t]he Delaware Supreme Court has held 
that when ‘the directors possess a body of reliable evidence with which to 
evaluate the fairness of a transaction, they may approve that transaction 
without conducting an active survey of the market’”).  It follows that the 
Business Court was not “confused”. 
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Dissenters also suggest, here and elsewhere in their brief, that the 
deal price negotiated by the parties should be ignored because of this 
Court’s decision in Corwin v. British American Tobacco PLC, 371 N.C. 
605, 821 S.E.2d 729 (N.C. 2018).  That is incorrect.  In Corwin, this Court 
concluded that an RAI shareholder had failed to plead facts sufficient to 
show that BAT had control of RAI and owed the other RAI shareholders 
fiduciary duties.  371 N.C. at 625, 821 S.E.2d at 743.  Dissenters 
characterize the decision as giving BAT “the ‘green light’ to use the 
leverage inherent in its large position and presence on the [RAI] board” 
to disadvantage other shareholders.  (DB 88.)  But Corwin was a 
pleadings stage decision.  Here, unlike in Corwin, the underlying facts 
have now been tested through discovery and trial.  The Business Court 
carefully reviewed the negotiation history of the Transaction and found 
no evidence that BAT used its influence at RAI to secure a deal price that 
undervalued the company.  Indeed, the Business Court found that “RAI 
had freedom to make decisions independent of BAT” (R p 290 ¶ 334) and 
forcefully rejected Dissenters’ various efforts to argue that RAI’s 
management or Board took steps to aid BAT (R pp 290-97 ¶¶ 334-47.)  
Like much of Dissenters’ brief, their reliance on Corwin disregards the 
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fact that there was a trial here, after which the Business Court made 
detailed findings of fact that Dissenters have failed to challenge.16 
D. The Business Court Properly Considered Gompers’s Adjusted 
Unaffected Stock Price Analysis as an Indicator of Fair Value 
on the Transaction Date. 
Dissenters bring two separate challenges to the Business Court’s 
consideration of Gompers’s Adjusted Unaffected Stock Price analysis.  
First, Dissenters re-argue the facts underlying this analysis, without ever 
acknowledging that the Business Court has conclusively resolved these 
factual disputes against them.  (DB 89-91, 95-99.)  Second, Dissenters 
bring an evidentiary challenge to the Business Court’s admission of 
Gompers’s testimony on this subject.  (DB 91-95.)   
Both challenges fail, for the reasons below.  Before addressing the 
specific flaws in Dissenters’ arguments, however, it bears emphasizing 
that the Adjusted Unaffected Stock Price analysis was just one of several 
indicators of value on which the Business Court relied.  Even if 
                                      
16 Dissenters also overstate the breadth of the Corwin dissent.  The dissenting 
opinion did not focus on whether “BAT had actual control over RAI” in the abstract.  
(DB 23 n.1.)  Rather, as the dissent noted, “the allegations of control are with regard 
to a particular transaction that is being challenged—the Lorillard acquisition.”  371 
N.C. at 628 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 646 (concluding that 
“plaintiff has sufficiently alleged actual control by BAT over the board in the Lorillard 
acquisition” (emphasis added)).  The present case involves a different transaction and 
a different set of facts, which were reviewed in great depth by the Business Court. 
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Dissenters’ challenge to this analysis had merit (which it does not), that 
would not warrant reversing the Business Court’s ultimate fair value 
determination, which rests on numerous other grounds.  See, e.g., R p 186 
¶ 102; see also Faucette v. 6303 Carmel Rd., LLC, 242 N.C. App. 267, 274, 
775 S.E.2d 316, 323 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (“The appellant thus bears the 
burden of showing not only that an error was committed below, but also 
that such error was prejudicial—meaning that there was a reasonable 
possibility that, but for the error, the outcome would have been different.” 
(quoting Medford v. Davis, 62 N.C. App. 308, 311, 302 S.E.2d 838, 840 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1983))); Burgess v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 264 N.C. 82, 83, 
140 S.E.2d 766, 767 (1965) (“The burden is on appellant to show not only 
that there was error in the trial but also that there is a reasonable 
probability that ‘the result was materially affected thereby to his hurt.” 
(quoting Garland v. Penegar, 235 N.C. 517, 519, 70 S.E.2d 486, 488 
(1952))). 
1. The Business Court’s Factual Findings Regarding 
Gompers’s Adjusted Unaffected Stock Price Are 
Supported by the Record. 
The Business Court found that “[e]xtensive evidence . . . show[ed] 
that RAI’s fair value was in line with the value that the market ascribed 
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to RAI”, and thus that “the market’s view of the value of RAI is persuasive 
evidence of underlying fair value”.  (R p 229 ¶ 196.)  Included in that 
“extensive evidence” was a market-based metric, RAI’s “Adjusted 
Unaffected Stock Price”, that the Business Court found to be “persuasive 
evidence” of RAI’s fair value.  (R p 237 ¶ 211.)  As explained above 
(pp 39-40, 76-77), that analysis indexed RAI’s 20 October 2016 stock price 
to market and industry benchmarks to estimate where RAI’s stock price 
would have traded as of the Transaction Date if BAT had not made an 
offer to buy the company.17  The analysis indicated that “while RAI’s 
stock price may have appreciated to some degree in the time between the 
October 20 Offer and the Transaction Date, RAI’s stock would still have 
traded 7% to 10% below the deal price as of July 24, 2017”.  (R p 237 
¶ 211.)   
 Dissenters first challenge the starting point of this analysis, 
contending that the 20 October 2016 price of $47.17 per share did not 
reflect RAI’s fair value on that date “because it failed to incorporate 
                                      
17 As explained above at pp 76-77, RAI’s actual stock price at the time of closing 
is not an accurate proxy for fair value because it incorporated value attributable to 
BAT’s announced offer, which cannot be included in RAI’s fair value.  (R pp 235-36 
¶ 208; N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5).) 
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material non-public information that BAT had and the investing public 
did not”.  (DB 90.)  But the Business Court expressly found to the 
contrary, finding that no “nonpublic information warrants disregarding 
RAI’s Unaffected Stock Price as evidence of value”.  (R pp 233-34 ¶ 203.)  
Likewise, each of the two pieces of supposedly material non-public 
information on which Dissenters rely fly in the face of findings of fact that 
Dissenters do not challenge.  Specifically, Dissenters contend that the 
market did not know RAI “was projecting strong 7-8% growth in years 
six through ten of its ten-year projections”.  (DB 90.)  As discussed above, 
however, the ten-year projections simply cannot bear the weight that 
Dissenters place on them.  The Business Court made detailed factual 
findings about the manner in which those projections were created and 
the limited purpose for which they were intended.  (See above pp 28-29, 
63-64; R pp 202 ¶ 138, 203 ¶ 140.)  It found that “[t]he projected growth 
rates were not based on any underlying material, value-relevant 
information about specific business plans or other developments”.  
(R p 235 ¶ 206.)  They were instead “based largely on extrapolations of 
current volume and pricing trends in the industry, which were publicly 
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available and therefore already likely to be reflected in RAI’s stock price”.  
(R p 234 ¶ 205.)  
The other supposedly material non-public information Dissenters 
identify is the authorization RAI’s Board gave management to 
repurchase RAI stock “at prices up to $65 per share”.  (DB 90.)  But 
Dissenters’ own expert “pointedly declined to testify that the 
authorization ceiling was value-relevant information even when 
prompted by counsel”.  (R p 235 ¶ 207.)  For good reason.  As the Business 
Court found, the authorization ceiling “was not a valuation of RAI.  
Rather, . . . it was an internal corporate authorization for a purchasing 
program, which was intentionally set at a price that was higher than 
what RAI management ever expected it would need to spend”.  (Id.; see 
also R p 214 ¶ 165 (finding that it “was not management’s intention to 
set the share repurchase authorization ceiling at the ‘intrinsic value’ of 
RAI’s shares”).) 
 Dissenters next argue that RAI’s 20 October 2016 stock price was 
not a reliable indicator of fair value as of that date because BAT made its 
initial offer at an “opportunistic” time when RAI’s stock had fallen.  
(DB 90.)  This again ignores the factual findings of the Business Court, 
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which determined that RAI’s common stock price of $47.17 on 20 
October 2016 “did not represent a substantial deviation from the price at 
which RAI’s stock was previously trading”.  (R p 229 ¶ 197.)  This finding 
was well-supported (see above pp 22-23), and Dissenters do not argue 
otherwise.  
2. The Business Court’s Admission of Gompers’s 
Testimony Regarding the Adjusted Unaffected Stock 
Price Was Within Its Discretion. 
The Business Court’s determination of evidentiary issues 
concerning expert testimony is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard.  See State v. Anderson, 322 N.C. 22, 28, 366 S.E.2d 459, 463 
(1988) (“In applying [Rule 702], the trial court is afforded wide discretion 
and will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion.”). 
Dissenters claim the Business Court abused its discretion in 
admitting Gompers’s testimony regarding his Adjusted Unaffected Stock 
Price analysis.  (DB 91.)  Dissenters offer two bases in support of their 
argument, both of which train on the adequacy of the evidence supporting 
the Business Court’s finding that “the market for RAI stock was semi-
strong form efficient”.  (R p 232 ¶ 202.) 
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First, they argue that market efficiency must be established 
through expert testimony and that factual evidence alone can never be 
sufficient proof.  (DB 94-95.)  That is wrong.  As the Business Court 
stated, “there is no legal or evidentiary rule in North Carolina requiring 
a court’s determination of market efficiency to reflect a consideration of 
expert testimony”.  (R p 322 ¶ 11.)  In contrast, Dissenters draw their 
bright-line evidentiary rule from a rhetorical flourish in a single 
Delaware case.  (DB 94 (citing Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *50.)  But 
Stillwater had no cause to decide, or even consider, whether market 
efficiency can be proven without expert testimony—because the question 
was not presented in that case.  While Dissenters claim it would be 
“unprecedented” to find market efficiency without expert testimony 
(DB 94-95), it is their hard-and-fast rule that has no precedent: they 
identify no case in which a court has held, as a matter of law, that factual 
evidence is insufficient to show that a stock trades in an efficient market.  
To the contrary, courts in appraisal proceedings have considered 
numerous factual criteria in assessing whether the market for a 
particular security is efficient.  See Dell, 177 A.3d at 24-27 (identifying 
numerous facts in the record suggesting an efficient market and 
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reversing lower court’s decision in part because it “ignored the efficient 
market hypothesis long endorsed by this Court”); see also Jarden, 2019 
WL 3244085, at *27; In re Appraisal of Solera Holdings, Inc., 2018 
WL 3625644, at *24 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2018).  As with other matters of 
proof, expert testimony on market efficiency may (or may not) be helpful, 
but there is no law or rule that makes it mandatory.18 
Second, Dissenters argue that Gompers’s Adjusted Unaffected 
Stock Price analysis lacked appropriate foundation because it relied on 
the opinion of another expert (Professor Anil Shivdasani) who did not 
testify at trial.  (DB 91.)  But as the Business Court found, “given the 
evidence introduced by RAI, which was not disputed by Dissenters, there 
[wa]s a sufficient factual record” for the Court to find market efficiency.  
(R p 232 ¶ 202 (emphasis added).)  For this reason, Dissenters’ reliance 
on J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 243 F.3d 441 (8th 
Cir. 2001), is misplaced.  (See DB 93.)  That case involved the exclusion 
of an expert’s testimony because the only foundation for its relevance was 
                                      
18 Moreover, in this case, while neither side presented an expert that 
specifically opined on the efficiency of the market for RAI stock, “[e]xperts for both 
sides . . . agreed that the market for most publicly traded stocks on most days is close 
to semi-strong form efficient, particularly stock for large companies like RAI”.  
(R p 232 ¶ 202 (emphasis added).) 
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the testimony of another expert that had been excluded.  J.B. Hunt, 243 
F.3d at 444-45.  Here, Gompers’s testimony was supported by 
substantial, uncontroverted fact evidence.  (R p 231-33 ¶¶ 201-02.)19  
Dissenters also appear to dispute whether the facts relied on by the 
Business Court are sufficient to allow the conclusion of an efficient 
market for RAI stock.  Tellingly, however, while Dissenters devote five 
pages of their brief to criticizing the relevance of the (undisputed) facts 
on which the Business Court relied (DB 95-99), Dissenters do not 
advance a solitary shred of trial evidence pointing in the other direction.  
Dissenters identify literally nothing in the record that shows the market 
for RAI stock to have been inefficient.  Thus, they ask this Court to reject 
the detailed findings of the Business Court as clearly erroneous without 
putting so much as a feather on the other side of the scale.  
In any event, Dissenters’ criticism of the relevance of the Business 
Court’s factual findings is unfounded.  The record included evidence 
showing, among other things, that (i) RAI was publicly traded on the 
                                      
19 Dissenters’ remaining cases are even further afield.  They involve experts 
who simply “parrot[ed]” the opinions of a non-testifying expert without independently 
verifying the non-testifying expert’s conclusions.  (DB 93-94 (citing cases).)  Even 




NYSE, making it highly liquid, (ii) RAI was a very large company with a 
market capitalization of nearly $70 billion as of 20 October 2016, 
(iii) information about RAI was both widely available and readily 
disseminated to the market, (iv) RAI’s historical stock price increased 
and decreased in relation to the release of new company-specific 
information and market-wide trends and (v) RAI’s stock was followed by 
16 equity analysts, who frequently published research about the 
company.  (R p 232 ¶ 202.)  These same factors have been considered by 
other appraisal courts to support the conclusion that a stock trades on an 
efficient market.  See Jarden, 2019 WL 3244085, at *27-29; Dell, 177 A.3d 
at 7; DFC, 172 A.3d at 352-53, 372-73.  The Business Court was in very 
good company in relying on these factors to assess market efficiency. 
Despite the fact that appraisal courts have considered these factors, 
Dissenters argue that courts should not do so because they “are not 
designed or intended to identify markets in which trading price is a 
reliable proxy for fundamental value”.  (DB 96.)  This request for the 
Court to break new ground by rejecting the relevance of these factors is 
particularly inappropriate in this case.  The primary reason a stock with 
these “informationally efficient” characteristics might not trade at its 
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intrinsic value is if there is material nonpublic information about the 
company’s prospects.  See Fir Tree Value Master Fund, LP v. Jarden 
Corp., 236 A.3d 313, 324 n.56 (Del. 2020) (“[T]he share price of a 
company’s stock, even when informationally efficient, may diverge 
occasionally from the stock’s fundamentally efficient price. This 
divergence occurs, however, only when and to the extent that there is 
material nonpublic information that is not impounded in a company’s 
share prices.” (citation omitted)).  Here, as noted above, the Business 
Court made a factual finding that there was no material nonpublic 
information as of BAT’s offer on 20 October 2016 (R pp 233-34 ¶ 203)—
meaning there is no reason that the traditional market efficiency factors 
on which the Business Court relied would lead to a mistaken result. 
E. The Business Court Properly Determined that Fair Value 
Does Not Include a “Control Premium”. 
Dissenters next argue that the Business Court improperly failed to 
add a so-called “control premium” when considering market-based 
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evidence of RAI’s value.  (DB 99-100.)20  Once again, Dissenters 
completely ignore—indeed do not even mention—the Business Court’s 
factual findings on this point.21  They instead provide a now-discredited 
theoretical disquisition on the meaning of a control premium, which was 
refuted by the trial testimony of their own expert.  
As the Business Court properly found, the record evidence showed 
that “[a] control premium is the additional value that a buyer ascribes to 
an asset under the assumption that the buyer will be able to derive more 
value from the asset”.  (R p 273 ¶ 298.)  It is “what an acquirer is willing 
to pay because they can better manage that asset, drive additional cash 
flows from that asset or get synergies”.  (R p 273 ¶ 298.)  In other words, 
“[t]he value attributable to a control premium is a subjective value on 
behalf of the acquirer; that is, it only reflects the value the acquirer 
believes it can add” by improving the financial performance of the 
                                      
20 As with Dissenters’ challenge to the Adjusted Unaffected Stock Price 
analysis discussed above, this challenge addresses only a subset of the various 
indicators of value on which the Business Court relied.  For example, it does not relate 
to the deal price, the Financial Advisors’ DCF calculations, analyst and market 
reaction, or precedent transactions.  Thus, even if Dissenters’ challenge had merit 
(which it does not), it would not warrant upsetting the Business Court’s fair value 
determination.  See Faucette, 242 N.C. App. at 274; Burgess, 264 N.C. at 83.  
21 Dissenters focus entirely on the Business Court’s conclusion in 
paragraph 354 of its opinion, without acknowledging the lengthier treatment of the 
issue in paragraphs 298-301. 
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company.  (R p 273 ¶ 299.)  It is not what the statutory definition of fair 
value contemplates: “the value of that company under the existing 
management—assuming that no transaction occurred”.  (R p 310 ¶ 375.) 
The Business Court grounded this finding in the trial testimony of 
both sides’ experts.  Gompers explained that “the control premium 
represents the increase in value . . . that can be generated because the 
new acquirer can be more efficient [and] do things better than the 
existing management.  And that’s why somebody buys the assets because 
they believe that they’re going to be better. . . .  And so that control 
premium represents the value only under the control of the entity that 
buys it.”  (T p 912:10-17.)  Likewise, Dissenters’ expert, Professor Bilge 
Yilmaz, testified that fair value should be determined for the company 
“as an independent firm that is expected to go on as an independent 
entity”.  (R pp 273-74 ¶ 300; T pp 1866:24-1867:4.)  To emphasize the 
point, when asked to “explain the definition of fair value that [he] used 
for the purpose of [his] analyses”, he testified:  “Just to be sure we are all 
on the same page, this does not have any kind of minority discount or 
some kind of acquisition premium or control premium attached to it.”  
(R pp 273-74 ¶ 300; T pp 1866:24-1867:10.) 
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Ignoring all of this, Dissenters wrongly contend that the Business 
Court relied only on other testimony from Gompers, in which he 
explained that it is improper to add a control premium to a DCF 
valuation.  (DB 101-02.)  Dissenters contend that because this testimony 
related to a DCF valuation, it is irrelevant to the Business Court’s 
conclusion that a control premium should not be added to market-based 
evidence like stock price.  (Id.)  But as shown above, the Business Court 
relied on a wealth of other testimony that Dissenters omit from their 
brief.  In any event, even in this testimony, Gompers explained that “[t]he 
way to think about it is that there’s a set of projections under the existing 
management and the DCF value of that will equal the stock price”.  
(T p 787:5-7; see also id. at 787:19 (“DCF value should equal the share 
price with no discount”).)  The cited testimony was therefore equally 
applicable to market-based evidence like stock price, precisely as the 
Business Court found.22   
                                      
22 Dissenters also focus on other testimony from Gompers, in which he 
described a minority discount as the “flip of a control premium”.  (DB 100-01.)  But in 
this respect, Gompers is again in accord with Yilmaz in explaining that the “fair 
value” of an independent entity includes neither a minority discount nor a control 
premium.  So this testimony is no help to Dissenters.  In any event, determining 
which testimony in the record to credit is squarely the province of the Business Court; 
there is no doubt that there is more than sufficient evidence (which Dissenters simply 
ignore) to support the Court’s finding here. 
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Thus, without any support in the record—indeed, not a single 
citation to any of their own experts—they ask this Court to strike out on 
a path that finds no support in current law or the academic literature.  
They assert that an appraisal court must add a control premium to 
market-based valuations of a public company to account for an “implicit 
minority discount” present in publicly traded shares.23  (DB 100-01.)  In 
support, Dissenters cite three opinions from Delaware courts, the most 
recent of which is from 2004.  (DB 100-02.)  To the extent these opinions 
were ever the law in Delaware, that is no longer true.  As the Delaware 
Supreme Court held earlier this year, “[t]here is no ‘long-recognized 
principle’ that a corporation’s unaffected stock price cannot equate to fair 
value”.  See Fir Tree, 236 A.3d at 316.  In that opinion, the Court affirmed 
an appraisal decision in which the trial court relied on publicly traded 
stock price as evidence of fair value, without indicating that the price 
                                      
23 Rather than afflicting all stocks, a “minority discount” is “[a] reduction in 
the value of a closely-held business’s shares that are owned by someone who has only 
a minority interest in the business”.  Minority Discount, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th 
ed. 2019).  Thus, the appraisal case law about minority discounts in Model Act states 
like North Carolina relates largely to closely held companies. See, e.g., Brown v. Arp 
& Hammond Hardware Co., 141 P.3d 673, 676, 684 (Wyo. 2006); First W. Bank Wall 
v. Olsen, 621 N.W.2d 611, 614, 617 (S.D. 2001); see also R pp 300-01.  Dissenters’ 
reliance on the portion of N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5) that requires fair value to be 




incorporated a minority discount and without adding a control premium.  
See id.  Other recent Delaware Supreme Court appraisal decisions have 
likewise considered stock price as evidence of fair value without adding 
a control premium.  See, e.g., Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven 
Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 6 (Del. 2017); Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 
A.3d at 138 (“[T]he price a stock trades at in an efficient market is an 
important indicator of its economic value that should be given 
weight . . . .”).   
Dissenters’ attack on the Business Court’s citation to an article by 
Professors Hamermesh and Wachter on the grounds that it applies only 
to issues that are supposedly unique to Delaware law’s conception of “fair 
value” (DB 102-03) is unfounded.  The passage cited by the Business 
Court is not tied to Delaware law; it focuses on “financial or empirical 
scholarship” and it could not possibly be clearer.  (R p 301 ¶ 354 (“[N]ot 
a single piece of financial or empirical scholarship affirms the core 
premise of the IMD [implicit minority discount]—that public company 
shares systematically trade at a substantial discount to the net present 
value of the corporation.” (citing Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. 
Wachter, The Short and Puzzling Life of the “Implicit Minority Discount” 
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in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (2007))).)  The 
Business Court’s citation to this scholarship to corroborate the factual 
record was not an error, particularly when Dissenters offer nothing in 
response.24 
Dissenters’ invocation of this Court’s decision in Corwin v. British 
American Tobacco PLC, 371 N.C. 605, 821 S.E.2d 729 (2018), is also off 
base.  (DB 103-04.)  The Corwin Court was not asked to, and did not, 
address whether RAI’s shares traded at a discount to their fair value.  See 
id. at 606, 624.  Indeed, to the extent Corwin is relevant, it supports the 
Business Court’s determination because it affirmed the dismissal of a 
claim that BAT was a controlling stockholder—making it less likely that 
there was any such discount in RAI’s trading price.  To be sure, the 
dissenting opinion in Corwin deemed the allegations of control sufficient 
                                      
24 Dissenters’ misguided effort to distinguish Delaware and North Carolina law 
on this point is curious, given that their only support for their control premium 
argument is in Delaware trial court cases from the turn of the century.  In any event, 
Dissenters’ description of the Hamermesh and Wachter article is wrong.  The authors 
do not say, as Dissenters contend, that Delaware courts have determined that fair 
value “should reflect whatever minority discount inheres in the market price of a 
corporation’s stock”.  (DB 103.)  Rather, the authors say that, in the absence of a 
controller, there is no minority discount to fair value, “let alone a wrongful discount”.  
See Hamermesh & Wachter, at 52-53.  Ironically, the section of the article that 
Dissenters cite is titled “Why the Delaware Bench and Bar Fell Into Error” and 




to warrant proceeding on to discovery, but, as noted above (pp 104-05), 
the Business Court here actually had full discovery and trial, and 
reached its determination on the basis of an extensive factual record that 
contained no evidence that a control premium should be added to market-
based metrics of RAI’s value.   
Dissenters’ partial quotation of the Corwin dissent’s concern about 
BAT’s being able to “get the milk without buying the cow” is especially 
inapt.  (DB 103.)  The dissent was discussing allegations in Corwin’s 
complaint that RAI’s Board had “agreed to allow BAT to access 
Reynolds’s game-changing technology without adequate compensation”, 
and that “this ‘forestalls a takeover by making Reynolds a significantly 
less attractive takeover target for BAT,’ or in other words, it allows BAT 
to ‘get the milk without buying the cow’”.  Corwin, 371 N.C. at 646 
(Hudson, J., dissenting).  In the transaction now under review, however, 
BAT did pursue a takeover—it bought the proverbial cow.  The only 
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question is the fair value of the shares it bought, and Corwin does not 
speak to that question.25 
III. THE BUSINESS COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
ADMITTING GOMPERS’S TESTIMONY. 
Dissenters contend that the Business Court made other incorrect 
evidentiary rulings pertaining to Gompers’s testimony (beyond those 
discussed above in Part II.D.2).  Specifically, Dissenters claim that they 
were entitled to an adverse inference regarding the efficiency of RAI’s 
stock and the exclusion of certain of Gompers’s testimony because it 
constituted improper “vouching” and improper summarization of facts.  
These evidentiary issues were committed to the sound discretion of the 
Business Court, see Anderson, 322 N.C. at 28, 366 S.E.2d at 463, and 
Dissenters have not shown that the Business Court abused that 
discretion. 
                                      
25 Dissenters’ final argument—that not adding a control premium to market-
based metrics would make appraisal a worthless remedy (DB 105-06)—is just a re-
hash of their view that appraisal should capture the value that a buyer pays because 
it believes it can improve the financial performance of the company.  That is not 
correct.  An appraisal dissenter is entitled to no more and no less than the fair value 
of the shares it holds, as if the company were continuing as an independent entity, 
without the benefits the buyer will bring.  See N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5).  The appraisal 
remedy is a protection against shareholders being forced to sell their shares for less 
than what they are currently worth; it is not a tool for claiming additional value.  
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A. The Business Court Appropriately Denied Dissenters’ 
Request for an Adverse Inference. 
Prior to trial, RAI notified Dissenters that it had chosen not to call 
Professor Shivdasani to provide an expert opinion at trial regarding 
market efficiency.  Dissenters likewise chose not to elicit trial testimony 
from Shivdasani, either through a trial subpoena (he resides in Chapel 
Hill) or through his deposition testimony pursuant to Rule 32(a)(4) of the 
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.  Dissenters also chose not to 
introduce any evidence of their own regarding market efficiency.  Instead, 
they requested an adverse inference against RAI on the issue of market 
efficiency pursuant to the “missing witness rule”.  The Business Court’s 
decision not to draw an adverse inference was well within its discretion.26  
(R p 327 ¶ 18.) 
“The ‘missing witness rule’ is not a rule; it is simply a ‘permissible 
inference that a factfinder may draw from the absence of a potential 
witness who might have knowledge of facts at issue in the case.’”  (R p 326 
¶ 17 (quoting Harris v. State, 458 Md. 370, 182 A.3d 821, 832 (Md. 2018) 
                                      
26 Even if it had not been within the Business Court’s discretion, error on this 
ground would not justify reversal, given the wide variety of other evidence supporting 
the Business Court’s fair value determination.  (See above n.20.) 
-125- 
 
(emphasis added)).)  Dissenters have not identified a single instance in 
which a North Carolina court was required to draw an adverse inference 
based on a witness’s absence from trial.  Additionally, “North Carolina 
courts have never suggested that the missing witness rule should apply 
to expert witnesses”.  (R p 327 ¶ 19.)  The rule has been applied only to 
fact witnesses with unique information unavailable from another source.  
See, e.g., Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Head & Engquist Equip., L.L.C., No. 00-
CVS-10358, 2003 WL 21017456, at *49 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 2, 2003).   
Pointing to authority from other states, Dissenters contend that the 
missing witness rule should apply to expert witnesses (DB 121-22), but 
they do not address the authorities cited by the Business Court, including 
decisions by the Supreme Courts of New Jersey and South Carolina, that 
offer persuasive reasons why the missing witness rule ought not to apply 
to experts.  (R pp 327-28 ¶ 19.)  The New Jersey Supreme Court in 
Washington v. Perez held that it was reversible error for a trial court to 
grant a missing witness instruction regarding an expert witness.  219 
N.J. 338, 359-65, 98 A.3d 1140, 1152-55 (N.J. 2014).  After describing in 
detail the development of the missing witness rule, including that it 
“should not be a reflexive response whenever a party fails to call an 
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expected witness”, id. 361, the court in Washington noted that “[t]here 
are significant distinctions between the testimony of expert witnesses 
and the testimony of fact witnesses, which are pertinent to the adverse 
inference charge”, id. at 361-64.  Among the reasons identified were 
(i) the fact that modern discovery rules afford an opposing party 
significant information about an expert witness’s testimony, such that 
the testimony is “unlikely to be a mystery to the parties and their counsel 
when a case proceeds to trial”; (ii) “an expert is unlikely to be in exclusive 
possession of factual evidence that would justify an adverse inference 
charge”, and “any facts or data that support the expert’s opinion must be 
disclosed in his or her report”; (iii) court rules “do not preclude a party 
from choosing among multiple experts identified before trial, or foregoing 
the presentation of expert testimony entirely”; and (iv) “there are many 
strategic and practical reasons that may prompt a party who has retained 
an expert witness to decide not to present the expert’s testimony at trial”, 
including cost, redundancy and availability.  Id. at 1153-55.  
The South Carolina Supreme Court analyzed the applicability of 
the missing witness rule in the context of a psychiatric expert.  In re 
Gonzalez, 409 S.C. 621, 627-35, 763 S.E.2d 210, 213-17 (S.C. 2014).  After 
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describing the origin and rationale behind the missing witness rule, that 
court determined that the complexity of expert witness testimony was ill-
suited to application of an adverse inference, which would allow a non-
expert factfinder “to simply speculate as to what the expert might have 
said”.  Id. at 635.  Accordingly, the court held that “[b]ecause of the risk 
of unfairness that such adverse inferences could impose, we hold today 
that a party’s invocation of the missing witness rule should be limited to 
fact witnesses, and it should not be applied to opinion witnesses”.27  Id. 
Instead of addressing these cases, Dissenters assert without 
explanation that their chosen set of out-of-state authority is “better-
reasoned”.  (DB 121.)  Dissenters are mistaken.  Unlike the authorities 
cited by the Business Court, which analyzed in detail whether the 
missing witness rule should apply to experts, none of Dissenters’ cases 
actually addressed that issue head on.  See Taylor v. Kohli, 162 Ill.2d 91, 
96-98, 642 N.E.2d 467, 469-70 (Ill. 1994) (addressing whether a party 
                                      
27 Dissenters’ suggestion that the only reason a party might not call one of its 
experts at trial is to “hide” the expert’s testimony (DB 118, 123-24) ignores these 
courts’ cogent explanations, as well as the realities of trial practice, in which parties 
routinely decide not to call witnesses who were on their original witness lists.  Were 
it otherwise, RAI would be entitled to the benefit of an adverse inference on fair value, 
because Dissenters chose not to call one of their own valuation experts, Robert Taylor.  
(R p 125 ¶ 19; R p 145 ¶ 6 n.1.) 
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effectively abandoned its expert witness before trial); DeVito v. Feliciano, 
22 N.Y.3d 159, 165-66, 1 N.E.3d 791, 796 (N.Y. 2013) (addressing 
whether a party’s treating physician’s testimony would be cumulative); 
Cler v. Providence Health System-Oregon, 349 Or. 481, 488-90, 245 P.3d 
642, 647 (Ore. 2010) (stating that the trial court improperly permitted 
portions of counsel’s closing statement addressing matters outside the 
record); Kovach v. Solomon, 732 A.2d 1, 10-11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) 
(addressing whether a party’s failure to remove a witness from its 
witness list seven days before trial in violation of a local rule prevented 
the witness from being “equally available” to opposing counsel); Dickey v. 
McCord, 63 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming the lower 
court’s refusal to apply missing witness rule to an expert).28  
Moreover, Shivdasani was not a “missing” witness.  Dissenters 
were free to seek to serve a trial subpoena or to introduce his deposition 
testimony through Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a)(4).  N.C. R. Civ. 
                                      
28 Dissenters also cite the Connecticut Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in State 
v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 646 A.2d 1318 (Conn. 1994) (DB 122), but fail to note that the 
legislature in Connecticut has expressly prohibited the use of the missing witness 
instruction in civil cases, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-216c, and that Connecticut’s 
Supreme Court has held that the missing witness instruction may not be applied in 
criminal cases.  State v. Malave, 250 Conn. 722, 730, 737 A.2d 442, 447 (Conn. 1999) 
(“[W]e conclude that the rule should be abandoned in criminal cases.”).  
-129- 
 
P. 32(a)(4) (“The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be 
used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: . . . the witness is an 
expert witness whose testimony has been procured by videotape as 
provided for under Rule 30(b)(4).”).  Dissenters contend that their ability 
to introduce Shivdasani’s testimony is irrelevant because, as RAI’s 
expert, he was in their view under RAI’s control—and they argue that “a 
witness who is under the control of one party . . . is not ‘equally available’ 
to the other side”.  (DB 125.)  But their own cases say the opposite.  See, 
e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 68 N.Y.2d 424, 428, 502 N.E.2d 583, 586 (N.Y. 
1986) (“It is to be emphasized that the ‘availability’ of a witness is a 
separate consideration from that of ‘control’.  ‘Availability’ simply refers 
to the party’s ability to produce such witness.”).  The fact is that 
Dissenters offer no explanation for why they elected not to call an expert 
whose report they claim to have been favorable for them, whose 
deposition testimony was on videotape and whose opinions they now 
deem to be so critically important.29  As noted previously (p 113), 
                                      
29 That has not stopped Dissenters from asserting on appeal what they 
(incorrectly) contend Shivdasani’s testimony would have shown.  (DB 120, 124 n.34.)  
If that testimony were as helpful as they contend, they could and should have offered 
it at trial.  Having foregone the opportunity to do so, their incorrect characterization 
of it should be disregarded on appeal.  
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Dissenters also failed to introduce any evidence of their own regarding 
market efficiency.30  
Further, the Business Court was well within its discretion to find 
that the missing witness rule ought not to apply in this case because RAI 
had a reasonable basis not to offer testimony from Shivdasani—
specifically, that his testimony was unnecessary because, as the Business 
Court ultimately found, there was sufficient evidence and testimony from 
other witnesses establishing the facts necessary for the Court to find that 
RAI’s stock traded efficiently.  R p 289 ¶ 333; see, e.g., Taylor, 162 Ill. 2d 
at 96 (“In general, the missing-witness instruction is available when . . . 
there is no reasonable excuse shown for the failure to produce the 
witness.”); State v. Montgomery, 163 Wash. 2d 577, 599, 183 P.3d 267, 
278 (Wash. 2008) (“[T]he doctrine applies only if the witness’s absence is 
not satisfactorily explained.”); see also McCormick on Evidence § 264 (7th 
ed. 2016) (“if the testimony of the witness would be merely cumulative, 
the inference is unavailable”). 
                                      
30 Dissenters’ ability to call Shivdasani under Rule 32(a)(4) is another basis for 
distinguishing the out-of-state authority on which Dissenters rely.  None of those 
jurisdictions has a comparable rule.  Indeed, in the first case they cite, the appellate 
court held that the trial court erred in permitting an opposing party’s expert’s 
deposition testimony to be introduced when the expert was not called to testify at 
trial.  See Taylor, 162 Ill. 2d at 96. 
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B. Gompers Did Not Improperly “Vouch” for the Work of Others. 
Dissenters assert that portions of Gompers’s expert testimony 
evaluating the reasonableness of the inputs used in RAI’s financial 
advisors’ DCF analyses amounted to improper “vouching”.  (DB 126-28.)  
Vouching occurs when an expert merely “parrots” or “rubber stamps” an 
opinion from another witness.  See In re Wagner, No. 06-cv-01026, 2007 
WL 966010, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2007); Loeffel Steel Prods., Inc. v. 
Delta Brands, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 794, 824 (N.D. Ill. 2005).  The 
Business Court was well within its discretion to conclude that Gompers 
did not “rubber stamp” the DCF analyses performed by the Financial 
Advisors.   
As Gompers explained at trial, he formed his opinion regarding the 
reasonableness of the Financial Advisors’ DCF inputs only after 
conducting detailed analyses commonly performed by financial 
economists.  (See T pp 745:2-20; 746:7-747:13.)  Gompers testified that he 
performed precisely the same type of analysis to review the Financial 
Advisors’ DCF analyses as if he were conducting his own DCF-based 
valuation.  (T p 745:2-20.)  And in addition to reviewing the Financial 
Advisors’ DCF inputs, Gompers did his own multiples analyses to serve 
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as market checks on the Financial Advisors’ DCF inputs and overall 
valuations.  (See T pp 752:1-753:18; 770:7-771:6; 779:25-780:16.)  The 
Business Court properly found that Gompers did not rubber stamp the 
results of the Financial Advisors’ DCF valuations—he extensively 
evaluated and stress-tested the Financial Advisors’ DCF inputs and 
made his own expert determination that they were reasonable.31  
(R pp 320-21 ¶¶ 8-9.) 
An examination of the authorities relied upon by Dissenters 
demonstrates how flawed their characterization of Gompers’s testimony 
is.  The lone North Carolina case on which Dissenters rely for their “no 
vouching” principle, State v. Bullock, No. COA10-320, 2010 WL 4290134 
(N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2010), stands for a very different proposition than 
the one Dissenters espouse.  (DB 126-27.)  Based on “the application of 
North Carolina Rules of Evidence 608(a) and 405(a)”, each of which 
relates to the introduction of character evidence, the court in Bullock 
                                      
31 Dissenters’ framing of Gompers’s testimony as “[o]ne of the worst abuses in 
civil litigation” (DB 126) is unfortunate and baseless.  Contrary to Dissenters’ 
unsupported accusations, Gompers’s testimony about opinions he personally formed 
based on work that he did, which was fully disclosed and tested through discovery, 




stated that “[t]he testimony of an expert to the effect that a prosecuting 
witness is believable, credible, or telling the truth is inadmissible 
evidence”.  Id. at *3 (quoting State v. Bailey, 89 N.C. App. 212, 219, 365 
S.E.2d 651, 655 (1988)).  This “no vouching” concept is inapplicable here 
because Gompers’s testimony did not pertain to the personal credibility 
or veracity of any other witness. 
Dissenters next assert that this case is “analytically 
indistinguishable” from FrontFour Capital Grp. LLC v. Taube, 
No. 2019-0100-KJSM, 2019 WL 1313408 (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2019), a 
merger case from Delaware.  (DB 129.)  Again, Dissenters’ comparison is 
inapt.  In FrontFour, the defendants’ expert opined only on the “process” 
used by the investment banks.  2019 WL 1313408, at *26.  In contrast, 
Gompers went well beyond “process”; he stress-tested the substance of 
the Financial Advisors’ work and assessed the validity of their inputs and 
assumptions.  (See T pp 745:2-747:13.)  Rather than simply opining that 
RAI’s Financial Advisors used a proper “process” for performing a DCF 
analysis, Gompers scrutinized the inputs that the Financial Advisors 
selected, analyzed them by performing customary valuation techniques 
of the kind he would have performed had he done his own valuation, and 
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on the basis of that independent work concluded that the Financial 
Advisors’ DCF inputs were reasonable.  (See id.; T pp 752:1-757:23.) 
Dissenters’ other cases from outside North Carolina fare no better.  
They cite In re Wagner for the proposition that “[t]he Federal Rules of 
Evidence do not permit experts to simply ‘parrot’ the ideas of other 
experts or individuals.”  (DB 128 (quoting In re Wagner, 2007 WL 966010, 
at *4).)  But the trial court in Wagner overturned the magistrate judge’s 
decision to exclude testimony from an expert witness, and permitted that 
testimony because, among other things, the expert’s opinion was based 
on “the type of materials upon which an expert in his field would rely”.  
In re Wagner, 2007 WL 966010, at *3.  Just so here.  Gompers used his 
expertise as a financial economist to assess the reasonableness of the 
inputs to the Financial Advisors’ DCF analyses and to cross-check them 
by using other valuation methodologies, such as comparable companies 
and precedent transactions analyses, which are commonly used by 
financial economists.  (See T pp 745:2-747:13; 752:1-757:23.)  He did not 
simply repeat the Financial Advisors’ conclusions; he applied his training 




Dissenters’ reliance on Loeffel also is misplaced.  There, the trial 
court excluded an expert witness from testifying because the expert 
himself admitted that the theory on which he relied was “beyond [his] 
ken”.  Loeffel, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 824 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Ash Grove Cement Co. v. Employers Insurance suffers from a similar 
defect.  246 F.R.D. 656, 661 (D. Kan. 2007) (excluding testimony that was 
“within the province of an expert on coatings” by an expert who 
represented that he would “not serve as a coatings expert”).  In contrast 
to the experts in Loeffel and Ash Grove Cement, Gompers is indisputably 
qualified as an expert in financial economics and has extensive expertise 
applying the valuation methodologies in this case. 
Virginia Power Energy Marketing, Inc. v. EQT Energy, LLC also 
provides no support for Dissenters.  No. 11cv630, 2012 WL 13034278, 
at*1 (E.D. Va. May 9, 2012).  There, the trial court properly excluded one 
of an expert’s “opinions” that read, in its entirety, “I have reviewed the 
Protivti [sic] report produced by Guy Davis and, in my opinion, its 
analysis is consistent with the standard process used in the industry to 
quantify the value of natural gas pipeline firm capacity release 
agreements.”  See Expert Report of George Briden at 5, Va. Power Energy 
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Mktg., Inc. v. EQT Energy, LLC, 2012 WL 7040505.  Such an opinion is 
plainly unhelpful to the trial court, fails to disclose the bases for the 
expert’s own independent conclusion and warrants exclusion. 
In HealthOne v. UnitedHealth Grp., No. 10-cv-01633-WYD, 2012 
WL 94678 (D. Colo. Jan. 12, 2012), on which Dissenters also rely 
(DB 127), the court denied a motion to exclude expert testimony and 
found that if the information at issue was of a type “reasonably relied 
upon by experts in [their] field in forming opinions or inferences”, then 
such evidence “may be proper”.  Id. at *6.  Both Matter of James Wilson 
Associates, 965 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1992) and Dura Automotive Systems of 
Indiana, Inc. v. CTS Corp., 285 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2002), involved an 
expert who sought to testify in areas beyond his “domain of expertise” by 
adopting the statements of a non-testifying expert in a different specialty.  
James Wilson Associates, at 172-73; Dura Auto., at 613-14. Here, 
Gompers testified about corporate valuation—a subject squarely within 
his expertise. 
The Business Court acted within its discretion in rejecting 
Dissenters’ “vouching” objection to Gompers’s testimony. 
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C. Gompers Did Not Impermissibly Summarize Fact Evidence or 
Hearsay. 
Dissenters’ attack on the Business Court’s decision overruling their 
intertwined objections that Gompers’s testimony was a “summation of 
the factual record” and “recitation of hearsay” contained in analyst 
reports (DB 126-35) fails on every level. 
The testimony identified by Dissenters as improper summary in 
fact reflects the proper application of Gompers’s expertise as a financial 
economist to the facts of this case.  For example, Gompers explained the 
economic problems with performing a DCF using projections that ignore 
known risks to RAI’s cash flows (T pp 732:24-733:7), why as a matter of 
DCF methodology it was appropriate for the Financial Advisors to use 
the October 2016 projections even though they were optimistic 
(T p 735:8-24), and why the PGR and discount rate ranges used in mid-
2016 to derive the ceiling for management’s authority to make share 
repurchases did not alter his opinions about the Financial Advisors’ DCF 
inputs (T p 760:14-22).  He did not merely “re-hash” the record.  Rather, 
in each case, Gompers applied his own specialized expertise to the record 
evidence and offered independent opinions grounded in financial 
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economics.  The Business Court’s decision is therefore amply supported.  
(R pp 321-25.) 
Dissenters’ claim that Gompers engaged in “recitation of hearsay” 
contained in analyst reports (DB 130) fails for a similar reason.  Rule 703 
permits experts to rely on hearsay and other inadmissible evidence to 
support their opinions.  N.C. R. Evid. 703 (“If of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences 
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.”).  
Numerous witnesses—including the Financial Advisors, both sides’ 
experts and a representative of one of the Dissenters—testified that 
analyst reports are commonly relied upon when forming opinions on 
corporate valuation.  (R pp 323-25 ¶¶ 13-15.)  That is what Gompers did 
when he “examined each individual analyst report and explained how the 
reports supported his conclusions”.  (R p 325 ¶ 15.) 
This Court’s opinion in State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 409 S.E.2d 
288 (N.C. 1991) (cited at DB 130), does not help Dissenters.  There, an 
expert psychologist sought to testify about the results of an experiment 
without actually offering an opinion based on those results.  Id. at 25-26.  
The court determined that, because the expert was not using the 
-139- 
 
experiment as a basis for his opinion, the testimony was offered only for 
the truth of the experiment’s results and was thus hearsay.  Id.  Here, by 
contrast, the Business Court found that Gompers explained how the 
analyst reports informed his opinions.  (R p 325 ¶ 15; see also 
T pp 729:24-731:5; 745:2-747:2; 751:3-18; 801:21-23; 802:12-803:8.)  
Dissenters’ other authorities are inapplicable for the same reason.  See, 
e.g., SEC v. Bankatlantic Bancorp, Inc., No. 12-60082, 2013 WL 
12009694, at *8-9, 12 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2013) (excluding expert 
testimony where substance of analyst reports was conveyed without 
expert’s offering any opinion to which the reports related). 
In response, Dissenters appear to say that Gompers could not have 
used the hearsay analyst reports to support his opinions because, in their 
view, he did not offer any opinions.  (DB 132 (“Gompers did not rely on 
analyst reports to perform his own discounted cash flow analysis.  
Gompers did not perform a discounted cash flow analysis at all.” 
(emphasis in original)); DB 133 (“Gompers admitted that he did not use 
analyst reports in connection with his own perpetuity growth rate 
analysis because he did not perform any such analysis.” (emphasis in 
original)).)  At its core, Dissenters’ argument is that a DCF analysis is 
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the only valuation concept or technique through which a financial 
economist may offer a valuation opinion (such that not doing an 
independent DCF valuation from the ground up is equivalent to offering 
no opinion at all), and that Gompers’s opinions and the bases for them 
should have been excluded by the Business Court for that reason.  
Dissenters cite no authority for that proposition.  As the Business Court 
properly found, “Gompers performed extensive independent work” 
applying his undisputed expertise in order to, among other things, “test 
the Financial Advisors’ DCF-based valuations of RAI . . . and to explain 
why Zmijewski’s valuation of RAI was an outlier when compared to all 
other evidence of value in this case”.  (R pp 321-22 ¶ 10.)  
The Business Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
Gompers’s testimony. 
IV. DISSENTERS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN INTEREST AWARD 
BECAUSE THEY ALREADY RECEIVED FAIR VALUE (PLUS 
INTEREST) FOR THEIR SHARES. 
Dissenters’ interest calculation, proffered as an application of the 
“plain language” of N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(e), is both inconsistent with the 
plain language and substantively absurd, and it was correctly rejected by 
the Business Court.  (R p 312 ¶ 379 (“[Dissenters’] interpretation would 
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result in an interest award to Dissenters in this action of over $100 
million even though the Court has concluded that RAI paid them fair 
value for their shares.  The Court concludes that this is a nonsensical 
result, one supported neither by the text of the statute nor the intent of 
the legislature.”).) 
A. Dissenters Ignore the Statutory Definition of “Interest”. 
Dissenters’ argument is premised on the statutory language 
providing for judgment “for the amount, if any, by which the court finds 
the fair value of the shareholder’s shares, plus interest, exceeds the 
amount paid by the corporation to the shareholder”.  N.C.G.S. 
§ 55-13-30(e) (emphasis added).  Dissenters interpret the italicized words 
“plus interest” in effect to mean “plus an amount calculated by applying 
the statutory interest rate to the entire fair value of the shares for the 
entire period between the merger closing and satisfaction of a judgment”.  
But that is not how “interest” is defined in the statute.  Under N.C.G.S. 
§ 55-13-01(6), “interest” is calculated by applying the statutory rate “from 
the effective date of the corporate action until the date of payment” 
(emphasis added).  Thus, under the plain language of the statute (as in 
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common understanding), interest stops running on an amount when that 
amount is paid. 
The following example demonstrates why this common sense 
interpretation is warranted (and why Dissenters’ interpretation was 
properly rejected).  Suppose the Business Court had found the fair value 
of RAI shares to have been $60.  The statutory phrase “plus interest” 
would then have required calculating interest on $60 “until the date of 
payment”.  For the first $59.64, interest would run until it was paid 
in 2017.  For the remaining $0.36, interest likewise would have run until 
it was paid per the Court’s hypothetical judgment at the end of the 
appraisal proceedings.  This straightforward application of the statutory 
text corresponds with the ordinary understanding of “interest” in finance 
and in the English language.32  By contrast, under Dissenters’ 
interpretation, interest would continue to run on the $59.64 even after 
RAI paid that amount, in violation of the statutory definition.  It would 
                                      
32 This reading also makes sense of the phrase “if any” in N.C.G.S. 
§ 55-13-30(e).  With this phrase, the statute contemplates that in some instances the 
fair value of the shares “plus interest” will not exceed the amount already paid.  
Under Dissenters’ reading, that would likely never happen unless a company wildly 
overestimates fair value and overpays a dissenter under N.C.G.S. § 55-13-25.  In fact, 
under Dissenters’ reading, shareholders could still receive interest awards even if the 
corporation paid more than fair value, because interest would continue to accrue 
during the litigation. 
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also allow Dissenters to earn a return on that $59.64 twice—once at the 
statutory rate from RAI and once at whatever rate they earned in the 
market since RAI paid them that money in 2017.33 
B. Dissenters’ Interpretation of the Statute Has Been Rejected 
Overwhelmingly. 
The one case cited by Dissenters adopting their preferred interest 
calculation stands alone.  See Torrington Rsch. Co. v. Marvin, No. 
CV064005175, 2010 WL 1667580 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 6, 2010) (cited 
at DB 137).  In contrast to the Connecticut trial court opinion in 
Torrington, the case law in Model Act states with statutory language 
similar or identical to North Carolina’s calculates interest in a manner 
consistent with the Business Court.34  Dissenters do not address this 
point, wrongly ignoring extensive contrary authority.  Further, 
                                      
33 The perverse effect of Dissenters’ interpretation would be to limit 
corporations’ incentive to make robust payments to dissenting shareholders.  After 
all, if interest continued to run on any amounts paid to the dissenters, then 
corporations would be better off paying less and keeping more of the money for 
themselves during the pendency of appraisal proceedings. 
34 See, e.g., Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc., 63 P.3d 353, 357 (Colo. 2003); 
Ely, Inc. v. Wiley, No. LA-22998, Slip Op. at 9 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 31, 1994), rev’d on 
other grounds, 546 N.W.2d 218 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996); First W. Bank Wall v. Olsen, 
621 N.W.2d 611, 615 (S.D. 2001); Utah Res. Int’l, Inc. v. Mark Techs. Corp., 342 P.3d 
761, 768 (Utah 2014); HMO-W Inc. v. SSM Health Care Sys., 266 Wis. 2d 69, 72-75, 
667 N.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003); Brown v. Arp & Hammond Hardware 
Co., 141 P.3d 673, 677 (Wyo. 2006). 
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Torrington has not been cited by any other case, in Connecticut or 
elsewhere, in calculating interest on an appraisal award.  Although the 
court in Torrington did apply Dissenters’ method of calculating interest, 
the parties had not briefed the issue and the court’s opinion did not 
discuss it.  See id. at *7.  Moreover, the difference in the two calculation 
methods was likely not a major focus in Torrington because the total sum 
of interest awarded was approximately $8,400.  Id.  Here, Dissenters’ 
interpretation would result in a windfall award of over $100 million, even 
though the Business Court concluded that RAI timely paid Dissenters 
fair value for their shares.  (R p 312 ¶ 379.)  Dissenters do not even 
attempt to justify this absurd result.35 
Finally, Dissenters note that Pennsylvania revised the relevant 
portion of its Model Act-based appraisal statute, and therefore assert 
that North Carolina “has not adopted a formulation that calls for interest 
to be paid only on the difference between fair value and amounts 
previously paid to dissenting stockholders by the corporation”.  (DB 137.)  
                                      
35 Contrary to Dissenters’ argument, it is not just the “sheer amount” of the 
requested interest award here that makes it absurd.  Awarding any amount of 
interest in an appraisal action would be absurd when the court finds that the 
corporation has already timely paid a dissenting stockholder fair value for its shares.  
If a corporation timely pays all that is due (as the Business Court found RAI had 
done), then there is no outstanding amount to pay interest on. 
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But as another Model Act state’s Supreme Court explained in response 
to a similar argument about a Model Act revision:  “[a]n equally plausible 
explanation for the legislature’s failure to amend” the statute “is that the 
legislature deemed no revisions necessary” because as already written 
the statute does not require calculating interest in the way Dissenters 
propose. See Brown v. Arp & Hammond Hardware Co., 141 P.3d 673, 684 
(Wyo. 2006). 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the judgment of the Business Court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, this 16th of November, 2020. 
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The weighted average cost of capital we updated 
with the new inputs.  But it was largely the same 
methodology.  And then of course the perpetual growth rate, 
we ended up using the same rate because, in our view, nothing 
had fundamentally changed in the industry during the 
intervening two years.  In fact -- yeah.  Nothing had really 
changed. 
Q. So you used the same perpetual growth rate range in 
these two circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that in one 
case your client was buying and in another case it was 
selling?
A. That's right.  We did.  
Q. And you believe that was appropriate?
A. Yes.  No, in fact, I think -- it's not to suggest 
you wouldn't -- any deviation from that would need to be 
based in some facts, and nothing had changed.  So it would 
have been peculiar for us to deviate from that -- that 
approach in the absence of any new information.  
Q. Now, you mentioned in your -- in an earlier 
instance something of a peer set.  Is that the same or 
different than comparable companies?
A. Right.  It's the same.  The comparable companies.  
Q. So once again, in the context in which your client 
was a buyer and in a separate context in which it was a 
seller, you used the same comparables and -- or peer set?
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A. That's right.  We did.  
Q. And you used some of the same precedent 
transactions?  
A. Yeah.  Many of the same precedent transactions, 
including the Lorillard transaction itself was in the peer 
set.  It was one of the higher value numbers.  
Q. Okay.  And so now going back to the mechanics of 
the BAT version of the DCF analysis, what weighted average 
cost of capital did you use?
A. We used 5 to 6 percent range.  
Q. And that was the same as you used in Lorillard?
A. Well, actually it was lower because some of the 
inputs had -- had decreased, notably the risk free rate.  And 
the beta, one of the assumptions was very low for Reynolds.  
But we used 5 to 6 percent, which was lower than the 
Lorillard range.  
Q. What do you mean by beta?
A. Beta is just -- is a way of looking at the 
correlation of a company relative to the market.  And then 
that covariance, that correlation is then part of the capital 
asset pricing model.  So you use that beta to look at the 
market risk.  And the relationship between those two is what 
you add to the risk view rate to come up with a cost of 
equity.  So a cost of equity that appropriately factors in 
the risk profile of that particular asset.  
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And when we update those, we look at those 
assumptions at that time.  So that's why it can vary over 
time.  
Q. And so you ran your DCF analysis into the Excel 
spreadsheet program.  Yes?
A. That's right.  Ultimately.  Yes.
Q. And you ran it at a variety of inputs of different 
range -- the range of perpetual growth rate went from 
negative 5 to positive 5?
A. That's right.  
Q. And you ran zero as well?
A. We ran zero as well.
Q. And you ran a range of weighted average cost to 
capital?
A. That's right.
Q. And from that, you then produced a view as to the 
value of RAI's shares?
A. That's right.  
Q. Okay.  Did you use any additional metrics to either 
test your view that resulted from the DCF or to take a look 
at it in any way?
A. Yes.  So we spent a lot of time looking at the 
analysis and making sure that it properly -- that it properly 
reflects the -- that it makes sense.  That it's reasonable.  
One is, on the DCF specifically, we will -- I think 
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I mentioned earlier that when you look at the terminal value 
you can calculate it in two ways:  You can apply the 
perpetual growth rate, which is the way we did it, but the 
other methodology is to look -- you could do it as a multiple 
of earnings at the terminal value.  
And what we do is we imply -- we look at the 
implied exit multiple of that terminal value at -- from the 
DCF that we do.  And that's a way to sanity check the 
numbers.  
And, in this case, that implied exit -- range of 
exit multiples was in line with the public trading multiples 
of the peer group.  And that's something we do always to make 
sure that the DCF output is grounded in reality.  
The other thing is we make sure that the terminal 
value -- we look at how much of that -- how much of the total 
value is comprised by the terminal value.  And in this case, 
it was roughly 80 percent, which is in line with what you'd 
expect with a five-year forecast.  So that's part -- that's 
one of the steps we perform is we really look at the DCF and 
make sure that it's -- that the values that it's yielding 
make sense.  
And then we triangulate and look at the precedent 
transactions and the public comparables and -- you would 
expect them to be in line with each other, not perfectly in 
line because precedent transactions will typically be higher 
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than the public trading multiples for -- for the reason that 
precedent transactions are controlled transactions.  So they 
typically carry a premium.  So you would expect them to be 
above trading values where there is no -- not takeover 
premium.  
And then discounted cash flows, because typically 
we're doing discounted cash flows, including internal numbers 
that may not be in the market, you will sometimes get a wider 
range and a higher range on the outer set in the same way 
that we did, in this case, which is typical.  The DCF is 
typically the higher value and then you have the precedent 
transactions and then you have the public trading multiples 
in -- in the -- in what we call the football field or the 
display page. 
Q. How would you characterize the nature of the DCF if 
you change some of the -- let's say, if you used a wide range 
of perpetual growth rates, would you expect to get very 
wide-ranging results?
A. Yes.  It's mechanical.  And it's an important point 
because if you have too wide a range of perpetual growth 
rates, you're going to get a very wide range of outputs.  And 
that just makes it harder to be informative.  If you have too 
wide a range, it's -- you're not really forming a view.  
You're just putting in assumptions and inputting a big -- a 
big number, a big range in front of somebody, it's not very 
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informative.  
So we -- you tend to have to keep the perpetual 
growth range fairly lateral in order to not get too wide a 
range.  And like I said, we always sanity check it relative 
to the implied exit multiples that -- that's associated with 
that.  
Q. And did you do that here in the BAT transaction, 
the sanity check?
A. Yeah.  We did.  We did.  Sure.  
Q. Okay.  If I could have you look at -- well, let me 
do it this way.  
MR. RAFFERTY:  Your Honor, I'm going to offer 
PX0115 for which there is no objection because I simply want 
to show one page.  It's the proxy statement.  It's one of the 
binders we handed up to you at the break.  I just want to 
show one page from it.  And in the paper it's kind of blurry 
so I can put it up on the screen.
THE COURT:  All right.  
MR. RAFFERTY:  I don't believe there's any 
objection.
THE COURT:  You're offering PX115?  
MR. RAFFERTY:  It's the 13E-3.  Yes.
THE COURT:  Objection?
MS. SADIGHI:  No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  All right.  Admitted.  
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(PX115 was marked and admitted into evidence.)
MR. RAFFERTY:  Could you go to 582.  
MS. SADIGHI:  I apologize, Your Honor.  Could we 
have one moment?
THE COURT:  Mr. Rafferty, which page are you 
directing the witness to?  
MR. RAFFERTY:  Oh, I'm sorry, Your Honor.  582.  
But I think they may want to make some kind of objection.  So 
why don't you hold off.
MS. SADIGHI:  Your Honor, the confusion is, we 
understand that he's using one excerpt.  We do have an 
objection to the entirety of the Schedule 13E-3 to the extent 
of how it is used.  
MR. RAFFERTY:  (Indicating.)  
(Discussion held off the record.)
MS. SADIGHI:  I apologize.  
MR. RAFFERTY:  Okay.  It's on the stipulation, Your 
Honor.  So. . .
THE COURT:  All right.  So there's --
MR. RAFFERTY:  So could we go back to page --
THE COURT:  So what -- why don't we state it on the 
record so it's clear what we've been -- 
MS. SADIGHI:  To be clear on the record, my initial 
response was correct.  We have agreed.  There's no objection 
to PX115.
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would think of as the intrinsic or the fundamental value is 
the expected cash flow.  So it would be that cash flow which 
was somehow probability weighted among sort of good outcomes 
and bad outcomes and it's that central tendency.  If you 
don't have the expected cash flows, you're not going to get 
to that intrinsic or fundamental value.
Q. So how do you deal with the situation in which a 
business faces a variety of critical risks in trying to 
identify the right cash flows to use?
A. So sometimes it's possible in certain circumstances 
to have a set of projections which are somehow the midpoint.  
You know, they sort of -- sort of lie in the middle of what 
might happen on the upside or what might happen on the 
downside.  Other times, what you actually need to do is do 
explicit modeling of those scenarios.  
And so if there are some upside scenario where good 
events happen, you'd assess the probability of those things 
happening.  And if there are potential negative events, you 
have a scenario which looked at the financial implications of 
those negative events happened and weighted by the 
probability of those two. 
Q. So maybe it would be useful to illustrate this.  We 
have a demonstrative we can put up on the screen.  It's Slide 
No. 2 in the deck.  
So can you tell us, Professor, what it is we're 
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looking at here on Slide 2? 
A. So this is just a hypothetical example.  And 
probably the easiest way to think about it is perhaps -- 
let's think about a pharmaceutical company.  And that 
pharmaceutical company is developing a new drug.  And if we 
assume for a second that there's a 40 percent likelihood that 
that drug gets FDA approval, and if it does get FDA approval, 
then those incremental cash flows from the new drug are going 
to follow that blue line.  
And so over time, the cash flows from that company 
are going to grow from 200 million if the drug is approved in 
the first year, all the way up to a billion dollars in year 
five.  But, again, we know that drug approval is not certain 
and so if we assume that there's a 60 percent chance that the 
drug's not approved, then the cash flows from this 
pharmaceutical company might increase like that red line.  
And so starting at 200 million and at year five end up at 
only 400 million because they don't have that new drug. 
Q. So is the blue line kind of the good case and red 
line is the bad case?
A. Exactly.  Optimistic, pessimistic, upside, 
downside.  You could characterize it a lot of ways.
Q. And if you were doing a discounted cash flow of 
this company, which of these two lines would you use as 
the -- as the expected cash flows?
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A. You'd use neither one.  You'd use something which 
was in between.  You'd probability weight those two cash flow 
series.  And you'd get something which would be in between.
Q. So let's turn to the next slide.  And so what are 
we looking at here with this green line?
A. Yes.  In this hypothetical example, the green line 
would represent the expected cash flow.  And it's just a -- 
it's just taking 60 percent -- 60 percent of the downside 
scenario and 40 percent of the upside scenario.  
So the only cash flow series that would give you 
the intrinsic or fundamental value of this company would be 
that middle green line.  To use the blue line or the red line 
would be wholly inappropriate.  
Q. So if you had a student who was valuing this 
company, you would tell that student to use which line?
A. It would be the green line.
Q. Okay.  And what if the student used the blue line 
to do the valuation, what would you tell her she had done 
wrong?
A. I would tell her that she missed one of the 
fundamental premises of finance which is that value when you 
do a DCF is wholly dependent, entirely dependent on using the 
expected cash flows, not the best case or upside scenarios.  
Q. Did you form a view as to whether the projections 
that were used by the bankers in this matter complied with 
Theresa B. Kramer, Official Court Reporter
Mecklenburg County Courthouse, North Carolina


























- App. 10 - 
the principles that you just articulated?
A. I did.  
Q. And what was that view?
A. So my view after, you know, reviewing industry 
information and analyst reports and the like is that the cash 
flows, those five years of projections that the financial 
advisors used are more like the blue line, more like an 
upside case, as opposed to the green line, the expected value 
case.  
Q. So did those projections that you looked at take 
account of all potential outcomes that the company was 
facing?
A. No.  It was clear in both the way that the cash 
flows were described by the company and disclosed in the 
proxy that it was assuming business as usual.  And when you 
look through in terms of looking at what the sort of industry 
experts are saying about the issues in the tobacco industry, 
there are some things which are potential upside scenarios in 
terms of market share and the like, but there's a description 
of a tremendous number of game changing downside risks.
So, you know, I've sat through the Court for a 
number of days and if you look through, reading through 
industry reports from experts and the analysts, you know, 
things like nicotine reformulation by the FDA, the menthol 
ban, changes to the age of purchase of cigarettes, the 
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increases in state and federal excise taxes, or 
cannibalization from new products, all of those things could 
be major game changers.  And were one of them to occur in the 
next three years, five years or ten years, it would have 
major negative implications for cash flow.  
Q. Now, is it your understanding that management at 
RAI just ignored the risks entirely when they put the 
projections together?
A. No.  I think the description is that, because they 
couldn't be certain when those risks might occur and could 
not assess exactly the probability, they didn't factor them 
into the projections.  The projections were business as 
usual, but they were very clear at saying that these risks 
were out there and were real probabilities occurring.  And 
the further you went in time, the increased in probability 
that at least one or multiple of those risks would occur in 
that time frame.  
Q. Now, you mentioned it and I should have asked you, 
but have you had the opportunity to be here for any portion 
of the trial?
A. I've been here since Tuesday morning.  Yes.
Q. And did you hear Ms. Crew testify this morning?
A. I did.
Q. And she was asked a number of questions on 
cross-examination about whether as a business matter, it 
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would have been appropriate for her and her team to model in 
what were characterized as speculative events.  Do you 
remember hearing those questions?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you remember Ms. Crew answering that she did 
not think it was appropriate to do that as a business matter 
so that she could in fact continue to run the business?
A. Yes.
Q. And then she was asked a question about whether it 
would be appropriate to factor in those kinds of risks in a 
situation in which the company was being sold.  Do you recall 
that?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you remember her testimony was that it would 
be appropriate in that case because you needed to value the 
company rather than just run it on a day-to-day business?
MR. ROLNICK:  Objection, Your Honor.  Leading and 
mischaracterizes the testimony.
THE COURT:  I'll sustain the -- I'll sustain the 
objection.  The last four questions have been more of a 
memory test than they have been to actually get to the point 
so why don't you get to the point.
BY MR. BORNSTEIN: 
Q. The point I was going to get to was to ask:  Do you 
agree with Ms. Crew's testimony on this subject?
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A. I do.  I mean, to ignore real probable events that 
could occur over some reasonable finite sort of time period 
that could dramatically change the cash flows of the business 
would violate all the principles of value.  And so you need 
to take them into consideration in some way.  
To ignore them and to use projections which do not 
embed them would be 100 percent wrong.  
Q. And do you agree with Ms. Crew that there are 
different considerations in doing projections to run the 
business on a day-to-day basis and doing projections for 
valuation purposes?
MR. ROLNICK:  Objection again, Your Honor.  He's 
asking a question that asks whether he agrees with testimony 
that was given and characterizing it.  It's inappropriate.  
We would ask --
THE COURT:  I'll sustain it.  Just ask him the 
question as opposed to the agreement.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Sure.  Absolutely.
BY MR. BORNSTEIN: 
Q. Is it the case that projections that someone does 
in the purpose of managing the business on a day-to-day 
business can be different in this respect from projections 
that someone does for the purpose of valuing the entity as a 
going concern?
A. A hundred percent.  And maybe sort of an example.  
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I've been on the board of some start-up companies.  I've 
advised lots of my students who have started companies.  And 
what I tell them is that you need -- you need different sets 
of projections.  You need projections to run the business.  
And those projections may not be the same thing as the 
expected outcome that you'd use to value the business because 
you need to build the business as if things continue to go.  
If there's -- if it -- for example, if you're a 
biotech company, you can't be certain that the drug's going 
to be approved, but you have to continue to operate the 
business as if you believe it will be approved.  So managing 
the business on that scenario of approval, even if from a 
valuation sense, it's only 40 percent likely that it would be 
approved.  And so absolutely, it's not only what I teach, 
it's what I've advised when I've been on the board that you 
can have projections for business purposes, but the 
evaluation for valuation purposes could be substantially 
different. 
Q. And if we have a situation where there is a company 
where there are differences between the management focused 
projections and the valuation focused projections, what would 
be the effect on the reliability of the discounted cash flow 
for using the management focused projections rather than the 
valuation focused projections?
A. So typically management projections for operating a 
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business tend to be more optimistic.  They tend to be sort of 
upside.  Things are going to go well and I want to build a 
business to be able to execute if those things go well.
If you were to use management projections for 
operating the business and you don't adjust for some of these 
negative probabilities, you're going to overvalue the 
company.  It's going to be an optimistic valuation. 
Q. So in light of that, was it a mistake for the 
financial advisors to use the projections that they used to 
support their fairness opinion?
A. No, I don't think so.  
Q. And why is that?
A. Well, what the financial advisors were tasked with 
doing was to assess whether or not the deal offered by BAT 
treated the non-BAT shareholders fairly.  Were they getting 
sort of fair compensation, fair return for their shares?  So 
to the extent that the projections that they were using were 
optimistic, were upside, not factoring in some of these 
downside risks, it would -- it would be -- it would be an 
optimistic valuation.  
So if the deal price was at or above that, they 
could reasonably conclude that the RAI shareholders, the 
non-BAT RAI shareholders were getting sort of, you know, 
compensated above the intrinsic value. 
Q. So if the output of the DCF analysis the bankers 
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did were still lower than were in the range of the deal 
price, you're saying, even if they're optimistic, what flows 
from that?
A. Well, that the true intrinsic value based, or the 
fundamental value based on expected cash flows would be 
lower.  And therefore, they could reasonably conclude that -- 
that -- that the non-BAT RAI shareholders were receiving fair 
compensation.  They were receiving their value.  
Q. So if the price that's being paid is higher than an 
optimistic value, that price is by definition fair?
A. From a financial -- I can't opine as a matter of 
law.  
Q. Of course.
A. That's for the judge.  But from a financial 
economics perspective, that would be true.
Q. Okay.  And one question just to touch quickly on 
something you said, which was that management tends to have 
optimistic projections, is there a basis for that opinion in 
the field of financial economics?
A. Yes.  So there are a number of academic studies 
which have looked at realized financial performance relative 
to internal projections.  And generally speaking, internal 
projections tend to be -- management internal projections 
generally tend to be optimistic.
Q. Now, in doing a discounted cash flow analysis, are 
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there any rules about the number of years of projections that 
you need to have to do it right?
A. No.  There's no hard and fast rules.  Generally, 
you want to project out toward some steady state.  But 
there's, again, no hard and fast rule, whether it's five, 
three, ten.  
Q. Well, we heard a lot of testimony -- and since you 
were here, you heard a lot of testimony -- about whether 
five-year projections were appropriate or ten-year 
projections were appropriate.  
Can you do a reliable DCF analysis with five years 
of cash flow projections? 
A. Absolutely.  I've done them.  I've seen, you know, 
reasonable valuations done.  So absolutely.  
Q. And there was a spreadsheet that was up on the 
screen for some time yesterday morning.  Do you remember 
that?
A. Yes.  I was here for that.  Yes.  
Q. And I want to ask just a few questions related to 
that spreadsheet and the questioning around it --
THE COURT:  Why don't we -- before you do that, why 
don't we take the midmorning break and then come back and let 
you move into that subject.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Of course.  Thank you.
THE COURT:  All right.  We'll be adjourned for 15 
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years or five years into the future.  It's, like, 
theoretically or practically forever into the future.  When 
you assume a perpetuity growth rate, you're assuming that 
that company will grow at that rate forever into the future.  
Q. And how does a financial economist go about 
selecting what perpetuity growth rate to use in the DCF?
A. You analyze the industry, you analyze the company.  
You look at the trends that are happening.  You look at 
potential risks and the like.  And from an analysis of that 
information, you then sort of come up with your estimate of 
what you believe an appropriate perpetuity growth rate is.  
Q. And are there, you know, typical boundaries that 
are recognized in economics that people think about in 
selecting a growth rate?
A. Yes.  For a typical business, it's usually the case 
that most valuation professionals, most -- myself included -- 
would use a perpetuity growth rate somewhere between 
inflation and nominal GDP growth.  And the way to think about 
that is, if you have a company which is going to stay -- stay 
its steady state and it's going to stay the same size in sort 
of real economic terms, that sort of says its performance, 
its cash flows are going to grow at the rate of inflation.  
And what that is sort of saying is this firm is going to stay 
the same size forever.  
A second possibility is that the company will grow 
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at the overall rate of the economy.  So generally, the 
economy grows faster than inflation on average.  And so if 
this company is sort of going to grow roughly proportional to 
the overall economy, then you would assume that the 
perpetuity growth rate would be the rate of nominal GDP 
growth into the future. 
Q. Are there circumstances in which it is appropriate 
to use a growth rate that is below the rate of inflation?
A. Absolutely.  
Q. In what circumstances?
A. So I've been involved in circumstances where I've 
done valuations where there's no terminal value.  So the -- 
say it's a patent and you're trying to value a patent.  Once 
it expires, there's no sort of positive free cash flow.  So 
there's no terminal value.  There are other circumstances in 
which there are companies or industries that are in real 
decline, meaning that they're disappearing for a variety of 
reasons.  
It could be new technology obviates the need for 
that particular business and that business is going to 
generally go away over time.  It could be a business like 
cigarettes in which for health and regulatory reasons, that 
that business is going away over time. 
Q. Now, did you come up with your own perpetuity 
growth rate number here?
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A. No.
Q. So what work did you do in looking at the 
perpetuity growth rates that were selected by the financial 
advisors?
A. I did the same work that I would do if I were to 
have chosen my own perpetuity growth rate.  Looked at 
industry reports.  Looked at industry data.  Read through the 
volumes of analyst reports in the case.  And came up with an 
assessment and a set of information by which I could evaluate 
the choices which were made by the financial advisors.  But 
it was the same set of work that I did that I would have done 
had I come up with my own estimate.
Q. And is the work that you just described the work 
that financial economists do in the ordinary course of their 
field?
A. Oh, any time I've done my own valuation, I've 
done -- I do that exact same set of things where you look at 
industry reports, analyst reports and the like, to come up 
with an assessment of what you think an appropriate 
perpetuity growth rate would be.
Q. And what did the bankers here conclude was the 
appropriate growth rate to use, or range of rates?
A. So Goldman Sachs and Lazard used the same range.  
Their range was minus .5 percent to plus .5 percent.  
JPMorgan used a slightly higher range which was 
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from zero to 1 percent.  
Q. And what did you conclude about the ranges that 
they selected?
A. My conclusion is that, you know, range centered 
around zero sort of makes sense.  Those are reasonable 
terminal growth rates.
Q. What's the basis of that opinion?
A. So when you look, most of the investment analysts 
actually who were following RAI were projecting negative long 
run growth.  
Second, it was clear from my analysis of the 
industry reports and from the analysts that there were, you 
know, major changes in the industry.  Volumes had been 
declining for quite some time and it was clear from the 
industry experts that the ability to continue to offset those 
volume declines with price increases was potentially going to 
be limited in the future.  
And then the third thing was the discussion of what 
were these very large game changing risks which faced the 
industry?  I think I've mentioned a couple of them earlier.  
So things like FDA regulation of nicotine, the menthol ban, 
restrictions on age purchases of product, state and federal 
excise taxes, new products like vapor and its 
cannibalization.  
All of those things could have dramatic step order 
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function changes in a negative way to the industry and those 
were very real possibilities.  
Q. In addition to looking at this publicly available 
information like analyst reports and so forth, did you also 
look at any of the internal documentation from RAI or 
testimony of the like?
A. Certainly.  So I reviewed the various internal 
documents, the public disclosures and say the proxy, the -- 
and sort of the testimony, and it was clear from that that 
management itself understood that these very large risks were 
out there and were very real probabilities over a reasonable 
horizon, and that those things would dramatically change the 
business in sort of a very negative way.  
Q. There have been a number of questions over the 
course of the trial focused on what's been characterized as a 
cliff.  Do you remember that coming up?
A. I do.  
Q. Can you tell us whether a -- the use of a zero 
percent perpetuity growth rate means that a company is 
falling off a cliff?
A. Yes.  I mean, that's actually a mischaracterization 
of what a zero percent growth rate means.  
So if you think about it -- so practically speaking 
first of all, what a zero percent growth rate means is that 
if you have nine billion of cash flow or five billion of cash 
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flow in year five, you'd have that exact same amount in year 
six and year seven and year eight so your cash flow would 
stay the same.  So it's five billion in six, five billion in 
seven, five billion in eight.  But the thing that we need to 
sort of understand about this perpetuity growth rate is that 
it really is meant to capture two sort of factors.  The first 
of which is as I mentioned earlier, there's a time series of 
growth rates.  
So that perpetuity growth rate is meant to capture 
not just what happens in the next two, three, four, five 
years, but what happens over the life of the business.  
So it's time averaging over, like, infinity in some 
sense.  So if you look over the next 20 years, maybe it grows 
somewhat quickly over the next three to five years, but 
eventually it's going to decline by 5, 10, 15, 25 or 30 
percent.  And so that zero percent can capture some growth -- 
some positive growth now but then averaging with this big 
negative growth into the future.  
The second thing it captures is just the fact that 
projections are just estimates and they're never perfect.  
And I think the way we should think about it is that zero 
percent captures the fact that it's possible that RAI would 
continue to grow at 7 or 8 percent through year ten, but as 
the -- you know, as the industry analysts and experts sort of 
acknowledge and the company itself, there are real 
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probabilities that one or more of these big negative events 
are going to hit.  It could hit in year four, year six, or 
year ten.  And if they hit, these are going to have game 
changing effects.  
So you could have 25, 30, 50 percent changes.  I 
mean, if it was a menthol ban, that's sort of -- you know, 
the largest area of what's going on in RAI.  Their best 
performing subset of cigarettes.  And so the way to think 
about it is that that zero percent averages across some 
scenarios in which, yes, maybe it grows at 7 or 8 percent, 
but maybe in year eight, there's a regulatory event that has 
minus 25 percent.  
And so the way -- the way you should think about 
that growth rate is it averages over the time with maybe some 
positive and then negative in the future and averages across 
scenarios some of which may be very large negative events 
that happen. 
Q. Is there a concept of present value weighting in 
connection with perpetuity growth rate selection?
A. Yes.  So the way to think about the first element 
is that that zero percent would be sort of a present value 
weighted calculation of the growth rates in year six, seven, 
eight, ten, 15, 20, 30.  
Q. And can you tell us what you mean by present value 
weighted calculation?
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A. Well, I think I explained to the Court a little 
earlier that there's the time value of money.  That money 
today is worth more than money later and so the growth rate 
ten years from now is less important to the perpetuity growth 
rate than growth say in year six.  
And so you would have to adjust for, say, a big 
negative growth rate in year ten or 15 by that time value of 
money, by the weighted average cost of capital.  
Q. And does the perpetuity growth rate which is just a 
single number -- zero or .5 or whatever it is -- does that 
number capture that rise and fall over time?
A. That's one element of how you would get to a zero 
percent growth rate.  Yes.  
Q. And so if you have a company that is growing at, 
say, 7 percent over the course of five years and then you 
assign a zero percent perpetuity growth rate in year six, 
does that mean that you are saying that growth necessarily 
stops immediately in year six?
A. No, not at all.  
Q. And that's for what reason?
A. For the two reasons I mentioned, one of which is 
that the perpetuity growth rate averages across all the 
years.  The present value across all the years, as well as 
averaging across different scenarios that might happen.  So 
there's nothing embedded in a zero percent growth rate which 
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would say that this company would fall off a cliff after year 
five.  
Q. So is it -- is it correct that the growth of RAI 
over the past several years has been higher than the rate of 
inflation?
A. Yes.
Q. Does that undermine in any way the reasonableness 
of the bankers' selection of a zero percent rate for 
perpetuity?
A. No, not at all.
Q. Can you explain why not?
A. Because part of their ability to grow quickly was 
driven by price -- their ability to increase prices.  And it 
was clear that their ability to increase prices at least from 
the perspective of analysts in the industry and including 
internally, perhaps was going to be limited in the future.  
The ability to continue to increase at 6 or 7 or 8 percent 
per year would be hard.  
The second thing is that, while we didn't get one 
of these regulatory events perhaps in the last, you know, 
three to five years, that says nothing about the real 
probability that one of those events may happen in the next 
three, five or sort of ten years.  And so the fact that 
they've grown quickly over the last several years in no way 
negates a zero percent growth rate being reasonable. 
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Q. Are there customary ways to look and check the 
reasonableness of the perpetuity growth rate that you select 
when do you a DCF?
A. For sure.  
I mean, so one of the things that we teach in first 
year finance and one of the things that you see -- one of the 
things that I've always done when I do valuation, as well as 
the thing you see that all three financial advisors doing is 
to gauge their perpetuity growth rate by looking at what's 
called the terminal year exit multiple. 
Q. And what is that?
A. So we know -- and one of the things I did here in 
terms of a market check was to do a comparable company's 
multiple analysis.  What a terminal year exit multiple 
analysis is, is just to say a particular perpetuity growth 
rate implies some multiple in that terminal year.  So because 
we're calculating a terminal value, we can say, what multiple 
would be active or valid in order to create that terminal 
value?  And so you calculate the EBITDA multiple, the ratio 
of enterprise value to EBITDA, in that final year of 
projection based on your choice of perpetuity growth rate.
Q. All right.  So let me break down a couple of pieces 
of that answer.  
First of all, you used the word multiple a lot.  
Let's make sure we're all in agreement on what you mean by 
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that.  
A. So one common -- one common check to a DCF is 
typically to do what we call a comparable companies or 
precedent transaction.  Which a lot of people would just call 
a multiples analysis.  And what that is, is it's taking the 
ratio of your value to some financial metric.  And then -- 
Q. So for example.  
A. For example.  I was going there.  
So one example -- and probably the most common is 
EBITDA, earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization.  
And so a very common -- things that market 
participants do -- and you should certainly use as a check is 
to say what does -- you know, what does the choice of your 
perpetuity growth rate imply for the multiple that will 
exist, that ratio of enterprise value to EBITDA.  
Q. And did you look at that in this matter?
A. I did, yes.  
Q. So let's see if we can put on the screen please 
Demonstrative No. 7.  And does this slide reflect the work 
that you did on this?
A. It does.
Q. All right.  So can you tell us first of all what 
that very first green bar with the 12.4X is?
A. That represents the ratio of enterprise value to 
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EBITDA for RAI as of October 20th, before the offer from BAT.  
And so at that time, if you took the enterprise value and 
divided it by the 12 months EBITDA, you would get 12.4  
times.
Q. And the enterprise value is something that you 
calculate how?
A. Well, you take the number of shares times the share 
price to get equity value.  You add the value of the debt and 
subtract out the excess cash.
Q. So is that a measure of the value of the firm as -- 
as set by the market?
A. Correct.  Yes.  
Q. And so this first multiple is calculated as a 
market value of the firm divided by some measure of earnings?
A. That's correct.  
Q. Okay.  So then what are the next three green bars?
A. So the next three green bars just do that 
calculation for the terminal value of the financial advisors.  
So you take the total value of their -- their total terminal 
value and you divide it by the last year of EBITDA.  And so 
that essentially is saying, what's the EBITDA multiple that 
is implied by this perpetuity growth rate that will exist in 
sort of year six?  
Q. So let's just take a concrete example here of let's 
say the Goldman analysis that gets you to the 10.5X.  What 
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are the different inputs into the calculation that arise at a 
10.5 times multiple?
A. It's -- so within their spreadsheets analysis, 
the -- they have a component of value which is called 
terminal value, which is the value which after the projection 
period, from year six forward, is the value that they 
calculate based on their perpetuity growth rate.  So you take 
that terminal value and you divide it by EBITDA in year five.  
So that's sort of what we call a trailing 12-month 
EBITDA multiple.  But that gives you this 10.5 number.  So 
the ratio of terminal value to year five EBITDA is 10.5.  
Q. So the numerator is the portion of the Goldman 
Sachs valuation that starts in year six?
A. Correct.  
Q. And the denominator is what?
A. Year five EBITDA.
Q. Okay.  And then they used a range of perpetuity 
growth rates in the analysis -- 
A. Correct.
Q. -- from negative .5 to positive .5.  
Do you recall which spot in the range was used to 
calculate the numbers on your chart here? 
A. So it's the midpoint for all of these.  So it's 
zero for Lazard and Goldman Sachs and .5 for JPMorgan.  
Q. Okay.  And now, can you tell anything or do you 
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draw any conclusions as an economist from the fact that the 
bankers' multiples are somewhat lower than the pre-merger 
trading multiple in the first bar?
A. That's sort of what you expect.  So their implied 
terminal exit multiples give you comfort that the choice of 
perpetuity growth rate is reasonable.
Q. And why does it give you comfort that those numbers 
are a little bit lower?
A. So the -- the multiple is really just dependent 
upon the risk of the cash flows and the growth rate.  And 
generally we think of growth rates declining over time.  So 
if the growth rates standing in year five looking off into 
the future is lower than the growth rates standing here 
today, then on average, multiples decline over time.  
And so the fact that the multiples are a little bit 
lower in year five would be reasonable because, looking 
forward, you would expect the growth rate off into the future 
five years from now will be lower than the growth rate today.  
Q. So tell us what the two bars over on the right are 
and how you calculated those.  
A. So I did the exact same thing for the two experts 
for the Dissenter, Mr. Taylor and Professor Zmijewski.  And 
if you do the exact same calculation that I did for the 
financial advisors, you arrive at implied terminal exit 
multiples of 17 and a half and 17.7.  
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Q. And can you draw any conclusions about the 
reasonableness of their valuations based on what we see here 
on the chart?
A. So as I said, this is really a test of the 
perpetuity growth rate.  And if I were looking at this -- 
because again, this is an important check -- this would cause 
me to have serious concerns about the perpetuity growth rate 
that I chose.  
Q. And why is that?
A. Because essentially you're assuming that mult- -- 
the multiple's going to go up over time.  And it would 
generally imply that from the perspective of expectations, 
growth in this company is going to be accelerating.  So 
growth in five years is going to be higher than growth today.
Q. And would it be reasonable to expect that growth in 
RAI would be higher five years from now than it is today?
A. No.  
Q. And why is that?
A. Generally speaking, this is an industry in decline.  
It's been growing relatively rapidly and is expected over the 
next several years to grow, you know, more rapid than zero 
and therefore standing five years from now, we would expect 
it to be growing slower.  
Q. Let's take a look at Slide No. 4, please.  On the 
subject of terminal value, can you tell us what it is we're 
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looking at here?
A. So what I did here is just to break apart the total 
per share enterprise value that Professor Zmijewski and Mr. 
Taylor calculate.  And I divided into the component which is 
based on their projection period cash flows.  It's five years 
for Professor Zmijewski and eight years for Mr. Taylor.
Q. And that's the green portion?
A. That's correct.  And I look at that as a fraction 
of the overall value and then also what fraction of the 
overall value is due to their terminal value.  
Q. And what, if any, conclusions or implications are 
there for you from what you've done here on the chart?
A. So what this says is that the vast, vast, vast 
majority of the value they come up with is in their terminal 
value.  
And because that is totally dependent upon their 
perpetuity growth rate, what this says is that you need to 
take an extreme amount of care in choosing that perpetuity 
growth rate because it is the most critical factor in terms 
of determining the value of RAI.  
Q. So are there some steps that you would then take 
upon seeing that your calculation led to these results?
A. Certainly.  You'd want to do checks.  
And one of the checks we just talked about which 
was a check of the implied exit multiple.  But you also -- 
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you know, again, this is sort of Finance 101.  That you don't 
just do your DCF because as I mentioned to the Court a little 
earlier, DCF is just math.  It's literally just formulas.  
And what matters are your inputs.  And you want to check 
those inputs with other measures of value.  And so you'd want 
to do reasonable checks of that value in other ways.  
Q. Have you seen any documents internally at RAI that 
reflected some kind of DCF calculation?
A. I have, yes.  
Q. And do you recall what the inputs were in -- in 
that document?
A. I do, yes.
Q. What were they?
A. So they were projections and then the discount 
rates and perpetuity growth rates.
Q. And do you recall what perpetuity growth rate was 
used by the company in connection with trying to come up with 
a ceiling for authorization to go purchase shares in the 
market if it chose to do so?
A. They used 3 percent in those projections.
Q. Okay.  And -- and in that calculation?
A. In that calculation, yes.
Q. Now, does that cause you to question in any way 
your opinion about the reasonableness of the growth rates 
that the bankers used?
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A. No.  
Q. Please explain why not.  
A. Well, the first reason is that they -- they tied 
that growth rate to what I would almost call a step factor 
calculation of their discount rate.  So they had this set of 
factors which would increase or decrease their base discount 
rate based on things like protected market, new product, and 
the like.  And those things generally are related to the sort 
of -- the sort of probability that those things are going to 
be successful or not.  
And so there's a direct tie between the way they 
calculate the discount rate and the perpetuity growth rate.  
Those two things are inextricably sort of linked.  
The second thing is that this wasn't done for what 
I would call a fundamental or intrinsic value purposes in 
terms of really being this probability weighted expected 
growth rate into the future.  And that be sort of, you 
know -- I often talk about projections and calculations being 
done for different purposes.  This wasn't done to estimate 
intrinsic or fair value.  It was done to estimate the maximum 
price that they would be willing to pay for their shares in 
this repurchase program.  
Q. So let me go back to the first of the two things 
you mentioned relating to the way they calculated the 
weighted average cost of capital.  
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To put the question kind of bluntly, did the 
company go about calculating weighted average cost of capital 
the right way? 
A. No.  I would have failed them in that sense.  
They didn't do a market derived cost of capital 
where you look and you calculate -- I'm sure I'll have a 
chance to talk to the Court about betas and those sorts of 
things.  But they didn't do a market derived cost of capital 
and therefore it's disassociated from the way we would do a 
valuation.  
Q. So to just sort of put a pin on that for a second, 
when you did a -- did you do a weighted average cost of 
capital calculation in this case?
A. I did.
Q. And what weighted average cost of capital did you 
come up with?
A. 5.78.
Q. Do you remember what each of the Dissenters' 
experts came up with?
A. I believe Professor Zmijewski was 5.70 and 
Mr. Taylor was 5.75.
Q. And would you characterize that as a wild 
disagreement or general consensus on the right number?
A. It may be the kind of things that academics around 
the lunch table might argue about, but from a practical 
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perspective, it's not important.  
Q. Because everyone's pretty much --
A. Yeah.  We're pretty much in the same -- in the same 
range.
Q. Okay.  And is that also where the company came out 
in this share repurchase document?
A. No.  They had a much higher cost of capital.  
Q. Okay.  And what does that imply to you about the 
work that they did in selecting the growth rate and the cost 
of capital?
MR. ROLNICK:  Objection, Your Honor.  He's asking 
him to speculate about what RAI management was thinking.
THE COURT:  Well, he's asking for an opinion.  I'll 
allow the question.  Overruled.  
A. So from the document which shows how they created 
the cost of capital, they were tying their -- the way they 
were talking about -- the way they were calculating their 
cost of capital to things which might influence the growth 
rate.  The two were actually linked.
BY MR. BORNSTEIN:
Q. So you referenced just now a document that talked 
about the way they were calculating their cost of capital.  
Just to make sure we're all thinking about the same document, 
can we have PX47 on the screen?  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  This is in evidence already, Your 
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flow on my own.  
Q. If you had been asked to, is that something you 
could have done?
A. Yes.
Q. And what would you need to have done in order to do 
it?
A. So if I -- if I were asked to do an affirmative 
DCF, I would have likely done --
MR. ROLNICK:  Your Honor, I'm sorry to interrupt, 
but I'm going to object.  
If he's going to ask this witness to opine on what 
a DCF would have looked like had he done one, which he had 
every opportunity to do and we could have examined him on 
that, we could have deposed him on that, they chose not to do 
a DCF.  This witness didn't do a DCF.  And so I'm going to 
object to a hypothetical question that says, had you done 
one, what would it look like?  That's not fair to us and it's 
improper.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  I'm not seeking to elicit any kind 
of valuation information about where he would have come out 
had he done a DCF or anything of the like through this 
question.  So I will be clear to the professor that's not my 
intent here.
THE COURT:  I'll overrule the objection at this 
point.  
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BY MR. BORNSTEIN:
Q. Should I rephrase the question just to --
A. No, no, no.  So the way that -- given the very real 
sort of large downside risk that this industry faced, I 
believe that an appropriate discounted cash flow that I would 
have done would have entailed a number of scenarios.  I would 
have absolutely put in place a downside scenario in which 
some time over those first five years, a negative event would 
have occurred, which would have had an effect on the cash 
flows of RAI.  And then I would have weighted those two to 
come up with the DCF.
Q. And this -- 
MR. ROLNICK:  Your Honor, I move to strike that 
testimony.
THE COURT:  Is this line of inquiry, has this 
been -- has this been displayed in any disclosures during 
discovery or was it foreclosed during deposition?  
MR. ROLNICK:  Not to my knowledge, Your Honor.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Your Honor, the point of this 
question is to respond to the arguments that Mr. Rolnick made 
before the examination began in which he challenged Professor 
Gompers for not having done a DCF analysis and all I'm asking 
Professor Gompers to do is to explain what he did and the 
rationale for why he did it the way he did it.
THE COURT:  Well, actually, I think what you're 
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asking him to do is if he had done a DCF, how would he have 
done it, what would he have considered.  And I think 
Mr. Rolnick's concerns about that are well taken.  So I'm 
going to sustain the objection.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  All right.  Thank you, Your Honor.  
BY MR. BORNSTEIN: 
Q. Let's switch to a different topic then which is the 
comparable companies analysis you mentioned.  
And did you actually do your own comparable 
companies analysis? 
A. I did.  
Q. So let's start by saying, what is a comparable 
companies analysis?
A. We had a brief introduction a little while ago, but 
essentially it's identifying companies which you believe are 
peers who share sort of the same characteristics and you try 
to benchmark the value of the company you're valuing by 
looking at the multiples that those companies trade at.  So 
you calculate for a set of companies that you identify as 
peer, you calculate that enterprise value to EBITDA.  
Q. And why does someone do a comparable companies 
analysis when conducting a valuation?
A. It's a check.  Again, this -- you know, discounted 
cash flows is just formula with some inputs into it.  
And if there are multiple pieces of information 
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that you can utilize to check that DCF, you always do it.  I 
always do it in my analysis.  When I look at financial 
professionals doing their analysis, they always do that 
analysis.  Because to ignore it would be wrong because you 
just don't know if your DCF is using the right set of 
assumptions.  
Q. So how do you go about selecting the companies that 
you would use in a comparables analysis?
A. Because you're trying to match companies based on 
their riskiness and their growth, what you do is you try to 
constrain it to firms which are in the industry and you can 
sort of have various filters where you try to make the set of 
companies as similar as possible.  
Now, you never have a perfect twin.  You never have 
a company which is going to be identical to RAI that you'll 
say, ah, this is exactly RAI's value.  
But firms, say, here in the tobacco industry are 
going to have similar sets of regulatory risk and use issues 
and that will help them provide information to the value of 
RAI.  Certainly the closer a company is in terms of the 
geography, operating in the U.S., its product mix in terms of 
mostly being cigarettes, that will provide more information.  
But to disregard companies that have other characteristics 
which are shared with RAI would be inappropriate.  
Q. Okay.  How did you go about picking the comparables 
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that you used for your work in this case?
A. So I looked at four sources.  I looked at the 
companies that RAI said in its SEC filings were sort of peer 
companies.  The second thing is I used the set of companies 
that RAI listed during the Strategy Day as comparable 
companies.  I did a tabulation of the investment analysts 
because when investment analysts analyze companies, they 
typically will sort of list sets of firms that they think are 
comparable to, say, RAI.  And then finally, I looked at the 
list of comparables that the financial advisors used in their 
check of their discounted cash flow.
Q. All right.  So let's put Slide 8 up on the screen, 
please.  Are these the companies that you ultimately landed 
on as -- through the work you just described?
A. Yes, they are.
Q. Now, are all of these companies equally informative 
or equally valuable to you in doing a comparable companies 
analysis?
A. Well, no.  Again, this gets to my earlier comment 
which is, certainly some of these are going to provide more 
information about value than others.  So, for example, Altria 
is, you know, virtually all of their sales are cigarettes and 
their sales are sort of in the U.S.   And so that's a much 
closer peer than a firm like Philip Morris which doesn't have 
sales in the U.S.   
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And so you give relatively more weight in terms of 
evaluating them as check of the value.  But to ignore the 
others would be improper.  
Q. And just so that they're in the trial transcript, 
could you tell us which are the companies that you ultimately 
identified?
A. Sure.  So it was Altria Group, Imperial Brands, 
ITC, Japan Tobacco, Philip Morris, Scandinavian Tobacco, 
Swedish Match, and Vector Group.
Q. And what -- which of these companies do you 
consider to be the more informative comparables?
A. Yeah.  So certainly Altria is the firm here.  
It's -- you know, it's the biggest rival of RAI in the U.S.   
In fact, it's the market leader larger than RAI.  Its sales 
are primarily cigarettes.  Virtually all of their sales are 
cigarettes.  And they operate in the U.S.   And so it has -- 
you know, it's subject to the same regulatory environment, 
the same consumer issues and the like.  And so while it's not 
a perfect twin, it's probably the most important as a check 
of value.  
Q. Okay.  And what metrics did you then use to do this 
analysis?  And if it's helpful we can put --
A. No, no, no.  
So if we remember one concept which is value is 
forward looking.  You know, we don't buy a stock because it 
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arrived at during the DCF by the financial advisors seems 
very reasonable.  
Q. And what does it tell you about the DCFs that were 
done by the Dissenters' experts in this case?
A. It sort of -- you know, they're sort of way off.  
The values they come up with are virtually twice the value 
you get from these comparable companies.  
Q. Well, let's go back to the prior slide which has 
the multiples on it that you calculated.  Did you also 
calculate the multiple that's implied by the valuations that 
the Dissenters' experts came up with?
A. I did.  
Q. And what did you find?
A. So if you calculate the EBITDA multiple for 
Professor Zmijewski's analysis, you get something like 24.  
And the multiple for Professor Taylor -- Mr. Taylor's 
analysis is 23.2.  
Q. And, again, as -- what does it tell you to compare 
those numbers to the multiples like the roughly 12 that we 
see for Altria and the others on the screen?
A. It sort of says that their prospects are twice as 
good as sort of the other peer companies in the industry.  
Q. So let's look at Slide No. 12, please.  What is it 
we're looking at here?
A. So what we're looking at is the sort of 
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comparison -- it's sort of hard to see.  But it's comparing 
the Altria market cap to sort of three things on the 
left-hand side.  The first, this $67.25 billion is just the 
market cap implied by the RAI unaffected stock price.  So 
that 47.17 from October, that implies a 67.25 billion-dollar 
valuation.  Professor Zmijewski when he does his DCF, adds 64 
billion on top of that and Mr. Taylor adds another 2.7 
billion sort of on top of that.  So they get valuations which 
are pretty comparable to Altria here in terms of overall 
value.
Q. When you say they get valuations that are 
comparable to Altria, who are you talking about?
A. Professor Zmijewski and Mr. Taylor.
Q. And can you draw any conclusions about the 
reasonableness of their valuation based on the similarity 
between what they found -- their implied market cap for RAI 
and Altria?
MR. ROLNICK:  I object, Your Honor.  Unless this 
witness has done a valuation of Altria or has somehow looked 
at its cash flows and attempted to determine what its true or 
intrinsic market value is, I don't think he's in a position 
to make a comparison about the reasonableness.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Your Honor, I think that's 
cross-examination.
THE COURT:  Hang on one second.  
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I'll allow it.  You may answer.  
A. So I think you want to look at relative to say the 
size of the companies.  And, again, Professor Zmijewski and 
Mr. Taylor saying that the value of RAI is, you know, almost 
exactly the same as Altria.  But if you look -- for example, 
if you just look at, say, revenues, there's, you know, a big 
difference in the revenue between these two companies.
BY MR. BORNSTEIN:
Q. Well, let's look at the next slide, please.  Slide 
13.  What are we seeing here on the two sides of the slide?
A. So the left graph is just what was up in the prior 
slide and the right graph just shows the revenue of these two 
companies.  That RAI had 2016 revenues of 12 and a half 
billion and Altria's revenues were nearly 60 percent higher 
at 19.3 billion.  
Q. And what does that tell you about the 
reasonableness of the Dissenters' valuations?
A. Again, this would cause me to really pause about 
the assumptions that I put into my valuation analysis.  This 
check sort of says, you know, maybe there's some errors that 
I have in my assumptions.
Q. Because they're saying that even though RAI has 
substantially lower revenue, its value is comparable?
A. That's correct.  
Q. Let's talk about precedent transactions.  Did you 
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do a precedent transactions analysis in this case?
A. I did.
Q. And is that a technique that is commonly used by 
valuation professionals?
A. It is.  
Q. For what purpose?
A. Again, as a check.  Again, as a reasonableness 
check to the valuation.  
Q. And just very high level, how does one conduct a 
precedent transactions analysis?
A. You do it in a similar way to the -- to the 
comparable companies.  You identify transactions that are 
similar because they're in the same industry and hopefully 
you have a similar size.  And then you create those same 
multiples, those same sort of deal value to EBITDA multiples 
to see what they were purchased at.  
Q. And how did you go about selecting the transactions 
that you used as comparables here?  And we can put Slide 14 
on the screen too.  
A. So I searched the Capital IQ database which is just 
a database of transactions.  I looked at all the mergers or 
acquisitions which were in the tobacco industry that closed 
within five years of the transaction here closing.  And then 
I restricted it to those that had an enterprise value greater 
than $500 million.
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Q. And so if we go to Slide 15, are these the 
transactions that resulted from that filtering?
A. They are.
Q. Okay.  And they're acquisitions of Gryson, JT 
International, the U.S. cigarette brands and other assets of 
Lorillard Reynolds, the acquisition of Lorillard itself, and 
the acquisition of Souza Cruz; right?
A. Yes.  
Q. Okay.  Now, are all of these transactions in your 
mind equally informative of the value of Reynolds?
A. Absolutely not.  You have to do a similar kind of 
assessment and give more weight to those which are more 
similar to the RAI transaction.  And in this case, you know, 
Lorillard clearly stands out as the most helpful in terms of 
our assessment of value.  And -- 
Q. For what reason?
A. Yeah.  So first of all, its, you know, business is 
primarily, you know, and virtually all cigarettes.  It's in 
the U.S.   And, you know, in fact, the major element of this 
purchase was Newport, which ended up being a major -- and is 
a major component of RAI.  
Q. So once you select your precedent transactions, 
what is the next thing that you do in a precedent transaction 
analysis?
A. So you take the sort of deal value -- 
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Q. And, you know, may be helpful to explain this by 
having Slide 16 on the screen.  
A. So you take sort of the implied enterprise value 
from the deal consideration and then you divide it by these 
different measures of value.  Here I used three measures of 
value.  I used the last 12 months of EBITDA and then those 
two forward looking measures of EBITDA that I used before.  
Q. And on the screen here, is this the calculations 
you did with respect to the acquisition of Lorillard?
A. It is.  Exactly.  That's what the LO stands for up 
there.  And so if you just do this analysis for Lorillard, 
the sort of implied enterprise value to last 12 months EBITDA 
is 11.5.  The enterprise value to next 12-month EBITDA is 
11.2.  And then the second year out multiple is 10.5.  
Q. And so let's look at Slide 17, please.  What does 
this show?
A. It's the same type of chart that I showed for the 
comparable companies which is it's just looking at the 
average, the median, and then I pull out the one that I think 
is most comparable, Lorillard.  And it's looking at the 
different measures of enterprise value to EBITDA.  
Q. And can you remind us what multiples were implied 
by the valuations that the Dissenters' experts did?
A. 24 for Professor Zmijewski and 23.2 for Mr. Taylor.
Q. And what does this slide tell you about the 
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reasonableness of those valuations?
A. Well, again, you know, these are in line with the 
comparable companies.  You know, they're virtually identical 
to the multiples for comparable companies.  And if you get 
implied multiples which are twice as high as these two, again 
it causes you -- it would cause me to have serious concern 
about the assumptions I'm making in my discounted cash flow.
Q. Well, let's go to the next slide, please.  Can you 
tell us what we see here on Slide 18?
A. So this just uses those multiples to get sort of an 
implied value for RAI.  So you take last 12 months EBITDA, 
next 12 months EBITDA, and then the second year beyond and 
you multiply it by these.  And on average, these numbers are, 
again, for Lorillard anywhere from 41 to 42 and a half 
dollars up to 45 to 47.20 for the average.
Q. And what does this tell you about the multiple that 
BAT paid to acquire RAI in this transaction?
A. You know, that multiple was much, much higher.  It 
was something like 15 or above 15.  And so that's -- you 
know, that's a multiple that's substantially higher than 
these numbers indicate.  
Q. In the beginning of the examination, you mentioned 
that you also looked at certain market evidence like the 
unaffected share price of RAI; correct?
A. I did.  
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Q. Can you tell us why as an economist that was 
something that you considered relevant to look at?
A. So if the market is efficient and there's no 
material, nonpublic information, then the market price will 
be the best estimate of a firm's, you know, intrinsic or 
fundamental value.
Q. And -- 
MR. ROLNICK:  Your Honor, I object to that answer 
and I move to strike it.  This is -- the premise of that 
answer was, if the market is efficient, and they had an 
expert who was going to opine on that issue, and they made 
the decision not to call that expert.  I think it's 
inappropriate for Professor Gompers to offer any opinions 
about whether RAI's stock was efficient.
THE COURT:  I'll allow him to testify, but it will 
be subject to your objection.  
MR. ROLNICK:  Thank you, Your Honor.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  And to be clear, Your Honor, I have 
not asked him to offer the opinion as to whether it was 
efficient.  And we'll deal with the objection in due course 
in the papers.  
BY MR. BORNSTEIN:
Q. So let me just actually put that out there so it's 
very clear.  Do you have an opinion, Professor, as to whether 
or not the market for RAI stock was efficient at the time of 
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BAT's first offer?
A. No.
Q. Okay.  Do you have an opinion as a financial 
economist more generally as to whether large stocks like RAI 
that trade on a large exchange, are or not generally 
efficient at various points in time?
A. I think to be precise, that most of the time, large 
firms traded on national exchanges are trading efficiently.
Q. Have you seen any evidence in this case that has 
caused you to say that the stock of RAI is inefficient?
A. No.  I see no evidence of inefficiency.  
MR. SHINDEL:  Objection, Your Honor.  
MR. ROLNICK:  Your Honor, I'm going to object again 
to this line of questioning.  He just said he was not going 
to put this witness on to opine that the stock was efficient.  
THE COURT:  I'll allow him to testify but subject 
to your objection.
MR. ROLNICK:  Thank you, Your Honor.  
BY MR. BORNSTEIN: 
Q. And, again, to be clear, have you formed a view as 
to whether it is -- the market was efficient for RAI stock at 
the time?
A. No.  
Q. So when you just testified that you didn't see 
evidence indicating inefficiency, can you explain how that is 
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consistent with the fact that you haven't formed an 
affirmative opinion as to efficiency?
A. Yeah.  So there's nothing I've seen either in the 
review of the analyst reports or any evidence produced in 
this manner which would cause me to be concerned that the 
market was inefficient.  There's no evidence which has been 
put forward that would demonstrate that RAI was trading 
inefficiently.  
Q. There's been some testimony that I believe you've 
heard over the course of the past few days in which people 
have used the phrase minority discount.  
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember that?
A. Yes.
Q. So just as a matter of economics, what is a 
minority discount?
A. So we think of a minority discount -- and the way 
to think about it is, it's the flip of the control premium.  
So the way we think about a control premium is how much -- 
how much extra would you be willing to control these assets?  
And so this -- in this case, BAT paid a 26 percent premium to 
the prevailing stock price and so that's the controlled 
premium.  The minority discount is just the opposite of that.  
It relates to where the stock trades under the existing 
management.  
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Q. So if you do a DCF valuation of the company, just 
in the abstract, not RAI specifically.  If do you a DCF 
valuation of the company, does the output of the DCF if done 
properly, include a minority discount or a control premium?
A. So no.  The way to think about it is that there's a 
set of projections under the existing management and the DCF 
value of that will equal the stock price.  So you don't need 
to take a minority discount off of the stock price relative 
to the projections for that current management.  
Now, a controlled premium, the reason BAT may be 
willing to pay more is because they think they can derive 
more value.  So they think they can generate more cash flows.  
Perhaps they can get some synergy value and the like.  And so 
the assets are worth more.  So they pay a control premium.  
And the value they hope is that their DCF value under their 
control equals what they would be willing to pay for it.  
But it is certainly the case that if you have 
projections for a company under the existing management, that 
DCF value should equal the share price with no discount.  
Q. So assume a hypothetical company trading on an 
efficient market that is trading at $10 a share.  Would that 
$10 share price on the efficient market represent the DCF 
value of the company or would there be some kind of discount 
reflected in that $10 trading price?
A. It would --
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MR. SHINDEL:  Objection, Your Honor.  Improper 
hypothetical.  There's no evidence in the record that the 
market is -- 
(The Court Reporter asked for clarification.)
MR. SHINDEL:  It's an improper hypothetical because 
there's no evidence in the record that the market is 
efficient.  Therefore, there's no foundation for the 
hypothetical.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Your Honor, it's a hypothetical to 
an expert.  If it turns out that it's not consistent with the 
facts, that's in argument, they're free to make it in their 
briefs or on cross-examination.
THE COURT:  I'll allow the testimony subject to the 
objection.  
A. So the value would equal the DCF value.  You don't 
take any discount from it.  So the -- in an efficient market, 
those shares would trade at the discounted cash flow value.
BY MR. BORNSTEIN:
Q. And there's been -- there's been some questioning 
in the case that has I think attempted to imply that the 
discounted cash flow -- excuse me.  To get from the stock 
price to a discounted cash flow value, you need to add a 
control premium.  You remember testimony about that, question 
like that?
A. Yes.
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Q. Do you agree -- 
MR. ROLNICK:  Objection, Your Honor.  I believe 
that mischaracterizes prior testimony.  I think he should 
just ask the question.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  I'll just ask the question.  I'll 
withdraw it, Your Honor.  
BY MR. BORNSTEIN: 
Q. In your opinion as a matter of economics, is it the 
case that you need to add a control premium to the price of 
the stock trading on an efficient market to get to the 
discounted cash flow value of that company?
A. No.
Q. Please explain why that's not correct.  
A. So as I said, the control premium is the value to 
somebody else who can derive more value from those assets.  
It's not the value of that company under the existing 
management -- assuming that no transaction occurred.  So what 
you're really trying to figure out is what is this company 
worth if it were to have continued on its own and you don't 
add a control premium to that discounted cash flow value?  
Q. Let's go to the -- some of the work you looked at 
with respect to the share price here.  
When you talked about it, you referenced the 
unaffected share price of RAI.  Can you tell me what you mean 
by calling it the unaffected share price? 
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THE COURT:  Is it just too much?  
(Courtroom laughter.)
MS. SADIGHI:  Sorry.
THE COURT:  Mr. Rolnick, we dare not start without 
you.  
(Mr. Rolnick arrived.)  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  We decided to take that out of your 
time.
(Courtroom laughter.)
THE COURT:  All counsel ready?  
MR. ROLNICK:  Yes.  Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  All right.  Mr. Bornstein, you may 
resume your direct examination.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Thank you, Your Honor.  
BY MR. BORNSTEIN:
Q. Before the lunch break we were talking about the 
reason why you had looked at the deal price as part of your 
evaluation of the Dissenters' experts fair value estimates.  
Can you explain why it was you looked at the deal price?
A. I had started to go into the answer and what I 
wanted to do was to compare the premium that was paid by BAT 
to purchase RAI of 26 percent to the implied premium if you 
were to apply the valuations done by Professor Zmijewski and 
Mr. Taylor.  And so as I mentioned, the premium -- well, the 
deal premium was 26 percent.  But if the valuations of 
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Dissenters' experts were true, the value -- the premium would 
have been 95 to a hundred percent.  
Q. And what conclusion do you draw from that?
A. That that's just sort of -- that kind of a premium 
paid in an acquisition is enormous.  It's huge.
Q. And what relevance does that have to your 
assessment ultimately of the reasonableness of their 
evaluation?
A. Again, it would cause you pause.  This is a check.  
And if you see that the premium is that high, you want to go 
back to your assumptions into your discounted cash flow to 
understand what's driving this and are those reasonable 
assumptions.  
Q. And as an economist, if there were a discrepancy of 
this magnitude between the deal price and the fair value of 
the company, would you expect that to be noticed by the 
market?
A. Over time for sure.  One would expect the market 
would sort of find it out.  In some sense, it would be like 
the proof is in the pudding.  Eventually the truth would come 
out and the price would rise to that level.
Q. Well, when you say eventually the truth would come 
out, can you explain what you mean?
A. Well, I mean, as we saw earlier, the implied 
multiples are nearly twice as high based on the Dissenters' 
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experts.  So if there was truly some mountain of gold that 
was hidden, something inside RAI that was hidden, eventually 
that would have come out and I would have expected -- again, 
back to the analysis we talked about just before break -- 
that somehow BAT would have appreciated quite substantially 
because they got such a deal on purchasing of RAI.
Q. Are you saying that BAT stock would have gone up at 
some point when the value became known?
A. So essentially both Professor Zmijewski and 
Mr. Taylor are -- they're opining that, you know, $50 billion 
of value was transferred from the RAI shareholders to BAT 
because they've underpaid by $50 billion.  So if that were 
the case, one would expect that over time -- again, the proof 
is in the pudding -- that those results would have come out 
and BAT would have gone up because people would have seen 
that they got such a great deal.
Q. And did you see any evidence that that has happened 
over time?
A. Well, no.  Again, the stock price of BAT has fallen 
by about 60 percent since they purchased RAI.
Q. Was there anything in the analysts' coverage of the 
deal that was relevant to your assessment of the Dissenters' 
valuations of the company?
MR. ROLNICK:  Your Honor, I'm going to object to 
that question.  Whether or not analysts who are not before 
Theresa B. Kramer, Official Court Reporter
Mecklenburg County Courthouse, North Carolina


























- App. 60 - 
the Court offered opinions or not is rank hearsay.  They're 
not here to be cross-examined.  He hasn't conducted a 
valuation.  This is just another way of summarizing argument 
and presenting it to the Court.
THE COURT:  Well, experts can rely on inadmissible 
evidence and I'm going to -- I'll -- subject to your 
objection, I'm going to allow the testimony.  But it's 
subject to your objection and that will be something that you 
can raise in your post-trial briefing.  
MR. ROLNICK:  Thank you, Your Honor.  
BY MR. BORNSTEIN:
Q. And perhaps to grease the wheels on this a little 
bit, is the review of analyst coverage of a stock something 
that financial economists do in the ordinary course of 
assessing the value of a company?
A. Absolutely.  Whenever I do a valuation, I look at 
industry analysts, I look at company analysts to try and 
assess what the view in terms of the state of the company, 
the state of the industry, certainly the financial advisors 
here did the same thing.  And so while again, you have to 
filter it and sort of interpret it from, you know, just these 
are individuals' perspectives, it does provide you insight in 
terms of contemporaneously what they were thinking about in 
this case the deal price that was agreed to.  
Q. And what did you find when you did that analysis 
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here?
A. So I read every single analyst report around the 
deal, around the merger, for both RAI and for BAT.  And, you 
know, typically the vast, vast, vast majority -- virtually 
all except for one, thought the deal price was rich.  It was 
at a historic high.  And that potentially BAT was overpaying.  
So saw nothing -- not a single analyst who said 
that BAT was getting a steal.  
Q. Let's take a look at Slide 27, please.  And can you 
tell us, Professor, what Slide 27 shows?
A. So Slide 27 is just all of the evidence that I 
bring to bear on assessing sort of fair value here.  And it 
starts with my unaffected stock price analysis on the top.  I 
graph the range of discounted cash flow values from the 
financial analysts.  My own comparable company and precedent 
transaction analysis, as well as the comparable company and 
precedent transaction analysis of the financial advisors.  
And what you can sort of see is that generally they all line 
up -- they all line up a lot.  
The one outlier here is actually on the comparable 
companies, there's one outlier and that's ITC, this sort of 
Indian conglomerate.  That's where you get this 82 and the 
79.  But other than that one comparable company, all the 
others line up basically right where the deal price is or 
actually lower.  
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And what I did as well is I just put Professor 
Zmijewski's and Mr. Taylor's discounted cash flow numbers on 
here just for the purposes of seeing where it lies.  And you 
can sort of see that relative to all the other evidence that 
one should think about in terms of assessing the sort of fair 
value or the market intrinsic value of RAI, they all line up 
with the deal price and there's only two that are far to the 
right.  
Q. So on the slide, what is the vertical line that 
cuts through the middle of everything?
A. Sure.  I probably should have said.  But you see at 
the top, it says deal price and then if you follow it over to 
the right, it says 59.64?  That's sort of the deal price.  
And that vertical line, the dotted line just represents -- 
just represents where among all those analyses 59.64 is.
Q. And where in comparison to the dotted line do you 
see Professor Zmijewski and Mr. Taylor's analyses landing?  A 
question I ask in part so it's in the transcript and not just 
here on the screen.  
A. It's at the bottom and it's the 92.17 and the 
94.33.  And they are way off to the right on the far end 
of the -- on the far end of the graph.
Q. And what does that tell you as an economist about 
the reasonableness of their valuations?
A. They're unreasonable.  All the checks and value go 
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to say that it's just an unreasonable valuation of RAI.  And 
doing any of these checks would have caused you to go back 
and be concerned about your inputs.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  I have no further questions for 
you, Professor.  Return the witness five minutes early.
THE COURT:  All right.  Cross-examine?  
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. ROLNICK: 
Q. Good afternoon, Professor Gompers.  
A. Good afternoon.
Q. How many appraisal opinions, expert opinions have 
you given in the past?
A. In all states, four in Delaware, two in California, 
one in Massachusetts, and one in Illinois.  So maybe nine, 
ten.  
Q. And how many of those have been for Plaintiffs?  
And by Plaintiffs, I mean Dissenters.  
A. Almost half.  So, yeah, I would sort of say, if 
it's not half, it's sort of a significant fraction of them.
Q. Okay.  So about half of them given for Plaintiffs 
which I'm calling Dissenters here, shareholders, and half 
for -- on behalf of the company; right?
A. Yeah.  It's roughly speaking.  It's certainly a 
significant fraction.  I haven't always been for the 
tendering company.
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Q. Okay.  So the question was:  Are you offering an 
opinion that the value of RAI as of the merger closing date 
is within the range of the discounted cash flow valuations 
that the financial advisors produced?  
And your answer is:  I haven't been asked to offer 
that opinion.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Your Honor, we need to see the 
remainder of the answer, which goes on for another two 
paragraphs if we're going to try to impeach the witness, we 
need to do it with a full answer rather than one sentence.
THE COURT:  Well, under 106, let's see the rest.
BY MR. ROLNICK:
Q. It's certainly the case -- excuse me?  
THE COURT:  He just needs to remove the highlight.  
BY MR. ROLNICK:
Q. So I'll just start with the preliminary question 
which is:  You're not offering -- 
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Your Honor, I think we should 
actually see the attempted impeachment here so we can --
THE COURT:  He does need to see -- it's proper for 
the party opposing to see the context which is now on the 
screen.  
BY MR. ROLNICK:
Q. So my question is:  Is it the case that you're not 
offering an opinion that the fair value of RAI as of the 
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closing date is within the range of discounted cash flow 
valuations that the financial advisors produced?
A. I was about to offer to your prior question an 
answer which is exactly the same as the answer I gave at my 
deposition.  Which is, it's my view that the valuation done 
by the financial advisors were optimistic.  Because they used 
optimistic cash flows in their projections, the valuation -- 
the actual fair value actually likely lies below because 
these projection were optimistic.  
And that's exactly what I go on to say in response 
to the question that I was asked at the deposition.  
Q. Okay.  So I understand that you have reviewed their 
opinions; right?
A. I've reviewed the analysis they've done and I've 
come to the conclusion that their discount rates are 
reasonable, close to what I come up with.  The perpetuity 
growth rate is reasonable, but the projections are 
optimistic.  Those things would lead their valuations to be 
optimistic or an overestimate of fair value.  
Q. Okay.  You're not giving any opinion that the 
unaffected stock price on October 20th was the -- represented 
the fair value of Reynolds; correct?
A. That's correct.  It has to be on the merger date 
that it's completed.
Q. And you're not giving any opinion that the deal 
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price represented the fair value of RAI; correct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. Okay.  You're not giving any kind of an opinion 
that the deal process involving the sale of RAI to BAT was 
sufficient or adequate to produce a fair price; correct?
A. I haven't been asked to offer an opinion on the 
process.  
Q. And you have no opinion about whether BAT's stated 
unwillingness to support a sale to another potential buyer 
may have impacted fair value; correct?
A. Again, I haven't been asked to look at that.  
Q. And you're not offering the opinion that the 
analysts' opinions represented the fair value of Reynolds; 
right?
A. No, but I think they are indicators of value which 
is helpful to the Court.  
Q. Okay.  Now, I'd like to put up on the board one of 
the slides, PDX5.24.   
(The Court Reporter asked for clarification.)
MR. ROLNICK:  Yeah.  PDX5.24.  Yeah.  
BY MR. ROLNICK:
Q. And as a preliminary matter, you would agree with 
me, wouldn't you, that discounted cash flow analysis is the 
best method to value a company provided you can do one?
A. So discounted cash flow is certainly the definition 
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of value.  It's derived from finance.  But it's only as good 
as the inputs.  It's -- as I mentioned in my direct, it's 
math.  And without doing an analysis of checks, you can't be 
certain that your inputs are correct.
Q. But you'd agree with me that it is generally the 
preferred methodology for valuation?
A. Absolutely.  But without checks, then it's just not 
following proper valuation procedures.
Q. Professor Gompers, we'll get to the checks.  I'd 
just like you to answer the questions if you could.  It's the 
preferred methodology for valuating companies; right?
A. It's the first method you would choose but not the 
only.
Q. Okay.  But that wasn't my question.  The question 
is:  Isn't it the preferred method?
A. I would not use the word preferred.  I think that's 
incorrect.  
Q. Okay.  It's almost uniformly used in valuing 
companies; right?
A. It's the first set of analysis I would do, but I 
would not use it without a check.  That would be incorrect.
Q. Okay.  In direct when you were being examined by my 
colleague, Mr. Bornstein, didn't you say, quote, I'm a firm 
believer that the DCF is the way to go, unquote?  Wasn't that 
your testimony?
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A. It is certainly the first approach to valuation 
that you would take.
Q. So it was your testimony?
A. I don't recall my exact testimony, but I think I 
was clear in my direct that it's the first approach, but 
you'd certainly want to check the inputs into that DCF.  
Q. And it's the approach that you used when you were 
giving a fairness opinion that a deal price arrived at in a 
situation where a large majority shareholder indicated that 
it would not support a sale to a third party failed to arrive 
at a fair price; right?
A. If I'm asked to offer an affirmative opinion on 
value, I start with the DCF and then do other calculations.  
So absolutely I would have done DCF.  
Q. In fact, you were the expert who gave a fairness 
opinion in Golden Telecom; right?
A. I did.
Q. And in Golden Telecom, Golden Telecom involved a 
situation where two shareholders who together held a large 
block of stock refused to sell their stock in a transaction 
and bought the company; right?
A. I remember Golden Telecom.  I don't remember the 
particulars of the transaction.  
Q. Okay.  So you don't remember whether or not you 
offered an opinion that the fair value of the company wasn't 
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the deal price in that situation but was substantially higher 
than the deal price, even 35 percent higher?  You don't 
recall that?
A. I do -- let me be clear.  I don't recall 
particulars of the way the transaction proceeded.  I do 
recall giving an analysis and coming up with an analysis 
where the fair value of -- intrinsic value of the company was 
higher than the deal price.
Q. Okay.  And do you recall that it not only was 
higher, but the fair value that you opined was the true value 
of the company, was over a hundred percent higher than the 
unaffected stock price of that company before the offer was 
made?
A. Again, I haven't reviewed the Golden Telecom 
report, but I'll take that as a representation.
Q. You don't remember?
A. I haven't reviewed the Golden Telecom report in 
quite some time so I just don't remember the exact numbers.  
Q. Okay.  Well, let's take a look at the Golden 
Telecom decision.  Can we -- I think it's in your book.   
It's toward the end.
THE COURT:  Can I have a tab reference?  
MR. ROLNICK:  I'm sorry?
THE COURT:  A tab reference to where --
MR. ROLNICK:  It's just -- it's at the end and it's 
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MR. BORNSTEIN:  We had talked about 2:30 as the 
time I would commit to finished.  So I'm happy -- I'm going 
to use less than 20 minutes anyway.
MR. ROLNICK:  20 minutes?  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  I'll be less than that.
THE COURT:  All right.  Proceed.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Thank you very much.  
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BORNSTEIN: 
Q. I'll just start where the questioning was kind of 
ending.  This has come up a few times during the course of 
the day.  There's been some questions about control premium.  
You recall those?
A. Yes.
Q. And, for example, there was a question about ITC 
and whether -- if you would -- I'll use the questions just 
now.  
Mr. Rolnick asked the question whether -- if you 
add a 30 percent premium to your calculation of the adjusted 
stock price using Altria, which was 55 and change, you got to 
some $70 number; correct? 
A. Correct.  
Q. Is it correct as Mr. Rolnick's question implied, 
that you need to add a control premium in order to get to the 
fair value of the security?
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A. So I can't opine as a matter of law, but it's my 
understanding that fair value from a financial economics 
perspective is to value the company as if the transaction 
didn't occur.  So the control premium is there because the 
asset is worth more to the acquirer.  It only exists after 
the transaction.  
So if what you're trying to value is the firm, the 
fair value of the firm, assuming no transaction, you should 
not gross it up by some control premium. 
Q. So let's look, for example, to try to make this 
concrete at DX277, which was the document Mr. Rolnick 
directed you to.  Page 20.  And this is the document 
Mr. Rolnick was referencing with the 30 percent control 
premium; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, do you understand this chart to say that these 
acquirers purchased these targets at a premium of 30 percent 
over the stock price at which the target was trading?
A. Yes.
Q. And would that 30 percent premium be something that 
would have to be included in the fair value of these 
particular targets?
A. So, again, I can't opine as a matter of law -- 
Q. No.  And I'm not asking a legal question.  
A. Yeah.  But as a matter of financial economics, no.  
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Because the value -- this is the control premium.  This is 
the increase in value because it's suddenly owned by somebody 
else who believes they can do more with it.  And therefore, 
the fair value, if it's valuing the company as if it 
continued without the acquisition, would not include that 
29.4 percent premium.
Q. So maybe I should ask the question more simply 
then.  As an economic matter, what is the relationship 
between fair value and a control premium?
A. So the control premium represents the increase in 
value, the increase in cash flows that can be generated 
because the new acquirer can be more efficient, they can hire 
new managers, they can, you know, do things better than the 
existing management.  And that's why somebody buys the assets 
because they believe that they're going to be better.  
They're going to be able to, you know, fire lazy managers and 
the like.  And so that control premium represents the value 
only under the control of the entity that buys it.
Q. So if we assume a company that's trading on an 
efficient market at say $10 a share, would you add some kind 
of control premium to that $10 price in order to reach the 
fair value?
A. From a financial economics perspective, no.  
Q. So if -- so what would be the fair value in that 
circumstance, assuming a perfectly efficient market?
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A. Well, in an efficient market, that price would 
equal the discounted value you would expect in future cash 
flows under the existing management.  And therefore, in that 
scenario, the fair value would be $10 because that $10 would 
reflect the discounted value of those expected future cash 
flows with existing management.  
Q. So if one of your students came to you with your 
adjusted stock -- unaffected stock price analysis and said I 
got to $53.33 for Altria using that analysis, and now to get 
the fair value, I have to tack on a control premium on top of 
that, what kind of grade would you give that?
A. If it was a financial economics class or corporate 
finance class, they'd certainly be marked down for doing 
that.  
Q. And why is that?
A. Because it's just indirect.  It's not -- it's not 
based on the fundamental principles of the way markets work 
in finance.
Q. Let me switch to a different subject which is the 
comparables companies analysis that we've been talking 
about for a bit.  And Mr. Rolnick asked you whether you 
believe that none of the companies were really comparable and 
you told him no and then he moved on.  And I want to give you 
the opportunity to explain why you said no to that question.  
A. So because all of these companies sell 
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cigarettes -- sell tobacco products and tobacco products are 
driven, yes, by different regulatory environments, but 
there's some commonality across all of them.  And therefore, 
while some of them are certainly closer, and if I were to 
think about how I would weight these, I would certainly put 
more weight on those which are closer which is why I talked a 
lot about Altria here in terms of, you know, being the market 
leader with all the sales in the U.S. and virtually all 
tobacco.  
But to ignore those other data points would just be 
wrong.  They do provide information about the valuation of 
tobacco companies and hence, RAI. 
Q. Well, let's focus specifically on Altria.  Would it 
be a mistake as a matter of economics to ignore Altria as a 
comparable in valuing RAI as of the closing?
A. Absolutely.  It provides information that would be 
important to valuing RAI.  
Q. And when Mr. Rolnick read to you from paragraph 127 
of your report where he asked if you stood by a variety of 
statements, he skipped two of them.  I can just read them to 
you.  He said, with respect to Altria, like RAI, it operates 
in the United States tobacco industry and in the cigarette 
market specifically.  Do you stand by that statement?
A. I do.  
Q. And you said additionally, this firm generated a 
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remind the Court, you calculate this multiple as follows:  
You take the terminal value out five years and divide it by 
the -- what's called EBITDA, earnings before interest.  So 
EBITDA.  You divide it into EBITDA and say, well, that's the 
multiple that's implied by your terminal value.  That's what 
it is.  And from my terminal value, it's 17.7.  Mathematical 
calculation.  
And as we describe in the book and as we typically 
do, how do you -- what do you do with that?  Well, you try to 
figure out is that a reasonable number, 17.7 for an EBITDA 
multiple for this company for its terminal value?  That's 
what do you.  
Professor Gompers compared it to the same 
calculation for each of the investment banks.  For the 
financial advisors.  For example Lazard's terminal value 
divided by that EBITDA was 11.5.  And then Professor 
Gompers -- I don't recall exactly what he said, but he 
certainly pointed out those are different and how can 
Zmijewski be reasonable relative to the investment bankers?  
Look at the investment bankers.  They're ten and a half to 
eleven and a half.  Zmijewski's at 17.7. 
So that was his testimony.  And when I saw that, 
you know, I said well, there's a different chart that should 
be shown, not that chart.  So I created a different chart 
which is on the next slide. 
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Q. And is that Slide 26?
A. Yes, it is.  
Q. And what's this show?
A. So why would we get -- on Slide 25, why do we get 
those differences?  Well, it's very simple.  I just showed 
the Court what happens if you use a ten-year forecast, how 
different those values are.  And that's also the same if you 
use, instead of the zero percent growth rate, Dr. Flyer's 2.2 
percent growth rate.  So what I did was I calculated -- 
re-calculated Goldman's DCF, JPMorgan's DCF, Lazard's DCF.  
And instead of using their midpoint growth rate, I used 2.2 
percent, Dr. Flyer's.  Then I would calculate the terminal 
value, divided by their EBITDA, these are the numbers you 
get.  
And you see my 17.7 is right in the middle of the 
three financial advisors had they used the 2.2 percent growth 
terminal growth rate that Dr. Flyer opines on.  
So what does that previous slide show us?  The 
previous slide that Dr. -- Professor Gompers showed us is 
telling us nothing other than Zmijewski used a higher growth 
rate than the investment bankers.  That's all that you can 
learn from that chart.  And we know that's true and that's of 
course one of the big issues in this matter, is the 2.2 
percent growth rate, the correct growth rate.  And if it is, 
then the next slide, Slide 26, is the correct comparison and 
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I am right in the middle of the financial advisors.  
Q. So just to make sure I'm clear, what you're saying 
is these charts say nothing other than you used a different 
growth rate than the financial advisors in your valuation.  
Is that right?
A. Yes.  It's just another way to depict differences 
in growth rate.  Yes.  
Q. So moving on from your discounted cash flow 
valuation, did you consider any other customary valuation 
methodologies in valuing RAI?
A. I did.  I was asked to -- by you, to consider -- 
use your valuation methodologies that you use typically to 
value Reynolds to the extent you can.  And those are the DCF 
valuation method and the market multiple valuation method.  
Market multiple valuations, there's two types, two broad 
types.  One is you go to publicly traded comparable 
companies, calculate their multiples, apply it to the company 
you're valuing.  The other is you go to transactions that 
occurred, calculate the multiples from those transactions, 
and use those transaction multiples, sometimes called 
precedent transactions, to value the company value.  
And I reviewed those two methods and concluded 
neither one of those methods would result in a reliable 
valuation of Reynolds.  
Q. So let's start with the market multiples 
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methodology that you described as the comparable company 
market multiple methodology.  Is that okay?
A. Of course.  
Q. And you said you determined in this case that you 
didn't rely on the comparable companies methodology to value 
Reynolds.  Could you explain why not?
A. Yes.  As a preface to that explanation, if you look 
at Slide 28.  And this is just a little screenshot of my 
book.  You'll just say in words what it says here.  
First, all market multiples depend on risk and 
growth.  The higher the risk, the lower the multiple.  The 
higher the growth, the higher the multiple.  So if you have a 
high growth company, it will have a higher multiple, all else 
equal, than a low growth company.  
No one disagrees with that.  Professor Gompers in 
his report agreed with that.  
You don't stop there when you're using an EBITDA 
multiple.  I'm focused just on EBITDA now.  Because there's 
other determinants.  Tax rates affect the EBITDA multiple.  
Depreciation, cost structure affects the EBITDA multiple.  
The required investments in working capital and capital 
expenditures affect the EBITDA multiple.  The profitability, 
margins, rates of return all affect the EBITDA multiple.  So 
when you think about are two companies comparable, which is 
the last sentence that I have in this cut out, we begin with 
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comparable companies as potential comparable companies by 
looking at competitors. 
 That's not enough.  You have to look at all these 
determinants of these multiples, risk, growth, for EBITDA 
multiple, working capital requirements, capital expenditure 
requirements, tax rates, cost structure, rates of return, 
margins, all of those factors drive multiples in one 
direction or another.  You need to align -- what you would 
like to do is have a comparable company that aligns on every 
one of those factors.  It doesn't exist but that's how you 
assess comparability.  You can't just go out and say they're 
both selling cigarettes.  That's good enough.  That's not how 
it works.  
Q. So in this case, how did you use all of those 
underlying criteria to inform your view of whether or not 
potential competitors or potential companies were, in fact, 
comparable for purposes of a market multiple valuation?
A. So first issue, first thing you do when you're 
doing an assignment like this is is what did the financial 
advisors do.  And I noticed immediately that many of the 
identified potential comparable companies are not U.S. 
companies.  They don't sell products in the U.S.   
What does that mean?  Well, first that raises a 
whole different set of issues.  Independent of this industry, 
if you're looking at market multiples across countries, you 
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perpetuity growth rates relative to what I think we would 
have used had we had ten years.
Q. Did you have discussions internally about what 
perpetuity growth rates you would use, if you had ten years 
worth of projections?
A. We did.  
Q. And what were those discussions?
A. Well, we never came to a specific conclusion 
because ultimately we ended up using the five years.  But I 
believe we would have -- we were at least socializing using a 
range of negative perpetuity growth rates, if we had years 
six through ten.  
Q. And why would you have used lower growth rates if 
you had ten-year projections than growth rates you had used 
after the five years of projections?
A. Because our anticipation was that there would be, 
you know, some growth -- continued growth at the company in 
years six through ten and thus, to account for that, in the 
context of the five years of projections that we did have, we 
used a slightly higher range of perpetuity growth rates 
relative to if we had ten years worth of projections, and 
then had accounted for that potentially higher growth in 
years six through ten.  
We would have married that with a view that the 
industry would continue to decline following that point in 
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time at a likely negative rate.  
Q. Now, earlier you mentioned that you did a terminal 
multiple analysis.  Is that correct?
A. We did.  Yeah.
Q. And could you explain for the Court what that 
means?
A. Sure.  A terminal forward EBITDA multiple that is 
seen at the bottom right of page .261.  And this document is 
essentially calculating the firm value EBITDA of the company 
following the forecast period, as if you had fast-forwarded 
to the end of five years.  And we used this as a sanity check 
in the context of our valuation work because that multiple 
should be a turn or two -- typically is a turn or two lower 
than where the company trades today, given that you have gone 
through five years of out size growth.
Q. So using that terminal forward EBITDA multiple, did 
that tell you anything about the inputs that you had chosen 
to use in your discounted cash flow analysis?
A. It did.  I think -- as we would have expected, it 
came in about a turn and a half below where the company 
trades today; and thus, ultimately, helped us conclude that 
the valuation work that we had done in the context of the 
discounted cash flow analysis was intuitive and rational.  
Q. Now, here you did a discounted cash flow analysis, 
as well as an analysis of the multiples with precedent 
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transactions and the multiples for comparable companies, why 
do you do -- why do you use three valuation methodologies?
A. Just -- just as a means of being complete and 
looking at as many accepted valuation methodologies in the 
context of looking at the value of a publicly-traded company.  
It is -- it would be atypical for us to do anything but look 
at all three of those valuation methodologies in the context 
of providing an opinion.  
Q. Now, ultimately, did JPMorgan issue a fairness 
opinion?
A. We did.  
Q. What's the process at JPMorgan for issuing a 
fairness opinion?
A. We have a very rigorous process, whereby we prepare 
a set of materials that do not look very different from this 
set of work materials that you've referenced here.  It 
typically has a couple of additional pages just to provide 
additional background in the context of this situation.  
And the steps that we go through are, first, that 
set of materials is sent to the Fairness Committee 
coordinator who does an initial review of the materials, the 
analytics, the assumptions underlying the analytics and 
potentially in certain circumstances, if they have views or 
thoughts on the way we've approached the analytics provides 
those points of feedback in advance of ultimately scheduling 
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a Fairness Committee meeting, which is made up of a number of 
managing directors within our M&A group who do not work on 
that particular deal.  
And then there is a -- either a meeting or a call, 
depending on scheduling, to review the materials with the 
Fairness Committee, who then has the ability to provide 
additional feedback on our materials and analytics.  
Q. And with regard to this transaction, did you meet 
with the Fairness Committee before issuing the fairness 
opinion?
A. We did.  Can't recall if it was a meeting or a 
call, but we did speak with them.  
Q. Okay.  And did the Fairness Committee have any 
concerns about okaying a fairness opinion to be issued here?
A. No concerns as it relates to the fairness of the 
transaction.  There was some dialogue about what we had 
discussed in relation to the company's ability to provide us 
a ten-year forecast.  But other than that, from a headline 
value perspective, there were no concerns.  
Q. Were there any discussions about the perpetuity 
growth rates that you chose to use in your discounted cash 
flow analysis when you were -- you had your discussions with 
the Fairness Committee?
A. Not to my recollection.  I don't recall that being 
a particular point of discussion.  
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Q. Now, I believe you said that a fairness opinion was 
ultimately issued by JPMorgan?  
A. That's correct.  
Q. And did you have any concerns about whether or not 
you should issue a fairness opinion for this transaction?
A. Not at all.  
Q. How did you feel this transaction rated in terms of 
bringing value to the shareholders?  Did you think it was a 
valuable transaction?
A. Yeah.  I thought it was a fantastic transaction.  I 
wish we had the ability to get transactions like this for all 
of our clients.  
MS. SHAH:  I have no further questions.
(PX115 was marked and admitted into evidence.)
THE COURT:  Cross-examine?  
MR. ROLNICK:  Thank you, Your Honor.  May we 
approach with the books, Your Honor?
THE COURT:  Yes.  
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. ROLNICK: 
Q. Good morning, Mr. Clark.  My name is Lawrence 
Rolnick, and I'm here representing a group of shareholders 
who are dissenters from the merger.  
A. Morning.
Q. I'd like to show you in the first instance on 
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Wharton.  
Currently, since 2013, I hold the endowed chair -- 
professorship; the Wharton Private Equity Professor chair.  I 
also lead the school's efforts on alternative investments.  
My formal title is founding academic director of Josh Harris 
Program in Alternative Investments.  I think that's new 
title.  
In that capacity, I lead the school's efforts in 
both research and teaching.  In that capacity, I have 
redesigned the school's curriculum on alternate investments, 
ranging from venture capital, private equity, hedge funds, 
corporate restructuring, destressed investment, 
infrastructure, finance, and so on so forth.  And I have 
designed about ten courses and I've lead teaching of most of 
those courses in the last four years.  
I've also created our executive education in that 
space, so I also train investment professionals in this area.  
I understand the previous witness didn't find it worthwhile 
to come to Wharton.  Getting a CFA certificate was more 
attractive, but I would encourage her to rethink.  That was 
meant as a joke, so.
Previous to my current job, I was on the faculty of 
Stanford Graduate School of Business, again teaching finance.  
Before I moved to Stanford, I had started my career at the 
Wharton School about 23 years ago.  
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Q. And have you taught any classes related to 
valuation?
A. Most of my investment classes are based on 
valuation, shareholder activism, private equity mergers and 
acquisition.  They're all valuation based.
Q. Have you taught classes related to game theory?
A. Interestingly, finance and economics is a little 
unusual.  At the Ph.D. level, things change dramatically.  So 
we don't really train our students in game theory a lot at 
the undergraduate/MBA level.  But at the Ph.D. level, both at 
Wharton and Stanford, I have taught game theory with 
application of the finance.  
Q. What is your educational background?
A. My first degrees are in electrical engineering and 
physics.  Then I switched to economics at the graduate level.  
I earned my master's and the Ph.D. in economics from 
Princeton University.  
Q. What areas has your academic research focused on?
A. We divide financial economics in terms of research 
into two areas.  Asset pricing and corporate finance.  I work 
on both those areas.  
Asset pricing is how asset allocation is done in an 
optimal way and also how prices are formed in financial 
markets.  The corporate finance side is where most of my 
teaching is because those are popular courses, is how 
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corporations are valued and how financial decisions should be 
made in corporations.  
MR. SHINDEL:  Your Honor, at this point, the 
Dissenters would tender Professor Yilmaz as an expert in 
economics, finance, and valuation and ask for judicial 
recognition of his ability to testify in that capacity.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  No objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:  The witness may testify.  
BY MR. SHINDEL:
Q. All right.  Professor Yilmaz, what was your 
assignment in this matter?
A. I was asked to read, evaluate, analyze, and respond 
to the reports of Professor Gompers and Professor Shivdasani.  
And within that, there were two main questions I 
was asked or expected to analyze.  One of them is that 
pre-offer as of October 20th, 2016, was the trading price a 
good proxy for fair value of Reynolds, or RAI.  
For the record, I will say Reynolds.  RAI's is a 
little thicker for me to say, for some reason, but that's 
what I mean.  
Second question is very similar in nature.  Was the 
merger consideration as of closing date, was a good proxy for 
the fair value of Reynolds?  
Q. And so everyone is on the same page, can you 
explain the definition of fair value that you used for the 
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purpose of your analyses?
A. So this is very standard in financial economics.  
When we look at a company as an independent firm that is 
expected to go on as an independent entity, we value its 
total future cash flows and we divide it by -- we divide it 
by the number of outstanding shares fully diluted.  That 
gives you the fair value.  
Just to be sure we are all on the same page, this 
does not have any kind of minority discount or some kind of 
acquisition premium or control premium attached to it.  
I was also told that this coincides with North 
Carolina law, but I'm not a legal scholar so I won't opine on 
that.  
Q. And if we go to Slide No. 4, can you summarize your 
opinions with respect to whether RAI's pre-offer trading 
price is a good proxy for fair value?
A. Right.  This is an important concept that we'll 
talk more about as to how much of the information is 
incorporated into prices.  And at the time of the offer, 
there was a lot of private information that was not known by 
the public markets and there was also a new information came 
by the time the closing came.  
You have to realize, October to July, there is 
several months that had a lot of information events were 
occurring.  So given that information had no chance of being 
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incorporated into prices, I don't believe the trading price 
had any chance of being close to fair value.  
Second point is that the company had an unusual 
large blockholder.  They usually associate that with some 
kind of a minority discount with the trading price.  And that 
will be another reason that a specific discount that is worth 
looking into. 
Q. And with reference to the next slide, can you 
summarize your opinion with respect to whether the merger 
price or transaction price is a good proxy for fair value?
A. So when I analyzed the case, I've noticed that the 
process did not really look for other potential buyers pre- 
or post-signing and there was no competitive environment 
created by the sellers either.  And I will comment on that 
more as needed.  So those are the things that would be 
obstacles in price discovery, so to say, during that sales 
process.  
The other issue that is of importance here that is 
similar to the trading price prior to the offer is that, at 
that point when shareholders were deciding, there were still 
considerable amount of information that was not made 
available to the shareholders, nor to other potential 
bidders.  So that always would be another reason.  
And similarly to the previous case, the large 
blockholder will also be an obstacle on other potential 
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bidders coming in and leading to an efficient price formation 
in the marketplace.  So that's another thing.  
This last point is a rather complicated and deep 
point.  I'll try to make an attempt.  Again, don't take me 
as -- I mean, I'm coming from a different profession so I 
think there is little bit of a miscommunication within legal 
scholars and finance scholars.  That's my experience.  
I happen to speak a lot on the law scholar events 
as well.  This is something I'll try to -- I think economists 
should take on themselves to explain better.  And I will try 
to explain well because I don't think economists have 
succeeded in legal scholar environment.  So this will be a 
big issue for me.  
Q. Okay.  Well, we'll focus on that one later.  For 
now I want to turn back to the trading price.  And I don't 
think you were present in the courtroom live when Professor 
Gompers testified.  Were you?
A. I was not.  I actually went through his document -- 
is it called trial testimony?  
Q. A copy of -- well, a rough copy of the transcript?
A. Transcript.  That's right.  So I'm familiar with 
it.  
Q. So you had the opportunity to review the transcript 
of Professor Gompers' testimony?
A. That's right.  It was a learning process for me.  
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Superior Court of North Carolina, Gaston County.
Business Court.
Lena Sue BEAM, (widow of C. Grier Beam),
Prue K. Beam (Widow of Dewey Beam), First
Union National Bank of North Carolina,
Trustee and First United Methodist Church
of Cherryville, North Carolina, Petitioners,
v.
WORLDWAY CORPORATION, formerly known




{1} This is a dissent and appraisal proceeding governed by
N.C.G.S. §§ 55-13-01 through 55-13-31. The case is before
the Court on respondent Worldway Corporation's motion to
strike the petitioners' demand for jury trial. At issue is the
petitioners' right to have a jury determine the issue of fair
value under the appraisal process. A hearing was held in
Mecklenburg County on August 2, 1996. The Court concludes
that the petitioners in this action are not entitled to a jury trial
under N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(d) and do not have the right to a
jury trial under the North Carolina Constitution.
Attorneys and Law Firms
James P. McLouglin, Jr. of Moore & Van Allen and Craig P.
Buie of Buckley, McMullen & Buie, attorneys for Petitioners.
Debbie W. Harden and Steven D. Gardner of Womble Carlyle
Sandridge & Rice, attorneys for Respondent.
ORDER AND OPINION
RELEVANT STATUTES
*1  {2} N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(d) provides:
(d) The jurisdiction of the court in
which the proceeding is commenced
under subsection (b) is plenary and
exclusive. The court may appoint
one or more persons as appraisers
to receive evidence and recommend
decision on the question of fair
value. The appraisers have the powers
described in the order appointing
them, or in any amendment to it.
The parties are entitled to the same
discovery rights as parties in other
civil proceedings. However, in a
proceeding by a dissenter in a public
corporation, there is no right to a trial
by jury.
N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(d) (1990) (emphasis added).
{3} N.C.G.S. § 55-1-40 provides in pertinent part:
In this Chapter unless otherwise specifically provided:
....
(14) “Means” denotes an exhaustive definition.
....
(18a) “Public corporation” means any corporation that
has a class of shares registered under Section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (15 U.S.C.
Sec 781).
N.C.G.S. S 55-1-40 (Supp.1995).
{4} N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01 provides in pertinent part:
In this Article:
(1) “Corporation” means the issuer of the shares held by
a dissenter before the corporate action, or the surviving or
acquiring corporation by merger or share exchange of that
issuer.
(2) “Dissenter” means a shareholder who is entitled to
dissent from corporate action under G.S. 55-13-02 and who
exercises that right when and in the manner required by
G.S. 55-13-20 through 55-13-28.
(3) “Fair value,” with respect to a dissenters shares, means
the value of the shares immediately before the effectuation
of the corporate action to which the dissenter objects....
- 1 - 
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N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01 (1990).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
{5} Each of the petitioners was the record or beneficial
owner of shares of the 4% preferred stock of Worldway
Corporation (“Worldway”). Worldway was formerly known
as Carolina Freight Carriers Corporation and Carolina Freight
Corporation. It was previously headquartered in Cherryville,
North Carolina. The individual petitioners are widows of the
cofounders of Carolina Freight Corporation.
{6} On July 14, 1995, Arkansas Best Corporation, through
a wholly owned subsidiary, ABC Acquisition Corporation,
offered to purchase all of the outstanding shares of common
stock of Worldway. At that time, Worldway had a class of
shares registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, had in excess of two thousand shareholders,
and was a “public corporation” as defined by N.C.G.S. §
55-1-40(18a). As a part of the proposed transaction, the
shareholders, including petitioners, were notified that ABC
Acquisition Corporation would be merged into Worldway
after the purchase of a sufficient number of shares of
Worldway.
{7} On or before October 11, 1995, all of the petitioners gave
notice of their intent to demand payment for their respective
shares of preferred stock in the event the shareholders of
Worldway voted to approve the merger of ABC Acquisition
Corporation into Worldway as they were required to do by
N.C.G.S. § 55-13-21. Had they not done so, they would have
failed to meet the necessary requirements under the statute to
“be and remain a dissenter eligible to demand payment for his
shares.” See N.C.G.S. § 55-13-21 official comment (1990).
*2  {8} On October 12, 1995, the common shareholders of
Worldway voted to approve the merger of ABC Acquisition
Corporation into Worldway. The merger was complete
at 11:59 p.m. After the merger, Worldway had only
one shareholder. It is undisputed that the merger created
dissenters' rights in petitioners under N.C.G.S. § 55-13-02.
That same day, Worldway sent petitioners the dissenters'
notice required by N.C.G.S. § 55-13-22 to be sent to all
shareholders who had complied with N.C.G.S. § 55-13-21.
The official comment to this section of the statute states: “The
basic purpose of Section 13.22 is to require the corporation
to tell all actual or potential dissenters what they must do in
order to take advantage of their right to dissent.” N.C.G.S. §
55-13-22 official comment (1990) (emphasis added).
{9} On October 20, 1995, effective at the opening of
the trading session, Worldways common stock, formerly
registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, was
deregistered pursuant to application by the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. At this point, Worldway was no longer a
public corporation and has not regained that status. It is a
wholly owned subsidiary of Arkansas Best Corporation, a
public corporation.
{10} On or before November 20, 1995, Worldway had
received from petitioners a written demand for payment of
their shares of preferred stock as required by N.C.G.S. §
55-13-23. Had petitioners failed to make written demand,
they would have waived their rights under article 13. The
official comment to this section of the statute refers to the
demand for payment as the “definitive statement by the
dissenter.” See N.C.G.S. § 55-13-23 official comment (1990).
In the demand for payment, a dissenter must certify whether
the date on which the dissenter acquired ownership of the
shares was before or after the date of announcement of
the proposed corporate action giving rise to the dissenter's
rights. Petitioners had also deposited their share certificates as
required by this section of the statute. The official comment
states: “The deposit of share certificates is necessary to
prevent dissenters from giving themselves a 30-day option to
take payment if the market price of the shares goes down, but
sell their shares on the open market if the price goes up.” Id.
(emphasis added).
{11} On or before November 20, 1995, Worldway had also
sent to petitioners a written offer to purchase their respective
shares which N.C.G.S. § 55-13-25 required be sent to all
dissenters who had complied with the demand for payment
requirements. That statute provides in pertinent part: “As soon
as the proposed corporate action is taken, or upon receipt of
a payment demand, the corporation shall offer to pay each
dissenter who complied with G.S. 55-13-23 the amount the
corporation estimates to be the fair value of his shares, plus
interest accrued to the date of payment, and shall pay this
amount to each dissenter who agrees in writing to accept it
in full satisfaction of his demand.” N.C.G.S. § 55-13-25(a)
(1990) (emphasis added).
*3  {12} On or before December 20, 1995, petitioners sent
Worldway the notice of their estimate of the fair value of their
respective shares of preferred stock required by N C.G.S. §
- 2 - 
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55-13-28. Failure to comply with this requirement would have
resulted in petitioners resuming the status of nondissenting
shareholders. See N.C.G.S. § 55-13-28 N.C. commentary
(1990).
{13} On February 8, 1996, petitioners filed their petition to
determine fair value as provided in N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30. It
is undisputed that at that time, Worldway was not a public
corporation as defined in the statute.
{14} At each step in the process, petitioners have complied
with the statutory requirements to be and remain dissenters.
I
{15} The first issue before this Court is whether the date
used to determine if a dissenter is a shareholder in a public
corporation is the date the petition to determine fair value is
filed or the date the corporate action is taken from which the
shareholder dissents.
{16} In this case, it is clear that Worldway was not a public
corporation on February 8, 1996, the date the petition for
fair value was filed, and that it was a public corporation
on October 12, 1995, the date of the merger which was the
corporate action from which petitioners dissent. The date to
which this Court looks in determining the corporation's status
is determinative of the right to jury trial under the statute.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the
date of the corporate action from which the petitioners dissent
is the date to which the Court should look in determining
whether Worldway was a “public corporation” as defined in
N.C.G.S. § 55-1-40(18a) and used in N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(d).
{17} In interpreting N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(d), this Court must
ascertain and be guided by the intent of the legislature. State
v. Fulcher, 294 N.C. 503, 243 S.E.2d 338 (1978). The intent
and spirit of the Act are controlling in its construction. In
re N.C. Fire Ins. Rating Bur., 275 N.C. 15, 165 S.E.2d 207
(1969). In ascertaining that intent, the Court should look to
the language of the statute, the spirit of the Act and what it
sought to accomplish, as well as the changes that were made
and how they should be effected. Stevenson v. Durham, 281
N.C. 306, 188 S.E.2d 281 (1972). N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(d) was
enacted as part of an overall revision of the North Carolina
Business Corporation Act in 1989. The history of dissenters'
rights prior to 1989 and the 1989 revisions are instructive in
ascertaining the legislature's intent.
{18} Dissenters' rights are entirely statutory. No common
law cause of action exists for dissent and appraisal. Indeed,
North Carolina was one of the first states to create dissenters'
rights. See Russell M. Robinson, Robinson on North Carolina
Corporation Law § 27-1, at 519 (5th ed.1995) [hereinafter
N.C. Corporation Law ]. North Carolina first enacted a
dissent and appraisal statute in 1925. From that time until the
1989 revisions at issue here, the right to a jury trial on the
issue of fair value existed under the statutory scheme. See
N.C.G.S. § 55-167 (1950), § 55-113 (1982). North Carolina
has historically been home to many family-owned textile,
furniture, and retail companies. It has a history of protecting
the rights of minority shareholders, particularly in closely
held companies. See Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279,
307 S.E.2d 551 (1983).
*4  {19} It is against this background that the current
revisions must be assessed. When the General Statutes
Commission was charged with rewriting the Business
Corporation Act, it delegated responsibility for creating the
original draft to the Business Corporation Act Drafting
Committee (the “Drafting Committee”). The Drafting
Committee used the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act (the “Model Act”) as a basis for its work, comparing
the then-existing chapter 55 with the Model Act, section
by section. See Drafting Committee minutes of January 20,
1986. The section of the Model Act dealing with dissent and
appraisal proceedings was section 13-30. It did not provide
for a trial by jury in dissent and appraisal proceedings. The
Drafting Committee followed the Model Act and eliminated
the right to jury trial in appraisal cases. See Drafting
Committee minutes of September 21, 1987, and October
28, 1987. It proposed to the General Statutes Commission
a version of N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30 which read in pertinent
part: “The parties are entitled to the same discovery rights as
parties in other civil proceedings but are not entitled to a trial
by jury.” General Statutes Commission minutes of March 4,
1988. The language proposed and the Drafting Committee
minutes of October 28, 1987, clearly indicate that the Drafting
Committee intended to eliminate jury trials in all appraisal
cases. The October 28 minutes provide:
The committee also noted that the
appraisal process, which has been
liberalized by the committee, involves
an adjustment of corporate rights and
that a jury would have problems
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understanding the appraisal process.
The Committee further noted that the
right of appraisal is not a constitutional
right but is part of the corporate
contract in that it is part of what a
shareholder buys into when he buys
shares in a corporation.
{20} The Drafting committee's version of N.C.G.S.
§ 55-13-30 survived review in the General Statutes
Commission unchanged and became a part of Senate Bill
280, which constituted the proposed Business Corporation
Act revision submitted by the General Statutes Commission
to the General Assembly. The Senate passed the bill without
any change to N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30. When the bill was
considered in the House Judiciary Committee, Representative
Miller proposed to amend the last sentence of N.C.G.S. §
15-13-30(d) to read: “[T]he parties are entitled to the same
discovery rights as parties in other civil proceedings, but
in a proceeding by a dissenting shareholder in a public
corporations [sic] are not entitled to a trial by jury.” House
Judiciary Committee minutes of May 30, 1989. The next day,
Representative Michaux proposed to amend the last sentence
of N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(d) to read as follows, “The parties
are entitled to the same discovery rights as parties in other
civil proceedings. However, in a proceeding by a dissenter
in a public corporation, there is no right to a trial by jury.”
House Judiciary Committee minutes of May 31, 1989. This
version ultimately became law.
*5  {21} The use of the Model Act as a basis for the
revisions to the Business Corporation Act was purposeful.
It helped to bring North Carolina's corporation law in closer
conformity with the majority of other states. This helped
provide certainty for businesses interpreting North Carolina
law since there would be a broader body of case law from
similar statutes giving greater guidance in interpretation. It
also helped remove any unique quirks in the North Carolina
statutes which would discourage corporations, particularly
large public companies with operations in many states,
from domesticating in North Carolina. By conforming more
closely to the Model Act, North Carolina made itself more
attractive to public companies to incorporate here. The Model
Act provided no right to trial by jury in appraisal cases
for either public or private companies. There are several
valid reasons for eliminating jury trials in appraisal cases.
The appraisal process can be extremely complex, especially
with diversified national or multinational companies. As
the Drafting Committee noted, a jury could have difficulty
understanding the appraisal process. Furthermore, publicly
traded companies operate in an environment where there
is a market mechanism which provides a strong, if not
determinative, indicator of the value of minority shares.
There are federal and state statutory protections built into
transactions involving publicly held companies. Information
from which shareholders can evaluate transactions is readily
available from public companies because of disclosure and
filing requirements of the federal securities laws. In the
merger or purchase of a publicly traded company, minority
and majority shareholders are generally treated the same.
{22} Closely held companies present a different situation.
The appraisal issues are generally less complex with
smaller, less diversified, locally owned companies. There
is no strong market mechanism to provide an indication
of value. There are no filing or disclosure requirements.
Financial information may not be readily available. Squeeze-
outs of minority shareholders in closely held companies
have the potential of creating disproportionate benefits
between minority and majority shareholders and of frustrating
minority shareholder expectations which may exist in such
situations. Thus, practical reasons exist for differentiating
between public corporations and closely held companies in
the appraisal context.
{23} It is apparent that the legislature was faced with
a conflict between the benefits of conforming to the
Model Act and the tradition of preserving the rights of
minority shareholders in closely held companies. There were
also practical reasons for differentiating between the two
ownership situations. Not surprisingly, a compromise was
reached which followed the Model Act with respect to public
corporations and preserved the right to jury trial for minority
shareholders in closely held corporations.
*6  {24} The changes from the language and structure of
the last sentence in the Drafting Committee report to the
last two sentences of the statute as enacted demonstrate that
the distinction was being made between publicly held and
privately owned companies. When that decision was made,
the language had to be changed to differentiate (a) those civil
proceedings in which a jury trial would not be afforded, and
(b) those civil proceedings referred to in the first part of the
original sentence. The change was made in a manner that
deviated as little as possible from the Model Act and the
Drafting Committee's proposal.
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{25} The purpose behind the legislative action is instructive
on the issue before the Court because the transaction to
which petitioners dissent was a transaction involving a public
corporation. The shareholders in the corporation were thus
afforded the protection of a market mechanism for valuation,
full disclosure, public information, and a similar treatment
of all shareholders. This was not a transaction in a closely
held corporation whose shareholders did not have those
protections.
{26} The Worldway/ABC merger is typical of the common
practice of a parent company using a wholly owned subsidiary
or acquisition corporation as a vehicle to accomplish
the purchase of a publicly held company. The acquiring
corporation and the acquired corporation are frequently
merged, and the surviving corporation becomes a wholly
owned subsidiary of the parent corporation. There is nothing
in the statutory history or language to suggest that the
legislature, by amending the Drafting Committee's language,
meant to extend the right to jury trials in those situations. It
is far more likely that the legislators were concerned with
providing a jury trial to shareholders in corporations which
were closely held at the time of the transaction giving rise to
dissenters rights.
{27} Focusing on the transaction also helps clarify the issue
from the perspective of interpretation of the specific language
and the statutory scheme. To dissent is to withhold assent.
Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 336 (10th ed.1993).
The action from which petitioners are withholding assent is
the merger of Worldway and ABC Acquisition Corporation.
Assent is being withheld from the action of a corporation
in which the shareholder had an ownership interest. See
the definition of “corporation” in N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(l)
set out above. Petitioners' position that a “dissenter in a
public corporation” must refer only to a shareholder who
has withheld assent from an action and filed a petition to
determine fair value after the action has been taken is not
supported by logic or the statutory scheme. The statutory
focus is clearly on the time of the transaction from which the
shareholder dissents. “Fair value” must be determined just
before that time, not at the time of trial. It is only logical
that the time to determine the status of the corporation for the
purpose of ascertaining the right to a jury trial should be the
same as the time of the corporate action triggering the right.
Nor is petitioners' position supported by the statutory scheme.
As the factual background set forth above (particularly the
passages in italicized print) indicate, pursuit of dissenters'
rights involves a series of steps. At each step, dissenters must
take certain actions to become and remain dissenters. The
status of dissenter may be gained and lost prior to the filing
of a petition to determine fair value. Accordingly, article 13
as a whole does not support an inference that “dissenter in a
public corporation” as used in N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(d) refers
only to a shareholder who has filed a petition.
*7  {28} Petitioners argue that the definition of “dissenter”
in N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(2) supports their position. That
definition does just the opposite. It defines a dissenter as a
shareholder who exercises his or her rights “when and in the
manner required by G.S. 55-13-20 through 55-13-28.” It thus
specifically defines a dissenter without reference to the filing
of a petition as set forth in N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30. Petitioners fit
the description of a dissenter in a public corporation perfectly.
{29} Focusing the determination of dissenter status at the
time of the corporate action has the practical benefit of fixing
the determination at one point in time. Under petitioners'
theory, the determination could change from time to time after
the action depending on the public or private status of the
surviving company in the merger. It is unlikely the legislature
intended to create such a moving target.
{30} The legislative history, the purpose of the statute, the
language, and the statutory scheme all support the conclusion
that in a proceeding initiated by a shareholder withholding
assent from an action of a public corporation giving rise to
dissenters' rights, there is no right to trial by jury on the issue
of fair value.
II
{31} The second issue before this Court is whether petitioners
have been unconstitutionally deprived of their right to a trial
by jury.
{32} Petitioners contend that if the North Carolina Business
Corporation Act is read to deprive them of a jury trial on
the issue of fair value, it is unconstitutional. The Drafting
Committee considered that argument and rejected it. N.C.
Corporation Law § 27-4, at 529 n. 8. The Drafting Committee
was correct because dissenters' rights are a statutory creation
and were not in existence at the time the North Carolina
Constitution was adopted in 1868. There was no common law
right to dissent and appraisal. The right was first created in
1925 by statute. Thus, the right to a jury trial on the issue of
fair value could only be created by express language in the
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statute. Kiser v. Kiser, 325 N.C. 502, 385 S.E.2d 487 (1989).
Such express language does not exist in article 13; to the
contrary, the express language eliminates the right to a jury
trial.
CONCLUSION
{33} Petitioners are “dissenters in a public corporation” as
that term is used in N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(d). That statute
expressly denies their right to a trial by jury on the issue of
fair value. The denial is not a violation of their constitutional
rights. Respondents' motion to strike petitioners' jury demand
should be granted.
{34} It is therefore, ORDERED that the demand for a jury
trial in this action be stricken.
All Citations
Not Reported in S.E.2d, 1997 WL 33463602, 1997 NCBC 3
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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*1  This statutory appraisal action arises out of a May 12,
2015, merger whereby Fortune Brands Home & Security, Inc.
(“Fortune”) acquired Norcraft Companies, Inc. (“Norcraft” or
the “Company”) (the “Merger”) for $25.50 cash per share (the
“Merger Price”). Petitioners, Blueblade Capital Opportunities
LLC and Blueblade Capital Opportunities CI LLC (together,
“Blueblade”), were Norcraft stockholders on the Merger's
effective date and seek a judicial determination of the fair
value of their Norcraft shares as of that date.
In an appraisal action under the Delaware General
Corporation Law, the trial court's “fair value” determination
must “take into account all relevant factors.” 1  The relevance
(or not) of certain factors “can vary from case to case
depending on the nature of the [acquired] company,” the
nature of the process leading to the company's sale and,
perhaps most importantly, the evidence adduced by the parties
at trial in support of their respective valuation positions. 2
“In some cases, it may be that a single valuation metric
is the most reliable evidence of fair value and that giving
weight to another factor will do nothing but distort that best
estimate. In other cases, “it may be necessary to consider
two or more factors.” 3  In all cases, however, the trial
court's determination respecting the “relevant factors” must
be grounded in the evidentiary record and “accepted financial
principles.” 4
I am cognizant of the Delaware Supreme Court's embrace
of “deal price” as a strong indicator of fair value in Dell
and DFC. Those decisions teach that deal price often will
be a relevant factor in the trial court's fair value calculus
—particularly where the respondent company was publicly
traded and sold following a meaningful market check. 5  In
both cases, however, despite having been urged to do so, the
Supreme Court declined to adopt a rule that the deal price is
presumptively reflective of fair value. 6  Mindful of DFC and
Dell, I have considered carefully whether the Merger Price
(less synergies) reflects the fair value of Norcraft as of the
Merger date. For the reasons explained below, I am satisfied
it does not.
*2  In this case, the evidence reveals significant flaws in the
process leading to the Merger that undermine the reliability of
the Merger Price as an indicator of Norcraft's fair value. There
was no pre-signing market check; Norcraft and its advisors
fixated on Fortune and never broadened their view to other
potential merger partners. As the parties worked to negotiate
the Merger agreement, Norcraft's lead negotiator was at least
as focused on securing benefits for himself as he was on
securing the best price available for Norcraft. And, while
the Merger agreement provided for a thirty-five-day post-
signing go-shop, that process was rendered ineffective as a
price discovery tool by a clutch of deal-protection measures.
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Dell reminded us that Delaware courts have “long endorsed”
the “efficient market hypothesis” and emphasized “that the
price produced by an efficient market is generally a more
reliable assessment of fair value than the view of a single
analyst, especially an expert witness who caters her valuation
to the litigation imperatives of a well-heeled client.” 7  I
have heeded that guidance as well. Unfortunately, this case
was tried before the Supreme Court decided Dell, and the
record evidence regarding the efficiency of the market for
Norcraft stock prior to the Merger is, in a word, thin. With
that said, the evidence that can be drawn from the record
reveals that, at the time of the Merger, Norcraft was fresh
off an initial public offering of its stock, was relatively thinly
traded given the niche market in which it operated and was
also thinly covered by analysts. Under these circumstances,
I can discern no evidence-based rationale that would justify
looking to the unaffected trading price of Norcraft's stock
either as a standalone indicator of fair value or as a data point
underwriting the use of a deal-price-less-synergies metric.
Having concluded that flaws in the sales process leading to
the Merger undermine the reliability of the Merger Price as
an indicator of fair value, and that the evidence sub judice
does not allow for principled reliance upon the efficient
capital markets hypothesis, I have turned to a “traditional
valuation methodology,” a discounted cash flow (“DCF”)
analysis, to calculate the fair value of Norcraft as of the
Merger date. 8  In my view, given the evidence in this record,
a DCF-based valuation provides the most reliable means by
which to discharge the Court's statutorily mandated function
to appraise Norcraft.
Not surprisingly, both parties proffered expert testimony
regarding Norcraft's fair value on a DCF basis. And, as
we have come to expect in appraisal litigation, the experts'
DCF analyses yielded valuations that are miles apart. Neither
expert walked the high road from start to finish during their
respective DCF journeys. That is to say, both experts, at times,
made choices in their analyses that were not supported by the
evidence or not supported by “accepted financial principles”
in order to support a desired outcome. I have, therefore,
borrowed the most credible components of each expert's
analysis to conduct my own DCF valuation, in my best
effort to obey our appraisal statute's “command that the Court
of Chancery undertake an ‘independent’ assessment of fair
value” when performing its mandated appraisal function. 9
As explained below, my DCF analysis reveals a valuation of
$26.16 per share.
*3  Insofar as Dell and DFC require that the trial court
carefully consider deal price before disregarding it altogether,
I have returned to the Merger Price as a “reality check” before
locking in my DCF valuation as the last word on fair value.
Having done so, I am satisfied that the $0.66 per share delta
between the Merger Price and my DCF valuation of Norcraft
is a product of the identified flaws in Norcraft's deal process.
Accordingly, I conclude that the fair value of Norcraft as of
the Merger date was $26.16 per share.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I recite the facts as I find them based on the evidence presented
during a four-day trial. That evidence comprises testimony
from thirteen fact witnesses (some presented live and some by
deposition) and three live expert witnesses, along with over
500 exhibits. I accord the evidence the weight and credibility
I find it deserves. As noted, both parties carried a burden to
prove their respective valuation positions by a preponderance
of the evidence. Thus, Petitioners were obliged to prove that
their proffered valuation of Norcraft, a DCF-based valuation
of $34.78 per share, represented Norcraft's fair value as
of the Merger; Respondent's burden was to prove that its
proffered valuation of $21.90 per share, the Merger Price less
synergies, was Norcraft's fair value as of the Merger. With
these competing burdens in mind, I find that the following
facts were proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
A. Parties and Relevant Non-Parties
Respondent, Norcraft, is a Delaware corporation in the
cabinetry manufacturing business. 10  Prior to the Merger,
Norcraft's stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange. 11
On May 12, 2015, Fortune acquired Norcraft for $25.50 cash
per share in the Merger. 12  In connection with that transaction,
Norcraft merged with an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary
of Fortune, Tahiti Acquisition Corp. (“Tahiti”), with Norcraft
surviving as a wholly-owned Fortune subsidiary. 13
Petitioners were Norcraft stockholders as of the Merger date
and collectively held 557,631 shares of Norcraft common
stock. 14  It is undisputed that they properly perfected their
statutory appraisal right.
Non-party, Fortune, is a home and security products company
with four business segments: cabinets, plumbing, doors and
security. 15  Fortune sells its products through several sales
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channels, “including kitchen and bath dealers, wholesalers
oriented to builders or professional remodelers, industrial
and locksmith distributors [and] ‘do-it-yourself’ remodeling-
oriented home centers .... ” 16
Non-parties, Mark Buller, Christopher Reilly, Michael
Maselli, Harvey Wagner, Ira Zecher and Edward Kennedy
served on Norcraft's board of directors (the “Board”) at
all relevant times. 17  Buller also served as the Chief
Executive Officer of Norcraft (and its predecessors) from
2003 to the Merger's consummation in May 2015. 18  Non-
party, Leigh Ginter, was the Chief Financial Officer of
Norcraft (and its predecessors) from 2003 through the
Merger's consummation. 19  And non-party, Eric Tanquist,
was Norcraft's Vice President of Finance Administration from
approximately 2007 through the Merger's consummation. 20
*4  Non-party, Christopher Klein, is Fortune's CEO and
served in that capacity at all times relevant to this action. 21
Non-party, Robert Biggart, is Fortune's general counsel and
served in that capacity at all relevant times. 22  And non-party,
Jason Baab, served as Fortune's Vice President of Corporate
Development and M & A at the time of the Merger. 23
B. Pre-Merger Norcraft
As of the Merger date, “Norcraft was a leading manufacturer
of kitchen and bathroom cabinetry in the United States and
Canada.” 24  The Company sold its products primarily to
kitchen and bathroom cabinet dealers in the home repair,
remodeling and new home construction markets through
four business divisions: Mid Continent Cabinetry, StarMark
Cabinetry, UltraCraft Cabinetry and Urban Effects (a.k.a.
Norcraft Canada). 25  Prior to the Merger, Norcraft regarded
Fortune, American Woodmark Corporation (“American
Woodmark”) and Masco as its principal competitors. 26  It
also faced competition from “a large number of smaller
manufacturers.” 27
1. Buller and Two Private Equity Firms Acquire
Norcraft's Operating Subsidiary in 2003
In October 2003, Buller, certain Buller family members
and funds affiliated with the private equity firms Saunders,
Karp & Megrue (“SKM”) and Trimaran Capital Partners
(“Trimaran”) acquired Norcraft Companies, L.L.C. for
approximately $315 million (the “2003 Acquisition”). 28  At
the same time, Norcraft Companies, L.L.C. converted to
a Delaware limited partnership, Norcraft Companies, L.P.
(“Norcraft LP”), and Buller became the CEO of that entity. 29
For the next ten years, Norcraft LP operated as a privately-
held company.
2. Norcraft and the Cyclical Cabinetry Industry
*5  The undisputed evidence reveals that Norcraft operated
in a cyclical industry. 30  As one naturally might expect,
the cabinetry industry is directly affected by the home
improvement industry, which, in turn, is affected by
macro-economic conditions, including employment levels,
demographic trends, availability of financing, interest rates
and consumer confidence. 31  The cabinetry industry is also
directly affected by housing starts, as a significant percentage
of sales are connected to new home construction. 32  When
housing starts decrease, as they often do for various
reasons, 33  cabinet sales decrease as well. 34
Norcraft was no exception to this cyclicality. Norcraft
LP enjoyed steady growth of its earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation and amortization (“EBITDA”) from
2003 through 2006—$47 million (2003) to $80 million
(2006). 35  This growth was fueled, in large part, by a
significant acquisition in March 2002 and a boom in the
United States housing market. 36  Growth stalled, however,
beginning in 2007, when Norcraft LP experienced the first
of three consecutive years of declining sales and adjusted
EBITDA. 37  As is typical in classically cyclical businesses,
Norcraft LP saw improved sales beginning in 2010, although
its adjusted EBITDA continued to decline until 2012 (with
2010 being the only exception). The attached chart illustrates
the trends 38 :
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As reflected in the chart, Norcraft LP's adjusted EBITDA
trended up in 2013, suggesting that its six-year period of
decline had come to an end, at least for the time being. 39
3. Norcraft's IPO and Reorganization
On November 13, 2013, Norcraft completed an initial public
offering (“IPO”) 40  whereby the Norcraft enterprise was
reorganized into the following holding company structure 41 :
The newly-formed parent company, Norcraft—a publicly-
traded company—was a holding company; Norcraft
Companies LLC (“Norcraft LLC”) 42  and its subsidiaries
were the operating entities. 43  Following the reorganization,
Norcraft was Norcraft LLC's sole managing member and
owned (directly and indirectly) approximately 87.7% of
Norcraft LLC, with Buller, his family members and certain
members of Norcraft management holding the remainder. 44
*6  As part of the IPO, Norcraft sold 7,356,634 shares
of Norcraft common stock, or 39.1% of Norcraft's equity,
to the public at $16.00 per share. 45  SKM and Trimaran
together retained a 60.9% equity interest in Norcraft, while
Buller, his family members and certain members of Norcraft
management, through their convertible Norcraft LLC units,
collectively held a prospective 12.3% equity interest. 46
In conjunction with the IPO, Norcraft entered into Tax
Receivable Agreements (“TRAs”) with SKM, Trimaran
and the Norcraft LLC unitholders (collectively, the “TRA
Beneficiaries”). 47  Under the TRAs, Norcraft was required
to pay the TRA Beneficiaries 85% of the applicable annual
tax savings, if any, that Norcraft realized as a result of certain
tax benefits contributed to Norcraft by the TRA Beneficiaries,
including net operating losses and asset basis step-ups. 48  The
TRAs also provided that Norcraft's payment obligations to
the TRA Beneficiaries would be accelerated in the event of
a “Change of Control.” 49  The TRAs later came to feature
prominently in the Norcraft-Fortune negotiations leading up
to the Merger.
C. Fortune Approaches Norcraft
On October 20, 2014, representatives of Fortune's financial
advisor, RBC Capital Markets, LLC (“RBC”), contacted
Buller to inform him of Fortune's interest in a potential
acquisition of Norcraft. 50  Three days later, Buller met with
Fortune's CEO, Christopher Klein, at Fortune's headquarters
in Deerfield, Illinois to discuss a potential Norcraft-Fortune
transaction. 51  During that meeting, Buller informed Klein
that Norcraft was not for sale, but also indicated that he
(Buller) would convey any acquisition proposal to Norcraft's
Board. 52  Perhaps sensing that his Board might be inclined
to pursue a deal with Fortune, Buller advised Klein that
he would like to have a role in the post-Merger company
in the event the parties reached an agreement. 53  Klein
was noncommittal but, internally, Fortune was disinclined to
bring Buller on board post-Merger. 54  At the meeting's close,
Klein provided Buller with a written, non-binding proposal
under which Fortune would (1) acquire “100% of [Norcraft's]
equity ownership interests” for $22.00 cash per share via a
tender offer (followed by a merger); and (2) satisfy Norcraft's
obligations under the TRAs. 55
*7  Buller promptly informed Norcraft's Board of Fortune's
proposal, and the Board convened on November 4, 2014 to
discuss it. 56  Following that meeting, Norcraft engaged legal
and financial advisors to assist the Board in its consideration
of Fortune's proposal. 57  The Company retained Ropes &
Gray LLP (“Ropes & Gray”) as its legal advisor and
Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (“Citi”) as its financial
advisor. 58  The Board promptly tasked Citi with “review[ing]
strategic alternatives of the [C]ompany, including a potential
sale to Fortune.” 59  Norcraft also engaged Pricewaterhouse
Coopers (“PwC”) to provide an assessment of the Company's
contractual obligations under the TRAs. 60
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D. Norcraft's Management Prepares Long-Term
Projections
Norcraft's Board met again on November 8, 2014. 61  During
this meeting, “[t]he [B]oard ... discussed next steps in
formulating a potential response to [Fortune], and after
discussion, agreed that [Buller, Ginter and Reilly] would
map out a proposed strategy and response with Citi [ ] and
report their recommendations back to the [B]oard.” 62  The
Board also instructed Buller and Ginter to prepare five-year
financial projections to facilitate the Board's evaluation of
strategic alternatives (including a potential Norcraft-Fortune
transaction). 63
Buller and Ginter both had experience preparing long-term
projections, having previously prepared five-year projections
in connection with Norcraft's IPO and four debt financing
transactions between 2003 and 2010. 64  Norcraft, however,
did not prepare long-term projections in the ordinary course of
its business; it only did so in connection with “extraordinary
event[s]” such as financing transactions and ultimately the
Merger. 65  Ordinarily, Norcraft management prepared an
annual one-year budget, which forecasted Norcraft's quarterly
(and monthly) performance for the upcoming year. 66  The
Company's annual budgeting process began each fall and
involved several steps 67 :
• First, the corporate controller for each of Norcraft's four
business divisions would prepare a detailed “bottoms-
up” budget for his or her division. 68  As part of that
process, the division controllers “would work with [their
respective] division presidents to come up with what
they expected for sales growth in the [upcoming] year
and... would build that into the budget[,] [along with] ...
other assumptions like labor efficiencies [and] material
cost.” 69  In this way, the division controllers “would get
a picture of what [profit and loss] would look like for
[their respective divisions for] the [upcoming] year.” 70
• Next, each division controller would present his or her
division-level budget to Buller and Ginter “for review
and approval.” 71
• Finally, “[a]fter several rounds of... back-and-forth,”
Ginter would compile the division-level budgets “into
a consolidated format,” which was then presented to
the Board for review and approval in January of the
budgeted year. 72  After review, the Board typically
would approve the consolidated annual budget that same
month. 73
*8  Following the Board's November 8, 2014 meeting,
Buller and Ginter created two sets of five-year projections:
a base-case projection (the “Base Case”) and an upside-
case projection (the “Upside Case”), both of which are
summarized below. 74
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In preparing the Base Case and Upside Case projections,
Buller and Ginter took a “top-down” approach—
independently projecting Norcraft's net sales, operating
expenses and capital expenditures (for all business divisions)
in the first instance, and then consulting with division-
level management as and where needed—rather than the
“bottoms-up” approach they used to prepare Norcraft's annual
budgets. 77  They created the Upside Case first. 78  After
preparing the Upside Case, Buller and Ginter presented it to
Reilly for his review. 79  “Upon review, [Reilly opined] that
the [Upside Case] ... was too aggressive ... and asked [Buller
and Ginter] to go back and... do a more conservative model,
which became known as the [B]ase [C]ase.” 80  Buller and
Ginter both believed that Norcraft could achieve the results
forecasted in the Base Case and Upside Case projections,
although “the [U]pside [C]ase was more of a stretch and
everything would have had to go right.” 81
Buller and Ginter presented the Base Case and Upside Case
projections to Norcraft's Board at a meeting on November
25, 2014. 82  After discussion, the Board approved both
sets of projections for use in connection with the Board's
consideration of Fortune's proposal. 83
E. Norcraft Pushes Fortune to Increase its Offer
*9  Norcraft's Board next met on December 3, 2014. 84
During this meeting, Citi presented the Board with an analysis
of Norcraft's standalone prospects and possible strategic
alternatives. 85  Citi's presentation included an overview of
preliminary valuation perspectives and selected strategic
alternatives, 86  “including maintaining the status quo, a
possible sale of the Company to [Fortune] or another buyer,
as well as some other potential acquisition targets.” 87
Following Citi's presentation, the Board determined that
(1) “[Fortune's] proposed price of $22.00 per share was
inadequate”; and (2) “[Fortune's] offer would need to be
significantly and substantially higher in order for the Board to
consider a potential sale of the Company at this time.” 88  The
Board, however, did not task Citi with pursuing alternative
buyers or canvassing the market.
Two days later, Buller called Klein and conveyed to him
the Board's determination. 89  Buller also explained that
“if [Fortune] were interested in significantly increasing
[its proposed price] ..., [Norcraft] would be prepared to
share certain [non-public] information [with Fortune], under
a confidentiality agreement with an appropriate standstill,
in order to assist [Fortune] in understanding [Norcraft's]
prospects, upside potential and intrinsic value.” 90  Soon
thereafter, on December 11, 2014, Norcraft and Fortune
entered into a confidentiality agreement with a standstill. 91
On January 7, 2015, Buller, Ginter and Citi representatives
met with Fortune's management at Buller's home in
Winnipeg, Canada to discuss the proposed Norcraft-Fortune
transaction. 92  The discussion focused on the structure and
timing of the proposed transaction, Norcraft's business and
financial projections and the integration of Norcraft into
Fortune. 93  Norcraft provided Fortune with the Base Case
and Upside Case projections as well as certain preliminary
information regarding the TRAs. 94  During this meeting,
Buller reiterated his interest in post-closing employment with
Fortune and discussed the possibility with Klein. 95  Again,
Klein “ke[pt] the door open” but stopped short of making a
commitment. 96
The following week, on January 14, Norcraft's tax advisor,
PwC, presented its analysis regarding the TRAs to Fortune's
management and RBC. 97  PwC explained that termination of
the TRAs in connection with Fortune's acquisition of Norcraft
would require significant payments to the TRA Beneficiaries
(including Buller). 98  PwC also identified certain tax benefits
that Fortune could realize from the acquisition, including a
stepped-up basis in Norcraft's assets. 99  The next day, Klein
advised Buller that Fortune's tax advisor was performing
its own analysis of Norcraft's obligations under the TRAs
following the proposed transaction. 100  Klein also noted that
Fortune would require more information about the TRAs
to calculate Fortune's full payment obligations to the TRA
Beneficiaries. 101
*10  On January 27, 2015, Klein delivered to Buller a revised
written indication of interest with a proposed price of $25.00
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per share. 102  Buller promptly informed Norcraft's Board of
Fortune's revised proposal, and the Board met on February
2 to discuss it. 103  During this meeting, Citi provided the
Board with its revised valuation analysis, which incorporated
Norcraft's net sales and EBITDA results for Q4 FY2014
(both of which were higher than expected) and Fortune's
latest proposal of $25.00 per share. 104  Reilly then reviewed
with the Board the tax benefits that Fortune would realize
in connection with its proposed acquisition of Norcraft,
including a stepped-up basis in Norcraft's assets. 105  After
receiving Reilly's report, “the Board concluded that [Fortune]
would benefit from th[at] step-up in basis going forward and
should therefore value th[at] benefit in its offer price.” 106
With Citi's and Reilly's input in hand, the Board determined
that Fortune's proposed purchase price of $25.00 per share
was inadequate, in part because it did not value the tax
benefits that Fortune would realize in connection with the
proposed transaction. 107  The Board also believed, however,
“that a transaction with [Fortune] could potentially create
more value for [Norcraft] stockholders if at an appropriate
valuation than if [Norcraft] continued independently to
execute on its strategic plan. Accordingly, the Board
authorized [Buller and Reilly] to continue to engage in
discussions with [Fortune] to confirm if [Fortune] was
willing to further increase its propos[ed] [price].” 108  Even
at this stage, however, the Board did not reach out to other
potentially interested parties in hopes of securing a better
offer or, at least, a source of leverage in its discussions with
Fortune.
The next day, Buller called Klein to convey Norcraft's
position regarding Fortune's revised proposal. 109  During
that call, Buller advised Klein that Fortune's proposed price
remained inadequate and encouraged Fortune to increase
its bid. 110  Unable to invoke the threat of an alternative
transaction, Buller highlighted Norcraft's better than expected
preliminary FY2014 results and FY2015 outlook as support
for his pitch that Fortune pay a higher price. 111  Apparently
not feeling the heat, Klein advised Buller that Fortune would
consider increasing its bid but that it was unlikely that
Fortune's proposed price would move significantly higher
than $25.00 per share. 112
Following Buller and Klein's February 3 call, Fortune
increased its offer to $25.50 per share, indicating that this
was its “best and final offer.” 113  The Norcraft team was less
than thrilled with Fortune's $25.50 per share proposal; indeed,
Reilly and Ginter both believed that Fortune's proposal
significantly undervalued Norcraft. 114  Nevertheless, the
Board remained focused exclusively on Fortune. In a last-
ditch effort to get Fortune to increase its “best and final
offer,” the Board responded with a counterproposal of $27.50
per share. 115  When Fortune rejected that counterproposal,
the Board bid against itself with a second counterproposal
of $26.25 per share. 116  Once again, Fortune held firm
and reiterated that $25.50 per share was its best and final
offer 117 —well aware that it was getting the Company for
a “good price.” 118  With no alternative transaction on the
horizon, Norcraft's Board capitulated on February 21 at
$25.50 per share, hoping to extract further value during a post-
sign go-shop. 119
F. The Parties Negotiate the Merger Agreement
*11  In late February 2015, Citi informed Fortune that
Norcraft was prepared to move forward with Fortune's
$25.50 per share proposal, subject to the negotiation of a
merger agreement that included a forty-five-day post-signing
go-shop right for Norcraft. 120  Fortune responded with a
counterproposal that provided for a twenty-five-day post-
signing go-shop “that would be limited to certain identified
potential purchasers.” 121  The counterproposal also called
for a $15 million termination fee if Norcraft accepted a
superior proposal received during the go-shop period and
a $25 million termination fee otherwise. 122  By proposing
this structure, Fortune sought to give Norcraft's Board “the
minimum amount [of time it] needed to satisfy [its] fiduciary
responsibility... and no more,” 123  while also “discourag[ing]
potential bidders.” 124
On February 27, following negotiations, the parties
eventually settled on a thirty-five day post-signing go-shop
period (the “Go-Shop Period”) with no restrictions on the
parties Norcraft or its advisors could contact, a $10 million
termination fee if Norcraft accepted a superior proposal
during the Go-Shop Period and a $20 million termination
fee otherwise. 125  Importantly, however, Fortune also secured
information rights with respect to competing proposals
and unlimited matching rights with respect to superior
proposals. 126  In a final stroke of masterful bargaining,
Fortune also secured the right to launch Tahiti's tender offer
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for all of Norcraft's outstanding common stock (at $25.50 per
share) fifteen days after the start of the Go-Shop Period. 127
In early March 2015, Fortune was given access to Norcraft's
electronic data room, and on March 4, Fortune and
Norcraft entered into a thirty-day exclusivity agreement. 128
Thereafter, on March 13, Buller, Ginter and Tanquist met
with Fortune management to provide additional non-public
information about Norcraft, and, on March 18, Fortune
met with the senior management of each Norcraft business
division. 129
*12  With the Merger Price set, and negotiations between
Norcraft and Fortune proceeding apace, Buller again
approached Klein about post-Merger employment with
Fortune. At a Fortune-initiated meeting with Norcraft
management on March 6, Buller advised Klein that he
wanted to head Norcraft and Fortune's combined cabinetry
business post-acquisition. 130  With the price locked in, and
the inevitably uncomfortable confrontation now unavoidable,
Klein finally informed Buller that Fortune would have no
place for him after the Merger. 131  This came as a shock to
Buller, who thereafter became increasingly “disruptive.” 132
Unable to abandon the enterprise completely, Buller soon
returned to Fortune with a new proposal: if he would
not be a part of the combined company, then, upon
Fortune's acquisition of Norcraft, Buller would acquire Urban
Effects (Norcraft Canada) from Fortune. 133  After Buller
announced his interest in acquiring Norcraft Canada, the
Board determined, for the first time, that Buller was conflicted
and, therefore, should be excluded from Board deliberations
regarding the potential Norcraft-Fortune transaction. 134
*13  Buller, for his part, was determined to acquire
Urban Effects and continued to press Fortune for a
commitment to sell him the business, while also continuing
to lead Norcraft's negotiations with Fortune. 135  Fortune,
however, was unwilling to give such a commitment while
negotiations with Norcraft were ongoing—much to Buller's
frustration. 136  Yet it soon became clear to Fortune that
Buller's ire now risked derailing the deal. 137  To keep
the peace, on March 25, Reilly emailed Buller to advise
him that “[Klein] is going to offer to provide you some
meaningful comfort on [C]anada....” 138  Klein's overture to
Buller accomplished its intended purpose; Buller felt he
had “[g]ot[ten] good comfort on UE.” 139  This “comfort”
included:
• Fortune's waiver of a two-year, Canada-specific non-
compete covenant otherwise applicable to Buller 140 ;
and
• Fortune's agreement to modify Buller's employment
agreement with Norcraft's operating subsidiary to
provide that Buller would receive a severance payment
if his employment was terminated without cause
(including by Buller himself) within twelve months of
Fortune's acquisition of Norcraft. 141
Thereafter, it appears that Buller was content to “live with a
trust me I will sell Canada to you” status quo, and ostensibly
was willing to support the Norcraft-Fortune transaction again
—to Fortune's great relief. 142
With the Norcraft Canada fire contained, Fortune was soon
on to the next Buller-related fire. In late March 2015,
having finalized most of the merger agreement's material
terms, Norcraft and Fortune found themselves unable to
reach agreement on the termination payments that would be
due to the TRA Beneficiaries holding Norcraft LLC units
(including Buller and his family members). 143  Norcraft's and
Fortune's tax advisors disagreed as to the value of certain tax
attributes associated with the Norcraft LLC units, resulting in
a $3 million difference in their respective calculations of the
termination payments. 144
*14  On March 26, Fortune tried to “cut a deal with Buller”
on the TRA termination payments by offering to pay $2
million of the $3 million difference. 145  Buller insisted,
however, that Fortune pay the entire $3 million, much to
Fortune's exasperation. 146  At this point, Fortune seemingly
had reached its limit with Buller and advised Citi that “if
there [was] no signed [merger] agreement by [the morning
of March 30, Fortune was] done.” 147  Negotiations followed.
Ultimately, to appease Buller and keep the deal on track,
SKM and Trimaran offered to transfer $1 million of the TRA
termination payments they stood to receive to the Norcraft
LLC unitholders, such that the unitholders would receive the
full $3 million demanded by Buller. 148  With that, the TRA
fire was extinguished and Fortune had no more Buller-related
fires to fight.
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G. Norcraft's Board Approves the Merger and
Norcraft Executes the Merger Agreement
On March 29, 2015, Norcraft's Board received Citi's fairness
opinion and approved the Merger Agreement. 149  The
following day, Norcraft and Fortune executed the Merger
Agreement and issued a press release announcing the
Merger. 150  Immediately following the execution of the
Merger Agreement, Norcraft entered into TRA termination
agreements with the TRA Beneficiaries—SKM, Trimaran
and the Norcraft LLC unitholders—providing that the TRAs
would be terminated (if the Merger was consummated) in
exchange for $43.5 million in total payments to the TRA
Beneficiaries. 151
SKM, Trimaran and the Norcraft LLC unitholders also
entered into Tender and Support Agreements (“TSAs”) with
Fortune and Tahiti, 152  whereby SKM, Trimaran and the
Norcraft LLC unitholders agreed that:
• they would “promptly” tender their Norcraft shares into
Tahiti's tender offer and, in any event, would do so
at least two days before the offer's initial expiration
date 153 ; and
• the shares so tendered could not be withdrawn unless
and until the tender offer expired or was “terminated in
accordance with the terms of Merger Agreement.” 154
H. The Go-Shop
*15  The Go-Shop Period commenced with the Merger's
announcement on March 30, 2015. 155  Given that Norcraft
and Citi had focused exclusively on Fortune during the pre-
sign “process,” it was especially important that the Company
run an effective go-shop to provide a meaningful market
check. Yet Citi's lead banker, Eldridge, had never run a sell-
side go-shop. 156  Because Norcraft's Board was unsure of
the go-shop's core components, it relied completely on Citi
to oversee the process. 157  Fortune, on the other hand, knew
full well what was at stake. Its Vice President of M & A,
Robert Baab, pushed hard for an unlimited match right and for
Fortune's right to launch Tahiti's tender offer during the Go-
Shop Period, understanding that both measures would make
it less likely that a topping bidder would emerge. 158
During the Go-Shop Period, Citi contacted fifty-four potential
bidders: twelve potential “strategic” bidders and forty-two
private equity firms. 159  Of the fifty-four parties contacted,
seven entered into nondisclosure agreements—six private
equity firms and American Woodmark, one of Norcraft's
industry peers. 160  Only one of those seven parties, Carlyle,
went on to meet with Norcraft management. 161  Carlyle
ultimately did not submit a bid. 162
Most of the parties Citi contacted indicated either that they
were “not interested in competing with Fortune” 163  or that
“[t]he price [was] too high.” 164  At least two non-bidding
parties, however, advised Citi that they could not “move fast
enough [to submit a bid] in 35 days.” 165
In an effort to ensure that Fortune would reap the benefits
of its hard-fought bargain, RBC and Klein devised a strategy
to dissuade potentially interested parties from engaging with
Norcraft. In that connection, early in the go-shop process,
RBC emailed Klein advising that RBC had “a call scheduled
for [April 9, 2015] with Masco”—one of the go-shop
participants—“to discuss the [Merger].” 166  In this email,
RBC explained that it would “emphasize [to Masco] that
[Norcraft] is an asset that [Fortune has] been monitoring/
targeting for a long time ... and [that Fortune] view[ed] the
[Merger] as highly strategic.” 167  RBC also indicated that
it hoped to “get some sense from Masco as to whether or
not [Masco was] likely to engage [with Norcraft].” 168  Eager
to close the deal, Klein advised RBC that “[t]he trick [with
Masco] ... is not to make Norcraft sound very interesting
for them.” 169  Klein also emphasized that he was “more
interested in [RBC] shutting the door on [Masco] and [its]
willingness to look at [acquiring Norcraft], versus learning a
lot from [Masco] .... ” 170
*16  When Fortune's general counsel, Biggart, learned of
this correspondence, he nearly had “a heart attack in [his]
office.” 171  He immediately “went over to see [Klein]”—
before RBC's call with Masco—and “explained to him that
[Fortune and its deal team] can't be doing this.” 172  Biggart
then warned RBC that Klein's proposed approach was “the
wrong way to deal with a go-shop” and that “[RBC] can't be
interfering like this.” 173  Klein apparently heeded Biggart's
admonition, as did RBC. 174
As permitted by the Merger Agreement, Fortune launched
Tahiti's tender offer for Norcraft's stock fifteen days into the
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Go-Shop Period, on April 14, 2015, securing the support of
a majority of Norcraft's outstanding common stock (per the
TSAs). 175  The Go-Shop Period expired as scheduled on May
4, with Norcraft having received no competing acquisition
proposals. 176  Tahiti successfully completed its tender offer
on May 11, and the Merger closed the following day. 177
I. The Parties' Experts
Both parties presented valuation experts at trial to opine on
Norcraft's fair value as of the Merger date. 178  Petitioners'
valuation expert was David A. Clarke; Respondent presented
Yvette R. Austin Smith. 179  Petitioners also presented a
deal process expert, Guhan Subramanian (“Subramanian”), to
opine on the soundness (or not) of Norcraft's deal process. 180
I summarize each expert's opinion below.
1. Clarke's Opinion Regarding Norcraft's Fair Value
*17  Clarke opined that the Merger Price of $25.50 per
share “does not reflect Norcraft's fair value [as of the Merger
date] ... [b]ecause there was no competitive process to acquire
Norcraft prior to the signing of the Merger Agreement and
the post-signing go-shop process was not an effective tool
for price discovery .... ” 181  According to Clarke, a DCF
analysis premised on the Base Case projections provides
the most reliable evidence of Norcraft's fair value as of
the Merger date. 182  Based on his DCF analysis, Clarke
concluded that Norcraft's fair value as of the Merger was
$34.78 per share. 183
For his DCF analysis, Clarke chose to extend the Base Case
projections for an additional five years (through 2024), before
applying a perpetuity growth rate (“PGR”) of 3.5% at the end
of the projection period. 184  He also adjusted the Base Case
projections to deduct for income tax expense in each projected
year, which the Base Case projections presented in Norcraft's
Schedule 14D-9 failed to do. 185
After determining Norcraft's projected unlevered free cash
flows through Norcraft's FY2024, Clarke then discounted
each year's projected free cash flow amount to present value
using a 9.6% discount rate based on an estimate of Norcraft's
weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”). 186  With these
inputs, Clarke concluded that the present value of Norcraft's
projected unlevered free cash flows through FY2024 was
$297.3 million. 187
Clarke then calculated Norcraft's terminal value by (1)
dividing Norcraft's terminal year unlevered free cash flow by
a capitalization rate of 6.1% and (2) discounting the quotient
of that calculation to present value using Norcraft's estimated
9.6% WACC. 188  This yielded a terminal value of $509.5
million. 189  Clarke then added Norcraft's terminal value to
the present value of Norcraft's projected unlevered free cash
flows through FY2024 to obtain an $806.8 million operating
value. 190
*18  Clarke next made the following adjustments to
Norcraft's operating value to derive Norcraft's total equity
value: (1) adding Norcraft's excess cash, estimated at $44.3
million; (2) adding the value (to Norcraft) of TRA-related
tax benefits, estimated at $4.4 million; (3) adding cash
received by Norcraft from the (presumed) exercise of all
outstanding options on Norcraft stock, estimated at $18.3
million; and (4) deducting the book value of Norcraft's long-
term debt—$147.5 million, per Norcraft's Form 10-Q for
Q1 FY2015. 191  After making these adjustments, Clarke
concluded that Norcraft's total equity value was $726.3
million. 192  Finally, Clarke divided this aggregate value by
Norcraft's “fully diluted” shares outstanding (20,880,123) to
obtain an aliquot value of $34.78 per share. 193
Clarke also performed a comparable company analysis to
confirm the results of his DCF analysis. 194  For this analysis,
he selected four companies for his peer group: (1) American
Woodmark, (2) Masonite International Corp. (“Masonite”),
(3) PGT Innovations, Inc. (“PGT”) and (4) Ply Gem Holdings,
Inc. (“Ply Gem”). 195  The analysis yielded a $33.92 per share
valuation. 196  Clarke “determined not to weight this analysis
in determining a specific per share value [for Norcraft],
however, due to the difficulties in finding any companies that
were fully comparable to Norcraft.” 197
2. Austin Smith's Opinion Regarding Norcraft's Fair
Value
Austin Smith determined that the most reliable indicator
of Norcraft's fair value as of the Merger date was
the Merger Price, “less ... contemporaneously estimated
synergies [of $3.60 per share]” 198 —a metric that yields a
valuation of $21.60 per share. Austin Smith also conducted
an independent valuation using three different valuation
methodologies: DCF, comparable company and precedent
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transaction analyses. 199  Based on those approaches, Austin
Smith determined that Norcraft's fair value as of the Merger
date “ranged from $17.48 to no more than $23.74.” 200
Austin Smith's primary DCF analysis, like Clarke's, relied
on the Base Case projections (adjusted to deduct for income
tax expense in each of the projected years) and applied a
3.5% PGR at the end of the projection period. 201  Unlike
Clarke, however, Austin Smith did not extend the Base Case
projections. 202
*19  After determining Norcraft's projected unlevered
free cash flows through Norcraft's FY2019, Austin Smith
discounted each year's projected free cash flow amount to
present value using a 11.2% discount rate based on her
estimate of Norcraft's WACC. 203  From this, Austin Smith
concluded that the present value of Norcraft's projected
unlevered free cash flows through FY2019 was $151
million. 204
Austin Smith then calculated Norcraft's terminal value by (1)
dividing Norcraft's terminal year unlevered free cash flow
by a capitalization rate of 7.69% and (2) discounting the
quotient of that calculation to present value using Norcraft's
estimated 11.2% WACC. 205  Austin Smith concluded that
Norcraft's terminal value was $435 million. 206  She then
added Norcraft's terminal value to the present value of
Norcraft's projected unlevered free cash flows through
FY2019 to obtain a $586 million operating value. 207
Austin Smith made two adjustments to Norcraft's operating
value to determine Norcraft's total equity value: (1) adding
Norcraft's excess cash, estimated at $52.7 million 208 ; and
(2) deducting the book value of Norcraft's long-term debt—
$147.5 million, per Norcraft's Form 10-Q for Q1 FY2015. 209
Having made these adjustments, Austin Smith concluded that
Norcraft's total equity value was $491 million. 210  She then
divided this total equity value by Norcraft's “fully diluted”
shares outstanding (20,880,123) to obtain an aliquot value
of $23.54 per share. 211  Finally, upon “summing th[is]...
component[ ] of [Norcraft's] value” with the value of the
TRA-related tax benefits that Norcraft would realize in each
projected year (estimated at $0.20 per share), Austin Smith
determined that “the per share value of Norcraft was $23.74”
as of the Merger date. 212
*20  As noted, Austin Smith also undertook to value Norcraft
using two “market-based” valuation methodologies. Her
comparable company analysis yielded a valuation of $23.46
per share and her precedent transaction analysis yielded a
valuation of $17.48 per share. 213
According to Austin Smith, “[t]he high level of consistency
between [her] three separately determined estimates of fair
value and the [Merger Price] (less synergies) provides strong
analytical support that $21.90 accurately represents the per
share fair value of Norcraft.” 214  In addition, Austin Smith
submits, “the fact that the [Merger Price] derived from a
robust deal process” lends “additional support” to her fair
value determination. 215
3. Subramanian's Opinion Regarding Norcraft's Deal
Process
Professor Subramanian served as Petitioner's deal process
expert. 216  According to Subramanian, Norcraft's deal
process was flawed in several respects that rendered
the process “unlikely to have yielded fair value for the
Norcraft shareholders.” 217  The principal flaws Subramanian
identifies are (1) the lack of any “competitive process
to acquire Norcraft prior to the signing of the Merger
Agreement” 218 ; (2) information asymmetries between
Fortune and potential third-party bidders 219 ; and (3) the
presence of certain deal protection mechanisms that curbed
the efficacy of the go-shop and effectively truncated the Go-
Shop Period by at least five days. 220
a. Absence of Pre-Signing Competition
Subramanian posits that Norcraft's “decision to negotiate
exclusively with Fortune” prior to signing the Merger
Agreement “eliminated a standard source of bargaining
leverage for Norcraft”—namely, “invok[ing] the threat of an
alternative deal” to extract a higher price. 221  Consequently,
Norcraft was unable to move Fortune above its proposed
purchase price of $25.50. 222  Moreover, Subramanian
submits, it does not appear “that Norcraft extracted something
else [from Fortune] in exchange for exclusivity.” 223
As a practical matter, the absence of pre-signing competition
“meant that the Norcraft Board was relying on [the] go-
shop process to ensure that Norcraft shareholders received
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fair value.” 224  According to Subramanian, this reliance was
misplaced because Norcraft's go-shop process was so poorly
structured that it was rendered entirely ineffective as a price
discovery tool. 225
b. Information Asymmetries
Subramanian next posits that certain information
asymmetries between Fortune and prospective acquirors
vitiated the effectiveness of Norcraft's go-shop process. 226
As noted, Fortune first approached Norcraft regarding
a potential acquisition on October 20, 2014, and the
parties signed a confidentiality agreement on December 11,
2014. 227  Exclusivity soon followed. 228  This dynamic gave
Fortune a substantial head start relative to other potential
suitors in evaluating the benefits and challenges of a Norcraft
transaction, including the complex issues relating to the
TRAs. 229  And, per Subramanian, “[t]his discrepancy ...
created a severe information asymmetry problem, because
it would be virtually impossible for prospective third-party
bidders to [learn] as much about Norcraft as Fortune [already
knew]” in the thirty-five days allotted for Norcraft's go-shop
process. 230
*21  Moreover, Subramanian submits, regardless of whether
Fortune's “first mover” status provided it with an actual
benefit, potential competing bidders would have perceived
Fortune to enjoy an informational advantage. 231  That
perceived advantage, in turn, discouraged others from bidding
for Norcraft to avoid the “winner's curse”—a phenomenon
that occurs in common value auction settings where the
winning bidder has “buyer's remorse” because it has overpaid
for the asset in question. 232  That remorse is a product, in
part, of the winner's perception that it lacked an adequate
understanding of the asset before it made its bid. 233  Here,
Subramanian submits, because potential competing bidders
for Norcraft perceived that Fortune knew more about the
Company than they could hope to learn in thirty-five days,
they may well have feared that they would end up overpaying
to acquire Norcraft if they outbid Fortune. 234
c. Deal Structure Minimizes Efficacy of the Go-Shop
According to Subramanian, the interaction between certain
deal protection provisions in the Merger Agreement and the
TSAs effectively truncated the Go-Shop Period “from 35
days to 30 days or even shorter.” 235  As noted, the Merger
Agreement entitled Fortune to launch Tahiti's tender offer for
Norcraft's stock fifteen days into the Go-Shop Period. 236
In addition, under the TSAs, Buller, SKM and Trimaran
were obligated to tender 53.6% of Norcraft's outstanding
voting stock into Tahiti's tender offer “promptly following”
the initiation of the offer and, in any event, no later than two
days before the offer's initial expiration date. 237  And that
tender could not be rescinded absent a “full-blown superior
proposal.” 238
Thus, if Fortune launched Tahiti's tender offer halfway
through Norcraft's go-shop process (as it did), 239  53.6% of
Norcraft's voting shares would “promptly” be tendered to
Tahiti—and that tender would be irrevocable absent a superior
proposal. Moreover, even if Norcraft received a superior
proposal during the Go-Shop Period, Fortune would still have
at least four days to match that proposal. 240
According to Subramanian, the confluence of the deal
protections, the limited duration of the Go-Shop Period,
Fortune's unlimited match right, the definition of “superior
proposal” and Fortune's ability to launch Tahiti's tender offer
during the go-shop, resulted in a systematic “tightening
and shortening” of the go-shop process. The “tightening”
occurred because “a third party would have to make a full-
blown superior proposal, not just get to excluded party status,
by the end of the 35 days.” 241  The full-blown superior
proposal was required for Norcraft to terminate the Merger
Agreement and prevent Tahiti from accepting the shares
tendered pursuant to the TSAs (a majority of the shares
outstanding). Subramanian explained:
Ordinarily, if this was a normal go-
shop, you'd have excluded party status
by the end of the go-shop period. But...
[here] you've got to get to a superior
proposal. Got to get the whole shebang
done, as Chancellor Strine said it in
Lear, by the end of the go-shop period.
And in my observation and in my
experience looking at these go-shops,
that is a big deal. Having to get to an
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entire superior proposal by the end of
the go-shop period is a very different
task than getting to simply excluded
party status. 242
*22  The “shortening” occurred because any potential bidder
contemplating whether to participate in the go-shop could
wait no longer than April 30—what Subramanian terms the
“last clear chance” date—to make its superior proposal if
it wanted to ensure that (i) the Norcraft Board had the two
business days it was allowed under the Merger Agreement
to assess the proposal and declare it superior; (ii) Fortune's
four-business-day period to match expired; and (iii) Norcraft
terminated the Merger Agreement before Fortune (via Tahiti)
could close on the tendered Covered Shares. The following
graphic from Subramanian's report illustrates the “tightening
and shortening” phenomenon:
Subramanian also observes that, even without the “tightening
and shortening” of the go-shop, Fortune's unlimited match
right stands alone as a disabling feature of this go-
shop. 243  According to Subramanian, from the perspective
of a potential bidder, unlimited match rights are typically
perceived as limiting any “pathway to success.” 244  Indeed,
Subramanian submits, “[e]verybody agrees that match rights
deter bids. It [is] not even a debated question.” 245
Here again, Fortune was acutely aware of the advantage it
secured, while Norcraft's Board apparently did not understand
what an unlimited match right was much less how that
deal protection might work to hinder the go-shop. 246  In
describing the disparity in the sophistication of the two parties
negotiating this Merger, Subramanian observed: “it seems
like... the Fortune side was playing chess and the Norcraft side
was playing checkers.” 247
J. Procedural Posture
Petitioners filed a petition with this Court on June 22,
2015, seeking appraisal of their 557,631 shares of Norcraft
common stock. 248  The Court held a four-day trial in June
2017, and the parties thereafter submitted post-trial briefing.
On December 20, 2017, the Court requested supplemental
submissions from the parties to address certain questions
following the Delaware Supreme Court's December 14, 2017,
decision in Dell. 249  The Court heard post-trial argument on
April 25, 2018.
II. ANALYSIS
Our appraisal statute, 8 Del. C. § 262, provides, “[t]hrough
[the appraisal] proceeding, the Court shall determine the fair
value of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon
the amount determined to be the fair value. In determining
such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant
factors.” 250  “Easy enough,” one might say on a first read, but
the judicial appraisal process, through the years, has proven
to be anything but “easy.” 251
*23  “Section 262(h) unambiguously calls upon the Court
of Chancery to perform an independent evaluation of ‘fair
value’ at the time of a transaction ... [and] vests the Chancellor
and Vice Chancellors with significant discretion to consider
‘all relevant factors’ and determine the going concern value
of the underlying company.” 252  “By instructing the court
to ‘take into account all relevant factors’ in determining
fair value, the statute requires the Court of Chancery to
give fair consideration to ‘proof of value by any techniques
or methods which are generally considered acceptable in
the financial community and otherwise admissible in court.’
Given that ‘[e]very company is different; [and] every merger
is different,’ the appraisal endeavor is ‘by design, a flexible
process.’ ” 253
Taking to heart the mandate of Section 262(h), as reiterated by
our Supreme Court, I have carefully considered all relevant
factors. And I have assigned those factors the weight (or not)
I determined they deserve based on my evaluation of the
credible evidence, and my application of “accepted financial
principles” as derived from that evidence. 254
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A. The Merger Price is Not a Reliable Indicator of
Norcraft's Fair Value
As our Supreme Court has recognized, “corporate finance
theory reflects a belief that if an asset—such as the value of
a company as reflected in the trading value of its stock—can
be subject to close examination and bidding by many humans
with an incentive to estimate its future cash flows['] value,
the resulting collective judgment as to value is likely to be
highly informative[.]” 255  So long as “all estimators hav[e]
equal access to information, the likelihood of outguessing the
market over time and building a portfolio of stocks beating
it is slight.” 256  Thus, the Supreme Court has emphasized
that our courts must appreciate “the economic reality that the
sale value resulting from a robust market check will often
be the most reliable evidence of fair value, and that second-
guessing the value arrived upon by the collective views of
many sophisticated parties with a real stake in the matter is
hazardous.” 257
Nevertheless, our Supreme Court has declined on several
occasions to pronounce a presumption in favor of deal price
in determining fair value. 258  Instead, it has reiterated the
“flexible” nature of the trial court's fair value calculus, while
also noting its lack of “confidence in [its] ability to craft,
on a general basis, the precise pre-conditions that would
be necessary to invoke a presumption” in favor of the deal
price. 259
Here, Norcraft's deal process did not include a meaningful
market check and, consequently, the Merger Price was not
“arrived upon by the collective views of many sophisticated
parties with a real stake in the matter.” 260  Prior to the
execution of the Merger Agreement, the Company chose to
negotiate with Fortune and Fortune alone. 261  That decision,
if made as a strategic choice, does not alone render Norcraft's
deal process unsound. 262  Nor does it preclude a finding
that Norcraft's deal process resulted in a reliable indication
of fair value (reflected by the Merger Price). Indeed, even
Petitioners' expert has acknowledged that negotiating with a
single potential buyer pre-signing can, in certain instances,
lead to significant value. 263
*24  But the single bidder focus here, while perhaps not
amounting to a breach of fiduciary duty, 264  did not provide a
meaningful market check as would yield a reliable indication
of fair value. First, there is no evidence that the Board or Citi
employed a single bidder approach for the sake of achieving
a strategic advantage or maximizing value. Second, and more
troubling, the Board's focus on only one bidder was tainted by
the fact that Buller (who was conflicted) served as Norcraft's
lead negotiator from start to finish.
The shambolic pre-signing process left Norcraft's post-
signing go-shop as the only meaningful opportunity to check
the market. 265  Unfortunately, Fortune extracted concessions
from Norcraft that rendered the go-shop process equally
ineffective as a price discovery tool.
1. The Board's Singular Focus on Fortune, Failure to
Manage Buller's Conflicts and Misplaced Reliance on
the Go-Shop
There is no dispute that neither Norcraft nor Citi contacted
other bidders before Norcraft signed the Merger Agreement.
This resulted in lost opportunities. Not only did Norcraft
miss the opportunity to test the market before committing to
Fortune, it also missed the opportunity to leverage the interest
of another suitor to extract a higher price from Fortune.
Given these missed opportunities, it is not surprising that, by
the time the parties settled on the Merger Price, Norcraft's
management still believed that the merger consideration was
too low. 266  The plan, therefore, was to put all eggs in the
go-shop basket as a means to achieve fair value for Norcraft
stockholders. 267
Of course, on the other side of the table, Fortune perceived
the Merger Price as very favorable (to Fortune). 268  It was
protective of that price and sought to avoid or limit the go-
shop to preclude a topping bid. 269  And that is precisely what
it did.
*25  Norcraft's Board left the negotiations principally to
Buller. Yet Buller was just as (if not more) fixated on
extracting commitments from Fortune regarding the TRAs
and his future role with the combined company as he was
on securing the best price possible for Norcraft. Fortune,
for its part, was “stringing Buller along” as it negotiated
with him over the Merger Price, leading him to believe he
might continue his employment with Fortune post-close. 270
When Fortune finally informed Buller (after settling on the
Merger Price) that he would have no place at Fortune post-
close, Fortune secured Buller's continued commitment to the
Merger by stringing him along again, this time by dangling
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the possibility that Fortune would be willing to sell Norcraft
Canada to Buller after the closing. 271
The Board either did not appreciate Buller's conflict, or
chose not to manage it, until Buller announced that he would
pursue the acquisition of Norcraft Canada after closing. 272
By then, Buller had been spurring with Fortune in an
attempt to extract every dollar he demanded for the TRAs
(diverting consideration from the stockholders) and had
pushed hard for post-closing employment with Fortune. Yet
all along, the Board did nothing to manage the conflict
—it did not form a special committee of its members to
negotiate with Fortune or take any other steps to neutralize
Buller's influence. Even its half-hearted effort to recuse
Buller from further Board deliberations regarding the Merger
following his demonstrated interest in Norcraft Canada
proved ineffective. 273
Given that the single-bidder pre-signing process led
by a conflicted negotiator yielded what at least some
within Norcraft deemed unsatisfactory consideration, it was
imperative that the Norcraft Board run an effective post-
signing go-shop. It did not.
2. The Post-Sign Go-Shop Provides No Basis to Rely
on the Deal Price
Although it is hardly clear that Norcraft's Board appreciated
this fact, the ineffective pre-signing process should have
made clear that the post-signing go-shop would offer the
only real opportunity for a meaningful market check. 274
Unfortunately, that process fell far short on many levels, as
the following evidence illustrates:
• Prior to the Go-Shop Period, it was not widely known
that Norcraft was “up for sale” 275 ; thus, potentially
interested parties did not know that Norcraft was “in
play” before the Merger was announced, putting them
several steps behind Fortune in pursuing an acquisition
of Norcraft 276 ;
• Norcraft's Board appeared to lack even a basic
understanding of the terms and function of the go-
shop 277 ;
• Any potential bidder had to value the TRAs—and provide
for the satisfaction of Norcraft's payment obligations
thereunder—within the Go-Shop Period, a task that
Fortune had several months to complete (and struggled
to navigate successfully, even with the assistance of
expert tax advisors) 278 ;
• Fortune had an unlimited match right under the Merger
Agreement, which gave Fortune four business days to
match a superior proposal by a third-party bidder and
two business days to match any subsequent proposal by
the same bidder 279 ;
*26  • In order to proceed with an alternate transaction,
Norcraft had to receive a “Superior Proposal” by the
end of the Go-Shop Period, “essentially require[ing]
the bidder to get the whole shebang done within the
[Go-Shop Period].” 280  This requirement was made
more onerous by the TRAs' interaction with the Merger
Agreement's go-shop provisions, allowing “Fortune [to]
close its tender offer for the 54 percent [of Norcraft
common stock] before Norcraft [could] terminate the
merger agreement, because Norcraft [couldn't] terminate
on the possibility of a superior proposal. [Rather,
Norcraft could] only terminate after [it had] given
Fortune four days to match. And the four days [could]
go beyond the tender offer expiration.” 281
• On April 14, 2015, about two weeks into the thirty-
five-day Go-Shop Period, Fortune launched Tahiti's
tender offer, 282  triggering the TSAs and causing 53.6%
of Norcraft's outstanding shares to be committed to
supporting the Norcraft-Fortune transaction absent a
superior proposal 283 ; and
• In a fit of bad judgment, RBC attempted to contact and
dissuade possible bidders from topping Fortune's bid
during the go-shop. 284
*27  Presented with this factual record, I am not persuaded
that Norcraft's go-shop process provided a meaningful market
check that resulted in a transaction price derived from the
“collective views of many sophisticated parties with a real
stake in the matter.” 285  Accordingly, I do not accord any
weight to the deal price in my fair value calculus. 286
3. Insufficient Evidence to Consider the Efficient
Market Hypothesis
Following our Supreme Court's renewed endorsement of the
efficient capital market hypothesis in Dell, I requested that
the parties submit supplemental post-trial briefing addressing
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whether Norcraff's unaffected trading price was probative
of Norcraft's fair value on the Merger date. 287  Because
this case was tried before the Supreme Court's decision in
Dell, the parties presented limited evidence at trial respecting
Norcraft's trading history and the market for its stock.
Consequently, the parties had a rather limited record to
draw upon when addressing this issue in their supplemental
submissions. 288
To the extent the trial evidence is informative at all
on this issue, it does not support assigning any weight
to Norcraft's unaffected trading price for purposes of
determining Norcraft's fair value on the Merger date. Norcraft
had a limited public trading history given that it had just
completed an IPO eighteen months before the Merger. 289
What trading did occur following the IPO was relatively
limited, an unsurprising phenomenon given the niche market
in which Norcraft operated. 290  The analyst coverage of
Norcraft's stock was relatively sparse. 291  Based on this
record, I am unable to conclude that the market for Norcraft's
common stock was efficient or semi-strong efficient. 292
Absent that finding, I do not assign any weight to Norcraft's
unaffected trading price as an indicator of Norcraft's fair value
on the Merger date. 293
B. Norcraft's Fair Value under “Traditional Methods”
of Valuation
*28  Having determined that neither the Merger Price
nor Norcraft's unaffected stock price provide a reliable
indicator of the Company's fair value, I must now consider
the remaining valuation analyses presented by the parties'
experts. In this regard, our law is clear that:
In discharging its statutory mandate,
the Court of Chancery has the
discretion to select one of the
parties' valuation models as its general
framework or to fashion its own.
The Court of Chancery's role as
an independent appraiser does not
necessitate a judicial determination
that is completely separate and
apart from the valuations performed
by the parties' expert witnesses
who testify at trial. It must,
however, carefully consider whether
the evidence supports the valuation
conclusions advanced by the parties'
respective experts. 294
I have followed this guidance as I have worked through the
experts' competing analyses here.
1. Comparable Companies and Precedent Transaction
Analyses Are Not Reliable
As previously mentioned, both experts performed a
comparable company analysis. Austin Smith also performed
a precedent transaction analysis. “The utility of a comparable
company [or precedent transaction] approach is dependent
on the similarity between the company the court is valuing
and the companies [or precedent transactions] used for
comparison.” 295  When there are no sufficiently comparable
companies or precedent transactions, such analyses are
unavailing in the search for fair value. 296
After carefully reviewing the evidence, I see no factual basis
to rely on a precedent transaction or comparable company
analysis as an indicator of Norcraft's fair value as of the
Merger date. The parties agree that there had not been an
acquisition of any publicly-traded, “dealer channel” cabinet
manufacturer—or a satisfactorily comparable business 297 —
in any temporal proximity to the Merger. 298  Nor were the
parties (or their experts) able to identify any truly comparable
companies that could support a reliable comparable company
analysis. 299  It is, therefore, unsurprising that neither expert
relied on market-based approaches (comparable company
or precedent transaction analyses) as the principal metric
by which to value Norcraft. 300  Instead, they offered these
valuations to corroborate the results they reached utilizing
their preferred valuation methodologies. 301  Because I
disagree that market-based valuation metrics provide any
guidance here, I do not consider those metrics further.
2. The DCF Analysis
*29  “[A] DCF analysis can provide the court with a helpful
data point about the price a sale process would have produced
had there been a robust sale process involving willing buyers
with thorough information and the time to make a bid.” 302
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The basic premise underlying the
DCF methodology is that the value
of a company is equal to the value
of its projected future cash flows,
discounted to the present value at the
opportunity cost of capital. Calculating
a DCF involves three steps: (1) one
estimates the values of future cash
flows for a discrete period, where
possible, based on contemporaneous
management projections; (2) the value
of the entity attributable to cash
flows expected after the end of the
discrete period must be estimated to
produce a so-called terminal value,
preferably using a perpetual growth
model; and (3) the value of the cash
flows for the discrete period and the
terminal value must be discounted
back using the capital asset pricing
model or “CAPM.” In simpler terms,
the DCF method involves three basic
components: (1) cash flow projections;
(2) a discount rate; and (3) a terminal
value. 303
a. The Disputed Inputs
As is typically the case, the substantial delta between
the experts' DCF valuations can be traced to their
disagreements regarding the DCF inputs. Their most
significant disagreements are: (1) whether to extend the Base
Case projections by an additional five years; and (2) how
to calculate Norcraft's beta in connection with estimating
Norcraft's WACC. On the latter point, the experts disagree
regarding (i) the selection of appropriate guideline public
companies (“GPCs”) for a proxy beta calculation and whether
net debt or gross debt should be used to unlever the GPC
betas and relever the resulting proxy beta 304 ; and (ii)
whether Norcraft's observed capital structure or a target
capital structure should be used to relever the concluded beta
when calculating Norcraft's cost of equity. 305  The experts
generally agree on the remaining DCF inputs.
i. Management Projections
“The most important input necessary for performing a proper
DCF is a projection of the subject company's cash flows.
Without a reliable estimate of cash flows, a DCF analysis is
simply a guess.” 306  While Norcraft's management (Buller
and Ginter) prepared several sets of projections, the experts
agree that the most reliable projections are the Base Case
projections—and both experts relied on those projections in
their primary DCF analyses. 307
*30  The record reflects that Norcraft management did
not prepare long-term projections in the ordinary course of
Norcraft's business. 308  Nevertheless, Buller and Ginter knew
how to prepare long-term projections and they approached
the Base Case projections with a view to providing the
Board with a reliable estimate of Norcraft's future financial
performance. 309  When all was said and done, Buller and
Ginter were confident they had prepared a set of realistic,
reasonable projections upon which Citi and the Board could
rely in assessing Norcraft's value during the course of
negotiations. 310  While not perfect, I am satisfied that the
Base Case projections provide a reliable foundation for a valid
DCF. 311
The experts' dispute regarding the Base Case projections does
not turn on their reliability (or lack thereof), but rather on
whether the projections should be extended by an additional
five years. Clarke opined that the extension was necessary,
while Austin Smith opined that a PGR should be applied at
the end of the five-year Base Case projection period.
According to Clarke, extending the Base Case projections is
necessary to capture Norcraft's future cash flows because “the
Base Case [p]rojections had not reached [a] steady state at
the end of the [five-year] projection period” and, therefore,
“it would be inappropriate to apply a standard [PGR] at
th[e] last year [of that period].” 312  To account for Norcraft's
growth potential as of 2019, Clarke extended the Base Case
projections by an additional five years—through 2024—“to
gradually reduce growth rates over time until reaching [a
3.5%] PGR.” 313
*31  Austin Smith, on the other hand, maintains that
extending the Base Case projections is inappropriate because
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doing so forecasts growth that Norcraft almost certainly could
not achieve. In this regard, she points out that the cabinetry
industry is cyclical, as demonstrated by trends in (1) the
industry's historical performance (growth and decline); and
(2) the historical growth (and decline) of the residential
construction market. 314  Extending the Base Case projections
by an additional five years implies a ten-year period of
consistent growth following two years of already achieved
growth. According to Austin Smith, projecting twelve years
of steady growth for a business in the cabinetry industry is
patently unreasonable. 315
On this point, I find Austin Smith most credible. The evidence
adduced at trial supports her view that the cabinetry industry
is cyclical and follows the cycle of the residential construction
market. 316  The evidentiary record also reflects that the
residential construction market is projected to reach a “steady
state” at or slightly before the last year of the Base Case
projection period (2019). 317  Moreover, insofar as Norcraft's
own management was not inclined to project Norcraft's
financial results beyond FY2019, I see no basis to do so post
hoc for the sake of reaching a litigation result.
ii. Norcraft's Estimated WACC
*32  The parties also dispute how to calculate the applicable
discount rate based on Norcraft's estimated WACC. More
specifically, they dispute how to calculate Norcraft's beta in
connection with estimating Norcraft's cost of equity capital (a
key component of WACC).
The application of a discount rate to financial projections
attempts to “convert the [subject company's] expected
economic income stream to present value.” 318  Where the
discount rate is based on the subject company's WACC, the
projected future cash flows and terminal value are discounted
by the WACC to bring them back to present value. 319  A
company's WACC represents the cost (to the company) of
financing its business operations; it comprises the weighted
average of the company's cost of debt and equity 320 :
Here, both experts calculated Norcraft's cost of equity capital
pursuant to CAPM. 321  Following CAPM, a company's cost
of equity is calculated as follows 322 :
The experts generally agree on many of the relevant inputs to
calculate Norcraft's WACC; both experts used the same risk-
free rate of return (2.75%), equity risk premium (6.21%) and
size premium (2.69%). 323  The experts differed, however, in
their respective estimates of Norcraft's pre-tax cost of debt.
Clarke estimated Norcraft's pre-tax cost of debt as 6.95%—
based on “the average of the 15-year yield-to-maturity of B
and BB rated bonds” as of the Merger date. 324  Austin Smith,
by contrast, estimated Norcraft's pre-tax cost of debt as 5.85%
—based on the “[a]verage of (a) BofA Merrill Lynch US High
Yield B Effective Yield as of 5/12/15 [the Merger date] and
(b) total return on Norcraft['s] [then-outstanding] term loan
(including [the] effect of issuance discount).” 325
The experts' respective estimates of Norcraft's pre-tax cost of
debt are both reasonable. As of the Merger date, Norcraft's
long-term debt was rated “B2” by Moody's Global Credit
Research and “B+” by Standard & Poor's, and the yield
to maturity on high-yield U.S. corporate bonds with 10+
year maturity on that date was approximately 6.34%. 326
Accordingly, I use the average of the experts' respective
estimates of Norcraft's pre-tax cost of debt (6.40%) for my
DCF analysis. 327
*33  As to the estimation of Norcraft's cost of equity, the
experts' principal point of disagreement concerns Norcraft's
beta coefficient. “Beta is a measure of the systematic risk
of a stock; the tendency of a stock's price to correlate with
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changes in the market.... [B]etas for equity capital are used
as a modifier to the equity risk premium [ ] in the context of
[calculating a company's cost of equity].” 328
A company's beta is measured by tracking relative change
in the trading price of its stock over a discrete time period
(the “lookback period”), with a set frequency (e.g., daily,
weekly, monthly). 329  When there is insufficient data on
the trading history of a company's stock, the company's
“beta must be an estimate based on the [observed] betas
of comparable, publicly traded companies” (i.e., a “proxy
beta”). 330  Observed betas are levered betas; they reflect a
company's operating risk and its financial risk. 331  Thus,
when calculating a proxy beta, one must “unlever” each
GPC's observed (levered) beta to remove the debt-related
risk(s) of that particular GPC. 332  Once the GPC betas
are unlevered, and the mean or median of those betas is
calculated, the unlevered summary measure beta (i.e., the
unlevered proxy beta) must be relevered to add back financial
risk. 333  The relevant financial risk, however, is the subject
company's not the GPCs'. 334
The experts generally agree that there is insufficient
information regarding Norcraft's own beta to allow a reliable
beta calculation based solely on that information—a function
of Norcraft's limited trading history. 335  Accordingly, they
agree that the use of a proxy beta is appropriate. They
disagree, however, as to (1) which GPCs should be used to
derive the proxy beta; (2) whether gross debt or net debt
should be used to unlever the GPC betas and relever the
resulting unlevered proxy beta; and (3) whether Norcraft's
observed capital structure or a target capital structure should
be used to relever the proxy beta.
I begin with the first point of disagreement—appropriate
GPCs. Clarke used four GPCs for his proxy beta calculation
—American Woodmark, Masonite, PGT and Ply Gem 336 —
which he selected by applying a set of comparability-related
screening criteria. 337  After selecting these four GPCs, Clarke
then calculated each GPC's beta over a two-year lookback
period (measured weekly) and a one-year lookback period
(measured daily)—both periods relative to the Merger date—
and unlevered each observed GPC beta using the gross debt
of the corresponding GPC. 338  This led Clarke to derive an
(unlevered) proxy beta for Norcraft of 0.80 based on the mean
and median of the unlevered GPC betas. 339
*34  Austin Smith, by contrast, identified sixteen GPCs for
her proxy beta calculation; the four companies selected by
Clarke and twelve additional companies, including Fortune
and Masco. 340  Having selected these sixteen GPCs, Austin
Smith derived a proxy beta for Norcraft based on the median
of the unlevered GPC betas, measured weekly over a two-year
lookback period—relative to the Merger date—and unlevered
using each GPC's net debt. 341  This resulted in an unlevered
proxy beta for Norcraft of 1.02. 342
Each expert disputes the suitability of the other's selected
GPCs. According to Clarke, Austin Smith's selected GPCs
“were either not comparable [to Norcraft] and/or were
going through significant restructuring events that impacted
their historical betas.” 343  Austin Smith, for her part,
maintains that Clarke's methodology for selecting GPCs is
“fundamental[ly]” flawed, principally because: (i) it “results
in the exclusion of two of the three publicly-traded cabinet
manufacturers: Fortune ... and Masco”; and (ii) it yields
a relatively small set of companies, all but one of which
manufacture products other than cabinets—meaning they are
less comparable to Norcraft than Fortune and Masco. 344
Both experts present valid arguments. After considering the
evidentiary record, I have determined to derive a proxy
beta for Norcraft based on the weekly observed betas of
Fortune, Masco, American Woodmark, Masonite, PGT and
Ply Gem, measured over a two-year lookback period (relative
to the Merger date). I acknowledge the size difference
between Norcraft, on one hand, and Fortune and Masco,
on the other, but there are few publicly-traded, “dealer
channel” cabinet manufacturing businesses operating in the
United States from which to draw. 345  To account for
this dynamic, I have selected a set of GPCs that includes
publicly-traded companies directly competing with Norcraft
(Fortune, Masco and American Woodmark), and also public
companies operating in the same general industry that are
more comparable in size to Norcraft (Masonite, PGT and
Ply Gem). 346  Since neither party has provided me with a
principled way to assign different weights to the betas of
individual GPCs, I have determined to derive the proxy beta
by taking the median of the unlevered GPC betas. 347
*35  As to the question whether to use gross or net debt for
unlevering and relevering purposes, I have determined that
Clarke's approach (gross debt) is most appropriate. I consulted
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the finance literature cited by both experts with regard to this
issue and have come to the conclusion that using gross debt
is the more generally accepted approach when applying the
Hamada unlevering and relevering formulas (as both experts
did), 348  which utilize “total debt” as an input. 349  I also find
that considering net debt, while it might eliminate some of
the drawbacks of the Hamada approach if done properly, 350
complicates the analysis and adds a significant risk of error to
an already abstract process.
In her deposition, Austin Smith explained that using net debt
requires “a judgment call” because “public companies don't
report excess cash.” 351  In essence, to derive net debt, one
“look[s] at how the cash balances for th[e chosen] companies
changed over time, and [then] look[s] at the relationship
between cash and debt, and come[s] to an assessment.” 352
If insufficient data about excess cash is available, “total
cash is assumed to equal excess cash.” 353  Considering the
many variables already at play in a DCF analysis (especially
when deriving a proxy beta), I find that figures based on a
“judgment call” are unreliable in the absence of a principled
way to evaluate the soundness of the underlying “judgment.”
For all these reasons, I have utilized gross debt rather than net
debt for unlevering and relevering purposes.
That takes me to the final beta-related dispute: the appropriate
capital structure to relever the unlevered proxy beta. Austin
Smith submits that a target capital structure based on the
capital structure of comparable companies provides the most
reliable input, while Clarke advocates the use of Norcraft's
actual (observed) capital structure as of the Merger date.
Austin Smith explains her choice by noting that Norcraft only
went public in 2013 and its management had not indicated as
of the Merger that it intended to maintain the Company's then-
existing capital structure. 354  According to Austin Smith, it
is likely that, over time, Norcraft's capital structure would
come to resemble that of its peers. 355  Clarke counters that
Norcraft's observed capital structure as of the Merger date
was the “operative reality” of the Company at that time and,
as such, is the appropriate capital structure to apply when
relevering the unlevered proxy beta. 356
Clarke has the better of this debate. While there are instances
where using a target capital structure for relevering purposes
would be appropriate, 357  especially where the target's capital
structure is in flux, that is not the case here. It is true that,
as of the Merger, Norcraft had operated for only eighteen
months after its IPO. There is no evidence, however, that
management intended to change Norcraft's capital structure,
and any suggestion that it would do so is nothing more
than sheer speculation. 358  Accordingly, I refer to Norcraft's
observed capital structure as of the Merger (75% equity, 25%
debt) to relever Norcraft's concluded unlevered beta. 359
b. The Court's DCF Valuation of Norcraft
*36  Like Clarke and Austin Smith, I begin my DCF analysis
with the Base Case projections, adjusted to deduct for income
tax expense in each of the projected years (based on a 38%
tax rate). This adjustment yields the following figures for





















I next adjust the NOPAT figures to obtain unlevered free
cash flow figures for each projected year by (1) adding
back non-cash charges—depreciation, amortization and stock
compensation expense; (2) deducting Norcraft's capital
expenditures; and (3) deducting year-over-year change in
Norcraft's net working capital (“NWC”). My adjustments
with respect to each item track those made by both
experts. 361
The foregoing adjustments yield the following figures for





















*37  To calculate the present value of these unlevered
cash flows, like Clarke and Austin Smith, I have applied
a discount rate based on Norcraft's estimated WACC. My
WACC calculation also uses CAPM to estimate Norcraft's
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cost of equity—based on the parties' common risk-free rate
of return (2.75%), equity risk premium (6.21%) and size
premium (2.69%)—and uses a 6.40% pre-tax cost of debt,
which yields a post-tax cost of debt for Norcraft of 3.97%
(again based on a 38% tax rate).
To derive a beta for my cost of equity calculation, I have
unlevered the observed weekly betas of my selected GPCs
over a two-year lookback period relative to the Merger
date, using the Hamada unlevering formula and gross debt












































The median of the unlevered GPC betas, 0.98, constitutes
Norcraft's concluded unlevered beta. I then relevered that beta
using Norcraft's observed capital structure of 75% equity and
25% debt (per Clarke's estimation), resulting in a levered beta
for Norcraft of 1.187. Incorporating this levered beta into
my WACC calculation, along with the other inputs already
mentioned—again using Norcraft's observed capital structure
—I derived a WACC for Norcraft of 10.60%. Applying
Norcraft's concluded WACC to discount its projected future
cash flows to present value, I have calculated the present value
of those cash flows to be $149.7 million.
To calcul ate Norcraft's terminal value, I have used the
Perpetuity Growth method (as did both experts), 362  which
posits that terminal value equals the quotient of (1) the
subject company's terminal year free cash flow (here, $51.41
million); and (2) the applicable capitalization rate (here,
7.10%) 363 —discounted to present value using the applicable
discount rate (here, Norcraft's WACC of 10.60%). 364  This
yields a terminal value of $477.2 million.
*38  Summing together the present value of Norcraft's
projected unlevered cash flows ($149.7 million) and its
terminal value ($477.2 million) results in an operating value
for Norcraft of $626.9 million. To calculate Norcraft's total
equity value, I then made the following adjustments to
Norcraft's concluded operating value:
• adding Norcraft's excess cash as of the Merger date,
calculated as $62.6 million 365 ;
• adding the value of the TRA-related tax benefits realized
by Norcraft in each of the projected years, calculated as
$4.3 million 366 ; and
• deducting Norcraft's long-term debt as of the Merger date,
calculated as $147.5 million. 367
These adjustments to Norcraft's operating value yield a
total equity value for Norcraft of $546.3 million. Dividing
Norcraft's total equity value by Norcraft's fully diluted
shares outstanding as of the Merger date (20,880,123), 368  I
conclude that Norcraft's equity value per share on that date
was $26.16.
3. The Merger Price as a “Reality Check”
*39  As explained above, I have determined that the Merger
Price is not a reliable indicator of Norcraft's fair value as
of the Merger date. That does not mean, however, that
the Merger Price is irrelevant for purposes of the Court's
fair value determination. To the contrary, it is appropriate
to consider the Merger Price as a “reality check” on the
Court's DCF valuation of Norcraft. 369  Insofar as I am obliged
to articulate a principled, evidence-based explanation for
the delta between the Merger Price and the Court's DCF
valuation (here, $0.66 per share), I am satisfied that the
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process infirmities I have identified resulted in the Board
leaving $0.66 per share on the bargaining table. 370  With that
said, I am also satisfied that the delta between the Merger
Price and the DCF value is not so great as to cause me to
question whether the DCF value is grounded in reality. 371
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I have found the fair value of
Norcraft shares as of the Merger date (May 12, 2015) was
$26.16 per share. The statutory rate of interest, compounded
quarterly, shall accrue from the date of closing to the
date of payment. The parties should confer and submit an
implementing final judgment within ten (10) days.
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137 JX 195 (e-mail chain between Klein and Fortune deal team, Mar. 25, 2015) (Klein: “[Eldridge] said I need to
call [Buller] and calm him down and make him feel good.”).
138 JX 197 (e-mail chain between Buller and Reilly, Mar. 26, 2015).
139 JX 202 (e-mail from Buller to PwC, Mar. 27, 2015).
140 JX 198 (e-mail chain between Norcraft and Fortune deal teams, Mar. 26, 2015) at NCFT0168392; TT 126:6-16
(Biggart) (“I got Chris Klein to agree ... that [Fortune] would waive [Buller's] noncompete in Canada, as a
showing of good faith to ... Buller that we were serious when we say we're going to ... have a negotiation
after the closing.... ”).
141 JX 219 (Amendment to Buller's Employment Agreement).
142 JX 204 (e-mail from Reilly to Maselli, Mar. 27, 2015).
143 TT 123-26 (Biggart) (explaining the TRA-related difficulties); id. at 126:2-5 (Biggart) (“I called [Ropes & Gray]
and said ... [w]e better do something quick or this whole deal is going to fall apart.”).
144 TT 123-24 (Biggart).
145 JX 13 (Biggart Dep.) at 168:2-3; JX 198 (e-mail chain between Norcraft and Fortune deal teams, Mar. 26,
2015); JX 207 (e-mail from Klein to Fortune deal team, Mar. 27, 2015); TT 126:8 (Biggart) (“[Fortune was]
willing to pay 2 out of the $3 million.”).
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146 JX 207 (e-mail from Klein to Fortune deal team, Mar. 27, 2015) (Klein: “We[ ] heard through [Buller's] personal
lawyer that he rejects our offer of 2 of 3 million [of the] disputed TRA amount, needs all 3.... I've been very
reasonable here in all of this, but really cannot go any farther. I do not wish to call [Buller] and go through all of
this again with him - it could do more harm than good.”) (formatting altered); TT 128:12-23 (Biggart) (“Q. What
was [Buller's] response to that proposal? A. He said no. And he said, I want... everything that my accountant
says I'm entitled to. He said, [my accountant] has calculated my TRA payment at 19.7 [million], I want 19.7.”).
147 JX 207 (e-mail from Klein to Fortune deal team, Mar. 27, 2015).
148 JX 212 (Mar. 27, 2015 e-mail from Buller to Maselli, Reilly et al., thanking Maselli and Reilly for agreeing
that Trimaran and SKM, respectively, would transfer the $1 million sum to the Norcraft LLC unitholders); TT
129:6-24 (Biggart).
149 JX 238 (Norcraft Schedule 14D-9) at 16-17.
150 PTO ¶ 2y; JX 238 (Norcraft Schedule 14D-9) at 17.
151 PTO ¶ 2z. Under the TRA termination agreements, the Norcraft LLC unitholders would receive approximately
$ 19.7 million, SKM would receive approximately $15.9 million and Trimaran would receive approximately
$7.9 million. Id.
152 PTO ¶ 2bb.
153 JX 229 (Buller Tender and Support Agreement [“Buller TSA”] ) § 3; JX 230 (SKM Tender and Support
Agreement [“SKM TSA”] ) § 3; JX 231 (Trimaran Tender and Support Agreement [“Trimaran TSA”] ) § 3.
Fortune initiated Tahiti's tender offer on April 14, 2015, PTO ¶ 2ee, and the offer's initial expiration date was
May 11, 2015. JX 239 (Norcraft Schedule TO, filed Apr. 14, 2015, attaching Tahiti's tender offer) at 9.
154 JX 229 (Buller TSA) § 3(b); JX 230 (SKM TSA) § 3(b); JX 231 (Trimaran TSA) § 3(b).
155 PTO ¶ 2cc.
156 TT 45:14-46:8 (Eldridge); JX 8 (Eldridge Dep.) at 49:8-12, 89:17-90:22.
157 JX 3 (Buller Dep.) at 199-200; JX 9 (Maselli Dep.) at 76:5-16; JX 11 (Reilly Dep.) at 122-29.
158 JX 12 (Baab Dep.) at 100-02; see also JX 149 (Feb. 27, 2015 email from Klein to Fortune deal team outlining
Fortune's conditions for the go-shop, explaining their intended effect of avoiding an auction); JX 232 (e-mail
chain between RBC, Klein and other members of Fortune's deal team, Apr. 7, 2015, explaining RBC should
emphasize to other potential buyers that Fortune has matching rights).
159 TT 26:22-27:1 (Eldridge). Citi's contact list was developed with input from Buller and Reilly, who “suggested
[certain] companies to put on the list, including companies that had reached out to [Norcraft] historically.”
TT 27:7-12 (Eldridge).
160 TT 27 (Eldridge); JX 243 (“Buyers Log” dated May 4, 2015, prepared by Citi [“Citi Go-Shop Log”] ). The six
private equity firms were The Carlyle Group (“Carlyle”), TPG Capital, Wind Point Partners, Olympus Partners,
American Industrial Partners and another unidentified private equity firm. TT 27 (Eldridge); JX 243 (Citi Go-
Shop Log).
161 JX 240 (“Go-Shop Process Update” dated Apr. 20, 2015, prepared by Citi); TT 157 (Biggart).
162 PTO ¶ 2cc.
163 JX 243 (Citi Go-Shop Log) at 5 (“no interest in going head-to-head with Fortune on this”), 7 (“Fortune is a
logical buyer here, so hard for us to compete”), 8 (“[n]ot that interested in competing against Fortune”), 10
(“[c]an't compete with Fortune”), 11 (“[c]an't compete with Fortune”).
164 Id. at 6, 14 (“[v]alue too high”).
165 Id. at 15; seeid. at 2 (“investment is too big [ ] to consider in a short period”); TT 46:9-19 (Eldridge) (“Q. And,
sir, you testified at your deposition that there were go-shop participants in this process who indicated that they
would like to have more time. Correct? A. Yes. Q. And what parties were those? A. I don't recall specifically.
I recall it being a general comment from a couple of people that we spoke with. They may not have been
people that signed NDAs. It was just a general comment from various people that we contacted.”).
166 JX 233 (e-mail chain between Klein, RBC and other members of Fortune's deal team, Apr. 7, 2015) at
FB0089016.
167 Id.
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171 TT 144:3-4 (Biggart).
172 TT 144:5-6 (Biggart).
173 TT 144:16-18 (Biggart).
174 JX 5 (Klein Dep.) at 275:6-276:14.
175 JX 221 (Merger Agreement), pmbl. & § 1.1; PTO ¶¶ 2cc, 2ee.
176 PTO ¶ 2cc.
177 JX 250 (May 12, 2015 Fortune press release); PTO ¶ 2ff.
178 TT 455-56 (Clarke); TT 698 (Austin Smith).
179 YT 455-56 (Clarke); TT 698 (Austin Smith). By any measure, both experts are well qualified. See JX 18
(Report of David G. Clarke, ASA [“Clarke Report”] ) at 8 (describing qualifications); JX 20 (Austin Smith
Report) at 3 (describing qualifications). And both did what they were engaged to do here - advocate their
side's position on fair value - quite effectively. It is accepted in Delaware appraisal litigation that paid valuation
experts have assumed more of an advocacy role, and less of a traditional expert witness role (as illustrated by
the wide deltas we regularly see in their valuation conclusions). SeeDell, 177 A.3d at 24 (“the price produced
by an efficient market is generally a more reliable assessment of fair value than the view of a single analyst,
especially an expert witness who caters her valuation to the litigation imperatives of a well-heeled client”);
Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, 993 A.2d 497, 498-99 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Both these men of valuation
science purported to apply the same primary method of valuation—the discounted cash flow (‘DCF’) method
—but the expert for the petitioners came up with a value of $139 per share and the expert for Golden came up
with a value of only $88 per share—a modest $51 per share value gap.” (emphasis supplied) ). Despite the
repeated expressions of frustration by our courts, the practice continues. When a rushing river flows against
a resisting rock, eventually the river wins out. Perhaps that is the hope among appraisal advocates and the
valuation experts they engage to sponsor their positions.
180 TT 243–14 (Subramanian). Subramanian is “the H. Douglas Weaver Professor of Business Law at the
Harvard Business School (HBS) and the Joseph Flom Professor of Law and Business at the Harvard Law
School (HLS).” JX 19 (Expert Report of Guhan Subramanian [“Subramanian Report”] ) at 2; see id. (describing
qualifications).
181 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 17 (quoting JX 19 (Subramanian Report) at 25) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Clarke did not offer any independent analysis as to why the Merger Price is not a reliable indicator of Norcraft's
fair value as of the Merger date; instead, he adopted in full Subramanian's conclusion on that point. See JX
18 (Clarke Report) at 6, 17.
182 Seeid. at 2.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 2-3. The extension of the projections, according to Clarke, was required to reduce Norcraft's growth
rates gradually to a “steady state.” In this regard, Clarke notes that “if [he] had to use 2019 as the final year of
[his] projections, [he] would then need to use a higher [PGR of 4.4%] to account for the tapering of [Norcraft's]
growth to a steady state.” JX 21 (Rebuttal Report of David G. Clarke, ASA [“Clarke Rebuttal Report”] ) at
27 n.62.
185 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 24; JX 1 (Ginter Dep.) at 44—45.
186 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 3, 42. To derive Norcraft's WACC, Clarke first “calculated [1] Norcraft's cost of equity
based on the capital asset pricing model (‘CAPM’) and [2] Norcraft's long-term[,] [after-tax] cost of debt.” Id.
at 3, 33. Clarke next multiplied (1) Norcraft's estimated cost of equity (11.4%) by the proportion of equity in
Norcraft's capital structure (approximately 75%), as measured by Norcraft's (undiluted) market capitalization
immediately before the Merger's announcement ($396 million); and (2) Norcraft's estimated after-tax cost of
debt (4.31%) by the proportion of debt in Norcraft's capital structure (approximately 25%), as measured by
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the book value of Norcraft's long-term debt on March 29, 2015 ($147.5 million). Id. at 33, 42 & sched. 5-B.
Finally, Clarke summed the product of each calculation to obtain a WACC of 9.6%. Id. at 33.
187 Id., sched. 2-A (DCF analysis).
188 Id., sched. 2-A (DCF analysis). Terminal year free cash flow is the future value implied by (1) the subject
company's projected revenue and expense items in the final year of the discrete projection period; and (2)
the subject company's estimated PGR. See id. Clarke calculated Norcraft's capitalization rate as the positive
difference of Norcraft's estimated WACC (9.6%) and estimated PGR (3.5%). Id. at 43.
189 Id., sched. 2-A (DCF analysis).
190 Id.
191 Id. Operating value, as stated here, represents the present value of Norcraft's future unlevered free cash
flows. Id. A DCF analysis, however, attempts to derive the value of the subject company's equity. Id. at 45.
Thus, adjustments to the operating value are generally necessary to add in equity in the form of excess
cash (or cash equivalents) and to remove debt. Id. at 45-47. Clarke based his excess cash and “cash from
option exercise” estimates on the information disclosed in the Base Case projections and Norcraft's Form
10-Q for Q1 FY2015. Id. at 45. He based his estimation of the TRA-related tax benefits on the “[I.R.C. § ]
743(b) and [net operating loss] utilization” projections included in Citi's March 28, 2015 presentation to the
Norcraft Board. Id. at 46.
192 Id. at 48.
193 Id. Clarke calculated Norcraft's “fully diluted shares outstanding” as the sum of (1) the total number of Norcraft
shares and stock options outstanding as of the Merger date; and (2) the total number of convertible Norcraft
LLC units (convertible into Norcraft stock) outstanding on that date. Id.
194 Id. at 2–4.
195 Id. at 51.
196 Id. at 4.
197 Id. at 2.
198 JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at 29 (emphasis in original). Austin Smith based her $3.60 per share “synergies”
figure on “the presentations of Citi and the work done by RBC.” TT 704:24-705:1 (Austin Smith).
199 JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at 1.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 20-21, 23 & Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis). Austin Smith performed two additional DCF analyses, one relying on
the Ginter 2014 Projections, which valued Norcraft at $15.59 per share, and another relying on a Capitalization
of Cash Flow methodology, which valued Norcraft at $12.65 per share. Id. at 23-24.
202 Id. at 23 & Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis).
203 Id. at 20.
204 Id., Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis). To derive Norcraft's WACC, Austin Smith first calculated (1) Norcraft's cost of equity
based on CAPM and (2) Norcraft's after-tax cost of debt (using a 37.69% tax rate). Id., Ex. 5 (Calculation of
WACC). She next multiplied (1) Norcraft's estimated cost of equity (12.4%) by a target proportion of equity in
Norcraft's capital structure (86%), based on the capital structure of selected comparable companies; and (2)
Norcraft's estimated after-tax cost of debt (3.6%) by a target proportion of debt in Norcraft's capital structure
(14%), again based on a “comparable capital structure” approach. Id., Exs. 4 (Calculation of Beta) and 5
(Calculation of WACC). Finally, Austin Smith summed the product of each calculation to obtain a WACC of
11.2%. Id., Ex. 5 (Calculation of WACC).
205 See id., Ex. 5 (Calculation of WACC). This is the same approach Clarke followed to determine terminal value
(with different inputs). JX 18 (Clarke Report), sched. 2-A (DCF analysis).
206 JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis).
207 Id.
208 JX 537 (native Excel version of Austin Smith's DCF model). Austin Smith calculated Norcraft's excess cash
on the Merger date based on the “Cash from Norcraft” figure in the “Funds Flow Memorandum” prepared
in connection with the Merger ($54,396,335.01), JX 249 at 2, less a $20 million cash balance (cash for
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operations, per the Base Case projections) plus the product of (1) Norcraft's total options outstanding as of
the Merger date (1,142,383) and (2) the weighted average exercise price of those options ($16.01). JX 20
(Austin Smith Report), Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis) (drawing option-related information from Norcraft's Q1 FY 2015
10-Q, JX 248 at 14).
209 JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis).
210 Id.
211 Id. Austin Smith calculated Norcraft's fully diluted shares outstanding as 20,869,976. JX 20 (Austin Smith
Report) at 13 & n.25. It is unclear how Austin Smith derived this figure, and the figure conflicts with the
information set forth in Norcraft's Form 10-a for Q1 FY2015 and the “Funds Flow Memorandum” prepared
in connection with the Merger. See JX 248 (Norcraft's Q1 FY2015 Form 10-Q) at 4, 11 (17,311,573 shares
of Norcraft common stock outstanding, 2,426,167 convertible Norcraft LLC units outstanding and 1,142,383
options on Norcraft stock outstanding as of March 31, 2015); JX 249 (Funds Flow Memorandum) at 3,
11 (18,947,886 shares of Norcraft common stock outstanding, 789,854 convertible Norcraft LLC units
outstanding and 1,142,383 options on Norcraft stock outstanding as of May 11, 2015). Both documents
indicate a figure of 20,880,123 fully diluted shares outstanding as of the Merger date.
212 JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at 23.
213 Id. at 25-28.
214 Id. at 29.
215 Id. In her reports and trial testimony, Austin Smith provided only a cursory—and mostly conclusory—
discussion of Norcraft's deal process. Seeid. at 19-20; TT 701-703 (Austin Smith). She also acknowledged
that she had never before been called upon to offer expert testimony on the efficacy of a sales process. TT
791:20—24 (Austin Smith).
216 JX 19 (Subramanian Report) at 24-25.
217 Id. at 26.
218 Id.
219 7d. at 25, 33-36.
220 Id. at 25, 45-52.
221 Id. at 30 (internal quotation and footnote omitted).
222 Id. at 31; see TT 100:4-17 (Biggart); JX 238 (Norcraft Schedule 14D-9) at 13.
223 JX 19 (Subramanian Report) at 31.
224 Id. at 32.
225 Id. at 32-33.
226 Id. at 25, 33-36.
227 PTO ¶¶ 2k, 2p.
228 PTO ¶¶ 2w.
229 JX 19 (Subramanian Report) at 29-30, 34 (“Fortune ... signed a confidentiality agreement on December 11th,
2014, and then had 110 days of exclusive access to confidential information and management time at Norcraft
before the deal was announced on March 30th, 2015.”). During the course of those 110 days, both Norcraft
and Fortune had to deal not only with valuation issues relating to the Norcraft business, but also complex
tax and valuation issues (with the help of separate independent experts) relating to the TRAs. JX 5 (Klein
Dep.) at 137-38.
230 JX 19 (Subramanian Report) at 34.
231 Seeid. at 35.
232 Id. at 35-36 (citing Guhan Subramanian, Deal Making: The New Strategy of Negotiauctions 87-88 (2011) ).
233 Id. at 40-41.
234 Id. Per Subramanian, Fortune's unlimited match right compounded the “winner's curse” problem, and so
operated as a “ ‘powerful disincentive’ to prospective third-party bidders.” Id. at 43 (footnote and citation
omitted).
235 Id. at 52.
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236 JX 221 (Merger Agreement), pmbl. & § 1.1.
237 JX 229 (Buller TSA) § 3; JX 230 (SKM TSA) § 3; JX 231 (Trimaran TSA) § 3.
238 TT 254:21-255:7 (Subramanian); JX 221 (Merger Agreement) § 1.1.
239 PTO ¶ 2ee.
240 JX 221 (Merger Agreement) § 5.4(g).
241 TT 255:4-7 (Subramanian).
242 TT 299:18-300:4 (Subramanian).
243 JX 19 (Subramanian Report) at 41-44; JX 221 (Merger Agreement) at § 5.4(g).
244 JX 19 (Subramanian Report) at 50.
245 TT 254:4-7 (Subramanian).
246 Compare JX 232 (e-mail chain between RBC, Klein and other members of Fortune's deal team, Apr. 7, 2015)
with JX 11 (Reilly Dep.) at 125:3-22 and JX 3 (Buller Dep.) at 206:16-207:24.
247 TT 269:8-11 (Subramanian).
248 JX 260 (Petition for Appraisal).
249 1 77 A.3d 1; D.I. 91.
250 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
251 See, e.g.,In re Orchard Enters., Inc., 2012 WL 2923305, at *18 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012) (“As a law-trained
judge who has to come up with a valuation deploying the learning of the field of corporate finance, I choose
to deploy one accepted method as well as I am able, given the record before me and my own abilities.”);
Global GT LP, 993 A.2d at 517 n.126 (explaining that “academics and professionals throw around ... ranges
of value [that] are used by a law-trained judge to come to a single point estimate of value” and that “[t]he
law-trained judges who must perform such analyses are more conscious than anyone of the inherent risk
of error in such an endeavor, and indeed of the reality that no one can really tell if an error was made”),
aff'd, 11 A.3d 214; Finkelstein, 2005 WL 1074364, at *12 (“The judges of this court are unremittingly mindful
of the fact that a judicially selected determination of fair value is just that, a law-trained judge's estimate
that bears little resemblance to a scientific measurement of a physical reality.”). Indeed, “the judges of this
Court” have lamented the challenges posed by the appraisal statute for many years. While perhaps repetitive,
these expressions serve a valuable function; they serve as a longhand way of saying to the parties and the
community of interest: “I've done the best I can here.”
252 DFC, 172 A.3d at 364 (quoting 8 Del. C. § 262(h) ).
253 Dell, 177 A.3d at 21 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983); Golden Telecom, 11 A.3d
at 218; and In re PetSmart, Inc., 2017 WL 2303599, at *26 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017) ) (alteration in original).
254 Dell, 177 A.3d at 22.
255 DFC, 172 A.3d at 370.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 366.
258 See, e.g., id.;Golden Telecom, 11 A.3d at 217-18.
259 DFC, 172 A.3d at 366.
260 Id.
261 TT 13-15 (Eldridge).
262 SeeIn re Fort Howard Corp. S'holders Litig., 1988 WL 83147, at *13-14 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988) (finding board-
chosen single-bidder process satisfied Revlon duties); In re Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d 691, 706 (Del.
Ch. 2001) (“[T]he mere fact that the Pennaco board decided to focus on negotiating a favorable price with
Marathon and not to seek out other bidders is not one that alone supports a breach of fiduciary duty claim.”); In
re MONY Gp. Inc. S'holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9, 21 (Del. Ch. 2004) (same) (quoting Pennaco, 787 A.2d at 706).
263 JX 31 (Guhan Subramanian, Go-Shops vs. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals: Evidence and Implications, 63
Bus. Law. 729 (2008) ) at 755 (“[A] pure go-shop can be a valuable tool for extracting the highest possible
price in the sale of [a] company.”).
- 38 - 
Blueblade Capital Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft Companies, Inc., Not Reported in Atl....
2018 WL 3602940
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 33
264 M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 797 (Del. 1999) (“A fair merger price in the context of a breach
of fiduciary duty claim will not always be a fair value in the context of determining going concern value.”); In re
Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 78 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“A court could conclude that a price fell within the
range of fairness and would not support fiduciary liability, yet still find that the point calculation demanded by
the appraisal statute yields an award in excess of the merger price.”); Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp.,
28 A.3d 442, 466 (Del. Ch. 2011) (same).
265 Petitioners urge the Court to conclude that “a go-shop only process” is, per se, inadequate to generate fair
value. Pet'rs' Post Trial Opening Br. 3 (citing IQ Hldgs. v. Am. Commercial Lines, 2013 WL 4056207 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 18, 2013) and Huff Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx, Inc., 2013 WL 5878807, at *13 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013)
). Having reviewed the cited authority, I do not see where IQ Holdings addressed the issue at all. As for
CKx, Inc., while the court acknowledges that a scenario where the only market check is an unsuccessful go-
shop might undermine the reliability of the deal price as an indicator of fair value, the court says nothing of
adopting a rule that a go-shop alone will never produce fair value for the target. Id. at * 13. I see no basis
in law or fact to adopt such a rule.
266 JX 140 (e-mail from Reilly to Buller, Maselli and Citi representatives, Feb. 20, 2015) (Reilly: “I do believe
we are leaving $ on the table”); TT 29:19-22 (Eldridge) (Buller “eager to try and find a buyer at a higher
valuation”); JX 138 (e-mail from Ginter to Buller, Feb. 19, 2015) (“Current offer will be 10.9x or less by the
time we close in April at $25.50. so we weren't happy with the deal in [O]ct[ober] but now we are?”).
267 See JX 3 (Buller Dep.) at 85-86.
268 JX 185 (e-mail chain between Fortune director David Mackay and Klein, Mar. 20, 2015) (Mackay: “Looks very
positive[.] A good strategic fit at a reasonable price ... I fully support the deal and hope no one comes along
and offers more.”); id. (Klein: “You are spot on - its [sic] a good price, and there is a risk someone comes
along and tries to top the offer.”); JX 300 (Mar. 31, 2015 e-mail from Fortune director Mackay to Fortune's
other directors and deal team members) (“Let's hope no one bids!”).
269 TT 146:18-147:9 (Biggart) (explaining a Fortune presentation analyzing potential go-shop competitors
“[b]ecause at this point in time, we're about to agree to a go-shop, and our CEO is very upset about the idea
of doing this”); see also JX 5 (Klein Dep.) at 164:11—22 (“Q. And Norcraft insisted on some type of go-shop
process, right? A. Yes. Q. And in the context of negotiating that, your goal was to minimize the chances that
the go-shop process would result in a higher bidder, — A. I wanted to — Q. — correct? A. — give them
what they needed - the minimum amount they needed to satisfy their fiduciary responsibility which I know
they had.”). Of course, it is not unusual—or inherently problematic—for a prospective acquiror to want to
avoid being outbid after having expended considerable time, effort and funds. Fortune's attitude, however,
suggests that it appreciated the pre-sign process did not yield fair value for Norcraft stockholders and that
it wanted to protect that advantage throughout the go-shop process. Again, this is precisely what the Board
reasonably should have expected from the party sitting on the other side of the table.
270 JX 166 (e-mail from Klein to Fortune deal team, Mar. 12, 2015); TT 205 (Biggart) (On March 6, 2015, Fortune
“definitively told [Buller] he didn't have the job.”).
271 See JX 189 (e-mail chain between Dave Randich, head of Fortune's cabinet division, Klein and members of
Fortune's deal team, Mar. 23, 2015); JX 199 (Mar. 26, 2015 e-mail from RBC to Klein and other members
of Fortune's deal team); JX 202 (Mar. 27, 2015 email from Buller to PwC); JX 194 (e-mail chain between
members of Norcraft and Fortune deal teams, Mar. 25, 2015).
272 JX 11 (Reilly Dep.) at 158-160.
273 JX 13 (Biggart Dep.) at 107-109, 111:6-112:3; JX 194 (e-mail chain between members of Norcraft and Fortune
deal teams, Mar. 25, 2015).
274 In re AOL, Inc., 2018 WL 1037450, at *9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2018) (observing “if front-end information
sharing is truncated or limited, the post-agreement period should be correspondingly robust, so to ensure
that information is sufficiently disseminated that an informed sale can take place and bids can be received
without disabling impediments”).
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275 The Merger Agreement was publicly announced on March 30, 2015. See JX 227 (Norcraft Mar. 30, 2015
Proxy Statement) at 3. That same day, the Go-Shop Period began. PTO ¶ 2cc.
276 JX 19 (Subramanian Report) at 34; JX 243 (Citi Buyers Log) at 2 (“investment is too big [ ] to consider in a
short period”); id. at 12 (“can't move fast enough in 35 days”); id. at 2, 5, 7-9 (prospective bidders explaining
they had no interest in competing against Fortune).
277 See, e.g., JX 3 (Buller Dep.) at 207:5-24 (“Q. Do you know what Norcraft's rights were if another proposal
came in during the go-shop period? A. Don't recall. Q. Do you have any knowledge of what Norcraft could
have done if one of the go-shop parties was interested and made a bid? A. We could have pursued the
offer. Q. Were there any restrictions on Norcraft's ability to pursue an offer? A. Some, but I don't recall what
they were.... Q. Do you recall anything about Fortune's rights if another offer came in? A. I don't recall.”);
JX 8 (Eldridge Dep.) at 85:17-19 (“Q. What kind of matching rights did Fortune have in this transaction? A. I
don't recall.”); JX 9 (Maselli Dep.) at 75:5-78:5 (“Q. Under the terms of the merger agreement, what needed
to occur for a go-shop participant to continue to negotiate with Norcraft regarding a possible sale after the
go-shop period ended? ... A. I don't know what the threshold was, but ... if it was a sufficiently robust offer,
they would have an opportunity to complete the transaction.”); JX 11 (Reilly Dep.) at 121:3-130:20 (“Q. Did
you personally ever consider what effect the tender and support agreements would have on the go-shop
process? A. I can't recall.... To be honest with you, I'm not an expert in going private transactions, though
I've been around for a while; and, in my estimation, the retention of both Ropes and Citibank and to rely on
their advice and counsel with respect to the process was, you know, doing my duty. So that's kind of what
we really looked to the experts to help us.... Q. What are matching rights? A. I have no idea.... Q. Okay. Well,
do you know what type of matching rights Fortune had in Norcraft's go-shop process? ... A. I don't recall....
Q. Do you recall any discussions among Norcraft's directors or officers with respect to Fortune's matching
rights in this go-shop process? A. I do not. Q. Under the merger agreement that Norcraft signed with Fortune
Brands, what needed to happen for a go-shop participant to continue to negotiate with Norcraft regarding a
possible sale after the go-shop period ended? A. I don't recall.”); cf. JX 1 (Ginter [CFO] Dep.) at 140:9-14
(“A. My knowledge of a go-shop is limited in that regard. I know the banks ran it for us and prepared a list
of potential investors that may be interested in looking at Norcraft. But my knowledge of a go-shop is limited
to that and what I learned during the process.”).
278 JX 5 (Klein Dep.) at 137-139; JX 11 (Reilly Dep.) at 164-165; JX 130 (Feb. 9, 2015 RBC presentation regarding
TRA value); JX 162 (Mar. 10, 2015 RBC email attaching questions regarding TRAs).
279 JX 221 (Merger Agreement) § 5.4(g); seeLender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *25 (“In this case, the
most persuasive explanation is that the existence of an incumbent trade bidder holding an unlimited match
right was a sufficient deterrent to prevent other parties from perceiving a realistic path to success.... Without a
realistic path to success, it made no sense to get involved.”). Fortune's Vice President of M & A confirmed that
“the team at Fortune understood that unlimit[ed] matching rights would discourage potential bidders in a go-
shop process.” JX 12 (Baab Dep.) 99-100. And, Fortune's CEO touted Fortune's match right when instructing
RBC how to dissuade potential go-shop participants from bidding. JX 232 (e-mail chain between RBC, Klein
and other members of Fortune's deal team, Apr. 7, 2015).
280 In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 119-20 (Del. Ch. 2007).
281 TT 289:1-7 (Subramanian).
282 PTO ¶ 2ee. As noted, the Go-Shop Period began on March 30, 2015. PTO ¶ 2cc.
283 JX 229 (Buller TSA); JX 230 (SKM TSA); JX 231 (Trimaran TSA).
284 JX 232 (e-mail chain between RBC, Klein and other members of Fortune's deal team, Apr. 7, 2015) (RBC
describing its planned efforts to dissuade potential buyers); id. (Klein expressing his interest in RBC “shutting
the door on [potential buyers] and their willingness to look at [Norcraft]”).
285 DFC, 172 A.3d at 366. Respondent advanced deal price less synergies as reflecting Norcraft's fair value.
Accordingly, it was Respondent's burden to prove the reliability of Norcraft's deal process. Respondent,
however, failed to meet that burden—its witnesses struggled to recall basic aspects of the deal process and
its valuation expert presented only a cursory, mostly conclusory, analysis of that process. Petitioners, on
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the other hand, presented credible evidence demonstrating that deal price less synergies is not a reliable
indicator of Norcraft's fair value.
286 This, of course, means that I give no weight to Austin Smith's deal price less synergies valuation.
287 D.I. 91.
288 SeeAOL, 2018 WL 1037450, at *10, n.118 (declining to engage in an extensive analysis of the efficient market
hypothesis when the parties did not present either an argument to that effect or sufficient evidence to allow
the court to undertake the analysis on its own).
289 JX 216 (e-mail from RBC to Biggart, Mar. 29, 2015, attaching RBC presentation on Norcraft) at FB0047792,
FB0047795.
290 See JX 68 (Sept. 18, 2014 Fortune Presentation) at FB0089499; JX 215 (Citi Board Discussion Materials)
at FB0049833.
291 See JX 215 (Citi Board Discussion Materials) at FB0049845.
292 SeeDell, 177 A.3d at 25 (“A market [for a company's stock] is more likely efficient, or semi-strong efficient,
if [the company] has many stockholders; no controlling stockholder; ‘highly active trading’; and if information
about the company is widely available and easily disseminated to the market.” (quoting DFC, 172 A.3d at
373-74) ).
293 SeeVerition P'rs Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 2018 WL 922139, at *24 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15,
2018) (“DFC and Dell teach that if a company's shares trade in a market having attributes consistent with
the assumptions underlying a traditional version of the semi-strong form of the efficient capital markets
hypothesis, then the unaffected trading price provides evidence of the fair value of a proportionate interest
in the company as a going concern.” (footnote omitted) ).
294 MG. Bancorp., Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 525-26 (Del. 1999).
295 IQ Hldgs., Inc., 2013 WL 4056207, at *1 (quoting Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., 2004 WL 1152338, at
*8 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2004) ) (internal quotation omitted); see alsoMerion Capital, 2013 WL 3793896, at *5;
James R. Hitchner, Financial Valuation: Applications and Models 291-93, 297 (4th ed. 2017) (cited in JX 21
(Clarke Rebuttal Report) ).
296 In re Orchard Enters., Inc., 2012 WL 2923305, at *9 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012) (“Reliance on a comparable
companies or comparable transactions approach is improper where the purported ‘comparables’ involve
significantly different products or services than the company whose appraisal is at issue, or vastly different
multiples.”); see also Hitchner, supra, at 292-93.
297 See JX 13 (Biggart Dep.) at 75:1-76:23, 152:22-153:1 (explaining he could not recall any precedent
transaction in the dealer channel since 2010). Many of the precedent transactions identified by Austin Smith
preceded the Norcraft-Fortune Merger by three or more years during a time in which the housing market was
still recovering from the Great Recession. See JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 14 (Precedent Transaction
Method) (showing that 11 out of the 16 transactions predated 2012). The remaining transactions involved
very small, non-public companies, making them unfit for comparison. See id. Under these circumstances, I
see no reason to dwell on a precedent transaction analysis in determining Norcraft's fair value on the Merger
date. SeeMerion Capital, 2013 WL 3793896, at *5 (“The utility of a market-based method depends on actually
having companies that are sufficiently comparable that their trading multiples provide a relevant insight into
the subject company's own growth prospects.”); see also Hitchner, supra, at 304-06.
298 See JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 14 (Precedent Transaction Method) (showing that 11 out of the 16
transactions predated 2012); JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 4 n.8; JX 21 (Clarke Rebuttal Report) at 6.
299 Cf. JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at 25-28 (explaining, “of the guideline public companies, [Norcraft] is
most similar to (though smaller than) American Woodmark, the only other pure-play cabinet manufacturer,”
“Norcraft is significantly smaller than most of the guideline public companies based on revenue, EBITDA, or
assets”); TT 510:10-13 (Clarke) (“I view Norcraft being somewhat unique in that regard. So these are not —
you know, these are not perfect comps.”).
300 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 32, 55; TT 636:17-637:6 (Clarke); JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at 29.
301 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 32, 55; TT 636:17-637:6 (Clarke); JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at 29.
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302 Dell, 177 A.3d at 35.
303 Merion Capital, 2013 WL 3793896, at *10 (internal citation omitted).
304 See Shannon P. Pratt & Roger J. Grabowski, Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples 223 (5th ed. 2014)
(cited in JX 18 (Clarke Report) ) (“Using betas of guideline public companies for estimating a proxy beta has
been found to provide reasonably accurate estimates of the subject company”); Duff & Phelps, 2015 Valuation
Handbook, Guide to Cost of Capital 5-3 (2015) (cited in JX 18 (Clarke Report) ); Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide,
Inc., 2005 WL 2045640, at *15 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005). “A company's debt capital can be measured by
[gross] debt or net debt, where net debt is equal to total debt less excess cash.” JX 23 (Austin Smith Rebuttal
Report) at 23 (emphasis in original).
305 The capital structure used to relever the subject company's unlevered beta should also be used when
calculating its WACC (for weighting purposes). TT 854:17-857:10 (Austin Smith).
306 AOL, 2018 WL 1037450, at *11 (quoting Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290,
332 (Del. Ch. 2006) ). See also Shannon P. Pratt, Robert F. Reilly & Robert P. Schweihs, Valuing a Business:
The Analysis and Appraisal of Closely Held Companies 156 (4th ed. 2000) (cited in JX 18 (Clarke Report) )
(hereinafter “Valuing a Business”).
307 As noted, Austin Smith performed two additional DCF analyses, one relying on the Ginter 2014 Projections
and another relying on a Capitalization of Cash Flow methodology. See JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at 23-24.
Neither analysis, however, formed the basis for her final conclusion regarding fair value. Seeid. at 1.
308 JX 1 (Ginter Dep.) at 27:2-28:14, 34:5-10; JX 3 (Buller Dep.) at 101:20-24.
309 JX 3 (Buller Dep.) at 115:8-18 (explaining that the Base Case projections were “something [management] felt
very, very comfortable in doing”); id. at 114:11-22; JX 1 (Ginter Dep.) at 93:23-25 (stating the Board approved
the Base Case projections); JX 11 (Reilly Dep.) at 55:9-19.
310 JX 3 (Buller Dep.) at 115:8-18. Cf. Petsmart, 2017 WL 230359, at * 12 (noting that the respondent company's
management characterized their projections as “bordering on being too aggressive”—even “approaching
‘insan[ity]’ ”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks, footnote and record citation omitted).
311 TT 473-75 (Clarke) (explaining why the Base Case projections are reasonable). Austin Smith found several
“significant limitations” to the Base Case projections: (1) they were not created in the ordinary course; (2)
they were not created using the same procedure as Norcraft's annual budgets (i.e., bottoms-up); (3) they
projected an additional five years of growth after two years of already achieved growth in a cyclical industry;
and (4) Ginter and Buller, who prepared the Base Case projections, allegedly knew they were going to lose
their jobs if the transaction was completed—introducing the possibility of bias. TT 734:10-736:14 (Austin
Smith). Despite all of her concerns, however, Austin Smith relied on the Base Case projections for her primary
DCF analysis. TT 737:13-23 (Austin Smith). See In re Appraisal ofAncestry.com, Inc., 2005 WL 399726, at
*18 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (noting that “in a number of cases Delaware Courts have relied on projections
that were prepared by management outside of the ordinary course of business and with the possibility of
litigation”) (collecting cases).
312 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 2.
313 Id. 2-3. Clarke “gradually reduce[d] growth rates over time until reaching the PGR,” id., by applying a “straight
line reduction in growth” from the end of the Base Case projections to the end of his additional five-year
projection period. TT 606-607. According to Clarke, “if [he] had to use 2019 as the final year of [his] projections,
[he] would need to use a higher [PGR of 4.4%] to account for the tapering of [Norcraft's] growth to a steady
state.” JX 21 (Clarke Rebuttal Report) at 27 n.62.
314 JX 23 (Rebuttal Report of Yvette R. Austin Smith [“Austin Smith Rebuttal Report”] ) at 5-6.
315 Seeid. at 4-6.
316 See JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at 21-22 & Ex. 3 (Indexed Growth of Norcraft Adjusted EBITDA versus
Key Economic Indicators 2013-2015); TT 21:8-9 (Eldridge) (“[B]uilding products companies are cyclical ....
”); JX 23 (Austin Smith Rebuttal Report), Fig. 1 (Comparison of Normalized Growth Patterns); id. at Fig. 2
(Historical and Forecasted EBITDA Margins); TT 607:23-608:1 (Clarke) (“Q: Mr. Clarke, the cabinet business
is cyclical, isn't it? A. Yes.”); see also JX 23 (Austin Smith Rebuttal Report), Fig. 1 (Comparison of Normalized
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Growth Patterns); id. at Fig. 2 (Historical and Forecasted EBITDA Margins); JX 5 (Klein Dep.) at 312:4-10.
In light of this determination, I decline to apply Petitioners' suggested 4.4% PGR since that PGR is based
on an unrealistic assessment of Norcraft's future financial performance. See JX 21 (Clarke Rebuttal Report)
at 27 n.62.
317 See JX 112 (Gabelli Report) (stating, as of January 2015, “[w]e see a gradual recovery in housing that
will materialize over the next several years”); JX 535 (Fortune Investor Presentation, “Maximum Long-Term
Value,” May 1, 2015) (“Expectation is for the housing market to return to steady state (1.5 million [new
construction] starts and 5-6% [average] annual [repair and remodeling] growth) by 2017 or 2018.”). According
to “accepted financial principles,” Dell, 177 A.3d at 22, “terminal value must reflect an appropriate estimate of
sustainable growth.” Pratt, supra, at 49. “[F]or cyclical businesses [ ] the discrete [projection] period commonly
corresponds to the number of years or periods until the point is reached where the net cash flow represents
an average base net cash flow expected over an entire business cycle,” i.e., until the midpoint of the cycle.
Id. at 47 (emphasis supplied); see also Robert W. Holthavsen & Mark E. Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation:
Theory, Evidence & Practice 216 (2014) (“[T]he steady state for a company in a cyclical industry should be at
the midpoint of the cycle.”). Clarke's extension of the Base Case projections posits a ten-year growth trend
but does not account for cyclicality in the cabinetry industry and the impact of such cyclicality on Norcraft's
free cash flows. See JX 14 (Clarke Dep.) at 60-61 (explaining his extension does not reflect cyclicality prior
to 2025); JX 23 (Austin Smith Rebuttal Report), Fig. 1 (Comparison of Normalized Growth Patterns); JX 18
(Austin Smith Report), Fig. 1 (Norcraft Net Sales and EBITDA (Historical 2003-2014) (citing JX 99 (Norcraft
Jan. 2015 Management Presentation) ) ). See alsoAOL, 2018 WL 1037450, at *19 (“In a fast-paced industry
with significant fluctuations, where management is hesitant to project beyond four years, using a three-stage
DCF model or a ten year projection period seems particularly brazen.”).
318 Pratt, supra, at 8; see also Duff & Phelps, supra, at 10-15.
319 Pratt, supra, at 546 (“WACC generally works as a substitute for the enterprise-cash-flow discount rate.”). See
also Valuing a Business, supra, at 184.
320 Valuing a Business, supra, at 184; Duff & Phelps, supra, at 10-16.
321 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 33; JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 5 (WACC Calculation).
322 Duff & Phelps, supra, at 2-13.
323 JX 21 (Clarke Rebuttal Report) at 27.
324 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 41.
325 JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 5 (WACC Calculation). The BofA Merrill Lynch US High Yield B Effective
Yield “represents the effective yield of the ICE BofA[ ] [Merrill Lynch] US Corporate B Index, a subset of the ICE
BofA[ ] [Merrill Lynch] US High Yield Master II Index tracking the performance of US dollar denominated below
investment grade rated corporate debt publically issued in the US domestic market. This subset includes all
securities with a given investment grade rating B.” ICE BofAML US High Yield B Effective Yield, retrieved
from FRED, Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A2HYBEY (last visited
July 24, 2018). By way of reference, Citi used a pre-tax cost of debt of 5.3% in its calculation of Norcraft's
WACC and RBC used 4.5%. See JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 41 n.91.
326 JX 267 (Norcraft FY2014 10-K) at 21; ICE BofAML US High Yield B Effective Yield, retrieved from FRED, Fed.
Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A2HYBEY (last visited July 24, 2018);
S & P U.S. High Yield Corporate Bond 10+ Year Index, available online at https://us.spindices.com/indices/
fixed-income/sp-us-high-yield-corporate-bond-10-year-index (last visted on July 24, 2018). The experts do
not challenge each other's estimates of Norcraft's pre-tax cost of debt. See JX 21 (Clarke Rebuttal Report)
at 31 (“Austin Smith's conclusion [regarding Norcraft's pre-tax cost of debt] is in the range of reasonableness
given Norcraft's improving performance and generally positive industry outlook as well being consistent with
the financial advisors' cost of debt estimate.”).
327 This average figure tracks the ICE BofA Merrill Lynch US High Yield B Effective Yield as of the Merger date
(6.39%) and the S & P U.S. High Yield Corporate Bond 10+ Year Yield to Maturity as of that date (6.34%). ICE
BofAML US High Yield B Effective Yield, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://
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fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A2HYBEY (last visited July 24, 2018); S & P Dow Jones Indices LLC, S &
P U.S. High Yield Corporate Bond 10+ Year Index, available online at https://us.spindices.com/indices/fixed-
income/sp-us-high-yield-corporate-bond-10-year-index (last visited on July 24, 2018).
328 Duff & Phelps, supra, at 5-1.
329 Id. at 5-3.
330 Id.; Pratt, supra, at 223. When calculating a company's beta, change in the trading price of the company's
stock is measured relative to change in the returns of the overall market (or a proxy therefor) over the relevant
observation period. JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 34.
331 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 34-35.
332 See Duff & Phelps, supra, at 5-25 and 10-17.
333 See JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 34-35.
334 See Duff & Phelps, supra, at 10-21; Pratt, supra, at 244.
335 See JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 37-39; JX 23 (Austin Smith Rebuttal Report) at 18-20. While Clarke found
Norcraft's observed beta “statistically relevant,” he did not rely upon that beta beyond using it to define the
lower end of a range of betas. He ultimately selected the higher end for his DCF. See JX 18 (Clarke Report)
at 37-39.
336 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 51. Clarke notes in his report that RBC used all four of his chosen companies and
Citi used three of the four in their respective analyses of Norcraft. Id.
337 Id. at 48-49. Clarke's screening criteria were: (1) public company; (2) industry classification of “Building
Products”; (3) 2014 Calendar Year Revenue between $40 million and $4 billion; (4) primary geographic
location in the U.S. or Canada; and (5) no recent major divestures or pending significant acquisitions. Id.
Clarke's application of these criteria yielded a set of sixty-five companies, which Clarke then screened
“for companies with a minimum expected EBITDA margin of 7.5% for fiscal year 2016 (approximately half
of Norcraft's EBITDA margins) and a maximum expected EBITDA margin of 22.5% for fiscal year 2016
(approximately 50% above Norcraft's margins). In addition, [he] screened for companies that had forecasted
2016 revenue growth between 5% (approximately half of Norcraft's expected growth) and 15% (approximately
50% above Norcraft's expected growth). Based on those two criteria, the 65 companies were reduced to
28.” Id. at 50. Clarke then determined that four of those companies—his four chosen GPCs—“had a primary
business in manufacturing products for the [repair and remodeling] and/or new construction residential home
construction [markets].” Id.
338 Id. at 38 & sched. 5-C; JX 517 (native Excel version of Clarke's DCF model).
339 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 39 (“An unlevered beta of 0.80 is slightly above the median and average of the one-
year daily betas of the [GPCs] (0.75 to 0.79) while slightly below the median and average two-year weekly
betas of the [GPCs] (0.81 to 0.87).”). Clarke relevered his concluded unlevered beta for Norcraft based on
Norcraft's actual (observed) capital structure as of the Merger date (75% equity, 25% debt, per Clarke). Id.,
sched. 5-B. This resulted in a relevered beta for Norcraft of 0.97. Id.
340 JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at 26 & Ex. 4 (Beta Calculation). The other ten GPCs were: Armstrong World
Industries, Inc., Beacon Roofing Supply, Inc., Builders FirstSource, Inc., Caesarstone Ltd., Continental
Building Products, Inc., Mohawk Industries, Inc., Patrick Industries, Inc., Quanex Building Products
Corporation, Trex Company, Inc. and Universal Forest Products, Inc. Id., Ex. 4 (Beta Calculation). Austin
Smith divided her sixteen GPCs into two groups: Group I (comprising American Woodmark, Masco and
Fortune), “which consists of companies operating specifically (though not exclusively) in the cabinet market,
and Group II [comprising the rest of the GPCs], which consists of companies operating in the general
residential building products sector.” Id. at 26.
341 Id., Exs. 4 (Beta Calculation) and 5 (WACC Calculation).
342 Id., Exs. 4 (Beta Calculation) and 5 (WACC Calculation). Austin Smith relevered her concluded unlevered beta
for Norcraft based on a target capital structure comprising 86% equity and 14% debt. Id., Ex. 5 (Calculation
of WACC). This yielded a relevered beta for Norcraft of 1.12. Id.
343 JX 21 (Clarke Rebuttal Report) at 28.
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344 JX 23 (Austin Smith Rebuttal Report) at 17.
345 See JX 112 (Gabelli Report) at CITI-00053582.
346 See Pratt, supra, at 223 (“The more guideline companies used in the sample size, the better the accuracy.”);
id. (“The accuracy is also enhanced if the guideline public companies are reasonably close in size to the
subject company. When the guideline public companies are larger than the subject company, the beta
estimate for the subject company is likely biased low because of the propensity of betas of larger companies
to be smaller than the betas of smaller companies.”). My selection of GPCs is further supported by RBC and
Citi's choices of GPCs. RBC included all six of the selected companies, JX 216 (Mar. 29, 2015 e-mail from
RBC to Biggart, attaching RBC presentation) at FB0047799, and Citi included five out of the six (it did not
include Masonite). JX 505 (Citi Discussion Materials for the Fairness Opinion Committee) at CITI-00075076.
347 See Pratt, supra, at 204 (explaining that to derive a proxy beta, one will take the median or an average of the
unlevered betas). This approach also avoids additional risk for error that might flow from assigning different
weights. See JX 530 (Bradford Cornell, Corporate Valuation, Tools for Effective Appraisal and Decision
Making (1993) ) at 68. As previously explained, Austin Smith derived a proxy beta for Norcraft based on the
median of the unlevered betas of her selected GPCs. JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Exs. 4 (Beta Calculation)
and 5 (WACC Calculation). Clarke's proxy beta calculation, by contrast, took into account both the median and
the mean of the unlevered betas of his selected GPCs. JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 39. My proxy beta calculation
utilizes the median rather than the mean of the unlevered GPC betas. I took that approach to account for
Masonite. Austin Smith and Clarke included Masonite in their respective analyses but both acknowledged
that its business was less comparable to Norcraft than some of the other companies considered. Indeed,
Masonite exhibited a significantly lower unlevered beta that risked distorting the Court's measurement of
Norcraft's relative operating risk (if the Court were to use the mean for summary measure purposes).
348 JX 18 (Clarke Report), sched. 5-B (Cost of Equity Calculation per CAPM); JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Exs.
4 (Calculation of Beta) and 5 (Calculation of WACC).
349 Pratt, supra, at 243. The Hamada unlevering formula is as follows:
350 Seeid. at 262-63.
351 JX 16 (Austin Smith Dep.) at 192:5-12.
352 Id. at 192:13-16.
353 Id. at 192:18-21.
354 See JX 23 (Austin Smith Rebuttal Report) at 22; TT 764:1-19 (Austin Smith).
355 See TT 764:1-19; JX 23 (Austin Smith Rebuttal Report) at 22.
356 TT 506:11-17 (Clarke).
357 See Duff & Phelps, supra, at 1-15, 1-16.
358 TT 859:4-16 (Austin Smith) (“Q. And you testified earlier that you found no evidence in the record which
would guide you in selecting what that target capital structure would be for Norcraft. Correct? A. That's right.
Q. And so you had to use the data from comparable companies. Correct? A. Right. Q. And just to be explicit,
there's no evidence in the record that Norcraft had any expectation of changing its capital structure after
the transaction. Correct? A. That's correct.”). Austin Smith herself recognizes that use of a target capital
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structure is only appropriate when “the company's existing capital structure is not equal to the company's
target capital structure.” JX 23 (Austin Smith Report) at 21-22. According to Austin Smith, Clarke's estimation
of Norcraft's actual capital structure as of the Merger date is erroneous because it fails to account for Buller et
al.'s ownership of Norcraft LLC units convertible into a 12.3% equity ownership interest in Norcraft (in the form
of shares of Norcraft common stock). Id. at 21. Austin Smith's criticism in this regard is based on her (apparent)
assumption that the conversion of the Norcraft LLC units into Norcraft common stock would not affect the
per share trading price of that stock. See id. (calculating Norcraft's fully diluted market capitalization on the
Merger date without adjusting for the potential dilutive effect of a Norcraft-LLC-unit-to-Norcraft-common-
stock conversion on the per share trading value of Norcraft common stock). Upon reviewing the record, it is
unclear how such a conversion would affect Norcraft's market capitalization—and, by extension, the equity
component of Norcraft's capital structure. In addition, Austin Smith's calculation of Norcraft's fully diluted
market capitalization on the Merger date does not account for the exercise of all outstanding options on
Norcraft stock on that date. See id. (“The total equity in Norcraft['s] capital structure was $452 million ... not
the $396 [million] calculated by Mr. Clarke. The operating cash flows of Norcraft were supported not just by
the equity of Norcraft Inc. but also by [Buller et al.'s] ownership interest [in Norcraft] LLC.”); but cf.id. at 13 &
n.25 (“[Norcraft's] implied fully diluted market capitalization was $532 million based on the transaction price
of $25.50 [multiplied by] 20,869,976 fully diluted shares [outstanding].”) (emphasis supplied). Moreover, as
previously noted, Austin Smith's calculation of Norcraft's fully diluted shares outstanding as of the Merger
date is inconsistent with the information set forth in Norcraft's Form 10-Q for Q1 FY2015 and the Funds
Flow Memorandum prepared in connection with the Merger. The inclusion of all options on Norcraft stock
outstanding as of the Merger date in the equity component of Norcraft's fully diluted capital structure (together
with all Norcraft common stock and convertible Norcraft LLC units outstanding on that date) implies a capital
structure of approximately 76% equity and 24% debt. I am satisfied, therefore, that Clarke's estimation of
Norcraft's actual capital structure on the Merger date captures Norcraft's “operative reality” on that date.
Accordingly, I have adopted that estimation.
359 For these same reasons, I refer to that same capital structure to calculate Norcraft's WACC (for weighting
purposes).
360 The calculation of Norcraft's NOPAT (and unlevered free cash flow) for FY2015 is based on the Base Case
projections for the May-December 2015 period. Hence the “Stub” notation. Austin Smith took this same
approach in her DCF analysis. JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis). I have adopted Austin
Smith's approach in this regard, given that the operative valuation date here is May 12, 2015 (the Merger
date).
361 See JX 18 (Clarke Report), sched. 2-A (DCF Analyis); JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis). In
calculating the period-over-period change in Norcraft's NWC, both experts excluded Norcraft's current TRA
liability in each of the projected years. JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis) (“Working capital
excludes tax-related items.”); see JX 517 (native Excel version of Clarke's DCF model). The rationale for
this exclusion appears to be that Norcraft's payment obligations under the TRAs are non-ordinary-course,
non-operating liabilities. See JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 29, 46. It is, therefore, more accurate to describe
the experts' respective NWC-related computations as calculating period-over-period change in Norcraft's net
operating working capital (“NOWC”). The Court's calculation of period-over-period change in Norcraft's NWC
—or rather, its NOWC—likewise excludes Norcraft's current TRA liability in each of the projected years. I
also note that both experts departed from the Base Case projections' forecast of Norcraft's “current portion of
long-term debt” in FYs 2018 and 2019. See JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis); JX 517 (native
Excel version of Clarke's DCF model); JX 509 (native Excel version of Base Case projections). Both experts
projected a $1.5 million figure for each year, whereas the Base Case projects zero for both years. Compare
JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis) and JX 517 (native Excel version of Clarke's DCF model),
with JX 509 (native Excel version of Base Case projections). The record is unclear as to why, exactly, the
experts chose to depart from the Base Case in this particular respect. Nevertheless, because both experts
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made the same adjustment to the Base Case projections with regard to Norcraft's “current portion of long-
term debt” in FYs 2018 and 2019, i have followed suit.
362 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 43 (“I calculated [Norcraft's] terminal value using the Perpetuity Growth Method[.]”);
JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at 20 (“To calculate [Norcraft's] terminal value I relied upon the Gordon Growth
(or Perpetuity Growth) model.”).
363 In the Perpetuity Growth model, the capitalization rate is calculated as the positive difference between the
applicable discount rate and the subject company's PGR. JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 43. I have used Norcraft's
WACC (10.60%) as the applicable discount rate and a 3.5% PGR for Norcraft, which together imply a
capitalization rate of 7.10%.
364 Id. Mindful of Clarke's justified criticism of Austin Smith's calculation of Norcraft's terminal year free
cash flow, my calculation of that value adjusts for the fact that Norcraft's projected depreciation and
amortization expense in the final year of the Base Case projections (FY2019) exceeds Norcraft's
projected capital expenditures in that year by approximately $100,000. The adjustment entails implying
a 3:4 relationship between Norcraft's depreciation/amortization expense and capital expenditures in
perpetuity and thereby avoids “underinvesting in net PP & E.” JX 21 (Clarke Rebuttal Report) at 25; see
Hitchner, supra, at 138 (“[I]n a growing business, long-term annual estimated capital expenditures exceed
annual depreciation, primarily due to inflation.”); see also Gilbert E. Matthews & Arthur H. Rosenbloom,
Delaware's Unwarranted Assumption that Capex Should Equal Depreciation in a DCF Model, (May 15,
2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/15/delawares-unwarranted-assumption-in-dcfpricing/ (“The
assumption that depreciation equals capital expenditures is only appropriate if it is also assumed that there
is no growth and no inflation. However,... the normalized capital expenditures of a [perpetually] growing
company must materially exceed depreciation over time.”).
365 Both experts added Norcraft's estimated excess cash to its operating value in order to calculate the
Company's total equity value. JX 18 (Clarke Report), sched. 2-A (DCF Analysis); JX 20 (Austin Smith Report),
Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis). The experts differed, however, in how they calculated Norcraft's excess cash and
thus reached different estimates of that figure. As noted, Austin Smith calculated Norcraft's excess cash on
the Merger date based on the “Cash from Norcraft” figure in the “Funds Flow Memorandum” for the Merger
($54,396,335.01), JX 249 at 2, less a $20 million cash balance (cash for operations, per the Base Case
projections), plus the product of (1) Norcraft's total options outstanding as of the Merger date (1,142,383) and
(2) the weighted average exercise price of those options ($16.01). JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 6 (DCF
Analysis). Clarke, by contrast, calculated Norcraft's excess cash on the Merger date as the sum of (1) the
cash balance indicated in Norcraft's Q1 FY2015 Form 10-Q ($63,135,000), JX 248 at 4, and (2) the Merger-
related fees indicated in that same filing ($1.2 million), less $20 million cash for operations (per the Base
Case projections). JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 45. I have adopted Clarke's approach, but have added to his
excess cash figure Norcraft's cash receipts from the exercise of all options outstanding on the Merger date
(1,142,383) at the weighted average exercise price ($16.01). JX 248 (Norcraft's Q1 FY2015 Form 10-Q) at
14. I find that this holistic approach best approximates Norcraft's “operative reality” as of the Merger date.
366 Clarke valued the TRA-related tax benefits realized by Norcraft in each of the projected years at $4.4 million,
JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 46, while Austin Smith valued them at $4.2 million. JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex.
7 (Tax Characteristics Analysis). Having considered each expert's (quite complicated) approach to valuing
those tax benefits, I find that both approaches—and both resulting valuations—are reasonable (they differ by
approximately $200,000). Accordingly, I have adopted the average of the experts' respective value estimates.
367 Like Clarke and Austin Smith, I have drawn this figure directly from Norcraft's Q1 FY2015 Form 10-Q. JX
248 (Norcraft's Q1 FY2015 Form 10-Q) at 4; JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 47; JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex.
6 (DCF Analysis).
368 JX 248 (Norcraft's Q1 FY2015 Form 10-Q) at 11.
369 SeeAOL, 2018 WL 1037450, at *2 (“I take the parties' suggestion to ascribe full weight to a [DCF] analysis ...
[and thus] relegate transaction price to a role as a check on that DCF valuation: any such valuation
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significantly departing from even the problematic deal price here should cause me to closely revisit my
assumptions.”).
370 I am mindful that “[t]he issue in an appraisal is not whether a negotiator has extracted the highest possible
bid. Rather, the key inquiry is whether the dissenters got fair value and were not exploited.” Dell, 177 A.3d
at 33. Here, in light of the identified flaws in Norcraft's deal process (pre- and post-sign), I find it more likely
than not that the Board “left a portion of [Norcraft's] fundamental value on the table.” Verition P'rs Master
Fund, 2018 WL 922139, at *44.
371 SeeAOL, 2018 WL 1037450, at *2.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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*1  On May 4, 2017, Sibanye Gold Ltd. (“Sibanye”)
acquired Stillwater Mining Co. (“Stillwater”) through a
reverse triangular merger. Under the terms of the merger
agreement, each Stillwater share at closing was converted into
the right to receive $18 of merger consideration. Between the
signing and the closing of the merger, the commodity price for
palladium, which Stillwater mined, increased by nine percent,
improving Stillwater's value.
Certain former Stillwater stockholders dissented to the
merger, perfected their statutory appraisal rights, and pursued
this litigation. During the appraisal trial, petitioners argued
that the flawed deal process made the deal price an unreliable
indicator of fair value and that increased commodity prices
raised Stillwater's fair value substantially between the signing
and closing of the merger. On August 21, 2019, the
Court of Chancery issued its memorandum opinion (the
“Memorandum Opinion”), holding that the $18 per share deal
price was the most persuasive indicator of Stillwater's fair
value at the time of the merger. The court did not award an
upward adjustment for the increased commodity prices.
The petitioners now appeal the Court of Chancery's decision,
arguing that the court abused its discretion when it ignored the
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flawed sale process and petitioners' argument for an upward
adjustment to the merger consideration.
Having reviewed the parties' briefs and the record on appeal,
and after oral argument, this Court holds that the Court of
Chancery did not abuse its discretion when it deferred to
the deal price as a reliable indicator of fair value without an
upward adjustment. Therefore, this Court affirms the Court
of Chancery's August 21, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and
September 27, 2019 Post-Trial Judgment order.
I. BACKGROUND 1
Stillwater Mining Company was a publicly traded Delaware
corporation primarily engaged in the business of mining and
processing platinum group metals (“PGMs”) from the J-M
Reef in Montana. The J-M Reef is the only PGM mine in the
United States, with the only other significant deposits located
in South Africa and Russia. Stillwater has two producing
mines at the J-M Reef, Stillwater Mine and East Boulder. 2
Stillwater also owns one of the largest PGM recycling
operations in the world, which provides additional market
supply of PGMs. 3  In light of its operations, Stillwater's
common stock trading price is heavily influenced by the spot
and forward pricing of the PGM palladium. 4
By October 2015, Stillwater's board of directors (the “Board”)
and management had become concerned that both the
palladium and platinum markets were facing long-term
“structural decline[s],” 5  largely due to the decline in gasoline
and diesel-powered automotive markets, the primary end-
use of Stillwater's PGMs. 6  Accordingly, the Board began to
consider strategic alternatives, including a merger of equals
or the sale of some of Stillwater's business operations. 7
*2  In 2016, the Board's fears materialized as Stillwater's
stock price declined, reflecting a decrease in the spot price
of palladium that continued throughout the year. Due to the
downturn in the trading price, the Board authorized Michael
McMullen, Stillwater's CEO and board member, to inquire
into strategic opportunities and report back to the Board. 8
Also around this time, McMullen privately expressed unease
at the company's situation and began considering his exit from
Stillwater. 9
A. McMullen Engages with Sibanye
On January 30, 2016, Sibanye requested a meeting to
discuss the acquisition of Stillwater. 10  Without the Board's
knowledge or approval, McMullen met with Neal Froneman,
Sibanye's CEO, on March 1, 2016. 11  At the meeting,
McMullen asked Froneman to provide “an informal proposal”
that included “an idea of valuation” and “transaction
structure.” 12  He told Froneman that any potential acquisition
would need to feature “a large cash component.” 13
McMullen also stated that Stillwater would need to “be priced
at a premium of 30% over Stillwater's thirty-day volume-
weighted average price (‘VWAP’).” 14  After the meeting,
Froneman had the impression that a deal “was doable if we got
the valuation right.” 15  McMullen took these actions without
involving the Board, and he did not inform the Board about
his discussions with Sibanye at the Board's next regularly
scheduled meeting in May 2016. 16
By July 2016, Stillwater's stock price and the price of
palladium had largely recovered. On July 21, 2016, Sibanye
provided a preliminary, non-binding indication of interest at
$15.75 per share in cash. 17  Shortly thereafter, on July 27 and
28, 2016, Stillwater's Board met in “executive session” with
McMullen to discuss Sibanye's offer. 18  On August 9, 2016,
Stillwater executed a confidentiality agreement with Sibanye
and provided Sibanye data room access. 19
B. Stillwater Engages with Other Parties
On August 10, 2016, the Board met and directed management
to begin outreach to other potentially interested parties. 20
But instead of working to generate “as much interest
as possible” in a transaction with Stillwater, McMullen
continued to focus on courting Sibanye. 21  Nonetheless,
Stillwater's management met with Bank of America Merrill
Lynch (“BAML”) on August 18, 2016, to discuss potential
options. 22  At that meeting, BAML got “the sense ... that
a sale was a possibility” and independently contacted a list
of fifteen potential acquirers about purchasing Stillwater. 23
Meetings were arranged with a number of interested parties,
including Hecla, Coeur, Kinross, and Gold Fields. 24  By early
October, both Hecla and Coeur conducted site visits and
obtained access to the data room. 25
On October 3, 2016, the Board met, reviewed a list of
eighteen potential acquirers, and directed McMullen to solicit
proposals from investment banks and create an internal cash
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flow model to value the company. 26  Additionally, Brent
Wadman, Stillwater's General Counsel, recommended that
the Board form a special committee to oversee the sale
process. Since the July 2016 meeting between McMullen
and Sibanye, Wadman had become concerned that McMullen
was rushing the sale process to facilitate his exit from the
company. 27  The Board sought the advice of external counsel,
Holland & Hart LLP, as to whether any conflicts existed
and whether a special committee should be formed. 28  With
Holland & Hart LLP's advice, the Board determined that
no conflicts of interest existed at that time. 29  The Board
formally retained BAML on November 7, 2016, and BAML
immediately conducted a market check. 30  On November
11, 2016, the Board retained Jones Day for its “substantial
experience in advising Delaware publicly traded companies
in respect of potential strategic transactions.” 31
*3  By the next Board meeting on November 23, 2016,
twenty-four parties had received some type of formal or
informal contact from BAML or Stillwater management.
Four of those parties accessed the data room, four conducted
site visits, and one, Sibanye, submitted an indication of
interest. 32  McMullen informed the Board that he viewed
Sibanye's initial offer of $15.75 per share as insufficient. 33
At the Board's direction, BAML reached out to additional
parties, and one, Northam, signed a non-disclosure agreement
and accessed the data room. 34  Two other parties—Northern
Star and Independence—informed Stillwater that they were
only interested in a merger of equals. 35
On December 1, 2016, Sibanye revised its offer to $17.50-
$17.75 per share in cash. 36  On December 2, 2016,
Stillwater's Board rejected the revised offer. 37  That same
day, BAML provided its internal discounted cash flow model
valuing the company between $10.78 and $14.14 per share. 38
BAML also provided a financial analysis of the two merger
of equals proposals from Northern Star and Independence. 39
After reviewing the financial analysis, the Board ultimately
determined not to pursue either merger of equals transaction,
finding neither tenable for a number of reasons. 40
On December 3, 2016, Sibanye made its “best and final”
offer of $18 per share to acquire Stillwater. 41  The $18
price represented a 22.6% premium over the unaffected
trading price and a 24.4% premium over the 30-day volume-
weighted average price. 42  At this point, although five parties
had signed nondisclosure agreements and gained access to
Stillwater's non-public information, Sibanye was the only
party to make a bid. 43
C. Stillwater Signs with Sibanye
On December 8, 2016, BAML provided an opinion to
the Board that Sibanye's offer was fair to stockholders. 44
The Board considered BAML's fairness opinion in its
deliberations, approved the merger, and signed the merger
agreement. 45  The transaction was publicly announced on
December 9, 2016. 46
In March 2017, Wadman resigned as general counsel.
Wadman's resignation letter cited his concerns about how the
deal process unfolded and his belief that McMullen used the
process to engage in self-dealing. 47  Stillwater negotiated a
settlement with Wadman, and the company issued a statement
that did not mention the reasons for his resignation. 48
During the 138 days between the signing and the stockholder
vote, no other bidder made a topping bid over $18 per
share, but the price of palladium and Stillwater's trading
price increased during that time. 49  Still, on April 26, 2017,
approximately 75% of the issued outstanding shares eligible
to vote approved the merger. 50  On May 4, 2017, the sale of
Stillwater to Sibanye closed. 51
D. Appraisal Litigation
On May 22, 2017, appellants, petitioners-below, initiated this
appraisal litigation. 52  The Court of Chancery conducted a
four-day trial and held post-trial argument on May 1, 2019.
On August 21, 2019, the court issued its Memorandum
Opinion. 53  The Court of Chancery held that “Sibanye proved
that the sale process was sufficiently reliable to make the
deal price a persuasive indicator of fair value.” 54  Further,
the court stated that while “[t]he evidence demonstrated that
Stillwater's trading price could provide a persuasive indicator
of value, ... it was a less persuasive indicator than the deal
price.” 55  It also held that “[n]either side proved that its DCF
valuation provided a persuasive indicator of fair value. The
experts disagreed over too many inputs, and the resulting
valuation swings were too great, for [the court] to rely on a
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model when a market-tested indicator is available.” 56  Thus,
the court deferred to the merger price of $18 per share as
the most reliable indicator of Stillwater's fair value. 57  It also
declined to make an upward adjustment to the price to account
for Stillwater's increase in value after signing, holding that
petitioners did not prove that they were entitled to a deal price
adjustment. 58  On September 27, 2019, the Court of Chancery
entered its Post-Trial Judgment order.
E. Petitioners Appeal the Court's Memorandum
Opinion and Order
*4  On October 8, 2019, Petitioners filed a timely Notice
of Appeal. On appeal, Petitioners argue that the Court
of Chancery abused its discretion by ignoring the flawed
sale process and holding that the deal price of $18 per
share reflected Stillwater's fair value at closing. 59  Further,
Petitioners argue that the court relied on an incorrect
conclusion to justify its decision to not adjust the deal price
upward to account for rising commodity prices. 60
Sibanye responds that the Court of Chancery correctly
examined Stillwater's sale process and held that the process
presented sufficient indicia of reliability, making the deal
price the best indicator of Stillwater's fair value. 61  Further,
it argues that because Petitioners' arguments concerning the
deal price adjustment were wholly conclusory, the court
correctly held that Petitioners “failed to prove ... ‘that the deal
price should be adjusted upward to reflect a change in value
between signing and closing.’ ” 62
On review, this Court holds that the Court of Chancery did not
abuse its discretion when it relied on the deal price as the most
reliable indicator of Stillwater's fair value. Nor did the Court
abuse its discretion when it declined to adjust the deal price.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews errors of law de novo. 63  We review
statutory appraisal awards for abuse of discretion and “grant
significant deference to the factual findings of the trial
court.” 64  “So long as the Court of Chancery has committed
no legal error, its factual findings will not be set aside on
appeal unless they are clearly wrong and the doing of justice
requires their overturn.” 65  “We defer to the trial court's fair
value determination if it has a ‘reasonable basis in the record
and in accepted financial principles relevant to determining
the value of corporations and their stock.’ ” 66
III. ANALYSIS
Under 8 Del. C. § 262(a), a dissenting stockholder to a merger
“shall be entitled to an appraisal by the Court of Chancery
of the fair value of the stockholder's shares of stock.” In an
appraisal proceeding, the Court of Chancery must “determine
the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value
arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger
or consolidation, together with interest, ... to be paid upon the
amount determined to be the fair value.” 67  “To reach this
per-share valuation, the court should first envisage the entire
pre-merger company as a ‘going concern,’ as a standalone
entity, and assess its value [on the closing date of the
merger] as such.” 68  “Then, once this total standalone value
is determined, the court awards each petitioning stockholder
his pro rata portion of this total—his proportionate interest in
[the] going concern plus interest.” 69
When determining a company's fair value in an appraisal,
“the Court shall take into account all relevant factors.” 70
Although “[t]he value of a corporation is not a point on a
line, but [instead] a range of reasonable values,” the court
must “assign one particular value within this range as the most
reasonable value in light of all the relevant evidence and based
on considerations of fairness.” 71  “In discharging its statutory
mandate, the Court of Chancery has discretion to select one
of the parties' valuation models as its general framework or
to fashion its own.” 72  But, “[i]n the end, the trial judge must
determine fair value, and ‘fair value is just that, “fair.” It does
not mean the highest possible price that a company might
have sold for.’ ” 73
A. The Court of Chancery Did Not Abuse its
Discretion when it Held that the Deal Price was the
Best Evidence of Stillwater's Fair Value
*5  Petitioners first argue that “[t]he court below erroneously
concluded that the flawed sale[ ] process was sufficient
to defer completely to merger price.” 74  Petitioners allege
that instead of analyzing the actual merger process in
accordance with this Court's precedent, the Court of Chancery
“constructed a made-up deal process—involving only a single
bidder—to speculate that if this Court would defer completely
to merger price in that (more extreme) scenario, it would
likely uphold a merger-price determination here, despite
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the significant process deficiencies.” 75  Thus, Petitioners
contend that the Court of Chancery disregarded “the facts
of this case” and “failed to analyze the sale[ ] process for
Stillwater to determine whether it provided reliable evidence
of third-party market valuation.” 76
Here, contrary to Petitioners' representations, the Court of
Chancery examined Stillwater's sale process, explained its
reasoning, and grounded its conclusions in the relevant facts
and law. The court dedicated 56 pages of its 139-page decision
to examining the reliability of the deal price. The court
walked through each step of the sale process, found that
there were objective indicia of reliability, and addressed each
of Petitioners' arguments concerning alleged defects in the
pre- and post-signing phases. After conducting this analysis,
the court held that although Stillwater's sale was “rough
and ready,” “given the arm's-length nature of the Merger,
the premium over market, and the substance of what took
place during the sale process, it is not possible to say that
an award at the deal price would result in the petitioners
being exploited.” 77  This Court cannot hold that the Court
of Chancery abused its discretion in reaching this conclusion
based on the record before us.
1. The Court of Chancery determined that the sale
process provided objective indicia of reliability
This Court has recently examined instances when sale
processes provided persuasive evidence of fair value. In
DFC, Dell, and Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba
Networks, Inc., 78  this Court looked to objective factors
that bolstered the reliability of the sale process and gave
considerable weight to the deal price. In DFC, this Court
considered a sale process where
i) the transaction resulted from a
robust market search that lasted
approximately two years in which
financial and strategic buyers had
an open opportunity to buy without
inhibition of deal protections; ii) the
company was purchased by a third
party in an arm's length sale; and iii)
there was no hint of self-interest that
compromised the market check. 79
This Court concluded that “the best evidence of fair value was
the deal price, as it resulted from an open process, informed
by robust public information, and easy access to deeper, non-
public information, in which many parties with an incentive
to make a profit had a chance to bid.” 80  In so holding, this
Court noted that the
refusal to craft a statutory presumption
in favor of the deal price when certain
conditions pertain does not in any
way signal [this Court's] ignorance
to the economic reality that the sale
value resulting from a robust market
check will often be the most reliable
evidence of fair value, and that second-
guessing the value arrived upon by the
collective views of many sophisticated
parties with a real stake in the matter is
hazardous. 81
Likewise, in Dell, this Court determined that the deal price
deserved deference when “Dell's sale process bore many of
the same objective indicia of reliability” present in DFC. 82
Specifically, this Court reasoned that
when the evidence of market
efficiency, fair play, low barriers to
entry, outreach to all logical buyers,
and the chance for any topping bidder
to have the support of Mr. Dell's
own votes is so compelling, then
failure to give the resulting price
heavy weight ... abuses even the
wide discretion afforded the Court of
Chancery in these difficult cases. 83
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*6  Thus, this Court in Dell held that, due to the objective
indicia of reliability, “the deal price deserved heavy, if not
dispositive, weight.” 84
Finally, in Aruba this Court noted “the long history of giving
important weight to market-tested deal prices in the Court of
Chancery and this Court” 85  and underscored that “a buyer
in possession of material nonpublic information about the
seller is in a strong position (and is uniquely incentivized) to
properly value the seller when agreeing to buy the company
at a particular deal price.” 86  The Court concluded that
the buyer's “view of value should be given considerable
weight by the Court of Chancery absent deficiencies in the
deal process” because the buyer had access to nonpublic
information and was able and incentivized to properly value
the target. 87
Using the above decisions as guidance, the Court of Chancery
examined Stillwater's sale process and determined that it
also presented “ ‘objective indicia’ that ‘suggest[ed] that
the deal price was a fair price.’ ” 88  The court highlighted
five key objective indicators that supported the reliability of
Stillwater's sale process: (1) “the Merger was an arm's length
transaction with a third party”; (2) “the Board did not labor
under any conflicts of interest”; (3) the buyer “conducted
due diligence and received confidential information about
Stillwater's value”; (4) Stillwater “negotiated ... multiple price
increases”; and (5) “no bidders emerged during the post-
signing phase.” 89  This Court has held that each of these
indicators reflected a trustworthy process when evaluating
the sale processes in DFC, Dell, and Aruba. 90  Although
these indicators are fewer indicia of fairness than this Court
identified when reviewing the sale processes in DFC, Dell, or
Aruba, the court did not abuse its discretion by determining
that “the objective indicia that were present provide a cogent
foundation for relying on the deal price as a persuasive
indicator of fair value.” 91
2. The Court of Chancery considered and rejected
Petitioners' objections to the pre-signing process
*7  Having identified the objective signs that the deal price
was a reliable indicator of fair value, the Court of Chancery
also addressed and rejected each of Petitioners' several
arguments for why the pre-signing process undermined that
reliability. 92
First, the court considered Petitioners' claim that McMullen's
role in the pre-signing process and the Board's lack
of “meaningful oversight” during that period sullied the
reliability of the sale process. 93  The court acknowledged
that aspects of the process, including McMullen's early
unsupervised activities and the lack of Board involvement
until later in the sale discussions, presented “flaws.” 94  It
held, however, that “[t]hose flaws are factors to consider,
but they do not undermine the reliability of the sale price”
because BAML's pre-signing canvas, the repeated rejections
of Sibanye's offers, and an effective post-signing market
check ensured a sufficient degree of reliability. 95  Therefore,
the suboptimal executive and board involvement early on did
“not inherently disqualify the sale process from generating
reliable evidence of fair value.” 96
Second, the court held that although McMullen's pursuit of
the merger “appears to have been motivated by his desire
to maximize his personal wealth and retire,” those personal
interests did not undermine the sale process. 97  Instead, the
court determined that McMullen's financial and personal
interests were aligned with stockholders' desire to maximize
the company's value. 98  And “[w]hen Sibanye indicated
interest at $15.75 per share in July 2016, McMullen did not
rush to sign up a deal[,]” evidencing his commitment to
extract the highest possible price for the company. 99  Further,
the court noted that “McMullen's personal interests as a whole
do not appear materially different from interests that have
not been sufficient in other cases to undermine the reliability
of sale processes.” 100  Thus, McMullen's personal interests
did not lead him or the Board “to accept a deal price that
left a portion of Stillwater's fundamental value on the table,
particularly in light of the effective post-signing market check
that Stillwater conducted.” 101
Third, the court analyzed Stillwater's initial “soft sell”
approach and BAML's pre-signing market check. The court
determined that although “the ‘soft sell’ strategy was not
an effective means of generating interest in the Company,”
it “did not do anything to harm either BAML's abbreviated
pre-signing process or the post-signing market check.” 102
BAML reached out to fourteen parties once it was retained,
and seven parties engaged to some degree in the process. 103
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While Petitioners “have criticized the timing, pacing, and
scope of the pre-signing process, ... it resulted in BAML
contacting the ‘logical strategic buyers’ before Stillwater
signed up its deal with Sibanye.” 104  Further, “[t]he number
of meaningful contacts compares favorably with or is similar
to the facts in the Delaware Supreme Court precedents.” 105
Thus, while the “abbreviated pre-signing process was not
ideal,” the court concluded that it was still “a positive factor
for the reliability of the sale process.” 106
*8  Fourth, and finally, the court rejected Petitioners'
argument that “Sibanye pressured Stillwater to sign a merger
agreement before the company's rising stock price made
what Sibanye was willing to pay look inadequate.” 107
Sibanye conducted due diligence before signing, received
access to material non-public information, and was uniquely
incentivized to value Stillwater properly. When Sibanye made
its final offer of $18 per share, it “could have deployed
cash on hand or drawn on its revolving line of credit” to
increase that offer if its own valuation supported such an
increase; it did not. 108  “That Sibanye did not bid higher does
not mean that the price it agreed to pay did not reflect fair
value when its bid prevailed.” 109  Moreover, Stillwater twice
rejected Sibanye's lower offers before accepting a deal for
$18 per share. As such, the court held that “[t]he negotiations
between Stillwater and Sibanye over price, together with
Sibanye's refusal to pay more, provide[ ] strong evidence of
fair value.” 110
Thus, the court considered each of Petitioners' arguments
concerning the pre-signing process. This Court is satisfied
that the Court of Chancery did not abuse its discretion when
it held that the pre-signing process was sufficient to support
reliance on the deal price as evidence of fair value.
3. The Court of Chancery considered and rejected
Petitioners' objections to the post-signing process
The Court of Chancery also considered Petitioners' “relatively
few” claims challenging the terms of the Merger Agreement
and the Board's decisions during the post-signing period. 111
Because the market price of palladium increased between
signing and closing, Petitioners complained that “the Merger
Agreement ‘provided no practical way for Stillwater's
stockholders to receive that additional value.’ ” 112  But
the Court of Chancery dismissed those arguments as
contradictory to the terms of the contract itself. According to
the court, the Merger Agreement was not designed “to give
the stockholders the benefit of a transaction that included the
potential upside or downside that would result from changes
in the price of palladium after signing. The Merger Agreement
was trying to provide stockholders with the ability to opt
for the comparative certainty of deal consideration equal
to $18.00 per share.” 113  Moreover, the court held that the
challenge to the Merger Agreement failed because Stillwater's
stockholders were not wholly barred from capitalizing on
rising palladium prices; as a practical matter, “[i]f Stillwater's
stockholders had wanted to capture the increased value of
palladium, then they could have voted down the Merger and
kept their shares.” 114
The court also rejected Petitioners' argument that the no
solicitation provision and matching rights “deterred interested
buyers from making a topping bid.” 115  The court compared
the deal protections here to the “similar suite of deal
protections” in Aruba and held that, as in Aruba and other
cases, these protections “did not preclude or impermissibly
impede a post-signing market check.” 116  Potential bidders
had 138 days to submit a competing bid. “The absence of a
higher bid indicates ‘that the deal market was already robust
and that a topping bid involved a serious risk of overpayment,’
which in turn ‘suggests the price is already at a level that is
fair.’ ” 117
Last, the Court of Chancery addressed Petitioners' argument
that “the stockholders approved the Merger based on
incomplete and misleading information.” 118  The court noted
that “[t]he disclosure theories about McMullen and Wadman
would likely have some merit if the petitioners had done
more to articulate them, support them with case law,
and explain their relationship to a determination of fair
value.” 119  Despite the cursory nature of the allegations,
the court acknowledged that “the proxy statement should
have disclosed McMullen's interest in retiring, his roles with
GT Gold and New Chris, and their implications for his
employment agreement. Stockholders also should have been
told that Wadman resigned because of disputes with senior
management about the conduct of the sale process.” 120
But, the court was not convinced that Petitioners' arguments
were “sufficient to undermine the stockholder vote as an
expression of the preference of a supermajority of Stillwater's
stockholders for a sale rather than having the Company
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continue as a standalone entity.” 121  Although the disclosures
might have “affected stockholders' views about whether their
negotiators had extracted the highest possible bid,” there
would not have been “any reason to revise their assessment
of the Company's prospects as a standalone entity or to vote
down the Merger in the belief that the Company was more
valuable as a going concern in its operative reality as a widely
held, publicly traded firm.” 122  Nonetheless, the court did
“not give heavy weight to the stockholder vote” because of
the disclosure issues. 123
*9  As with the pre-signing arguments, after analyzing and
addressing all of Petitioners' post-signing process challenges,
the court concluded that “Sibanye proved by a preponderance
of the evidence that the sale process made the deal price a
persuasive indicator of fair value. The sale process was not
perfect, and the petitioners highlighted its flaws, but the facts
of this case, when viewed as a whole, compare favorably”
with this Court's precedents. 124  On review, given the record
before the Court of Chancery, we hold that the court did not
abuse its discretion in so holding.
4. The Court of Chancery properly based
its deal price analysis on the sale process,
not on its single-bidder hypothetical
Petitioners do not meaningfully challenge any of the Court of
Chancery's specific holdings regarding the objective indicia
of reliability. Nor do they meaningfully dispute the court's
treatment of any of the specific arguments concerning the pre-
and post-signing phases. Instead, Petitioners assert that “[t]he
court below failed to analyze the sale[ ] process” because it
“analyzed a hypothetical ‘single-bidder’ process.” 125
When addressing Petitioners' arguments concerning the lack
of outreach to other buyers during the pre-signing phase, the
Court of Chancery entertained the question of whether “the
deal price [would] provide persuasive evidence of fair value
if Stillwater had pursued a single-bidder strategy in which
it only interacted with Sibanye before signing the Merger
Agreement ....” 126  The court stated that it believed that “if
the proponent of a single-bidder process could show that the
merger agreement allowed for a passive post-signing market
check in line with what decisions have held is sufficient to
satisfy enhanced scrutiny, and if there were no other factors
that undermined the sale process, then the deal price would
provide persuasive evidence of fair value.” 127
But, contrary to Petitioners' allegations, the court did not
ignore the facts pertinent to the actual process. As this
Court described above, the Court of Chancery reviewed
each step of the sale process before concluding that the
deal price was reliable. The entirety of the court's single-
bidder discussion encompasses a small portion of its lengthy
analysis. Moreover, the court recognized that its analysis was
hypothetical and emphasized that it “already found that the
sale process exhibited objective indicia of reliability” without
relying on the hypothetical. 128  As a result, that portion of
the court's analysis was not necessary to its decision, does not
alter its holding in this case, and is not being considered on
appeal.
“What is necessary in any particular case ... is for the Court of
Chancery to explain its [analysis] in a manner that is grounded
in the record before it.” 129  Here, the Court of Chancery
thoroughly analyzed the facts surrounding Stillwater's sale
process in accordance with this Court's precedent. Absent
any sign that the court abused its statutory mandate, this
Court will not second-guess the court's careful examination
of Stillwater's sale process. Therefore, we hold that the Court
of Chancery did not abuse its discretion when it held that the
deal price was a reliable indicator of Stillwater's fair value.
B. The Court of Chancery Did Not Abuse its
Discretion when it Declined to Grant a Deal Price
Adjustment
*10  Next, Petitioners argue that the Court of Chancery
abused its discretion when it declined to adjust the deal
price upward to reflect the rising commodity prices between
signing and closing. They argue that “[t]he trial court,
while recognizing the undisputed increase in Stillwater's
value between signing and closing, refused to award such
accretion ....” 130  Moreover, according to Petitioners, the
court wholly based its decision to not adjust the deal price on
its erroneous conclusion that “Petitioners had not argued for
such an adjustment.” 131
“In a statutory appraisal proceeding, both sides have the
burden of proving their respective valuation positions ....” 132
Therefore, in an appraisal proceeding, the party seeking an
adjustment to the deal price reflecting a valuation change
between signing and closing bears the burden to identify
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that change and prove the amount to be adjusted. 133  The
time for determining the value of a dissenter's shares is the
date on which the merger closes. 134  Thus, if the value of
the corporation changes between the signing of the merger
agreement and the closing, then the fair value determination
must be measured by the “operative reality” of the corporation
at the time of the merger. 135
A holistic review of the court's analysis suggests that it
was unconvinced by Petitioners' conclusory arguments for
an adjustment to the deal price and declined to grant the
adjustment because Petitioners failed to meet their burden
of proof. 136  While Petitioners seize on the court's language
that “the petitioners never argued for an adjustment to the
deal price,” 137  this reading ignores the court's analysis of
numerous difficult considerations that Petitioners failed to
adequately address. The court's statement that petitioners did
not argue for an adjustment to the deal price may have been
inartful, but it appears that the court also considered and
rejected the notion of a deal price adjustment based on gaps
in Petitioners' arguments.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court of Chancery's August 21,
2019 Memorandum Opinion and September 27, 2019 Post-
Trial Judgment order are AFFIRMED.
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IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR LINN COUNTY 
ELY, INC., f/k/a ) 
.) - · MicroFuel Corporation, ) . -
) -:--, 
Plaintiff. ~ ' -; ) 






ALLEN C. WILEY, ) FINDINGS OF FACT. 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Defen~~t. ) AND DECISION 
On March 7. 1994, trial in the above-captioned matter brgan. At that time the Plaintiff 
appeared by attorney Don Thompson and board chair Peter Dietrich; the Defendant 
appeared in person with attorney Mark Liabo and attorney Tom Riley. Evidence was 
taken on March 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, 1994. The record was left open for the presentation of 
further deposition testimony until March 16, 1994. Briefs were filed on or before March 
31, 1994. The matter was taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered all of the evidence presented and the written and oral 
statements and arguments finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The above-captioned matter is a dissenter's rights action f!led pursuant to Division XIII of 
Chapter 490 of the Code of Iowa. Defendant is the only ,rinority shareholder dissenting 
to the corporate act of the Plaintiff. the sale of its assets to Fuller. Plaintiff pursuant to 
Chapter 490 filed suit to have the Court detennine the fai• •.1alue of the Defendant's stock. 
The Defendant, Allen Wiley. was age 51 al the time of trial. He holds an AA degree in 
electrical engineering from an Illinois school. I le spent four years in the Air Force in 
electronics and communication. In 1968 he was employed wi th an clcc1rical contractor. 
In 1970 he started his own electrical contract mg c:ompany. In t\fay of 1971 he moved to 
Iowa City. Vie went into business with Selzer Constrnction and lnsul Sound doing 
insulation. He took classes on energy consulting and in 1978 he fonned Wiley & 
Associates to do energy audits. His company worked under federal grants for schools 
and hospitals doing energy audits to reduce energy eons11111ption. Because of the oil/gas 
shortages he began investigating ways of grinding material dfo::icntly as well as ways 10 
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convert oil and gas burners back to coal burners. His thought was to use micronizcd coat. 
The concept of micronized coal was knov,1n but fairly new. He had learned of the TAS 
Company, which was using the process. Micronized coal reduces the particulates (ash) 
as well as reduces the size of the ash. It bums almost totally with little carbon and cools 
off better. Micronized coal has the composition of talcum powder. 
He analyzed various milling devices: the hammer mill which uses attrition, the mortar 
and pestle or roller mills, and the fluid energy mills which cause material to be fired at 
one another with steam or compressed air. Each of these had an advantage or a 
disadvantage. The mortar and pestle being the most common was a simple application 
but it was difficult to get the particles small enough to become micronized and also the 
fines could build up between the rollers. With the hammer mills the erosion rate was too 
high. The fluid energy was a good concept but it was too costly. 
Mr. Wiley concluded that if one could create fluid energy by mechanical means. it 
might become economically viable. His thought was to create fluid energy by using 
specific waves of air to collide the particles. He developed a drawing of a MicroMill 
using the fluid energy method and in January of 1986 applied for patents. In May of 1990 
he obtained four U.S. patents: one for the method and three for the apparatus including 
shapes of blades, the rotational impact zone and air waves. His MicroMill would vacuum 
the air and tl-,e material into the mill in no more than a four-inch lump size. The lumps 
would rotate creating a tornado. The air flow would move up toward the impeller. The 
chunks would be thrown into the rotational impact zone and be crushed into smaller 
bands of material. Centrifugal force keeps the particulars in the mill until they are small 
enough to be shot out. 
In order to obtain the patents, he had to demonstrate that the grinding actually took place 
in the rotational impact orris zone. When the particulates are small enough they are 
caught in an air stream and exhausted out into a classifier. a horizontal cyclone where 
they would be classified. If they were too large. the particulates would go back into the 
MicroMill for further micronization. If they were small enough. they would go into the 
furnace. His first idea was to use the mill for micronizing coal: however. there were 
other possible applications, such as grinding limestone or sorbent or grinding grain. He 
thought it could be used in the utility industry as well as industry. for example. at an 
asphalt plant micronized coal could be used as fuel in an aggregate dryer. 
In 1985 he put together a group of investors. Oil prices were high and people were 
looking for a way to go back to using coal more ctlicicntly with less emissions. I le sold 
80 percent of the stock in the company in January o f 198() 10 Nebraska Boilers/National 
Dynamics. The demonstration facility w~s built in Lincoln. :--Jehraska. A complete 
system was sold to an asphalt plant in Illinois. When the price of oil fell. National 
'1 
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Dynamics lost interest in the technology and the Defendant purchased the company back 
in May ofl987. In order to complete the purchase he needed to raise funds. He was to 
pay I million dollars for the company and had six months to raise the money. He knew 
that large coal-fired utilities consume Jots of oil because some substance is needed that 
will flame immediately to ignite the burners. However. the drawback to oil is that it 
leaves a film on the external surfaces of a furnace and it smokes. He theorized 
micronized coal, although you would still need a gas gun to ib'Tlite it, would provide a 
quicker startup and a lower turndown. In other words, he thought that MicroMiJls would 
keep furnaces in utilities on ready reserve. So in order to raise funds he contacted various 
utilities and venture capital firms. He eventually fonned MicroFuel Corporation in June 
ofl987. The original investors were IES Energy. Inc .. Midwest Services (Jowa Public 
Service), and Arete. Wiley stayed in as a minority shareholder owning approximately 12 
percent of the stock. This provided funds to buy out National Dynamics. 
It become obvious that a larger mill was needed for larger furnaces. There were two big 
technical issues to be addressed: the impeller needed to be redesigned for replaceable 
blades and the bearing frame needed to be redesigned. In 1989, 1990 and early 1991 little 
progress was made on upsizing the mill . Technically the bearing issue was still not 
solved, so during that period of time money was being put into the company by the 
investors with no money coming in. By the end of 1991 the bearing frame had been 
redesigned, the problem solved and the impeller problem had been solved except for the 
material of the blades. 
In October of 1991 one unit was sold to Clyde Carnithers in Australia. In 1991 more stock 
was sold to JES for 25 cents per share. In July of 1989 they had paid 50 cents per share, 
and then I dollar per share. In the summer of 1991 I ES loaned the company up to 
$600,000 on a line of credit. It was only drawn down to S350.000. Also in 1991 
MicroFuel (hereinafter referred to as MFC) was having discussions with the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (hereinafter referred to as TVA) about the Clean Coal IV Project. As a 
result of the Federal Clean Air Act certain monies were available through the Department 
of Energy (DOE) under the Clean Coal IV Project fo r the development and 
demonstration of technologies which could utilize coal hut still meet the emissions 
standards for NOx set out in Clean Air Act. The Clean Air Act required phase I 
companies to meet the emissions standards by fanuary of 1995 and phase II companies to 
meet the standards by the year 2000. Thus. the utility mdustry and the T VA in particular 
were investigating various ways to convcn their boilers and furnaces to meet the 
emissions standards. They became interested in the rvlicroMill technology and 
micronized coal and through 1991 and 1992 were involved in discussions with the 
company (MFC) about demonstration projccls ,md imTstmcnts . 
.' 
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Also during the 1991-92 period MFC's board of directors. in pa1ticular IES representative 
Peter Dietrich, began to search for additional investors and/or strategic partners. They 
were attempting to find a company with similar product lines and market capabilities, as 
well as some strength and money, tl1ings the cmTent investors did not have available. As 
of August of 1991 it was costing about $50,000 a month to keep the company operational 
and it really had no cash or income. The current stockholders were polled and stock was 
offered at 25 cents a share but no one came forward. A conventional lender was not 
available either. Thus, the prospect in August oft991 for other monies ft om other sources 
appeared to be zero. IES abrreed to loan the company the dollars indicated above. All of 
the assets of the corporation were pledged on the note and the due date of the note was 
April I ofl992. An audit as of December 31 of 1991 of Micro Fuel listed a cash balance of 
$49,096 and shareholders' equity of $19.627. They had lost most of the equity during the 
preceding year. 
According to Mr. Oeitrich's testimony, by the end of l991 the MFC company had lost 
$2,841,000. Eventually it appeared that Fuller Corporation was interested in purchasing 
the company. Fuller Corporation is a wholly owned United States subsidiary of Smidth 
Manufacturing out of Denmark. It manufactures and markets equipment to various 
industries, including the utility industry. They had grinding products that they were 
already selling to utilities and had research capabilities. Eventually a finn offer was 
made by Fuller to purchase all of the assets of Micro Fuel. The Defendant. through his 
company Wiley & Associates, attempted to match that offer or make a better off er. Both 
offers were presented to the shareholders witl1out a recommendation and on September 2 
ofl992 at the meeting of the shareholders the Fuller deal was accepted with Mr. Wiley 
dissenting and one other shareholder abstaining. The essential tenns of the deal are 
attached to Exhibit 3 as Exhibit A. Basically Fuller would make a $750.000 down 
payment which would first go to pay off liabilities and then be distributed between the 
shareholder!). There was also the possibility of royalties over a period of seven years 
based on sales of units. with a maximum royalties of $6.5 million. 
Based on the sale, by a majority. board of directors of Ely. Inc .. detennined the fair value 
of Defendant Wiley's shares in the corporation by a written unanimous consent effective 
December I, 1992, to be " ... the amount of cash currently available for di stribution to Mr. 
\Viley in proportion to his shares. 12 percent of the outstanding shares of the corporation. 
the sum of $24,000 (estimated fair value) ." They further detennincd the c1ppl icable 
percentage rate to be 3 percent from and after September 4 of 1992 and that Mr. Wiley 
shall be entitled to future distributions of any royalties paid hy Fuller during the contract 
period in proportion to his shareholdings by assignment of 12 percent of the royalty 
payment to the corporation under the contract. The Ddi.:1,d:1111 was paid $24.200 for the 
fair value of his stock plus interest. It is that amount he dissents from . Given those 
figures he was paid approximately 2.5 cents per share. 
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At the time of trial each side called a "expert witness" to give an opinion with regard to 
the fair value of the stock. Iowa law requires in dissenters' rights actions that the fair 
value be determined immediately before the corporate action dissented from, in this case 
the asset sale. Ely, Inc's, expert Paul Much, whose resume' is in evidence as Exhibit 27. 
gave an opinion that the best measure of value is an actual transaction if it meets the test 
of a fair market transaction, being a willing buyer, willing seller and no compulsion. 
Thus, he looked only at the Fuller transaction to see if it was a fair market transaction. 
Once be determined it was a fair market transaction and a noncompulsion sale, he thought 
the fair value of the stock is the net cash available, the amount Mr. Wiley was paid. 
Mr. Wiley's expert, Yale Kramer, whose qualifications are listed on Exhibit 143, provided 
a list of the information he reviewed on Exhibit 144 and gave his opinion that the fair 
value of the stock is 40 cents per share. 
CONCLUSIONS Of- LA \V 
Iowa Code Chapter 490 defines a dissenter as a shareholder who is entitled to dissent 
from corporate action and who exercises that right when and in the manner required by 
the Code. It also defines fair value with respect to dissenter's shares as the value of the 
shares immediately before the effectuation of the corporate action to which the dissenter 
objects excluding any appreciation or depreciation in anticip:ltic,, of the corporate action 
unless the exclusion would be inequitable. 
Interest is defined as the interest from the effective date of the corporate action until the 
date of payment at the average rate currently paid by the corporation on its principal bank 
loans, or, if none, at a rate that is fair and equitable under all the circumstances. 
Under Iowa Code Section 490.1302 the shareholder may dis::;cnt from (c.) consummation 
of a sale or exchange of all. or substantially all. of the prope11y of the corporation other 
than in the usual and regular course of business. if the shareholdrr is entitled to vote on 
the sale or exchange, including a sale in dissohnion . .. 
The term fair value as used in the valuation of a dissenter's share 1s not a rigid crite1ion 
but establishes a flexible general standard for lixing the value between panies who are 
unwilling or unable to agree. Richardson v Palmer Broadcastinl! Co .. 353 N.W.2d 374 
(Iowa 1984), citing 13 W. Fletcher. Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations. Sec. 
5906.12, at 286. Fair value cannot be dete1111ined hy any precise mathematical 
computation and no one figure or formula is binding. or conclusive. lg. The decision is, 
therefore, a matter of judgment based on all material c,·idcncc and all relevant factors. Id. 
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Courts must take into consideration all factors and elements which reasonably might enter 
into the fixing of value. Thus, market value. asset value. dividends, earning prospects, 
the nature of the enterprise and any other facts which were known or could be ascertained 
... and which throw any light on future prospects .. . must be considered . . . Litton 
Industries v Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc .. 709 F. Supp. 438 (SONY 1989). 
Three factors which are discussed most often in determining fair value include: 
I. Market value which is the amount that stock would be sold between a willing seller 
and a willing buyer, 2. Net asset value which is defined as the share which the stock 
represents and the value of the net assets of the corporation. and 3. Investment value 
which is the present value of the anticipated future earnings of a b 1siness considered as a 
going concern. See Woodward v Quigley, 133 N.W.2d 38 (Iowa 1965) and 18A AmJur 
2d Corporations, Sec. 846 ( 1985). 
The Iowa Supreme Court has stated that all three approaches to valuation should be 
viewed as relevant factors to be considered rather than as essential components. 
Richardson, 353 N. W .2d at 3 78. It is unwise to attempt to state every factor that may 
bear on the value of stock in a particular case. The underlying theory is one of 
compensating the owner of stock for his property rights and no one method of valuation 
should be relied on exclusively. 
Courts must decide cases based upon the evidence presented. Parties to a "fair value" 
case may be unable to find witnesses whose testimony will con-espond to each recognized 
element of fair value. Further, testimony as to any particular element may appear to the 
court to be so unreliable that it has no place in influencing the final result . Trial courts 
may reject valuation techniques that are not supported by the evidence. but they should 
look to valuation techniques that arc easy to understand and provide a reliable guide to 
value. Value is always determined as of a specific date and is based upon all pertinent 
facts and conditions which were either known or reasonably anticipated on that date. 
Sieg Co. v Kcllv. 512 N.W.2d 275 (Iowa 1994). 
Iowa Code Section 490. 1330(5 )(a) provides that each di~scnter is entitled to a judgment 
for the amount, if any. by which the coLn1 finds the fair va lue of the dissenter's shares. 
plus interest. exceeds the amount paid by the corporation. but it docs not specif)' 
provisions as to time and method of payment to the dissenter. 
The dissenter's rights statute requires fair value be dctennincd immediately before the 
corporate action to which the dissenter objects. A contract provision which gives the 
dissenter the value of his shares at some point subsequent to thl· dTectivc date of the 
() 
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corporate action does not serve the statutory purpos ven though it may be advantageous 
to the dissenter. Waters v LL, Inc., 755 P2d 129 daho App. 1987). A shareholder 
should not benefit from a corporate action fron which he dissents nor be made to suffer 
any depreciation resulting from that action. Id. 
In the case of Van Der Maaten v Fanners Co-op Co . 472 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1991). the 
Iowa Supreme Court dealt with the payment issue under Co-operative Associations. 
Section 499 .65 of the Iowa Code. Under that section a newly merged co-operative 
association must pay off the interest of the dissenter hut it was not clear under the statute 
how or when the payment was to be made. In that case the parties agreed on the amount 
of the fair value of the dissenter's shares but the dissenter argued that the statute required 
this amount be paid in full at any rime the co-operative made dividend payments or 
preferred stock redemptions to the nondissenring members. The co-operative contended 
the dissenter was entitled to receive only a pro rata share of the co-operative's total 
payment. The Iowa Supreme Court affinned the district court rnling that the dissenter 
must be paid ofT in a lump sum. The court found this result to be consistent with 
amendments to that statute and with the legislative intent of severing the relationship 
betv, een the fonner members and the new association as soon as it is economically 
feasible to do. 
In Dissolution of Sea.groan Floral Co. 563 NYS2d 539 (NY Appeal Dav. l 990) the court 
approved a lump sum amount and concluded further it was reasonable to require 
dissenters to be paid $500,000 within 60 days of the entry of the judgment with the 
balance to be paid over a period of years with interest. The dissenters obj ..:cted to the 
payment over an eight-year period. The court found the tenns and conditions of the 
purchase of a minority shareholder's sh, re are discrctiona1)' mat1ers for the court to 
determine under the New York statute. However. even though the lump sum amount was 
fixed, the cour1 allmved it to be paid over a period of years. 
Rlf LIN<; 
In this case the Court did not appoint an appraiser. Each par1y presented an expert 
witness who gave an opinion with regard to the fair value of the stock and reasons for that 
opinion. As indicated in Richardson v Palmer Broadcasting. 353 N.W . .2d 374 (Iowa 
1984). the reality facing a trial court is that courts. unl ike appraiser~. arc? forced to decide 
cases based upon the evidence presented. 
Paul Mucl:. Ely's expen. was asked to detcrmim: the fair value of Defendant Wiley's 
shares just before the transaction (asset sale to Fuller). 1-k testified the best measure of 
value is an actual transaction if it meets the test to h<.: a fa ir market transaction. that being 
7 
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one between a willing buyer and a willing seller and under no compulsion, a. ann's 
length. He looked at the sale by Ely. Inc., to Fuller t0 see if it was a fair market 
transaction. Having detennined in his own mind that it v-.ras in fact a fair market 
transaction and a noncompulsion sale. he testified the fair value of Wiley's stock would 
be the net cash available. 
This Court, however, finds Mr. Much's testimony to be unreliable for a couple of reasons. 
The first and most important is that he was to detem1ine the fair value of the stock before 
the corporate transaction, yet he used the transaction itself to dete,mine the value. To 
detennine fair value one must basically ignore the corporate transaction since the fair 
value occurs immediately before said action. In addition, he fe)1. the f-uller sale was not a 
compulsion sale but evidence from witnesses involved indicates Ely. Inc .. was essentially 
out of money and the note held by JES, the major shareholder, had been called. It 
appears to the undersigned from the seller's standpoint this ieally was a compulsion sale. 
Ely. Inc., had very few options available at the time of the sale. 
Regarding Defendant Wiley's expert, Yale Kramer, Exhibit 144 sets out a ten-page listing 
of evidence, depositions, documents that he reviewed prior to reaching an opinion with 
regard to fair value. He really did not consider the Fuller transaction itself and opined 
that fair value does not equal an actual sale. Among things Mr. Kramer considered were 
the fact the average price per share paid by all of the shareholders was 43 cents: that 
discussions with Kim's House of Trading from South Korea appeared to support $1.27 per 
share value as of December of 1990~ that in April of 1991 JES valued the stock at 37 cents 
pe;- share; that the Department of Energy and TVA were supportive of a demonstration of 
the MicroMill technology during the Clean Coal IV Project; that shares in January of 
1992 were offered to Duke Power at a dollar per share: in March of I 992 Ely. lnc.'s 
chainnan of the board Peter Dietrich ( also an employee of I ES) stated an opinion that 
MicroFuel was worth between 7 and 9 million clollars: that Mr. Dietrich in July of 1992 
prepared a discounted cash flow concluding the share value ranged from 49 cents to 32 
cents and, further. in August of 1992 the TVA was willing to provide substaniial funds 
for a percentage of the technolo1::i,y patents and a license agreement. Having reviewed 
those facts and circumstances and fm1her having considered all of the items set out in 
Exhibit 14-l. Mr. Kramer gave his opinion that the fair \aluc of Wiley's stock immediately 
before the transation was 40 cents per share . 
Having found Mr. Much's testimony and opinion cannot be relied 011 because he based his 
value only on the transaction itself. not before the transaction. the Court is faced with 
deciding whether or not Mr. Kramer's valuation is reliable. This Coun now finds Mr. 
Kramer's valuation is reliable and appropriate. He considered all of the evidence and 
documentation available and he further has the background and expe11ise to make said 
valuation. This Court now accepts hi s valuation and adopts it and hereby finds the value 
8 
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of Defendant Wiley's shares immediately prior to the Fuller asset sale was 40 cents per 
share. 
JUDGMENT ENTRY 
Based on the above finding that the vah.,e per share is 40 cents per share, the Court finds 
the fair value of Defendant Wiley's shares immediately before the FuJler sale is $377.600 
(944,000 times 40 cents). From that amount is deducted the payment already made, 
$24,200. 
Judgment is therefore entered in favo. >f Allen C. Wiley and against Ely, Inc. , f/k/a 
MicroFue) Corporation, for $353,400 plus interest at the rate of 3 percent from and after 
September 4, 1992, plus interest at the rate of IO percent from and after January 25, 1993, 
pins costs. 
Clerk to notify. 
Dated: August 3 1, 1994. 
MAIL~LIVEFil::O ON q- / -&; t/ 
3Y ~ TO: Melissa Anderso n 
Donald Thompson 
Kel1 y Baier 
Tom Ri.lty 
Pei: e r R:i l e v r . q 
1 
'-i'f 
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
McCORMICK, V.C.
*1  Due to the press of time, 1  aspects of this decision lack
polish or extended treatment.
March came in like a lion. Snow flurries and gray overcast
covered downtown Wilmington for most of March's early
days. The courthouse witnessed another flurry of activity
during those days as the plaintiffs, FrontFour Capital Group
LLC and FrontFour Master Fund, Ltd. (“FrontFour”), tried
their expedited claims to enjoin transactions orchestrated by
twin brothers Brook and Seth Taube.
The challenged transactions, which were announced on
August 9, 2018, would combine an asset management firm
founded and majority owned by the Taube brothers, Medley
Management, Inc. (“Medley Management”), with two
business development corporations that Medley Management
advises, Medley Capital Corporation (“Medley Capital”),
and Sierra Income Corporation (“Sierra”). If the transactions
proceed, Sierra will acquire first Medley Capital and then
Medley Management in two cross-conditioned mergers, with
Sierra as the surviving combined entity (the “Proposed
Transactions”). Medley Management will receive per share
$ 3.44 cash, plus $ .065 in cash dividends, and the right
to receive .3836 shares of Sierra stock, which represents a
premium of approximately 100% to Medley Management's
trading price. The Taube brothers and their management
team will receive lucrative employment contracts with the
combined company. Medley Capital stockholders, including
FrontFour, will receive per share the right to 0.8050 shares
of Sierra stock, which provides no premium against Medley
Capital's net asset value (“NAV”).
The Taube brothers proposed the transactions in late June
2018. They touted size/scale, asset quality, and internalized
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management resulting from the transactions as beneficial
to all of the parties. They set an aggressive timeline to
permit announcement of a deal in early August 2018 in
connection with the release of second-quarter financials.
In response to the proposal, each of the three affiliated
entities empowered a special committee to negotiate and,
if appropriate, recommend the transaction. It was July 11th
before the Medley Capital special committee had retained a
financial advisor and was prepared to negotiate, leaving only
a few weeks to negotiate under the Taube brothers' timeline.
During that time, the Medley Capital special committee
negotiated a slightly better exchange ratio, secured the Taube
brothers' agreement to waive payments in connection with
a valuable tax receivable agreement (“TRA”), and obtained
the opinion of an independent compensation expert that
the Taube brothers' compensation packets were reasonable.
The committee members also secured for themselves the
agreement that two of the four of them—to be determined
through an interview process following announcement of the
Proposed Transactions—would serve on the board of the
combined entity.
*2  From a distance, this process appeared arm's-length. The
December 2018 proxy recommending that the stockholders
approve the Proposed Transactions certainly made it seem
that way.
At trial, FrontFour proved otherwise. FrontFour commenced
this litigation on February 11, 2019. They claimed that the
Medley Capital directors, who include the Taube brothers,
breached their fiduciary duties to the common stockholders
by entering into the Proposed Transactions. They accused
Sierra of aiding and abetting in those breaches. They also
claimed that Medley Capital's public disclosures failed
to provide several categories of information material to
stockholders considering the Proposed Transactions.
In reality, when the Taube brothers proposed the transactions
in June 2018, Medley Management was facing enormous
financial pressure. Medley Management had engaged in
two sales processes in 2017, both of which failed, which
left merging with affiliates as Medley Management's only
solution. As part of the 2017 sales processes, Medley
Management had secured standstill agreements from around
thirty potential bidders, which prevented those third parties
from proposing transactions with Medley Capital. During
negotiations with one bidder during the 2017 sales process,
the Taube brothers had already agreed to give up the TRA for
substantially less consideration than they will receive under
the Proposed Transactions. In 2018, Medley Management
received two inbound expressions of interest for Medley
Capital, which they ignored. The Medley Capital special
committees did not know any of this information before this
litigation. They were not told. They did not ask.
In the midst of this informational vacuum, Medley Capital's
special committee members determined not to run any pre-
signing market check or consider alternative transactions.
They made this determination, although around that time at
least one stockholder was agitating for Medley Capital to
engage in a sales process. They capitulated to the aggressive
timeline, although Medley Capital had no business reasons
for rushing toward a deal. Then, they insulated the deal from
a post-signing market check by agreeing to deal protections,
including a no-shop.
This post-trial decision finds that the Proposed Transactions
trigger the entire fairness test. FrontFour proved that half
of the Medley Capital special committee was beholden to
the Taube brothers, and thus the Taube brothers dominated
and controlled the board with respect to the Proposed
Transactions. Defendants failed to meet their burden of
proving that the Proposed Transactions are entirely fair. The
deal protections of the merger agreement also fail enhanced
scrutiny.
As relief, FrontFour seeks a curative shopping process,
devoid of Medley Management's influence, free of any deal
protections, plus full disclosures. One obstacle prevents the
Court from issuing this relief: FrontFour failed to prove that
the acquirer, Sierra, aided and abetted in the other defendants'
breaches of fiduciary duties. Under the Delaware Supreme
Court's decision in C & J Energy, 2  an injunction may not
issue if it would “strip an innocent third party of its contractual
rights” under a merger agreement, unless the party seeking
the injunction proves that the third party aided and abetted
a breach of fiduciary duty by the target directors. Ordering
a go-shop despite the no-shop and preventing enforcement
of the deal protections would effectively strip Sierra of its
contractual rights.
*3  And so, what came in like a lion goes out like a lamb:
Under C & J Energy, FrontFour's requested relief must be
denied.
Medley Capital's stockholders, however, are entitled to
corrective disclosures. The proxy creates the misleading
impression that the special committee replicated arm's-
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length negotiations amid the conflicts tainting the Proposed
Transactions. To vote on an informed basis, the stockholders
must know the reality—that the majority of the members
of the special committee failed to act independently
when negotiating the Proposed Transactions. Further, the
stockholders are entitled to additional disclosures concerning
third-party expressions of interests. On this topic, disclosures
to date have been incomplete or, in one instance, outright
false. Any stockholder vote on the Proposed Transactions is
enjoined pending corrective disclosures consistent with the
matters discussed in this decision.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Trial took place over one and three-quarter days. The record
comprises over 800 trial exhibits, live testimony from six fact
and two expert witnesses, deposition testimony from five fact
witnesses, and ninety-seven stipulations of fact. 3  The parties
submitted pre-trial and post-trial briefs. These are the facts as
I find them after trial.
A. The Taube Brothers, the Medley Entities, and
Medley Capital
Each of the entities named as a defendant in this action
is an affiliate of Medley Management, a publicly traded
asset management firm formed by Brook and Seth Taube.
Brook, Seth, and their younger brother, Chris, control
Medley Management through majority ownership. 4  Medley
Management is the parent entity of several registered
investment advisors, which manage several funds, including
Medley Capital and Sierra (collectively, the “Medley
Entities”). The Medley Entities' organizational structure is
reflected in the attached chart. 5
Medley Capital is a business development corporation
(“BDC”) formed by the Taube brothers in 2011. 6  BDCs are
special investment vehicles regulated under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (the “ '40 Act”) and designed
to facilitate capital formation for small and middle-
market companies. 7  Medley Capital describes its business
as “generat[ing] income and capital appreciation by
lending directly to privately held middle market companies
....” 8  Medley Capital “source[s] investment opportunities
through direct relationships with companies, financial
intermediaries ..., as well as through financial sponsors.” 9
Medley Capital launched its initial public offering in 2011. 10
*4  Medley Capital licenses its name from the Medley
Entities. 11  Medley Capital has no employees, offices, or
physical assets of its own; all of this is supplied by its
external advisor, MCC Advisors LLC (“Advisors”), a Medley
Management subsidiary. The Medley Entities experience
total insider overlap. Every member of Medley Capital's
management team holds management positions, and each of
Medley Capital's inside directors hold board seats in other
Medley Entities, including Medley Management, Advisors,
and Sierra. 12
Advisors manages Medley Capital pursuant to an Amended
and Restated Investment Management Agreement (the
“Management Agreement”) dated January 19, 2014. 13
Under that agreement, Medley Capital pays Advisors a base
management fee of 1.75% of Medley Capital's gross assets
and a two-part incentive fee calculated from net investment
income (“NII”) and net capital gains. 14  Advisors has broad
discretion in making investment decisions and directing
Medley Capital's rights under its debt instruments. 15  Such
external management arrangements are common among
BDCs. 16
Under the '40 Act, a majority of Medley Capital's board of
directors (the “Board”) must be independent, and Medley
Capital cannot enter into any transaction with its external
advisor without the approval of a majority of its independent
directors. 17  Medley Capital has a seven-member Board
divided into three classes. 18  The directors are elected by
a plurality vote and serve staggered three-year terms. 19
Medley Capital's current Board comprises three inside
directors and four independent directors. 20  Medley Capital's
inside directors are Brook Taube, Seth Taube, and their
friend of thirty years, Jeff Tonkel. 21  Medley Capital's outside
directors are John E. Mack, Karin Hirtler-Garvey, Arthur S.
Ainsberg, and Mark Lerdal. 22  Mack, Hirtler-Garvey, and
Ainsberg joined the Board in 2011. 23  Lerdal joined the Board
in 2017. 24
Under the '40 Act, Medley Capital's independent directors
must annually review and, if appropriate, approve its
Management Agreement. 25  In the approval process, the
outside directors confer with counsel and review management
fee levels of other BDCs. 26  Under the '40 Act, the
Management Agreement must be terminable at will on
- 72 - 
FrontFour Capital Group LLC v. Taube, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
2019 WL 1313408
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4
60 days' notice without a termination fee. 27  The outside
directors have never considered Advisors' performance 28  or
threatened (or even considered threatening) to terminate the
Management Agreement as part of their annual review or
otherwise. 29
*5  In sum, Medley Capital depends on the Taube brothers
for its day-to-day operations, office space, office equipment,
staff, and even its name. Medley Capital has the right to
terminate Advisors' Management Agreement, but has never
considered using that right. Termination of that agreement
would not extricate Medley Capital from the Taube brothers'
influence in any event, given the other points of overlap.
Another salient fact: None of Medley Capital's fiduciaries
(officers and directors) have interests aligned with the
interests of Medley Capital's common stockholders.
As to the inside directors and management, their financial
interests lie in Medley Management, 30  although the Taube
brothers beneficially own just under 15% of Medley
Capital's common stock. 31  If the Proposed Transactions
close, the Taube brothers and Tonkel will each receive
compensation for their Medley Management interests, as well
as lucrative compensation packages more secure than the at-
will Management Agreement. 32
As to the outside directors, the value of their director fees
dwarfs the value of their Medley Capital common stock. 33
Ainsberg, Hirtler-Garvey, and Mack have each been paid over
$ 1 million for serving on the Board and its committees. 34
For the company's fiscal year ending September 30, 2018,
Ainsberg earned $ 299,000 as a Medley Capital director,
representing roughly half of his 2018 income. 35  Lerdal has
been paid $ 288,702 for his two years as Medley Capital
director. 36  By contrast, at the deal price, the value of all
of the outside directors' combined common stock is under
$ 40,000. 37  In the Proposed Transactions, two of Medley
Capital's four outside directors will serve on the Board of the
combined company; all four outside directors interviewed for
the position after the Merger Agreement was signed. 38
B. Pre-Signing Events
1. Medley Management's Failed Sales Processes
*6  Since its January 20, 2011 IPO, by every industry
measure, Medley Capital has been in a steady financial
decline. 39  This decline occurred during a period of sustained
stock market and sector share price increases. 40  Medley
Capital's performance is poor compared to its peers. 41  Due
to Medley Capital's poor financial performance, 42  Medley
Management faced financial pressures. 43
In May 2017, Medley Management embarked on a
process to consider a range of strategic transactions. 44
Medley Management retained UBS and Credit Suisse to
conduct outreach. 45  Nineteen parties expressed interest and
seven executed confidentiality agreements, but the process
ultimately failed. 46
*7  In October 2017, Medley Management determined to
restart the process and reach out to potential bidders. 47
Medley Management retained Goldman Sachs & Co.
LLC (“Goldman”) and Broadhaven Capital Partners,
LLC (“Broadhaven”). 48  They invited thirty-eight potential
strategic partners to participate in the preliminary round
of a two-round sale process. 49  Twenty-four of them
executed confidentiality agreements. 50  Medley Management
received three “viable” first-round, non-binding indications
of interest. 51  Only one bidder, “Party X,” made a second-
round proposal. 52  From January 12, 2018, through January
24, 2018, Medley Management and Party X engaged
in negotiations and exchanged numerous proposals and
counterproposals. 53
The confidentiality agreements executed by third parties in
Medley Management's two sales processes prevented the
third-parties from offering to enter into any transaction with
funds managed by Medley Management, including Medley
Capital. 54  These restrictions applied for a “standstill period”
following execution of the agreements. The standstill periods
ranged from twelve to twenty-four months. 55
On January 26, 2018, the Medley Capital Board convened a
meeting to receive updates on Medley Management's sales
process. 56  Brook Taube reported on the process as well as the
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status of negotiations with Party X. 57  His report to the Board
was high-level. It omitted information that he had presented
to Medley Management's board of directors that same day. 58
The Board was not informed, for example, that the arm's-
length parties were only willing to pay premia of 8.4% (one
third-party) – 30.0-55.4% (Party X). They were not told that
Party X had dropped its price due to concerns about the
performance of Medley Management. They were not made
aware of the standstill provisions restricting transactions at
Medley Capital. Before this litigation, none of the Board
members ever asked for or were made aware of this
information.
*8  If consummated, Party X's proposal would result in
a change of control of Medley Management, triggering
Medley Capital's approval rights under the Management
Agreement. 59  To consider the impact of the Party X proposal
on Medley Capital, 60  the Board determined to establish a
special committee. 61  The Board appointed to the committee
Ainsberg, Hirtler-Garvey, Mack, and Lerdal, with Ainsberg as
chair (the “Special Committee”). 62  The committee retained
Kramer Levin as legal advisors. 63
On March 15, 2018, Party X submitted a revised bid
that reduced the proposed purchase price significantly and
changed other important terms. 64  Medley Management
determined that the revised proposal was not in the
best interests of Medley Management and terminated
discussions. 65  On May 2, 2018, Party X informed Medley
Management that it did not intend to continue to pursue a
potential transaction. 66
In April 2018, a third-party, Origami Capital Partners, LLC
(“Origami”), reached out to Medley Capital several times
to propose a potential transaction. 67  On April 4, 2018,
Origami submitted an indication of interest. 68  Medley
Capital publicly denied ever receiving that letter. 69  But
Origami addressed the April 2018 letter to both Brook
Taube and Marilyn Adler, a Medley Capital Senior Managing
Director. 70  And Adler responded to the letter: “I am excited
to tell you that Medley has agreed to discuss a process for the
sale. I've given your name as a possible buyer. I am having a
discussion this week and will update you as I know more.” 71
Brook Taube still maintains: “It's not clear to me where
the mysterious correspondence came from.” 72  Before this
litigation, the Special Committee was not aware of Origami's
2018 overtures.
As part of Medley Management's negotiations with Party
X, the Medley Entities' founders (the Taube brothers
and other executives) agreed to give-up their TRA, 73
which was worth approximately $ 5.9 million for fifteen
years following Medley Management's IPO. 74  Before this
litigation, the Special Committee was not informed of Medley
Management's negotiations with Party X concerning the
TRA.
2. Medley Management's Proposed
Transactions with Medley Capital and Sierra
*9  By May 2018, Brook Taube felt that Medley
Management was “under enormous pressure” financially. 75
Wells Fargo noted that Medley Capital's “NAV has dropped
for a remarkable fifteen quarters,” 76  and observed Medley
Capital's “severe underperformance.” 77  In Mack's words, by
May 2018, Medley Capital's credit portfolio was “bottoming
out.” 78  The management team faced fee waivers at Medley
Capital 79  and NAV issues “across the board,” which would
have a “meaningful impact on [Medley Management].” 80
Intensifying this pressure, in 2016, the Taube brothers caused
Medley LCC, a subsidiary of Medley Management, to a
Master Investment Agreement with affiliates of Fortress
Credit Advisors, LLC (“Fortress”). Under the agreement,
Fortress provided approximately $ 40 million in capital for
Medley Capital projects. Fortress received a put right that, if
exercised, forces Medley to “immediately redeem” Fortress's
interest. 81  This put right can be triggered in if Medley LLC
fails to pay Fortress a preferred distribution or if Medley
ceases to control Advisors. 82
Brook Taube proposed implementing drastic steps, including
closing Sierra Total Return Fund 83  to boost cash flow, ending
the Sierra distribution to gain $ 4 million in EBITDA, and
imposing other cost saving initiatives to squeeze another $
2 million out of the business. 84  On May 9, 2018, Brook
even requested that two of his senior management members
agree to defer cash payments owed to them and take Medley
Management stock instead. 85  His colleagues declined. 86
Before this litigation, the Special Committee was unaware
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of the pressures Medley Management faced during this time
period. 87  In a candid moment during trial, Ainsberg admitted
that he wished he had known. 88
As one solution, the Taube brothers and their team began
to contemplate a three-way combination between Medley
Management, Medley Capital, and Sierra. Sierra is a non-
traded BDC specializing in first lien, second lien, and
subordinated debt of middle market companies with annual
revenue between $ 50 million and $ 1 billion. 89  Like
Medley Capital, Sierra is externally managed by a Medley
Management subsidiary. 90  Sierra is much larger than Medley
Capital. As of September 30, 2018, Sierra had total net assets
of $ 687,862,000 and a NAV per share of $ 7.05. 91
*10  Internally, Medley Management referred to this
new proposal as “Project Integrate.” 92  Brook Taube had
conceived of this transaction in March 2018 as a fallback to
the Party X deal. 93  By May 21, 2018, Project Integrate was
at the top of the list of alternatives, and the management team
was “very supportive.” 94  By May 30, 2018, Brook Taube
had asked Goldman and Broadhaven to consider the proposed
three-way combination. 95
At Sierra and Medley Capital board meetings on June 18
and 19, 2018, respectively, Medley Management formally
introduced the idea of the three-way combination. 96  The
initial proposal was that each share of Medley Capital
stock would be converted into the right to receive 0.76
shares of Sierra common stock. Sierra would acquire Medley
Management for $ 3.75 in cash and 0.41 shares of Sierra
common stock. 97
The minutes of the January 19, 2019 Board meeting
summarize Medley Management's rationale behind the
proposed transaction. 98  In sum, the major benefits of the
proposed transaction touted by the transaction's proponents
are: increased scale, increased liquidity, diversified asset pool,
and internalization. 99
Of course, the Proposed Transactions posed significant
conflicts. In an effort to simulate arm's-length dealings,
each of the three entities empowered a special committee
to negotiate and, if appropriate, approve the transaction.
Like Medley Capital, Sierra had formed a special committee
in January 2018 to consider the impact of the Party X
transaction; 100  the committee had been in a holding pattern
since that time. Each of the committees hired financial
advisors. Medley Management hired Barclays Capital Inc.
(“Barclays”); 101  Medley Capital hired Sandler O'Neill +
Partners, L.P. (“Sandler”), as discussed below; and Sierra
hired Broadhaven.
*11  Brook Taube facilitated the Sierra special committee's
retention of Broadhaven. He thought highly of Broadhaven's
Todd Owens, 102  having known him for years. 103  However,
Medley Management had determined to retain Goldman only
for Project Integrate—“two fees on the Integrate didn't make
sense.” 104  So, Brook Taube agreed to introduce Broadhaven
to the Sierra special committee, 105  even though Broadhaven
was still engaged by Medley Management. 106  Brook Taube
suggested the idea to Tonkel on June 6, 2018. Broadhaven
terminated its engagement with Medley Management on June
16, 2018, and pitched the Sierra special committee on June
18, 2018. 107  The Sierra special committee formally retained
Broadhaven on June 29, 2018. 108  Although Broadhaven
terminated its Medley Management engagement without
receiving any payment, the Sierra special committee agreed
to make an up-front payment of $ 1 million, the same
amount Broadhaven would have earned as a transaction fee
if the Medley Management strategic process had concluded
successfully. 109
3. Medley Capital's Special Committee Process
On June 19, 2018, the Medley Capital Board expanded
the scope of the Special Committee's charter to consider
the Proposed Transactions. 110  The Special Committee was
empowered to evaluate and negotiate any proposed business
combination, hire independent legal and financial advisors,
determine whether the transaction was in the best interests of
Medley Capital's stockholders, and recommend the approval
or rejection of the transaction. 111
a. What the Special Committee did.
The Special Committee retained a financial advisor. They
interviewed two candidates. Ainsberg and Hirtler-Garvey
participated in person; Mack and Lerdal participated
by phone. 112  On June 21, 2018, at Brook Taube's
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recommendation, the committee members interviewed
Medley Management's recent financial advisor, Credit
Suisse. 113  On June 22, 2018, the committee interviewed
Sandler. 114  The committee members met again on June 22
and 25, 2018, to select financial advisors, and they determined
to retain Sandler. 115  Ainsberg signed Sandler's engagement
letter on June 29, 2018. 116  Sandler gained access to the data
room that day. 117
*12  The Special Committee next met on July 11, 2018,
to consider the Proposed Transactions. 118  Chris Donohoe
of Sandler gave a presentation to give the committee “a
solid grounding in understanding what Medley Capital looked
like, what the other companies coming in would look like,
and what a combined company would look like ....” 119
They authorized Sandler to negotiate on their behalf. 120
The committee's goals in these negotiations was to obtain
“greater value for [the Medley Capital] stockholders” and
“make sure that the combined company was better positioned
to succeed.” 121  To reach those goals, the committee
(through Sandler) asked for cash consideration. 122  In the
alternative, they authorized Sandler to push for less cash
to leave the combined company. 123  Sandler negotiated
on the founders' TRA and the management team's post-
closing compensation. 124  Finally, Sandler set out to “ensure
that the disinterested shareholders of [Medley Capital] had
representation and say in the management of the combined
business” through board representation in the combined
company. 125
Sandler began to negotiate on July 11, 2018. 126  Through
negotiations, the founders agreed to waive the annual TRA
payment, 127  Sierra agreed to permit two Medley Capital
directors to join their Board, 128  and Sierra agreed to a higher
exchange ratio than originally proposed. 129  At Sandler's
request, Sierra obtained a compensation expert's opinion
concerning the management compensation packages. 130
The opinion was provided on August 3, 2018, 131  with a
supporting presentation. 132  Sierra did not agree to any cash
consideration for Medley Capital stockholders. 133
On July 29, 2018, Medley Management, Medley Capital,
and Sierra reached final agreement on the ratios. 134  In the
preceding three weeks, the Special Committee had met eight
times. 135
After settling on the economic terms, the parties focused on
the legal terms of the merger agreement. 136  The Special
Committee met four more times. 137  The record concerning
negotiations of the deal protections is sparse. At least one
document reflects that, as of August 8, 2018, the termination
fee was still being negotiated. 138
*13  On August 9, 2018, Sandler presented its opinion
to the Special Committee that the Medley Capital Merger
Consideration was fair to Medley Capital stockholders from
a financial point of view. 139  On August 9, 2018, the Special
Committee approved Medley Capital's merger agreement
with Sierra. 140
b. What the Special Committee did not do.
Out of the gate, the Special Committee failed to assert
control over the timing of the process. At the June
2018 Medley Capital Board meeting, Medley Management
presented an aggressive timeline, which contemplated that
the parties would execute definitive transaction agreements
and announce a transaction by July 31, 2018. 141  This made
sense for Medley Management, which had shopped itself for
more than a year prior to that point. By contrast, Medley
Capital had not undertaken any strategic process before the
June meeting. 142  Between its January 26, 2018 formation
and the June 19, 2018 Board meeting, the Special Committee
did not hold any meetings, retain a financial advisor,
or engage in any substantive discussions with the Taube
brothers or other members of Medley Management about a
strategic transaction. 143  Unlike Medley Management, the
Special Committee was starting from scratch. Unlike Medley
Management, the Special Committee had no reason to rush
deliberations. Yet, the committee capitulated to the timeline
Medley Management proposed.
Then, throughout the negotiations, Brook Taube pressured
the Special Committee to stick to the aggressive timeline.
He denies this, 144  but contemporaneous documents prove
otherwise. 145  In a July 11, 2018, email to the Medley
Management Board, Brook Taube emphasized that “[t]ime
is not in our favor given performance, inquiries, letters,
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etc.” 146  He specifically flagged the possibility of “unwanted
interloping” and emphasized that it was “real and should be
taken seriously by the board.” 147  He went on to underscore
the fact that the transaction represented a “100% premium
and a great deal” for Medley Management. 148  On July 27,
2018, Brook instructed Medley Management and Goldman to
advise Medley Capital that they “have a fiduciary obligation
to close.” 149  That same day, he emailed Broadhaven: “Make
this happen!!!!!!” 150  On July 31, 2018, Brook Taube emailed
Jeff Tonkel while Tonkel was on a “Sierra call with Tony.” 151
He instructed Tonkel: “Thursday board meetings are the time
to push these guys hard in person.” 152  On August 1, 2018,
Brook reported to the Medley Management Board that “[w]e
and Goldman continue to believe the risk is substantial if we
announce earnings without simultaneously announcing this
deal.” 153  On August 5, 2018, Lerdal texted Brook Taube:
“Are we on track? Anything you need from me?” Taube
responded: “Let's talk soon / Pushing Hard :-)” 154
*14  The Special Committee did not analyze the value
of Medley Management, or understand what Medley
Management would obtain in the Proposed Transactions,
although in effect Medley Capital and Medley Management
were competing for consideration. The Medley Management
transaction and Medley Capital/Sierra Merger were cross-
conditioned, and the new, combined company would own
Medley Management post-closing.
The Special Committee did not consider alternative
transactions, 155  although disgruntled stockholders were
publicly advocating for a sale process as of April 2018. In a
letter to the Board dated April 17, 2018, one Medley Capital
stockholder wrote: “We believe the Board of Directors should
immediately undertake a serious effort to sell the business
(the underlying investment portfolio and the Management
Agreement). We believe there is an attractive market for
[Medley Capital's] investment portfolio well above where
[Medley Capital's] current stock trades.” 156  Although the
Special Committee was broadly empowered, they laser-
focused on only one option. Sandler corroborated—they
viewed their role as evaluating the three-way combination
only. 157
The Special Committee did not conduct a pre-signing
market check. When asked why, Hirtler-Garvey said she
was happy with the transaction at hand. 158  She wanted
a deal with Medley Management. Ainsberg testified to his
belief that the 2017 Medley Management sales processes
“effectively” checked the market for Medley Capital. 159
He believed that Party X's offer had the potential to result
in a deal with Medley Capital. 160  Mack went further,
testifying that he understood the Party X transaction to be
geared toward a deal with Medley Capital, not with Medley
Management. 161  This, of course, was wrong. Brook Taube
testified, and contemporaneous evidence reflects, that the
2017 sales processes and negotiations with Party X aimed to
develop strategic transactions and generate potential bidders
for Medley Management, not Medley Capital. 162  Medley
Capital was not “effectively” shopped.
*15  Although Medley Management's prior two sales
processes informed the Special Committee's decision not to
conduct a pre-signing market check, the committee members
did nothing to inform themselves of basic aspects of those
two sales processes. As discussed above, one member did not
know that the process aimed to generate a deal for Medley
Management, not Medley Capital. 163  No one asked about
the terms of the potential Party X transaction or any other
proposal received by Medley Management as part of those
processes.
Critically, none of the committee members knew that
approximately thirty confidentiality agreements contractually
foreclosed potential third parties from proposing a transaction
with Medley Capital. Of the thirty agreements, only two
standstill periods expired before the Proposed Transactions
were announced on August 9, 2018. 164  The other twenty-
eight agreements restricted potential counterparties during the
entire period that the Special Committee was negotiating the
Proposed Transactions. 165
When asked about the standstill agreements during his
deposition, Mack stated his belief that “[t]his is a management
issue, not a director [issue].” 166  He thought that more
signed standstill agreements would be beneficial for Medley
Capital. 167  He admitted, “I was not familiar with the
specifics,” and disclaimed any interest in being informed: “I
may not want to know how sausage is made.” 168
The Special Committee did not probe meaningfully into
the value of Medley Management. Medley Management's
financial projections forecasted “hockey stick” growth in the
outer years of the forecast based on revenue from new projects
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and clients. 169  Sandler ran a sensitivity analysis, but lacked
much of the information that was concerned with whether
the NII benefit from the deal was just projected growth, or
whether there was underlying value and earnings to support
the figures. 170
Also, the Special Committee did not know about two
expressions of interest from third parties concerning a
transaction with Medley Capital. The first was from Origami,
discussed above. The Special Committee did not learn of
Origami's 2018 outreach until Origami publicly disclosed it
in February 2019. 171  The second was from Lantern, which
executed a confidentiality agreement on May 23, 2018, as
part of the Medley Management sales process. 172  On July 3,
2018, Tom Schmidt of Lantern reached out to Goldman about
its interest in acquiring Medley Management and potentially
recapitalizing Medley Capital. 173  Schmidt followed up on
July 10. 174  He followed up again on July 20, this time
expressing frustration. 175  On July 30, Lantern submitted
an indication of interest. 176  Among other things, Lantern
explained that it was “interested in exploring alternatives
for providing a significant cash infusion of new capital into
Medley Capital to the extent it is prudent.” 177  Lantern's
recapitalization idea did not reach the Special Committee
before execution of the Merger Agreement.
C. The Proposed Transactions
*16  On August 9, 2018 the Special Committee
unanimously recommended that the Board approve the
merger agreement with Sierra (the “Merger Agreement”). 178
Medley Management, Medley Capital, and Sierra announced
the Proposed Transactions on August 9, 2019. 179
The Merger Agreement contains a series of deal protection
provisions. Section 7.10 of the Merger Agreement prevents
Medley Capital from soliciting or engaging with parties
submitting “Competing Proposals” unless it constitutes
a “Superior Proposal” or is likely to lead to one. 180
“Competing Proposal” is defined as an offer to acquire
20% or more of Medley Capital's securities or assets
or a liquidation. 181  “Superior Proposal” is defined as a
Competing Proposal that is on terms more favorable, from a
financial point of view, than the Merger Agreement and is as
likely to close. 182  Section 7.10(e) of the Merger Agreement
provides that the Medley Capital Board may not make
an “Adverse Recommendation Change” or enter into any
agreement (other than a confidentiality agreement), subject to
a fiduciary out. 183  Section 9.4 of the Medley Capital Merger
Agreement provides for a $ 6 million “Termination Fee,”
which Medley Capital must pay if either party terminates the
Medley Capital Merger Agreement after the Medley Capital
Board effects an “Adverse Recommendation Change,” or
if Medley Capital terminates the Medley Capital Merger
Agreement to enter into a definitive agreement contemplated
by a Superior Proposal.
*17  Employment contracts connected to the merger provide
for lucrative positions for Medley Management's senior
management. 184  The cost of these employment contracts




FrontFour beneficially owns 1,674,946 shares of Medley
Capital common stock, which constitutes approximately
3.1% of Medley Capital's outstanding shares. 186  FrontFour
first learned of the Proposed Transactions when they were
publicly announced on August 9, 2018. 187
FrontFour's corporate representative, David Lorber, testified
at trial that he was “perplexed” by the announcement. 188
He believed that Medley Management had performed poorly
over the prior five years, “erod[ing] significant NAV value,
as well as stock price,” yet “Medley Management was
receiving an excessive amount of value” in the Merger
Transactions. 189
A FrontFour analyst reached out to Medley Capital to
“better understand the transaction” 190  and eventually was
placed in contact with Medley Capital's risk management
officer, Sam Anderson. 191  They spoke on the phone in
late September. 192  FrontFour was not aware during that
call that Anderson was also a senior managing director
of Medley Management. 193  During the call, FrontFour's
representative asked why the proxy had not yet been
issued. 194  Anderson responded suggesting that the parties
to the Merger Transactions were having difficulty agreeing
- 78 - 
FrontFour Capital Group LLC v. Taube, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
2019 WL 1313408
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10
on the disclosures, which raised concerns for FrontFour. 195
After the call, FrontFour asked to be placed in contact with
Medley Capital's independent directors. 196  Instead, Brook
Taube responded. He promised to “revert back.” 197  He did
not timely do so. 198
*18  On November 2, 2019, FrontFour nominated Lorber
and Clifford Press as candidates for election as directors at
Medley Capital's next annual meeting of stockholders. 199  On
November 20, 2018, FrontFour obtained a telephonic meeting
with Ainsberg and Hirtler-Garvey. 200  John Fredericks,
Medley Capital's Chief Compliance Officer—who is also
Medley Management's General Counsel and Sierra's Chief
Compliance Officer—joined the call and did all of the
talking. 201  On November 27, 2018, Medley Capital
responded to questions raised by Lorber on the call. 202
On December 13, 2018, FrontFour issued an open letter to
stockholders opposing the Proposed Transactions. 203
2. Medley Capital's Public Disclosures
During an investors call on August 10, 2019, Medley Capital
management represented that the proxy statement would be
filed within weeks. 204  Medley Capital issued the proxy
statement on December 21, 2019. 205  It was flawed. 206
On January 11, 2019, FrontFour commenced litigation in
this Court pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 220 to compel Medley
Capital to produce book and records for inspection. 207  After
an initial scheduling conference with the Court, Medley
Capital voluntarily produced to FrontFour stocklist materials
and certain core documents concerning the Merger. 208  On
January 30, 2019, FrontFour raised questions regarding the
adequacy of the disclosures in the Proxy. 209  On February
5, 2019, Medley Capital issued the Proxy Supplement and
postponed the stockholder vote until March 8, 2019. 210
3. Multiple Third Parties Express
Interest in Medley Capital
After Medley Capital issued the proxy, multiple third parties
expressed interest in entering into an alternative transaction
with Medley Capital.
• ZAIS. On January 2, 2019, ZAIS submitted a letter
proposing that the Special Committee appoint ZAIS
as the new investment advisor for the sole purpose
of managing an orderly sale or liquidation of Medley
Capital. 211  ZAIS requested the opportunity to meet
the Special Committee to share its views. The Special
Committee met to consider the proposal on January
9, 2019. 212  Nobody acting on behalf of the Special
Committee ever contacted ZAIS. On January 24, 2019,
Brook Taube instructed ZAIS that the Medley Capital
Merger Agreement prohibited contact. 213
*19  • NexPoint. On January 24, 2019, NexPoint
Advisors, L.P. (“NexPoint”) submitted a letter of
intent proposing that Medley Capital terminate the
Management Agreement and replace Advisors with
NexPoint, which would charge a lower fee and make
a cash payment to Medley Capital. 214  On January 31,
2019, NexPoint made a second proposal contemplating
the combination of Medley Capital and Sierra and the
retention of $ 100 million in cash otherwise earmarked
for Medley Management stockholders in the Proposed
Transactions. 215  NexPoint also proposed to pay $
25 million to the combined company for the benefit
of stockholders, to provide a reduced fee structure
and lowered costs (resulting in at least $ 9 million
in annual savings), and to purchase at least $ 50
million of combined company shares over a five-quarter
period. 216
On February 1, 2019, NexPoint made both its proposals
public. 217  On February 6, 2019, Medley Capital
and Sierra issued a press release indicating that
their respective special committees had unanimously
determined not to pursue the second NexPoint
Proposal. 218  The press release purported to identify
the reasoning behind the determinations by the Special
Committees. But Medley Management had drafted the
press release before the Special Committee had even
made its determination. 219
• Origami. On February 11, 2019, Origami issued an open
letter to the Medley Capital Board, proposing to buy
100% of the interests of Medley Capital's wholly owned
subsidiary, Medley SBIC, for $ 45 million cash. 220
Origami also disclosed that it had reached out several
times during the spring of 2018 and sent a formal
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letter on April 4, 2018 expressing interest but had never
received a response. 221  On February 14, 2019, Origami
sent another letter clarifying and reiterating its interest
in a potential transaction. 222  On February 19, 2019,
Medley Capital rejected Origami's proposal. 223
• Marathon. On March 1, 2019, Marathon Asset
Management L.P. (“Marathon”) submitted a letter
to the Special Committee proposing that Medley
Capital remain as an independent company, terminate
the Management Agreement, and enter into a new
management contract with Marathon. 224
The Special Committee held meetings to consider the multiple
expressions of interest. But nobody reached out to ZAIS,
except to confirm that the Merger Agreement prohibited
contact. 225  Nor has anyone acting on behalf of the Special
Committee contacted NexPoint or Origami, despite their
expressed willingness to improve their proposals. 226  The
Special Committee has never asked for a waiver of the non-
solicitation provisions of the Merger Agreement to enable
discussions with any of these potential counterparties, nor
has it attempted to secure better terms from the Taube
brothers. 227
*20  In sum, the Special Committee considered each offer,
but did not engage with any competing bidder, and seems to
question the need to do so. 228  Their attitude is best captured
by Lerdal in a text to Brook Taube. Around the time of the
Special Committee meeting at which the ZAIS offer was
considered, Lerdal texted Brook Taube: “Are we going to
respond to every f**ksake on the planet?” 229
E. The Litigation
FrontFour commenced this litigation on February 11, 2019,
and amended the complaint the next day to reflect the Origami
offer. 230  Defendants stipulated to an expedited schedule, and
the parties agreed to hold trial before the March 8, 2019
stockholder vote. 231  The parties substantially completed
document production by February 24, 2019, took twelve
depositions between February 26 and March 4, 2019, and
submitted pretrial briefs and a form of pretrial order on March
4, 2019. 232  A pretrial conference was held on March 5,
2019. 233  Trial took place on March 6 and 7, 2019. 234
II. ANALYSIS
The Amended Complaint asserts three counts: Count I
contends that the Taube brothers, Tonkel, and the Special
Committee members breached their fiduciary duties to
FrontFour and the members of the Class in connection
with the approval of the Proposed Transactions. 235  Count
I challenges the Proposed Transactions under the entire
fairness standard (the “Entire Fairness Claim”), and the deal
protections of the Merger Agreement under enhanced scrutiny
(the “Enhanced Scrutiny Claim”). Count II contends that
the Medley Capital directors breached their fiduciary duty
of disclosure (the “Disclosure Claims”). 236  Lastly, Count
III contends that Medley Management, Sierra, Advisors, and
two other Medley Entities—Medley Group and Medley LLC
—aided and abetted in the other Defendants' breaches of
fiduciary duties. 237
A. Entire Fairness Claim
“Delaware has three tiers of review for evaluating director
decision-making: the business judgment rule, enhanced
scrutiny, and entire fairness.” 238  Entire fairness review arises
“when the board labors under actual conflicts of interest,” 239
such as when a controlling stockholder stands on both
sides of a challenged transaction 240  or when a controlling
stockholder competes with the minority stockholders for
consideration. 241
*21  FrontFour argues that the Proposed Transactions should
be reviewed under Delaware's most onerous standard, 242
entire fairness. The Taube brothers stand on both sides of the
Proposed Transactions, so entire fairness applies if they are
deemed controllers. FrontFour bears the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence facts necessary to trigger
entire fairness. If entire fairness is triggered, Defendants bear
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
the Proposed Transactions are entirely fair.
1. Entire Fairness Applies Because
the Taube Brothers Are Controllers.
The Taube brothers beneficially own less than 15% of
Medley Capital, and those shares are subject to “echo
voting” requirements. Although a majority stockholder
is a controlling stockholder as a matter of law, 243  a
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minority stockholder can also be deemed a controller. 244  In
determining whether a minority stockholder is a controller,
the level of stock ownership is not the predominant factor, and
an inability to exert influence through voting power does not
foreclose a finding of control. 245
*22  Under Delaware law, a plaintiff can demonstrate
that a minority stockholder exercised de facto control by
showing that: (a) the stockholder “actually dominated and
controlled the majority of the board generally”; 246  or
(b) the stockholder “actually dominated and controlled the
corporation, its board or the deciding committee with respect
to the challenged transaction.” 247
FrontFour has proven facts necessary to trigger entire fairness
under the second theory. Specifically, FrontFour has proven
that at least half of the Special Committee members were
not independent from the Taube brothers when negotiating
the Proposed Transactions. Under Delaware law, calling
a director “independent” does not make it so. To be
independent, a director “must act independently.” 248  An
independent director should demonstrate “the care, attention
and sense of individual responsibility to the performance of
one's duties ... that generally touches on independence.” 249
Mack, who did not testify at trial, demonstrated a lack of
independence through his deposition testimony, where:
• Mack spoke to Brook Taube on the phone frequently, at
least weekly, about business matters. 250
• Mack knew that the Taube brothers managed
Medley Capital's investments, but couldn't identify any
other person involved in managing Medley Capital's
portfolio. 251
• Mack had no idea what Medley LLC was, who owned it,
or the role it played in the Taube brothers' control of the
Medley family of entities. 252
• Mack had no understanding of what Medley
Management's business was in 2017. 253
• Mack could not identify the Taube brothers' or Tonkel's
roles at Medley Management, the very source of their
conflicts. 254
*23  • Mack did not know that the Taube brothers
controlled Medley Management, and did not think
it was important to consider their ownership of
Medley Management in evaluating the Proposed
Transactions. 255
• Mack “was not familiar with the specifics” of the
transaction process and “may not want to know how
sausage is made.” 256
• Based on a call with Brook Taube, Mack believed
Goldman Sachs was engaged to assist Medley
Capital. 257
• Mack did not believe the standstill provisions should have
been reviewed by the Board, calling it a “management
issue, not a director [issue]” and suggesting “the more
the merrier.” 258
• Mack did not think it was important for the
Medley Capital Board to be informed when Medley
Management entered contracts that were binding on
Medley Capital. 259
• Mack had no idea whether Medley Capital paid
performance fees to Advisors in 2017, or how the
fees Advisors collected from Medley Capital affected
Advisors' ability to pay its employees. 260
• Mack believed that the Party X proposal was geared
toward a deal with Medley Capital, not Medley
Management. 261
• Mack could not recall whether he considered having
Sandler perform any form of a market check. 262
Instead, he relied on Brook Taube for his purported
knowledge that “we were looking at strategic
alternatives.” 263
• Mack did not believe that Medley Capital had ever
solicited the market on its own behalf and was indifferent
about the failure to do so. 264
• Mack did not think the personal interests of the
Taube brothers in closing the Proposed Transactions
were relevant considerations in evaluating the
transactions. 265
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• Mack did not have any understanding as to the
significance of the Taube brothers' Medley Capital
stockholdings or how they came to hold that
position. 266
• Mack was completely unaware as to the financing
arrangement that the Taube brothers had with Fortress,
which intensified the “enormous pressure” that drove
the Taube brothers' decision to pursue the Proposed
Transactions. 267
• Mack did not think the fund's recent performance
was an important consideration in the annual review
of Advisors' contract with Medley Capital. Mack
stressed the Board would consider comparisons to
the fees and legal restrictions of comparable advisory
arrangements, but did not think that recent performance
was particularly important. 268
• The lack of cash consideration for Medley Capital
stockholders in the Proposed Transactions raised no
concerns for Mack, even in the face of the large cash
component that Medley Management was going to
receive in the transactions. 269
• Mack was indifferent to the compensation levels that
would be paid to senior management in the combined
company, even in the face of conversations concerning
the fact that the compensation packages could
potentially eliminate the benefits touted for Medley
Capital stockholders in the Proposed Transactions. 270
Mack was satisfied that it was a concern for Sierra's
board because they were negotiating and deciding the
compensation, rather than the Medley Capital Board. 271
*24  The record also reflects that half of Mack's annual
income in the past three years had come from his service on
the Board, making him susceptible to wanting to stay in the
good graces of the Taube brothers. 272
Lerdal was similarly susceptible to Brook Taube's outsized
influence as Medley Capital's founder. 273  Lerdal desired
to continue as director after formation of the combined
company. He curried favor from Brook Taube during the
selection process. When he was not selected, he contacted
Brook Taube for other personal favors. The record reflects
that Lerdal, who did not testify at trial, was loyal to Brook
Taube, not the Medley Capital common stockholders:
• Lerdal shared information about the Special Committee's
process with Brook. 274
• Lerdal personally kept Brook up to date on market interest
in Medley Capital, warning him by text on August 15,
2018 that the company “has some bargain hunters.” 275
• Four days before approving the merger, Lerdal asked
Brook: “Are we on track? Anything you need from
me?” 276  The two talked on the phone soon thereafter.
• The day the Special Committee approved the Proposed
Transactions, Lerdal praised Brook as the “architect” of
the deal and stated that he was “excited for the future
whether the Sierra guys give me the nod or not.” 277
• When the Special Committee decided to turn down a
bidder in February 2019, Lerdal texted Brook: “Hang in
there brother. The deal is still the best option.” 278  The
two then exchanged an additional fourteen messages.
• When Brook Taube suggested that the “predictable
naysayers” would be the first people removed from
their positions during the Proposed Transactions, Lerdal
was quick to support the idea, texting “Freak the
naysayers.” 279
• Lerdal requested personal updates by text on the merger
behind-the-scenes from Brook, asking “How do we
look?” on October 9, 2018. Brook responded that there
was “[G]ood news yesterday from [the SEC]” and
that the deal was “Read[y] to go when ‘advisors’ stop
fussing.” 280
• Lerdal's texts effortlessly wove ingratiating personal
adoration with business details. On October 26, 2018, he
texted Brook that he had played a game of golf in Brook's
honor, and offered “an open invitation to visit and I'll
host any time.” 281
• In an August 1, 2017 email, Lerdal complained that the
Taube brothers gave the Board “too much information,”
asserted that the company could not pay him enough
to make him continue being diligent and thorough, and
bragged about how he would conduct himself in future
litigation against the company. 282
*25  In short, the majority of the members of the Special
Committee lacked independence from the Taube brothers.
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The Special Committee also sat supine in negotiations
concerning the Proposed Transactions, allowing the Taube
brothers to dominate the process by: setting the deal structure;
controlling the flow of information; withholding information;
withholding details about Medley Management's own value
and the existence of offers from third parties; locking out
“interlopers” through standstill agreements, deal protections,
and an aggressive timeline; and rushing the committee's
deliberations. In the end, the Special Committee allowed
Medley Management to extract a huge premium while
Medley Capital stockholders received none.
The Special Committee deferred to the Taube brothers
although the committee had ample negotiating leverage—the
ability to terminate the Management Agreement or simply
reject the deal, either of which would have had devastating
consequences for Medley Management. Terminating the
Management Agreement would trigger Fortress's rights under
the joint venture. Rejecting the deal would foreclose Medley
Management's only viable solution to the enormous financial
pressure they labored under.
It bears noting that there is nothing inherently wrong under
Delaware law with the structure of the Medley Entities. Most
BDCs have corporate structures similar to Medley Capital
and Sierra—they rely on external advisors for management,
administration, office space, staff, and other aspects of their
existence. As a critical counterbalance to management's
extensive control over the day-to-day operations, the '40 Act
requires that the majority of the directors on BDC boards are
independent from management. At no point in time is this
protection more critical than in the context of a conflicted
transaction. In this case, FrontFour has demonstrated that the
Taube brothers are controllers not because of flaws inherent
in the structure of BDCs, but rather, because those tasked
with standing independent from the Taube brothers willfully
deferred to their authority.
2. The Proposed Transactions Are Not Entirely Fair.
“The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing
and fair price.” 283  Although the two aspects may be
examined separately, “the test for fairness is not a bifurcated
one as between fair dealing and price. All aspects of the
issue must be examined as a whole since the question is
one of entire fairness.” 284  Defendants bear the burden of
demonstrating that fair dealing and fair price. 285
Fair dealing “embraces questions of when the transaction was
timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed
to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and
the stockholders were obtained.” 286  “The scope of this factor
is not limited to the controller's formal act of making the
proposal; it encompasses actions taken by the controller in
the period leading up to the formal proposal.” 287  “Particular
consideration must be given to evidence of whether the
special committee was truly independent, fully informed and
had the freedom to negotiate at arm's length.” 288
*26  In this case, the timing, structure, initiation, and
negotiation of the Proposed Transactions were conceived for
the purpose of—and did—advance the Taubes' interest at the
expense of Medley Capital's other stockholders. In the events
leading up to the Proposed Transactions, the Taube brothers
created an informational vacuum, which they then exploited.
The Special Committee was not truly independent and did
not negotiate at arm's length. In sum, Defendants have not
proven that the Proposed Transactions were the product of fair
dealing.
The second aspect of the entire fairness inquiry is fair
price. Fair price “relates to the economic and financial
considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant
factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and
any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value
of a company's stock.” 289
The primary evidence presented at trial on the issue
of fair price consists of the opinions of the parties'
respective experts. 290  Defendants offered the testimony
of Dr. Marc Zenner, who performed regression analyses
intended to show the benefits of size/scale, asset quality, and
internalized management. 291  That analysis did not support
the propositions for which it was offered. One analysis
explained only 11% of the variation in p/NAV multiples. 292
The other was not statistically significant and lacked
explanatory power. 293  Zenner also conducted a comparable
transactions analysis, but 50% of his “transactions” were
offers that never resulted in an actual merger. 294  Zenner
did not opine on the value of Medley Capital, a fair price
to acquire Medley Capital, or the value of the combined
company if the Proposed Transactions were to occur. He
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opined that the process used by various investment banks
was reasonable, but an expert cannot simply vouch for
the work of someone else. 295  Zenner opined that Medley
Capital's trading price following the announcement of the
proposed transaction supported a finding of fair price. Zenner,
however, was unable to exclude other possible causes of
Medley Capital's stock price bump in response the Proposed
Transactions. 296
By contrast, FrontFour's expert Dr. William Kennedy credibly
testified that the fair value of Medley Capital is $ 5.07 per
share and the price being offered is well below that. 297
Ultimately, this is a case in which a deeply flawed process
obscures the fair value of Medley Capital. The record reveals
that the Taube brothers obstructed any pre-signing price
competition from “interlopers.” 298  The two aspects of the
entire fairness standard interact. 299  Just as “[a] strong record
of fair dealing can influence the fair price inquiry, ... process
can infect price.” 300  Any inability to determine the degree
to which the flawed process infected the price works to
Defendants' detriment, as they bear the burden of proof on
this issue. 301
B. Enhanced Scrutiny Claim
*27  The parties engaged in a robust dispute concerning
whether deal protections or the Proposed Transactions in their
entirety are subject to and pass enhanced scrutiny. 302  Any
Delaware law enthusiast would relish the opportunity to dilate
on the issues raised, but the press of time requires a more
direct approach.
FrontFour challenges three deal protections in the Merger
Agreement: a no-shop, an adverse-recommendation-change
requirement, and a termination fee. 303  Enhanced scrutiny
applies to deal protections, and the burden lies on Defendants
to justify those protections. 304  Defendants cannot meet that
burden here.
The suite of deal protections at issue would pass muster under
most circumstances, but not in this case. The Court's analysis
is fact intensive and context specific. 305  Due to extreme
process flaws that led to the Proposed Transactions, the deal
protections are not within the range of reasonableness. 306
*28  Of the three challenged deal protections, the no-shop
is the primary offender. No-shop provisions paired with a
fiduciary out are not unique. 307  No-shop provisions are used
to entice acquirers to make a strong offer by contractually
eliminating the risk that the acquirer is a stalking horse
used to generate a bidding war. 308  That justification has
no application here. The Proposed Transactions are among
affiliated entities. All of the parties were aware, when
negotiating the deal protections, that there was no pre-signing
auction or market check and no risk that Sierra was being
used as a stalking horse. There was also no risk that Medley
Capital would lose the “bird in hand” if the transaction was
shopped. 309
Incrementally, the other two deal protections are
also problematic. The adverse-recommendation-change
provision 310  unduly cabins the Board. 311  Although the
termination fee is not unreasonable on its own, in combination
with the other deal protections, it too falls outside the range
of reasonableness. 312
C. Disclosure Claims
*29  “[T]o establish a violation of the duty of disclosure,
[a plaintiff] must prove that the omitted fact would have
been material to the stockholder action sought.” 313  The
materiality standard requires that fiduciaries disclose all facts
which “under all the circumstances ... would have assumed
actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable
shareholder.” 314  “A material fact is one that a reasonable
stockholder would find relevant in deciding how to vote. It
is not necessary that a fact would change how a stockholder
would vote.” 315  “A material fact is one that a reasonable
investor would view as significantly altering the ‘total mix’ of
information made available.” 316  However, once fiduciaries
have “traveled down the road of partial disclosure,” they
must “provide the stockholders with an accurate, full, and fair
characterization of [the] events.” 317
Controlling stockholders “have large informational
advantages that can only be imperfectly overcome by the
special committee process, which almost invariably involves
directors who are not involved in the day-to-day management
of the subsidiary.” 318  Accordingly, controllers owe “a duty
of complete candor when standing on both sides of a
transaction and must disclose fully all the material facts and
circumstances surrounding the transaction.” 319
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Applying these principles, FrontFour has proven that
Defendants violated their duties of disclosure to inform
stockholders of the process that led to the Proposed
Transactions and the expressions of interest from third parties.
1. Process Disclosures
The Proxy describes the deployment of three different
special committees to mitigate conflicts and replicate arm's-
length bargaining. 320  The description creates the misleading
impression that the Special Committee process at Medley
Capital was effective. In reality, during the negotiation
process, the Special Committee was disabled by its ignorance
of: the details of the bids made for Medley Management
during Project Elevate; the “enormous pressure” facing
Medley Management and the Taubes; 321  and the standstill
agreements that forbade potential transaction partners from
presenting proposals directly to Medley Capital without
Medley Management's consent. These process failures and
others identified in this decision are material to stockholders
considering the Proposed Transactions.
The Proxy and Medley Capital's other public filings disclose
certain of these process flaws now, but they fail to mention
that the Special Committee only learned of these items
after the execution of the Merger Agreement (and in some
cases only after this litigation began). 322  The timing of the
Board's knowledge is a critical fact that would impact any
stockholder's assessment of the quality of the transaction
process. 323
2. Other Indications of Interest—
Lantern, NexPoint, Origami, and ZAIS
*30  Following FrontFour's January 30, 2019 letter to the
Medley Capital Board, 324  Medley Management disclosed
on February 5, 2019 certain terms of eleven indications of
interest. It characterized each as a “non-binding indication
of interest received by Medley Management.” 325  Medley
Capital separately issued supplemental disclosures regarding
offers made by NexPoint on January 31, 2019, to replace
Medley Management as manager, and Origami on February
11, 2019, to acquire Medley SBIC.
Defendants never disclosed to stockholders that Lantern
had expressed interest in a recapitalization transaction with
Medley Capital, or that Lantern had executed a standstill
agreement with Medley Management that prohibited it from
making its recapitalization proposal directly to Medley
Capital. 326
Defendants also never disclosed ZAIS's January 2, 2019
proposal to replace Medley Management as Medley Capital's
investment advisor for the “explicit task of managing
an orderly sale or liquidation of Medley Capital.” 327
Nor have Defendants disclosed Brook Taube's January
24, 2019 rejection of ZAIS's proposal on behalf of
Medley Capital, citing the non-solicitation provision in
the Medley Capital Merger Agreement. 328  Text message
correspondence between Brook Taube and Lerdal on the
day of the Special Committee's January 9, 2019 meeting
shows that Medley Management coordinated with the Special
Committee regarding whether and how to respond to ZAIS.
None of this was disclosed. 329
Stockholders cannot make a fully informed decision
regarding the Proposed Transactions unless they know about
Lantern's expressed interest in a recapitalization, the ZAIS
proposal, and Brook Taube's response citing the Medley
Capital Merger Agreement. 330
Further, on February 13, 2019, Defendants publicly denied
that Medley Management received an offer from Origami to
purchase Medley SBIC in April 2018. 331  Medley Capital's
February 13 press release stated: “Contrary to Origami's
public statements, the Company never received a proposal
to buy the SBIC Subsidiary from Origami until yesterday.
Origami did not propose to buy the equity of the SBIC
subsidiary for 60% of its fair market value or at any price
last April as suggested by Origami's press release.” 332  This
disclosure creates the impression that Origami fabricated the
fact of the proposal.
Origami did not fabricate the fact of the proposal. In fact,
Medley Capital received an April 11, 2018 letter from
Origami addressed to Brook Taube and Marilyn Adler, Senior
Managing Director, Medley Capital, expressing “interest in
purchasing 100% of Medley Capital Corporation and its
affiliates' interest in Medley SBIC.” 333  Adler responded,
dispelling any notion that the email failed to transmit. 334
Whether Brook Taube never saw Origami's proposal, as he
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contends, is irrelevant to the truth: Medley Management
received it. “Whenever directors communicate publicly or
directly with shareholders about the corporation's affairs,
with or without a request for shareholder action, ... the
sine qua non of directors' fiduciary duty to shareholders is
honesty.” 335  Medley Capital must correct its disclosures
regarding Origami. 336
D. Aiding and Abetting
*31  To establish an aiding and abetting claim against
Sierra, FrontFour was required to prove that Sierra knowingly
participated in the other Defendants' breach of fiduciary
duty. 337  This is “a stringent standard that turn[s] on proof of
scienter.” 338  FrontFour bears the burden for the aiding and
abetting claim. 339
“The adjective ‘knowing’ modifies the concept of
‘participation,’ not breach.” 340  The underlying wrong does
not have to be knowing or intentional; it can be a breach of
the duty of care. 341  Under Section 876(b) of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, knowing participation exists when a third
party:
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant
to a common design with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to
the other to so conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in
accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct,
separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the
third person. 342
For purposes of a board decision, the requirement of
participation can be established if the third party “participated
in the board's decisions, conspired with [the] board, or
otherwise caused the board to make the decisions at
issue.” 343  In particular, a third party can be liable for aiding
and abetting a breach of the duty of care if the third party
“purposely induced the breach of the duty of care ....” 344  The
method of facilitating the breach can include “creating the
informational vacuum” in which the board breaches its duty
of care. 345
*32  A court's analysis of whether a secondary actor
“knowingly participated” is necessarily fact intensive.
Illustrative factors include the following:
• The nature of the tortious act that the secondary actor
participated in or encouraged, including its severity, the
clarity of the violation, the extent of the consequences,
and the secondary actor's knowledge of these aspects;
• The amount, kind, and duration of assistance given,
including how directly involved the secondary actor was
in the primary actor's conduct;
• The nature of the relationship between the secondary and
primary actors; and
• The secondary actor's state of mind. 346
At trial, FrontFour succeeded in raising suspicions concerning
the independence of the Sierra special committee's financial
advisor, Broadhaven. Broadhaven's conflicts alone, however,
do not prove that Sierra knowingly participated in the other
Defendants' fiduciary breach. Broadhaven did act as Sierra's
agent, and Sierra knew that Broadhaven had previously
worked for Medley Management. But this is the extent
of Sierra's scienter FrontFour proved at trial. Broadhaven
was not “the fiduciary and primary wrongdoer.” 347  Nor
was Broadhaven a “representative of the [Sierra] who either
controls [Sierra] or who occupies a sufficiently high position
that [its] knowledge is imputed to [Sierra].” 348
FrontFour provided no window into the deliberations on
the Sierra side of the negotiations to permit the Court to
conduct the fact-intensive inquiry demanded. FrontFour did
not call any of the Sierra special committee members live
or by deposition. FrontFour adduced no evidence that the
Taube brothers controlled the Sierra portion of the process
or dominated the Sierra board. FrontFour did not brief their
aiding and abetting claim before or after trial. 349
Accordingly, FrontFour has failed to prove that Sierra aided
and abetted in the other Defendants' breaches of fiduciary
duties.
E. Remedy
To recap, FrontFour has proven that: Conflicted insiders
tainted the process that led to the Proposed Transactions.
The Special Committee negotiated with willful blinders, not
knowing: the value that third-parties had placed on Medley
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Management; that Medley Management felt “enormous
pressure” to enter into a transaction; that standstill agreements
prevented third parties from coming forward; and that Medley
Management—not Medley Capital—was shopped in the
2017 sale process on which they relied when determining not
to conduct a pre-signing market check. Compounding these
problems, the Special Committee agreed to deal protections
preventing an effective post-signing market check.
*33  At this stage, the most equitable relief for the Medley
Capital stockholders would be a curative shopping process,
devoid of Medley Management's influence, free of any deal
protections, plus full disclosures. Thereafter, if no better
proposal surfaces, the Medley Capital stockholders would
have the opportunity to cast a fully informed vote for or
against the Proposed Transactions. This relief is precisely
what FrontFour seeks.
Yet, ordering such relief would require the Court to blue-
pencil Sierra's merger agreement with Medley Capital (and,
by implication, its cross-conditioned agreement with Medley
Management) so that Medley Capital could solicit additional
competing bids in contravention of the no-shop provision. In
other words, FrontFour's requested relief would keep Sierra
“on the hook” to purchase Medley Capital in case the “go-
shop” process fails to yield a better offer. Such a revision of
the Merger Agreements would deny Sierra the benefit of its
bargain and force Sierra to comply with terms to which it
never agreed.
Under the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in C & J
Energy, 350  an injunction may not issue if it would “strip an
innocent third party of its contractual rights” under a merger
agreement, unless the party seeking the injunction proves that
the third party aided and abetted a breach of fiduciary duty
by the target directors. FrontFour has failed to prove that
Sierra aided and abetted in the breaches of fiduciary duties.
Under these circumstances, C & J Energy leaves this Court
no discretion—the most equitable remedy for Medley Capital
stockholders cannot be granted.
To ensure that Medley Capital stockholders are fully informed
on any vote on the Proposed Transactions, FrontFour is
entitled to corrective disclosures consistent with this decision,
and Defendants are enjoined from consummating the Mergers
until such disclosures have been made. 351  FrontFour may
also pursue a damages claim by amending their complaint, if
FrontFour so chooses.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that Medley
Capital's directors violated their fiduciary duties in entering
into the Proposed Transactions. Medley Capital is ordered to
issue corrective disclosures in accordance with this decision
and to permit the stockholders sufficient time in advance of
any stockholder vote to assimilate the information. Judgment
on Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint are entered
in favor of FrontFour to the extent set forth in this decision,
and judgment on Count III is entered in favor of Defendants.
FrontFour's request to permanently enjoin the Proposed
Transactions is denied. 352
Attachment
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All Citations
Not Reported in Atl. Rptr., 2019 WL 1313408
Footnotes
1 This litigation commenced on February 11, 2019. The parties stipulated to an expedited schedule to
accommodate a March 31, 2019 drop-dead date under the challenged merger agreements. Pre-trial briefs
were submitted on Monday, March 4. Over 800 trial exhibits arrived in Chambers on Tuesday, March 5. Trial
took place on March 6–7. On the second day of trial, the acquirer informed the Court that its “rights under
the Merger Agreements will be eviscerated if the Court does not issue a decision on Plaintiffs' request for an
injunction by 9 a.m. on Monday, March 11.” Post-trial briefs were filed at 8 a.m. on Saturday, March 9. Daylight
savings time began on Sunday, March 10, further depriving the Court of an hour and confirming Murphy's law.
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2 C & J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Empls.' and Sanitation Empls.' Ret. Tr., 107 A.3d 1049, 1071–
72 (Del. 2014).
3 The Factual Background cites to: docket entries (by docket “Dkt.” number); trial exhibits (by “JX” number);
the trial transcript (“Trial Tr.”); and stipulated facts set forth in the Parties' Pretrial Order (Dkt. 128) (“PTO”).
The parties called by deposition John Mack, Russ Hutchinson on behalf of Goldman Sachs, John Simpson
on behalf of Broadhaven, Jeffrey Young on behalf of Origami, and Thomas Surgent on behalf of NexPoint.
The transcripts of their respective depositions are cited using the witnesses' last names and “Dep. Tr.” (e.g.,
“Mack Dep. Tr.”).
4 The three Taube brothers own about 82% of Medley Group LLC. Trial Tr. at 311:17–312:11 (Taube). Medley
Group LLC, in turn, owns 97.7% of Medley Management. Id. at 321:12–14.
5 See Dkt. 136, Ex. A: PDX 001. This decision refers to a number of demonstratives that summarize the record
evidence and were publicly filed by the parties. Referring to charts has the added bonus of appealing to the
visual learner. The Charts need a cipher, as this decision uses different defined terms to refer to each of the
Medley Entities to improve readability: MDLY = Medley Management; MCC = Medley Capital; SIC = Sierra.
6 PTO ¶¶ II.3, II.5.
7 See generally U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Fast Answers: Investment Company
Registration and Regulation Package, available at https://www.sec.gov/investment/fastanswers/
divisionsinvestmentinvcoreg121504htm.html#P75_10439 (last visited Mar. 7, 2019); Morrison Foerster,
FAQs About BDCs, https://media2.mofo.com/documents/faqbusiness-development-companies.pdf (last
visited Mar. 11, 2019). See also Medley Capital Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 30 (Feb. 14, 2018) (“We
are classified as a non-diversified investment company within the meaning of the '40 Act, which means that
we are not limited by the '40 Act with respect to the proportion of our assets that we may invest in securities
of a single issuer.”).
8 JX 013 at p.4.
9 Id.
10 PTO ¶ II.21.
11 JX 051 at p.23.
12 See Dkt. 136, Ex. A: PDX 005 (“Medley Entities: Overlapping Management & Directors”).
13 JX 004. Advisors provides Medley Capital's office facilities, equipment, and other administrative services to
Medley Capital pursuant to a separate administration agreement. PTO ¶ II.23; JX 051 at p.23. For the years
ended September 30, 2017, 2016, and 2015, Medley Capital paid Advisors $ 3.8 million, $ 3.9 million, and
$ 4.1 million, solely for administrative expenses, respectively. Id.
14 PTO ¶ II.24; JX 004 § 8.
15 Trial Tr. at 313:17–315:23 (Taube testimony). “We [Advisors] make the loans on behalf of Medley Capital ...
as the manager, we manage all aspects of the loan from inception through to repayment, and the board isn't
involved in how we process the loan at any time.” Id. at 315:7–14.
16 See Trial Tr. at 417:22–418:5 (Hirtler-Garvey).
17 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-56; JX 430 at p.14.
18 Medley Capital Corp., Registration Statement Amendment (Form N-2/A) (Nov. 23, 2010), Ex. 99.A.3 (“Medley
Capital Certificate of Incorporation”) § 6.3; Id., Ex. 99.B.3 (“Medley Capital Bylaws”) § 3.1 (“The number of
directors which shall constitute the whole of the Board of Directors shall be seven.”).
19 Medley Capital Certificate of Incorporation § 6.3.
20 Medley Capital Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 72 (Dec. 4, 2018).
21 PTO ¶¶ II.4–6; Medley Capital Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 72 (Dec. 4, 2018); Trial Tr. at 318:12–
16 (Taube testifying that he has known Tonkel since college).
22 PTO ¶¶ II.7–10.
23 Id. ¶¶ II.7–9.
24 Id. ¶ II.10.
25 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(2).
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26 Trial Tr. at 163:10–21 (Ainsberg); Mack Dep. Tr. at 40:21–41:9.
27 Id. § 80a-15(a)(3); PTO ¶ II.23; see Trial Tr. at 286:20–287:2 (Taube); Id. at 162:24–163:21 (Ainsberg).
28 Trial Tr. at 197:11–14 (Ainsberg) (“Q.... [T]he Medley Capital board has never considered declining to renew
Medley Capital Advisors' contract due to poor performance, has it? A. It has not.”).
29 Mack Dep. Tr. at 43:10–12 (“Q: Has the Board ever considered terminating the investment management
agreement? A: Not that I'm aware of.”); Trial Tr. at 197:11–14 (Ainsberg) (“Q: ... [T]he Medley Capital board
has never considered declining to renew Medley Capital Advisors' contract due to poor performance, has
it? A. It has not.”); id. 390:1–5 (Hirtler-Garvey) (“Q: Now, did you ever discuss with your special committee
members or with the other independent directors of the board, I guess, terminating that contract? A. We
have not.”).
30 The Taube brothers have close to a 100% ownership interest in Management. See PTO ¶ II.5 (“Seth Taube,
with Brook Taube, is the beneficial owner of ... 97.7% of the voting interests in [Medley Management] common
stock”); PDX 001. Tonkel owns 6% of the units in Medley LLC, which are exchangeable for shares of MDLY
Class A stock. PTO ¶ II.6.
31 PTO ¶ II.5 (“Seth Taube, with Brook Taube, is the beneficial owner of 14.6% of Medley Capital common
stock”); Trial Tr. at 281:19–21 (Taube) (“Management and Medley [Management] have, in combination,
approximately 14.9 percent interest in Medley Capital Corporation shares.”).
32 Under the terms of the Proposed Transactions: Brook Taube will be Chairman and CEO of the combined
company, receive an annual base salary of $ 600,00, and be eligible for additional performance-based
compensation of $ 1,200,00 cash and $ 2,000,000 in restricted shares; Seth Taube will be Vice Chairman,
Senior Executive Vice President, and Senior Managing Director of the combined company, receive an annual
base salary of $ 480,000, and be eligible for additional performance-based compensation of $ 600,000 in
cash and $ 1,150,000 in restricted stock; and Tonkel will be President, receive an annual base salary of $
480,000, and be eligible for additional performance-based compensation of $ 600,000 cash and $ 1,150,000
in restricted stock. PTO ¶¶ II.69–71.
33 Ainsberg owns only 3,000 shares of Medley Capital stock, which he purchased shortly after joining the
Medley Capital Board (JX 001); Hirtler-Garvey owns only 3,000 shares of Medley Capital stock, which were
purchased shortly after the IPO (JX 003); Mack owns only 1,000 shares of Medley Capital stock, which were
purchased in 2012 (JX 002); and Lerdal does not own any shares of Medley Capital stock. None of them have
elected to receive Medley Capital stock in lieu of cash compensation since 2011, and none of the independent
directors have acquired shares in Medley Capital since 2012. JX 1–JX 3; JX 417 at p.559.
34 Each independent director receives an annual fee of $ 90,000. Medley Capital Corp., Annual Report (Form
10-K) at 78 (Dec. 4, 2018). In addition, Chairman of the Audit Committee receives an annual fee of $ 25,000,
and chairpersons of the Nominating, Corporate Governance, and Compensation Committees receive annual
fees of $ 10,000. Id. Other members of the Audit Committee, the Nominating and Corporate Governance
Committee, and the Compensation Committee receive annual fees of $ 12,500, $ 6,000, and $ 6,000,
respectively. Each independent director on the special merger committee received a one-time retainer of $
25,000, the chairman of the special committee receives a monthly fee of $ 15,000 and other members receive
a monthly fee of $ 10,000. Id. For Medley Capital's fiscal year ending on September 30, 2018, Ainsberg
received $ 299,000, Hirtler-Garvey received $ 267,500, Mack received $ 275,000, and Lerdal received $
252,500. Id.
35 JX 622 at pp.7–11.
36 Medley Capital Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), Proposal I (Dec. 21, 2017) (reporting compensation
of $ 36,202 for fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 2017); Medley Capital Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 78
(Dec. 4, 2018) (reporting compensation of $ 252,500 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2018).
37 Seven thousand shares x $ 5.68 per share. JX 700, Medley Capital Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEFM14A)
(Dec. 21, 2018) (“Medley Capital Proxy”).
38 Mack Dep. Tr. at 102:2–14; Trial Tr. at 387:15–23; JX 379 at p.1.
- 90 - 
FrontFour Capital Group LLC v. Taube, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
2019 WL 1313408
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 22
39 See Dkt. 118, Pls.' Pretrial Br. at 17, Chart & n.3 (compiling data). Between its IPO and the announcement
date of the challenged transactions, Medley Capital's stock plummeted by approximately 72% and its
cumulative return was -34%. JX 507 at p.7. The deterioration in Medley Capital's net investment income
(“NII”), a key metric in measuring BDC performance and a proxy for BDC earning power, and dividend are
particularly dramatic. Since 2014, NII has plunged by 85% (from $ 1.58 to $ 0.23 per share), and the dividend
has fallen by 65% (from $ 1.48 to $ 0.52 per share). JX 443 at p.8; Trial Tr. at 194:4–12 (Zenner). Because
dividends have exceeded NII, Medley Capital has operated with an unsustainable shortfall since 2016. Id.
40 JX 509 at p.7.
41 The S & P BDC Index has had a positive 57% return since 2011. JX 443 at p.3; Trial Tr. at 469:23–470:2
(Zenner) (testifying that Medley Capital's performance had been poor relative to its peers). As of August 9,
2018, Medley Capital had the largest discount to NAV (53%) of any BDC. JX 343 at p.33. As of year-end,
Medley Capital has continued to languish at a 55% discount to NAV—the single largest NAV discount among
the 46 BDCs covered by Raymond James' investment banking group in their “BDC Weekly Insight” report
(published January 3, 2019) and nearly 3x the BDC average discount of 19%. JX 434 at p.7.
42 At the end of 2017, the Management Agreement appears to have accounted for 21% of Medley
Management's fee-earning assets under management (“fee earning AUM” or “FEAUM”). Medley
Management, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 52–53 (Mar. 29, 2018). FrontFour quantifies the
Management Agreement as producing about 30% of Medley Management's fee revenue. JX 443 at p.10.
Whichever way one computes the value of the Management Agreement to Medley Management, it is clearly
significant.
43 Between 2016 and 2017, base management fees paid to Medley Capital Advisors fell from $ 19.5 million to
$ 17.8 million. JX 051. The incentive fee had fallen from $ 8.0 million to $ 0.9 million in the same period, and
Advisors was likely to lose all of its incentive fees from Medley Capital in 2018. JX 051 at F-51.
44 Id. at 288:17–289:22; PTO ¶ II.27; Medley Capital Proxy at 57. Medley Management internally referred to
this process as “Project Redwood.” JX 027 (Project Redwood Management Presentation).
45 PTO ¶ II.27.
46 Id.; Medley Capital Proxy at 57–58. On July 2017, two interested parties submitted non-binding bids, but
neither bid progressed beyond the initial indication of interest. PTO ¶ II.30; JX 621 (Pls.' Expert Report of Dr.
Kennedy) at ¶ 26 (“one cash proposal included an acquisition of [Medley Management] and [Advisors], and
the other proposed a combination in exchange for consideration of cash and stock of the combined entity”);
Medley Capital Proxy at 57 (“In July 2017, two of the interested parties submitted non-binding bids to acquire
[Medley Management] and [Advisors]. One of the interested parties proposed an acquisition of [Medley
Management] and [Advisors] for cash, and the other proposed a combination in exchange for consideration
of cash and stock of the combined entity. However, neither bid progressed beyond the initial indication of
interest.”).
47 Medley Management referred to this process internally as “Project Elevate.” See JX 029 (Project Elevate:
Confidential Information Packet). The relevant record materials are: id.; JX 068 (Project Elevate: January
2018 Discussion Materials); JX 635 (Project Elevate: Apr. 2018 Process Summary); JX 639 (Project Elevate:
July 2018 Process Summary); JX 646 (Project Elevate: Deal Point List); JX 035 (Project Elevate: Oct. 2017
Discussion Materials); JX 047 (Project Elevate: First Round Bid Summary Materials); JX 064 (Project Elevate:
Discussion Materials); JX 205 (Project Elevate: July 2018 Process Updates).
48 JX 054 (letter engaging Goldman “as financial advisor in connection with the possible sale of all or a portion
of [Medley Management]”); Medley Capital Proxy at 58.
49 JX 085.
50 Medley Capital Proxy at 58.
51 Id.
52 JX 057; JX 635 at p.3.
53 Medley Capital Proxy at 58.
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54 They prevented the third parties from offering to acquire or be involved in “any acquisition, transaction, merger
or other business combination relating to all or part of ... any funds advised by [Medley Management] or
acquisition transaction for all or part of the assets of ... any funds advised by [Medley Management].” PTO
¶ II.28; see, e.g., JX 037 (Schroders Conf. Agr.) § 10.a. The agreements also restricted the third parties'
ability to “encourage, initiate, induce or attempt to induce [Medley Capital] ... to terminate, amend or otherwise
modify their advisory agreements with [Medley Management] during the Standstill Period.” PTO ¶ II.29. See,
e.g., Schroders Conf. Agr. § 10.h.
55 See Dkt. 136, PDX 006 (Summary: Standstill Periods); id. PDX 007 (Summary: Standstill Periods, cont.).
56 JX 065 at p.1.
57 Id. at pp.1–2.
58 Compare JX 067 (including half-page summary of the Goldman process and background on Party X) with
JX 068 (including comprehensive information about the Medley Management bidding process, the terms of
each bid, and financial terms proposed by Party X).
59 JX 065 at p.2 (Jan. 26, 2018 Medley Capital Board meeting minutes, Brook reported that the contemplated
transaction “would result in a change in control due to the fact that [Medley Capital's] investment advisory
agreement would be assigned to [Party X].”).
60 Trial Tr. at 293:13–24 (Taube) (“You know, when the determination was made to proceed with [Party X],
we identified that, due to the assignment of the contract, that that was a decision that needed to be made.
My recollection is that [the] special committee was formed so that they could make that decision and
determination on their own without the interested board members.”).
61 JX 065 at pp.2–4.
62 Id.
63 Id. at p.5. The Medley Capital Board approved a $ 25,000 retainer for each committee member, a stipend of
$ 15,000 per month for the committee chair, and a stipend of $ 10,000 per month for all other members. Id.
64 JX 087; Medley Capital Proxy at 59; JX 635 at p.5.
65 PTO ¶ II.40; Medley Capital Proxy at 59.
66 PTO ¶ II.41.
67 JX 101; JX 107.
68 JX 544.
69 Medley Capital Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) at 1 (Feb. 13, 2019) (“Contrary to Origami's public
statements, the Company never received a proposal to buy the SBIC Subsidiary from Origami until
yesterday.”).
70 JX 100. Origami addressed the letter to Adler because it believed at the time that Adler was instructed to
solicit expressions of interest to purchase Medley SBIC. Young Dep. Tr. at 78:6–7. Knowing that Brook and
Adler worked together, Origami contacted the two of them. Id. at 77:13–15. Origami was “surprised and
disappointed that [Brook] refused to respond.” Id. at 77:16–18.
71 JX 108.
72 Trial Tr. at 373:22–374:1.
73 For some background on TRAs, see Lynnley Browning, Squeezing Out Cash Long After the I.P.O., New
York Times (Mar. 13, 2013), available at https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/private-equity-squeezes-
out-cash-long-afterits-exit/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).
74 Trial Tr. at 246–47 (Sterling).
75 JX 126 (May 9, 2018 email from Brook Taube).
76 JX 078 (Wells Fargo Equity Research Report, Medley Capital: We Were Wrong, But Staying the Course
(Feb. 6, 2018) ); see also JX 618 (Defs.' Expert Report of Dr. Zenner) at p.56.
77 JX 129 (Wells Fargo Equity Research Report, Medley Capital: When the Going Gets Tough ... (May 10,
2018) ); see also JX 618 (Defs.' Expert Report of Dr. Zenner) at p.58.
78 Mack Dep. Tr. at 61:16–25.
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79 On May 4, 2018, Medley Capital Advisors voluntarily elected to waive $ 380,000 of the base management
fee payable for the quarter ended March 31, 2018. JX 417 at p.16.
80 JX 126 at p.1. Trial Tr. at 287:18–23 (Taube) (“[W]e were under pressure. And by that I mean, we were not
going to make the quarter. And I think on any quarter, we're doing our best to make the earnings that we are
targeting. In this quarter, as I recall, a few hundred thousand dollars was the difference.”).
81 Id. § 6.3.
82 Id. § 6.2.
83 “[A]nother [investment] vehicle that was intended and still does follow in the tracks of [Sierra].” Trial Tr. at
282:14–17.
84 See JX 119.
85 JX 126 (May 9, 2018 email from Brook Taube).
86 JX 701; JX 133.
87 Trial Tr. at 215–17 (Ainsberg), 287–88 (Taube).
88 Id. at 215:18–217:2.
89 PTO ¶ II.12; JX 656.
90 Medley Capital Proxy at 21.
91 Id. at 360.
92 See JX 091; JX 092.
93 JX 092 (Mar. 29, 2018 email from Brook: “I like project integrate / Let's see if we can defer recapture and
tax ... and keep TRA / That would be good :-)”).
94 See JX 134.
95 JX 140.
96 JX 162; JX 163; JX 164.
97 JX 164.
98 Those minutes state: “[T]here was an industry-wide push for increased scale, ... potential benefits of increased
scale include better financing options, investment opportunities, and cost savings, among other benefits. In
particular, by scaling the institutional manager, [the combined company, “Newco”] would be able to commit
capital for investments alongside strategic partners and other institutional investors. He also pointed out
that the Potential Transaction would create a streamlined organizational structure allowing for significant
reductions in fixed costs and expenses. In addition, following the Potential Transaction, Newco would
experience increased scale and liquidity. Newco would have approximately $ 1.2 billion in assets and would
be the second largest internally managed [BDC] and the seventh largest BDC overall. Discussion ensued
among members of the Board. Mr. Taube further noted that compared to externally managed BDCs, internally
managed BDCs traded at a substantial market premium to book, or net asset value, and that issuing shares
while trading at a premium would in and of itself be accretive. Mr. Taube emphasized, however, that it is not
possible to precisely predict how the market would react to the Potential Transaction.” JX 164 at p.2.
At this point, it bears noting that none of the Board or Special Committee meeting minutes from June 2018
forward were finalized until after FrontFour commenced this litigation. Trial Tr. at 419:2–16 (Hirtler-Garvey);
JX 293. For that reason, I do not view them as contemporaneous evidence or give them any presumptive
weight, but rather use them to summarize Defendants' litigation position.
99 JX 163 at p.7 (June 19, 2018 Medley Capital Board Presentation); Medley Capital Proxy at 26; JX 618 ¶ 25;
Trial Tr. at 295:8–297:12 (Taube).
100 Medley Capital Proxy at 71 (“[O]n January 26, 2018, [Medley] Management held meetings with the Medley
Capital Board and the Sierra Board ... [the] Sierra Board established ... the Sierra Special Committee ... and
authorized the committee[ ] to evaluate the merits of a potential sale of substantially all of [Advisors'] assets
to Party X ....”).
101 PTO ¶ II.53. The decision to engage Barclays was made at the July 10, 2018 meeting of the Medley
Management special committee. JX 204 at p.2.
102 Trial Tr. at 349 (Taube).
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103 Id. at 348.
104 Id. at 301; see also id. at 349 (“We had made the decision only to pay Goldman going forward.”).
105 Id.
106 Trial Tr. at 300:21–301:3 (Taube) (B. Taube giving reasons for recommending Broadhaven to the [Sierra]
special committee); JX 151 (June 13, 2018 email from B. Taube telling Broadhaven that they were “on deck”
to pitch on June 18, 2018).
107 JX 158; JX 151; JX 162.
108 JX 031.
109 See JX 191 at p.4; JX 031.
110 JX 164.
111 Id. at pp.6–8.
112 Trial Tr. at 170:9–171:3 (Ainsberg); Id. at 299:19–300:1 (Hirtler-Garvey). But see Mack Dep. Tr. at 71:12–17
(“Q. And were you involved in the hiring of a financial advisor? A. I was not involved in the interview process.
However, all of the members of the committee reviewed the submitted materials and voted on the hiring of
the financial advisor.”).
113 Trial Tr. at 299:23–300:14 (B. Taube recommended Credit Suisse); JX 177 (June 21, 2018 Credit Suisse
pitch book).
114 JX 189 (Sandler engagement letter); JX 175 (June 22, 2018 Sandler pitch book); JX 187 (Email from B.
Taube to J. Tonkel describing terms of Sandler engagement).
115 JX 175; JX 430; Trial Tr. at 170–71 (Ainsberg). Mack explained his reasons for selecting Sandler: “[T]hey
gave a very good presentation and they were a lot cheaper than the other guy.” Mack Dep. Tr. at 72:2–4.
In Ainsberg's view: “[Sandler] had extensive experience in the BDC space. They're a very highly regarded
investment banker. I had known the firm for many years reputationally. I had never done any business with
them. They had known the folks at [Medley Management] but hadn't had any important retention ... for a
period of years.” Trial Tr. at 171:8–17. And Ainsberg agreed that Sandler's “pricing for their assignment was
significantly less than Credit Suisse, so finances were a factor.” Id.
116 PTO ¶ II.49; Medley Capital Proxy at 71.
117 JX 703; Trial Tr. at 236:2–237:6 (Sterling).
118 JX 209 at 2–4.
119 Trial Tr. at 240:2–241:8 (Sterling); JX 208; JX 209.
120 Trial Tr. at 242:2–14 (Sterling).
121 Id. at 243:17–18.
122 Id. at 243:21–244:4.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 173–74 (Ainsberg); Id. at 244:5–14 (Sterling).
125 Id. at 244:15–19 (Sterling); id. at 395:9–16 (Hirtler-Garvey) (“That was an idea that they brought forward that
we thought was a great idea.”).
126 JX 707.
127 Trial Tr. at 246:12–247:6 (Sterling).
128 JX 509 at p.5; JX 723 at 10; Trial Tr. at 244:15–19 (Sterling).
129 Trial Tr. at 245:18–24, 246:5–8 (Sterling) (testifying that negotiations achieved a ratio that was equal to
Medley Capital's “equity value or book value in the form of NAV”).
130 JX 288.
131 The one-sentence letter reads: “It is our professional opinion that the employment agreements and the
executive compensation packages attached to the merger agreement are reasonable.” JX 641.
132 JX 299; Trial Tr. at 247:21–248:1.
133 Id. at 246:1–4. See generally Id. at 173–76 (Ainsberg).
134 JX 280.
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135 See Dkt. 134, Defs.' Demonstrative SC-D-01 (Medley Capital Special Committee Meetings Between
Retention of Sandler O'Neill and Announcement of Merger). See also JX 208 (July 11, 2018 Sandler
presentation deck); JX 209 (July 11, 2018 board minutes); JX 223 (July 17, 2018 Sandler presentation deck);
JX 225 (July 17, 2018 board minutes); JX 228 (July 18, 2018 Sandler presentation deck); JX 229 (July
18, 2018 board minutes); JX 235 (July 20, 2018 Sandler presentation deck); JX 236 (July 20, 2018 board
minutes); JX 247 (July 20, 2018 Sandler presentation deck, draft); JX 248 (July 23, 2018 board minutes);
JX 257 (July 26, 2018 Sandler presentation deck); JX 259 (July 26, 2018 board minutes); JX 266; JX 278
(July 27, 2018 Sandler presentation deck); JX 268 (July 27, 2018 board minutes) JX 279 (July 28, 2018
board minutes).
136 Trial Tr. at 177–78 (Ainsberg).
137 JX 295 (Aug. 2, 2018 board minutes); JX 308 (Aug. 6, 2018 board minutes); JX 321 (Aug. 8, 2018 board
minutes); JX 319 (Aug. 9, 2018 Sandler presentation deck, draft); JX 333 (Aug. 9, 2018 Sandler presentation
deck); JX 335 (Aug. 9, 2018 board minutes); JX 640 (Sandler Summary of Synergies).
138 JX 332 at p.6.
139 PTO ¶ II.58; JX 333 (Sandler Fairness Opinion Presentation deck).
140 Id. ¶ II.59.
141 See JX 163.
142 See JX 702.
143 See Medley Capital Proxy at 59–71. Despite the lack of any visible work, the Medley Capital Special
Committee was paid a total of $ 280,000 between January and June 2018. JX 164 at p.6.
144 Trial Tr. at 355:3–6 (Taube) (“Q. You were pushing the special committees of all of these entities to get a
deal done; right? A. I was not.”).
145 Compare Trial Tr. at 352 (“We wanted to have a process that was timely but sensible.”) with JX 289 (“Thursday
board meetings are the time to push these guys hard in person.”) (emphasis added); JX 269 (“I want to agree
on ONE suggestion (not a menu) and tell them they are better off ... or at least no worse off ... and have a
fiduciary obligation to close”) (emphasis added); JX 275 (“Make this happen!!!!!! If not ... I don't know what to
say). See also Simpson Dep. Tr. at 623:23–225:2 (“Brook was pushing very hard – we advised the Special
Committee that we had talked to Brook and that he was pushing very hard for his position.”).
146 JX 212 at p.3.
147 JX 212 at p.3.
148 Id. at p.4.
149 JX 269.
150 JX 275. Brookhaven's corporate representative, John Simpson, advised the Sierra special committee “that
Brook was pushing very hard ... that [Broadhaven] had talked to Brook and that he was pushing very hard
for his position.” Simpson Dep. Tr. at 224–25.
151 JX 289.
152 Id. (emphasis added).
153 JX 292.
154 JX 717 at p.1 (emphasis added). Brook Taube did not produce text messages in discovery. Trial Tr. at 358.
FrontFour was forced to press for them. Dkt. 127. Lerdal produced this text message after Brook Taube's
deposition. Trial Tr. at 359:5–9.
155 JX 569 (“Medley Capital did not contact any third parties for the purpose of exploring an Alternative Medley
Capital Transaction between May 1, 2017 and execution of the Medley Capital Merger Agreement”).
156 JX 105. See also Trial Tr. at 20:8–13 (Lorber).
157 Trial Tr. at 231:18–232:14 (Sterling).
158 Id. at 419:17–420:4 (Hirtler-Garvey).
159 Id. at 182:2–183:4 (Ainsberg) (“We didn't shop the company because, if one steps back and thinks about
the history of [Medley Management], starting in 2017, even before the Goldman Sachs and Brookhaven
involvement, Medley Management undertook a process with both Credit Suisse and UBS to look at the
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marketplace to see if there would be an opportunity to come together with a group. And when [Medley
Management] was doing that, as we discussed earlier, that involves [Medley Capital], because [Medley
Capital] effectively would have to approve a transaction in some shape, manner, or form. So effectively what
happened, both at the time of the Credit Suisse/UBS and at the time of the Goldman/Broadhaven reach-
out to the street, many, many significant players in the street knew about it, that [Medley Management] was
interested in the transaction. So this business effectively was -- was looked at. Now, did they look at our
-- I don't know what they looked at, effectively, when they were looking at it, these other entities. I don't
know what documents they were provided with. But you would assume that they, early on, before our current
transaction, that these folks looked at various documents of the entities.”).
160 Trial Tr. at 225–28 (Ainsberg).
161 Mack Dep. Tr. at 57:10–25. Mack also testified that he did not know or think about who Goldman Sachs was
working for. Id. at 99:20–25. “They were – they were trying to shop to see whether there was a deal out there,
but I'm not sure that I ever thought about who they were working for.” Id. at 99:25–100:4.
162 Trial Tr. at 289:21–293:24 (Taube); JX 022 (Benefit Street Partners non-binding proposal to Medley
Management); JX 035 (Project Elevate Discussion Materials); JX 038 (Project Elevate Preliminary Proposal
Instructions); JX 031 (Broadhaven engagement letter).
163 Mack Dep. Tr. at 57:3–25.
164 See Dkt. 136, PDX 006 (Summary: Standstill Periods); id. PDX 007 (Summary: Standstill Periods, cont.).
165 See Dkt. 136, Ex. A: PDX 006 (Summary: Standstill Periods).
166 JX628 at 52:7–10 (“You have to delegate things to the management. Directors direct. I'm sorry. Directors
direct, managers manage.”).
167 Mack Dep. Tr. at 53:13–15 (“The fact is, as you -- as I think about it, the more the merrier. It's -- then it's
just become a part of a process.”).
168 Mack Dep. Tr. at 53:13–22.
169 JX 341 at p.28.
170 Trial Tr. at 254:5–11 (Sterling).




175 JX 234 (“I have not been able to get you guys to respond since Tuesday. Left messages at the office for you
as well as email. Not trying to be difficult but would like some input on scheduling. If I need to get to NYC
I will do that. Thank you.”).
176 JX 286.
177 JX 283 at p.2 (emphasis added).
178 PTO ¶ II.59; JX 336.
179 JX 350.
180 JX 317 (Merger Agr.) § 7.10(d) (“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement, at
any time prior to the date that [Medley Capital] Stockholder Approval is obtained (in the case of [Medley
Capital] ) or [Sierra] Stockholder Approval is obtained (in the case of [Sierra] ), in the event that [Medley
Capital] (or its representatives on [Medley Capital's] behalf) or [Sierra] (or its representatives on [Sierra's]
behalf) receives a Competing Proposal from any Third Party, (i) [Medley Capital] and its representatives or
[Sierra] and its representatives, as applicable, may contact such Third Party to clarify any ambiguous terms
and conditions thereof (without the [Medley Capital] Board or [Sierra] Board, as applicable, being required to
make the determination in clause (ii) of this Section 7.IO(d) ) and (ii) [Medley Capital] and the [Medley Capital]
Board and its representatives or [Sierra] and the [Sierra] Board and its representatives, as applicable, may
engage in negotiations or substantive discussions with, or furnish any information and other access to, any
Third Party making such Competing Proposal and its representatives and Affiliates if the [Medley Capital]
Board or [Sierra] Board, as applicable, determines in good faith (after consultation with its outside financial
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advisors and legal counsel) that (A) such Competing Proposal either constitutes a Superior Proposal or could
reasonably be expected to lead to a Superior Proposal and (B) failure to consider such Competing Proposal
could reasonably be expected to be inconsistent with the fiduciary duties of the directors of [Medley Capital]
or [Sierra], as applicable, under Applicable Law; provided, that (x) such Competing Proposal did not result
from any material breach of any of the provisions set forth in this Section 7.10, (y) prior to furnishing any
material non-public information concerning [Medley Capital] or [Sierra], as applicable, [Medley Capital] or
[Sierra], as applicable, receives from such Third Party, to the extent such Third Party is not already subject
to a confidentiality agreement with [Medley Capital] or [Sierra], as applicable, a confidentiality agreement
containing confidentiality terms that are not less favorable in the aggregate to [Medley Capital] or [Sierra],
as the case may be, than those contained in the Confidentiality Agreement (unless [Medley Capital] or
[Sierra], as applicable, offers to amend the Confidentiality Agreement to reflect such more favorable terms) (it
being understood and agreed that such confidentiality agreement need not restrict the making of Competing
Proposals (and related communications) to [Medley Capital] or the [Medley Capital] Board or to [Sierra] or the
[Sierra] Board, as the case may be) (an ‘Acceptable Confidentiality Agreement’) and (z) [Medley Capital]
or [Sierra], as the case may be, shall (subject to the terms of any confidentiality agreement existing prior to the
date hereof) promptly provide or make available to the other party any material written non-public information
concerning it that it provides to any Third Party given such access that was not previously made available to
the other party or its representatives.”) (emphasis original).
181 Id. § 1.1 (“ ‘Competing Proposal’ means any inquiry, proposal or offer made by any Third Party: (a) to
purchase or otherwise acquire, directly or indirectly, in one transaction or a series of transactions (including
any merger, consolidation, tender offer, exchange offer, stock acquisition, asset acquisition, binding share
exchange, business combination, recapitalization, liquidation, dissolution, joint venture or similar transaction),
(i) beneficial ownership (as defined under Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act) of twenty percent (20%) or
more of any class of equity securities of [Medley Capital] or [Sierra], as applicable, or (ii) any one or more
assets or businesses of [Medley Capital] or its Subsidiaries or [Sierra] or its Subsidiaries that constitute twenty
percent (20%) or more of the revenues or assets of [Medley Capital] and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole,
or [Sierra] and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, as applicable; or (b) any liquidation of [Medley Capital] or
[Sierra], in each case other than the Merger and the other transactions to occur at Closing in accordance
with this Agreement.”) (emphasis original).
182 Id. (“ ‘Superior Proposal’ means any bona fide written Competing Proposal made by a Third Party that the
[Medley Capital] Board or the [Sierra] Board, as applicable, determines in good faith, after consultation with
its outside financial advisors and legal counsel, and taking into account the terms and conditions of such
proposal, the party making such proposal, all financial, legal, regulatory and other aspects of such proposal,
as well as the likelihood of consummation of the Competing Proposal relative to the Merger and such other
factors as the [Medley Capital] Board or [Sierra] Board, as applicable, considers to be appropriate, is more
favorable to [Medley Capital's] stockholders or [Sierra's] stockholders, as applicable, from a financial point
of view than the Merger and the other transactions contemplated by this Agreement (including any revisions
to the terms of this Agreement committed to by [Sierra] to [Medley Capital] in writing in response to such
Competing Proposal made to [Medley Capital] or by [Medley Capital] to [Sierra] in writing in response to such
Competing Proposal made to [Sierra] under the provisions of Section 7.10(f); provided however, for these
purposes, to the extent relevant to the Competing Proposal in question, all percentages in subsections (a)
(i) and (a)(ii) of the definition of Competing Proposal shall be increased to fifty percent (50%).”) (emphasis
original).
183 Id. § 7.10(e) (“Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, (i) the [Medley Capital] Board shall not
effect [a Medley Capital] Adverse Recommendation Change and the [Sierra] Board shall not effect [a
Sierra] Adverse Recommendation Change (each, an ‘Adverse Recommendation Change’), (ii) [Medley
Capital] Board shall not approve or recommend, or allow [Medley Capital] to execute or enter into, any
letter of intent, memorandum of understanding or definitive merger or similar agreement with respect to any
Competing Proposal (other than an Acceptable Confidentiality Agreement), and (iii) the [Sierra] Board shall
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not approve or recommend, or allow [Sierra] to execute or enter into, any letter of intent, memorandum of
understanding or definitive merger or similar agreement with respect to any Competing Proposal (other than
an Acceptable Confidentiality Agreement); provided however, that notwithstanding anything in this Agreement
to the contrary, if at any time prior to the receipt of [Medley Capital] Stockholder Approval (in the case of
[Medley Capital] ) or the [Sierra] Stockholder Approval (in the case of [Sierra] ), [Medley Capital] or [Sierra], as
the case may be, has received a Competing Proposal that its board of directors has determined in good faith
(after consultation with its outside financial advisor and legal counsel) constitutes a Superior Proposal, the
[Medley Capital] Board or [Sierra] Board, as applicable, may (x) make an Adverse Recommendation Change
in connection with such Superior Proposal if the board of directors effecting the Adverse Recommendation
Change determines in good faith (after consultation with its outside financial advisor and legal counsel) that
failure to make an Adverse Recommendation Change could reasonably be expected to be inconsistent with
the fiduciary duties of the [Medley Capital] Board or [Sierra] Board, as applicable, under Applicable Law, and/
or (y) authorize, adopt or approve such Superior Proposal and cause or permit [Medley Capital] or [Sierra],
as applicable, to enter into a definitive agreement with respect to such Superior Proposal concurrently with
the termination of this Agreement in accordance with Section 9.1(g) or 9.1(i), as applicable, but in each case
only after providing the Notice of Adverse Recommendation or Notice of Superior Proposal, as applicable,
and entering into good faith negotiations as required by Section 7.lO(f).”) (emphasis original).
184 Trial Tr. at 405:13–20 (Hirtler-Garvey). Brook Taube will be Chairman and CEO of the combined company
and will receive an employment package that includes a base $ 600,000 annual salary and a $ 3.2 million
incentive bonus comprising $ 2 million in restricted stock units and $ 1.2 million in cash. PTO ¶ II.69. Seth
Taube will be Vice Chairman, Senior Executive Vice President and Senior Managing Director of the combined
company and will receive an employment package, with a base $ 480,000 annual salary and a $ 1.75 million
incentive bonus comprising $ 1.15 million in restricted stock units and $ 600,000 in cash. PTO ¶ II.70. Tonkel
will serve as President of the combined company and will receive an employment package, with a base $
480,000 annual salary and a $ 1.75 million incentive bonus comprising $ 1.15 million in restricted stock units
and $ 600,000 in cash. PTO ¶ II.71.
185 Trial Tr. at 405:16–406:3 (Hirtler-Garvey).
186 Dkt. 128, Pretrial Order (“PTO”) ¶ II.1; JX466; JX 720. FrontFour is on the “smaller scale of hedge funds.
Assets under management are ... about $ 150 million.” Trial Tr. at 11, 55 (Lorber).
187 Id. at 16.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 16:11–18:6.
190 Id. at 18:19–24.
191 Id. at 24:19–24.
192 Id. at 24:22–23.
193 Id. at 24:6–18.
194 Id. at 25:10–16.
195 As Lorber described: “[Anderson] said to Steve [FrontFour's representative], ‘have you ever done a merger
before?’ Steve said, ‘you know, yes, I have.’ And Sam said, ‘have you ever done a three-way merger?’
Steve said, ‘no, actually I haven't.’ And then Sam said, ‘well, it's very difficult to get three parties to agree on
what actually happened.’ That was quite alarming. Given that what actually [happened] should be factual. It
shouldn't be difficult to get people to agree on what actually happened.” Id. at 25:10–24.
196 Id. at 26.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 27:16–20.
199 JX 396. Lorber testified that this was the deadline for nomination letters. Trial Tr. at 29. Medley Capital has
not noticed the 2019 annual meeting. Id. at 31.
200 JX 409; Trial Tr. at 27–28. The meeting was held telephonically, as Medley Capital refused FrontFour's
request for an in-person meeting. Id. at 28.
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201 Id. at 28.
202 JX 409.
203 JX 421.
204 JX 365 (Transcript of Aug. 10, 2018 Medley Investor Conference Call re: Merger Overview) at p.2 (“there will
be further detail in our proxy which will file in the next few weeks”); Trial Tr. at 25:10–14 (Lorber).
205 See Medley Capital Proxy.
206 It claimed that, “because each of the proposals submitted included various conditions and carve-outs, and
different forms of consideration, some of which was contingent, and in light of the fact that none were binding,
it would be both impracticable and speculative to assign a particular value to any such proposal.” Id. at 57
(emphasis added); see also Id. at 59. But it was possible to derive enterprise, equity and corresponding per-
share values for Medley Management (as well as implied premium calculations) from each of the IOIs; Medley
Management and its advisors did exactly that when communicating internally. JX 705.
207 C.A. No. 2019-0021-KSJM.









217 JX 488. After NexPoint made its proposals public, ISS changed its recommendation to voting against the
Proposed Transactions. ISS initially recommended voting in favor of the merger based on the theory that it
was the better of two bad options. JX 463 at p.2 (describing the Proposed Transactions as “the better of the




221 See id; see also JX 101.
222 JX 557.
223 JX 564.
224 Medley Capital Corp., Non-Management Solicitation Material (Form DFAN14A) (Mar. 6, 2019).
225 JX 459; Trial Tr. at 366:22–367:10 (Taube).
226 Trial Tr. at 188:21–189:1 (Ainsberg); id. at 424:2–425:3 (Hirtler-Garvey).
227 Also, as discussed above, in May 2018, Lantern expressed an interest in a possible transaction that involved
a recapitalization of Medley Capital. JX 138. On July 3, 2018, a Lantern representative again reached out to
Goldman: “[A]ny chance we can talk today? I have been speaking with Todd Owens [of Broadhaven] about
our interest in acquiring [Medley Management] and recapitalizing Medley Capital. Thanks!” JX 197. By that
time, Project Integrate was underway. The Special Committee was unaware of this offer when they were
negotiating the Proposed Transactions, and it has never been disclosed to Medley Capital stockholders.
Despite a call that apparently took place between Lantern and “the company” in late July 2018, followed
by an email to Russ Hutchinson, no one from Medley Capital pursued Lantern's proposal. JX 254; Trial Tr.
at 188:21–189:1 (Ainsberg) (“Q. And what happened with respect to the proposals, at least at the – what's
happened so far with respect to the proposals? That is to say, Zais, NexPoint, and Origami. A. They've all
been rejected.”).
228 Trial Tr. at 222:16–225:7 (Ainsberg); id. at 423:5–425:3 (Hirtler-Garvey).
229 JX 717 at p.11.
230 Dkt. 1; Dkt. 8 (“Am. Compl.”).
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231 Dkt. 63; Dkt. 79.
232 Dkt. 271, 81, 116, 117, 118, 124.
233 Dkt. 128, PTO ¶ II.130.
234 Dkt. 133.
235 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 144–52.
236 Id. ¶¶ 153–60.
237 Id. ¶¶ 161–67.
238 Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 457 (Del. Ch. 2011).
239 Id.
240 Kahn v. Tremont Corp. (Tremont II ), 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997); Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638
A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
241 In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S'holder Litig., 2009 WL 3165613, at *12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009),
interlocutory appeal refused, 984 A.2d 124 (Del. 2009) (TABLE); see In re Delphi Fin. Gp. S'holder Litig., 2012
WL 729232, at *12 n.57 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012) (applying entire fairness where the controlling stockholder
received differential merger consideration); see also In re Primedia, Inc. S'holders Litig., 67 A.3d 455, 487
(Del. Ch. 2013) (applying entire fairness where “the [m]erger conferred a unique benefit on” the controlling
stockholder).
242 In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 44 (Del. Ch. 2013).
243 Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1113 (observing that a stockholder becomes a fiduciary if it “owns a majority interest
in ... the corporation” (internal quotation marks omitted) ); see In re PNB Hldg. Co. S'holders Litig., 2006 WL
2403999, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006) (Strine, V.C.) (“Under our law, a controlling stockholder exists when a
stockholder ... owns more than 50% of the voting power of a corporation ....”); Williamson v. Cox Commc'ns,
Inc., 2006 WL 1586375, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2006) (“A shareholder is a ‘controlling’ one if she owns more
than 50% of the voting power in a corporation.”).
244 See Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1113 (observing that a stockholder becomes a fiduciary if it “exercises control over
the business affairs of the corporation” (emphasis original) ); In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S'holder Litig., 2018
WL 1560293, at *19 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018) (concluding on a motion to dismiss that it was reasonably
conceivable that Musk, owner of 22.1% of company's common stock, was a controller based on well-pled
facts related to “Musk's voting influence, his domination of the Board during the process leading up to the
[challenged acquisition] against the backdrop of his extraordinary influence with the Company generally,
the Board level conflicts that diminished the Board's resistance to Musk's influence, and the Company's
and Musk's own acknowledgement of his outsized influence”); Calesa Assocs. v. Am. Capital, Ltd., 2016
WL 770251, at *10–12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2016) (concluding on motion to dismiss that it was reasonably
conceivable that stockholder owning 26% of the company's stock exercised actual control where the plaintiff
alleged instances of actual control beyond the fact that the stockholder “exercised duly obtained contractual
rights to its benefit and to the detriment of the company”); In re Zhongpin Inc. S'holders Litig., 2014 WL
6735457, at *7–8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26, 2014) (concluding on motion to dismiss that it was reasonably conceivable
that stockholder owning only 17.3% of the company's stock was a controller because the stockholder was
CEO and the company's 10-K stated that the stockholder effectively controlled the company), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. S'holder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173 (Del. 2015); Williamson,
2006 WL 1586375, at *4–5 (concluding on a motion to dismiss that it was reasonably conceivable that
two stockholders, owning collectively 17.1% of the company's stock, jointly controlled the company based
on their ability to nominate two of the five directors, their ability to influence the flow of revenue into the
corporation, and their potential “veto” power over certain corporate decisions); In re Cysive, Inc. S'holders
Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 535, 551–52 (Del. Ch. 2003) (Strine, V.C.) (finding post-trial that a stockholder owning
35% of the company's stock controlled the company because he was a “hands-on” “Chairman and CEO of
[the company],” and because he had the ability to “elect a new slate [of independent directors] more to his
liking without having to attract much, if any, support from public stockholders” through his familial ties with
the company's other stockholders); O'Reilly v. Transworld Healthcare, Inc., 745 A.2d 902, 912–13, 915–16
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(Del. Ch. 1999) (concluding on motion to dismiss that it was reasonably conceivable that a 49% stockholder
exercised actual control where the plaintiff alleged that the stockholder forced the board to comply with its
terms on the merger through threats).
245 See Tesla, 2018 WL 1560293, at *14 (“[T]here is no absolute percentage of voting power that is required in
order for there to be a finding that a controlling stockholder exists.” (quoting PNB Hldg., 2006 WL 2403999, at
*9) ); Calesa Assocs., 2016 WL 770251, at *11 (explaining that there is “no correlation between the percentage
of equity owned and the determination of control status”); see In re Crimson Expl. Inc. S'holders Litig., 2014
WL 5449519, at *10–12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 2014) (collecting cases discussing when a stockholder may be
considered a controlling stockholder).
246 Tesla, 2018 WL 1560293, at *13; In re Rouse Props., Inc., 2018 WL 1226015, at *12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2018)
(citing Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp., 2017 WL 2325152, at *17 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2017); Cysive,
836 A.2d at 531, and Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1114–15); see In re Primedia Inc. Deriv. Litig., 910 A.2d 248, 257
(Del. Ch. 2006) (“[T]he plaintiffs need not demonstrate that [the alleged controller] oversaw the day-to-day
operations of Primedia. Allegations of control over the particular transaction at issue are enough.”).
247 Rouse, 2018 WL 1226015, at *12 (citing Williamson, 2006 WL 1586375, at *4); Tesla, 2018 WL 1560293,
at *13; see also Basho Techs. Holdco B, LLC v. Georgetown Basho Inv'rs, LLC, 2018 WL 3326693, at *27
(Del. Ch. July 6, 2018) (“Broader indicia of effective control also play a role in evaluating whether a defendant
exercised actual control over a decision. Examples of broader indicia include ownership of a significant equity
stake (albeit less than a majority), the right to designate directors (albeit less than a majority), decisional rules
in governing documents that enhance the power of minority stockholder or board-level position, and the ability
to exercise outsized influence in the board room, such as through high-status roles like CEO, Chairman, or
founder.” (footnotes omitted) ).
248 Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 264 (Del. 2002) (emphasis added); see also Tesla, 2018 WL
1560293, at *17 (“Even an independent, disinterested director can be dominated in his decision-making by
a controlling stockholder.”).
249 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984) overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d
244 (Del. 2000); accord Tremont II, 694 A.2d at 430; Telxon, 802 A.2d at 264.
250 Mack Dep. Tr. at 16–17.
251 Id. at 23–24.
252 Id. at 30–31.
253 Id. at 44.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 31.
256 Id. at 53.
257 Id. at 46–47.
258 Id. at 52–53.
259 Id. at 52–53.
260 Id. at 63.
261 Id. at 57. Until his deposition, Mack “never really thought about the entities” involved in the proposal. Id. at 118;
see id. (“I thought it was Medley Capital, but I would say that's just me not digging into who the parties are.”).
262 Id. at 73.
263 Id. at 53.
264 Id. at 72–73.
265 Id. at 32.
266 Id. at 33–34.
267 Id. at 34–35.
268 Id. at 42–43.
269 Id. at 79.
270 Id. at 82–83.
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271 Id. at 80–81, 83.
272 Id. at 10–11.
273 See Basho Techs., 2018 WL 3326693, at *27 (explaining that a broader indicia of effective control includes
“the ability to exercise outsized influence in the board room, such as through high-status roles like CEO,
Chairman, or founder”).
274 JX 717 at p.11 (text message chain on January 9, 2019 at 2:56 p.m.: Lerdal: “Old ladies and their
schedules ...”; Brook: “Whoa”; Lerdal: “Recommendation will be forthcoming. Proper response. Your question
was the proper one.”; Brook: “Which one?”; Lerdal: “Are we going to respond to every f**ksake on the planet?”)
275 Id. at p.4.
276 Id. at p.1.
277 Id. at p.2.
278 Id. at p.4.
279 Id. at p.4.
280 Id. at p.5.
281 Id. at pp.6–7.
282 JX 023.
283 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
284 Id.
285 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del. 1995) (defendants must prove “to the court's
satisfaction that the transaction was the product of both fair dealing and fair price” (emphasis original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) ).
286 Id. at 1162 (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711).
287 In re Dole Food Co., Inc. S'holder Litig., 2015 WL 5052214, at *26 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015).
288 Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1120–21. See also In re Tele–Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2005 WL 3642727, at *10
(Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2005) (“[A]n important element of an effective special committee is that it be fully informed
in making its determination.”); Tremont II, 694 A.2d at 431 (“In evaluating this claim the Court of Chancery
correctly stated that “[a] controlling shareholder ... must disclose fully all material facts and circumstances
surrounding the transaction.”) (citing Kahn v. Tremont Corp. (Tremont I ), 1996 WL 145452, at *15 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 21, 1996) ).
289 Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1115 (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711).
290 See Trial Tr. at 427:3–502:21 (Zenner examination); JX 618 (Zenner Report); Trial Tr. at 94:6–152:20
(Kennedy examination); JX 621 (Kennedy Report).
291 JX 621 (Kennedy Report).
292 Trial Tr. at 475–76 (Zenner).
293 Id. at 474–75.
294 Id. at 491–92.
295 See, e.g., Va. Power Energy Mktg., Inc. v. EQT Energy, LLC, 2012 WL 13034278, at *1 (E.D. Va. May 9,
2012) (holding that a “comment upon the opinion of another expert ... is not a proper subject for expert opinion
evidence”).
296 Trial Tr. at 488:3–8 (Zenner).
297 Trial Tr. at 96–98, 103–111 (Kennedy).
298 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2016 WL 3186538, at *36 & n.36 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016) (“[T]he bulk of any
price competition occurs before the deal is signed.”), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar
Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017).
299 Dole, 2015 WL 5052214, at *34.
300 Reis, 28 A.3d at 467; accord Ross Hldg. & Mgmt. Co. v. Advance Realty Gp., LLC, 2014 WL 4374261, at
*33 (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2014) (“Robust procedural protections may support a determination that price was
fairly within a range of reasonable values, and a failure of process may prevent a Court from reaching such
a conclusion.”); see William Penn P'ship v. Saliba, 13 A.3d 749, 758 (Del. 2011) (“Merely showing that the
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sale price was in the range of fairness, however, does not necessarily satisfy the entire fairness burden when
fiduciaries stand on both sides of a transaction and manipulate the sales process.”); Gentile v. Rossette,
2010 WL 2171613, at *9 (Del. Ch. May 28, 2010) (“From a tainted process, one should not be surprised if
a tainted price emerges.”); Bomarko, Inc. v. Int'l Telecharge, Inc., 794 A.2d 1161, 1183 (Del. Ch. 1999), as
revised (Nov. 16, 1999), aff'd, 766 A.2d 437 (Del. 2000) (“[T]he unfairness of the process also infects the
fairness of the price.”); HMG/Courtland Properties, Inc. v. Gray, 749 A.2d 94, 116 (Del. Ch. 1999) (holding
that the defendants did not satisfy their burden by showing that the price was “within the low end of the range
of possible prices that might have been paid in negotiated arm's-length deals” where “[t]he process was ...
anything but fair”); Tremont II, 694 A.2d at 432 (“[H]ere, the process is so intertwined with price that under
Weinberger's unitary standard a finding that the price negotiated by the [special committee] might have been
fair does not save the result.”).
301 Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., 40 A.3d 839, 857–58 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff'd 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012).
See also id. at 874–75 (“[The defendant] has argued throughout this litigation that [the property] was worth
less than its debt and thus any surplus over zero was a fair price, but I cannot accept this as true based on the
record before me. [The defendant] himself is responsible for this evidentiary doubt. He fended off [a potential
buyer], gave incomplete information to [the appraiser hired by the LLC], and did not promote a fair Auction
process. Thus, I do not view the Auction process as generating a price indicative of what [the property] would
fetch in a true arm's-length negotiation. Rather, the evidence suggests that [the property] was worth more
than what [the defendant] paid. [The defendant] was not motivated to bid his best price because he knew that
he was the only bidder before he finalized his offer ... The fact that we do not have concrete evidence of what
a fully negotiated third-party deal would have produced is [the defendant's] own fault, and such ambiguities
are construed against the self-conflicted fiduciary who created them.”).
302 FrontFour urges the Court to apply enhanced scrutiny to the entirety of the Proposed Transactions, not just
the deal protections. They argue that, “as conceived, the entire Transaction is an improper defensive measure
implemented by [Medley] Management to advance its own interests ....” Pls.' Post-Trial Br. at 65.
303 More specifically, the deal protections are: (1) a no-shop provision preventing each party from attempting
to undermine the Merger Agreement by soliciting other bids, subject to a “Superior Proposal” fiduciary out;
(2) an “adverse recommendation change” requirement that the Medley Capital Board recommend that the
stockholders vote in favor of the merger, subject to a fiduciary out; and (3) a “termination fee” provision
requirement the payment of $ 6 million to Sierra under certain conditions. Defendants' expert quantifies the
termination fees as 2.79% of the deal value, and FrontFour does not dispute this computation. JX 618 at p.31.
304 See Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151 (Del. 1989); Mills Acq. Co. v. Macmillan
Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1988). “Deal protections” are provisions of a merger agreement that
compensate a jilted third party if the target does not consummate the deal or obstructs disruption of the deal
by another transaction. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Categorical Confusion: Deal Protection Measures in Stock-for-
Stock Merger Agreements, 56 Bus. Law. 919, 922 (2001) [hereinafter Categorical Confusion]. Under default
rules of the Delaware General Corporation Law, a stockholder can sell control of the company in the minimum
number of days permitted under federal securities law. Id. at 924 & n.14. Deal protection measures disturb
this natural ordering by obstructing a stockholders' ability to engage in other transactions once a merger
agreement is signed. Further, mergers require stockholder approval. To be effective, the stockholder vote
must be “meaningful and voluntary.” See 8 Del. C. § 251(c). By safeguarding the merger, deal protections
encroach on the voluntary nature of the stockholder vote. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1387 (Del. 1996).
305 La. Mun. Police Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1181 n.10 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“The inquiry,
by its very nature fact intensive, cannot be reduced to a mathematical equation.”); id. (“Our courts do not
‘presume that all business circumstances are identical or that there is any naturally occurring rate of deal
protection, the deficit or excess of which will be less than economically optimal.... [A] court focuses upon the
real world risks and prospects confronting [directors] when they agreed to the deal protections.”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also In re BioClinica, Inc. S'holder Litig., 2013 WL 5631233, at *8
(Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2013) (“a no-solicitation provision, a poison pill, a reasonable termination fee, information
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rights, and a top-up option ... in the context of an otherwise reasonable sales process, have been found
non-preclusive” (emphasis added) ); In re Cogent, Inc. S'holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 501–09 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(assessing the preclusive effect of deal protections individually and “in the aggregate”); Orman v. Cullman,
2004 WL 2348395, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004) (noting that deal protection devices may be unreasonable
even if not coercive or preclusive); Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 1573, 1587 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 9, 1990) (Allen, C.) (“Thus, where it is applicable, Unocal requires a judicial judgment finely focused
upon the particulars of the case.”).
306 Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 935 (Del. 2003).
307 See, e.g., In re Cogent, 7 A.3d at 502 & n.40 (collecting decisions) (“Potential suitors often have a legitimate
concern that they are being used merely to draw others into a bidding war. Therefore, in an effort to entice
an acquirer to make a strong offer, it is reasonable for a seller to provide a buyer some level of assurance
that he will be given adequate opportunity to buy the seller, even if a higher bid later emerges.”).
308 Id. at 502.
309 Interestingly, Defendants' expert, Dr. Marc Zenner, presented a comparable transactions analysis related
to deal protection devices. In that analysis two-thirds of his comparable set involved a pre-signing formal
auction. Of course, this renders the set not comparable to the Proposed Transactions. Trial Tr. at 494–95.
It also supports the notion that no-shops are outside of the range of reasonableness absent a pre-signing
market canvas or efforts to assess potential price competition pre-signing. See Forgo v. Health Grades, Inc.,
C.A. No. 5716-VCS, at 16:18–20 (Del. Ch. Sept. 3, 2010) (TRANSCRIPT) (“Well, you know, if you're not
going to do as much on the front end, you got to make sure the back end works.”).
310 Merger Agr. § 7.10(e).
311 See generally In re Complete Genomics, Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888-VCL, at 17 (Del. Ch. Nov. 9,
2012) (TRANSCRIPT) (stating that placing restrictions on a board's “ability to change its recommendation”
that mirror “the types of conditions and procedures frequently and historically used to regulate a target's
contractual ability to terminate a merger agreement and accept a superior proposal” is “fraught with peril”).
This Court provided a definitive summary of the relevant issues in In re Primedia, Inc. Shareholders Litigation:
Delaware law requires that a board of directors give a meaningful, current recommendation to stockholders
regarding the advisability of a merger including, if necessary, recommending against the merger as a result
of subsequent events. This obligation flows from the bedrock principle that when directors communicate
publicly or directly with shareholders about corporate matters, the sine qua non of directors' fiduciary
duty to shareholders is honesty. The duty of loyalty, which mandates that directors act in stockholders'
best interests, consequently requires ensuring an informed stockholder vote. The obligation to change as
recommendation prior to a stockholder vote can be further viewed as a duty to update a prior material
statement. A board may not suggest or imply that it is recommending the merger to the shareholders if in
fact its members have concluded privately that the deal is not now in the best interest of the shareholders.
In light of these principles, the target board must have an ability to make a truthful and candid
recommendation consistent with its fiduciary duties—and this duty will be applicable whether or
not there is a superior offer.”
67 A.3d 455, 491–92 (Del. Ch. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
312 See In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 840 (Del. Ch. 2011) (enjoining defensive
measures not because the defensive measures themselves failed enhanced scrutiny but because they were
“the product of a fiduciary breach”).
313 Unanue v. Unanue, 2004 WL 2521292, at *10 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2004).
314 In re Novell, Inc. S'holder Litig., 2013 WL 322560, at *13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 2013) (citation omitted).
315 Klang v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 702 A.2d 150, 156 (Del. 1997) (footnotes omitted).
316 Zaucha v. Brody, 1997 WL 305841, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 3, 1997); see Novell, 2013 WL 322560, at *13
(explaining that material facts are those which, “under all the circumstances ... would have assumed actual
significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.” (citation omitted) ).
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317 Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp., Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1280 (Del. 1994); see also Rodgers v. Bingham, C.A.
No. 2017-0314-AGB, at 81 (Del. Ch. June 1, 2017) (TRANSCRIPT).
318 In re Pure Res., Inc., S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 450 (Del. Ch. 2002).
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WILEY Y. DANIEL, Chief Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
*1  THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant
UnitedHealth Group Incorporated's [“United Health”]
Motion to Exclude Testimony of Plaintiffs' Expert Kenneth B.
Germain and for Filing Under Seal filed June 17, 2011 (ECF
No. 56). A response was filed to the motion on July 11, 2011,
a reply was filed on July 28, 2011, and a surreply was filed
on October 24, 2011. The portion of the motion that seeks to
restrict public access to the expert report of Mr. Germain is
granted. 1
As to the portion of the motion that seeks to exclude
Plaintiffs' expert Kenneth Germain, UnitedHealth argues
that his testimony should be excluded under Fed.R.Evid.
702 as unhelpful, unreliable and prejudicial because Mr.
Germain allegedly “seeks improperly to draw an inference
from UnitedHealth's assertion of the attorney-client privilege,
to parrot another expert's testimony, and invade the province
of the Court.” (Mot. to Exclude Testimony 1). Thus,
UnitedHealth asserts that his opinions are not relevant or
reliable, and should be excluded as they have been in multiple
other cases.
The specific opinions that Mr. Germain seeks to offer
according to his March 31, 2011 report (Ex. 1 to Def.'s
Motion) are that: (1) UnitedHealth should not have used the
“UnitedHealthOne” mark because “competent legal advice
would have informed it” that use of the mark would
violate Plaintiffs' rights (Germain Report at ¶ 8(a)); (2) the
survey of Basil G. Englis, another of Plaintiffs' experts,
is reliable, legitimate, and admissible and “deserves much
credence” (Id. at ¶ 8(b)); and (3) the “modern, federalized,
widespread doctrine of ‘reverse confusion’ applies to this
case” (Id. at ¶ 8(d)). UnitedHealth argues that: (1) Mr.
Germain's opinion that UnitedHealth should not have used
the “UnitedHealthOne” mark relies improperly on the fact
that UnitedHealth asserted the attorney-client privilege; (2)
Mr. Germain's opinion regarding the Englis survey is outside
the scope of Mr. Germain's expertise and introduces improper
legal conclusions; and (3) Mr. Germain's proposed testimony
regarding “reverse confusion” attempts to usurp the function
of the Court, whose role it is to instruct the jury on the rules
of law that apply to the case. I find for the reasons discussed
below that United Health's motion should be granted in part
and denied in part at this juncture of the case.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
The court must make two inquiries in connection with
whether an expert opinion is admissible. Ralston v. Smith &
Nephew Richards, Inc., 275 F.3d 965, 969 (10th Cir.2001).
“First, the court ha[s] to determine whether ... the expert ...
[i]s qualified by ‘knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education’ to render an opinion. Id. (quoting Fed.R.Evid.
702). A key issue is whether the expert testimony will aid
the jury in its determination of the critical issue in the case.
Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 807 (10th Cir.1988); see
also Wilson v. Muckala, 303 F.3d 1207, 1219 (10th Cir.2002)
( “The ‘touchstone’ of admissibility of expert testimony is
its helpfulness to the trier of fact.”). “Expert testimony is
appropriate when it relates to issues that are beyond the
ken of people of ordinary intelligence.' “ Curtis v. Okla.
City Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ, 147 F.3d 1200, 1218 (10th
Cir.1998) (quotation omitted). “The Tenth Circuit takes a
liberal approach to the question of whether proffered expert
testimony will assist the jury. Doubts about whether an
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expert's testimony will be useful should generally be resolved
in favor of admissibility unless there are strong factors such as
time or surprise favoring exclusions.” Cook v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 580 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1083 (D.Colo.2006).
*2  Second, if the expert is so qualified, the court has
to determine whether the opinions are “reliable” under the
court's gatekeeping role as set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). When “[f]aced
with a proffer of expert scientific testimony ... the trial judge
must determine ..., pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the
expert is testifying to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will
assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in
issue.” Id. at 592. “This entails a preliminary assessment
of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning
or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in
issue.” Id. at 592–93. Factors to consider in making this
determination include: (a) whether the theory or technique
of the expert can be and has been tested, (b) “whether the
theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication”; (c) the known or potential rate of error of the
theory or technique; and (d) whether the theory or technique is
“generally accepted”. Id. at 593–94. The inquiry is a flexible
one and “must be solely on the principles and methodology,
not on the conclusions the expert generates.” Id. at 594–
595. If the evidence is “shaky but admissible” under the
above standard, “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation
of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of
proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking”
the evidence. Id. at 596.
The Supreme Court expanded this analysis in Kumho Tire
Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), holding
that Daubert's gatekeeping function also applies to the
testimony of experts who are not scientists, but who have
“technical” and “other specialized” knowledge. Id. “[W]here
such testimony's factual basis, data, principles, methods, or
their application are called sufficiently into question, ... the
trial judge must determine whether the testimony has ‘a
reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the relevant
discipline].’ “ Id. at 149 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).
The factors identified in Daubert may or may not be pertinent
in assessing the reliability of these opinions, depending on the
nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the
subject of his or her testimony. Id. at 150.
B. Whether Mr. Germain's Opinions Should Be Excluded
According to Mr. Germain's expert report, he is an attorney
and has taught “Trademarks”, Intellectual Property “and other
related classes. (Ex. 1 to Def.' s Mot., ¶ 1(a).) He states that he
has often served in an expert witness capacity in civil cases
involving a wide variety of issues related to the selection,
adoption, use, registration, maintenance and infringement of
trade designations of all kinds” and has “been called upon as a
potential expert witness on trademark and unfair competition
matters on dozens of occasions....” Id., ¶ 1(b).)
*3  While UnitedHealth has raised the applicability of
Daubert, Mr. Germain does not appear to be relying on
scientific testimony but on his experience and training in the
area of trademarks and unfair competition. Thus, many of
the Daubert factors are not relevant. Further, his opinion is
not improper simply because it is not scientific. Rule 702
authorizes opinion testimony by experts with “specialized
knowledge” which can be acquired through experience and
training. United States v. Garza, 566 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th
Cir.2009).
Also and importantly, UnitedHealth does not seek to
disqualify Mr. Germain based on any lack of skill, specialized
knowledge, experience, or qualifications, other than with
respect to his lack of expertise in connection with surveys.
Indeed, Plaintiffs note that Mr. Germain's trademark opinions
have been accepted in similar cases as reliable, qualified
and helpful testimony, including a case within this Court
which was ultimately affirmed by the Tenth Circuit. See
Vail Associates, Inc. v. Vend–Tel–Co., Ltd., Case No. 1:01–
cv–01172 (D.Colo. Jan. 4, 2005), affd, 516 F.3d 853, 861–
863 (10th Cir.2008). While UnitedHealth asserts that Mr.
Germain's opinions have been excluded in a number of cases,
which cases are attached to its motion, those cases were
all decided on the basis of the particular opinions to be
delivered in that case. Here also, I will address the specific
opinions of Mr. Germain that UnitedHealth objects to and the
admissibility of same.
Before doing so, however, I address generally the legal
parameters for expert opinions. This should guide the parties
in connection with their presentation of expert testimony,
including that of Mr. Germain. “Rule 704(a) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence ‘allows an expert witness to testify in
the form of an opinion or inference even if that opinion or
inference embraces an ultimate issue to be determined by
the trier of fact.’ “ United States v. Bedford, 536 F.3d 1148,
1158 (10th Cir.2008) (citing A.E. ex rel Evans v. Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 25, 936 F.2d 472, 476 (10th Cir.1991)). “However,
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an expert may not simply tell the jury what result it should
reach without proving any explanation of the criteria on which
that opinion is based or any means by which the jury can
exercise independent judgment.” United States v. Dazey, 403
F.3d 1147, 1171 (10th Cir.2005). “Expert testimony of this
sort is sometimes excluded on the ground that it ‘usurps the
function of the jury in deciding the facts, or interferes with the
function of the judge in instructing the jury on the law.’ “ Id.
Further, “[e]xpert witnesses may not testify as to ultimate
issues of law governing the jury's deliberations, because
instructing the jury is the function of the trial judge.” United
States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Pilatus Bus. Aircraft,
Ltd., 582 F.3d 1131, 1150 (10th Cir.2009). Expert testimony
is also not proper “when the purpose of testimony is to
direct the jury's understanding of the legal standards upon
which their verdict must be based.” Specht, 853 F.2d at 810.
Thus, “[w]hile testimony on ultimate facts is authorized under
Rule 704, ... testimony on ultimate questions of law is not
favored.” Id. at 808. “The basis for this distinction is that
testimony on the ultimate factual questions aids the jury in
reaching a verdict; testimony which articulates and applies
the relevant law, however, circumvents the jury's decision-
making function by telling it how to decide the case .” United
States Aviation Underwriters, 582 F.3d at 1150 (citing Specht,
853 F.2d at 808).
*4  While “[a]n ‘expert may not state legal conclusions
drawn by applying the law to the facts, [a]n expert may ... refer
to the law in expressing his or her opinion.’ “ Bedford, 536
F.3d at 1158 (quotation omitted). Indeed, an expert witness
“may properly be called upon to aid the jury in understanding
the facts in evidence even though reference to those facts
is couched in legal terms.” Specht, 835 F.2d at 809. Such
testimony is proper so long as “the expert does not attempt
to define the legal parameters within which the jury must
exercise its fact-finding function.” Id. Thus, in Specht, the
court noted that “the question, ‘Did T have capacity to make
a will?’ would be excluded, while the question, ‘Did T have
sufficient mental capacity to know the nature and extent of his
property and the natural object of his bounty to formulate a
rational scheme of distribution?’ would be allowed.” Id. 807–
08.
These concepts were further explored in Smith v. Ingersoll–
Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir.2000). In that case, the
defendant claimed that a forensic expert's “explanation of
hedonic damages constituted impermissible testimony on an
ultimate question of law”, violating the court's “admonition
that ‘in no instance can a witness be permitted to define the
law of the case.’ “ Id. at 1246 (quoting Specht, 853 F.2d at
810). The Tenth Circuit stated that “[t]his rule is not ... a per
se bar on any expert testimony which happens to touch on
the law; an expert may be ‘called upon to aid the jury in
understanding the facts in evidence even though reference to
those facts is couched in legal terms.’ “ Id. (quoting id. at 809).
I now turn to the opinions that are objected to by
UnitedHealth.
1. Opinions as to UnitedHealth's Assertion of the
Attorney–Client Privilege
UnitedHealth first asserts that Mr. Germain's opinion
relies improperly on the fact that UnitedHealth asserted
the attorney-client privilege or invades that privilege by
producing an alleged “adverse inference”. UnitedHealth
points to the fact that Mr. Germain begins his report by
inferring that (1) UnitedHealth's attorney probably gave
UnitedHealth “bad news” and warned against using the
“UnitedHealthOne” mark (Germain Report at ¶¶ 10(b), 12);
(2) UnitedHealth's attorney chose not to put that “bad news”
in writing (id. at ¶ 10); (3) UnitedHealth then ignored its
attorney's advice in favor of “a ‘Full speed ahead: damn the
torpedoes!’ attitude” (id. at ¶ 12); and (4) UnitedHealth's
attorney or someone else “made a record of the factual and
legal reason(s) seen as justifying” UnitedHealth's decision
to ignore its attorney's advice. Id. UnitedHealth asserts
that Mr. Germain predicates these inferences on the fact
that UnitedHealth has claimed privilege for confidential
communications with its counsel and has not asserted an
advice-of-counsel defense.
In response, Plaintiffs attach a redline draft of the report
that was proposed to UnitedHealth to address its objections
to Mr. Germain's opinions. In that redline draft, Plaintiffs
deleted almost all of what UnitedHealth found objectionable.
Plaintiffs argue that UnitedHealth did not meaningfully
confer with Plaintiffs as required by D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.
1, both before filing the motion and after the motion was
filed when Plaintiffs tendered the redlined draft of the expert
report to UnitedHealth in an attempt to ameliorate its concerns
about Mr. Germain's testimony. While it does appear that
UnitedHealth did not confer with Plaintiffs to the maximum
extent possible, I decline to deny its motion on that basis since
there was at least some effort to meet and confer.
*5  Instead, I address the redline draft of the expert report
that I will assume contains what Mr. Germain will not testify
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to at trial based on Plaintiffs' representation in its response
brief. From my review of that report, it does not appear
that Mr. Germain will testify about or invoke any adverse
inference about the fact that UnitedHealth has chosen not
to assert reliance on counsel advice as a defense. Indeed,
almost every opinion objected to by UnitedHealth about
Mr. Germain improperly using the attorney-client privilege
against UnitedHealth has been withdrawn from Mr. Germain's
report. To the extent that Mr. Germain may, however, still seek
to testify as to issues arising from the attorney-client privilege
or advice of counsel, I find this testimony is improper and
grant UnitedHealth's motion to exclude testimony on this
issue for the reasons stated in UnitedHealth's motion.
Plaintiffs assert now that Mr. Germain will testify as an expert
about the contents of the Search Report and the meaning
thereof, and that his testimony will be helpful to the trier of
fact. Plaintiffs further state that Mr. Germain's analysis of
the Search Report requires specialized knowledge, consumes
numerous hours of research and review and in no way makes
any conclusions as to the ultimate issue in this case, contrary
to UnitedHealth's argument. I agree with Plaintiffs that it
appears Mr. Germain's expert trademark testimony about the
Search Report (as outlined in the redline draft of his report)
may be of assistance to the trier of fact.
Plaintiffs state that the Search Report consists of hundreds
of pages of references to both registered and common-law
marks, canceled registrations, failed applications, domain
names, and business names. They contend that his testimony
about the meaning of the Search Report would be helpful
to the jury to understand the marks already in the
marketplace or intended to be in the marketplace at the
time UnitedHealth adopted its Marks and, therefore, what
knowledge UnitedHealth had or should have had given the
contents of the Search Report when it made its decision to
adopt the Marks at issue. UnitedHealth has not stated any
valid reason why this testimony should be excluded, and I
that this testimony appears to be proper. See Children's Med.
Center v. Columbia Hosp ., No. 3–04–2436–BD, 2006 WL
616000, at *5 (N.D.Tex. March 10, 2006) (denying challenge
to trademark law professor's opinion on the strength of a mark
based on the results of a trademark search report obtained
by the plaintiffs because “[a]n expert may base an opinion
on facts or data of a type reasonably relied upon by experts
in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject” and the expert stated that search reports
are “generally relied upon by trademark practitioners when
advising clients as to the availability of marks for use and
registration”); see also Larsen v. Ortega, 816 F.Supp. 97
(D.Conn.1992) (court found that expert testimony was proper
as to his factual investigation regarding other companies that
used the disputed mark, stating that “[t]here is little doubt
that expert testimony on the strength of a plaintiff's trademark
or on the degree of similarity within a discreet industry is
proper”)). 2  Thus, UnitedHealth's motion to exclude is denied
as to these issues.
*6  However, I find that Mr. Germain may not opine about
the results of his research as they apply to the ultimate issue
of trademark infringement. See Children's Med. Center, 2006
WL 616000 at *6 n. 4; Bay State Bank v. Baystate Fin. Servs.,
No. 03–40273–FDS, 2007 WL 6064455, at *2 (D.Mass.
March 23, 2007). To the extent he was planning to testify
as to this ultimate issue, UnitedHealth's motion to exclude is
granted.
2. Opinions About the Englis Survey
UnitedHealth argues that Mr. Germain's report analyzes a
consumer survey conducted by another expert, Basil Englis.
It asserts that Mr. Germain does not claim to be an expert
on consumer surveys and does not describe any consumer
survey that he has conducted, instead referring only to his
general “experience reviewing surveys.” (Germain Report
at TT 1(a), 13(b)). Nonetheless, Mr. Germain opines about
the “substantial reliability” and “legal legitimacy” of the
Englis survey as well as that the results of the survey are
“admissible.” (Id. at ¶ 8(b)).
UnitedHealth argues that although Mr. Germain concludes
that the survey is “fair” and “in accord with the prevailing
legal standards,” (Germain Report at ¶ 13), he provides
no analysis of the survey's methodology to explain those
conclusions. Further, Mr. Germain has no expertise in
consumer surveys. Accordingly, UnitedHealth argues that Mr.
Germain's opinions regarding the Englis survey, including its
“substantial reliability” and “legal legitimacy”, are outside
the scope of his expertise and introduce improper legal
conclusions. UnitedHealth further argues that Mr. Germain's
testimony regarding the survey is unhelpful to the factfinder
because it is cumulative and adds nothing to Mr. Englis'
opinion, and is merely an attempt to parrot and bolster the
opinions of Mr. Englis.
I agree with UnitedHealth that testimony by Mr. Germain that
attempts to bolster the legitimacy of the survey or merely
parrot the results of a survey conducted by another person
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would be improper. See Dura Auto. Sys. Of Indiana, Inc. v.
CTS Corp., 285 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir.2002) (“it is common
in technical fields for an expert to base an opinion in part
on what a different expert believes on the basis of expert
knowledge not possessed by the first expert; and it is apparent
from the wording of Rule 703 that there is no general
requirement that the other expert testify as well” but an expert
may not merely parrot what the other expert said, vouch for
that expert, or become that expert's “spokesman”.) Plaintiffs
assert, however, that they will not present such testimony.
Instead, Plaintiffs argue that citations to the survey are solely
for the purpose of providing a proper foundation for Mr.
Germain's opinion as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(B).
Plaintiffs further assert that Mr. Germain simply seeks to
establish that the survey is a legally sufficient foundation on
which he may base his opinions regarding reverse confusion,
addressed below. I find that testimony from Mr. Germain
about the survey may be proper if Mr. Germain can establish
a proper foundation for the survey under the Federal Rules
of Evidence and can show that the survey is the type
of data reasonably relied upon by experts in his field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject pursuant to
Fed.R.Evid. 703. This may well depend on whether or not Mr.
Germain has any familiarity with the methods or reasoning
used by Mr. Englis in his survey and what his experience is
with surveys. See TK–7 Corp. v. Estate of Barbouti, 993 F.2d
722, 732 (10th Cir.1993). I am unable to determine this from
Mr. Germain's report or the briefing and find that this is an
issue better left for trial. Thus, I deny the motion to exclude
all testimony regarding the survey, deferring resolution of this
issue until trial.
3. Opinions About Reverse Confusion
*7  Finally, UnitedHealth asserts that Mr. Germain's report
presents opinions as to the law that he contends should
apply in this case. In particular, UnitedHealth points to
Mr. Germain's opinion that reverse confusion is the law in
Colorado and his explanation and advocacy for this law.
(Germain Report at ¶ 8(d)). Mr. Germain asserts in his opinion
that “... forward and reverse confusion are not mutually
exclusive; indeed they both can occur at the same time”
and that “[a] plaintiff alleging trademark infringement can
prove actionable ‘likelihood of confusion’ by forward and/
or reverse confusion evidence. (Id. at ¶¶ 18(a) and 17(d)).
Mr. Germain then concludes that there was a likelihood
of confusion because UnitedHealth's advertising efforts
were “very likely to produce reverse confusion between
‘UnitedHealthOne’ and ‘HealthOne.’ “ (Id. at ¶ 19(a)).
UnitedHealth argues that Mr. Germain does not provide or
cite to any evidence of confusion, and that his testimony
regarding “reverse confusion” attempts to usurp the function
of the Court, whose role it is to instruct the jury on the rules
of law.
Plaintiffs argue in response that Mr. Germain's testimony
on reverse confusion will not state the law applicable to
this case or opine on the ultimate issues. The ultimate issue
here is whether there is a likelihood of confusion between
the HealthONE marks and the United HealthOne marks.
Mr. Germain is opining on one factor in the likelihood of
confusion analysis, specifically, the actual confusion factor
and how the doctrine of reverse confusion can explain the
results of the Mind/Share Survey. Plaintiffs further assert
that even if Mr. Germain's opinions embraced an ultimate
issue, Rule 704 permits such testimony. Mr. Germain does
not attempt to define the legal parameters within which
the jury must exercise its fact-finding function. Instead,
according to Plaintiffs, his opinion focuses on the role reverse
confusion plays in the level of actual confusion shown in
the control group of the Mind/Share survey. Any stating of
the law concerning reverse confusion is merely foundational
information for his opinions. Plaintiffs further point out that
as Plaintiffs' trademark claim is not based on the doctrine of
reverse confusion, there is no danger of Mr. Germain opining
or instructing about any rule of law in the jury instructions.
Finally, Plaintiffs assert that even if he did opine about any
rule of law, the Court could eliminate any concern about that
testimony by simply instructing the jury to disregard any of
Mr. Germain's testimony inconsistent with its instructions.
I find that this issue should be deferred until trial where I
can hear this evidence in context. I note, however, that so
long as Mr. Germain does not attempt to tell the jury what
the law is or define the law in the instructions, Mr. Germain's
testimony on this issue may be proper. Courts routinely
admit expert testimony from intellectual property attorneys
in trademark cases. See Olympia Group, Inc. v. Coopers
Industries, Inc., No. 5:01–CV–423, 2003 WL 25767444, at
*1 (E.D.N.C. April 17, 2003); Sam's Wine & Liquors, Inc. v.
Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., No. 92 C 5170, 1994 WL 529331, at
*8 (N.D.Ill. Sep. 27, 1994). Guidance from a trademark expert
regarding the individual likelihood of confusion factors or any
survey results upon which to analyze those factors may be
appropriate and critically helpful to the trier of fact, providing
a proper foundation is laid and the expert has the experience
necessary to opine as to these issues.
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*8  As set forth in a leading treatise:
Expert testimony on the factual factors
that go into the ultimate finding on
the confusion issue is generally quite
proper and helpful to both judge and
jury.... The expert testimony of expert
witnesses is generally allowed on [the
likelihood of confusion factors] and
other factors which are used to analyze
whether the designation is a valid
trademark or if there is a likelihood of
confusion.
4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:2.75
(“MCCARTHY”). Furthermore, McCARTHY advises that
trademark attorneys can be helpful in the jury's understanding
of unfamiliar and “perhaps counter intuitive” trademark
concepts. Id.
Indeed, McCARTHY cites a case within this Circuit where
Mr. Germain's testimony was allowed to assist the jury on
several of the factors relevant to likelihood of confusion in
a trademark case as set forth in Sally Beauty Co., Inc. v.
Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 972 (10th Cir.2002). The case in
which Mr. Germain testified, captioned Vail Associates, Inc.
v. Vend–Tel–Co., Ltd., Case No. 1:01–cv–01172 (D.Colo. Jan.
4, 2005), was ultimately affirmed by the Tenth Circuit, 516
F.3d 853, 861–863 (10th Cir.2008).
Vail Associates centered on the alleged trademark
infringement of the plaintiff's mark VAIL by the defendant's
mark 1–800–SKI–VAIL. The defendant called on Mr.
Germain to testify as to four of the six Sally Beauty factors:
strength of the mark; similarity of the marks; intent of the
defendant; and the degree of care. Vail Assocs., 516 F.3d at
861–63. Not only did the district court seemingly rely on Mr.
Germain's opinion in its order finding for the defendant on all
claims, but the Tenth Circuit extensively relied on and quoted
approvingly whole portions of Mr. Germain's testimony and
opinions in affirming the district court's opinion. See id.
(“Germain's testimony that [the defendant] did not appear
to intend to infringe upon [the [plaintiff]'s mark or utilize
[the plaintiff]s' reputation was equally critical;” “In this case,
Germain's testimony as to the similarities between the two
marks at issue is entirely consistent with our analysis of the
marks in Sally Beauty ”). While the Tenth Circuit did not
address any challenges to Mr. Germain's testimony, as noted
by UnitedHealth, it also did not find such evidence to be
improper.
Other courts have also allowed an expert to testify as to
factors relevant to likelihood of confusion so long as the
expert does not state the ultimate legal conclusion about
likelihood of confusion or the verdict the jury should reach
with respect to trademark infringement. See Scurmont LLC
v. Firehouse Rest. Group, Inc., No. 4:09–cv–00618, 2011
WL 2670575, at *8 (D.S.C. July 8, 2011); Roederer v. J.
Garcia Carrion, S.A., 2010 WL 489529, at *3 (D.Minn. Feb.
4, 2010); Sam's Wine & Liquors, 1994 WL 529331, at *8–
9; YKK Corp. v. Jungwoo Zipper Co., 213 F.Supp.2d 1195,
1203 (C. D.Cal.2002). Further, in Big O Tire Dealers, Inc.
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1371 (10th
Cir.1977), the Tenth Circuit noted that the district court was
within its discretion in accepting expert testimony from a
trademark attorney where the jury was instructed to ignore
any testimony contrary to court's instructions.
*9  I also note that the Tenth Circuit has allowed experts
to explain the law in certain circumstances. For example, in
Smith v. Ingersoll–Rand Company, the Tenth Circuit found
that the district court did not err in allowing an expert to
explain his interpretation of the meaning of hedonic damages
where the district court determined that such testimony was
relevant. 214 F.3d at 1245–46. The expert “did not attempt
to apply the facts of the case ‘to the criteria he proffered to
the jury; the jury remained free to exercise its fact-finding
function.’ “ Id. The court found that the expert's “testimony
on hedonic damages no more defined the law of the case than
did his testimony regarding the computation of other types of
damages” where “he described in great detail the factors the
jury could consider in calculating ... lost future earnings”. Id.
In another case, the Tenth Circuit found that “ ‘[e]xpert
testimony by an IRS agent which expresses an opinion as to
the proper tax consequences of a transaction is admissible
evidence,’ ... so long as the expert does not ‘directly embrace
the ultimate question of whether [the defendants] did in fact
intend to evade income taxes,’ ....“ Bedford, 536 F.3d at 1158
(quotations omitted). See also United States v. Dazey, 403
F.3d 1147, 1172 (10th Cir.2005); Okland Oil Co. v. Conoco,
Inc., 144 F.3d 1308, 1328 (10th Cir.1998).
From the foregoing, I agree with Plaintiffs that consideration
of the concept of reverse confusion in connection with Mr.
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Germain's discussion of the actual confusion factor may be
helpful if this issue is found to be relevant. However, the
admissibility of this testimony will turn on many factors,
including not only relevance but a balancing of the probative
value over any prejudice that could result to the jury under
Fed.R.Evid. 403, the extent to which Mr. Germain is qualified
to render testimony on this issue in regards to the survey, and
the extent to which the testimony may improperly invade the
province of the Court regarding instructing on the law. This
will, in turn, depend on the particular questions asked of Mr.
Germain. Accordingly, a ruling on this issue at this stage of
the case is premature, and UnitedHealth's motion to exclude
Mr. Germain's testimony is denied as to this argument..
III. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is
ORDERED that Defendant UnitedHealth Group
Incorporated's Motion to Exclude Testimony of Plaintiffs'
Expert Kenneth B. Germain and for Filing Under Seal filed
June 17, 2011 (ECF No. 56) is GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART consistent with this Order. The request
to prohibit public access to Mr. Germain's report is also
GRANTED. Mr. Germain's report will be restricted to public
access at Level One. See D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2.B.
All Citations
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2012 WL 94678, 87 Fed. R. Evid.
Serv. 502
Footnotes
1 While the motion asks that the report be sealed, the Local Rules of this Court were revised effective December
1, 2011, as to the procedure for restriction of access to documents. Instead of requesting to seal a document,
a party must request that the documents be restricted to public access based on restriction levels set forth in
the Rules. D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2.B. Since HP is asking that access to the documents be limited to the parties
and the Court, I will assume that HP is seeking a Level One restriction of Mr. Germain's expert report.
2 I reject UnitedHealth's assertion in its reply that Mr. Germain's opinions from his review of the search report
are mere ipse dixit.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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LASTER, V.C.
*1  The petitioners brought this statutory appraisal
proceeding to determine the fair value of the common stock of
Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc. The valuation's effective date
is July 1, 2016, when TransCanada Corporation completed
its acquisition of Columbia (the “Merger”). Pursuant to an
agreement and plan of merger dated March 17, 2016 (the
“Merger Agreement”), each share of Columbia common
stock was converted into the right to receive $25.50 in cash,
subject to each stockholder's right to eschew the consideration
and seek appraisal. This post-trial decision finds that the fair
value of Columbia's common stock on the effective date was
$25.50 per share.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The evidentiary record is vast. 1  After an initial spat during
the pre-trial process, the parties agreed to 716 stipulations of
fact, which were a welcome contribution. During a five-day
trial, the parties submitted 1,472 exhibits, including twenty-
one deposition transcripts. 2  Nine fact witnesses and five
experts testified live. The following factual findings represent
the court's effort to distill this record.
A. Columbia
At the time of the Merger, Columbia was a Delaware
corporation whose common stock traded actively on the New
York Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol “CPGX.”
Columbia developed, owned, and operated natural gas
pipeline, storage, and other midstream assets. As a midstream
company, Columbia did not own or sell the commodities that
it transported or stored. Columbia's success depended on its
contracts with shippers and producers.
Columbia's primary operating asset consisted of 15,000 miles
of interstate gas pipelines running from New York to the Gulf
of Mexico. The pipelines served the strategically important
Marcellus and Utica natural gas basins in Pennsylvania, Ohio,
and West Virginia. Columbia's growth-oriented business plan
sought to exploit a production boom in the Marcellus and
Utica basins by expanding its pipeline network and selling the
additional capacity. See PTO ¶ 248. The plan required billions
of dollars in capital expenditures, which in turn required large
amounts of low-cost financing.
*2  Columbia itself was a holding company. Its principal
asset was an 84.3% interest in Columbia OpCo LP (“OpCo”),
which owned Columbia's operating assets. Columbia's largest
business divisions operated interstate pipelines. Smaller
divisions operated gas-gathering and processing systems.
Columbia also owned a 100% general partner interest and a
46.5% limited partner interest in Columbia Pipeline Partners,
L.P. (“CPPL”), a master limited partnership (“MLP”) whose
common units traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
CPPL owned the other 15.7% interest in OpCo.
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Columbia's business plan depended upon using CPPL to raise
equity financing for Columbia's growth projects. To raise
capital using an MLP, a sponsor like Columbia sells assets
to the MLP, receiving cash in return. Because the MLP is a
pass-through entity, it can raise capital at a lower cost than the
sponsor. 3  Columbia planned to use a variant of the typical
method. Rather than having CPPL buy assets from Columbia,
CPPL would buy newly issued interests in OpCo, which
would use the proceeds to fund Columbia's growth plan. 4
Given the magnitude of Columbia's capital needs, analysts
expected that CPPL could own over 60% of OpCo by 2020.
See, e.g., JX 258 at 13.
B. NiSource
When the process leading to the Merger began, Columbia was
not yet a public company. It was a subsidiary of NiSource
Inc., a publicly traded utility company that today serves
approximately four million customers in seven states.
In 2005, Robert Skaggs, Jr. became the CEO of NiSource.
He also served as chairman of its board of directors. In 2013,
Skaggs told the NiSource directors that he wanted to retire
in a few years. See Taylor Dep. 93. For planning purposes,
Skaggs's financial advisor used a target retirement date of
March 31, 2016, and cautioned that “the single greatest risk”
to Skaggs's retirement plan was his “single company stock
position in NiSource.” JX 163.
Stephen Smith was NiSource's CFO. Smith, who was fifty-
two years old in 2013, considered fifty-five to be the “magical
age” to retire. Smith Dep. 97–98; see JX 199. He too targeted
a retirement date in 2016.
Since 2008, Lazard Frères & Co. had been evaluating a
spinoff of Columbia as part of its regular work for NiSource.
See JX 98 at 7–9. Lazard believed that a spinoff could unlock
major value for NiSource. 5  In January 2014, Lazard made a
presentation to the NiSource board. Consistent with Lazard's
advice, Skaggs and Smith pitched forming CPPL as part of
the spinoff to provide a financing vehicle for Columbia. See
JX 91. For much of 2014, the NiSource board weighed its
options.
*3  In summer 2014, The Deal reported that Dominion
Resources Inc. was trying to buy NiSource. The article
described Skaggs as “a willing seller” but only in an all-cash
deal at a 20% premium. JX 142.
C. The Spinoff
On September 28, 2014, NiSource announced that it would
spin off Columbia as a separate public company. NiSource
also announced the formation of CPPL as the “primary
funding source” for Columbia's growth capital. JX 182 at 15.
CPPL would go public in early 2015. Columbia would follow
later that year.
Columbia's post-spinoff business plan contemplated “a
potential capital investment opportunity of $12–15 billion
over the next 10 years, positioning the company to provide
enhanced earnings and dividend growth driven by its
projected net investment growth.” JX 174. The largest
components were pipeline expansion and modernization. JX
182 at 14. If all went according to plan, then Columbia would
triple in size. See PTO ¶ 291. The plan envisioned funding
the growth by having CPPL issue equity over a sustained
period. 6
In December 2014, the NiSource board signed off on Skaggs
and Smith leaving NiSource and joining Columbia. Skaggs
would become CEO and chairman of the board for Columbia
and CPPL; Smith would become CFO of both entities. Skaggs
and Smith made the move partly because they did not “want
to work forever.” JX 208. By this time, two investment banks
had told Smith that Columbia would “trade too rich to sell,”
and Smith sought a third view from Goldman Sachs & Co.
See id. Goldman believed Skaggs and Smith were eyeing “a
sale in near term.” Id.
*4  On February 11, 2015, CPPL closed its initial public
offering, generating net proceeds of approximately $1.17
billion. Under Columbia's business plan, CPPL did not plan
to raise additional equity until 2016. JX 304 at 28. In the
meantime, Columbia planned to draw over $500 million from
a revolving credit facility. Id.
As part of the spinoff, Columbia borrowed $2.75 billion
through a private placement of debt securities. Columbia used
the proceeds to make a $1.45 billion cash distribution to
NiSource and to refinance its existing debt. See id. Moody's
Investors Service rated Columbia's debt at Baa2, one notch
above non-investment grade. PTO ¶ 262. Columbia's debt
level meant that it could not borrow additional capital to fund
its business plan and would have to rely on CPPL. See JX
466; JX 1339.
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Columbia anticipated that it would become an acquisition
target after the spinoff. As part of its pre-transaction planning,
Columbia engaged Lazard as its financial advisor. 7  As
of May 2015, Lazard categorized the potential acquirers
into four tiers, ranked by their ability to pay and
likelihood of interest. The first tier consisted of Kinder
Morgan, Inc. and Energy Transfer Equity, L.P. The second
tier included TransCanada, Berkshire Hathaway Energy,
Dominion, Spectra Energy Corp., NextEra Energy, Enbridge
Inc., and The Williams Companies. See JX 300 at 35; Mir
Dep. 136–48.
On May 28, 2015, Lazard contacted TransCanada and
mentioned that Columbia might be for sale after the spinoff.
JX 311. A contemporaneous memorandum from Skaggs's
financial advisor made the point directly: “[Skaggs] noted
that [Columbia] could be purchased as early as Q3/Q4 of
2015. I think they are already working on getting themselves
sold before they even split. This was the intention all along.
[Skaggs] sees himself only staying on through July of 2016.”
JX 324.
In June 2015, Lazard advised TransCanada against “opening
a dialogue” until after the spinoff. JX 335. Doing so could
jeopardize the spinoff's tax-free status, which required that
NiSource not spin off Columbia in anticipation of a sale.
See JX 311. Internally, TransCanada discussed that “absent a
knock out offer, [Columbia] will likely go for a market check
(to maximize proceeds), which we should be prepared for.”
JX 335.
On July 1, 2015, NiSource completed the spinoff. On its first
day of trading, Columbia's stock closed at $30.34 per share.
From the spinoff until the Merger, Columbia's board of
directors (the “Board”) consisted of Skaggs and six outside
directors. The lead independent director was Sigmund
Cornelius, an oil and gas veteran who had worked in the
pipeline industry and as the CFO of ConocoPhillips. The other
directors were Marty Kittrell, Lee Nutter, Deborah Parker,
Lester Silverman, and Teresa Taylor. Most had served as
directors of NiSource before the spinoff.
D. Early Interest From Possible Buyers
On July 2, 2015, Columbia engaged Goldman to advise
on any unsolicited acquisition proposals. JX 347. Over the
next two weeks, Dominion and Spectra contacted Skaggs
to discuss potential strategic transactions. See PTO ¶¶ 391–
93. Skaggs viewed the Spectra outreach as trivial, but
thought Dominion was worth exploring. See JX 359 (Skaggs
classifying Spectra outreach as “casual pass” and Dominion
as “notable/substantive”).
*5  On July 20, 2015, Dominion expressed interest in buying
Columbia for $32.50 to $35.50 per share, half stock and
half cash. Lazard's contemporaneous discounted cash flow
(“DCF”) analysis valued Columbia at $30.75 per share, 5%
higher than the trading price. See PTO ¶ 395. After discussing
the expression of interest with the Board and receiving advice
from Lazard and Goldman, Skaggs asked Dominion to raise
its price to the “upper-$30s.” See id. ¶¶ 397–98.
On August 12, 2015, Columbia and Dominion entered into
a non-disclosure agreement (an “NDA”). PTO ¶ 400; see
JX 416. The parties began due diligence, but on August
31, Dominion disengaged. Citing a decline in Columbia's
stock price amid general stock market volatility, Dominion
indicated that even its floor of $32.50 per share had become
too high. See PTO ¶ 406.
By the end of August 2015, Columbia's stock price had fallen
to around $25 per share. By late September, it had fallen to
around $18 per share.
Meanwhile, TransCanada continued to examine Columbia
as an acquisition target. See JX 458. TransCanada's Senior
Vice President for Strategy and Corporate Development,
François Poirier, was friends with Smith and asked him to
dinner on October 26. See JX 487. It seems likely that
other companies were studying Columbia as well, but it is
unclear to what extent other firms were included in the scope
of discovery. The petitioners issued subpoenas to Spectra,
Berkshire, Dominion, and NextEra. See Dkts. 132, 170, 176,
217. They also obtained discovery from Goldman and Lazard.
E. The Equity Overhang
During fall 2015, the energy markets deteriorated, and the
market for issuances of equity by MLPs was “effectively
closed.” JX 466; see, e.g., Kittrell Tr. 1053–54 (citing “sea
change” in MLP market that “has continued to this day”). The
new market dynamics meant that Columbia could no longer
use CPPL to raise equity. See JX 466. With $1 billion in short-
term funding needs and no capacity to take on more debt,
Columbia had to consider issuing equity itself, even though
its cost of equity had spiked too. 8
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The confluence of problems created an “equity overhang.” JX
466. If investors feared that Columbia could not obtain the
capital to achieve anticipated growth rates, then they would
bid down the stock. The lower price would force Columbia
to issue more equity to raise the same amount of capital, and
Columbia could become “mired in a vicious cycle of issuing
more and more equity at lower and lower prices.” 9
*6  In a memorandum to the Board dated October 16, 2015,
Skaggs summarized Columbia's situation, identifying both
problems and potential solutions:
• “[T]he latest intrinsic value studies (which assume that
we're able to fully manage CPG's financing, project
execution, and counter-party risks) would suggest that
CPG's value has dropped roughly 30%.”
• “Required Equity Financing: We've raised almost $4
billion of capital (CPPL equity and CPGX debt) – at a
very attractive cost of capital – during the first half of '15
to launch CPG as a standalone company. Recall: because
of our investment grade credit rating commitments, CPG
cannot issue long-term debt until 2018. Consequently,
to support CPG's committed growth program AND
maintain our investment grade credit ratings, CPG or
CPPL still must issue between $3 billion and $4 billion
of equity (i.e., +/- 65% of CPG's current equity market
capitalization) over the next three years (i.e., $1+ billion
of equity per year).”
• “Track 1 – ‘Stay the Course’. Prepare to issue ~$1.0+
billion (~15% of CPG) of CPGX equity at +/-$18/share
by mid-January.... The current thinking is that we would
need to execute the transaction prior to our YE earnings
disclosure (2/15) – when we are set to announce yet
another increase (~$500 million) in our annual Cap-Ex
plan (i.e., a near-term expansion of the equity overhang).
Downside: if this approach doesn't alleviate the equity
overhang (and rather than a positive reaction, CPGX/
CPPL languishes), we face the real threat of ongoing
value erosion.”
• “Track 2 – ‘Seek a Balance Sheet’. Explore whether
Dominion or a select group of blue chip strategic players
(e.g., MidAmerican ( [Berkshire Hathaway Energy] ),
Sempra, Enbridge, TransCanada, and perhaps Spectra)
would have a legitimate interest in CPG – at a price that's
within CPG's intrinsic value range.... This approach
would be an attempt to capture/optimize CPG's intrinsic
value (i.e., avoid selling 15% of CPGX at a deep
discount); position shareholders to participate in the
potential growth of the combined enterprise; fully fund
our growth plan, and exert a measure of control over
the fate of our employees and other key stakeholders.
Downside: We believe there is no downside in ‘soft’
overtures to any or all of these potential counterparties.
This approach shouldn't ‘put us in play.’ ”
JX 466.
At a Board meeting held on October 19 and 20, 2015, Skaggs
recommended a dual-track strategy in which Columbia would
prepare for an equity offering while engaging in exploratory
talks with potential strategic or financing partners. PTO ¶ 422.
The Board agreed.
F. Renewed Talks With Possible Buyers
On October 26, 2015, Skaggs renewed talks with Dominion.
Skaggs offered exclusivity in return for a prompt offer of
approximately $28 per share, but he expected Dominion to
respond “in the 20–25% premium zip code ($24–$25).” 10
That night Smith met with Poirier, who said that TransCanada
wanted to buy Columbia. PTO ¶ 426; JX 487.
On October 29, 2015, the Board decided to wait to hear from
Dominion before responding to TransCanada. JX 1399 at
2. The Board determined that Columbia would have to sell
substantial public equity unless it received a merger proposal
for “around $28 per share.” PTO ¶ 428.
*7  On November 2, 2015, Dominion indicated that it could
not offer $28 per share. Dominion proposed either (i) an
all-stock merger with Dominion and its partner NextEra at
an undefined “modest premium” or (ii) a Dominion equity
investment in certain Columbia subsidiaries or joint ventures.
See id. ¶ 430. That day, Columbia's stock closed at $21.12.
Goldman believed that at this point, Columbia was trading
“very close to ‘dcf’ value, against a backdrop of having traded
at a discount to dcf value.” JX 505.
On November 7, 2015, Skaggs followed up with Dominion
about the Dominion/NextEra structure. PTO ¶ 436. On
November 9, Columbia and TransCanada entered into an
NDA. Id. ¶ 437. Over the next week, Columbia entered into
additional NDAs with Dominion, NextEra, and Berkshire
Hathaway Energy, and the NDA counterparties began
conducting due diligence. 11
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Each NDA contained a standstill provision that prohibited
the counterparty from making any offer to buy Columbia
securities without the Board's prior written invitation. Most
of the standstills lasted eighteen months. Each contained
a feature colloquially known as a “don't-ask-don't-waive”
provision (a “DADW”), which prohibited the counterparty
from “making a request to amend or waive” the standstill or
the NDA's confidentiality restrictions. E.g., JX 526 § 3.
Although due diligence was getting off the ground, Columbia
management did not think they could delay an equity offering
beyond early December 2015. And waiting until the last
possible minute to raise equity exposed Columbia to risk.
On November 17, 2015, the Board authorized management
to proceed with the equity offering as early as the week of
November 30. PTO ¶ 456.
On November 24, 2015, TransCanada expressed interest in
an all-cash acquisition at $25 to $26 per share. Berkshire
expressed interest in an all-cash acquisition at $23.50 per
share. Both expressions of interest were conditioned on
further diligence. Berkshire warned that an equity offering
would “kill [its] conversation” with Columbia. Id. ¶ 477.
On November 25, 2015, the Board decided to terminate
merger talks and proceed with the equity offering.
Columbia sent letters to Dominion, NextEra, Berkshire, and
TransCanada instructing them to destroy the confidential
information they had received under their NDAs. NextEra
was disappointed to lose the opportunity, but Dominion was
happy to go elsewhere. Dominion had already reached out
to Questar Corporation, and in February 2016, Dominion
announced that it was buying Questar for $4.4 billion,
effectively ending any prospect for a Columbia-Dominion
merger. See, e.g., PTO ¶ 478; JX 890.
Skaggs called TransCanada and Berkshire personally to reject
their offers. TransCanada's CEO, Russell Girling, asked if
Columbia would forego the equity offering if TransCanada
“close[d] the gap between $26 and $28 and we get it done
before Christmas.” JX 588; see also JX 575 at 4. Skaggs said
no. He explained that Columbia could not risk a failed deal
followed by a more expensive equity offering in 2016. See
PTO ¶ 476; Skaggs Tr. 875–77; see also JX 594.
*8  The same day, Smith told Poirier that Columbia
“probably” would want to pick up merger talks “in a few
months.” JX 588; accord Poirier Tr. 384. Poirier believed that
Columbia could have delayed its equity raise until January,
but that Columbia went ahead to improve its bargaining
position. Poirier also doubted whether Columbia's directors
shared management's enthusiasm for a deal. JX 594.
G. The Equity Offering
After the market closed on December 1, 2015, Columbia
announced an equity offering at $17.50 per share. PTO ¶ 480.
Columbia's stock had closed that day at $19.05. Id. ¶ 481.
The below-market offering was oversubscribed and raised
net proceeds of $1.4 billion. At trial, Skaggs described the
offering as “an unmitigated disaster” because Columbia had
“sold 25 percent of the company at 17.50.” Skaggs Tr. 890.
Columbia had solved its short-term funding needs, but the
overhang would persist without a long-term solution. See JX
1060 at 6; Poirier Tr. 450; Skaggs Dep. 139.
After the equity offering, Skaggs met with Columbia's
directors individually to pitch them on selling the company.
He emphasized that the business plan involved a “significant
amount of execution risk (both financial and operational).”
JX 646.
In mid-December 2015, Poirier called Smith to reiterate
TransCanada's interest in a deal. They scheduled a meeting
for January. Smith Tr. 236–37. Smith involved Skaggs and
Goldman, but no one told the Board that Smith was continuing
talks with TransCanada. 12  Internally, TransCanada believed
that the equity offering had made a deal “more challenging
from a valuation standpoint,” but regarded Columbia as a
“very strategic” target. Poirier Tr. 445; accord Marchand Tr.
482.
H. The Poirier Meeting
On January 5, 2016, Smith emailed Columbia's draft
2016 management projections to Poirier. JX 680. Goldman
prepared talking points for Smith to use with Poirier, and
Skaggs approved them. See JX 679 (talking points advising
that TransCanada could “avoid an auction process” with
a “preemptive” price because “every dollar matters a lot
to our Board”); Smith Tr. 248. The talking points were
tailored to respond to positions TransCanada had taken during
negotiations in November 2015, including TransCanada's
stance that it was “not inclined to participate in an auction
process” because it would take “resources to get[ ] fully
comfortable with the growth projects.” JX 575 at 4; see JX
589; JX 590. TransCanada had signaled that it would pay
extra for exclusivity, and internally it was describing its price
strategy as “preemptive.” See JX 575 at 4.
- 118 - 
In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
2019 WL 3778370
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6
On January 7, 2016, Smith met with Poirier. Smith
literally handed him the list of talking points. Smith Tr.
247–48. Smith stressed that TransCanada was unlikely
to face competition from major strategic players, telling
TransCanada in substance that Columbia had “ ‘eliminated’
the competition.” 13  By doing so, Smith contravened
Goldman's advice from 2015 to the effect that “[c]ompetition
(real or perceived) is the best way to drive bidders to their
point of indifference.” JX 505.
*9  Poirier and Smith portrayed these unusual tactics as a
good-faith effort to entice TransCanada to bid by assuring
TransCanada that it would be worthwhile to engage in due
diligence. 14  But TransCanada was going to bid anyway,
as it had before. It seems intuitive that Smith's assurance
about TransCanada not facing competition would have
undermined Columbia's bargaining leverage. At the same
time, it is not clear how much of an effect the disclosure
had, because TransCanada already knew about the company-
specific problems that its competitors faced. See Poirier Tr.
435–36 (referring to “other potential suitors being distracted”
as “public knowledge”).
Regardless, on January 25, 2016, Girling called Skaggs to
express interest in an all-cash acquisition in the range of $25
to $28 per share, similar to what TransCanada had proposed
in November 2018. PTO ¶ 516. That day, Columbia's stock
closed at $17.25.
I. TransCanada Obtains Exclusivity.
In the weeks leading up to Girling's indication of interest,
Skaggs had held a second round of one-on-one meetings with
the Columbia directors, “priming them for a TC bid.” JX
1466; see id. (Goldman indicating that Skaggs was “getting
questions from the Board ‘would you take $26 per share’
– he said every day it gets harder to say no”). Lazard had
advised Columbia's management that “[w]hile your valuation
has swung widely, the $25–28 range is a sensible one given
what we have concluded is your DCF value right now.” JX
742.
On January 28 and 29, 2016, the Board met with senior
management, Goldman, and Columbia's legal counsel from
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. TransCanada had indicated
that it would not proceed unless granted exclusivity. The
Columbia team considered whether to solicit alternative
suitors like Dominion or Spectra. The Board determined
that TransCanada's indicative range offered a significant
premium that outweighed the costs of exclusivity. See PTO
¶ 519; Kittrell Tr. 1061–62 (citing Goldman and Lazard's
recommendation); Taylor Tr. 1273–74 (citing high odds of
closing and “great” premium).
On February 1, 2016, Columbia granted TransCanada
exclusivity through March 2, 2016, which they later extended
by six days (the “Exclusivity Agreement”). PTO ¶¶ 523, 551.
In simplified terms, Columbia could not accept or facilitate
an acquisition proposal from anyone but TransCanada,
except that in response to a “bona fide written unsolicited
Transaction Proposal that did not result from a breach of”
the Exclusivity Agreement, Columbia could engage with
another party upon notice to TransCanada. In long form, the
Exclusivity Agreement provided that Columbia could not
(a) solicit, initiate, encourage or accept any proposals or
offers from any third person, other than [TransCanada],
(i) relating to any acquisition or purchase of all or any
material portion of the assets of [Columbia] or any of its
subsidiaries, (ii) to enter into any merger, consolidation,
reorganization, recapitalization, share exchange or other
business combination transaction with [Columbia] or any
subsidiary of [Columbia], (iii) to enter into any other
extraordinary business transaction involving or otherwise
relating to [Columbia] or any subsidiary of [Columbia], or
(iv) relating to any acquisition or purchase of all or any
material portion of the capital stock of [Columbia] or any
subsidiary of [Columbia] (any proposal or offer described
in any of clauses (i) through (iv) being a “Transaction
Proposal”), or
*10  (b) participate in any discussions, conversations,
negotiations or other communications regarding, furnish
to any other person any information with respect to, or
otherwise knowingly facilitate or encourage any effort
or attempt by any other person to effect a Transaction
Proposal;
provided that in response to a bona fide written unsolicited
Transaction Proposal that did not result from a breach
of this letter agreement (an “Unsolicited Proposal”)
[Columbia] may, after providing notice to [TransCanada]
as required by this letter agreement,
(1) enter into or participate in any discussions,
conversations, negotiations or other communications with
the person making the Unsolicited Proposal regarding such
Unsolicited Proposal,
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(2) furnish to the person making the Unsolicited Proposal
any information in furtherance of such Unsolicited
Proposal (provided that to the extent such information
has not been previously provided to [TransCanada],
[Columbia] shall promptly provide such information to
[TransCanada] ) or
(3) approve, recommend, declare advisable or accept,
or propose to approve, recommend, declare advisable
or accept, or enter into an agreement with respect to,
an Unsolicited Proposal or any subsequent Transaction
Proposal made by such person as a result of the discussions,
conversations and negotiations or other communications
described in clause (1), if the Board of Directors of
[Columbia] determines in good faith, after consultation
with its outside legal counsel, that the failure to do so would
reasonably be expected to be a breach of its fiduciary duties
under applicable law.
JX 832 (formatting altered). The Exclusivity Agreement
further provided that
[Columbia] immediately shall cease and cause to
be terminated all existing discussions, conversations,
negotiations and other communications with all third
persons conducted heretofore with respect to any of the
foregoing. [Columbia] shall
(x) notify [TransCanada] promptly (and in any event within
24 hours) if any Unsolicited Proposal, or any substantive
inquiry or contact with any person with respect thereto, is
made and
(y) in any such notice to [TransCanada], indicate the
material terms and conditions of such Unsolicited Proposal,
inquiry or contact, in the case of clause (y), except to the
extent the Board of Directors of [Columbia] determines in
good faith, after consultation with its outside legal counsel,
that providing such information would not be in the best
interests of [Columbia] and its stockholders.
Id. (formatting altered).
J. TransCanada Conducts Due Diligence.
On February 4, 2016, Columbia sent TransCanada a draft
of the Merger Agreement. By February 5, TransCanada
had sixty-nine personnel accessing Columbia's data room.
JX 784. A subset of the personnel comprised a clean
team that received access to Columbia's customer contracts,
enabling TransCanada to assess Columbia's counterparty risk
by examining its customers' creditworthiness. See Poirier Tr.
401–03. The parties have referred to these important contracts
as “precedent agreements.” 15
*11  TransCanada had indicated that it would submit a bid
by February 24, 2016, with the caveat that it needed backing
from credit rating agencies. On February 19, the credit
rating agencies warned TransCanada that acquiring Columbia
could result in a downgrade. One said that TransCanada
was “buying a BBB-mid asset and adding leverage.” JX
827. The other “observed that the resulting leverage from
the transaction would be high in a difficult market with
heightened counterparty concerns.” PTO ¶ 535. On February
24, Girling told Skaggs that TransCanada needed more time to
develop a financing plan that allowed it to pay $25 to $28 per
share without hurting its credit rating. Id. ¶ 544. Meanwhile,
Columbia and TransCanada continued to exchange drafts of
the Merger Agreement.
K. Columbia Demands A Price.
On March 4, 2016, the Board directed management to
demand a merger proposal from TransCanada. On March 5,
TransCanada offered $24 per share, below the low end of the
range it had cited to secure exclusivity. Smith told Poirier
that he could not recommend $24 per share to the Board,
but could recommend $26.50. See PTO ¶ 563. TransCanada
came back at $25.25, which it characterized as its best and
final offer. Id. When Skaggs called Girling to reject the offer,
Girling said: “I guess that's it.” JX 901. Skaggs told the Board
that TransCanada was unlikely to reengage and that “[i]n the
meantime, we have stopped all deal-work.” Id. Poirier told
Smith that TransCanada lacked room to move on price. PTO
¶ 566.
With merger talks on hold, TransCanada's management
debated how to justify paying more. Id. ¶ 568; JX 912; see
JX 907. Its CFO, Don Marchand, thought a deal “at $26
would be off-the-charts in terms of premium paid and the
market reaction could be quite tepid.” PTO ¶ 568. He believed
the transaction was “priced close to perfection at the $25.25
offer level.” Id. TransCanada's COO thought Columbia was
“playing ... poker to see where our barf price is.” JX 911
at 3. Poirier suggested floating a number like $25.75 or
$26, then asking Columbia for another month to find capital
and sort out credit rating issues. JX 905 at 3. To fund the
Merger, TransCanada ultimately would sell more than $7
billion in assets and raise over $3 billion through the largest
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subscription receipts offering in Canadian history. JX 939; JX
1008 at 8, 13–14.
On March 6, 2016, TransCanada's management conveyed
that they could support a price above $25.25 per share if
Columbia's management would support a price below $26.50.
See PTO ¶ 569. After consulting with Skaggs and Cornelius,
Smith asked Poirier to offer $26 per share. Id. ¶¶ 570–71.
Poirier replied that TransCanada's board needed until March
9 to make a decision.
L. The Wall Street Journal Leaks The Merger Talks.
On March 8, 2016, Columbia learned that the Wall Street
Journal was preparing a story about TransCanada being in
advanced discussions to acquire Columbia. TransCanada's
exclusivity expired that night. Id. ¶¶ 579–81.
On March 9, 2016, TransCanada made a revised offer at
$26 per share, with 90% of the consideration in cash and
10% in TransCanada stock. The offer was subject to market
conditions and feedback from credit rating agencies and
TransCanada's underwriters.
On March 10, 2016, the Board convened to discuss
TransCanada's proposal. 16  Skaggs reminded the Board that
TransCanada's exclusivity had expired. JX 1399 at 13. The
Board discussed that the news story could lead to inbound
offers. After the meeting, the Wall Street Journal broke the
story. 17
M. Spectra Reaches Out.
*12  After seeing the article, Spectra emailed Skaggs to
propose merger talks. 18  On March 11, 2016, the Board
decided to renew TransCanada's exclusivity through March
18, subject to further evaluation of Spectra. The Board
also instructed management to waive the standstills with
Berkshire, Dominion, and NextEra. See JX 1399 at 15; see
also JX 950. The next day, management sent emails waiving
the standstills. PTO ¶¶ 603–05.
On the morning of March 12, 2016, the Board determined
that Spectra was unlikely to propose a deal superior to
TransCanada's latest offer. See JX 1399 at 15–16. Around
this time, everyone at Columbia acted as if TransCanada's
exclusivity had already been renewed. The Board approved
a script “to use with Spectra and other inbounds.” JX 964.
It stated: “We will not comment on market speculation or
rumors. With respect to indications of interest in pursuing a
transaction, we will not respond to anything other than serious
written proposals.” JX 1399 at 15–16.
Based on advice from Goldman and Sullivan & Cromwell,
Skaggs proposed to send the script to TransCanada. He
described this move as a way to reassure TransCanada that its
deal remained on track, and to pressure TransCanada to agree
to an “expedited” closing. See JX 964. After the Board met on
March 12, Columbia's in-house counsel asked TransCanada
to approve the script:
[O]ur board has agreed to the renewal
of the EA for one week subject
to your agreement that this scripted
response would not violate the terms
of the EA (both in terms of the
inbound received in the EA's gap
period and going forward until signing,
which unfortunately, given the leak,
there is a potential that we will
receive additional inquiries). Please
confirm via response to this email that
[TransCanada] is in agreement with
this condition/interpretation and we
will send over the new EA.
JX 968 at 2. Asking TransCanada whether the script violated
the Exclusivity Agreement made no sense. Exclusivity
had expired days before. Columbia's in-house counsel also
conveyed to TransCanada that Columbia had received “an
inbound from a credible, large, midstream player,” without
saying who it was. JX 973.
The Board had instructed Goldman to screen Spectra's calls so
that Spectra could not talk directly with management. See JX
957; JX 1399 at 15–16. On March 12, Spectra's CFO called
Goldman, and Goldman read the script. See JX 974 (Spectra's
CFO: “[The Goldman banker] said he had to read from a script
that had two messages.”). The Spectra CFO told Goldman
that “any indication of interest would have to be conditioned
on further due diligence.” Id. Spectra said it could “move
quickly” and “be more specific subject to diligence,” but the
script did not allow for that option. JX 970. As one Goldman
banker put it: “Does [Spectra] ‘get it’ that they aren't going
to get diligence without a written proposal?” Id. The inverted
approach effectively shut out Spectra. TransCanada had not
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bid without due diligence, and no one else was going to either.
See, e.g., JX 1399 at 3 (discussing TransCanada's need for “30
to 45 days of due diligence in order to firm up the potential
offer”).
*13  Later on March 12, Spectra's head of M&A made a
follow-up call. He said to expect a written offer in the “next
few days” absent a “major bust.” JX 992. The banker who
took the call found Spectra's assurance credible, but Skaggs
and Smith were not interested. 19  The Board-approved script
meant that Columbia could only entertain a “serious written
proposal,” which Smith defined as
a bona fide proposal that says I will
pay you X for your company. Hard and
fast. No outs. No anything. No way to
wiggle out of anything. This is going to
happen. You're going to pay whatever
you're going to pay per share and we're
going to sign that agreement and we're
done. I don't know of any company
that would do that in that short of a
timeframe.
Smith Tr. 272. Spectra never made a written offer, and
TransCanada never faced competition or a meaningful threat
of competition from the anonymous yet “credible, large”
industry player that Columbia's management had described.
See Poirier Tr. 417–18.
N. TransCanada Changes Its Offer.
On March 14, 2016, Columbia renewed TransCanada's
exclusivity through March 18, making it retroactive to March
12. PTO ¶ 617; see JX 978. After the renewal, Skaggs
learned that TransCanada was revising its offer. See JX 1005;
JX 1006. Citing execution risk with the stock component,
TransCanada reduced its offer from $26 per share to $25.50,
all cash. PTO ¶ 618. TransCanada threatened that if Columbia
did not accept its reduced offer, then TransCanada would
“issue a press release within the next few days indicating its
acquisition discussions had been terminated.” Id. Exclusivity
terminated automatically upon receipt of TransCanada's
reduced offer. See JX 978.
At a telephonic meeting held the same day, the Board
acknowledged that TransCanada was pushing Columbia to act
before Spectra could make an offer. 20  The Board decided to
proceed with TransCanada as long as the termination fee in
the Merger Agreement did not exceed 3% of equity value. See
id. On March 15, 2016, Columbia and TransCanada agreed to
a termination fee of 3%.
O. The Board Approves The Merger Agreement.
On March 16 and 17, 2016, the Board convened to
consider the Merger. Sullivan & Cromwell reviewed the
Merger Agreement. Goldman and Lazard opined that the
consideration was fair to Columbia's stockholders. Goldman
presented a DCF analysis that valued Columbia's stock at
$18.64–$23.50 per share. JX 1016 at 107. Lazard's DCF
ranges valued the stock at $18.88–$24.38 per share on a
sum-of-the-parts basis and at $20.00–$25.50 per share on
a consolidated basis. Id. at 80; JX 1136 at 75–76. Other
valuation methods generated higher and lower ranges. 21
The Board determined that there was a serious risk that
TransCanada would withdraw its offer if Columbia delayed
signing to buy time for Spectra. The Board also determined
that Spectra was unlikely to make a competitive offer, if it
made one at all. 22
*14  At the conclusion of the meeting, the Board
unanimously approved the Merger Agreement. Its terms
provided for (i) a $309 million termination fee equal to 3%
of the Merger's equity value, (ii) a no-shop provision, and
(iii) a fiduciary out that the Board could exercise after giving
TransCanada four days to match any superior proposal. JX
1025 §§ 4.02, 7.02(b).
P. Columbia's Stockholders Approve the Merger.
Columbia held a special meeting of stockholders on June
22, 2016, to consider the Merger. Holders of 73.9% of the
outstanding shares voted in favor of the Merger. Holders of
95.3% of the shares present in person or by proxy at the
meeting voted in favor of the Merger. PTO ¶¶ 5–6. The
Merger closed on July 1, 2016.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
“An appraisal proceeding is a limited legislative remedy
intended to provide shareholders dissenting from a merger on
grounds of inadequacy of the offering price with a judicial
determination of the intrinsic worth (fair value) of their
shareholdings.” Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor
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I), 542 A.2d 1182, 1186 (Del. 1988). Section 262(h) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law states that
the Court shall determine the fair
value of the shares exclusive of any
element of value arising from the
accomplishment or expectation of the
merger or consolidation, together with
interest, if any, to be paid upon the
amount determined to be the fair
value. In determining such fair value,
the Court shall take into account all
relevant factors.
8 Del. C. § 262(h). The statute thus places the obligation to
determine the fair value of the shares squarely on the court.
Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publ'rs, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 361
(Del. 1997).
Because of the statutory mandate, the allocation of the burden
of proof in an appraisal proceeding differs from a traditional
liability proceeding. “In a statutory appraisal proceeding, both
sides have the burden of proving their respective valuation
positions ....” M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513,
520 (Del. 1999). “No presumption, favorable or unfavorable,
attaches to either side's valuation ....” Pinson v. Campbell-
Taggart, Inc., 1989 WL 17438, at *6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 1989).
“Each party also bears the burden of proving the constituent
elements of its valuation position ..., including the propriety
of a particular method, modification, discount, or premium.”
Jesse A. Finkelstein & John D. Hendershot, Appraisal Rights
in Mergers and Consolidations, Corp. Prac. Series (BNA) No.
38-5th, at A-90 (2010 & 2017 Supp.) [hereinafter Appraisal
Rights].
As in other civil cases, the standard of proof in an
appraisal proceeding is a preponderance of the evidence.
M.G. Bancorp., 737 A.2d at 520. A party is not required to
prove its valuation conclusion, the related valuation inputs,
or its underlying factual contentions by clear and convincing
evidence or to exacting certainty. See Triton Constr. Co. v. E.
Shore Elec. Servs., Inc., 2009 WL 1387115, at *6 (Del. Ch.
May 18, 2009), aff'd, 2010 WL 376924 (Del. Jan. 14, 2010)
(ORDER). “Proof by a preponderance of the evidence means
proof that something is more likely than not. It means that
certain evidence, when compared to the evidence opposed to
it, has the more convincing force and makes you believe that
something is more likely true than not.” Agilent Techs., Inc. v.
Kirkland, 2010 WL 610725, at *13 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
*15  “In discharging its statutory mandate, the Court of
Chancery has discretion to select one of the parties' valuation
models as its general framework or to fashion its own.” M.G.
Bancorp., 737 A.2d at 525–26. “The Court may evaluate
the valuation opinions submitted by the parties, select the
most representative analysis, and then make appropriate
adjustments to the resulting valuation.” Appraisal Rights,
supra, at A-31 (collecting cases). The court also may “make
its own independent valuation calculation by ... adapting or
blending the factual assumptions of the parties' experts.”
M.G. Bancorp., 737 A.2d at 524. It is also “entirely proper
for the Court of Chancery to adopt any one expert's model,
methodology, and mathematical calculations, in toto, if that
valuation is supported by credible evidence and withstands a
critical judicial analysis on the record.” Id. at 526. “If neither
party satisfies its burden, however, the court must then use its
own independent judgment to determine fair value.” Gholl v.
eMachines, Inc., 2004 WL 2847865, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24,
2004).
In Tri-Continental Corporation v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71 (Del.
1950), the Delaware Supreme Court explained in detail the
concept of value that the appraisal statute employs:
The basic concept of value under the
appraisal statute is that the stockholder
is entitled to be paid for that which
has been taken from him, viz., his
proportionate interest in a going
concern. By value of the stockholder's
proportionate interest in the corporate
enterprise is meant the true or intrinsic
value of his stock which has been taken
by the merger. In determining what
figure represents the true or intrinsic
value, ... the courts must take into
consideration all factors and elements
which reasonably might enter into
the fixing of value. Thus, market
value, asset value, dividends, earning
prospects, the nature of the enterprise
and any other facts which were known
or which could be ascertained as of
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the date of the merger and which
throw any light on future prospects of
the merged corporation are not only
pertinent to an inquiry as to the value
of the dissenting stockholder's interest,
but must be considered .... 23
Subsequent Delaware Supreme Court decisions have adhered
consistently to this definition of value. 24  Most recently, the
Delaware Supreme Court reiterated that “[f]air value is ...
the value of the company to the stockholder as a going
concern,” i.e. the stockholder's “proportionate interest in a
going concern.” Verition P'rs Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba
Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 132–33 (Del. 2019).
*16  The trial court's “ultimate goal in an appraisal
proceeding is to determine the ‘fair or intrinsic value’ of
each share on the closing date of the merger.” Dell, Inc.
v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177
A.3d 1, 20 (Del. 2017) (quoting Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at
1142–43). To accomplish this task, “the court should first
envisage the entire pre-merger company as a ‘going concern,’
as a standalone entity, and assess its value as such.” Id.
(quoting Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1144). When doing so,
the corporation “must be valued as a going concern based
upon the ‘operative reality’ of the company as of the time of
the merger,” taking into account its particular market position
in light of future prospects. M.G. Bancorp., 737 A.2d at
525 (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor
IV), 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996)); accord Dell, 177 A.3d
at 20. The concept of the corporation's “operative reality”
is important because “[t]he underlying assumption in an
appraisal valuation is that the dissenting shareholders would
be willing to maintain their investment position had the
merger not occurred.” Technicolor IV, 684 A.2d at 298.
Consequently, the trial court must assess “the value of the
company ... as a going concern, rather than its value to a third
party as an acquisition.” M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731
A.2d 790, 795 (Del. 1999).
“The time for determining the value of a dissenter's shares
is the point just before the merger transaction ‘on the date
of the merger.’ ” Appraisal Rights, supra, at A-33 (quoting
Technicolor I, 542 A.2d at 1187). Put differently, the valuation
date is the date on which the merger closes. Technicolor IV,
684 A.2d at 298; accord M.G. Bancorp., 737 A.2d at 525.
If the value of the corporation changes between the signing
of the merger agreement and the closing, then the fair value
determination must be measured by the “operative reality”
of the corporation at the effective time of the merger. See
Technicolor IV, 684 A.2d at 298.
The statutory obligation to make a single determination
of a corporation's value introduces an impression of false
precision into appraisal jurisprudence.
[I]t is one of the conceits of our
law that we purport to declare
something as elusive as the fair value
of an entity on a given date ....
[V]aluation decisions are impossible
to make with anything approaching
complete confidence. Valuing an entity
is a difficult intellectual exercise,
especially when business and financial
experts are able to organize data in
support of wildly divergent valuations
for the same entity. For a judge who
is not an expert in corporate finance,
one can do little more than try to
detect gross distortions in the experts'
opinions. This effort should, therefore,
not be understood, as a matter of
intellectual honesty, as resulting in the
fair value of a corporation on a given
date. The value of a corporation is
not a point on a line, but a range of
reasonable values, and the judge's task
is to assign one particular value within
this range as the most reasonable value
in light of all the relevant evidence and
based on considerations of fairness. 25
Because the determination of fair value follows a litigated
proceeding, the issues that the court considers and the
outcome it reaches depend in large part on the arguments
advanced and the evidence presented.
An argument may carry the day in
a particular case if counsel advance
it skillfully and present persuasive
evidence to support it. The same
argument may not prevail in another
- 124 - 
In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
2019 WL 3778370
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 12
case if the proponents fail to generate a
similarly persuasive level of probative
evidence or if the opponents respond
effectively.
Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., L.P., 2016
WL 7324170, at *16 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016). Likewise,
the approach that an expert espouses may have met “the
approval of this court on prior occasions,” but may be
rejected in a later case if not presented persuasively or if “the
relevant professional community has mined additional data
and pondered the reliability of past practice and come, by a
healthy weight of reasoned opinion, to believe that a different
practice should become the norm ....” Global GT LP v. Golden
Telecom, Inc. (Golden Telecom Trial), 993 A.2d 497, 517
(Del. Ch.), aff'd, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010).
*17  In this case, the parties proposed three valuation
indicators: (i) the deal price minus synergies, (ii) Columbia's
unaffected trading price, and (iii) a DCF analysis. The
petitioners relied on the DCF analysis. The respondent
relied on the other two metrics. Although technically the
respondent in an appraisal proceeding is the surviving
company, the acquirer is typically the real party in interest
on the respondent's side of the case. In this case, that party
is TransCanada. Reflecting this reality, this decision refers to
the respondent's arguments as TransCanada's.
A. Deal Price
TransCanada contends that the deal price of $25.50 per share
is a reliable indicator of fair value if adjusted downward
to eliminate elements of value arising from the Merger.
The petitioners argue that the deal price should receive no
weight, but that if it does receive weight, then it should
be adjusted upward to reflect improvements in value that
Columbia experienced between signing and closing. As the
proponent of using the deal price, TransCanada bore the
burden of establishing its persuasiveness. Each side bore the
burden of proving its respective adjustments.
1. Guidance Regarding How To Approach The Deal
Price
In three recent decisions, the Delaware Supreme Court has
endorsed using the deal price in an arm's-length transaction
as evidence of fair value. 26  In each decision, the Delaware
Supreme Court weighed in on aspects of the sale process that
made the deal price a reliable indicator of fair value, both
by describing guiding principles and by applying them to the
facts of the case. These important decisions illuminate what
a trial court should consider when assessing the deal price as
a valuation indicator.
a. DFC
The first decision—DFC—involved the acquisition of a
payday lender (DFC Global) by a private equity firm (Lone
Star). In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp. (DFC Trial), 2016
WL 3753123, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016) (subsequent
history omitted). The respondent urged the court to rely on
the deal price as the most reliable evidence of fair value. Id.
To assess the deal price, the trial court examined the strength
of the sale process, explaining that the deal price “is reliable
only when the market conditions leading to the transaction are
conducive to achieving a fair price.” Id.
The pre-signing sale process for DFC Global lasted two years,
but proceeded in fits and starts. In April 2012, DFC Global
hired a banker to explore a sale to a private equity firm. Id.
at *3. The banker selected six firms, and a seventh expressed
interest independently. By September 2012, none had bid, and
the banker spent the next year reaching out to another thirty-
five private equity firms and three potential strategic buyers.
In September 2013, two private equity firms—Crestview
Partners and J.C. Flowers & Co.—expressed interest in a
joint acquisition. In December 2013, Lone Star expressed
interest in a transaction at $12.16 per share. After Crestview
withdrew from the joint bid, J.C. Flowers expressed interest
in a transaction at $13.50 per share.
During due diligence, DFC Global provided both bidders with
a lowered set of projections, leading Lone Star to reduce its
expression of interest to $11 per share. In March 2014, DFC
Global entered into exclusive negotiations with Lone Star.
During the exclusivity period, DFC Global provided an even
lower forecast, and Lone Star dropped its formal bid to $9.50
per share. Lone Star gave DFC Global twenty-four hours to
accept, but later extended the deadline by five days. DFC
Global accepted, and the parties announced the transaction
publicly on April 2, 2014. It closed on June 13, 2014. Id. at *4.
*18  In the appraisal proceeding, the court first worked
through the parties' DCF valuations and the respondent's
comparable-companies analysis. Having done so, the court
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turned to the deal price, describing it as “an appropriate factor
to consider” and observing that the company “was purchased
by a third-party buyer in an arm's-length sale” after a process
that “lasted approximately two years and involved [DFC
Global's] advisor reaching out to dozens of financial sponsors
as well as several potential strategic buyers.” Id. at *21.
The court noted that the deal “did not involve the potential
conflicts of interest inherent in a management buyout or
negotiations to retain existing management ....” Id. Instead,
Lone Star took the opposite approach and replaced most of
the key executives. Id. At the same time, the court expressed
concern that DFC Global was facing a period of regulatory
uncertainty in which it could not access its full range of
strategic options. The evidence also indicated that Lone Star
had “focused its attention on achieving a certain internal
rate of return and on reaching a deal within its financing
constraints, rather than on [DFC Global's] fair value.” Id. at
*22. The trial court also observed that Lone Star had secured
exclusivity during a critical phase of the sale process and
pressured the company into the final price with an exploding
offer. Id. at *23. The post-signing phase, by contrast, was
relatively open, with a termination fee that “was reasonable
and bifurcated to allow for a reduced fee in the event of a
superior proposal.” Id.
The trial court ultimately concluded that each of the three
indicators that the parties advanced—the DCF analysis, the
comparable-companies analysis, and the deal price—had
limitations. But all three provided meaningful insight into
DFC Global's value, and all three fell within a reasonable
range. The court therefore averaged them, arriving at a
valuation of $10.21 per share. Id. That outcome reflected a
premium of 7.5% over the deal price of $9.50 per share.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed. In its
first argument for reversal, the respondent contended that
the Delaware Supreme Court should presume that the deal
price reflects fair value under specified conditions, effectively
asking the Delaware Supreme Court to overrule its decision
in Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP, 11 A.3d 214
(Del. 2010). There, the high court had rejected a similar
request to establish a presumption, explaining that “Section
262(h) neither dictates nor even contemplates that the Court
of Chancery should consider the transactional market price of
the underlying company. Rather, in determining ‘fair value,’
the statute instructs that the court ‘shall take into account all
relevant factors.’ ” Id. at 217 (quoting 8 Del. C. § 262(h)). The
Golden Telecom decision observed that “[r]equiring the Court
of Chancery to defer—conclusively or presumptively—to the
merger price, even in the face of a pristine, unchallenged
transactional process, would contravene the unambiguous
language of the statute and the reasoned holdings of our
precedent.” Id. at 218.
In DFC, the Delaware Supreme Court again declined to
establish a presumption, but cautioned that its
refusal to craft a statutory presumption
in favor of the deal price when certain
conditions pertain does not in any way
signal our ignorance to the economic
reality that the sale value resulting
from a robust market check will often
be the most reliable evidence of fair
value, and that second-guessing the
value arrived upon by the collective
views of many sophisticated parties
with a real stake in the matter is
hazardous.
DFC, 172 A.3d at 366. The justices also cautioned that
“we have little quibble with the economic argument that the
price of a merger that results from a robust market check,
against the back drop of a rich information base and a
welcoming environment for potential buyers, is probative of
the company's fair value.” Id.
The Delaware Supreme Court then elaborated on what fair
value means when evaluating a deal price:
[F]air value is just that, “fair.” It
does not mean the highest possible
price that a company might have sold
for had Warren Buffett negotiated for
it on his best day and the Lenape
who sold Manhattan on their worst....
Capitalism is rough and ready, and the
purpose of an appraisal is not to make
sure that the petitioners get the highest
conceivable value that might have
been procured had every domino fallen
out of the company's way; rather, it
is to make sure that they receive fair
compensation for their shares in the
sense that it reflects what they deserve
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to receive based on what would fairly
be given to them in an arm's-length
transaction.
*19  Id. at 370–71.
Addressing the merits, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed
the trial court's determination of fair value, noting that the trial
court had made the following post-trial findings of fact:
i) the transaction resulted from a robust market search that
lasted approximately two years in which financial and
strategic buyers had an open opportunity to buy without
inhibition of deal protections;
ii) the company was purchased by a third party in an arm's
length sale; and
iii) there was no hint of self-interest that compromised the
market check.
Id. at 349 (formatting altered). The high court further
observed that
[a]lthough there is no presumption
in favor of the deal price, under
the conditions found by the Court
of Chancery, economic principles
suggest that the best evidence of
fair value was the deal price, as
it resulted from an open process,
informed by robust public information,
and easy access to deeper, non-public
information, in which many parties
with an incentive to make a profit had
a chance to bid.
Id.
The Delaware Supreme Court cited “the failure of other
buyers to pursue the company when they had a free chance
to do so” as one of several “objective factors that support
the fairness of the price paid ....” Id. at 376. The high court
also observed that Lone Star “was subjected to a competitive
process of bidding[.]” Id. at 350. That finding was supported
by the competition between Lone Star and J.C. Flowers before
signing and the passive market check after signing. The
Delaware Supreme Court also explained that “the fact that
the ultimate buyer was alone at the end provides no basis for
suspicion” given the trial court's findings that
i) there was no conflict of interest;
ii) [DFC Global's investment banker] had approached
every logical buyer;
iii) no one was willing to bid more in the months leading
up to the transaction before management significantly
adjusted downward its projections; and
iv) management continued to miss its targets after Lone
Star was the only buyer remaining.
Id. at 376 (formatting altered). The Delaware Supreme Court
found that “the record does not include the sorts of flaws in the
sale process that could lead one to reasonably suspect that the
ultimate price paid by Lone Star was not reflective of DFC's
fair value.” Id.
Based on this analysis, the Delaware Supreme Court
determined that the Court of Chancery's “decision to give
one-third weight to each metric was unexplained and in
tension with the Court of Chancery's own findings about
the robustness of the market check.” Id. at 388. The senior
tribunal therefore remanded the case for the trial court to
“reassess [its] conclusion as to fair value in light of our
decision.” Id. at 388–89.
b. Dell
The second decision—Dell—involved a management buyout
of Dell Inc. in which its founder and CEO (Michael Dell)
teamed up with a private equity firm (Silver Lake) to acquire
the company. When the merger agreement was signed, the
deal price was $13.65 per share. With the stockholder vote
trending against the merger, the buyout group increased its
bid to $13.75 per share (the “Final Merger Consideration”).
*20  The respondent contended that the Final Merger
Consideration was the best evidence of Dell's fair value on the
closing date. In re Appraisal of Dell Inc. (Dell Trial), 2016
WL 3186538, at *21 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016) (subsequent
history omitted). To analyze this contention, the trial court
separately examined the pre- and post-signing phases of the
transaction process.
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The trial court found that bidding during the pre-signing phase
had not produced fair value. Three factors contributed to
this determination: (i) the bidders' use of leveraged-buyout
models to price their bids, (ii) evidence that the stock market
had undervalued Dell by focusing on its disappointing short-
term prospects, and (iii) limited pre-signing competition. See
id. at *29–37.
For present purposes, the third factor is most pertinent.
The trial court determined that pre-signing competition was
limited because Dell's special committee only invited one
other private equity firm to compete with Silver Lake at any
given time, and all of the firms priced the deal using the
same leveraged-buyout financing model that Silver Lake had
used. See id. at *9–10, *30–31, *37. The committee did not
approach strategic buyers during the pre-signing phase, in part
because one of the committee's financial advisors (Evercore)
discouraged the committee from contacting a wider universe
of buyers until the go-shop process, when the advisor would
earn a premium for generating a higher bid. Id. at *6, *11. The
committee's other financial advisor (JPMorgan) expressed
concern about the absence of a competitive dynamic and its
effect on the bidding. See id. at *6, *37.
Having found that the pre-signing phase failed to support
the reliability of the deal price, the trial court examined
whether the post-signing phase validated it. The merger
agreement contemplated a go-shop period, and during this
phase, two financial sponsors emerged with competing
recapitalizations. In response, and to secure a favorable
stockholder vote, the buyout group increased its price to
the Final Merger Consideration. Id. at *14, *16–18, *37–
38. The trial court found that the results of the go-shop
ruled out a large gap between the Final Merger Consideration
and fair value, because if Dell's value had approached
what the petitioners claimed, then a strategic bidder would
have intervened. But the trial court also concluded that
impediments to bidding undercut the reliability of the go-
shop as a price-discovery tool, citing (i) the magnitude of
the transaction, (ii) Mr. Dell's participation in the buyout
group, including his financial incentives as a net buyer of
shares and his valuable relationships with customers, and
(iii) information asymmetries between the buyout group and
competing bidders. See id. at *40–44.
Having concluded that the respondent did not carry its burden
of proving the reliability of the deal price, the trial court relied
on a DCF analysis. After resolving various disputes between
the parties, the trial court made a fair-value determination
of $17.62 per share, a result 28% over the deal price. This
outcome appeared consistent with the result from the sale
process, because it exceeded what a financial sponsor would
pay under a leveraged-buyout model, but was below the level
where the valuation gap would be sufficiently attractive for a
strategic buyer to intervene. It suggested that the company's
best option was to remain independent and ride out what
appeared to be a trough in the stock price. The trial court
perceived that this dynamic permitted the buyout group to
take the company private at a premium to market but at a
discount to fair value. See id. at *51.
*21  On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed.
Consistent with its earlier decisions in Golden Telecom
and DFC, the high court stressed that that “there is no
requirement that the court assign some mathematical weight
to the deal price ....” Dell, 177 A.3d at 23. But on the facts
presented, the high court held that the trial court “erred in not
assigning any mathematical weight to the deal price” under
circumstances suggesting that “the deal price deserved heavy,
if not dispositive weight.” Id.; accord id. at 30 (“Overall, the
weight of evidence shows that Dell's deal price has heavy, if
not overriding, probative value.”).
The Delaware Supreme Court explained that Dell's sale
process featured “fair play, low barriers to entry, outreach
to all logical buyers, and the chance for any topping bidder
to have the support of Mr. Dell's own votes ....” Id. at 35.
In reaching this conclusion, the Delaware Supreme Court
viewed the pre-signing process favorably, noting that (i) the
members of the special committee who ran the sale process
were “independent, experienced ... and armed with the power
to say ‘no,’ ” (ii) the committee persuaded the buyout group
to raise its bid six times, from an initial range of $11.22-
to-$12.16 to $13.65, and (iii) there was “[n]othing in the
record [that] suggests that increased competition would have
produced a better result.” Id. at 11, 28. The Delaware Supreme
Court also cited “leaks that Dell was exploring strategic
alternatives,” which corroborated Evercore's assumption that
“interested parties would have approached the Company
before the go-shop if serious about pursuing a deal.” Id. at
28. Finally, the high court cited JPMorgan's view that “any
other financial sponsor would have bid in the same ballpark
as Silver Lake.” Id.
The Delaware Supreme Court also viewed the post-signing
process favorably. The high court cited the number of parties
that the committee's bankers contacted and the fact that the
go-shop's structure was more flexible than other go-shops. Id.
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at 29. As with its assessment of the pre-signing phase, the
Delaware Supreme Court stressed the absence of evidence
that another party was interested in proceeding, explaining
that “[f]air value entails at minimum a price some buyer is
willing to pay—not a price at which no class of buyers in the
market would pay.” Id.; see id. at 32, 34. The absence of a
higher bid meant “that the deal market was already robust and
that a topping bid involved a serious risk of overpayment[,]”
which in turn “suggests the price is already at a level that is
fair.” Id. at 33.
Although it reversed the trial court's finding of fair value, the
Delaware Supreme Court did not require that the trial court
adopt the deal price: “Despite the sound economic and policy
reasons supporting the use of the deal price as the fair value
award on remand, we will not give in to the temptation to
dictate that result.” Id. at 44. The high court left it to the trial
judge to reach his own conclusion, while “giv[ing] the [trial
judge] the discretion on remand to enter judgment at the deal
price if he so chooses, with no further proceedings.” Id.
c. Aruba
The third decision—Aruba—involved the acquisition of a
technology company (Aruba Networks) by a much larger
competitor (Hewlett-Packard). See Verition P'rs Master Fund
Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc. (Aruba Trial), 2018 WL 922139
(Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018) (subsequent history omitted). The
respondent asked the court to give heavy weight to the deal
price. To evaluate its reliability, the trial court examined
the sale process in light of the Delaware Supreme Court's
decisions in Dell and DFC.
*22  The pre-signing sale process in Aruba had two phases.
In late August 2014, HP approached Aruba about a deal. Id.
at *7–8. Aruba hired an investment banker (Qatalyst), and the
banker and Aruba management anticipated obtaining a deal
for around $30 per share. Id. at *9. The companies entered
into an NDA that restricted HP from speaking with Aruba
management about post-transaction employment, and HP
began conducting due diligence. After receiving projections
from Aruba, HP determined that with synergies, the pro forma
value of acquiring Aruba was as high as $32.05 per share.
Id. at *11. Meanwhile, Qatalyst identified thirteen potential
partners and approached five of them. For reasons having
“nothing to do with price,” none was interested. Id. at *10.
Despite the restriction in the NDA, HP asked Aruba's CEO,
Dominic Orr, to take on a key role with the combined
entity. Orr replied that he had no objection. Id. at *11. The
parties seemed to be making progress towards a deal, but
the HP board of directors balked at making a bid without
further analysis, recalling the fallout from HP's disastrous
acquisition of Autonomy Corporation PLC in 2011. By the
end of November 2014, Orr felt the process had dragged on
long enough, and with the approval of the Aruba board, he
terminated the discussions. Id. at *12.
For its part, HP continued to evaluate an acquisition of Aruba.
In December 2014, HP tapped Barclays Capital Inc. as its
financial advisor, a firm that had worked for Aruba and had
been trying for months to secure the sell-side engagement. Id.
at *13. On January 21, 2015, HP's CEO met Orr for dinner.
During the meeting, when HP's CEO proposed resuming
merger talks, Orr responded positively and suggested trying
to announce a deal by early March. But HP's CEO also told
Orr that because Qatalyst had represented Autonomy when
HP acquired it, HP would not proceed if Aruba used Qatalyst.
Id. at *14.
The Aruba board decided to move forward with the deal and
informed Qatalyst about HP's ukase. Aruba was obligated to
pay Qatalyst a fee in the event of a successful transaction, so
it kept Qatalyst on as a behind-the-scenes advisor. From then
on, Qatalyst's primary goal was to repair its relationship with
HP, and Qatalyst regarded a successful sale of Aruba to HP
as a key step in the right direction. Aruba also needed a new
HP-facing banker. It hired Evercore, a firm that was trying to
establish a presence in Silicon Valley. During the sale process,
Evercore likewise sought to please HP, viewing HP as a major
source of future business. See id. at *9, *15–16, *19, *21.
The ensuing negotiations proceeded quickly. HP had
anticipated making an opening bid of $24 per share, but after
Orr's enthusiastic response, HP opened at $23.25 per share. Id.
at *16–17. Qatalyst reached out to a sixth potential strategic
partner, but it was not interested. Id. at *17. The Aruba board
decided to counter at $29 per share. Evercore conveyed the
number to Barclays, but when Barclays dismissed it, Evercore
emphasized Aruba's desire to announce a deal quickly. Id. at
*17–18. On February 10, 2015, twenty days after HP resumed
discussions with Orr, the Aruba board agreed to a price of
$24.67 per share. Id. at *19. The parties negotiated a merger
agreement, and on March 1, 2015, the Aruba board approved
it.
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The post-signing phase was uneventful. On March 2, 2015,
Aruba and HP announced the merger. The merger agreement
(i) contained a no-shop clause subject to a fiduciary out, (ii)
conditioned the out for an unsolicited superior proposal on
compliance with an unlimited match right that gave HP five
days to match the first superior proposal and two days to
match any subsequent increase, and (iii) required Aruba to
pay HP a termination fee of $90 million, representing 3% of
the Aruba's equity value. No competing bidder emerged, and
on May 1, 2015, Aruba's stockholders approved the merger.
Id. at *21–22.
*23  The trial court found that under Dell and DFC, Aruba's
sale process was sufficiently reliable to make the deal price a
persuasive indicator of fair value. The HP-Aruba transaction
was an arm's-length merger. The ultimate decision-makers
for Aruba—the board and the stockholders—did not face any
conflicts of interest. During the sale process, Aruba extracted
price increases from HP. There was also evidence that the
deal price credited Aruba with a portion of the substantial
synergies that the merger would create. And the merger
agreement's deal protections were relatively customary and
would not have supported a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty. Id. at *36–38. The trial court therefore viewed the HP-
Aruba merger as “a run-of-the-mill, third party-deal,” where
“[n]othing about it appears exploitive.” Id. at *38.
The trial court next turned to the petitioners' specific
challenges to the deal price. The petitioners argued that deal
price resulted from a closed-off sale process in which HP
had not faced a meaningful threat of competition. Id. at
*39. The trial court rejected that contention, noting that the
petitioners failed “to point to a likely bidder and make a
persuasive showing that increased competition would have
led to a better result.” Id. (citing Dell, 177 A.3d at 28–29,
32, 34). The petitioners proved that HP knew that it did not
face a meaningful threat of competition, but they did not show
that anyone else would have paid more. Id. at *41. Instead,
the record showed that none of the six parties that Qatalyst
contacted was willing to bid, and no one emerged between
signing and closing. Id.
The petitioners next argued that the negotiators' incentives
undermined the sale process, citing the desire of Aruba's
bankers to cater to HP and the more subtly divergent interests
of Aruba's CEO. The trial court found that although the
petitioners proved that Aruba could have negotiated more
aggressively, they did not prove that “the bankers, [the CEO],
the Aruba Board, and the stockholders who approved the
transaction all accepted a deal price that left a portion of
Aruba's fundamental value on the table.” Id. at *44.
In other portions of the decision, the trial court found that
Aruba's unaffected trading price was a reliable indicator
of fair value and rejected the parties' DCF valuations as
unreliable. These holdings left the trial court with two reliable
valuation indicators: the unaffected trading price and the deal
price. The trial court determined that the unaffected trading
price was the better measure of the fair value of Aruba's
shares. See id. at *53–55.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed. The high
court found that the trial court had incorrectly relied on
the unaffected trading price, but it accepted the trial court's
finding that the deal price was a reliable indicator of fair value.
Aruba, 210 A.3d at 141–42.
Addressing the petitioners' claim that the sale process lacked
a competitive bidding dynamic, the Delaware Supreme Court
explained that the trial court had misinterpreted DFC and Dell
as downplaying the value of competition. See id. at 136. The
Delaware Supreme Court emphasized that
when there is an open opportunity
for many buyers to buy and only a
few bid (or even just one bids), that
does not necessarily mean that there
is a failure of competition; it may
just mean that the target's value is
not sufficiently enticing to buyers to
engender a bidding war above the
winning price.
Id. The high court then applied this principle to the facts in
Aruba:
Aruba approached other logical
strategic buyers prior to signing the
deal with HP, and none of those
potential buyers were interested. Then,
after signing and the announcement of
the deal, still no other buyer emerged
even though the merger agreement
allowed for superior bids. It cannot
be that an open chance for buyers to
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bid signals a market failure simply
because buyers do not believe the asset
on sale is sufficiently valuable for
them to engage in a bidding contest
against each other. If that were the
jurisprudential conclusion, then the
judiciary would itself infuse assets
with extra value by virtue of the fact
that no actual market participants saw
enough value to pay a higher price.
That sort of alchemy has no rational
basis in economics.
*24  Id. On the facts presented, the level of competition in
Aruba was sufficient to support the reliability of the deal
price.
The Delaware Supreme Court also explained that
a buyer in possession of material
nonpublic information about the seller
is in a strong position (and is uniquely
incentivized) to properly value the
seller when agreeing to buy the
company at a particular deal price, and
that view of value should be given
considerable weight by the Court of
Chancery absent deficiencies in the
deal process.
Id. at 137. The high court observed that HP and Aruba went
“back and forth over price” and that HP had “access to
nonpublic information to supplement its consideration of the
public information available to stock market buyers ....” Id.
at 139. The Delaware Supreme Court elsewhere emphasized
that “HP had signed a confidentiality agreement, done
exclusive due diligence, gotten access to material nonpublic
information,” and “had a much sharper incentive to engage in
price discovery than an ordinary trader because it was seeking
to acquire all shares.” Id. at 140. On the facts presented, the
extent of the negotiations in Aruba was sufficient to support
the reliability of the deal price.
The high court ultimately concluded that Aruba's sale process
was sufficiently reliable to render the deal price the best
measure of fair value. The Delaware Supreme Court declined
to use the trial court's estimate of the deal price minus
synergies, instead adopting HP's contemporaneous synergies
estimate and remanding with instructions that “final judgment
be entered for the petitioners in the amount of $19.10 per share
plus any interest to which the petitioners are entitled.” Id. at
142.
2. Applying The Delaware Supreme Court's
Precedents To This Case
The Delaware Supreme Court's precedents indicate that the
sale process in this case was sufficiently reliable to make
the deal price a persuasive indicator of fair value. These
authorities call for rejecting the petitioners' challenges to the
sale process.
a. Objective Indicia Of Deal-Price Fairness
When assessing whether a sale process results in fair value, it
is critical to recall that “fair value is just that, ‘fair.’ ” DFC,
172 A.3d at 370. “[T]he key inquiry is whether the dissenters
got fair value and were not exploited.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 33.
“The issue in an appraisal is not whether a negotiator has
extracted the highest possible bid.” Id. Rather, “the purpose
of an appraisal is ... to make that [the petitioners] receive fair
compensation for their shares in the sense that it reflects what
they deserve to receive based on what would fairly be given to
them in an arm's-length transaction.” DFC, 172 A.3d at 370–
71.
When applying this standard, the Delaware Supreme Court
has cited “objective indicia” that “suggest[ ] that the deal price
was a fair price.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 28; accord DFC, 172 A.3d
at 376. In each of its recent decisions, the Delaware Supreme
Court found that the objective indicia outweighed the sale
processes' shortcomings. In this case, a similar analysis shows
that the deal price is a reliable indicator of fair value.
*25  First, the Merger was an arm's-length transaction with
a third party. See DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (citing fact that “the
company was purchased by a third party in an arm's length
sale” as factor supporting fairness of deal price). TransCanada
was a pure outsider with no prior stock ownership in
Columbia.
Second, the Board did not labor under any conflicts of
interest. Six of the Board's seven members were experienced
outside directors. Cf. Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (citing fact
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that special committee was “composed of independent,
experienced directors and armed with the power to say ‘no’
” as factor supporting fairness of deal price). Columbia's
stockholders were widely dispersed, and the petitioners have
not identified divergent interests among them.
Third, TransCanada conducted due diligence and received
confidential insights about Columbia's value. 27  Like the
acquirer in Aruba, TransCanada “had signed a confidentiality
agreement, done exclusive due diligence, gotten access to
material nonpublic information,” and had a “sharp[ ] incentive
to engage in price discovery ... because it was seeking to
acquire all shares.” Aruba, 210 A.3d at 140.
Fourth, during the first pre-signing phase, Columbia
contacted other potential buyers, and those parties failed to
pursue a merger when they had a free chance to do so. See
DFC, 172 A.3d at 376 (citing “failure of other buyers to
pursue the company when they had a free chance to do so” as
factor supporting fairness of deal price). The degree of pre-
signing interaction is similar to or compares favorably with
the facts in the Delaware Supreme Court precedents. 28
Fifth, Columbia negotiated with TransCanada and extracted
multiple price increases. See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 139 (citing
“back and forth over price”); Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (citing
fact that special committee “persuaded Silver Lake to raise
its bid six times”). After TransCanada offered $24 per share,
Columbia said no. When TransCanada raised its offer to
$25.25, Columbia again said no. The deal price of $25.50
per share was more than any other party had ever seriously
offered, including before the equity offering when Columbia
sold 25% of its stock for less than its trading price.
*26  Finally, no bidders emerged during the post-signing
phase, which is a factor that the Delaware Supreme Court has
stressed when evaluating a sale process. 29  The suite of deal
protections in the Merger Agreement fell within the norm,
making the absence of a topping bid significant.
Considering these factors as a whole, the sale process that led
to the Merger bore objective indicia of fairness that rendered
the deal price a reliable indicator of fair value.
b. Management Conflicts
As their central theme in this case, the petitioners argue that
Skaggs and Smith engineered a fire sale of Columbia to obtain
personal benefits. 30  They cite evidence that both had targeted
a 2016 retirement date. E.g., JX 163; JX 251. Each had a
change-in-control agreement that paid out triple the sum of
his base salary and target annual bonus if he retired after a sale
of Columbia. If the sale occurred after July 1, 2018, then the
multiple would drop from triple to double. PTO ¶¶ 206, 217;
Taylor Tr. 1263. When Columbia separated from NiSource,
both joined Columbia knowing that it was likely to be an
acquisition target. According to the petitioners, the executives
then strived to engineer a near-term sale, knowing they would
come out ahead even in a sale at less than fair value.
The Aruba decision involved a sale process where the
top executive and the company's investment bankers had
conflicting incentives. The CEO wanted to retire, but he
cared deeply about the company and its employees. When
HP proposed to acquire Aruba and keep the CEO on to
integrate the companies, it offered the perfect path “to an
honorable personal and professional exit.” Aruba Trial, 2018
WL 922139, at *5; see id. at *43 (analyzing CEO's conflict).
Aruba's investment bankers faced more direct conflicts
because both wanted to curry favor with HP. Qatalyst was
desperate to save its Silicon Valley franchise, and Evercore
was auditioning for future business. Id. at *43. The trial court
acknowledged the petitioners' concerns, but found that the
conflicting incentives did not undermine the deal price as an
indicator of fair value:
The evidence does not convince me
that the bankers, Orr, the Aruba
Board, and the stockholders who
approved the transaction all accepted
a deal price that left a portion of
Aruba's fundamental value on the
table. Perhaps different negotiators
could have extracted a greater share
of the synergies from HP in the
form of a higher deal price. Maybe
if Orr had been less eager, or if
Qatalyst had not been relegated to
the back room, then HP would have
opened at $24 per share. Perhaps
with a brash Qatalyst banker leading
the negotiations, unhampered by the
Autonomy incident, Aruba might have
negotiated more effectively and gotten
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HP above $25 per share. An outcome
along these lines would have resulted
in HP sharing a greater portion of
the anticipated synergies with Aruba's
stockholders. It would not have
changed Aruba's standalone value.
Hence, it would not have affected
Aruba's fair value for purposes of an
appraisal.
*27  Id. at *44. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court
accepted the reliability of the deal price as a valuation
indicator and used it when making its own fair value
determination. Aruba, 210 A.3d at 141–42.
The Dell decision also involved a conflict: Mr. Dell, the
company's founder and top executive, was a buy-side
participant in the management buyout and would emerge from
the transaction with a controlling stake. He did not lead the
negotiations on the sell side (that task fell to the special
committee), but the trial court regarded his involvement as
a factor cutting against the reliability of the deal price. For
example, the trial court found that Mr. Dell gave the buyout
group a leg-up given his relationships within the company and
his knowledge of its business, and the trial court accepted the
testimony of a sale-process expert that if bidders competed
to pay more than what Mr. Dell's group would pay, then they
risked a winner's curse. Dell Trial, 2016 WL 3186538, at *42–
43. Mr. Dell also was a net purchaser of shares in the buyout,
so any increase in the deal price cost him money.
If Mr. Dell kept the size of his
investment constant as the deal value
increased, then Silver Lake would
have to pay more and would demand
a greater ownership stake in the
post-transaction entity. Subramanian
showed that if Mr. Dell wanted to
maintain 75% ownership of the post-
transaction entity, then he would
have to contribute an additional $250
million for each $1 increase in the deal
price. If Mr. Dell did not contribute
any additional equity and relied on
Silver Lake to fund the increase, then
he would lose control of the post-
transaction entity at a deal price above
$15.73 per share. Because Mr. Dell
was a net buyer, any party considering
an overbid would understand that
a higher price would not be well
received by the most important person
at the Company.
Id. at *43 (footnote omitted). These factors did not make
Mr. Dell's involvement with the buyout group preclusive,
as that term is used in an enhanced scrutiny case, because
Mr. Dell testified credibly that he was willing to work with
any bidder, and there was evidence that two of the buyout
group's competitors had questioned Mr. Dell's value. But for
purposes of price discovery in an appraisal case, the trial
court perceived that Mr. Dell's involvement and incentives
undermined the effectiveness of the sale process and the
reliability of the deal price. Id. at *44.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that Mr. Dell's
involvement in the buyout group had not undermined the sale
process. See Dell, 177 A.3d at 32–33. The high court noted
that “the [trial court] did not identify any possible bidders that
were actually deterred because of Mr. Dell's status.” Id. at
34. The Delaware Supreme Court also emphasized Mr. Dell's
willingness to work with rival bidders during due diligence
and the absence of evidence that Mr. Dell would have left the
company if a rival bidder prevailed. Id. at 32–34. The high
court concluded that the lack of a higher bid did not call into
question the sale process, because “[i]f a deal price is at a
level where the next upward move by a topping bidder has a
material risk of being a self-destructive curse, that suggests
the price is already at a level that is fair.” Id. at 33.
*28  In this case, management's divergent interests fell short
of the conflicts that failed to undermine the sale process
in Dell. The alignment issue confronting Skaggs and Smith
more closely resembled the negotiators' incentives in Aruba.
Like Aruba's CEO and its bankers, Skaggs and Smith had
personal reasons to secure a deal under circumstances where
disinterested participants might have preferred a standalone
option: Their change-in-control benefits incentivized them
to favor selling Columbia before 2018. To minimize the
risk of missing that window, it was safer to act sooner
rather than later. See In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d
54, 94–95 (Del. Ch. 2014) (discussing how incentives
of contingently compensated representative are generally
aligned with principal's but diverge over whether to do a deal
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at all), aff'd sub nom. RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129
A.3d 816 (Del. 2015).
But Skaggs and Smith also had countervailing incentives to
pursue the best deal possible. Their change-in-control benefits
included significant equity components that appreciated with
a higher deal price. After the Merger, Skaggs retired and
received change-in-control payments totaling $26.8 million,
with over $19 million from equity awards. Skaggs received
an additional $30 million when the Merger cashed out his
nearly 1.2 million shares and phantom shares of Columbia
stock. Smith similarly retired and received change-in-control
payments totaling $10.9 million, with over $7.3 million from
equity awards. PTO ¶¶ 654, 656; JX 1370 at 17–18; see JX
1346 ¶¶ 12, 27.
When directors or their affiliates own “material” amounts
of common stock, it aligns their interests with other
stockholders by giving them a “motivation to seek the
highest price” and the “personal incentive as stockholders
to think about the trade off between selling now and the
risks of not doing so.”
Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 670–71 (Del. Ch.
2014) (quoting In re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d
573, 600 (Del. Ch. 2010)); see also Lender Processing, 2016
WL 7324170, at *22 (discussing incentive to maximize deal
price where target managers were net sellers and would not
retain jobs post-merger). That said, the equity components
in the change-in-control benefits did not fully solve the
alignment problem, because their contingent nature made
their recipients more averse to losing a deal, thereby limiting
their incentive to push for the final nickel or quarter. See
Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 94–95 (discussing how incentives
of contingently compensated representative and principal
diverge during final negotiations).
In sum, there is evidence to support the petitioners' theory, and
I have considered it seriously. Ultimately, however, I cannot
credit it. Although Skaggs and Smith wanted to retire, they
were professionals who took pride in their jobs and wanted to
do the right thing. They were not going to arrange a fire sale
for below Columbia's standalone value, and the Board would
not have let them.
Consistent with their incentives and professional
responsibilities, Skaggs and Smith rejected opportunities for
a quick sale. When Dominion expressed interest at an all-time
high valuation, Skaggs demanded more. Instead of taking
what they could get from Berkshire or TransCanada in fall
2015, Skaggs and Smith recommended a dilutive equity raise.
JX 534; JX 1399 at 2–3. When Columbia told TransCanada
that it was pursuing the equity raise, Girling offered a prompt
deal at a higher price. JX 588. Skaggs thought that was
too risky for Columbia and declined. A Columbia director
recognized that by pursuing the equity raise, Skaggs and
Smith had opted for “BIG, at least near, financial hits to your
net worth.” JX 621.
When negotiations with TransCanada resumed, Skaggs
remained focused on obtaining a fair price. While awaiting
TransCanada's formal offer in February 2016, Skaggs told
Cornelius that “if the cash portion of the initial salvo [is]
below $25, I would be inclined to not even counter.” JX 855.
When TransCanada offered $24, Skaggs and Smith said it
was a nonstarter. See PTO ¶ 563. TransCanada came back at
$25.25, and Skaggs recommended that the Board reject it. JX
1399 at 10; Skaggs Tr. 908–10; see Cornelius Tr. 1142–43.
The Board agreed, and after Skaggs told Girling, Lazard and
Skaggs believed the deal had died and that Columbia would
be proceeding with its standalone plan. See JX 901; JX 906;
JX 913.
*29  The most troubling event in the deal timeline is Smith's
one-on-one meeting with Poirier, when he explained that
TransCanada lacked competition. But Columbia did not take
TransCanada's $24 per share offer, or even its $25.25 offer.
Skaggs and the Board held out for a higher price, ultimately
obtaining the Merger consideration of $25.50.
There is some evidence that if the Board had said no to $25.50
per share, then TransCanada would have looked for ways to
go back up to $26. See Poirier Tr. 420–21. That prospect
is insufficient to undermine the deal price for appraisal
purposes. See Dell, 177 A.3d at 33 (explaining that fair value
in an appraisal is not a measure of “whether a negotiator has
extracted the highest possible bid”); accord DFC, 172 A.3d
at 370.
The evidence does not convince me that the Skaggs, Smith,
and the Board accepted a deal price that left a portion of
Columbia's fundamental value on the table. As in Aruba,
perhaps different negotiators could have done better. If they
had, then the higher price would have resulted in TransCanada
sharing a portion of the anticipated synergies with Columbia's
stockholders. It would not have affected whether Columbia's
stockholders received fair value.
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c. Claims Of Favoritism During The Pre-Signing Process
In their second attack on the sale process, the petitioners
contend that the pre-signing phase “yields no reliable
indication of fair value” because Columbia favored
TransCanada over opportunities with other buyers. See Dkt.
428 at 73–74. It is true that Columbia began to favor
TransCanada over time, but that was because a deal with
TransCanada offered higher and more certain value than the
alternatives.
The Aruba decision illustrates how a targeted pre-signing
process can evolve to focus on a single bidder without
undermining the deal price as an indicator of fair value.
There, the initial phase of the sale process involved outreach
to five potential strategic partners, and Aruba's banker later
contacted a sixth. All declined to bid. During the second
phase of the process, Aruba effectively engaged in a single-
bidder negotiation with HP, and the petitioners proved that HP
knew that it did not face a meaningful threat of competition.
Aruba Trial, 2018 WL 922139, at *40–41. As the high court
made clear on appeal, this fact pattern did not mean that
there was insufficient competition, nor did it render the deal
price unfair. See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136 (“[W]hen there is
an open opportunity for many buyers to buy and only a few
bid (or even just one bids), that does not necessarily mean
that there is a failure of competition; it may just mean that the
target's value is not sufficiently enticing to buyers to engender
a bidding war above the winning price.”).
The sale process in this case followed a similar pattern. It is
true that Columbia did not treat all bidders identically, but
Columbia's actions did not result in an ineffective sale process
or unreliable deal price. Rather than favoring TransCanada
throughout, Columbia initially expected Dominion to be
the logical buyer. After TransCanada's unsolicited outreach
to Smith in October 2015, Columbia remained focused on
Dominion, believing that it could pay more. See PTO ¶ 428.
In early November 2015, when Dominion said it could not
meet the Board's ask of $28 per share, Lazard recommended
broadening the process with private outreach to TransCanada,
Berkshire, and Spectra to “put pressure on [Dominion].” JX
503 at 2–3. Goldman agreed and recommended conducting
a broader market test only if the private process failed to
produce a bid materially greater than $24 per share. See JX
505.
*30  The targeted pre-signing process ultimately included
Dominion, NextEra, TransCanada, and Berkshire, but not
Spectra. The petitioners fault Columbia for not pursuing
Spectra, but they failed to prove that more vigorous pursuit
“would have produced a better result.” Dell, 177 A.3d at
28. On November 3, 2015, Spectra's CEO emailed Skaggs
to request a meeting or telephone call “in the next couple
of weeks to discuss what we may be able to accomplish
together.” JX 500. The two talked by phone on November 9.
During the call, Spectra's CEO “referenced potential strategic
opportunities for Columbia and Spectra, but provided no
specifics ... and did not request a follow-up meeting or
conversation.” PTO ¶ 438. Skaggs told Spectra to move
quickly, because otherwise Columbia would end talks and
proceed with an equity offering. Skaggs Tr. 960; see id. at
871. After the call, Spectra went “radio silent.” Skaggs Tr.
879; accord JX 541. On November 17, Skaggs reported to the
Board that Spectra's CEO “had again expressed interest in a
potential strategic transaction ... but had only spoken in terms
of generic transaction considerations and had not provided
a specific, actionable proposal or requested a substantive
follow-up.” PTO ¶ 456. In a November 25 update to the
Board, Skaggs confirmed that “no additional word had been
received” from Spectra. Id. ¶ 471. Spectra had a “free chance”
to pursue Columbia during the pre-signing phase. DFC, 172
A.3d at 376. Spectra's failure to act does not undermine the
fairness of the deal price.
The petitioners next claim that Columbia gave more
information to TransCanada than to others in November 2015.
The simple answer is that the bidders requested different
levels of information. Berkshire was the most demanding. 31
TransCanada was next, and both TransCanada and Berkshire
asked for redacted precedent agreements. Dominion did not
receive them because it did not ask.
The petitioners also complain that Skaggs gave TransCanada
and Berkshire an informal bid deadline of November 24,
2015, without sharing the deadline with Dominion. Columbia
told all of the parties it contacted to act quickly before
Columbia pivoted to an equity offering, so Dominion
knew there was time pressure. See Skaggs Tr. 960–61.
By November 22, because of extensive interactions with
TransCanada and Berkshire, Columbia management expected
imminent indications of interest from those firms. Dominion
“ha[d] been radio silent.” JX 569. Sure enough, TransCanada
and Berkshire made prompt bids, and Dominion did not.
The petitioners cite an email from November 25, 2015
in which Dominion's partner, NextEra, expressed surprise
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when Columbia called off the sale process to pursue an
equity offering, saying that the deadline “was news to us
—we were working on it.” JX 592. Dominion and NextEra
knew they had to move quickly, and had they been more
interested, they would have. There is no evidence that an
expression of interest from Dominion and NextEra would
have been sufficiently competitive and sufficiently actionable
to cause Columbia to forego the equity offering and agree to
a preemptive transaction at a higher value than the Merger.
The petitioners likewise claim that Columbia unduly favored
TransCanada after the equity offering. As it did throughout the
process, Columbia pursued the best opportunity. Columbia
first focused on Dominion. Because of Dominion's reticence,
Columbia next focused on Berkshire and TransCanada. After
the equity offering, Berkshire withdrew for good, calling
Columbia's business model “fundamentally broken.” See JX
547. TransCanada, by contrast, called to express continued
interest. That call spurred Smith's meeting with TransCanada
in January 2016. See Smith Tr. 323; accord id. at 234.
As with the evidence regarding management conflicts,
Smith's one-on-one meeting with Poirier is the most serious
evidence of favoritism towards TransCanada. But as noted
in the section on management's incentives, Columbia did not
take TransCanada's $24 per share offer, or even its $25.25
offer. Skaggs and the Board forced Columbia to pay $25.50.
The results of Columbia's negotiations compare favorably
with the facts in Aruba and DFC. During the meat of the
negotiations in Aruba, the company focused exclusively
on HP, which knew that it was not facing competition.
HP had anticipated offering $24 per share and then giving
ground. When Aruba's CEO responded with enthusiasm to
HP's approach, HP instead made an opening bid of $23.25.
Although HP later increased its bid, after adjusting for a
corrected share count, HP described the deal price of $24.67
as “the new $24.00.” See Aruba Trial, 2018 WL 922139, at
*39–41. Likewise, in DFC, Lone Star was the only bidder that
negotiated price with DFC Global, and rather than increasing
its bid, Lone Star lowered it twice. See DFC Trial, 2016 WL
3753123, at *3–4.
*31  The petitioners make similar arguments about
Columbia's decision to grant exclusivity to TransCanada and
to treat the exclusivity as effectively remaining in place even
after it terminated. As with Smith's meeting with Poirier, the
fact that only one bidder bids “does not necessarily mean
that there is a failure of competition ....” Aruba, 210 A.3d
at 136. The trial court in DFC found that DFC Global had
granted Lone Star exclusivity at an inopportune point in the
negotiations and that Lone Star had pressured the company
with an exploding offer. See DFC Trial, 2016 WL 3753123, at
*23. But those factors did not undermine the reliability of the
deal price given the objective indicia of fairness that were also
present in this case. See DFC, 172 A.3d at 349–50, 375–76.
As with their arguments about management incentives, the
petitioners have mustered evidence that supports their theory
of bidder favoritism, but they failed to show that Columbia
favored TransCanada to a degree that left fundamental value
on the table. The Board and management believed that
TransCanada was the optimal buyer to pursue, which is why
they gave TransCanada exclusivity and continued to deal
with TransCanada. See PTO ¶ 519. Put simply, “[n]othing in
the record suggests that increased competition would have
produced a better result.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 28.
d. The Standstills
The petitioners appear to argue that the standstills distinguish
this case from those where the deal price was reliable
despite weak interest from potential suitors. They assert
that Columbia permitted TransCanada to breach its standstill
by reengaging after the equity offering, while at the same
time failing to waive the standstills that bound rival bidders.
Although the Board ultimately waived the standstills with
Dominion, NextEra, and Berkshire in March 2016, the
petitioners say it should have done so sooner, claiming that
by that point TransCanada had an insurmountable head start
towards a transaction.
Each party that engaged with Columbia during fall 2015
entered into an NDA containing a standstill provision
substantially in the form of the following:
In consideration for being furnished with Evaluation
Material by [Columbia], each Party (each such Party
in such context, the “Standstill Party”) agrees that until
the date that is eighteen months after the date of this
[NDA], unless [Columbia's] board of directors otherwise
so specifically requests in writing in advance, the Standstill
Party shall not, and shall cause its Representatives not to ...
directly or indirectly,
(A) acquire or offer to acquire, or seek, propose or
agree to acquire ... beneficial ownership ... or constructive
economic ownership ... of any securities or material assets
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of [Columbia], including rights or options to acquire such
ownership,
(B) seek or propose to influence, advise, change or control
the management, board of directors, governing instruments
or policies or affairs of [Columbia], including by means of
a solicitation of proxies ..., contacting any person relating
to any of the matters set forth in this [NDA] or seeking to
influence, advise or direct the vote of any holder of voting
securities of [Columbia] or making a request to amend or
waive this provision or any other provision of this Section
3 or of Section 1 or Section 2 or
(C) make any public disclosure, or take any action that
could require the other Party to make any public disclosure,
with respect to any of the matters that are the subject of this
[NDA]....
JX 526 § 3 (formatting altered); see PTO ¶ 455. The standstills
prohibited the counterparties from “seek[ing]” to acquire
Columbia or influence its management without the Board's
prior written invitation.
*32  The petitioners proved at trial that TransCanada
breached its standstill several times. The first breach occurred
in mid-December 2015, when Poirier called Smith to convey
TransCanada's continued interest in acquiring Columbia. The
second breach occurred when Poirier and Smith met in
January 2016. There are other instances. 32
The petitioners posit that but for their own standstills,
Berkshire, Dominion, or NextEra would have competed with
TransCanada in spring 2016, driving up the deal price. But
there is no evidence that Dominion or NextEra had any
interest in reengaging with Columbia after the equity offering,
and Berkshire refused to do so. 33
*33  In March 2016, Columbia waived the standstills. If
Berkshire, Dominion, or NextEra wanted to bid, then they
could have done so in the post-signing phase (but they did
not). Their failure to do so resembles the fact pattern in
Aruba, which cited the absence of bidding during a passive
post-signing market check as supporting the fairness of the
price. See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136 (“[A]fter signing and the
announcement of the deal, still no other buyer emerged even
though the merger agreement allowed for superior bids.”).
The DFC decision also involved a passive post-signing
market check in which no bidders emerged. DFC, 172 A.3d
at 359.
The evidence does not show that the standstills undermined
the fairness of the deal price. None of the standstill parties
wanted to bid, and they in fact did not bid.
e. Claims About An Information Vacuum
In a variant of their arguments about bidder favoritism, the
petitioners contend that Skaggs and Smith misled the Board or
otherwise ran the sale process unsupervised. They posit that
but for these actions, the Board would have engaged more
vigorously with other bidders. If credited, these arguments
would show that the Board could have gotten more than fair
value, but they would not show that the deal price fell below
that mark. See DFC, 172 A.3d at 370 (noting that “the purpose
of an appraisal is not to make sure that the petitioners get the
highest conceivable value that might have been procured had
every domino fallen out of the company's way”).
On different facts, fraud on the board could lead to a
deal price below fair value. In this case, the petitioners'
assertions are largely unsupported. The Board received a
steady flow of information, with Skaggs regularly keeping
the directors informed through written memos, presentations
during meetings, and one-on-one communications. 34
The petitioners contend that Skaggs misled the Board in
November 2015 by failing to report that Spectra asked for
a meeting, but Skaggs testified credibly that he regarded
Spectra's passes as “casual passes” that “weren't serious.”
Skaggs Tr. 946. The petitioners also say that Skaggs should
have told the Board that he gave TransCanada and Berkshire
a bid deadline of November 24, 2015, without sharing the
deadline with the other suitors. The better view of the
evidence is that Skaggs told all of the interested parties that
they had to move quickly before Columbia pivoted to an
equity offering in December. TransCanada and Berkshire
received more specific guidance because they showed the
most interest. The petitioners also assert that Skaggs should
have told the Board that not all suitors received the same due
diligence in November 2015, but the bidders got what they
requested.
As with the petitioners' other challenges to the sale process,
their best argument centers on Smith's meeting with Poirier
on January 7, 2016. Smith sent Poirier confidential due
diligence materials and assured him that TransCanada faced
no competition. The Board did not authorize the meeting
or the disclosures. 35  And although Skaggs generally was
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forthcoming with the Board, in this instance Skaggs told the
Board that TransCanada had reached out to Smith, without
mentioning that Smith met with Poirier and without reporting
Smith's unauthorized disclosures. See JX 698.
*34  The petitioners have identified a flaw in the process, but
they have not shown that it led to a price below fair value.
After Poirier's meeting with Smith, TransCanada proposed a
price range similar to its indication from before the equity
offering. Columbia declined and pushed back.
The petitioners also assert that when the Board met on January
28 and 29, 2016, Skaggs “manipulate[d] the Board into
approving a TransCanada bid.” Dkt. 428 at 21–22. Skaggs
presented a chart discussing what the directors “would have
to believe” about Columbia's future trading price to reject a
merger proposal at $26 per share, and Skaggs recommended
that the Columbia directors accept an offer at $26 unless they
believed Columbia would trade at $30.11 in 2017. JX 753 at 9.
Goldman prepared the initial version of the chart, and at trial,
the petitioners pressed Skaggs on why his version omitted a
column which showed that the directors should be indifferent
to an offer at $26 per share if they believed Columbia would
trade at $27.69 at a 8.5% cost of equity in 2016. See Skaggs.
Tr. 982–90. In reality, Skaggs' chart was Goldman's summary
of the other charts it had prepared. Compare JX 753 at 9,
with JX 726 at 4. The absent column came from a chart that
Skaggs did not present. Skaggs did not mislead the Board by
presenting the summary chart in its entirety.
Finally, the petitioners fault Skaggs for not telling the Board
that on March 12, 2016, Spectra requested due diligence
and promised a written offer “in the next few days,” or that
Goldman thought Spectra was “serious.” JX 992. The Board
had previously approved a script that required a “serious
written proposal” as a condition to diligence. Skaggs prepared
for an offer from Spectra by having Goldman get an ability-
to-pay analysis ready. See JX 1009. Goldman determined that
at a price of $25.50, Spectra risked a credit downgrade and
dilution until 2019. 36  Spectra never made a written offer.
The petitioners did not prove that the Board was misled
or deprived of material information. The petitioners did
prove that management at times knew more about the sale
process, which is inevitable because directors do not run
companies on a day-to-day basis. The record does not show
that informational differences led to a deal price below fair
value.
f. The Stockholder Vote
In an entire fairness case, the unitary entire fairness standard
“embraces questions of when the transaction was timed,
how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the
directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the
stockholders were obtained.” Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). Drawing on an entire fairness
case, TransCanada posits that the informed approval of
disinterested stockholders, especially by a large margin, “is
compelling evidence that the price was fair.” ACP Master,
Ltd. v. Sprint Corp., 2017 WL 3421142, at *29 (Del. Ch.
July 21, 2017), aff'd, 2018 WL 1905256 (Del. Apr. 23,
2018) (ORDER). The petitioners take the opposite tack
and argue that if they can show defects in the stockholder
approval process, such as disclosure violations, then that
should undermine a claim that the deal price reflects fair
value.
*35  It is not self-evident that stockholder approval should
have the same implications for an appraisal proceeding as
an entire fairness case, given that the former is a statutory
remedy that turns solely on inadequacy of price, while the
latter is a liability proceeding in which the entire fairness
test is used to determine whether fiduciaries have breached
their duties. 37  The entire fairness test can apply to a wide
range of transactions, only some of which require stockholder
approval under the Delaware General Corporation Law. A
complex body of law governs the extent to which stockholder
approval lowers the standard of review from entire fairness
to the business judgment rule, shifts who bears the burden
of proving fairness, or operates as evidence of fairness
under the unitary entire fairness test. See, e.g., ACP Master,
2017 WL 3421142, at *16–19, *29. When an appraisal
proceeding follows a long-form merger like the one in this
case, stockholder approval is a statutory prerequisite. See 8
Del. C. § 251(c). The Merger would not have closed (and
appraisal rights would not have been triggered) unless the
stockholders approved the transaction. How different levels
of stockholder approval should affect the valuation inquiry is
something that our cases have yet to work out.
In this case, TransCanada argues that holders of
approximately 95.3% of the shares that were present in person
or by proxy at Columbia's meeting of stockholders favored the
Merger. Under Delaware law, a merger requires the approval
of holders of a majority of the outstanding shares, making that
the appropriate denominator for consideration. See 8 Del. C.
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§ 251(c). Under this voting standard, a non-vote counts the
same as a “no” vote. In Columbia's case, holders of 73.9%
of its shares voted in favor of the Merger, making the rate
of approval perhaps not as high as it might appear. Neither
side introduced expert testimony or other evidence that would
enable the court to assess the degree to which this level of
approval reflected an endorsement of the deal price, other than
recognizing the obvious fact that a majority of the outstanding
shares approved it.
The petitioners argue that the court should not give any
weight to stockholder approval in this case because the
proxy statement that Columbia distributed to its stockholders
was materially misleading. See JX 1136 (the “Proxy”). The
petitioners cite a list of issues, but three are most significant.
The first concerns an omission and a misleading partial
disclosure about Columbia's NDAs. The Proxy disclosed that
Columbia had entered into NDAs in November 2015 with
Parties B, C, and D, but the Proxy did not disclose that the
NDAs contained standstills, much less DADWs. The Proxy
then disclosed misleadingly that “[u]nlike TransCanada,
none of Party B, Party C or Party D sought to re-
engage in discussions with [Columbia] after discussions were
terminated in November 2015.” Id. at 46. The Proxy failed
to provide the additional disclosure that all four parties
were subject to standstills with DADWs, that TransCanada
breached its standstill, and that Columbia opted to ignore
TransCanada's breach.
In an effort to blunt these issues, TransCanada points out that
the Proxy disclosed that “none of Party A, Party B, Party
C or Party D would be subject to standstill obligations that
would prohibit them from making an unsolicited proposal to
the Board following announcement of entry into the merger
agreement with TransCanada.” Id. at 60. TransCanada cites
a secondary source indicating that some 80% of surveyed
NDAs contained standstills and 64% contained DADWs, then
argues that stockholders should have known that the NDAs
contained these restrictions and that Columbia waived them.
Stockholders should not have had to guess about whether the
NDAs contained these powerful provisions, and while it was
true that the restrictions did not apply post-signing, the Proxy
created the misleading impression that Parties B, C, and D
were not bound by standstills during the pre-signing period.
*36  These problems with the Proxy were material. A
reasonable stockholder would have found it significant that
TransCanada and Parties B, C, and D were bound by
standstills in fall 2015 and that TransCanada was permitted to
breach its standstill to pursue the Merger. A leading treatise
on mergers and acquisitions identifies benefits to standstills,
but also warns of potential dangers.
[I]t may well be that the presence of
[standstill] provisions will cause third
parties to put their highest and best
prices on the table in any pre-signing
market check or auction since, for
them, there will be no “tomorrow.”
However, such provisions, especially
if coupled with either a provision
that prohibits the target from waiving
the prohibition or one which does
not permit the third party from
requesting [sic] a waiver undercuts
the effectiveness of the post-signing
market check.
Lou R. Kling & Eileen T. Nugent, Negotiated Acquisitions of
Companies, Subsidiaries and Divisions § 4.04[6][b], at 4-92
(2019 ed.) (footnotes omitted). The limitations imposed by
the standstills and DADWs made their presence material to
Columbia's stockholders.
The petitioners next cite the Proxy's failure to disclose
that Skaggs and Smith were planning to retire in 2016.
TransCanada disputes the factual claim, arguing that Skaggs
was open to continuing work and observing that the Board
wanted Smith to stay on as CFO after the Merger. It was
not inevitable that Skaggs or Smith would retire in 2016, but
they wanted to and did. See, e.g., JX 1034 (Smith asking
advisor immediately after signing: “[D]o you think I can retire
now?”). Although this decision has found that Skaggs and
Smith's desire to retire did not undermine the sale process,
a reasonable stockholder would have regarded their plans
as material. See, e.g., In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926
A.2d 94, 114 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[A] reasonable stockholder
would want to know an important economic motivation of
the negotiator singularly employed by a board to obtain the
best price for the stockholders, when that motivation could
rationally lead that negotiator to favor a deal at a less than
optimal price, because the procession of a deal was more
important to him, given his overall economic interest, than
only doing a deal at the right price.”).
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Finally, the petitioners cite the Proxy's partial disclosure
regarding Smith's meeting with Poirier on January 7, 2016.
See JX 1136 at 46. The Proxy failed to mention that Smith
invited a bid and told Poirier that TransCanada did not
face competition. TransCanada downplays the meeting as
preliminary and immaterial given the generous deal price.
Stockholders could decide how much weight to give the
information, but the information itself was material.
The petitioners proved that the Proxy contained material
misstatements and omissions. In light of the flawed Proxy,
this decision does not give any weight to the stockholder vote
for purposes of evaluating the reliability of the deal price.
g. The Deal Protections
The petitioners contend that the deal protection measures
in the Merger Agreement undermined the effectiveness of
the sale process. Under the Delaware Supreme Court's
precedents, the deal protections did not have that effect.
The Merger Agreement contained a no-shop clause with
a fiduciary out. As is customary, the Merger Agreement
provided broadly that Columbia could not solicit, provide
information to, or engage in discussions with any party
other than TransCanada, then created an exception identifying
circumstances under which Columbia could respond to an
interested party. The first half of Section 4.02(a) of the Merger
Agreement established the broad prohibition, stating:
*37  The Company agrees that, except as permitted by
this Section 4.02, neither it nor any of its Subsidiaries
nor any of the officers and directors of it or its
Subsidiaries shall, and it shall instruct and use its
reasonable best efforts to cause its and its Subsidiaries'
employees, investment bankers, attorneys, accountants and
other advisors or representatives (such officers, directors,
employees, investment bankers, attorneys, accountants
and other advisors or representatives, collectively,
“Representatives”) not to, directly or indirectly:
(i) initiate, solicit or encourage any, or the making of
any, inquiry, indication of interest, proposal or offer that
constitutes, or could reasonably be expected to lead to, any
Acquisition Proposal;
(ii) engage in, continue or otherwise participate in any
discussions or negotiations regarding, or provide any
information or data to any Person relating to, any inquiry,
indication of interest, proposal or offer that constitutes, or
could reasonably be expected to lead to, an Acquisition
Proposal; or
(iii) otherwise knowingly facilitate any effort or attempt to
make any inquiry, indication of interest, proposal or offer
that constitutes, or could reasonably be expected to lead to,
an Acquisition Proposal.
JX 1025 § 4.02(a) (the “No-Shop Clause”) (formatting
altered).
The second half of Section 4.02(a) of the Merger Agreement
carved out the exception to the general prohibition. It stated:
Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing to the contrary,
prior to the time the Company Requisite Vote is obtained,
the Company may, subject to the Company providing prior
notice to Parent,
(A) provide information in response to a request therefor
by a Person who has made a bona fide written Acquisition
Proposal that did not result from a breach of this Section
4.02 if the Company receives from the Person requesting
such information an executed confidentiality agreement
on terms not less restrictive to the other party than
those contained in the Confidentiality Agreement (it being
understood that such confidentiality agreement need not
prohibit the making, or amendment, of an Acquisition
Proposal but which shall not prohibit the Company from
fulfilling its obligations under this Section 4.02); provided,
however, that the Company shall promptly after the
execution thereof provide a true and complete copy to
Parent of any such confidentiality agreement and any such
information to the extent not previously provided to Parent,
in each case, redacted, if necessary, to remove the identity
of the Person making the proposal or offer; or
(B) engage or participate in any discussions or negotiations
with any Person who has made such an unsolicited bona
fide written Acquisition Proposal, if and only to the extent
that,
(x) prior to taking any action described in clause (A)
or (B) above, the board of directors of the Company
determines in good faith (after consultation with its
outside legal counsel) that the failure to take such action
would reasonably be expected to result in a breach of the
directors' fiduciary duties under applicable Law and
- 140 - 
In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
2019 WL 3778370
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 28
(y) in each such case referred to in clause (A) or
(B) above, the board of directors of the Company has
determined in good faith based on the information then
available and after consultation with its outside legal
counsel and its financial advisor that such Acquisition
Proposal either constitutes a Superior Proposal or
could reasonably be expected to result in a Superior
Proposal....
Id. § 4.02(a) (the “Superior-Proposal Out”) (formatting
altered).
*38  Importantly for present purposes, the Superior-Proposal
Out permitted Columbia to provide due diligence information
in response to “a request therefor by a Person who has
made a bona fide written Acquisition Proposal,” subject
only to the bidder entering into an NDA “on terms not
less restrictive to the other party than those contained in”
the NDA with TransCanada. It also provided that the NDA
did not have to contain a standstill, thereby eschewing the
deal lawyer's trick of turning the requirement that the bidder
sign an equivalent confidentiality agreement into a powerful
backdoor defensive measure. The provision also authorized
Columbia to redact the name of the person making written
Acquisition Proposal. This aspect of the provision did not
require a superior-proposal determination before furnishing
due diligence, nor did it impose any delay before Columbia
could comply. Cf. In re Compellent Techs., Inc. S'holder
Litig., 2011 WL 6382523, at *6–8 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2011)
(discussing a radically buyer-friendly version of superior-
proposal out and possible alternative formulations). The
definition of Acquisition Proposal made this aspect of the
provision easy to satisfy by defining that term as
any proposal or offer ... relating to any transaction or series
of transactions involving
(A) any direct or indirect sale, lease, transfer, exchange,
acquisition or purchase of any assets or one or more
businesses that constitute more than fifteen percent (15%)
of the net revenues, net income, or assets of the Company
and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, or more than fifteen
percent (15%) of the total voting power of any class of
equity securities of the Company,
(B) any direct or indirect sale, exchange, transfer or
other disposition, tender offer or exchange offer or similar
transaction that, if consummated, would result in any
Person or “group” ... acquiring beneficial or record
ownership of more than fifteen percent (15%) of the total
voting power of any class of securities of the Company, or
(C) any merger, reorganization, consolidation, share
exchange, business combination, recapitalization,
liquidation, joint venture, partnership, dissolution or
similar transaction involving the Company (or any
Subsidiary or Subsidiaries ... whose business constitutes
more than fifteen percent (15%) of the net revenues, net
income or consolidated assets of the Company and its
Subsidiaries, taken as a whole).
JX 1025 § 4.02(b)(i) (formatting altered).
The Superior-Proposal Out required that before engaging or
participating in any discussions or negotiations, Columbia
had to made additional determinations. First, the Board
had to determine “in good faith (after consultation with its
outside legal counsel) that the failure to take such action
would reasonably be expected to result in a breach of the
directors' fiduciary duties under applicable Law.” Second,
the Board had to determine that the Acquisition Proposal
“either constitutes a Superior Proposal or could reasonably
be expected to result in a Superior Proposal,” with that term
defined as
a bona fide written Acquisition Proposal that did not
result from a breach of this Section 4.02 relating to any
acquisition or purchase by a Person or group of Persons of
(A) assets that generate more than fifty percent (50%) of
the consolidated total revenues of the Company and its
Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, (B) assets that constitute
more than fifty percent (50%) of the consolidated total
assets of the Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as a
whole, or (C) more than fifty percent (50%) of the total
voting power of the equity securities of the Company,
in each case, that the board of directors of the Company
determines in good faith (after consultation with its
financial advisor and outside legal counsel)
[1] is reasonably likely to be consummated in accordance
with its terms, taking into account
(x) the timing and likelihood of consummation of the
proposal (including whether such Acquisition Proposal
is contingent on receipt of third party financing or
is terminable by the acquiring Person or group upon
payment of a termination fee),
- 141 - 
In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
2019 WL 3778370
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 29
*39  (y) all legal, financial and regulatory aspects of the
Acquisition Proposal and
(z) the Person or group making the Acquisition Proposal
(including in respect of the potential effects of any
actions that might be required by any Government
Antitrust Entity in connection with the consummation of
such transaction), and
[2] if consummated, would result in a transaction more
favorable to the Company's stockholders from a financial
point of view than the Merger.
Id. § 4.02(b)(ii) (formatting altered; Arabic numerals added).
This dimension of the Superior-Proposal Out contained
relatively middle-of-the-road standards for its exercise. Cf.
Compellent, 2011 WL 6382523, at *6–8.
The Merger Agreement also contained a no-change-of-
recommendation provision with its own fiduciary out. As with
the structure of the No-Shop Clause and Superior-Proposal
Out, the provision first broadly prohibited the Board from
taking any action or agreeing to take any action to (i) change
its recommendation in favor of the Merger, (ii) recommend
any Acquisition Proposal, (iii) cause or permit Columbia
to enter into any letter of intent, agreement in principle,
acquisition agreement, or merger agreement regarding any
Acquisition Proposal, other than a confidentiality agreement
as contemplated by the Superior-Proposal Out, or (iv) take
any action to exempt an Acquisition Proposal from any
takeover statute. JX 1025 § 4.02(c). The Merger Agreement
then provided that if Columbia received a Superior Proposal
and the Board determined that its fiduciary duties required
it, then the Board could change its recommendation or, if
it wished, terminate the Merger Agreement for purposes
of entering into an agreement with respect to Superior
Proposal. Before taking either step, Columbia had to give
TransCanada notice that the Board intended to take that
action, and TransCanada then would have four business days
to match the Superior Proposal. The matching right was
unlimited, and any new or revised Superior Proposal triggered
an additional matching period of four business days. The
pertinent provisions stated:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary set forth in [the
no-change-of-recommendation provision], prior to the time
[that stockholder approval of the Merger] is obtained and
so long as the Company is in compliance with [No-Shop
Clause]:
(i) the board of directors of the Company may
(A) effect a Change of Recommendation in response to
a Superior Proposal that is not otherwise withdrawn at
the time of the Change of Recommendation or
(B) cause the Company to terminate this Agreement
for the purpose of entering into a definitive agreement
with respect to a Superior Proposal that is not otherwise
withdrawn at the time of such termination (provided
that the Company shall have paid the Termination
Payment prior to or concurrently with such termination),
which definitive agreement the Company shall enter
into concurrently with or immediately following such
termination,
in either case, if and only if the board of directors of the
Company determines in good faith (after consultation
with its financial advisor and outside legal counsel) that
the failure to take any such action would be inconsistent
with the directors' fiduciary duties under applicable Law;
provided, however, that the board of directors of the
Company may not take any such action unless
*40  (1) the Company first provides written notice to
Parent (a “Superior Proposal Notice”) advising Parent
that the board of directors of the Company intends
to either effect a Change of Recommendation or
terminate this Agreement pursuant to Section 7.01(c)
(i), which notice shall specify the reasons therefor
and include the material terms and conditions of the
applicable Superior Proposal and attach a copy of the
most current draft of any written agreement relating
thereto,
(2) during the four (4) Business Day period following
receipt by Parent of the Superior Proposal Notice
(the “Superior Proposal Negotiation Period”) (it being
understood that the first Business Day following
the day on which a Superior Proposal Notice is
received shall be the first day of the Superior Proposal
Negotiation Period), the Company negotiates in good
faith with Parent and its Representatives, to the extent
requested by Parent, with respect to any revisions to
the terms of the transactions contemplated by this
Agreement proposed by Parent; provided, however,
that if during any Superior Proposal Negotiation
Period there shall occur any subsequent amendment to
any material term of the applicable Superior Proposal,
the Company shall provide a new Superior Proposal
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Notice and a new Superior Proposal Negotiation
Period shall commence (provided that, with respect to
any Superior Proposal, each new Superior Proposal
Negotiation Period that commences shall be for a
period of four (4) days, except that in no event
shall any new Superior Proposal Negotiation Period
shorten the four (4) Business Day duration of the first
Superior Proposal Negotiation Period) and
(3) at or after 5:00 p.m., New York City time, on
the last day of the Superior Proposal Negotiation
Period, the board of directors of the Company (after
consultation with its financial advisor and outside
legal counsel) determines that the Superior Proposal
would continue to be a Superior Proposal, taking into
account any changes to the terms of this Agreement
theretofore agreed to by Parent in writing ....
Id. § 4.02(d)(i) (formatting altered). A separate fiduciary
out permitted the Board to change its recommendation in
response to an “Intervening Event,” defined as “an event,
fact, occurrence, development or circumstance that was not
known to” the Board “as of the date of this Agreement
(or if known, the consequences of which were not known
to the board of directors of the Company as of the date
of this Agreement) ....” Id. § 4.02(d)(ii). Unlike with a
Superior Proposal, the Board could not terminate the Merger
Agreement in response to an Intervening Event.
If the Board terminated the Merger Agreement in response
to a Superior Proposal or if Columbia's stockholders failed
to approve the Merger, then Columbia was required to
(i) pay TransCanada a $309 million termination fee and
(ii) reimburse TransCanada for “authorization, preparation,
negotiation, execution and performance” expenses not to
exceed $40 million. Id. § 7.02(c). Those amounts represented
3.42% of the total equity value of the Merger, which was
$10.2 billion. TransCanada believed that a Superior Proposal
would “effectively require total consideration greater than
$26.27 per share” because the termination fee was equivalent
to 77 cents per share, or roughly 3% of $25.50. JX 1093 at 6.
The $40 million expense reimbursement would increase the
per-share figure by another 10 cents.
Although these provisions created obstacles for competing
bidders, they did not undermine the sale process for appraisal
purposes. Commentators have perceived that under the
Delaware Supreme Court's recent appraisal decisions, a sale
process will function as a reliable indicator of fair value if
it would pass muster if reviewed under enhanced scrutiny in
a breach of fiduciary duty case. 38  The combination of deal
protection measures would not have supported a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty. 39
*41  The facts of Aruba involved a similar suite of deal
protections. The merger agreement in that case “prohibited
Aruba from soliciting competing offers and required the
Aruba Board to continue to support the merger, subject to a
fiduciary out and an out for an unsolicited superior proposal”
and included a termination fee equal to 3% of the merger's
equity value. Aruba Trial, 2018 WL 922139, at *21, *38.
The matching rights were similar too: HP had “an unlimited
match right, with five days to match the first superior proposal
and two days to match any subsequent increase, and during
the match period Aruba had to negotiate exclusively and in
good faith with HP.” Id. at *38 (footnote omitted). Viewing
the deal protections holistically, the Delaware Supreme Court
found that potential buyers had an open chance to bid, which
supported the high court's use of a deal-price-less-synergies
metric to establish fair value. See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136.
The outcome in Aruba comports with guidance from a
frequently cited treatise, which identifies “critical aspects” of
a merger agreement that does not “preclude or impermissibly
impede a post-signing market check.” Kling & Nugent, supra,
§ 4.04[6][b], at 4-89 to -90.
First, the economics of the executed agreement must be
such that it does not unduly impede the ability of third
parties to make competing bids. Types of arrangements
that might raise questions in this regard include asset lock-
ups, stock lock-ups, no-shops, force-the-vote provisions,
and termination fees. The operative word is “unduly;” the
impact will vary depending upon the actual type of device
involved and its specific terms.
* * *
Second, the target should be permitted to disclose
confidential information to any third party who has on
its own (i.e., not been solicited) “shown up” in the sense
that it has submitted a proposal or, at a minimum, an
indication of interest which is, or which the target believes
is, reasonably likely to lead to (and who is capable of
consummating) a higher competing bid. In this regard,
the target should also be able to negotiate with such third
parties. This removes any informational advantage that the
initial (anointed) purchaser may have.
* * *
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Finally, the target board of directors should have
the contractual right, without violating the acquisition
agreement, to withdraw or modify its recommendation to
shareholders with respect to the transaction provided for in
the executed acquisition agreement.
Id. at 4-90 to -94.1 (footnotes omitted). Using this framework,
the deal protections did not preclude or impermissibly
impede a post-signing market check. Columbia waived the
standstills with Dominion, NextEra, and Berkshire before
signing the Merger Agreement, so those provisions did not
operate as a constraint during the post-signing period. Any
party could obtain due diligence simply by submitting a
bona fide written Acquisition Proposal and entering into the
required confidentiality agreement; the initial Acquisition
Proposal did not itself have to be a Superior Proposal. If
the competing bidder then made an Acquisition Proposal that
either constituted or could reasonably be expected to result
in a Superior Proposal, and if the Board determined that its
fiduciary duties required it, then the Board could negotiate
with the competing bidder. And if the competing bidder
made a Superior Proposal that TransCanada was unable or
unwilling to match, then the Board could withdraw or modify
its recommendation in support of the Merger Agreement.
Going beyond what the treatise describes, Columbia could
take the additional step of terminating the Merger Agreement
and entering into an agreement regarding the Superior
Proposal, subject only to paying a termination fee and expense
reimbursement equal to 3.42% of the Merger's equity value.
The petitioners try to bolster their argument about the
deal protections by contending that the Proxy distorted the
informational content of the post-signing phase by creating
the false impression that Parties B, C, and D were never
subject to standstills, which they say a competing bidder
would take into account when deciding whether to intervene.
Under this view, if those parties and TransCanada had
been conducting due diligence in November 2015, and
if only TransCanada renewed its interest later on, then
a party considering a competing bid might reasonably
believe that TransCanada was paying top dollar because
only TransCanada had decided to proceed. Under those
circumstances, a potential competing bidder might view
Columbia as fully vetted and decline to bid because of the
winner's curse. 40  But a potential topping bidder might be
more likely to take the risk of competing with TransCanada if
it perceived that TransCanada had been able to move forward
while standstills blocked its competitors. In that case, the
competing bidder might think there was value that had not yet
been priced.
*42  This argument presents a variation of the winner's-
curse theory that the Delaware Supreme Court rejected in
Dell. There, the trial court found that Mr. Dell's participation
gave the buyout group advantages that competing bidders
would struggle to overcome and which therefore would
deter bidding. See Dell Trial, 2016 WL 3186538, at *36,
*42–44. The Delaware Supreme Court explained that “the
likelihood of a winner's curse can be mitigated through a due
diligence process where buyers have access to all necessary
information.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 32. The high court also cited
the trial court's observation that strategic buyers “are less
subject to the winner's curse because they typically possess
industry-specific expertise and have asset-specific valuations
that incorporate synergies.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Finally, the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized
the absence of evidence that another party was interested,
explaining that “[f]air value entails at minimum a price some
buyer is willing to pay—not a price at which no class of
buyers in the market would pay.” Id. at 29.
Similarly in this case, any competing bidder could gain
access to due diligence by submitting a bona fide written
Acquisition Proposal and entering into a confidential
agreement. Moreover, all of the likely bidders were strategic
buyers. Most importantly, the petitioners have not shown
that anyone would have made a topping bid. Columbia's
sale process involved most of the parties that its bankers
thought would be interested, including Berkshire, Dominion,
and NextEra. See JX 499. Each knew that it was subject to
a standstill, and each would have believed that others were
similarly bound. None wanted to buy Columbia at anything
near TransCanada's price. Spectra was never bound by a
standstill, yet did not bid. There is no persuasive evidence that
any other party wanted to bid. The evidence instead shows
that no one wanted to bid. As in Dell, the most plausible
explanation is that “a topping bid involved a serious risk of
overpayment.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 33. That in turn suggests that
the deal price was “already at a level that is fair.” Id.
The petitioners failed to show that the Proxy distorted bidder
behavior during the post-signing phase. More broadly, the
petitioners failed to prove that the deal protection measures
undermined the validity of the deal price. The better view of
the evidence is that if a bidder had been serious, then it would
have come forward.
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h. The Sale Process Was Reliable.
TransCanada proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
the sale process made the deal price a persuasive indicator of
fair value. The sale process was not perfect, and the petitioners
highlighted its flaws, but the facts of this case, when viewed
as a whole, compare favorably or are on par with the facts in
DFC, Dell, and Aruba.
In reaching this conclusion, I recognize the existence of other
decisions that have sought to apply the teachings of DFC
and Dell, and which have declined to rely on the deal price
as an indicator of fair value. 41  The petitioners have cited
similarities between aspects of the sale processes in those
cases and aspects of the sale process in this case, arguing that
the deal price here was unreliable.
In this decision, I have attempted to adhere to the principles
expressed in DFC, Dell, and Aruba and to take into account
how those decisions applied those principles to the facts.
Those factual applications have important implications for the
outcome here.
I also continue to regard it as important that the Delaware
Supreme Court's decisions in Dell and DFC reversed trial
court decisions for failing to give adequate weight to the deal
price. In each case, the Delaware Supreme Court regarded the
sale process as sufficiently good that the deal price deserved
“heavy, if not dispositive, weight.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 23; see
DFC, 172 A.3d at 349, 351. The decisions did not address
when a sale process would be sufficiently bad that a trial
court could give the deal price no weight. The decisions
also did not address when a sale process that was not as
good would still be good enough for a trial court to give the
deal price weight. Technically, the holdings did not delineate
when a sale process was sufficiently good that the trial court
should give it heavy if not dispositive weight. The Delaware
Supreme Court could have believed the sale processes in
DFC and Dell warranted that level of consideration without
excluding the possibility that a not-as-good sale process could
deserve the same treatment. I thus do not believe that the
Delaware Supreme Court's favorable comments regarding
the sale processes in Dell and DFC establish minimum
requirements for other sale processes to meet before the deal
price can be considered as a persuasive indicator of fair value.
*43  The Aruba decision points in the same direction. There,
the trial court found the sale process to be sufficiently reliable
to use the deal price as a valuation indicator, but declined to
give it weight. The Delaware Supreme Court accepted that the
sale process was sufficiently reliable and used the deal price
as the exclusive basis for its own fair value determination.
As with Dell and DFC, the Aruba decision did not have to
address when a sale process was sufficiently bad that a trial
court could decline to rely on the deal price.
The sale process in this case had aspects that compare
favorably with the processes in DFC, Dell, and Aruba. It also
had aspects that differed from the processes in those cases. On
balance, TransCanada proved that the deal price is a reliable
indicator of fair value.
3. The Synergies Deduction
“[I]t is widely assumed that the sale price in many M&A
deals includes a portion of the buyer's expected synergy gains,
which is part of the premium the winning buyer must pay to
prevail and obtain control.” DFC, 172 A.3d at 371. “In an
arm's-length, synergistic transaction, the deal price generally
will exceed fair value because target fiduciaries bargain
for a premium that includes ... a share of the anticipated
synergies ....” Olson v. ev3, Inc., 2011 WL 704409, at *10
(Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2011). “[S]ection 262(h) requires that the
Court of Chancery discern the going concern value of the
company irrespective of the synergies involved in a merger.”
M.P.M. Enters., 731 A.2d at 797. To derive an estimate of
fair value, the court must exclude “any synergies or other
value expected from the merger giving rise to the appraisal
proceeding itself ....” Golden Telecom Trial, 993 A.2d at 507.
“Of course, estimating synergies and allocating a reasonable
portion to the seller certainly involves imprecision, but no
more than other valuation methods, like a DCF analysis ....”
Aruba, 210 A.3d at 141.
TransCanada announced a total of $250 million in target
annual synergies, with $150 million attributable to cost
and revenue synergies and $100 attributable to financing
synergies. PTO ¶¶ 555, 632, 642; see Marchand Tr. 489–
490. The financing synergies resulted predominantly from
TransCanada generating funds at its lower cost of capital,
then channeling them through offshore financing structures to
generate tax advantages. Marchand Tr. 490.
The petitioners have questioned the financing synergies
because they were not labeled “synergies.” In a board
presentation, TransCanada labeled the cost and revenue
saving as “synergies” and the financing benefits as
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“offshore.” 42  The label is not dispositive. See Marchand Tr.
518. The Merger created value if it enabled TransCanada
to finance Columbia's business plan using its lower cost
of capital. To the extent that value is included in the
transaction price, it is value arising from the accomplishment
or expectation of the Merger that must be deducted under
Section 262(h).
TransCanada asked its valuation expert, Mark Zmijewski,
to value the synergies. Using a standard DCF methodology,
Zmijewski calculated the net present value of the synergies
at $4.64 per share. JX 1351 Ex. VI-3. Zmijewski did not use
a DCF analysis to value Columbia, and he disagreed with
many aspects of the DCF analysis prepared by the petitioners'
expert, so there is some irony in Zmijewski using it here.
In Highfields, this court declined to use a synergies estimate
that the respondent's expert prepared using a DCF analysis,
in part because the respondent's expert had not used a DCF
methodology when rendering his other valuation opinions.
See Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34,
60–61 (Del. Ch. 2007).
*44  The real question is the extent to which the deal
price included synergies. TransCanada's CFO testified that
the deal price included 100% of the estimated synergies.
See Marchand Tr. 490–91. Zmijewski tried to support
this testimony by analyzing the reaction of TransCanada's
stock to the announcement of the Merger. He found that
TransCanada's share price dropped, which was consistent
with the view that the Merger was a “bad deal for ...
TransCanada” and a “good deal for Columbia.” Zmijewski
Tr. 1447–48. Zmijewski's analysis operated at the level of the
overall deal price; it did not address the more detailed level
of the synergy deduction. See JX 1350 ¶¶ 63–65.
The contemporaneous evidence does not indicate that
TransCanada allocated synergies to Columbia, much less all
of the synergies. TransCanada relies on a presentation to
its board that references the full value of both the cost and
financing synergies and claims it shows that the synergies
were fully allocated to Columbia. See JX 935 at 12. The page
where these figures appear calculates transaction multiples
by taking enterprise values for Columbia that were implied
by various prices per share, then dividing those multiples by
EBITDA metrics, some of which add synergy figures. See id.
This table does not indicate that the synergies were allocated
to Columbia, and the “football field” page in the presentation
places the deal price comfortably within TransCanada's DCF
valuation of Columbia without synergies. See id. at 6.
TransCanada also observes that after Columbia rejected its
offer of $25.25 per share, Poirier suggested attempting to
identify additional synergies that could justify increasing the
offer. See JX 911 at 1, 4. TransCanada says that if it had not
already priced the synergies into its offer, then there would
have been no need to search for additional synergies. But the
email exchange shows a range of views among TransCanada
executives about the amount that TransCanada should be
willing to pay. The email does not suggest that TransCanada
had topped out its bid with all of the synergies going to
Columbia.
Other internal TransCanada documents focus only on cost
synergy estimates of $150 million per year. See JX 878 at 48;
JX 886 at 28. One informative package of materials for the
TransCanada board of directors values Columbia at $26.51
per share using a DCF methodology, then values the cost
synergies at $1.93 per Columbia share, with a sensitivity
range of $1.89 to $2.61 per share. See JX 1008 at 54; accord
JX 1018 at 1, 24, 26. The deal price of $25.50 per share falls
comfortably within TransCanada's valuation ranges without
any allocation of synergies. See JX 1008 at 50; JX 1018
at 22; JX 1365 ¶¶ 91–92. It also appears, as TransCanada
argues, that there were many sources for merger-related value
creation that justified paying a premium over Columbia's
trading price, and the cost, revenue, and financing synergies
were simply the easiest to quantify. See, e.g., JX 1027
(synergy overview). But the fact that TransCanada perceived
synergies does not mean that the deal price included them. 43
*45  Given this evidence, I am not able to credit
TransCanada's position that Columbia received 100% of
synergies worth $4.64 per share. TransCanada bore the
burden of proving a downward adjustment for synergies.
TransCanada did not meet its burden of proof. TransCanada
likely could have justified a smaller synergy deduction, but
it claimed a larger and unpersuasive one. This decision
therefore declines to make any downward adjustment to the
deal price.
4. Change In Value Between Signing And Closing
Because the valuation date in an appraisal is the date on which
the merger closes, fair value must be determined based on
the “operative reality” at the effective time. See Technicolor
IV, 684 A.2d at 298. The deal price provides an indication of
the value of the company on the date of signing. It does not
necessarily provide an indication of the value of the company
on the date of closing. In this case, over three months passed
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between the signing of the Merger Agreement on March 17,
2016, and the closing of the Merger on July 1, 2016. The
petitioners contend that Columbia's value increased during
this period. As the party arguing for an upward adjustment to
the deal price, the petitioners bore the burden of proof on this
issue.
By treating the petitioners as having argued that Columbia's
value increased between signing and closing, this decision is
giving the petitioners the benefit of the doubt on an argument
they did not explicitly make. The petitioners argued that
if the court adopted Columbia's unaffected trading price as
an indicator of fair value, then it should make an upwards
adjustment because Columbia's value would have increased
by the time of closing. The petitioners did not make the same
argument about the deal price, but the same logic applies.
Using either the unaffected trading price or the deal price
results in a temporal gap between the valuation indicator and
the closing date. In this case, the date for the unaffected
trading price was March 9, 2016. The parties signed the
Merger Agreement on March 17. The deal closed on July 1.
The length of the intervening periods differs by only eight
days.
The problem with giving the petitioners the benefit of the
doubt on this argument is that they did not suggest a means of
adjusting the deal price to reflect the increases in value that
resulted from the factors they cite. Perhaps an expert could
have constructed a metric, but the petitioners in this case did
not provide one. For purposes of adjusting the deal price, the
petitioners failed to satisfy their burden of proof.
The petitioners' arguments for an upward adjustment are
also unpersuasive in their own right. They contend that
Columbia's value increased because the market for CPPL's
equity recovered and because commodity prices improved.
The petitioners did not provide persuasive evidence on either
point.
a. An Improved Market For CPPL Equity
In their first argument for an upward adjustment, the
petitioners contend that Columbia's value increased between
signing and closing because the market for CPPL's peers
recovered. They proposed using changes in indices of peer
companies to translate those developments into an increased
trading price for CPPL. They also cite circumstantial evidence
that CPPL's trading price was rising in late February and early
March 2016, possibly suggesting an upward trend that would
have continued if Columbia had not announced the Merger.
See Dkt. 390 Ex. D.
The petitioners' theory builds on the fact that after the spinoff,
CPPL's trading price declined as part of broader investor
dissatisfaction with MLPs. Columbia recognized that it could
not use CPPL to raise the growth capital needed for its
business plan, so it explored less attractive alternatives like a
parent-level equity raise. The petitioners argue that if CPPL's
trading price had recovered, then Columbia could have used
CPPL to fund its business plan.
*46  As their primary evidence of a price change, the
petitioners cite the Alerian MLP Index and the Alerian
Natural Gas MLP Index (the “Gas Index”), both of which
improved by approximately 17% between signing and
closing. 44  CPPL's price did not improve during the same
period; it fell. The petitioners address this difficulty by
pointing to two analyst reports and to internal emails from
a petitioner fund, which suggest that CPPL's trading price
dropped after the announcement of the Merger because
market participants feared that TransCanada would not
transfer assets to CPPL to the same degree as Columbia would
have on a standalone basis. See JX 1069 at 8; JX 1056; JX
1061.
There are several problems with the petitioners' reliance on
the indices. The broader Alerian MLP Index is a poor proxy
for CPPL. It consists of firms that transport or store energy
commodities generally, and it tends to tracks the price of
crude oil. See Jeffers Tr. 743–44; Jeffers Dep. 75; see also
JX 740 at 9–10. The Gas Index provides a better proxy,
but the petitioners' industry expert testified that the higher
prices and lower yields associated with that index resulted
from the announcement of the Merger, which restored the
market's faith in natural gas MLPs. See Goodof Tr. 151. To the
extent his testimony accurately captured the reasons for the
change, then any increase in value implied by the Gas Index
would have resulted from the accomplishment or expectation
of the Merger and would need to be excluded under Section
262(h). In actuality, TransCanada demonstrated that the lower
yields resulted from changes in the composition of the Gas
Index. See JX 1470; Goodof Tr. 152–54. TransCanada also
demonstrated that the lower yields did not reach the level that
Columbia needed to use CPPL to fund its business plan. See
Adamson Tr. 1338–39. The change in the Gas Index does not
persuasively support an increase in Columbia's value.
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More broadly, Columbia's inability to raise growth capital
through CPPL reflected investors' wider concerns about
MLPs. Because of developments in the broader MLP
industry, this model of raising capital was fundamentally
broken. See JX 547; JX 1345 at 72–76. It was particularly
broken at Columbia, which faced additional difficulties in
raising capital because of its high debt load. See Adamson
Tr. 1332–37. A three-month uptick in the two Alerian indices
does not prove that Columbia fixed its model and does not
support an increase in Columbia's value.
b. An Improved Market For Commodities
In their second argument, the petitioners cite changes in
commodity prices. They point out that after the spinoff,
Columbia's trading price dropped as energy stocks fell out of
favor because of a decline in commodity prices. They argue
that as commodity prices recovered, energy stocks recovered.
They point out that between signing and closing, the prices of
natural gas and natural gas futures increased by 58.79% and
55.15%, respectively. See PTO ¶¶ 685, 690.
One difficulty with this argument is that Columbia's stock
price did not recover with commodity prices. It remained
stagnant until the Merger leaked on March 9, 2016. See
Dkt. 390 Ex. A. The bigger difficulty with this argument is
something everyone agrees on: Columbia's value does not
depend on commodity prices, except at the extremes when
ultra-low commodity prices could affect the creditworthiness
of Columbia's counterparties. See PTO ¶¶ 293–94. The
petitioners correctly point out that the declining stock market
hurt Columbia in fall 2015, and they say that the mirror-
image trend should benefit Columbia on the upside. But in fall
2015, the declining market hurt Columbia because it could
not use CPPL to raise equity capital. Columbia then faced the
prospect of raising equity capital by issuing its own shares
in a declining market, which would dilute Columbia's value
and threaten a downward spiral. The problems that Columbia
faced from a declining market did not reflect operational
problems. They reflected constrained financing alternatives.
The commodity-price story does not support an increase in
Columbia's value.
5. The Conclusion Regarding The Deal Price
*47  TransCanada proved that the deal price is a reliable
indicator of fair value. TransCanada failed to prove that
the consideration provided in the Merger included synergies
of $4.64 per share. The petitioners failed to prove that
Columbia's value increased between signing and closing,
and they failed to prove how any change in value could be
translated into an adjustment to the deal price. The market-
tested indicator for the fair value of Columbia is therefore
$25.50 per share.
B. The Unaffected Trading Price
TransCanada contends that the unaffected trading price of
Columbia's stock is a strong indicator of Columbia's fair
value. The petitioners contend that the court should not give
any weight to Columbia's trading price. As the proponent
of this valuation metric, TransCanada bore the burden of
demonstrating its reliability.
Both sides retained experts who rendered opinions on the
persuasiveness of the unaffected trading price as an indicator
of fair value. TransCanada relied on Zmijewski, who is an
emeritus professor of finance at the University of Chicago
and a consultant at Charles River Associates. The petitioners
relied on Eric Talley, a professor of law at Columbia
University and co-director of the Millstein Center for Global
Markets and Corporate Ownership.
The parties debated many issues relating to the unaffected
trading price, including (i) whether the trading price could
provide insight into fundamental value, (ii) whether the
trading price contained an implicit minority discount, (iii)
whether investors lacked access to or the trading price
otherwise failed to incorporate material information about
Columbia's value, and (iv) whether investor sentiment about
broader trends in the energy markets artificially depressed
Columbia's trading price. This decision could devote many
pages to parsing through the competing expert testimony, the
parties' evidentiary showings, and their legal arguments.
Ultimately, however, Delaware precedent demonstrates that
a reliable trading price is not a prerequisite to a reliable
determination of fair value based on a deal-price-less-
synergies metric. Consequently, assuming TransCanada
failed to prove that the trading price was a reliable indicator
of fair value, that ruling would not undermine this court's
ability to rely on the deal price. Indeed, even if the petitioners
proved affirmatively that the trading price was an unreliable
indicator of fair value, that finding would not undermine
this court's ability to rely on the deal price. On the facts
of this case, the deal-price-less-synergies metric is the most
reliable approach, making the analysis of the trading price
comparatively unimportant.
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The Delaware cases that have developed the deal-price-less-
synergies metric demonstrate that a reliable trading price is
not a prerequisite to a reliable deal-price-based determination
of fair value. The Union Illinois decision was the first
time a Delaware court deployed the deal-price-less-synergies
metric, 45  and that decision used it as the exclusive basis for
valuing a privately held company. See Union Illinois, 847
A.2d at 343 (“UFG was not a public company and therefore its
shares were not listed for trading on a stock exchange.”). The
foundational decision for the deal-price-less-synergies metric
thus deployed it in the absence of any trading price, much
less a reliable trading price. See id. at 357, 364 (awarding “the
value of the Merger Price net of synergies” after finding that
the deal price was “the most reliable evidence of fair value”
and “giving 100% weight to that factor”).
*48  Three years after Union Illinois, the Highfields decision
was next to deploy the deal-price-less-synergies metric, and
the first to use it for a widely held, publicly traded firm. See
Highfields, 939 A.2d at 61 (giving 75% weight to deal-price-
less-synergies metric). The court regarded the trading price as
an unreliable indicator of fair value, because the “stock price
included an element of value reflecting merger speculation
leading up to [the merger's] announcement.” Id. at 58. Even
so, the court had no difficulty finding that after deducting
synergies, the deal price was a reliable indicator where it
“resulted from an arm's-length bargaining process where no
structural impediments existed that might prevent a topping
bid.” Id. at 59. The Highfields decision shows that the deal-
price-less-synergies metric does not require a reliable trading
price.
After Highfields, the deal-price metric lay dormant for six
years before returning to prominence in a string of five
decisions issued between 2013 and 2015. 46  Each of those
decisions determined fair value based solely on the deal price,
and in finding that the deal price was reliable, each decision
focused predominantly on whether the merger resulted from
a “proper transactional process.” 47  The decisions did not
view the reliability of the deal price as turning on the
reliability of the trading price. Only one of the decisions
considered the reliability of the trading price. In AutoInfo,
the petitioners argued that the company “was thinly traded
and lacked financial analyst coverage[,]” which led to “the
market underpric[ing] the company because it was ignorant of
its potential.” AutoInfo, 2015 WL 2069417, at *12. The court
rejected this argument as a basis for undermining the deal
price as an indicator of fair value, explaining that “the Merger
price does not reflect the value that a potentially uniformed
market attributed to AutoInfo.” Id. The court noted that the
deal price generated a premium of 22% over the unaffected
trading price and concluded that “[w]hile the market may
have been uninformed about AutoInfo before the sale process,
it subsequently gained ample information” by virtue of the
sale process. Id. The reliability of the sale process rendered
irrelevant the potential unreliability of the trading price.
The decisions that followed Highfields and preceded the
Delaware Supreme Court's decision in DFC thus illustrate a
general rule that trading-price reliability is not a prerequisite
for deal-price reliability. DFC does not suggest a contrary
rule. The DFC decision cited with approval both Union
Illinois, where the trial court used the deal price for a privately
held company, and multiple post-Highfields rulings that had
relied on the deal price without regard to the trading price or
despite evidence that it was unreliable. See DFC, 172 A.3d
at 363 n.84.
*49  Dell also does not suggest a contrary rule. The Delaware
Supreme Court found that both the trading price and the deal
price were reliable indicators of value. See Dell, 177 A.3d at
5-7, 24-27, 35. The high court did not hold that its finding as
to the latter depended on the former. Instead, the Dell decision
regarded the trial court's treatment of the trading price and the
deal price as independent sources of error.
The Delaware Supreme Court's most recent appraisal decision
cuts the same way. In Aruba, the Delaware Supreme Court
held that the trial court erred by relying on the unaffected
trading price. The high court indicated that the trading price
was unreliable partly because the market had not received
information about Aruba's strong earnings. See Aruba, 210
A.3d at 138–39. At the same time, the decision accepted
the trial court's finding that the deal price was a reliable
valuation indicator. See id. at 141–42. The Delaware Supreme
Court pointed to HP's “access to nonpublic information
to supplement its consideration of the public information
available to stock market buyers,” including that it “knew
about Aruba's strong quarterly earnings before the market did,
and likely took that information into account when pricing the
deal.” Id. at 139. The reliability of the deal price thus operated
independently of the trading price. Like DFC, the Aruba
decision cited Union Illinois and Highfields with approval.
See id. at 135 n.41.
Based on these authorities, this decision does not have to
make a finding regarding the reliability of the trading price as
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a condition to relying on the deal price. It remains conceivable
that there could be a case where the parties anchored deal
negotiations off the trading price, but this is not that case. All
of the bidders, including TransCanada, submitted expressions
of interest based on their views of Columbia's value. Although
the various parties at times referred to market premiums when
discussing bids or potential bids, the bids were not priced
at a premium over the trading price. TransCanada's chief
concern about the trading price was that Columbia might
demand a big premium, creating a risk of overpayment. See,
e.g., JX 594 (Poirier remarking that “[if] the stock trades up,
[Columbia's] pricing expectations will increase accordingly,
and this transaction will be challenging for us.”).
As in Aruba, TransCanada submitted its formal bids
after conducting extensive due diligence and receiving
considerable non-public information, including (i) long-term
management projections and (ii) the precedent agreements
that secured Columbia's growth projects. TransCanada and
Columbia then went back and forth over price based on
the confidential information that Columbia possessed and
TransCanada had obtained. These efforts “improved the
parties' ability to estimate” Columbia's “going-concern value
over that of the market as a whole.” Aruba, 210 A.3d at 139.
To reiterate, if the petitioners proved that the trading price
in this case was an unreliable indicator of fair value, then it
would not undermine the reliability of the deal price given
the manner in which Columbia proceeded. This decision
therefore has not parsed the parties' many arguments about the
trading price. I have considered that form of market evidence,
and having done so, I regard the deal price as a more reliable
indicator of value. Relying on the trading price would only
inject error into the fair value determination.
C. The Discounted Cash Flow Method
*50  The petitioners contend that the court should determine
Columbia's fair value using a DCF analysis prepared by
their expert, William Jeffers. He valued Columbia at $32.47
per share. TransCanada did not submit its own DCF
analysis. Instead, Zmijewski critiqued Jeffers's model. As
the proponent of valuing Columbia based on the work of
their expert, the petitioners bore the burden of proving the
reliability of his valuation.
The DCF method is a technique that is generally accepted in
the financial community. “While the particular assumptions
underlying its application may always be challenged in
any particular case, the validity of [the DCF] technique
qua valuation methodology is no longer open to question.”
Campbell-Taggart, 1989 WL 17438, at *8 n.11. It is a
“standard” method that “gives life to the finance principle that
firms should be valued based on the expected value of their
future cash flows, discounted to present value in a manner that
accounts for risk.” Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005
WL 2045640, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005).
The DCF model entails three basic
components: an estimation of net cash
flows that the firm will generate and
when, over some period; a terminal
or residual value equal to the future
value, as of the end of the projection
period, of the firm's cash flows beyond
the projection period; and finally a cost
of capital with which to discount to
a present value both the projected net
cash flows and the estimated terminal
or residual value.
In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del.
Ch. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Dell and DFC, the Delaware Supreme Court cautioned
against using the DCF methodology when market-based
indicators are available. In Dell, the high court explained
that “[a]lthough widely considered the best tool for valuing
companies when there is no credible market information and
no market check, DCF valuations involve many inputs—
all subject to disagreement by well-compensated and highly
credentialed experts—and even slight differences in these
inputs can produce large valuation gaps.” Dell, 177 A.3d at
37–38. The high court warned that when market evidence
is available, “the Court of Chancery should be chary about
imposing the hazards that always come when a law-trained
judge is forced to make a point estimate of fair value based on
widely divergent partisan expert testimony.” Id. at 35. Making
the same point conversely in DFC, the Delaware Supreme
Court advised that a DCF model should be used in appraisal
proceedings “when the respondent company was not public
or was not sold in an open market check ....” DFC, 172 A.3d
at 369 n.118. The high court commented that “a singular
discounted cash flow model is often most helpful when there
isn't an observable market price.” Id. at 370.
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This case is not one where a DCF valuation is likely to
provide a reliable indication of fair value. Columbia was
publicly traded, widely held, and sold in a process that began
with pre-signing outreach and finished with an open, albeit
passive, post-signing market check. Jeffers's valuation of
$32.47 per share stands in contrast with contemporaneous
market evidence.
• Jeffers's valuation is 27% higher than the deal price of
$25.50 per share.
• Jeffers's valuation is 64% higher than the unaffected
trading price of $19.75 per share. 48
• Jeffers's opinion that the value of Columbia materially
exceeded the deal price conflicts with the market
behavior of other potential strategic acquirers who had
shown interest in Columbia, and who did not step
forward to top TransCanada's price.
*51  Dell and DFC teach that a trial court should have
greater confidence in market indicators and less confidence in
a divergent expert determination. See Dell, 177 A.3d at 35–
38; DFC, 172 A.3d at 369–70 & n.118.
Consistent with the Delaware Supreme Court's observations
in Dell and DFC, Jeffers's DCF valuation had many inputs,
and Zmijewski questioned a number of them. The proper
choices were matters of legitimate debate, and the outcome of
those debates generated large swings in the valuation output.
For Columbia, the swings were particularly large because
management's business plan (the “0&12 Plan”) forecasted
major capital expenditures between 2016 and 2021, resulting
in projected negative cash flow of nearly $4 billion during
that period. See Zmijewski Tr. 1457–58. As a result, all
of the positive value derived from the terminal period. In
Jeffers's calculation, the terminal value represented 125%
of his valuation of Columbia. Jeffers Tr. 783–85. Given
this fact, small changes in the assumptions and inputs that
generated the terminal value, such as the discount rate,
growth rate, or base-year free cash flow, had a much larger
effect on the valuation of Columbia than they would on a
typical valuation. See Zmijewski Tr. 1457–58. This court has
questioned the utility of a DCF in a case where the terminal
value represented 97% of the result, finding that “[t]his back-
loading highlights the very real risks” presented by using that
methodology and “undermin[ing] the reliability of applying
the DCF technique.” 49
*52  For example, Jeffers used a beta derived from a five-
year regression of weekly returns. Based on his review of
the forward pricing curves for natural gas and crude oil,
Zmijewski argued that Jeffers should have used a shorter
period. Zmijewski also pointed out that Columbia's financial
advisors both used betas derived from two-year regressions
of weekly observations, and TransCanada's financial advisor
used a beta derived from a one-year regression of daily
observations. Using a two-year regression of weekly returns
would lower the output of the Jeffers DCF model to $18.10
per share. See Zmijewski Tr, 1463–67; JX 1368 ¶ 94.
In another example, Jeffers separately valued Columbia's
three sources of cash flow: its operating income, its
distributions from its limited partner interest in CPPL, and
its distributions from its general partner interest in CPPL.
But Zmijewski pointed out that Jeffers treated all three as if
they were subject to identical risks, thereby underestimating
the cost of capital for the limited partner and general partner
interests. Correcting Jeffers's discount rates for these cash
flows would lower his valuation to a range of $18.96 to $19.23
per share. See Zmijewski Tr. 1458–60; JX 1368 ¶ 108.
A final example involves the terminal value calculation.
Jeffers used a perpetuity growth rate of 3%. The Proxy
indicates that Lazard's DCF analysis implied perpetuity
growth rates from 1.4% to 1.9%, and that Goldman's was 1%
to 2%. See JX 1136 at 65, 75. Reducing Jeffers's terminal
growth rate to 1.5% would lower his valuation to $17.28 per
share. See JX 1368 Ex. V-2.
The wide swings in output that result from legitimate debate
over reasonable inputs undermine the reliability of Jeffers's
DCF model. And the experts' debates went further, with
Zmijewski raising significant questions about the reliability
of the Jeffers model's core input (Columbia's management
projections). Although the preparation of the 0&12 Plan
started with a bottoms-up process, senior management added
a “growth wedge” or “initiative layer” to meet top-down
targets. Zmijewski Tr. 1454–56; see also JX 491. These add-
ons assumed significant returns on unidentified projects that
lacked customers or regulatory approval. See Adamson Tr.
1317–18; Skaggs Tr. 881–82; Mayo Dep. 273. This too raised
fundamental questions about the reliability of Jeffers's DCF
analysis as a whole.
If this were a case where a reliable market-based metric was
not available, then the court might have to call the balls and
strikes of the valuation inputs. In this case, the DCF technique
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“is necessarily a second-best method to derive value.” Union
Illinois, 847 A.2d at 359. This decision therefore does not use
it. See Solera, 2018 WL 3625644, at *32.
III. CONCLUSION
The fair value of Columbia's common stock at the effective
date was $25.50 per share. The legal rate of interest,
compounded quarterly, shall accrue on the appraised value
from the effective date until the date of payment. The parties
shall cooperate on a form of final order. If there are additional
issues for the court to resolve before entering a final order,
then the parties shall submit a joint letter within fourteen days
that identifies them and proposes a path to conclude this case
at the trial level.
All Citations
Not Reported in Atl. Rptr., 2019 WL 3778370
Footnotes
1 Citations in the form “PTO ¶ ––” refer to stipulated facts in the pre-trial order. Dkt. 397. Citations in the form
“[Name] Tr.” refer to witness testimony from the trial transcript. Citations in the form “[Name] Dep.” refer to
witness testimony from a deposition transcript. Citations in the form “JX ––– at ––” refer to a trial exhibit with
the page designated by the last three digits of the control or JX number or, if the document lacked a control
or JX number, by the internal page number. If a trial exhibit used paragraph numbers, then references are
by paragraph.
2 The parties designated the transcripts as joint exhibits rather than lodging them separately. The JX
designations made it more difficult to determine during briefing when a deposition transcript was being cited
and whose testimony it was. It would be more helpful to have the deposition transcripts lodged and collected
in a separate binder, then cited in the form “[Name] Dep.” I offer this point not to criticize the parties' approach,
which was a reasonable one, but rather as a suggestion for the future.
3 See Tom Miesner, A Practical Guide to US Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline Economics, 8 J. Pipeline Eng'g
111, 112 (2009); Matthew J. McCabe, Comment, Master Limited Partnerships' Cost of Capital Conundrum,
17 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 319, 325 (2014).
4 JX 258 at 2; see JX 886 at 34 (“[Columbia's] ‘Drop Downs’ are atypical in that the transaction is effected
through [CPPL] acquiring incremental interests in OpCo .... [Columbia's] interest in OpCo is accordingly
diluted down.”).
5 See id. at 46 (Lazard anticipating stock-price improvement of up to $12 per share; observing that NiSource
traded “at a premium valuation relative to its diversified utility peers, but at a discount to the blended
consolidated multiple implied by MLP valuations for [Columbia]”); see also JX 231 at 2 (consulting firm
remarking in January 2015 that despite “40% drop in gas price since 2014” and “pressure” on “[g]as basin
economics,” that “original [spinoff] rationale holds: Utilities and [Columbia] are separate businesses, the
market is supportive of focused players, growth stories and risk profiles are different”). See generally Mir Dep.
55–73. As anticipated, separating NiSource, Columbia, and CPPL increased their total market capitalization
by approximately $4 billion. See JX 404 at 6.
6 See Mir Tr. 1197 (“[T]he business plan was dependent on being able to raise a lot of equity through the MLP,
CPPL. The MLPs at the time were the de facto means of raising equity for pipeline and midstream projects.”);
JX 300 at 20 (Lazard warning that Columbia's “[f]inancing plan [was] highly dependent on CPPL's ability to
issue equity at attractive terms over time”); JX 480 at 7 (Lazard identifying upside of “[s]trong access to capital
and low cost of CPPL equity” and downside of “CPPL unable to access equity market at attractive terms
(potentially requiring [Columbia] to issue equity)”); JX 214 at 17 (CPPL IPO pitch materials indicating CPPL's
equity would “be the primary source of new funding for Columbia OpCo expansion capital projects”); JX 277
at 4 (analyst report identifying risks like “highly leveraged balance sheet,” growth plan's execution risk, and
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“financing strategy which relies almost completely on [CPPL's] ability to access the equity capital markets
during the next several years”); see also Kittrell Tr. 1052 (“As part of the spin, we had been able to launch
[CPPL] in January of 2015 and raise just over a billion dollars. We also had done a series of debt financings
as of the spin for about $3 billion. So that gave Columbia $4 billion of permanent capital to kind of come out
of the chute with as a standalone independent company. That still left $3 to 4 billion of capital that we were
going to need for '16, '17, and '18.”); JX 96 at 12 (Lazard observing that the “most successful” MLPs had
“low-risk assets and visible growth opportunities, driven by either organic investments or dropdowns from a
supportive general partner that is motivated to grow IDR distributions [to itself]”).
7 JX 167; see Mir Tr. 1195–97. Pre-spinoff, the operative entity was Columbia Energy Group, but for simplicity
this decision uses “Columbia.”
8 See id. Compare JX 753 at 4 (Skaggs explaining in January 2016 that “for CPPL to be a viable equity
currency,” prices would have to improve to at least $21 per unit by 2017 and at least $27 per unit by 2018),
with Dkt. 390 Ex. D (stipulated CPPL price chart showing prices below $14 per unit in late 2015).
9 Id.; see id. (“[I]f there is a real or perceived expectation of reduced growth rates, all the more pressure is placed
on the value of CPG's currencies, thereby exacerbating the challenge.”); Mir Tr. 1198–1202 (discussing
equity overhang at Columbia and CPPL levels); JX 1351 ¶¶ 100–01 (respondent's expert opining that
“disruption in the MLP market and [Columbia's] equity overhang could have forced [Columbia] into issuing
increasingly large numbers of shares to raise equity as the market drove down the value of [Columbia] shares
in expectation of repeated [Columbia] equity issuances” (citing Jonathan Berk & Peter DeMarzo, Corporate
Finance 888 (4th ed. 2017)).
10 Id. ¶ 425; see Skaggs Tr. 862–63; Cornelius Tr. 1133–34; see also JX 493.
11 Id. ¶¶ 442–49, 452–54. Goldman regarded Berkshire and TransCanada as the most likely buyers, followed by
Dominion. See, e.g., JX 499 (“We know D[ominion] is interested, but at a price.”). Poirier expected an auction.
See JX 528. He encouraged his colleagues to act quickly because Columbia had a “massive financing
overhang” and was preparing to “prefund[ ] [its] 2016/17 capex with a $1bn equity issuance.” Id.
12 See PTO ¶ 500; Smith Tr. 248; see also JX 646 (Goldman: “[TransCanada] indicated that they could be ~
$28.00/share.”); Poirier Dep. 148 (“The goal posts of 26 and 30 would translate to 24 and 28 post equity
issuance.”).
13 See JX 736 at 11; id. (noting that Dominion (“capital, HSR”), Enbridge (“complex structure”), Energy Transfer
Equity (“overextended”), and Kinder Morgan (“out of the market”) were unlikely to be suitors for Columbia);
Poirier Dep. 149–52.
14 See Smith Tr. 343 (“It was to negotiate with him, to basically say ... the market is in disarray. There are
number of, you know, big players that are dealing with issues. This is your opportunity, you know, to step up
to the plate and make an offer that will get the attention of the board.”); Poirier Dep. 150–51 (framing Smith's
approach as “encouragement to dedicate time and resources” by describing TransCanada's strong odds of
success at the right price); Poirier Tr. 435 (“He was simply trying to encourage us to be aggressive, that there
was an opportunity for us to acquire this company.”).
15 Broadly speaking, precedent agreements address future customer needs and can help justify pipeline
expansion to regulators. E.g., Mayo Dep. 277 (“[Precedent agreements are] the agreements signed before
the final contract.”). Columbia's precedent agreements covered infrastructure construction and defined the
quantities of natural gas to transport, transportation path, and terms of service. PTO ¶ 280. A party with
access to the precedent agreements could discern whether a given Columbia customer “was an ExxonMobil”
or “a single B grade producer” prone to default in a downturn. See Marchand Tr. 526; see also JX 815
(TransCanada due diligence memo finding credit terms relatively disappointing yet “normal for U.S. regulated
natural gas pipeline projects”); JX 829 (analyst report stating that Columbia “requires credit support for non-
I grade customers equivalent to 12–24 months of demand charges”).
16 In internal emails exchanged on March 10, 2016, TransCanada's bankers discussed that “[t]he [Columbia]
board is freaking out and told the management team to get a deal done with ‘whatever it takes’ .. Oddly, the
[Columbia] team has relayed this info to [TransCanada].” JX 938. This exchange could suggest that there
- 153 - 
In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
2019 WL 3778370
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 41
was a path for Columbia to extract additional merger consideration from TransCanada, but the petitioners
have not briefed this document, and I take no position on it.
17 See Ben Dummett et al., Keystone Pipeline Operator TransCanada in Takeover Talks, Wall
St. J., March 10, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/keystone-pipeline-operator-transcanada-in-takeover-
talks-1457627686 (“TransCanada ... is in takeover talks with Columbia Pipeline Group Inc., a U.S. natural-
gas pipeline operator with a market value of about $9 billion. The companies could reach a deal in the coming
weeks, according to people familiar with the matter.”).
18 JX 949. Goldman received calls too. See JX 951 at 3 (“One question [Skaggs] asked is shd [sic] we let
[TransCanada] know we are getting calls.”); see also JX 948 (Goldman banker indicating “[n]ot a lot of interest
[from Columbia's management] in engaging with Spectra. Would be all-stock deal, they don't love Spectra's
assets.”).
19 See id. (Smith email to Goldman and management: “We need to think about what the protocol is if we get a
letter. Presumably, the Board would have to respond officially, we would have to notify [TransCanada] and
we should think about what our response is if they make it public after being rebuked.”); Skaggs Tr. 1021–
22 (“Q. ... During this stage when you were getting an inbound call from the CEO of Spectra, an inbound
e-mail from the CEO of Spectra, a call from the CFO of Spectra to Goldman Sachs, and a call from the
chief development officer of Goldman Sachs, did you, Mr. Skaggs, or another member of management, do
anything to respond to Spectra? And since I'm going to anticipate what you're going to say, other than tell
Goldman to look at the script. A. That was it, sir. Q. So the answer's no. A. No.”).
20 See JX 1399 at 17 (“The Board ... acknowledged that proceeding with TransCanada on the expedited
timetable would mean that the Company would potentially be entering into the merger agreement without
having the opportunity to consider [the] formal proposal from Spectra” that Goldman expected to arrive “in
the next few days.”).
21 See, e.g., JX 1016 at 78–79, 107; JX 1136 at 66, 74–77.
22 See PTO ¶ 625. The Board made a related determination that the renewed Exclusivity Agreement prohibited
Columbia from soliciting an offer from Spectra or anyone else. See id. That was inaccurate. The renewed
Exclusivity Agreement expired upon “written notification to [Columbia] that [TransCanada] has determined
that it is no longer interested in pursuing a Potential Transaction on terms at least as favorable to the
stockholders of [Columbia] as the terms discussed ... on March 10, 2016.” JX 978 at 4. TransCanada's March
10 proposal offered $26 per share. TransCanada's reduced offer of $25.50 per share terminated exclusivity.
But if the Columbia directors had considered this fact, it would not have changed how they proceeded. When
exclusivity terminated the first time, the Board acted as if it remained in place, and the script used with Spectra
was the functional equivalent of exclusivity. See JX 968. The Board worried about losing the TransCanada
offer, and it regarded that risk as outweighing the benefit of an expedited solicitation process involving other
bidders.
23 Id. at 72. Although Battye is the seminal Delaware Supreme Court case on point, Chancellor Josiah Wolcott
initially established the meaning of “value” under the appraisal statute in Chicago Corporation v. Munds, 172
A. 452 (Del. Ch. 1934). Citing the “material variance” between the Delaware appraisal statute, which used
“value,” and the comparable New Jersey statute that served as a model for the Delaware statute, which
used “full market value,” Chancellor Wolcott held that the plain language of the statute required “value” to be
determined on a “going concern” basis. Id. at 453–55. But see Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Gp.,
Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 355–56 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“This requirement that the valuation inquiry focus on valuing the
entity as a going concern has sometimes been confused as a requirement of § 262's literal terms. It is not.”).
The going-concern standard also tracks the judicially endorsed account in which the appraisal statute arose
“as a means to compensate shareholders of Delaware corporations for the loss of their common law right to
prevent a merger or consolidation by refusal to consent to such transactions.” See, e.g., Alabama By-Products
Corp. v. Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254, 258 (Del. 1995). As Battye explains, the appraisal statute calls for
valuing the corporation as a going concern, using its operative reality as it then existed as a standalone entity,
because that is the alternative that the dissenters wished to maintain. Battye, 74 A.2d at 72. Commentators
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have questioned the accuracy of the historical trade-off, but it remains part of the foundational understanding
that has informed the concept of fair value. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Fair
Value of Cornfields in Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 J. Corp. L. 119, 130 n.52 (2005) (“The historical accuracy
of this trade-off story is questionable, however, given the fact that the appraisal remedy was often added well
after the adoption of statutes permitting mergers without unanimous consent.” (citing Robert B. Thompson,
Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate Law, 84 Geo L.J. 1, 14 (1995))).
24 See, e.g., Montgomery Cellular Hldg. Co. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 222 (Del. 2005); Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma
Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 553 (Del. 2000); Rapid-Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 802 (Del. 1992); Cavalier
Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989); Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 141 (Del.
1980); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218 (Del. 1975).
25 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 2003 WL 23700218, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003), as revised (July 9, 2004),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005); accord Finkelstein v. Liberty Dig., Inc.,
2005 WL 1074364, at *12 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2005) (“The judges of this court are unremittingly mindful of the
fact that a judicially selected determination of fair value is just that, a law-trained judge's estimate that bears
little resemblance to a scientific measurement of a physical reality. Cloaking such estimates in grand terms
like ‘intrinsic value’ does not obscure this hard truth from any informed commentator.”).
26 See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 135; Dell, 177 A.3d at 23; DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value P'rs, 172 A.3d 346,
367 (Del. 2017).
27 See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 137 (emphasizing that buyer armed with “material nonpublic information about the
seller is in a strong position (and is uniquely incentivized) to properly value the seller”). But see In re Dunkin'
Donuts S'holders Litig., 1990 WL 189120, at *9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1990) (“A bidder's objective is to identify
an underpriced corporation and ... acquire it at the lowest price possible.”); cf. DFC, 172 A.3d at 374 n.145
(rejecting reliance on evidence indicating buyer's contemporaneous belief that it purchased target “at trough
pricing”; commenting that “it is in tension with the statute itself to argue that the subjective view of post-
merger value of the acquirer can be used to value the respondent company in an appraisal”; observing “[t]hat
a buyer views itself as having struck a good deal is far from reliable evidence that the resulting price from a
competitive bidding process is an unreliable indicator of fair value”).
28 See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136–39, 142 (adopting deal price less synergies as fair value where company's banker
contacted six potential buyers after HP's initial outreach, none were interested, sale process terminated, and
sale process later resumed as single-bidder engagement with HP); Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (finding competitive
pre-signing process where Silver Lake competed one-at-a-time with interested parties); DFC, 172 A.3d at
350, 376 (finding “competitive process of bidding” where company's banker contacted “every logical buyer,”
three expressed interest, and two named a preliminary price with one dropping out before serious negotiations
commenced).
29 See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136 (“It cannot be that an open chance for buyers to bid signals a market failure
simply because buyers do not believe the asset on sale is sufficiently valuable for them to engage in a bidding
contest against each other.”); Dell, 177 A.3d at 29 (“Fair value entails at a minimum a price some buyer
is willing to pay—not a price at which no class of buyers in the market would pay.”); id. at 33 (finding that
absence of higher bid meant “that the deal market was already robust and that a topping bid involved serious
risk of overpayment,” which “suggests the price is already at a level that is fair”).
30 At times, the petitioners also targeted a third executive—Glen Kettering—who served as President of
Columbia. He was less involved in the sale process than Skaggs and Smith, and the petitioners never
deposed him. Although Kettering retired after the Merger and received change-in-control benefits, the
evidence does not support the contention that he pushed for an early sale.
31 Smith Tr. 316; see JX 562 (Goldman describing Berkshire's requests as atypically granular for “early [ ]
M&A dialogue”); JX 555 (Berkshire requesting separate operating models for each OpCo subsidiary); JX 550
(detailed Berkshire diligence questionnaire); JX 565 (same); JX 568 (same); JX 551 (responding to Berkshire
request about MLP tax structure); JX 554 (same). See generally PTO ¶¶ 460–66 (describing Berkshire
diligence).
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32 E.g., JX 746 (Skaggs writing to Board on January 26, 2016: “Consistent with our recent one-on-one
conversations about a potential inbound overture, TransCanada's ... CEO called me on Monday afternoon
(1/25) to outline a proposition to acquire CPG.”).
Before Poirier and Smith met in January 2016, Poirier assured Smith that he could share due diligence
materials without TransCanada breaching the standstill. See JX 485 at 2 (“My understanding is that our
respective counsels have talked, and that we are ok to proceed with exchanging information. As we destroyed
all non public [sic] information, in addition to the data room index, would it be possible to receive again the
information you previously sent, including the board summaries?”). At trial, Poirier unpersuasively rationalized
his overtures to Smith as complying with the standstill because he “wasn't submitting a formal offer for the
company.” Poirier Tr. 387. Poirier is an experienced investment banker. He should have understood the
standstill's scope. When pushed, he cited unspecified legal advice from TransCanada's counsel. See id.;
id. at 454.
On January 22, 2016, TransCanada's in-house counsel drafted an email to Columbia's in-house counsel
opining that an upcoming call between Girling and Skaggs would not breach the standstill, because although
“there may be some broad discussion regarding valuation of [Columbia],” Girling would not make an offer to
buy. JX 735. The point of talking numbers was to facilitate a bid, thus breaching the standstill. TransCanada's
in-house counsel concluded her email by seeking confirmation that TransCanada would not breach the
standstill “in the event [that it made] a verbal or written offer or proposal.” Id. That request effectively sought
waiver of the DADW, also a breach.
33 The petitioners advance a similar argument about the threat of massive tax liability deterring potential
acquirers from buying Columbia. NiSource spun off Columbia in a tax-free transaction, but an acquirer could
become liable for the tax if it had negotiated to buy Columbia before the spinoff and then bought it afterwards.
See I.R.C. § 355(c)(2), (e); Tres. Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(3)(iii); Rev. Rul. 2005-2 C.B. 684. The petitioners cite
an April 2016 email in which TransCanada's CFO cited “rumblings, that we are unable to confirm or refute,
that Enbridge may have had prior discussions with NiSource that could impact the tax-free status of the spin
of Columbia.” JX 1108. With the potential exception of TransCanada, there is no direct evidence of anyone
negotiating with NiSource before the spinoff. See, e.g., JX 311 (circumstantial evidence of TransCanada and
Lazard engaging in talks before spinoff). The petitioner failed to carry their burden of proof on this issue.
34 By February 2016, Skaggs was updating the Board on an at least weekly basis. See, e.g., JX 780; JX 785;
JX 806; JX 808; JX 830; JX 846; JX 852; JX 855. By March, Skaggs was updating the Board on a near-daily
basis. See, e.g., JX 874; JX 913; JX 929; JX 939; JX 945; JX 962; JX 964; JX 995; JX 1004; JX 1007; JX 1010.
35 See, e.g., Kittrell Tr. 1107–08 (“Q.... And it's fair to say that the board never authorized management to tell
any potential bidder that Columbia had eliminated the competition for a competing bid. Right? A. The board
would never have given that specific direction.”); accord Kittrell Dep. 164 (describing Smith's strategy as
“counterintuitive”).
36 See JX 1022; JX 1016 at 20; see also Mir Tr. 1212 (describing Lazard's view that Spectra was “not a credible
or capable buyer”).
37 See generally Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, 41 Del. J. Corp. L. 279,
320–25 (2017) (comparing appraisal with fiduciary review with primary focus on deals without a controlling
stockholder); Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A,
92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1551, 1607–09 (2015) (same).
38 Compare Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, Finding the Right Balance in Appraisal Litigation:
Deal Price, Deal Process, and Synergies, 73 Bus. Law. 961, 962 (2018) (commending outcomes in Dell and
DFC and arguing that “the Delaware courts' treatment of the use of the deal price to determine fair value
does and should mirror the treatment of shareholder class action fiduciary duty litigation”), and id. at 982–83
(citing Dell and DFC and observing, “What we discern from the case law, however, is a tendency to rely on
deal price to measure fair value where the transaction would survive enhanced judicial scrutiny .... Thus, in
order to determine whether to use the deal price to establish fair value, the Delaware courts are engaging in
the same sort of scrutiny they would have applied under Revlon if the case were one challenging the merger
- 156 - 
In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
2019 WL 3778370
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 44
as in breach of the directors' fiduciary duties.” (footnote omitted)), with Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, The
Flawed Corporate Finance of Dell and DFC Global, 68 Emory L.J. 221, 269 (2018) (criticizing Dell and DFC
as “conflat[ing] questions of fiduciary duty liability with the valuation questions central to appraisal disputes”).
39 See, e.g., Dent v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., 2014 WL 2931180, at *8–10 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014) (rejecting
fiduciary challenge to “(1) a no-solicitation provision; (2) a standstill provision; (3) a change in recommendation
provision; (4) information rights for [the acquirer]; and (5) a $5 million termination fee” where termination
fee represented 4.5% of equity value and change-of-recommendation provision included unlimited match
right); In re Novell, Inc. S'holder Litig., 2013 WL 322560, at *10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 2013) (describing “the no
solicitation provision, the matching rights provision, and the termination fee” as “customary and well within
the range permitted under Delaware law” and observing that “[t]he mere inclusion of such routine terms does
not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty”); In re Answers Corp. S'holders Litig., 2011 WL 1366780, at *4
& n.47 (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2011) (describing “a termination fee plus expense reimbursement of 4.4% of the
Proposed Transaction's equity value, a no solicitation clause, a ‘no-talk’ provision limiting the Board's ability to
discuss an alternative transaction with an unsolicited bidder, a matching rights provision, and a force-the-vote
requirement” as “standard merger terms” that “do not alone constitute breaches of fiduciary duty” (quoting
In re 3Com S'holders Litig., 2009 WL 5173804, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2009))); In re Atheros Commc'ns,
Inc. S'holder Litig., 2011 WL 864928, at *7 n.61 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011) (same analysis for no-solicitation
provision, matching right, and termination fee); In re 3Com, 2009 WL 5173804, at *7 & n.37 (also same
analysis for no-solicitation provision, matching right, and termination fee (collecting authorities)).
40 Cf. In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1015 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[I]n his scholarly work
Subramanian argues that [the] combination of a termination fee and matching rights raises the fears second
bidders have of suffering a ‘winner's curse.’ This is the anxiety that a first bidder will match the initial topping
bid, only to refuse to match the next topping gambit, leaving the second bidder having paid more than was
economically rational. This fear, Subramanian points out, is further exacerbated by the common circumstance
that first bidders often have superior information on the target, and presumably know when to say when. Of
course, the other side of this story is that the first bidder has taken the risk, suffered the search and opportunity
costs, and done the due diligence required to establish the bidding floor.”).
41 See Blueblade Capital Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft Cos., 2018 WL 3602940, at *23–27 (Del. Ch. July 27,
2018); In re Appraisal of AOL, Inc., 2018 WL 1037450, at *8–10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2018) (subsequent history
omitted). After post-trial briefing and argument in this case, this court took a similar approach in In re Appraisal
of Jarden Corporation, 2019 WL 3244085, at *24–25 (Del. Ch. July 19, 2019).
42 JX 935 at 12. In the presentation, TransCanada estimated $150 million in financing synergies. TransCanada
lowered this estimate to $100 million for purposes of communicating to the markets, viewing the lower number
as more realistic and achievable. See Marchand Tr. 494–96.
43 The petitioners argue that the alternative is zero, relying on an article from 1987 that Zmijewski cited in his
report. See JX 9. The authors examined a sample of tender offers from 1963 to 1984 and observed that
“[o]nly when competing bids are actually made do we observe greater returns to target shareholders and a
dissipation of the initial gains to the stockholders of the bidding firms.” Id. at 22–23. The petitioners argue that
Columbia never solicited competing bids, so Columbia could not have extracted any synergies. The article
does not support this claim. It finds that targets extract a share of surplus even in single-bidder contests,
but also finds that only in multi-bidder contests do the returns to bidders dissipate. The article thus supports
the view that TransCanada did not share all of its synergies with Columbia. It does not support the view that
TransCanada did not share any of its synergies with Columbia.
44 The petitioners also rely on a Wells Fargo research report that mentions that certain MLPs had success raising
capital in 2016, but it did not focus on natural gas MLPs. See JX 1468. The successful equity raises largely
involved blue-chip sponsors, offered preferred units that Columbia could not support because of its debt
load, or were completed through at-the-market raises, a technique that could not have sustained Columbia's
business plan. See Adamson Tr. 1333–40, 1406–09.
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45 As precedent for the deal-price-less-synergies metric, the Union Illinois decision cited three cases: M.P.M.
Enterprises, Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Company, 1993 WL 208763 (Del. Ch. June 8, 1993), and Van de
Walle v. Unimation, Inc., 1991 WL 29303 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 1991). See Union Illinois, 847 A.2d at 343 (citing
the three cases and stating that “our case law recognizes that when there is an open opportunity to buy a
company, the resulting market price is reliable evidence of fair value”).
The Pabst decision appears to be the first Delaware case to determine fair value by drawing on the pricing of
the deal that gave rise to the appraisal proceeding, but the Pabst court did so in a manner that differed from
Union Illinois. After a public auction involving competitive bidding by multiple suitors, G. Heileman Brewing
Company acquired Pabst Brewing Company through a structurally coercive, two-tiered tender offer, in which
Heileman paid $32 per share in the first step and squeezed out the remaining stockholders in the back-end
merger for a package of subordinated debentures with a face value of $24 per share. Pabst, 1993 WL 208763,
at *2, *8. The court rejected all of the parties' valuation methods, forcing the court to “make a determination
based upon its own analysis.” Id. at *8. The court reached a fair value conclusion of $27 per share by blending
the front-end and back-end consideration to reach a value of $29.50, and then deducting a control premium,
which the court estimated “did not exceed $2.50 per share.” Id. at *8, *10. The court did not equate the control
premium with a synergies-based deduction.
After Pabst, the concept of a deal price metric next surfaced in M.P.M. Enterprises. The petitioners were
minority stockholders in privately held company that was sold to a third-party buyer. The trial court valued the
company using a DCF analysis. The respondent appealed, asserting that the trial court erred by failing to give
weight to the transaction price and relying heavily on Van de Walle, a breach of fiduciary duty action in which
a controlled company was sold to a third party and all stockholders received consideration having the same
value. As one of many reasons for entering judgment in favor of the defendants, the Van de Walle court cited
the arm's-length negotiations between the seller and the buyer. In an eloquent turn of phrase that has figured
prominently in twenty-first century appraisal decisions, the Van de Walle court observed that “[t]he fact that a
transaction price was forged in the crucible of objective market reality (as distinguished from the unavoidably
subjective thought process of a valuation expert) is viewed as strong evidence that the price is fair.” 1991 WL
29303, at *17. In M.P.M. Enterprises, however, the Delaware Supreme Court distinguished Van de Walle as
a breach of fiduciary duty case and observed that “[a] fair merger price in the context of a breach of fiduciary
duty claim will not always be a fair value in the context of determining going concern value.” 731 A.2d at 797.
The high court did express agreement with “the general statement made by the Court in Van de Walle” to the
effect that “[a] merger price resulting from arms-length negotiations where there are no claims of collusion is
a very strong indication of fair value.” Id. But the high court again cautioned that “in an appraisal action, that
merger price must be accompanied by evidence tending to show that it represent the going concern value of
the company rather than just the value of the company to one specific buyer.” Id. Citing the trial court's broad
discretion when assessing fair value, the high court in M.P.M. Enterprises affirmed the trial court.
46 Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., 2015 WL 6164771 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015); LongPath Capital, LLC
v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., 2015 WL 4540443 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015); Merlin P'rs LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., 2015
WL 2069417 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015); In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 WL 399726 (Del. Ch. Jan.
30, 2015); Huff Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx, Inc., 2013 WL 5878807 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013). At the trial level
in Golden Telecom, this court stated that “an arms-length merger price resulting from an effective market
check is entitled to great weight in an appraisal.” Golden Telecom Trial, 993 A.2d at 507. The trial court in
Golden Telecom declined to apply the deal-price-less-synergies metric on the facts of the case because two
large stockholders holding a combined 44% of the equity stood on both sides of the transaction and a special
committee treated the deal as if the company had a controlling stockholder. Id. at 508–09.
47 Ramtron, 2015 WL 4540443, at *20; see BMC, 2015 WL 6164771, at *14 (“robust, arm's-length sales
process”); Ancestry.com, 2015 WL 399726, at *16 (“[T]he process here ... appears to me to represent an
auction of the Company that is unlikely to have left significant stockholder value unaccounted for.”).
48 For reasons previously discussed, this decision has not relied on the unaffected trading price as a valuation
metric and has not made a finding as to whether or not the trading price was reliable. The significant distance
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between the trading price of $19.75 and expert valuation of $32.47 per share is nevertheless worth observing,
because it suggests that at least one of these metrics, and possibly both, is wrong.
49 Union Illinois, 847 A.2d at 361; see In re Appraisal of Solera Hldgs., Inc., 2018 WL 3625644, at *32 (Del. Ch.
July 30, 2018) (discounting petitioners' DCF analysis in part because “nearly 88% of the petitioners' enterprise
valuation is attributable to periods after the five year Hybrid Case Projections”). In Union Illinois and Solera,
as in this case, growth rates drove the back-loading of the valuation. In other decisions, when valuators used
an exit multiple to derive the terminal value, this court has criticized valuations where a high percentage of
value resulted from the terminal period because “the entire exercise amounts to little more than a special
case of the comparable companies approach.” Gray v. Cytokine Pharmasciences, Inc., 2002 WL 853549, at
*9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2002) (criticizing a valuation on this basis where the terminal value accounted for over
75% of the total value); see Gholl, 2004 WL 2847865, at *13 (criticizing discounted cash flow valuation where
exit multiples method for calculating terminal year value resulted in the terminal value representing over 70%
of its total present value); Prescott Gp. Small Cap. v. Coleman Co., Inc., 2004 WL 2059515, at *24-25 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 8, 2004) (same criticism of terminal value derived using exit multiple method that comprised 70%
to 80% of present value).
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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*1  The petitioners are five institutions 1  who owned
common stock of Dell Inc. They sought appraisal after Dell
announced a going-private merger. Dell contends that they did
not hold their shares continuously through the effective date
of the merger and therefore lost their appraisal rights.
The Funds held their shares through custodial banks. By
virtue of this relationship, the Funds did not have legal title
to the shares; they were beneficial owners. But the custodial
banks did not have legal title either. The shares they held were
registered in the name of Cede & Co., which is the nominee
of the Depository Trust Company (“DTC”). 2
DTC's place in the ownership structure results from the
federal response to a paperwork crisis on Wall Street during
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Increased trading volume
in the securities markets overwhelmed the back offices of
brokerage firms and the capabilities of transfer agents. No
one could cope with the burdens of documenting stock
trades using paper certificates. The markets were forced to
declare trading holidays so administrators could catch up.
With trading volumes continuing to climb, it was obvious that
reform was needed. Congress directed the SEC to evaluate
alternatives that would facilitate trading.
After studying the issue, the SEC adopted a national policy
of share immobilization. To carry out its policy, the SEC
placed a new entity—the depository institution—at the
bottom the ownership chain. DTC emerged as the only
domestic depository. Over 800 custodial banks and brokers
are participating members of DTC and maintain accounts
with that institution. DTC holds shares on their behalf in
fungible bulk, meaning that none of the shares are issued in
the names of DTC's participants. Instead, all of the shares
are issued in the name of Cede. Through a Fast Automated
Securities Transfer account (the “FAST Account”), DTC uses
an electronic book entry system to track the number of shares
of stock that each participant holds.
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*2  By adding DTC to the bottom of the ownership chain, the
SEC eliminated the need for the overwhelming majority of
legal transfers. Before share immobilization, custodial banks
and brokers held shares through their own nominees, so new
certificates had to be issued frequently when shares traded.
With share immobilization, legal title remains with Cede. No
new certificates are required.
Although the depository system solved the paperwork crisis,
it complicated other aspects of the legal system. Appraisal
is one of those areas. When a transaction triggers appraisal
rights, Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law
(the “DGCL”) permits “[a]ny stockholder of a corporation”
who complies with its requirements to litigate a proceeding
that will result in a judicial determination of the “fair value
of the shares.” 8 Del. C. §§ 262(a) & (h). The statute states
that “[a]s used in this section, the word ‘stockholder’ means
a holder of record of stock in a corporation.” Id. § 262(a)
(the “Record Holder Requirement”). One of the statutory
requirements is that a stockholder who wishes to pursue
appraisal must “continuously hold[ ] such shares through the
effective date of the merger.” Id. (the “Continuous Holder
Requirement”).
Many appraisal decisions have involved disputes over these
requirements. In one recurring scenario, companies argued
that a petitioner had lost its appraisal rights when DTC
followed its usual procedures, surrendered the shares held in
fungible bulk for the merger consideration, and distributed the
merger consideration to its participants, who then deposited
it in their customers' accounts. 3  In Alabama By–Products
Corp. v. Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254 (Del.1995), the Delaware
Supreme Court held that if a petitioner had properly perfected
its appraisal rights through Cede, then the petitioner would
not lose its appraisal rights if DTC surrendered the shares
in exchange for the merger consideration. The court reached
this conclusion because the surrender did not comply with the
appraisal statute's requirements for withdrawing or settling
a properly perfected appraisal claim. The practical effect
of this decision was to “impose upon the corporation the
responsibility of overseeing the surrender of shares after a
merger.” Id. at 263.
*3  To help issuers oversee the surrender of shares, DTC
modified its procedures. Now, when a beneficial owner causes
Cede to demand appraisal, DTC removes the shares covered
by the demand from the fungible bulk tracked in the FAST
Account. DTC does this by causing the issuer's transfer agent
to issue a paper stock certificate for the number of shares
held by the beneficial owner. The paper certificate is issued in
Cede's name, so the same record holder continues to hold the
shares for purposes of the Continuous Holder Requirement.
In this case, DTC followed its procedures and issued paper
stock certificates in Cede's name for the Funds' shares. DTC
then contacted the custodial banks to make arrangements
for delivering the resulting valuable pieces of paper. But
here another back-office procedure kicked in. For various
understandable business reasons (insurance requirements,
recordkeeping for internal audit, mitigating risk of theft, etc.),
some banks and brokers only hold stock certificates that
are issued in the names of their own nominees. The Funds'
custodial banks followed this policy.
When DTC contacted the custodial banks, each instructed
Dell's transfer agent to record a transfer of the shares to its
nominee and issue a certificate in its nominee's name.
Dell's transfer agent complied. The Funds remained the
beneficial owners. The custodians remained the custodians.
But now there were new nominees on the stock ledger.
Dell has moved for summary judgment, arguing that these
back-office steps resulted in new record holders and broke
the chain of title for purposes of the Continuous Holder
Requirement. Under Delaware cases that pre-dated the federal
policy of share immobilization, the record holder for purposes
of the DGCL was the person that appeared on the stock ledger.
After the SEC created the depository system, the Delaware
courts adhered to this rule. They did not distinguish the
voluntary relationship between a client and its custodial bank
or broker (the “broker level” of ownership) from the federally
mandated relationship between the custodial bank or broker
and DTC (the “depository level” of ownership). Delaware
cases simply treated Cede as the holder of record and applied
the Continuous Holder Requirement strictly. Under these
decisions, the motion must be granted.
A different approach is possible and, in my view, preferable.
Federal law looks through Cede and recognizes the custodial
banks and brokers as record holders, just as before the federal
mandate. If Delaware law took a similar approach, the Funds
would retain their appraisal rights, because ownership by
the relevant DTC participants never changed. Were I writing
on a blank slate, I would account for the federal policy of
share immobilization by interpreting the term “stockholder
of record” as used in Section 262(a) to parallel its content
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under the federal securities laws. In other words, the term
“stockholder of record” would include a DTC participant. But
that is not how our cases have interpreted the statutory term,
and this court is bound by those precedents. Dell's motion for
summary judgment is therefore granted.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts are drawn from the parties' submissions in
connection with Dell's motion for summary judgment. There
are no disputes of material fact about the Funds' exercise of
their appraisal rights or the re-titling of their shares.
A. The Funds' Ownership Of Dell Shares
On February 5, 2013, Dell agreed to a merger in which
each publicly held share of Dell common stock would be
converted into the right to receive $13.75 in cash, subject to
the right of stockholders to seek appraisal. The Funds held
at least 922,975 shares of Dell common stock. Like most
investors, the Funds did not hold legal title to their shares.
The Funds owned the shares indirectly through accounts at
custodial banks. Two of the Funds used J.P. Morgan Chase
(“JP Morgan”) as their custodian. The others used The Bank
of New York Mellon (“BONY”).
*4  The custodial banks did not own record title either. JP
Morgan and BONY are two of more than 800 custodial banks
and brokers who are participating members of DTC.
The vast majority of publicly traded shares in the United
States are registered on the companies' books not in the
name of beneficial owners—i.e., those investors who paid
for, and have the right to vote and dispose of, the shares—
but rather in the name of “Cede & Co.,” the name used by
The Depository Trust Company (“DTC”).
Shares registered in this manner are commonly referred to
as being held in “street name.” ... DTC holds the shares on
behalf of banks and brokers, which in turn hold on behalf
of their clients (who are the underlying beneficial owners
or other intermediaries).
John C. Wilcox, John J. Purcell III, & Hye–Won Choi, “Street
Name” Registration & The Proxy Solicitation Process, in A
Practical Guide to SEC Proxy and Compensation Rules 10–3,
10–3 (Amy Goodman et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007 & 2008 Supp.)
[hereinafter Street Name ] (footnote omitted).
The history of how we arrived at this ownership structure is
important and informative. 4
Prior to 1970, negotiation was the most
common method used to transfer stock
in the United States. The owner would
endorse the physical certificate to the
name of the assignee on the back
of the certificate. This endorsement
instruct[ed] the corporation, upon
notification, [about] the change in
ownership of the shares on its
corporate books. If the parties used the
services of a broker, the seller would
transfer the certificate to his brokerage
firm. The brokerage firm representing
the customer buying the security
would receive the physical certificate
and transfer it to the buyer as the
new record owner of the security.
Occasionally, the new owner might
request that the physical certificate
remain at the street address of the
brokerage firm to facilitate the transfer
of the certificate in a subsequent sale.
Wolfe, supra, at 180 (footnotes omitted).
Transfer of securities in the traditional
certificate-based system was a
complicated, labor-intensive process.
Each time securities were traded,
the physical certificates had to be
delivered from the seller to the buyer,
and in the case of registered securities
the certificates had to be surrendered
to the issuer or its transfer agent for
registration of transfer.
Prefatory Note at 2.
*5  By the late 1960s, increased trading rendered the
certificate system obsolete. The paperwork burden reached
“crisis proportions.” Id.
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Stock certificates and related
documents were piled “halfway to
the ceiling” in some offices; clerical
personnel were working overtime, six
and seven days a week, with some
firms using a second or even a third
shift to process each day's transaction.
Hours of trading on the exchange
and over the counter were curtailed
to give back offices additional time
after the closing bell. Deliveries
to customers and similar activities
dropped seriously behind, and the
number of errors in brokers' records,
as well as the time to trace and correct
these errors, exacerbated the crisis.
Wolfe, supra, at 181 n.49 (quoting SEC Study at 219
n.1). “The difficulty that brokers and dealers experienced
in keeping their records due to the volume of transactions
and their thin capitalization caused many brokerage firms to
declare bankruptcy and many investors to realize losses.” Id.
at 182.
Congress responded by passing the Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970, which directed the SEC to study the
practices leading to the growing crisis in securities transfer. 15
U.S.C. § 78kkk(g). The SEC recommended discontinuing the
physical movement of certificates and adopting a depository
system. Wolfe, supra, at 182 n.58 (citing SEC Study at 13).
Congress then passed the Securities Acts Amendments of
1975, which directed the SEC to “use its authority under
this chapter to end the physical movement of securities
certificates in connection with the settlement among brokers
and dealers of transactions in securities consummated by
means of the mails or any means or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce.”15 U.S.C. § 78q–1(e). In a resulting
report, the SEC found that “registering securities in other
than the name of the beneficial owner” was essential to
establishing “a national system for the prompt and accurate
clearance and settlement of securities transactions.” Kahan &
Rock, supra, at 1237 n.49.
Thus was born the federal policy of immobilizing share
certificates through a depository system. “Congress called
for a more efficient process for comparison, clearing,
and settlement in a national market system, and for the
end of the physical movement of securities certificates
in connection with the settlement of transactions among
brokers and dealers.” Egon Guttman, Transfer of Securities:
State and Federal Interaction, 12 Cardozo L.Rev. 437, 447
(1990); accordS. REP. NO. 94–75 at 5 (1975) (“A national
clearance and settlement system is clearly needed.”). To
comply, “[b]rokerages and banks created [depositories] to
allow them to deposit certificates centrally (so-called ‘jumbo
certificates,’ often representing tens or hundreds of thousands
of shares) and leave them at rest.” Larry T. Garvin, The
Changed (And Changing?) Uniform Commercial Code, 26
Fla. St. U.L.Rev. 285, 315 (1999).
In 1973, just after the paperwork crisis and with the federal
writing on the wall, the members of the New York Stock
Exchange created DTC to serve as a depository and clearing
agency. Originally there were three regional depositories in
addition to DTC: the Midwest Securities Depository Trust
Company, which held through its nominee, Kray & Co.; the
Pacific Securities Depository Trust Company, which held
through its nominee, Pacific & Co; and the Philadelphia
Depository Trust Company, which held through its nominee,
Philadep & Co. “[I]n the 1990's DTC ... assumed the activities
of the [other] depositories.” Carnell & Hanks, supra, at 26.
Today DTC is the world's largest securities depository and the
only domestic depository. Kahan & Rock, supra, at 1238 n.50.
“DTC is owned by its ‘participants,’ which are the member
organizations of the various national stock exchanges (e.g.,
State Street Bank, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs & Co.).”
Street Name at 10–6 to 10–7.
*6  DTC has been estimated to hold “about three-quarters
of [the] shares in publicly traded companies.” Garvin, supra,
at 315; accord Kahan & Rock, supra, at 1236; Street Name
at 10–4 n.2. “The shares of each company held by DTC
are typically represented by only one or more ‘immobilized’
jumbo stock certificates held in DTC's vaults.” Street Name
at 10–7. “The immobilized jumbo certificates are the direct
result of Section 17A(e) of the Exchange Act, in which
Congress instructed the SEC to ‘use its authority ... to end the
physical movement of securities certificates....’ ” Id. at 10–
7 n.10.
The depository system is what enables public trading of
securities to take place. In 2014, the NYSE reported
average daily volume of approximately 1 billion shares
and approximately 4 million separate trades. See NYSE
Factbook, http://www.nysedata.com/factbook (last visited
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June 19, 2015). The failure of the certificate-based system
to keep up with much lower trading volumes in the 1960s
demonstrates that it cannot meet current demand. Prefatory
Note at 2. Without immobilization and DTC, “implementing
a system to settle securities within five business days (T+5),
much less today's norm of T+3 or the current goals of T+1
or T+0, would simply be impossible.” Kahan & Rock, supra,
at 1238. Trading at current levels is only possible because of
share immobilization and DTC. Street Name at 10–7; accord
Garvin, supra, at 315–16; Prefatory Note at 2–3.
Because of the federal policy of share immobilization, it
is now Cede—not the ultimate beneficial owner and not
the DTC-participant banks and brokers—that appears on the
stock ledger of a Delaware corporation. Cede is typically the
largest holder on the stock ledger of most publicly traded
Delaware corporations. Street Name at 10–6. To preserve
the pre-immobilization status quo—at least at the federal
level—the SEC provided that for purposes of federal law,
the custodial banks and brokers remain the record holders.
Depositories are defined as “clearing agencies.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(23)(A). The term “record holder” is defined as “any
broker, dealer, voting trustee, bank, association or other entity
that exercises fiduciary powers which holds securities of
record in nominee name or otherwise or as a participant
in a clearing agency registered pursuant to section 17A of
the Act.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c–1(i). The term “entity that
exercises fiduciary powers” is similarly defined as “any entity
that holds securities in nominee name or otherwise on behalf
of a beneficial owner but does not include a clearing agency
registered pursuant to section 17A of the Act or a broker or
a dealer.” Id. § 240.14c–1(c). Federal law thus looks through
DTC when determining a corporation's record holders. For
example, when determining whether an issuer has 500 or
more record holders of a class of its equity securities such that
it must register under 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g), DTC does not count
as a single holder of record. Each DTC participant member
counts as a holder of record. Michael K. Molitor, Will More
Sunlight Fade The Pink Sheets?, 39 Ind. L.Rev. 309, 315–16
(2006) (citing SEC interpretive releases).
The federal regulations also ensure that a corporation can
easily find out the identities of the banks and brokers
who hold shares through DTC. Federal regulations require
that DTC “furnish a securities position listing promptly to
each issuer whose securities are held in the name of the
clearing agency or its nominee.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ad–
8(b). The participant listing is known colloquially as the
“Cede breakdown,” and it identifies for a particular date
the custodial banks and brokers that hold shares in fungible
bulk as of that date along with the number of shares held.
A Delaware corporation can obtain a Cede breakdown with
ease. In 1981, this court noted that a Cede breakdown could
be obtained in a matter of minutes. Hatleigh Corp. v. Lane
Bryant, Inc., 428 A.2d 350, 354 (Del. Ch.1981). A Cede
breakdown can now be obtained through DTC's website or
by calling the DTC “Proxy Services Hotline.” Issuers use the
Cede breakdown to understand their stockholder profile, and
proxy solicitors use it when advising clients. Commentary
regards the information as reliable. Handbook for the Conduct
of Shareholders' Meetings 40 (ABA Business Law Section,
Corporate Governance Committee ed., 2000) (identifying the
“lists of holders obtained from depositories” as one of the
documents that can be relied on in “determining the shares
entitled to vote and tabulating the vote”).
*7  A publicly traded corporation cannot avoid going
through DTC. Federal law requires that when submitting a
matter for a stockholder vote, an issuer must send a broker
search card at least twenty business days prior to the record
date to any “broker, dealer, voting trustee, bank, association,
or other entity that exercises fiduciary powers in nominee
name” that the company “knows” is holding shares for
beneficial owners. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–13(a). Rule 14a–
13 provides that “[i]f the registrant's list of security holders
indicates that some of its securities are registered in the name
of a clearing agency registered pursuant to Section 17A of
the Act (e.g., ‘Cede & Co.,’ nominee for Depository Trust
Company), the registrant shall make appropriate inquiry of
the clearing agency and thereafter of the participants in such
clearing agency.” Id. § 240.14a–13(a) n.1 (emphasis added).
An issuer cannot look only at its own records and treat Cede
as a single, monolithic owner.
B. The Funds Seek Appraisal, And DTC Certificates The
Shares.
Dell was a publicly traded company and the merger involved
a stockholder vote, so Dell had to go through the federally
mandated process to identify the custodial banks and brokers
that held its shares through DTC, then send information
through them to the beneficial holders. The list of DTC-
participants included JP Morgan and BONY. Through JP
Morgan and BONY, information reached the Funds.
The Funds exercised appraisal rights for the 922,975 shares
that are the subject of this motion. Because they owned their
shares in street name through their custodial banks, the Funds
caused Cede to demand appraisal on their behalf. On July 12,
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2013, before the vote on the merger, Cede made appraisal
demands for the Funds.
DTC held all of the Dell shares registered in street name in
fungible bulk, which enabled DTC to track their ownership
through electronic bookkeeping entries in the FAST Account.
When the Funds caused Cede to make appraisal demands for
their shares, DTC moved a corresponding number of shares
out of the FAST Account by directing Dell's transfer agent
to issue uniquely numbered certificates. By issuing paper
certificates, DTC sought to avoid inadvertently surrendering
the shares for the merger consideration along with other
shares in the FAST Account. This procedure protected Dell,
which effectively had “the responsibility of overseeing the
surrender of shares after a merger.” Ala. By–Prods., 857 A.2d
at 263.
Dell's transfer agent is the American Stock Transfer & Trust
Company, LLC (the “Transfer Agent”). On July 24, 2013,
at DTC's request, the Transfer Agent issued paper stock
certificates in Cede's name for the shares owned beneficially
by the Funds
C. DTC Delivers The Certificates To The Custodians,
Who Re–Title Them.
As a matter of course, DTC does not act as a custodian
of paper stock certificates for its participants, even if those
certificates are issued in Cede's name. A participant can pay
to have a vault at DTC for its certificates, but that is a separate
service. Unless a participant has arranged for a vault, DTC
will contact the participant and deliver the paper certificate to
the participant for safekeeping.
JP Morgan and BONY do not have vaults at DTC. Therefore,
after the Transfer Agent delivered the paper certificates for
the Funds' shares, DTC made arrangements to deliver them to
JP Morgan and BONY.
When a DTC participant receives a paper certificate from
DTC, procedures differ. Some leave the certificates in Cede's
name and place them in their vaults. Others require that
the certificates be re-registered in the names of their own
nominees. JP Morgan's and BONY's internal policies do not
permit them to hold paper certificates unless the shares are
titled in the names of their own nominees. The custodial banks
therefore instructed Cede to authorize the shares to be re-titled
in the names of their nominees.
On August 5, 2014, Cede endorsed the Funds' certificates to
the custodial banks. Over the next three weeks, the custodial
banks arranged for the Transfer Agent to reissue the shares
in the names of their nominees. The Transfer Agent reissued
the shares held for Milliken and Manulife in the name of Hare
& Co. and the shares held for Curtiss–Wright in the name of
Mac & Co., which are BONY's nominees. The Transfer Agent
reissued the shares held for T. Rowe Price in the name of Kane
& Co. and the shares held for Northwestern in the name of
Cudd & Co., which are JP Morgan's nominees.
*8  There was an additional hiccough at BONY. Shortly after
the Transfer Agent reissued the shares, BONY conducted a
routine weekly sweep of its vault. BONY found the stock
certificates for the shares beneficially owned by Manulife
and Milliken and redeposited them with DTC in the FAST
Account.
On September 12, 2013, a majority of Dell's shares voted in
favor of the merger. A few weeks later, on October 4, BONY
realized that the shares beneficially owned by Manulife and
Milliken had been re-deposited in the FAST Account. BONY
withdrew them from DTC and had new certificates issued in
the name of Hare & Co.
Other than taking steps to cause DTC to demand appraisal
for their shares through Cede, the Funds had no involvement
in any of the transfers. The Funds did not explicitly approve
any or the transfers or cause any of them to take place.
The Funds concede that under their agreements with their
custodial banks, they gave their custodians authority to make
these types of back-office transfers.
D. The Merger Closes, And The Funds Seek Appraisal.
The merger closed on October 29, 2013. The Funds filed
timely petitions seeking appraisal. They disclosed the issues
relating to the re-titling of their shares. Dell moved for
summary judgment.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Under Court of Chancery Rule 56, summary judgment “shall
be rendered forthwith if ... there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” Ct. Ch. R. 56(c). The facts underlying
the motion are undisputed, and its outcome turns purely on
the following question of law: Does the Continuous Holder
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Requirement bar a beneficial owner from pursuing appraisal
if there has been an administrative transfer at the depository
level? Under current law, the answer is yes.
Read together, the Continuous Holder Requirement and
the Record Holder Requirement mandate that an appraisal
petitioner “continuously hold” the shares for which appraisal
is sought as a “holder of record” through the effective date
of the merger. 8 Del. C. § 262(a). There is no dispute that
the Funds continuously held their shares as beneficial owners
through the effective date of the merger. There is also no
dispute that the Funds' custodial banks continuously held the
shares on behalf of the Funds through the effective date of the
merger. The outcome of the motion turns on the implications
of a single event for “holder of record” status: a change in
the name on the shares from DTC's nominee to the custodial
banks' nominees.
The appraisal statute does not define what it means to be
a “holder of record.” No other provision of the DGCL
defines what it means to be a “holder of record.” The current
interpretation is circular: “The appraisal statute confers the
right to an appraisal only upon the stockholder of record in
the corporation. Consequently, only the person appearing on
the corporate records as the owner of stock in the corporation
may qualify for an appraisal....” Engel v. Magnavox Co., 1976
WL 1705, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 1976). But that statement
begs the question: What are the records of the corporation for
purposes of determining legal ownership?
In a simplified model of a Delaware corporation, the corporate
secretary maintains a document called the stock ledger.
From the corporation's standpoint, the stock ledger identifies
all of the legally relevant transactions in the corporation's
shares, including the date when any person acquires shares
and the number of shares acquired, and the date when any
person transfers shares and the number of shares sold. If
a holder transfers shares without notifying the corporation,
the corporation is not required to discover that fact, nor
need the corporation voluntarily treat the new holder as the
legal owner. The corporation can rely on its records until a
stockholder takes proper steps to transfer title to the shares.
Under this system, a paper stock certificate is not actually a
share of stock. It is only evidence of ownership of a share of
stock. 5
*9  If the corporation needs to determine who its current
stockholders are as of a particular date, the corporate secretary
uses the stock ledger to prepare a stock list. The stock list
identifies those stockholders who own stock as of a given
date, together with the number and type of shares owned,
based on the records. See8 Del. C. § 219(a) & (c). Evidencing
the connection between this process and the concept of a
record holder, the date used for preparing the stock list is
called the “record date.” 6
For most contemporary public corporations, the simplified
model no longer holds. Virtually all public corporations have
outsourced the maintaining of the stock ledger to a transfer
agent, as Dell did. The stock ledger and the stock list as of a
particular record date are corporate records, but they exist and
are maintained outside the corporation.
A. Existing Delaware Law Applied To This Case
If the only relevant records are those maintained by Dell
or the Transfer Agent, then summary judgment must be
granted in favor of Dell. Under existing precedent, Cede
was the stockholder of record for purposes of the Funds'
shares and therefore made the appraisal demand. “The
record holder must ... continuously hold such shares [seeking
appraisal] through the effective date of the merger....” In
re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 2007 WL
1378345, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007). It is the “record
holder—not the beneficial owner—[that] is subject to the
statutory requirements for showing entitlement to appraisal
and demonstrating perfection of appraisal rights under
Sections 262(a) and (d).” In re Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 WL
66825, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015). The re-titling of a
certificated share after the demand but before the effective
date violates the Continuous Holder Requirement by causing
record ownership to change. See Nelson v. Frank E. Best Inc.,
768 A.2d 473, 477 (Del. Ch.2000) (Strine, V.C.) (noting that
after Cede transferred record ownership of shares seeking
appraisal to appraisal petitioner “Cede's demand was invalid,
because Cede would not ‘continuously’ be the holder of
record between the ... date of Cede's demand and the effective
date of the Merger, as is required by 8 Del. C. § 262(a).”).
There is no dispute that on Dell's records as maintained by
the Transfer Agent, legal ownership of Funds' shares changed
from Cede to the four current nominees: Mac & Co., Kane &
Co., Hare & Co., and Cudd & Co. When the shares were re-
titled, the Funds lost their appraisal rights.
In an effort avoid this result, the Funds cite Alabama By–
Products and contend that “because the right to appraisal vests
at the time of perfection, the redemption of the beneficial
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owners' shares by the custodian and record holder without
the knowledge of the beneficial owners [does] not extinguish
the beneficial owners' right to appraisal of the fair value of
their shares.” Petitioners' Br. at 13. The issue in Alabama
By–Products was whether the surrender by DTC of the
appraisal petitioners' shares and the subsequent distribution
of the merger consideration deprived the appraisal petitioners
of properly perfected appraisal rights. At the time of the
surrender, more than sixty days had elapsed since the closing
of the merger, and an appraisal petition had been filed
within the statutory time period. Under the appraisal statute,
a stockholder cannot unilaterally withdraw an appraisal
demand more than sixty days after the merger closes, and
any withdrawal after the filing of a petition requires court
approval. 8 Del. C. § 262(h). The Delaware Supreme Court
held that DTC's surrender of the shares more than sixty
days after the merger closed, post petition, and without
court approval did not compromise the petitioners' appraisal
rights because the surrender did not satisfy the statutory
requirements.
*10  To bring themselves within the scope of Alabama
By–Products, the Funds describe their appraisal rights as
“perfected,” but the only step in the statutory process that had
been completed at the time of the re-titling was the making
of a demand. The merger had not yet closed, the time for
unilateral withdrawals had not yet elapsed, and no appraisal
petition had been filed. When the Funds' shares were re-titled,
their appraisal rights remained fragile and easily lost through
voluntary action by the holder. The custodial banks instructed
DTC and the Transfer Agent to re-title the shares, and under
current law, ownership changes driven by DTC's role in the
depository system are regarded as voluntary transfers. At the
stage when the re-titling occurred, the statutory provisions
found controlling in Alabama By–Products did not yet apply.
The Funds also contend that the Continuous Holder
Requirement should be “liberally construed for the protection
of objecting stockholders, within the boundaries of orderly
corporate procedures and the purpose of the requirement,”
which is a passage quoted from Raab v. Villager Industries,
Inc., 355 A.2d 888, 891 (Del.1976). But as the language of
this passage shows, Raab addressed the procedure for making
objections under the version of the appraisal statute that
existed before 1976. In that statutory scheme, a stockholder
who wanted to exercise appraisal rights had to send a written
objection to the corporation before the merger vote, then
submit a written demand for appraisal after the merger vote.
See 2 Balotti & Finkelstein, supra, § 262 at IX–159. The
purpose of the first step—the written objection—was “merely
to give notice.” Zeeb v. Atlas Powder Co., 87 A.2d 123,
127 (Del.1952). The Delaware Supreme Court construed
the objection requirement more liberally than the demand
requirement because “[t]he purpose of the objection [was] of
lesser importance than the demand for payment.” Raab, 355
A.2d at 891.
Stockholders seeking appraisal no longer have to make
a separate objection, so Raab 's language regarding the
“liberal construction” of this requirement is no longer
relevant. Delaware decisions have not generally construed
other aspects of the appraisal statute liberally in favor of
stockholders.See generally Jesse A. Finkelstein & John D.
Hendershot, Appraisal Rights in Mergers & Consolidations
at A–97 (5th ed. 2010) (collecting cases). The Delaware
Supreme Court has endorsed a principle of strict construction,
explaining that “[b]y exacting strict compliance ..., the
appraisal statute ensures the expedient and certain appraisal
of stock.” Ala. By–Prods., 657 A.2d at 263. In subsequently
re-affirming its adherence to the principle, the Delaware
Supreme Court cautioned that strict construction should be
applied “even-handedly, not as a one-way street.” Berger v.
Pubco Corp., 976 A.2d 132, 144 (Del.2009). In other words,
both petitioners and the corporation must adhere strictly to
the appraisal statute's requirements; neither gets the benefit of
the doubt under more a lenient rule of “liberal construction.”
Given these pronouncements and existing precedent, the
Funds cannot rely on a principle of liberal construction to
preserve their appraisal rights.
Finally, the Funds have pointed to the fact that they did
not know about or approve the nominee-level transfers. It is
undisputed that their agreements with their custodial banks
permitted the banks to re-title the shares. Our law currently
treats ownership changes driven by the depository system
as voluntary transfers, making this a risk that the Funds
accepted. By choosing to hold through intermediaries, the
Funds assumed the risk that the intermediaries might “act
contrary to [their] interests.” Ala. By–Prods., 657 A.2d at 262.
B. The Possibility Of A Different Approach
*11  There is another possible interpretation of the Record
Holder Requirement. When Congress and the SEC created
the depository system, they added DTC at the bottom of the
ownership chain and introduced Cede as the new omnibus
record holder, but the identities of the custodial banks and
brokers did not go away. They continue to appear on the
DTC participant list. As discussed in the Factual Background,
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the DTC participant list is an integral part of the federally
mandated ownership scheme. A publicly traded corporation
cannot avoid going through DTC. See17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–
13(a). Rule 14a–13 requires that the issuer “make appropriate
inquiry” of DTC to identify the custodial banks and brokers
who own shares through Cede. Id.§ 240.14a–13(a) n.1. An
issuer cannot rely on the stock ledger maintained by its
transfer agent, pretend that Cede is a single record holder, and
ignore the Cede breakdown. For purposes of federal law, Cede
is not a record holder. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(23)(A). The record
holders are the banks and brokers on the DTC participant list.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14c–1(i).
Were I writing on a blank slate, I would hold that the “records”
of the corporation for purposes of determining who is a
“stockholder of record” include the DTC participant list.
Under this interpretation, the custodial banks and brokers who
appear on the DTC participant list would be stockholders
of record for purposes of Delaware law, just as they are for
federal law and just as they were before share immobilization.
If that rule applied, then the motion for summary judgment
would be denied, because there was no change of ownership
at the DTC participant level.
In my view, this interpretation better reflects current
reality. Viewed pragmatically, the federal policy of
share immobilization compelled publicly traded Delaware
corporations to outsource one part of the stock ledger—the
DTC participant list—to DTC, just as Delaware corporations
have chosen to outsource other parts of the stock ledger
to transfer agents. Before share immobilization, banks and
brokers appeared on the stock ledger as registered holders.
After share immobilization, the same banks and brokers
appear on the stock ledger indirectly through DTC and the
Cede breakdown. Just as Delaware law treats the outsourced
stock ledger as a record of the corporation, albeit one
maintained by a third party, Delaware law likewise should
treat the outsourced DTC participant list as a record of the
corporation, albeit one maintained by DTC.
Adopting this approach would recognize that the changes in
ownership driven by the role of DTC in the depository system
result from the federal policy of share immobilization. This
case provides a fitting example. But for the federal mandate,
JP Morgan and BONY would have appeared through their
nominees on the stock ledger maintained by the Transfer
Agent. There would have been no need to re-title the shares.
The Funds lost their appraisal rights because of a system
imposed by federal law.
But in light of existing precedent, I do not believe that this
court is free to interpret the “holder of record” language in
this manner. I previously advocated treating DTC participants
as holders of record for purposes of analyzing whether the
shares they held could be voted without a DTC omnibus
proxy. See Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A.2d 140 (Del. Ch.), aff'd
in part, rev'd on other grounds sub nom.Crown EMAK P'rs,
LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377 (Del.2010). The Kurz decision
posited that recognizing DTC participants as record owners
would have beneficial effects for other areas of Delaware law,
including appraisal. See Kurz, 989 A.2d at 174 (“In some
circumstances, Delaware corporations should benefit from
looking through DTC to the holdings of the participant banks
and brokers. Reducing the number of shares available for
appraisal arbitrage is one area that springs to mind.”).
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the
Kurz decision on other grounds, rendering it unnecessary
for the high court to consider whether DTC participants
should be treated as record holders. The Delaware Supreme
Court nevertheless characterized the discussion of the DTC
participant list as “obiter dictum ” that was “without
precedential effect.” 7  The high court stated that
*12  a legislative cure is preferable.
The DGCL is a comprehensive and
carefully crafted statutory scheme
that is periodically reviewed by
the General Assembly. Indeed, the
General Assembly made coordinated
amendments to section 219 and section
220 in 2003. Any adjustment to the
intricate scheme of which section 219
is but a part should be accomplished
by the General Assembly through a
coordinated amendment process.
EMAK P'rs, 992 A.2d at 398.
I respectfully disagree with expressed preference for a
legislative cure. In my view, the question of what constitutes
the records of the corporation for purposes of determining
who is a “holder of record” is a quintessential issue
of statutory interpretation appropriate for the judiciary to
address. As the Delaware Supreme Court has explained, “[i]n
our constitutional system, this court's role is to interpret
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the statutory language that the General Assembly actually
adopts, even if unclear and explain what we ascertain to
be the legislative intent without rewriting the statute to fit
a particular policy position.” Taylor v. Diamond State Port
Corp., 14 A.3d 536, 542 (Del.2011). “[T]he Constitution
invests the Judiciary, not the Legislature, with the final power
to construe the law.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503
U.S. 318, 325 (1992). The interpretation of statutory text is
“one of the Judiciary's characteristic roles.” Japan Whaling
Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
*13  The Delaware courts play a particularly significant role
in the corporate arena. 8  Historically the judiciary, rather than
the General Assembly, has taken the lead when addressing
corporate law issues. 9  Two leading commentators have
noted that the Delaware Supreme Court has not traditionally
deferred to the prospect of legislative action. Rather, “the
Delaware Supreme Court has shown a certain degree
of discomfort with, perhaps even hostility to, legislative
intrusions into its domain.” 10
The significant role played by the Delaware courts stems
from the fact that, contra EMAK, the DGCL has not been
viewed traditionally as a comprehensive code, but rather
as a broadly enabling statute that leaves ample room for
private ordering and interpretation. 11  In an article written
while serving as a Vice Chancellor, Chief Justice Strine
distinguished between the “Delaware Model,” in which the
statute is “largely enabling and provides a wide realm for
private ordering,” and the “Mandatory Statutory Model,”
under which the corporate code would be “quite detailed and
prescriptive.” Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware's Corporate–Law
System: Is Corporate America Buying an Exquisite Jewel or
A Diamond in the Rough?A Response to Kahan & Kamar's
Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86
Cornell L.Rev. 1257, 1260 (2001). Because the latter type of
statute “would dictate how things should happen, there would
be less room for judicial interpretation, but also less space for
director choice.” Id. Chief Justice Veasey has drawn a similar
distinction in his own scholarly writings:
*14  A flexible or indeterminate
regime, such as we have had in
Delaware, is distinct from a rigid
codification system that prevails in
many systems outside the United
States. That is part of the genius of
our law. Life in the boardroom is not
black and white; directors and officers
make decisions in shades of gray all
the time. A “clear” law, in the sense
of one that is codified, is simply not
realistic.... There can be no viable
corporate governance regime that is
founded on a “one size fits all” notion.
E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What
Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from
1992–2004?A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153
U. Pa. L.Rev. 1399, 1412–13 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
The “skeletal framework” set forth in the flexible DGCL
necessarily requires judicial interpretation. Id. at 1411.
A review of applicable precedent teaches that for purposes
of the issue discussed in this case, there is ample room for
a continuing judicial role. A statutory amendment is one
method of modernizing the law, but it is not the only way.
1. The Creation Of The Record Holder Requirement
The statutory appraisal remedy dates back to the adoption of
the DGCL in 1899. The original statute contained a section
that stated:
If any stockholder in either corporation
consolidating aforesaid, who objected
thereto in writing, shall within
twenty days after the agreement
of consolidation has been filed
and recorded, as aforesaid, demand
in writing from the consolidated
corporation payment of his stock, such
consolidated corporation shall, within
three months thereafter, pay to him
the value of the stock at the date of
consolidation.
21 Del. Laws c. 273 § 56 (1899). The provision referred only
to the right of “any stockholder” to seek payment of the value
of his stock, without specifying whether the stockholder had
to be a holder of record.
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*15  Nearly five decades later, despite a series of intervening
amendments, the Delaware appraisal statute continued to
refer to “any stockholder” having the right to seek appraisal.
The question of whether a beneficial owner could seek
appraisal was finally raised in a proceeding arising out of the
merger between Salt Dome Oil Corporation and Gulfboard
Oil Corporation. See Schenck v. Salt Dome Oil Corp., 34 A.2d
249 (Del. Ch.1943), rev'd,41 A.2d 583 (Del.1945).
William Schenck and his fellow petitioners owned a total
of 7,100 shares of Salt Dome common stock, which were
registered on its books in the name of Guido Pantaleoni,
Jr. They also owned a total of 10,000 shares of Gulfboard
common stock, which were registered on its books in the
name of Berberich & Co. The petitioners made timely
objections to the merger and submitted timely demands for
appraisal. They did so in their own names, although their
objections and demands identified the record holders and
the number of shares for which appraisal was sought. The
respondent corporations argued that the petitioners could
not seek appraisal unless their names appeared on the
stock ledger, regardless of whatever other information they
might provide or documentation they might introduce to
substantiate their ownership.
Chancellor Harrington rejected this argument, reasoning that
on the facts presented, a court of equity could recognize the
petitioners as the real owners of the shares. Schenck, 34 A.2d
at 252. He declined to construe the term stockholder “in a
strictly legal sense” as limited to holders of record. Id. Instead,
he reasoned that “Section 61 of the General Corporation
Law [the appraisal statute] is clearly for the protection of
objecting shareholders [and] should be liberally construed to
that end.” Id. Although the Chancellor acknowledged that a
corporation can only look to its stock list to determine who
its stockholders are, he concluded that “the real owner of
the shares, nevertheless, has substantial rights that may be
materially affected by a corporate consolidation.” Id.
The companies appealed, and the Delaware Supreme Court
took the opposite view. In reaching its conclusion, the high
court discussed (i) the nature of the appraisal remedy, which
it regarded as an action at law rather than a proceeding in
equity, (ii) existing authorities which said that a corporation
could rely exclusively on the information in its records
to determine stockholder status, and (iii) a balancing of
competing public policies, in which the importance of
certainty and predictability prevailed, particularly given the
absence of any benefit to the corporation from the then-
prevailing system of beneficial ownership.
First, the Delaware Supreme Court viewed the appraisal
proceeding as a legal rather than equitable proceeding.
Because appraisal was a statutory remedy, the high court
reasoned that “[t]he right of an unregistered transferee of
stock to object to a proposed agreement of merger must be
looked for in the statute.” Salt Dome, 41 A.2d at 587. The
court found “nothing in the language of the statute that makes
clear the legislative intent to bestow the remedy provided
upon an equitable owner of stock, but much, indeed, to the
contrary.” Id. at 588. Rather than an equitable action for
breach of fiduciary duty, the appraisal proceeding resembled
a debt collection action. A stockholder could collect an
appraisal award “as other debts are by law collectible, that
is, by suit at law, judgment at law, and by the usual legal
process.”Id.
*16  Second, the Delaware Supreme Court summarized
existing authorities addressing the rights that a beneficial
owner had at law:
The term, ‘stockholder’, ordinarily,
is taken to apply to the holder of
the legal title to shares of stock. In
most jurisdictions registration, or its
equivalent, is essential to pass the
legal title as against the corporation;
and the unregistered transferee is not
entitled to the rights and privileges
of a stockholder in his relations with
the corporation. Whatever may be
the equitable rights that may arise
by a delivery of the stock certificate
accompanied with a power of attorney
for its transfer, the legal title and legal
rights and liabilities of the stockholder
of record remain unchanged until
the transfer is actually accomplished.
The record owner may be but the
nominal owner, and, technically, a
trustee for the holder of the certificate,
but legally he is still a stockholder, and
may be treated as the owner by the
corporation.
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Id. at 585 (citations omitted). After reviewing Delaware
authorities addressing other stockholder rights, most notably
the right to vote, the court concluded that only a registered
stockholder was entitled to exercise legal rights and be treated
as a stockholder by the corporation. Seeid. at 585–89.
Third, the Salt Dome court turned to considerations of public
policy:
With respect to matters intracorporate
affecting the internal economy of the
corporation, or involving a change in
the relationship which the members
bear to the corporation, there must be
order and certainty, and a sure source
of information, so that the corporation
may know who its members are and
with whom it must treat, and that the
members may know, in a proper case,
who their associates are. Especially
is this true in a merger proceeding
which is essentially an intracorporate
affair. The merging corporations are
entitled to know who the objecting
stockholders are so that the amount
of money to be paid to them may be
provided. The stockholders in general
are entitled to know the dissentients
and the extent of the dissent. The
corporation ought not to be involved in
possible misunderstandings or clashes
of opinion between the non-registered
and registered holder of shares. It may
rightfully look to the corporate books
as the sole evidence of membership.
Id. at 589 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court reasoned that
the relationship between the customer and the broker was a
voluntary one, making it appropriate to place any attendant
risk on the stockholder: “If, for any reason, [a stockholder]
chooses to allow his shares to be registered on the corporate
books in the name of another, it is not a denial of his right
of actual ownership to require him to establish his rights and
pursue his remedy through the nominee of his own selection.”
Salt Dome, 41 A.2d at 589. The high court therefore held that
“only the registered holder of stock is a ‘stockholder’ within
the sense of the word as used in” the appraisal statute. Id.
Importantly for present purposes, Salt Dome only addressed
the broker level of the beneficial ownership chain. The
decision obviously pre-dated the federal policy of share
immobilization—still three decades in the future—so the
Delaware Supreme Court could not have considered whether
any distinctions were warranted at the depository level of
ownership, the competing policy considerations raised by
the federal response to Wall Street's paperwork crisis, or the
benefits that the system provided to issuers. At the time, the
decision to hold in street name properly could be regarded as
a matter of choice, rather than involving at least one level of
beneficial ownership (the depository level) that resulted from
federal law. The Delaware Supreme Court also could regard
exclusive reliance on the stock ledger as promoting “order
and certainty” and providing a “sure source of information.”
After the federal policy of share immobilization, a legal rule
that looks no further than Cede has the opposite effect. It
masks the implications of beneficial ownership and promotes
uncertainty.
*17  Perhaps most important, the Salt Dome decision did not
pre-judge what documents might encompass the appropriate
records for determining registered status and whether, after
the adoption of the depository system, those records should
include the DTC participant list. What the Salt Dome decision
does show, however, is that interpreting the appraisal statute
to determine which stockholders are entitled to appraisal is an
appropriate subject for the courts.
2. Post-Salt Dome, Pre–Codification Cases
After Salt Dome, the Delaware Supreme Court adhered
to the Record Holder Requirement in Olivetti Underwood
Corp. v. Jacques Coe & Co., 217 A.2d 683 (Del.1966) and
Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 222
A.2d 789 (Del.1966). The Court of Chancery applied it in
Application of General Realty & Utilities Corp., 42 A.2d 24
(Del. Ch.1945). The Olivetti decision is noteworthy because it
re-framed the corporation's prerogative to rely on its records
as a restriction on the corporation's ability to look any further
than its records.
The petitioners in Olivetti were brokers who were registered
stockholders of Olivetti Underwood Corporation. The brokers
made appraisal demands in which they notified Olivetti that
they were record holders and did not beneficially own the
stock registered in their names. Underwood moved to dismiss
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the petitions, arguing that the brokers failed to submit proof
of their authority to act for the beneficial owners. Citing Salt
Dome, the Court of Chancery reasoned that the corporation
“ha[d] no right to raise any issue as to the right of a registered
owner to seek a statutory appraisal and such a stockholder
has no duty to supply proof as to that issue.” Abraham &
Co. v. Olivetti Underwood Corp., 204 A.2d 740, 741 (Del.
Ch.1964). Underwood appealed.
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. After quoting Salt
Dome at length, the high court summarized “the rule of the
Salt Dome case” as follows: “[T]here is no recognizable
stockowner under the merger-appraisal provisions of our
Corporation Law except a registered stockholder.” Olivetti,
217 A.2d at 686. By restating the holding of the earlier
decision in this fashion, the Delaware Supreme Court
expanded the rule. Where the Salt Dome decision permitted
a corporation to confine itself to dealing with registered
stockholders in intra-corporate affairs, the Olivetti opinion
required it. The court went further and stated that the
corporation “should avoid becoming involved in the affairs
of registered stockholders vis-á-vis beneficial owners,”
admonishing that “the relationship between, and the rights
and obligations of, a registered stockholder and his beneficial
owner are not relevant issues in a proceeding of this kind.”
Id. at 686, 687.
3. The Codification Of The Record Holder
Requirement
During the 1967 revisions to the DGCL, the General
Assembly codified the Record Holder Requirement. The
new version of the appraisal statute included the following
language:
When used in this section, the word
“stockholder” means a holder of
record of stock in a stock corporation
and as a member of record of a non-
stock corporation; the words “stock”
and “share” mean and include what
is ordinarily meant by those words
and also membership or membership
interest of a member of a non-stock
corporation.
56 Del. Laws c. 50 § 262(a) (1967). In his landmark treatise,
Professor Folk explained the purpose of the new text.
Section 262(a), as revised in 1967,
defines “stockholder,” for purposes of
the appraisal remedy, as a holder of
record. Although the prior statute was
not couched in terms so confined,
the prior cases consistently limited
the remedy to record owners on the
theory that a corporation should, in
estimating the number of dissenters,
be able to rely exclusively upon
corporate records of stock ownership
and should not become involved
in disputes between registered and
nonregistered stockholders. Moreover,
the unregistered stockholder is not
harmed, since it is within the power
to obtain the advantages of record
ownership by a transfer into his own
name.
*18  Ernest L. Folk, III, The Delaware General Corporation
Law: A Commentary and Analysis 373 (1972) (footnotes
omitted). Professor Folk also warned that the concept of
record ownership did not operate only as an impediment
to appraisal petitioners: “The registered stockholder
requirement cuts both ways. Not only is the corporation
entitled to look solely to record ownership, but in fact it may
ordinarily not inquire into the authority of a registered holder
to act for beneficial owners.” Id. at 374 (footnotes omitted).
All of the qualifications and limitations of the common
law version of the Record Holder Requirement apply to
the statutory version. The amendment pre-dated the federal
policy of share immobilization, although that initiative soon
would loom on the horizon. Because the depository system
had not yet been established, the General Assembly had
no ability to consider the depository level of ownership or
the competing policy considerations that led to its creation.
Notably, the language of the statutory provision only required
that the stockholder be “a holder of record of stock in a
stock corporation and as a member of record of a non-
stock corporation....” It did not specify what documents might
encompass the appropriate records for determining registered
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status and whether, after the adoption of the depository
system, those records should include the DTC participant list.
4. Delaware's Limited Acknowledgement Of Share
Immobilization
During the mid–1970s, the SEC implemented the federal
policy of share immobilization. Delaware decisions largely
ignored this development. Rather than distinguishing between
the broker level and the depository level, they treated both
as a matter of convenience that resulted exclusively from
the private contractual relationship between a broker and its
clients. That perception was inaccurate.
A representative decision is Carico v. McCrory Corp., 4 Del.
J. Corp. L. 595 (Del. Ch. July 13, 1978). The defendant
corporation received a timely written objection from the
beneficial holder of the corporation's stock. The objection
failed to disclose the identity of the record holder, Cede.
The corporation objected to the claim on the ground that a
proper written objection was not received from or on behalf
of the record holder of the stock in issue. This court agreed,
noting that “[i]t is well established that an objection which
does not enable the resulting corporation to identify the actual
record holder is insufficient.” Id. at 598. The court reasoned
similarly in Engel v. Magnavox Co., 1976 WL 1705, as did the
Delaware Supreme Court in Raab. In fairness, these decisions
involved merger objections made by beneficial owners at the
top of the ownership chain, so it did not matter whether the
record owner was Cede or a broker or custodial bank. In either
case, the wrong party made the objection.
In contrast to these decisions, when considering actions
brought under a different section of the DGCL, the Court
of Chancery showed greater sensitivity to the depository
revolution. When stockholders sought to obtain a stock list
under Section 220, Delaware decisions held that the Cede
breakdown was part of the list. 12  Ever since, Delaware
decisions have ordered the production of a Cede breakdown
as part of the stock list. 13  The decisions did not limit
stockholder status to the names appearing on the stock ledger,
in which case the inquiry would have stopped with Cede
and the breakdown would have been irrelevant. See Olson v.
Buffington, 1985 WL 11575, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1985)
(“This Court has recognized that a party entitled to a stocklist
pursuant to § 220 is also entitled to a Cede breakdown even
though technically Cede is the record holder on the company's
books.”).
5. An Opportunity Lost: The Enstar Decisions
*19  An opportunity to confront the implications of the
depository system for appraisal finally arose in litigation
arising out of a merger involving Enstar Corporation. See
In re Appraisal of Enstar Corp. (Enstar I ), 1986 WL 8062
(Del. Ch. July 17, 1986), rev'd sub nom.Enstar Corp. v.
Senouf (Enstar II ), 535 A.2d 1351 (Del.1987). The litigation
began as an appraisal proceeding, but Enstar reached a
global settlement of the appraisal litigation. After Enstar
refused to pay two of the appraisal petitioners, the matter
transformed itself into a breach of contract case, with
the petitioners seeking to enforce their entitlement to the
settlement consideration.
One petitioner was Lucie Senouf. Before the merger, she held
10,441 shares in an account with Drexel Burnham Lambert
Incorporated, which in turn held them through DTC. The
other petitioner was Margaret Earle. Before the merger, she
held 20,000 shares in an account with Prudential–Bache
Securities Inc., which in turn held them through DTC. Neither
Senouf nor Earle caused Cede to make an appraisal demand.
An individual named Mr. Champy made the demand for
Senouf. Prudential–Bache made a demand for Earle. Enstar
argued that neither petitioner had validly perfected appraisal
rights and was not entitled to participate in the settlement.
Senouf and Earle sought to take advantage of the settlement,
and the case went to trial before then-Vice Chancellor, later
Justice Hartnett. The petitioners did not argue that, by virtue
of the depository system and the DTC participant list, Drexel
and Prudential–Bache should be considered stockholders of
record. Instead, they contended that the disclosures in Enstar's
proxy statement did not accurately describe the role of DTC
and Cede and misleadingly stated that “[a] record holder such
as a broker who holds Common Shares ... as nominee for
beneficial owners ... must exercise appraisal rights on behalf
of such beneficial owners....” Enstar I,1986 WL 8062, at *4
(emphasis added).
Vice Chancellor Hartnett held that on the facts presented,
Senouf and Earle had satisfied the Record Holder
Requirement. He described the depository system in some
detail, although predominantly as a voluntary choice by
brokers. To get the flavor, it is worth quoting his description
at length:
CEDE & Co. is a partnership used by The Depository
Trust Company as its nominee to hold securities for its
participants—all of which are brokerage firms, banks and
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other financial institutions. Neither The Depository Trust
Company nor CEDE & CO. hold any shares for themselves
but only hold shares as nominees for the participants in
The Depository Trust Company. At the time of the merger
CEDE & Co. was listed on the books of ENSTAR as
holding over 7 million shares of its stock and there was
no breakdown on the books of ENSTAR of the actual
beneficial ownership of the CEDE holdings.
The use of CEDE & Co. and similar central security
depositories to hold shares for stockbrokers, which shares
are in turn held by the stockbrokers for their customers, has
emerged as a major, if not dominant, method for the holding
of shares of publicly traded corporations. The function
performed by the central security depositories is to provide
a central facility for the storage of enormous numbers of
stock certificates and to provide a means for the transfer of
shares without the actual transfer of certificates.
* * *
The publicly held corporations are well aware of the system
and it is obviously to their advantage to have their shares
held by central security depositories because this aids
capital formation and it relieves the corporation of the
paperwork which would be required if every owner of a
share of stock had his shares listed in his own name on the
books of the corporation.
*20 Id. at *1–2.
Vice Chancellor Hartnett contrasted the petitioners'
knowledge about Cede with what Enstar knew. In short, he
found that neither Senouf nor Earle knew that her broker was
a DTC participant or that her shares were registered in Cede's
name. By contrast, there was
no question that ENSTAR knew that
a large number of its shares were
held in the name of CEDE ... and
that CEDE ... was a nominee used
by [DTC] which in turn held the
shares for [its] participants—stock
brokerage firms, banks and other
financial institutions which in turn
held them for their customers, the
actual beneficial owners.
Id. at *2. He also discussed the Cede breakdown, finding that
ENSTAR received a monthly
breakdown from [DTC] of all the
shares held in CEDE['s] name which
showed the name of the stock broker,
etc., for whom the shares were being
held and which purportedly listed the
number of shares held for each broker.
ENSTAR was also entitled to receive,
on request, supplementary lists.
Id. At the time of the merger, Enstar knew from participant list
that Cede “held 379,268 shares for customers of Prudential–
Bache and 40,169 shares for customers of Drexel–Burnham
Lambert.” Id. Vice Chancellor Hartnett stressed that despite
knowing about Cede, Enstar's proxy materials made no
mention of it.
Vice Chancellor Hartnett ultimately resolved the case on
equitable grounds. He concluded that
[w]hen the totality of the
circumstances present here are
considered, it is clear that ENSTAR
had reasonable constructive notice that
Mrs. Earle's and Mrs. Senouf's shares
were listed on the corporation records
under the name “CEDE & CO.” and
that its refusal to permit Mrs. Earle and
Mrs. Senouf to receive the settlement
consideration [provided to appraisal
claimants] is based on impermissible
hypertechnicalities.
Id. at *7. He thus ordered Enstar to pay the settlement
consideration to the petitioners.
Enstar appealed, and the Delaware Supreme Court reversed.
The high court viewed the case as a traditional dispute
involving beneficial holder status, rather than a new scenario
resulting from the depository system. The high court
thus relied predominantly on existing precedent, such as
Salt Dome, and subsequent cases interpreting the statutory
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language of the Record Holder Requirement. Enstar II, 535
A.2d at 1354. The court also observed that requiring record
holder status was consistent with cases interpreting of other
sections of the DGCL, including 8 Del. C. § 219(c), and
that the rule was “harmonious with the Uniform Commercial
Code,” which permits a corporation to “treat the registered
owner as the person exclusively entitled to vote, to receive
notifications and otherwise to exercise all the rights and
powers of an owner.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting
6 Del. C. § 8–207(1)). The court does not appear to have
been presented with the argument that by virtue of the DTC
participant list, Drexel and Prudential–Bache should have
been considered registered owners.
Although the Delaware Supreme Court touched on the
practice of holding through DTC, the high court did not
consider the origins of the requirement or the overlay of
federal law. The Supreme Court regarded DTC as simply a
new form of doing business, observing that that “[t]he use of
security depositories by brokerage firms now is a common
practice.” Id. Of particular note, the court commented that
“[t]he decision [to use DTC] is a matter which is strictly
between the broker and its clients.” Id. As support for this
proposition, the Supreme Court cited the testimony of Mr.
Karasek, an employee of Prudential–Bache who signed the
appraisal demand for Earle. He had testified that
*21  [i]f the client wants their (sic) stock in street name,
then Prudential–Bache will buy the securities for the
client ...; the client has determined she wants it in street
name. That's how it's done.
* * *
The choice is up to the client.
Id. (alterations in original). Reflecting on Mr. Karasek's
testimony and citing Delaware cases pre-dating share
immobilization, the high court commented that “[i]n making
that choice [i.e., the choice to hold in street name], the burden
must be upon the stockholder to obtain the advantages of
record ownership. The legal and practical effects of having
one's stock registered in street name cannot be visited upon
the issuer. The attendant risks are those of the stockholder,
and where appropriate, the broker.” Id. (citations omitted).
Later in the decision, the Supreme Court reiterated its view
that Cede's role in the case resulted from a private decision
made by the petitioners and their brokers:
Here, the problem is one between
the plaintiffs and their brokers. Enstar
cannot, and should not, be blamed for
the failure of a nominee or broker
to correctly perfect appraisal rights
for a beneficial owner. Several other
brokers properly instructed CEDE &
Co. to demand an appraisal on behalf
of their customers. The failures of
Prudential–Bache or Drexel in that
regard should not be shifted to, or
borne by, Enstar. The dispute, if any,
is between these brokers and their
clients.
Enstar II, 535 A.2d at 1355. Elsewhere, the Supreme Court
quoted at length from Salt Dome and held:
Thus, in the interest of promoting
certainty in the appraisal process ...,
a valid demand must be executed
by or on behalf of the holder of
record, whether that holder is the
beneficial owner, a trustee, agent or
nominee. Any other result would
embroil merging corporations in a
morass of confusion and uncertainty,
none of which was of their making.
Id. at 1356.
Finally, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected the argument
that Enstar's disclosures about perfecting appraisal rights
were misleading. The high court held that the disclosures
gave proper instructions for perfecting appraisal rights and
that “the relationship between a beneficial stockholder and a
nominee are not relevant matters of concern to the merging
corporations.” Id. at 1357.
In my view, the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in
Enstar II reflected incorrect assumptions about the depository
system. First, Enstar II assumed that custodial banks and
brokers freely chose to move to the depository system for
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their own convenience. 14  To the contrary, the depository
system was a necessary response to the late 1960s paperwork
crisis and embodied in a federal mandate. The Enstar II court
similarly treated the holding of shares through depositaries as
something that is optional for end-users, i.e., actual investors.
While it is true theoretically that any particular investor could
opt out of the depository system and chose to hold in record
name, 15  only a few could do so before the system would
break down. Just as some individuals can choose not to
receive vaccinations and free ride on the immunity of the
group, so too can a small minority of stockholders elect to
hold shares directly. But without widespread participation in
the depository system, securities markets would again drown
in paperwork. The system was imposed by Congress and
the SEC, and almost-universal participation is a de facto
requirement.
*22  Second, Enstar II assumed that the depository system
imposes only costs on issuers and yielded them no benefits. 16
Yet by the time of the Enstar II decision, the depository
system was what enabled public trading of securities to take
place. Issuers could not undertake an initial public offering
or otherwise access the equity markets without depository
ownership. Being able to raise capital through the public
markets is an obvious benefit to issuers. So is avoiding the
costly paperwork burdens that previously brought the markets
to a stop. See Part I.A., supra. These benefits have only grown
more profound since Enstar II.
Third, Enstar II reiterated the Salt Dome decision's concern
about the uncertainty and practical difficulties a Delaware
corporation would face in identifying its stockholders if asked
to look beyond the stock ledger. With the Cede breakdown,
those concerns do not exist. When Enstar II was written, a
Cede breakdown could be obtained easily, and it provided a
reliable listing of the depository institutions that held through
DTC. Today, it is even easier to obtain a Cede breakdown,
and because trades are now tracked in real time rather than
awaiting an end-of-the-day netting-out process, the list is even
more accurate.
Finally, Enstar II asserted at several points that the nominee
relationship was not a matter of concern for the merging
corporation. 17  That is not accurate either. Under federal law,
the corporation whose stockholders would vote on the merger
—and who could be eligible for appraisal rights—must go
through DTC to identify its custodian banks and brokers for
purposes of mailing out proxy materials. The issuer cannot
ignore DTC and pretend that Cede is a single holder of record.
Notably, Enstar II did not address whether DTC participants
should be regarded as record holders for purposes of
Delaware law, as they are for federal law. No one seems
to have made the argument, and neither court considered it.
Although Enstar II seems to have collapsed the distinction
between the broker level of beneficial ownership and the
depository level, it did so on the assumption that the pertinent
legislative facts had not changed since Salt Dome. 18  In my
view, that was misguided.
*23 Enstar II does appear to have regarded construing the
Record Holder Requirement as an appropriate exercise of
judicial authority. As I see it, the question of whether DTC
participants should be regarded as holders of record remains
open for the Delaware Supreme Court to decide, should it
wish to do so.
6. The Rise Of Appraisal Arbitrage
The most recent decisions to consider the role of DTC have
involved the practice of appraisal arbitrage, a strategy in
which investors purchase shares in order to pursue appraisal.
In Transkaryotic, this court held that funds who bought shares
after the record date for a merger could seek an appraisal for
the shares purchased after the record date, without having
to show that the shares were not voted in favor of the
merger. 2007 WL 1378345, at *3. Subsequent decisions have
followed Transkaryotic. 19
The outcome in Transkaryotic turned on the role of Cede
as the omnibus holder of record. On the record date
for the merger, Cede held 29,720,074 shares. Acting in
accordance with the instructions of its participants, Cede
voted 12,882,000 shares in favor of the merger, leaving
16,838,074 shares eligible for appraisal. The petitioners
beneficially owned 2,901,433 shares on the record date and
acquired another 8,071,217 shares after the record date. They
sought appraisal for all 10,972,650 shares, which was less
than the total number of appraisal-eligible shares. This court
regarded that fact as dispositive because under Olivetti, “the
actions of the beneficial holders are irrelevant,” and only “the
record holder's actions determine perfection of the right to
seek appraisal.” Id. at *4, *3. Elaborating, the court explained
that
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[t]he issue here mirrors that in
Olivetti .... [Transkaryotic] seeks
to examine relationships between
Cede (the record holder) and certain
nonregistered, beneficial holders in
order to determine the existence of
appraisal rights. But the Supreme
Court has already deemed this
relationship to be an improper and
impermissible subject of inquiry in
the context of an appraisal. The law
is unequivocal. A corporation need
not and should not delve into the
intricacies of the relationship between
the record holder and the beneficial
holder and, instead, must rely on
its records as the sole determinant
of membership in the context of
appraisal.
Id. at *4.
In my view, the rise of appraisal arbitrage suggests the need
for a more realistic assessment of the depository system
that looks through Cede to the DTC participants. But first,
a caveat: Looking through DTC would not eliminate the
ability of appraisal petitioners to seek appraisal for shares
acquired after the record date, which is an outcome that
opponents of appraisal arbitrage frequently advocate. As to
that possibility, it is not clear to me why the law should
treat a stockholder's right to seek an appraisal differently
than how it treats other legal rights. An appraisal claim is
simply a chose in action. As such, the claim passes with
the shares. 20  In a market economy, the ability to transfer
property, including intangible property, is generally thought
to be a good thing; it allows the property to flow to the
highest-valuing holder, thereby increasing societal wealth.
For creditors, the ability to sell a bundle of property rights
that the buyer can enforce is unquestioned. When a creditor
assigns a loan, even one in default, the right to enforce the
loan passes to the new holder. No one objects that the assignee
purchased a lawsuit. It is not apparent to me why a right held
by the equity side of the capital structure should be treated
differently, particularly when the right to bring an appraisal
proceeding has been compared by the Delaware Supreme
Court to a debt collection action. 21  Consequently, no one
should view my arguments in favor of looking through DTC
as a way to eliminate appraisal arbitrage entirely—itself a
debatable policy goal. 22  Custodial banks and brokers still
could buy shares after the record date and seek appraisal for
those shares. And of course, even under a regime that denied
appraisal rights to shares purchased after the record date,
investors still could accumulate large appraisal-eligible stakes
between the time of deal announcement and the record date.
See Salomon Bros. Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 576 A.2d
650, 654 (Del. Ch.1989) (finding “nothing inequitable about
an investor purchasing stock in a company after a merger
has been announced with the thought that, if the merger is
consummated on the announced terms, the investor may seek
appraisal”).
*24  Nevertheless, in my view, looking through Cede to
the DTC participants would be an improvement. Under the
appraisal statute, a record holder is only supposed to be
able to seek appraisal for shares (i) owned on the date
of statutorily compliant demand for appraisal, (ii) held
continuously through the effective date of the merger, and
(iii) not voted in favor of the merger. Ancestry.com,2015
WL 66825, at *4. Taken together, Cede's dominant holdings
and the current one-size-fits-all interpretation of the Record
Holder Requirement prevent courts from applying these
requirements effectively. Cede owns too many shares, and
with share immobilization, ownership does not change.
By contrast, if the focus were to move beyond Cede, it should
be possible to develop a more nuanced jurisprudence. The
number of shares held by banks and brokers does change,
and those changes may have legal salience. Or situations
may arise that lend themselves to specific rulings, such
as if a broker acquires a large block of shares after the
record date in a negotiated transaction. In that case, the
seller should be readily identifiable, and it should be an easy
matter to determine how the shares were voted. The federal
securities laws require that banks and brokers obtain voting
instructions from their clients, and banks and brokers satisfy
this requirement by sending out voting instruction forms. See
generally Keir D. Gumbs et al., Debunking the Myths Behind
Voting Instruction Forms and Vote Reporting, 21 Corp. Gov.
Adv. 1 (July/Aug. 2013). It also may be possible to use
voter instruction forms for other purposes, such as confirming
whether or not particular shares held by an appraisal claimant
on the record date were voted in favor of the merger. And
as this case shows, there also may be records at the broker
level which, if examined, would allow the courts to apply
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other statutory limitations more accurately. We already make
these types of distinctions when dealing with the right to vote,
which was the principal right relied on by analogy in Salt
Dome for the creation of the Record Holder Requirement. 23
Under this more flexible approach, the corporation “generally
is entitled to rely on its own stock list,” but the list is not
conclusive; questions of ownership and the ability to exercise
associated rights can be the subject of proof. Preston, 650
A.2d at 649.
*25  It would have been preferable, in my view, to begin
developing this case law in 2010. See Kurz, 989 A.2d at
174 (arguing that treating DTC participants as holders of
record could help “[r]educ[e] the number of shares available
for appraisal arbitrage”). Yet the need for a more flexible
approach has not gone away. Looking through Cede is
obviously imperfect, but until share tracing becomes possible,
the perfect should not be the enemy of the good. Viewed
pragmatically, looking through Cede to the custodial banks
and brokers on the participant list merely returns Delaware
law to the state in which it existed before the federal policy of
share immobilization, restoring the conditions that prevailed
when Salt Dome was written and later when the Record
Holder Requirement was codified.
III. CONCLUSION
Under current law, Dell's motion for summary judgment
must be granted. The Funds lost their appraisal rights when
their shares were re-titled in the names of their custodial
banks' nominees. Were it up to me, I would hold that the
concept of a “stockholder of record” includes the custodial
banks and brokers on the DTC participant list. But given
existing precedent, I believe that only the Delaware Supreme
Court can change how our case law interprets the Record
Holder Requirement. This court obviously has no ability to
tell the Delaware Supreme Court what to do. This decision
has attempted only to present the reasons why one trial judge
believes that a different approach would be superior.
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including a bank or broker, that in the ordinary course of its business maintains securities accounts for others
and is acting in that capacity,” i.e., the custodial banks. Id. § 8–102(a)(14).
3 See, e.g., S. Prod. Co. v. Sabah, 87 A.2d 128 (Del.1952); Roam–Tel P'rs v. AT & T Mobility Wireless Op.
Hldgs. Inc.,2010 WL 5276991 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2010) (Strine, V.C.); Matter of Enstar Corp., 513 A.2d
206 (Del. Ch.1986); LeCompte v. Oakbrook Consol., Inc., 1986 WL 2827 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 1986); Engel v.
Magnavox Co., 1976 WL 1705 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1976); Abraham & Co. v. Olivetti Underwood Corp., 204 A.2d
740 (Del. Ch.1964), aff'd sub nom.Olivetti Underwood Corp. v. Jacques Coe & Co., 217 A.2d 683 (Del.1966).
See generally 1 R. Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein, The Delaware Law of Corporations & Business
Organizations § 9.44, at 9116 (3d ed. 2014) (“Prior to the Delaware Supreme Court's ruling in Alabama By–
Products Corp. v. Cede & Co., appraisal rights could be forfeited through any tender at any time, even if the
tender was inadvertent and an appraisal petition had been filed.” (footnote omitted)). The Delaware cases
traditionally treated the receipt of the transaction consideration as something inadvertent. Under Article 8 of
- 178 - 
In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2015)
2015 WL 4313206
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 20
the UCC, a securities intermediary is required by law to “take action to obtain a payment or distribution made
by the issuer of a financial asset” and is “obligated to its entitlement holder for a payment or distribution made
by the issuer of a financial asset if the payment or distribution is received by the securities intermediary.” 6
Del. C. § 8–505(a) & (b).
4 A variety of sources provide consistent accounts of the origins of the depository system. See, e.g., Securities
and Exchange Commission, Study Of Unsafe And Unsound Practices Of Brokers And Dealers, H.R. Doc. No.
92–231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9–10 (1971) [hereinafter SEC Study ]; Uniform Commercial Code, Prefatory
Note to Article 8 (revised 1994) [hereinafter Prefatory Note ]; Street Name at 10–6 n.5; Teresa Carnell &
James J. Hanks, Jr., Shareholder Voting and Proxy Solicitation: The Fundamentals, Maryland Bar Journal 23,
26 (Jan./Feb. 2004); David C. Donald, Heart of Darkness: The Problem at the Core of the U.S. Proxy System
and Its Solution, 6 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 41, 45, 50–61 (2011); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging
Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 Geo. L.J. 1227, 1237–38 & nn.45–50, 1273–74 (2008); Emily I. Osiecki,
Alabama By–Products Corp. v. Cede & Co.: Shareholder Protection Through Strict Statutory Construction, 22
Del. J. Corp. L. 221, 223–28 (1997); Suellen M. Wolfe, Escheat and the Challenge of Apportionment: A Bright
Line Test To Slice A Shadow, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 173, 178–88 (1995); Businesses & Subsidiaries–The Depository
Trust Company (DTC), http://www.dtcc.com/about/businesses-and-subsidiaries/dtc.aspx (last visited June 5,
2015).
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as a correct rule of law” and “could be relied upon adversely by courts, commentators and practitioners in
the future”).
8 Lawrence Hamermesh, How We Make Law in Delaware, and What to Expect from Us in the Future, 2 J. Bus.
& Tech. L. 409, 409 (2007) (“The best-known of the principal policymakers in Delaware are the members of
the judiciary.”); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law,
58 Vand. L.Rev. 1573, 1591 (2005) (“The most noteworthy trait of Delaware's corporate law is the extent
to which important and controversial legal rules are promulgated by the judiciary, rather than enacted by
the legislature.”); Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 68 U. Cin. L.Rev. 1061, 1075 (2000) (“Delaware corporate law relies on judicial lawmaking to a
greater extent than other states.”).
9 See, e.g., Hamermesh, supra, at 414 (“[W]e view the courts as the first line of defense, the first responders
in dealing with complex situations. When drafting legislation, we abstain from addressing complicated
matters that are hard to figure out, allowing them to develop through the common law.”); Omari Scott
Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware's Dominance and the Market for Corporate Law, 42 U.
Rich. L.Rev. 1129, 1159 (2008) (“As a result of the legislature's preference against regulatory prescription
and its deference to the judicial branch, Delaware courts are often the first responders to corporate law
controversies.”); see also Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Norman M. Monhait, A Delaware Response to
Delaware's Choice, 39 Del. J. Corp. L. 71, 75 (2014) (agreeing that the Corporation Law Council and
the General Assembly “have often subscribed to a ... ‘wait-and-see approach’ proposing and enacting,
respectively, amendments to the DGCL only when there are persuasive reasons to do so” and endorsing a
continuing policy of “reticence to initiate legislative action”).
10 Kahan & Rock, Symbiotic Federalism,supra, at 1594. The commentators referred to “numerous examples
of this tendency” and provided five examples. Id. at 1594–96. All involved statutory interpretation. Id. One
involved the interpretation of the appraisal statute. Id. (citing the narrow interpretation given to language in 8
Del. C. § 262(h) in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del.1983)).
11 See, e.g., Shintom Co. v. Audiovox Corp., 888 A.2d 225, 227 (Del.2005) (describing the DGCL as “an enabling
statute that provides great flexibility for creating the capital structure of a Delaware corporation.”); In re Topps
Co. S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 958 (Del. Ch.2007) (Strine, V.C.) (describing the DGCL as “a broadly
enabling statute”); Jones Apparel Gp., Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837, 845 (Del.Ch.2004) (Strine,
V.C.) (noting that the DGCL is “is widely regarded as the most flexible in the nation because it leaves the
parties to the corporate contract (managers and stockholders) with great leeway to structure their relations,
subject to relatively loose statutory constraints”); Matter of Appraisal of Ford Hldgs., Inc. Preferred Stock, 698
A.2d 973, 976 (Del. Ch.1997) (Allen, C.) (explaining that “unlike the corporation law of the nineteenth century,
modern corporation law contains few mandatory terms; it is largely enabling in character”); accord E. Norman
Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, History Informs American Corporate Law: The Necessity of Maintaining
A Delicate Balance in the Federal “Ecosystem”, 1 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 201, 204 (2006) (“Corporate statutes,
like the Delaware General Corporation Law, continue to take an enabling approach and allow wide latitude for
private ordering.”); Edward P. Welch & Robert S. Saunders, Freedom and Its Limits in the Delaware General
Corporation Law, 33 Del. J. Corp. L. 845, 847 (2008) (“The DGCL gives incorporators enormous freedom
to adopt the terms they believe are most appropriate for the organization, finance, and governance of their
particular enterprise.”).
12 See Hatleigh Corp. v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 428 A.2d 350 (Del. Ch.1981); Giovanini v. Horizon Corp., 1979 WL
178568 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 1979).
13 E.g., Berger v. Pubco Corp., 2008 WL 4173860, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2008); Wynnefield P'rs Small Cap
Value, L.P. v. Niagara Corp., 2006 WL 2521434, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2006); Envtl. Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Disease Detection Intern., Inc., 1988 WL 909658, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 15, 1988) (Allen, C.); RB Assocs. of
N.J., L.P. v. Gillette Co., 1988 WL 27731, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 1988) (Allen, C.); Shamrock Assocs. v. Tex.
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Am. Energy Corp., 517 A.2d 658, 661 (Del. Ch.1986); Weiss v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 1986 WL 5970,
at *4 (Del. Ch. May 22, 1986) (Allen, C.).
14 See Enstar II, 535 A.2d at 1354 (“The decision [to use DTC] is a matter which is strictly between the broker
and its clients.”). Other Delaware decisions during this period reflected the same assumption. See, e.g., RB
Assocs., 1988 WL 27731, at *3 (describing DTC system as a “mechanism of convenience for the brokerage
firms”); Olson, 1985 WL 11575, at *3 (describing Cede as “but a name used for the convenience of the
brokerage houses”); Hatleigh, 428 A.2d at 353 (remarking that DTC exists “for the benefit of those firms
participating in the Depository Trust Company so as to simplify their stock transfer transactions on behalf
of their customers”); Giovanini, 1979 WL 178568, at *1 (describing Cede as a “mechanism of convenience
for the brokerage firms”).
15 See, e.g.,6 Del. C. § 8–508 (“A securities intermediary shall act at the direction of an entitlement holder
to change a security entitlement into another available form of holding for which the entitlement holder is
eligible, or to cause the financial asset to be transferred to a securities account of the entitlement holder
with another securities intermediary.”); id. cmt. 1 (“If security certificates in registered form are issued for
the security, and individuals are eligible to have the security registered in their own name, the entitlement
holder can request that the intermediary deliver or cause to be delivered to the entitlement holder a certificate
registered in the name of the entitlement holder or a certificate indorsed in blank or specially indorsed to the
entitlement holder.... If the security can be held by individuals directly in uncertificated form, the entitlement
holder can request that the security be registered in its name.”); see also8 Del. C. § 158 (“Every holder of
stock represented by a certificate shall be entitled to have a certificate ... representing the number of shares
registered in certificate form.”).
16 See Enstar II, 535 A.2d at 1353 n.2 (“Whether a beneficial stockholder participates in a depository system is
a matter between the beneficial stockholder and his broker, and is not a consideration for issuers.”); accord
Wynnefield P'rs Small Cap Value L.P. v. Niagara Corp., 2006 WL 1737862, at *3 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2006)
(same), rev'd on other grounds,907 A.2d 146 (Del.2006) (ORDER); Am. Hardware Corp. v. Savage Arms
Co., 136 A.2d 690, 692 (Del.1957) (“If an owner of stock chooses to register his shares in the name of a
nominee, he takes the risks attendant upon such an arrangement....”).
17 Enstar II, 535 A.2d at 1354 (“The legal and practical effects of having one's stock registered in street name
cannot be visited upon the issuer. The attendant risks are those of the stockholder, and where appropriate,
the broker.”); id. at 1355 (“Here, the problem is one between the plaintiffs and their brokers. Enstar cannot,
and should not, be blamed for the failure of a nominee or broker to correctly perfect appraisal rights for a
beneficial owner.... The dispute, if any, is between these brokers and their clients.”)
18 The concept of “legislative facts” refers to the empirical assumptions about the world that courts necessarily
make when deciding cases. See In re Oracle Corp. Deriv. Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 940 (Del. Ch.2003) (Strine,
V.C.) (deploying concept and citing Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 Harv. L.Rev. 364, 402–403 (1942)). See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., The
Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of Corporations, 27 Del. J. Corp. L. 499, 502–503
(2002) (describing concept at greater length).
19 See, e.g., Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., 2015 WL 67586 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015);Ancestry.com,
2015 WL 66825.
20 See generally In re Activision Blizzard Inc. S'holder Litig., ––– A.3d ––––, 2015 WL 2438067, *13–25 (Del.
Ch. May 21, 2015). Choses in action are transferrable under Delaware law when they are the types of claims
that would survive the death of the transferor and pass to his personal representative. See Indus. Trust Co.
v. Stidham, 33 A.2d 159, 160–61 (Del.Super.1942). By statute in Delaware, “[a]ll causes of action, except
actions for defamation, malicious prosecution, or upon penal statutes, shall survive....” 10 Del. C. § 3701.
21 See Salt Dome, 41 A.2d at 588. Indeed, even the right to control how shares vote transfers with the shares,
notwithstanding the legal expedient of the record date, because the subsequent holder can compel the seller
to issue him a proxy (assuming the seller can be identified). Commonwealth Assocs. v. Providence Health
Care, Inc., 641 A.2d 155, 158 (Del. Ch.1993) (Allen, C.); In re Giant Portland Cement Co., 21 A.2d 697, 701
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(Del. Ch.1941); In re Canal Constr. Co., 182 A. 545, 547–48 (Del.1936) (Wolcott, Jos., C.); Italo Petroleum
Corp. of Am. v. Producers' Oil Corp. of Am., 174 A. 276, 280 (Del. Ch.1934) (Wolcott, Jos., C.).
22 Strong arguments can be made that appraisal represents a more rational and efficient alternative to traditional
fiduciary duty litigation. See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Competition and the Future of M & A Litigation,
100 Iowa L.Rev. Bull. 19, 25–28 (2015); Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the
Future of Public Company M & A, 92 Wash U.L.Rev. (forthcoming 2015); Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, The
Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do The Merits Matter, 75 Ohio State L.J. 829, 859–67 (2014). At one
point, the Delaware Supreme Court appeared to prioritize appraisal over fiduciary duty litigation by holding
that “a plaintiff's monetary remedy [following a merger] ordinarily should be confined to the more liberalized
appraisal proceeding herein established.” Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del.1983). That
promise did not survive the decisions in Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 (Del.1985),
and Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182 (Del.1988). See generally Andra v. Blount, 772 A.2d
183, 192 (Del. Ch.2000) (Strine, V.C.) (explaining that Rabkin and Cede effectively overruled the appraisal-
as-basic-remedy aspect of Weinberger ).
23 See, supra, n.19 (citing cases in which court permitted post-record date acquirer of shares to determine how
shares were voted, notwithstanding legal ownership on stock list); Preston v. Allison, 650 A.2d 646, 649
(Del.1994) (looking through name of registered holder on stock list and recognizing voting rights of beneficial
owners where form of ownership was mandated by federal law); Sutter Opportunity Fund 2 LLC v. Cede &
Co., 838 A.2d 1123, 1129 (Del. Ch.2003) (permitting issuer to look through Cede for purposes of analyzing
whether proponents of a proposal for a matter to be submitted to a vote met a 10% minimum threshold in
partnership agreement); Seidman & Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.A. Fin., Inc., 837 A.2d 21, 29 (Del. Ch.2003) (same);
In re Ne. Water Co., 38 A.2d 918, 923 (Del. Ch.1944) (treating statutory reference to stockholder status being
determined by name on stock list as “a limited but practical rule of evidence for the ready ascertainment of
persons entitled to notice of and to vote at a stockholders' meeting” but not dispositive in all cases); In re
Diamond State Brewery, Inc., 2 A.2d 254, 257 (Del. Ch.1938) (Wolcott, Jos., C.) (“The court is not bound
in a review proceeding [of an election] by the showing of stockholders made on the corporation's books.”);
cf.Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Pan Ocean Navigation, Inc., 535 A.2d 1357, 1359 (Del.1987) (“We now hold
that when the stock ledger is blank or non-existent, the Court of Chancery has the power to consider other
evidence to ascertain and establish stockholder status.”).
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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*1  This statutory appraisal action arises from a merger
whereby Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. (“Newell”) acquired
Jarden Corporation (“Jarden” or the “Company”) (the
“Merger”) for cash and stock totaling $59.21 per share (the
“Merger Price”). Petitioners, Verition Partners Master Fund
Ltd., Verition Multi-Strategy Master Fund Ltd., Fir Tree Value
Master Fund, LP and Fir Tree Capital Opportunity Master
Fund, LP (together “Petitioners”), were Jarden stockholders
on the Merger's effective date and seek a judicial appraisal of
the fair value of their Jarden shares as of that date.
At the close of the trial, I observed, “[w]e are in the
classic case where ... very-well credentialed experts are miles
apart.... There's some explaining that is required here to
understand how it is that two very well-credentialed, I think,
well-intended experts view this company so fundamentally
differently.” 1  This observation was prompted by the all-
too-frequently encountered disparity in the experts' opinions
regarding Jarden's fair value. Jarden's expert, Dr. Glenn
Hubbard, applying a discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analysis,
opines that Jarden's fair value as of the Merger was $48.01
per share. Petitioners' expert, Dr. Mark Zmijewski, applying
a comparable companies analysis, contends that Jarden's fair
value as of the Merger was $71.35 per share. To put the
disparity in context, Dr. Zmijewski's valuation implies that the
market mispriced Jarden by over $5 billion.
In a statutory appraisal action, the trial court's function is
to appraise the “fair value” of the dissenting stockholder's
“shares of stock” by “tak[ing] into account all relevant
factors.” 2  The statute does not define “fair value” but our
courts understand the term to mean the petitioner's “pro rata
share of the appraised company's value as a going concern.” 3
This definition of fair value “is a jurisprudential, rather
than purely economic, construct.” 4  Even so, the remarkably
broad “all relevant factors” mandate necessarily leads the
court deep into the weeds of economics and corporate
finance. These are places law-trained judges should not go
without the guidance of experts trained in these disciplines.
In other words, corporate finance is not law. The appraisal
exercise is, at bottom, a fact-finding exercise, and our courts
must appreciate that, by functional imperative, the evidence,
including expert evidence, in one appraisal case will be
different from the evidence presented in any other appraisal
case. Different evidence, of course, can lead to different
decision paths and different outcomes. After all, the appraisal
exercise prescribed by the governing statute contemplates a
trial—a good, old-fashioned trial—where the parties carry
burdens of proof, present their evidence in hopes of meeting
that burden and subject their adversary's evidence to the
“crucible of cross-examination” in keeping with the traditions
of our adversarial process of civil justice. 5
*2  Our Supreme Court has had several opportunities
recently to provide direction with regard to certain frames
of reference this court should consider while performing
the statutory appraisal function. 6  I will not recount those
holdings here as they are well known. Suffice it to say,
as I approached my deliberation of the evidence in this
case, my “takeaway” from the Supreme Court's recent
direction reduced to this: “What is necessary in any particular
[appraisal] case [ ] is for the Court of Chancery to explain its
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[fair value calculus] in a manner that is grounded in the record
before it.” 7  That is what this court endeavors to do after every
trial and what I have endeavored to do here. 8
The parties have reveled in the statutory mandate that the
court consider “all relevant factors.” Indeed, they have
joined issue on nearly every possible indicator of fair value
imaginable, including market indicators (unaffected market
price, deal price less synergies, Jarden stock offerings shortly
before the Merger) and traditional valuation methodologies
(comparable companies and DCF analyses). 9  The result: an
unfortunately long opinion, made so by a sense that I needed
to traverse every road the parties waived me down right to
the bitter end, even if that road did not lead to the desired fair
value destination. Appraisal litigation can be unwieldy. This
is one of those cases. Apologies in advance to those who read
on.
I begin my fair value analysis where I believe I must
—with the market evidence. 10  As explained below, I
have found Jarden's unaffected market price of $48.31
per share is a reliable indicator of its fair value at the
time of the Merger. This finding is supported by credible,
unrebutted expert testimony from Dr. Hubbard, including an
event study that analyzed the market's response to earnings
and other material announcements. Dr. Hubbard's expert
analysis of the Unaffected Market Price is corroborated by
credible evidence, including that Jarden had no controlling
stockholder, its public float was 93.9%, it was well covered by
numerous professional stock analysts, its stock was heavily
traded and it enjoyed a narrow bid-ask spread. As important,
there was no credible evidence that material information
bearing on Jarden's fair value was withheld from the market
as of the Merger. This market evidence was persuasive
and I have given it substantial weight in my fair value
determination.
*3  As noted, the Merger consideration, or “deal price,”
was $59.21 per share. Respondent proffers this evidence as a
reliable indicator fair value, particularly when synergies are
“backed out” as required by our law. 11  Petitioners respond
that the sale process leading to the Merger was highly flawed
because Jarden's lead negotiator was willing to sell Jarden
on the cheap and the Jarden board of directors (the “Board”)
failed to test the market before agreeing to sell the Company
to Newell. After considering the evidence, I agree with
Petitioners that the sale process left much to be desired.
Jarden's lead negotiator acted with little to no oversight by
the Board and, in doing so, got way out in front of the Board
and Jarden's financial advisors in suggesting to Newell a price
range the Board would accept to sell the Company before
negotiations began in earnest. There was no pre-signing or
post-signing market check. Moreover, the contemporaneous
evidence regarding deal synergies was conflicting and the
parties' experts acknowledged that valuing the synergies and
assessing which party took that value in the Merger was
especially difficult in this case. For these reasons, I have
placed little weight on the deal price less synergies beyond
considering that evidence as a “reality check” on my final fair
value determination.
As additional market evidence of Jarden's fair value,
Respondent points to Jarden's decision to finance a sizeable
acquisition just prior to the Merger (in the midst of
negotiations) with an equity offering valued at $49.00 per
share. When the market reacted poorly to the acquisition,
Jarden announced that it would buy back up to $50 million
in Jarden shares at prices up to $49.00 per share as a
signal of confidence to the market. This contemporaneous
evidence of Jarden management's internal valuation of the
Company, performed to facilitate Jarden's acquisition strategy
in furtherance of its standalone operations, is relevant market
evidence of fair value. While far from dispositive, Jarden's
internal efforts to value itself as a going concern for business,
not litigation, purposes provides a useful input.
In keeping with their theme that the market evidence is not
reliable, Petitioners have focused on “traditional valuation
methodologies” to carry their burden of proving Jarden's fair
value as of the Merger. Their valuation expert opines that a
comparable company/market multiples analysis provides the
best evidence of fair value, and that methodology supports
his conclusion that Jarden's fair value at the Merger was
$71.35 per share. The credibility, or not, of this methodology
depends in large measure on the quality of the comparables.
And then the appraiser must select an appropriate multiple.
After considering the evidence, I am satisfied that Petitioners'
comparable companies analysis is not credible because Jarden
had no reliable comparables. Consequently, I give no weight
to the results derived from this valuation approach.
Not surprisingly, both parties proffered expert evidence
regarding Jarden's fair value based on DCF and, not
surprisingly, the experts' DCF analyses yielded results that
were solar systems apart. After carefully reviewing the
evidence, including the valuation treatises submitted as
evidence in support of the experts' conclusions, I am satisfied
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that both experts utilized inputs in their DCF models that were
not justified and that skewed the results. 12  Accordingly, I
have utilized the most credible components of both expert's
analyses to conduct my own DCF valuation, in my best
effort to obey our appraisal statute's “command that the Court
of Chancery undertake an ‘independent’ assessment of fair
value” when performing its mandated appraisal function. 13
As explained below, my DCF analysis reveals a valuation of
$48.13 per share.
*4  After considering all relevant factors, I have appraised
Jarden's fair value as of the Merger at $48.31 per share.
This value, derived from the unaffected market price, is
consistent with Jarden's DCF value and the less reliable, but
still relevant, deal price less synergies value.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I recite the facts as I find them by a preponderance of the
evidence after a four-day trial beginning in June 2018. That
evidence consisted of testimony from twenty-eight witnesses
(twenty-five fact witnesses, some presented live and some by
deposition, and three live expert witnesses) along with more
than 2,000 exhibits. To the extent I have relied upon evidence
to which an objection was raised but not resolved at trial, I
will explain the bases for my decision to admit the evidence
at the time I first discuss it.
A. Parties and Relevant Non-Parties
Prior to its acquisition by Newell on April 15, 2016 (the
“Merger Date”), Jarden was a consumer products company
that held a diversified portfolio of over 120 quality brands. 14
This portfolio included well-known goods like Ball jars,
Coleman sporting goods, Crock-Pot appliances and Yankee
Candle candles. 15  Jarden was incorporated in Delaware with
headquarters in Boca Raton, Florida, and corporate offices
in Norwalk, Connecticut and Miami, Florida. 16  Prior to the
Merger, Jarden traded on the New York Stock Exchange. 17
Following the Merger, the combined company was re-named
Newell Brands, Inc. (“Newell Brands”). 18
Petitioners are Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd., Verition
Multi-Strategy Master Fund Ltd., Fir Tree Value Master
Fund, LP and Fir Tree Capital Opportunity Master Fund,
LP. 19  Petitioners acquired their Jarden shares after the
announcement of the Merger and were stockholders as of
the Merger Date. They collectively hold 2,435,971 shares of
Jarden common stock.
B. The Company
Jarden traces its origins to Alltrista Corporation, a company
that was spun off in 1993 from Ball Corporation's
canning business. 20  In 2000, Martin Franklin and
Ian Ashken acquired Alltrista after having initiated a
stockholder campaign to unseat Alltrista's board and senior
management. 21  By 2001, Franklin and Ashken served
as Alltrista's Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
Officer, respectively, and renamed the company Jarden. 22  In
August 2003, James Lillie joined the Jarden team as Chief
Operating Officer. 23  Their shared goal was to create the “best
consumer products company in the world.” 24
Franklin served as CEO and Chairman of the Board
until 2011, 25  when Jarden reorganized its management
structure. The Company created the “Office of the Chairman,”
comprising Franklin as Executive Chairman, Ashken as Vice
Chairman and CFO, 26  and Lillie as CEO. 27  As a result
of this reorganization, Franklin surrendered direct control of
Jarden's day-to-day operations, but remained chiefly in charge
of capital distribution and M&A activity. 28  Lillie and Ashken
took over the day-to-day operation of the Company. 29
Ashken also maintained a dominant role in Jarden's financial
planning and acquisitions. 30
*5  As a holding company, 31  Jarden maintained a unique,
decentralized structure. Its various businesses functioned
autonomously, allowing them to pursue outside opportunities
and synergies. 32  The respective business unit heads
exercised full control over the development of their individual
strategic plans. 33  Even so, the businesses stayed in constant
communication with Jarden senior management regarding
operations. 34
C. Jarden Experiences Strong Growth from 2001–
2015
Jarden pursued a two-pronged growth strategy, focusing on
internal growth and growth via acquisitions. 35  In this regard,
management set a goal of 3 to 5% annual internal revenue
growth, 36  10 to 15% earnings per share (“EPS”) growth, 3 to
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5% organic top-line growth, 7 to 10% EBITDA growth and
20 to 50 basis points of gross margin growth. 37  These targets
produced laudable results. From 2010 through 2015, Jarden
saw average organic yearly revenue growth of 4.8%, the top of
its targeted range. 38  In fact, Jarden was regarded as “best in
class by any measure in terms of shareholder returns over 15
years, 10 years, 5 years, 3 years, 1 year.” 39  Jarden's margins
experienced continued expansion and it met or exceeded its
guidance in all but one quarter of its existence. 40  By 2015,
Jarden generated over $1.2 billion in segment earnings and
revenues of almost $9 billion. 41  This reflected an increase in
revenue of 4.8% year over year in fiscal year 2015. 42
Given its impressive results, it is not surprising that Jarden's
stock performed well and traded efficiently. In 2012, Jarden
joined the “S&P 400.” 43  By the end of 2015, Jarden's
market capitalization topped $10.2 billion, placing it among
the top 20% of all US publicly traded firms. 44  More
than twenty professional financial analysts followed Jarden,
reporting regularly on the Company's business operations and
forecasts. 45  In addition to its high average trading volume,
Jarden's “bid-ask spread” was just 0.02% and its public
float was approximately 94% of its outstanding stock. 46
Jarden's stock trading price historically responded to the
announcement of value-relevant information as one would
expect in a semi-strong efficient market. 47
M&A drove Jarden's growth. 48  With Franklin at the helm,
Jarden acquired over 40 companies and brands, its stock grew
over 5,000% and its sales progressed from approximately
$305 million in 2001 to over $8.6 billion in 2015. 49  Franklin
and his team were not only well-known “deal-makers” in the
public markets, 50  they were among “the best performers in
the sector.” 51
*6  Under Franklin's leadership, Jarden management
constructed a well-conceived convention for singling-out
and completing acquisitions. 52  Jarden avoided acquisitions
that would insert it in spaces where major pure-play
competitors, like Proctor & Gamble, operated. 53  Jarden,
instead, concentrated on acquiring top brands in niche
markets. 54  This strategy developed secure trenches that
presented barriers to others who might look to compete with
Jarden's niche product lines. 55  It also enabled Jarden globally
to expand its brands. 56
D. Jarden Shifts Its Strategic Focus
Jarden's businesses sold their products across a vast spread
of distribution channels, including business-to-business,
direct-to-consumer (“DTC”), e-commerce retailers, and
club, department store, drug, grocery and sporting goods
retailers. 57  In 2014, Jarden committed to expanding its DTC
operations by promoting then-Vice President of International
Development, Leo Trautwein, to Vice President of Direct
to Consumer and Revenue Development. Trautwein, along
with Jarden management, developed a DTC Council that
comprised of representatives from Jarden and each of its
individual business units. 58  The DTC Council aimed to
detect DTC best practices and put in place DTC initiatives. 59
It set meaningful benchmarks to enhance DTC sales. 60
In their July 2015 Board presentation, Jarden management
expected online sales to represent 13% of Jarden's total sales
by 2019, equating to 15.9% of total EBITDA. 61  The DTC
initiative, on the other hand, was expected to yield a 55–60%
return on investment. 62  As it turned out, from 2012 through
2016, Jarden's DTC e-commerce sales (i.e., not including
brick and mortar DTC sales) experienced a more than 270%
increase in five years—expanding from roughly $237 million
to $643 million. 63
E. Jarden Makes Two Major Acquisitions Just Prior
to the Merger
Jarden completed two of the largest acquisitions in its history
in 2015. In July 2015, Jarden acquired the Waddington
Group, Inc. for approximately $1.35 billion. 64  Waddington
manufactures plastic consumables for the $14 billion U.S.
food sector market. 65  The acquisition was projected to yield
revenue of $840 million in 2016 with an approximately 20%
EBITDA margin. 66
In November 2015, Jarden acquired the parent company
of Jostens, Inc. for $1.5 billion. 67  Jostens was a market
leader in manufacturing and marketing yearbooks, rings,
caps and gowns, diplomas, regalia and varsity jackets,
mainly selling to schools, universities and professional sports
leagues. 68  Jarden predicted the Jostens acquisition would
not only offer Jarden “unique access to the difficult-to-
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enter academic market,” 69  but also would allow Jarden
to grow a number of its existing distribution channels and
develop new ones, intensifying Jarden's DTC impact. 70
Jostens provided superior market positions, steady financial
performance, strong margins and attractive cash flow to
Jarden's portfolio. 71  Indeed, Jostens' gross margins were
anticipated to better Jarden's overall margins and, in fact, the
transaction was instantly accretive. 72
*7  Overall, Jarden anticipated that these two acquisitions
would push Jarden's total annual revenues over the $10 billion
threshold. At the same time, however, they simultaneously
would increase Jarden's debt to a point where Jarden would
be unable to make another substantial acquisition for at least
another year. 73
F. Franklin Considers a Sale of Jarden
Jarden was not Franklin's only business interest. In 2013,
Franklin founded Platform Specialty Products Corporation
(“Platform”), a specialty chemicals production company, with
financial backing from Bill Ackman. 74  In 2014, Franklin
founded Nomad Foods Ltd. (“Nomad”), a frozen foods
company headquartered in the U.K. 75  Franklin also ran
a “family investment vehicle” called Mariposa Capital. 76
Mariposa entities often acquired orphan brands, like its
acquisition of Royal Oak in 2016. 77  In 2017, after the
Merger, Franklin created a special purpose acquisition
vehicle, J2 Acquisition Limited (“J2”), that raised more
than $1 billion in order to buy consumer-focused brands. 78
Franklin also looked forward to pursuing business ventures
with his sons, as his father did with him. 79
In early July 2015, during a meeting between Franklin
and Roland Phillips of Centerview Partners relating to
Nomad, Phillips mentioned that Newell's CEO, Michael Polk,
wanted to meet Franklin. 80  As discussed below, Newell had
previously retained Centerview to assist with Newell's search
for transformative M&A opportunities. 81  Understanding
that Polk would likely want to talk about a Newell/Jarden
transaction, Franklin told Phillips he would take the meeting,
he “would gladly take equity, [and he] ha[d] no issue with
someone else running the combined business.” 82
Later that month, Franklin met with Bill Ackman, his
Platform partner, and expressed his willingness to sell Jarden
so he could devote more energy to Platform and Nomad. 83
Ackman emailed Warren Buffett the following day and
indicated that Franklin would entertain a negotiated sale of
Jarden to Berkshire Hathaway. 84
Franklin was not authorized by the Board to entertain
discussions regarding a sale of Jarden nor did he disclose to
the Board his discussions with Phillips or Ackman. 85
G. Newell and Franklin Meet
*8  Like Jarden, Newell was a major consumer products
company with a vast portfolio of products sold under brands
like Sharpie, Paper Mate, Elmer's, Rubbermaid, Lenox, Graco
and Baby Jogger. 86  In 2011, Newell implemented a strategic
roadmap known as the “Growth Game Plan” under the
direction of its new CEO, Polk. 87  This plan incorporated
an initiative known as “Project Renewal” to streamline the
Company's business structure and decrease costs. 88
For many years, Newell operated as a traditional holding
company, much as Jarden did, owning several portfolio
businesses that essentially functioned as independent
companies. 89  In 2010, Newell retooled by implementing
an integrated operating company model as contemplated by
Project Renewal. 90  Newell “delayered the structure of the
company, ... releas[ing] a whole bunch of money” that was
invested back into Newell's brands. 91  As a result, Newell
doubled its brand expenditures, creating fast-tracked growth
and amplified margins for its business. 92  By the fall of
2014, Newell realized that the “investment firepower” Project
Renewal generated “was going to wane” by late 2018. 93  It
needed a new growth plan.
In late 2014, Newell initiated a strategy of pursuing
“transformational M&A” opportunities that would generate
larger scale and market share in its central businesses, in
addition to new prospects for growth. 94  This new strategy
prompted Newell to engage Centerview to produce a list
of possible targets for Newell and to arrange “get-to-know-
you meetings” as requested. 95  While Jarden was included
on Centerview's list, it was the target “least familiar” to
Newell since it “had been built [steadily] through acquisitions
from 2001 onward” and was, therefore, in Newell's eyes, a
“relatively new company.” 96  Polk had reservations about
Jarden because it was seen as a “company of diversified niche
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categories,” when Polk was “looking for scaled brands and
big, global categories.” 97  Even so, Polk asked Centerview to
arrange the “get-to-know-you meeting” with Franklin. 98  As
noted, Franklin agreed to take the meeting. 99
Franklin and Polk's first meeting took place at the Barclays'
investor “Back-to-School” conference on September 9,
2015 (the “Back-to-School Meeting”). 100  The conversation
exposed their different perspectives regarding the roles they
played at their respective companies—Franklin defined his
role at Jarden as creating value and “[t]hat's it,” while Polk
defined his role at Newell as building stronger brands and
a stronger company. 101  In other words, Franklin focused
on M&A, while Polk concentrated on organic growth. 102
Near the meeting's end, Franklin directed the conversation to
where he believed Polk wanted it to go by confirming that his
team was open to “strategically connecting” with Newell. 103
The meeting closed with both Franklin and Polk agreeing to
continue the conversation about a potential deal. 104
*9  Polk reported back to the Newell board that Franklin
“cut straight to the chase about being willing to sell his
company and offered a deeper discussion over the next few
weeks.” 105  At this point, however, Franklin still had not
informed Jarden's Board that he was entertaining Newell's
overture. 106  Indeed, it was not until several days after
the Back-to-School meeting that Franklin made individual
calls to members of the Board to let them know about his
discussions with Polk. 107
For his part, Polk warmed quickly to the idea of acquiring
Jarden, believing that Jarden would provide scale and
immediate cost synergies once Newell consolidated Jarden's
operations per Project Renewal. 108  As Polk explained, “we
believed we had the potential, based on what we could see
through the public data, to apply the playbook we'd just run on
Newell Rubbermaid to a broader set of categories that looked
very similar to the categories that we were managing as part
of [Newell].” 109
On October 5, 2015, Franklin and Polk met again, this
time on Franklin's yacht in Miami, along with Ashken,
Lillie and Mark Tarchetti, Newell's then-Chief Development
Officer (the “Boat Meeting”). 110  While Franklin informally
provided some advance notice of the Boat Meeting to certain
members of the Board, he did not obtain Board approval to
meet with Newell and certainly did not have Board approval
to discuss the financial parameters of a deal. 111  But that is
precisely what he did.
*10  Franklin advised Newell's team that Newell's offer for
Jarden would have to “start with a six” and would have to
include a significant cash component if Newell's goal was
to gain control of the combined company. 112  According to
Franklin, he arrived at this number based, in part, on his
understanding of Jarden's value as determined in connection
with the Jostens acquisition which was underway as of
the Boat Meeting. 113  He also wanted to state a number
he believed Newell had the “ability to pay,” 114  and he
assumed a price of $70.00 or higher was “laughable.” 115
At the time of the Boat Meeting, Jarden's stock was trading
in the high $40s. 116  Therefore, by this metric, a price
“starting with a six,” by any measure, would be a premium
for Jarden's stockholders. 117  According to Franklin, even
if $60 per share undervalued Jarden, 118  Franklin believed
Jarden stockholders would reap additional value by sharing
in the upside of the Merger with stock in the combined
company. 119
On the other side of the table, Polk expressed Newell's hope
that a merger would open substantial synergies given the
Newell team's demonstrated ability to consolidate business
functions and utilize the resulting cost savings to produce
growth. 120  Jarden's team had a more modest outlook on
possible synergies in the early stages of the discussions, but
became progressively more “excited” by the opportunity to
unlock significant transaction synergies as the negotiations
advanced. 121
Although he had not sought Board approval to meet with
Newell, Franklin briefed the Board on the Boat Meeting
within a matter of days, including his admonition to Newell
that an offer would need to “start with a six.” 122  The
Board was supportive and encouraged Franklin and his team
to continue the discussions with Newell within Franklin's
outlined parameters. 123
Jarden did not formally engage Barclays until November
2015. Even so, Franklin contacted Welsh, his personal
Barclays banker, on October 16, 2015, after the Boat
Meeting. 124  Franklin told Welsh he already signaled to
Newell that Jarden would agree to sell at $60 per share and
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instructed him to start developing an analysis supporting a
transaction in the range of $60–$69 per share. 125
H. The Ebb and Flow of the Negotiations
*11  On October 9, 2015, Newell distributed a press release
revealing that Tarchetti and another executive would leave
Newell at the end of the year. 126  Franklin was “very upset”
Polk had not informed him that “his chief lieutenant” was on
his way out of Newell. 127  Franklin was so upset, in fact, that
he entertained the idea of “stopping the conversations at that
point” because he “didn't want to look stupid in front of [the
Jarden] board ... [by] having a conversation with someone
that wasn't serious.” 128  Within days of the announcement,
Franklin and Polk had a “tough conversation” where Polk
explained that Tarchetti would stay with Newell if the parties
agreed to a deal. 129  After this, Franklin “got over it” and
negotiations continued. 130
As the parties were discussing a Jarden/Newell combination,
Jarden was closing the Jostens deal. On October 14, 2015,
Jarden announced it would acquire Jostens and finance
the acquisition through an equity offering priced at $49.00
per share and additional debt. 131  The next day, Jarden
presented five-year projections to potential financing sources
that reflected net sales growth of 3.1% (the “Lender
Presentation”). 132
The market reacted negatively to the Jostens acquisition. 133
Jarden's stock price dropped approximately 12% over the
following two weeks and analysts' reduced their Jarden price
targets accordingly. 134  The Board determined that Jarden
needed to project confidence to the market. Accordingly, in
early November 2015, it approved a stock buy-back up to
$50 million at prices capped at $49.00 per share. 135  Jarden
ultimately repurchased 276,417 shares on November 2, 2015,
at an average price of $45.96 per share, and repurchased an
additional 775,685 shares on November 3, 2015, at an average
price of $48.05 per share. 136
On October 15, 2015, Franklin caused Jarden to enter
into a mutual confidentiality and standstill agreement with
Newell, and the parties began preliminary due diligence. 137
True to form, Franklin did not seek Board authorization to
begin diligence on Jarden's behalf. 138  The next day, also
without the Board's authorization, Franklin and Polk spoke
on the phone to continue negotiations on the cash and stock
components of a deal, and Franklin introduced the concept of
Jarden taking seats on the combined company's board. 139
On October 22, 2015, Franklin, Ashken and Lillie
met with Newell representatives at Jarden's offices
in Norwalk, Connecticut (the “Norwalk Meeting”) and
shared non-public information, including a set of three-
year financial projections. 140  The three-year projections,
apparently created in connection with the negotiations,
incorporated financials for both the Waddington and Jostens
acquisitions, 141  and forecast 5% revenue growth, i.e., growth
at the high end of Jarden's historic guidance range of 3% to
5%. 142
*12  Entering into negotiations with Newell, Jarden had set
the market standard for average annual revenue growth within
the 3% to 5% range. 143  These growth figures were meant
to reflect Jarden's “organic growth” range, but they included
revenue from “tuck-in” acquisitions, where a Jarden portfolio
company would acquire a target. 144  Other public companies
operating as holding companies typically do not include
tuck-in acquisitions when projecting “organic growth.” 145
Nevertheless, even when tuck-in acquisitions are excluded,
Jarden generally performed in line with its target growth
range. 146
At trial, Lillie justified giving Newell projections at the very
top of the Company's 3%–5% guidance range by explaining
that 5% was a “round number[ ].” 147  He went on to
explain that, while the projections given to Newell were not
“wildly optimistic,” Jarden internally projected growth “in the
fours.” 148  Polk took notice of Jarden's “really aggressive”
projections. 149  He and his team determined that it was best to
stick with the 3.1% growth projections as stated in the Lender
Presentation when evaluating the transaction. 150
In November 2015, Jarden's financial advisor, Barclays,
asked Jarden management for projections extended to
2020. 151  In response, Lillie told Barclays to “extrapolate
out” the three-year forecast at a continuing growth rate of 5%
(the “November Projections”). 152  Barclays used these five-
year projections in its analyses of the potential transaction and
in its fairness opinion. 153
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In addition to negotiating price terms during the Norwalk
Meeting, Newell and Franklin began to discuss specifics
regarding change-in-control payments that would be due to
Franklin, Ashken and Lillie in the event of a merger. 154
And, again, Franklin did not seek Board approval before
undertaking these discussions. 155
Following the Norwalk Meeting, Franklin, Ashken, Lillie and
John Welsh of Barclays on behalf of Jarden, and Polk and
Tarchetti on behalf of Newell, met for dinner. 156  Franklin
believed whether the transaction would be consummated
depended on whether Tarchetti stayed at Newell. 157
Accordingly, he asked Tarchetti to share his thoughts
on the potential transaction. 158  Tarchetti declined to
respond, explaining he believed Newell still lacked adequate
information to evaluate the transaction. 159  Franklin was not
happy.
*13  After this “difficult dinner” among the negotiators,
Franklin told Ashken and Lillie, “I'm done. I don't want
to deal with this.” 160  Likewise, Polk said he thought
about “pull[ing] the plug” on the negotiations. 161  After a
“conciliatory” call between Lillie and Tarchetti, however,
the parties decided not to “let a bad dinner get in the way
of looking at whether this makes sense[,]” and negotiations
continued. 162
The Board held its first formal meeting to discuss a potential
Newell transaction on October 28, 2015. 163  There was no
discussion of a pre-signing market check. 164  Instead, the
Board focused its attention on Newell and directed that
negotiations continue. 165
In the meantime, Newell retained both Goldman Sachs
(“Goldman”) and Bain & Company (“Bain”) as additional
financial advisors to assist in evaluating a possible acquisition
of Jarden. 166  Tasked with performing a thorough evaluation
of Jarden's product categories, Bain's initial assessment
was that Jarden's portfolio demonstrated strong performance
across many promising product segments, 167  but its historic
organic growth rate, once “tuck-in” acquisitions were
separated, was at most 3.5%. 168  Early in the process,
Centerview had projected that potential synergies of $500
million to $900 million would result from a combination
with Jarden. 169  By the end of October 2015, Bain
was estimating that the combination had the “potential
to create $700M–$800M in cost synergies.” 170  Bain's
assessment encompassed “annualized savings” that would
recur annually. 171
Through due diligence, Newell discovered “almost every deal
Jarden had done, which were profound in number, had been
left standalone with almost no cost synergies or revenue
synergies realized.” 172  As a result of this holding company
structure, Newell and its advisors believed that Jarden
presented a substantial opportunity to replicate Newell's
Project Renewal success by combining Jarden's businesses
into Newell's operating company structure. 173
I. Newell Makes an Offer and Jarden Negotiates
*14  On November 10–11, 2015, the Newell board met
to discuss, among other things, whether to make an offer
to acquire Jarden. 174  On the first day, Tarchetti presented
the results of the diligence efforts so far, in addition to
management's perspective on the benefits of a merger with
Jarden. 175  On the second day, Bain and Goldman presented
their analysis of potential synergies. 176  Bain opined that
the potential Newell/Jarden “combination would enable ~
$600M in cost savings opportunities, with potential upside
to ~$700M.” 177  Goldman appraised cost synergies based
on comparable transactions ranging from 2.1% to 14.0%
of revenue, with a median of 10.0%, translating to roughly
$850 million of annual cost synergies resulting from the
acquisition. 178
Despite Bain and Goldman's synergies estimates, Newell
and its advisors structured their deal model on an estimate
of $500 million in annual cost synergies. 179  With this
estimate, Newell's model priced Jarden at $57.00 to $61.00
per share. 180  Within these parameters, the Newell board
understood that if its management team did not realize the
$500 million synergies estimate, then Newell shareholders
would not receive any increase in EPS. 181  After the advisors'
presentations, the Newell board authorized management to
negotiate an acquisition of Jarden at a price between $57.00
and $60.00 per share, with cash consideration up to $21.00
per share. 182
On November 12, 2015, Polk sent Franklin an offer whereby
Newell would acquire Jarden in a cash-and-stock transaction
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consisting of $20.00 cash plus a fixed exchange ratio of
0.823 Newell shares for each share of Jarden common stock,
representing total per share consideration of $57.00. 183  The
offer reflected an 18% premium over Jarden's then-current
share price ($48.19) and a 19% premium to Jarden's 30-
day volume-weighted average share price ($47.89). Newell
arrived at the cash and stock mix to preserve Newell's
investment grade credit rating and dividend policy. 184  Polk's
offer letter made clear that Newell “expect[ed] that Mr.
Franklin would join the Newell Brands Board of Directors
given the role he has played in Jarden's performance and
strategy to date,” and allowed that Newell was “open to
adjusting the size of our board and taking on a limited number
of [additional] members from Jarden's board.” 185
The Board met that day to discuss Newell's offer. 186  Barclays
made a presentation regarding the adequacy of Newell's
$57.00 offer in which it provided a preliminary valuation
of Jarden based on Jarden's historic market price as well
as comparable companies, precedent transactions and DCF
analyses. 187
While the $57.00 per share offer was higher than Jarden's
stock had ever traded, the Board unanimously decided “it was
not inclined to engage in discussions and possible negotiation
with [Newell] on the economic terms set forth in the [offer]
[l]etter,” and authorized management to “seek to obtain a
revised proposal with more favorable proposed terms.” 188
The Board “emphasized that the Company was not for sale
and that it would consider a potential business combination
with [Newell] only on terms that appropriately valued
the relative contribution (including revenue and EBITDA)
of each standalone company to the pro forma combined
company.” 189
*15  The Board authorized Franklin to continue negotiations
with Newell, but did not authorize him to make a counteroffer
because, as director Robert Wood testified, doing so would
“tie their hands.” 190  Franklin, however, recalled, “the board
basically authorized [him] to go back and have further
discussions and ... push the envelope to try to come back to
them with an enhanced offer from Newell.” 191
During the November 12 Board meeting, Franklin suggested
that the Board formally engage Barclays as the lead banker
for the Company and UBS Group AG as “co-investment
banker.” 192  Jarden thought a transaction of this magnitude
justified having two banks on board to guide the Company
through the process. 193  Barclays, in particular, had a
longstanding, fruitful relationship with Franklin and it knew
Jarden well. 194  Accordingly, Franklin believed Barclays was
positioned to provide Jarden with “genuine good advice” on
the potential merger. 195  And he believed UBS would serve
as a well-informed source for “second opinions.” 196  The
retention of UBS, however, did cause Jarden director Ros
L'Esperance to recuse herself from all deliberations and votes
of the Board, as she led UBS's Client Corporate Solutions
Group. 197
*16  On November 16, 2015, Jarden and Newell, along with
their financial advisors, met to continue negotiations over
the potential transaction. 198  In advance of the meeting with
Newell, the Jarden management team scheduled an evening
Board dinner anticipating there would be new developments
in the negotiations that would require the Board's prompt
attention. 199  In yet another demonstration of Franklin getting
ahead of his Board, Franklin announced to the Newell team
at the outset of the meeting that their $57.00 offer was too
low and then made a counteroffer of $63.00 per share—
$21.00 in cash with the balance in stock of the combined
company. 200  The Newell team balked. Not only did they
decline the counteroffer on the spot, they also refused to raise
their $57.00 offer. 201  Discussions turned “acrimonious” and
the meeting abruptly adjourned. 202
After the meeting, Ashken emailed the Board to advise that
the parties were at impasse and there was no need for the
scheduled Board dinner. 203  According to Ashken, “[a]s far
as we were concerned the deal was dead.” 204
J. Newell Increases Its Offer
On November 21, 2015, Newell submitted a revised offer to
acquire Jarden for $21.00 in cash plus a floating exchange
ratio between 0.85 to 0.92 Newell shares for each Jarden
share to be determined based on Newell's trailing 10-day
unaffected volume weighted average price (“VWAP”) at the
time of signing, with a target price of $60.00 per share. 205
This revised proposal was a 30% premium over Jarden's then-
current stock price ($46.33) and a 27% premium over Jarden's
30-day VWAP ($47.43). Newell reiterated that it expected
the potential merger to produce annual cost synergies of
approximately $500 million. 206  It also renewed its offer for
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Franklin, Ashken, Lillie and a new independent director to
join the board of the combined company. 207
The Board convened the following day to discuss the
$60.00 per share offer. After discussions with its financial
advisers, the Board determined that the offer would be
accepted and that Newell would be granted exclusivity
during a period of confirmatory due diligence. 208  Outside
director Robert Wood testified that the Board viewed the
revised offer “much more favorably,” 209  and explained that
while the Board thought Jarden's forecast of 5% growth
over the next three years was achievable, “the [B]oard's
level of concern [regarding future growth] was higher”
following recent acquisitions. 210  Specifically, the Board had
come to appreciate that Jarden could not sustain historic
growth without pursuing “bigger and bigger acquisitions,”
a strategy the Company had found was increasingly
difficult to execute. 211  As a result, Wood and the other
directors believed the $60.00 offer provided more value
for shareholders than Jarden could deliver as a standalone
company. 212
*17  Franklin believed the $60.00 offer represented a 13.5x
EBITDA multiple, “a high multiple, by any standard, for our
business ... [and] the highest multiple, by far, our company
would have ever traded or been valued.” 213  By way of
comparison, just a few weeks before Newell delivered its
revised offer, Jarden had acquired Jostens for $1.5 billion,
representing a 7.5x EBITDA multiple. 214  The Board also
concluded that Jarden stockholders stood to benefit from any
synergies on top of the $500 million estimate baked into
the purchase price, by remaining invested in the combined
company following the Merger. 215
As noted, the Board agreed to mutual exclusivity. 216  This,
of course, disabled any market check prior to consummation
of the Merger. 217  The Board thought “Newell was the
best and most likely acquirer of our business” and there
were no other “companies that had the same fit in terms
of synergies and ability to pay as Newell.” 218  From the
Board's perspective, Jarden was a “very diverse business”
operating in siloed industries that were not of interest to
other large consumer product companies. 219  Accordingly,
the Board and management understood that Jarden would
likely continue standalone unless a unique opportunity for a
business combination came along. 220  Newell provided that
opportunity.
K. Jarden and Newell Finalize Deal Documents
Over November 29 and 30, 2015, Jarden and Newell
convened at Jarden's Norwalk, Connecticut offices, where
the Newell team continued its diligence and presented its
strategic plan for the combined company. 221  Both Newell
and Jarden knew from the outset that a deal could only be
done if a substantial portion of the consideration was Newell
stock. 222  Because Newell understood this and appreciated
the magnitude and significance of Jarden's assets to the
combined company, Newell committed that certain Jarden
directors would be offered a seat on the Newell board post-
closing. 223  Newell specifically wanted Franklin to sit on the
combined board to provide a positive signal to the market of
his confidence in the future of the combined company. 224
*18  The parties understood that Newell's management team
would lead the combined company since capturing synergies
through the implementation of Project Renewal was the
“logic for the deal.” 225  Franklin, Ashken and Lillie each
were subject to two-year non-competition covenants in event
they were terminated following a change of control. 226
Newell wanted to draw out these non-competition covenants
to four years. 227  It also wanted to have access to Franklin,
Ashken and Lillie as consultants post-closing if needed. 228
Accordingly, Newell, Franklin, Ashken and Lillie negotiated
an “Advisory Services Agreement” that extended their non-
competes but also provided for Mariposa (on behalf of the
three executives) to be paid an annual consulting fee of
$4 million for three years ($12 million in total). 229  The
Advisory Services Agreement provided that Mariposa “shall,
upon the request of [Newell], devote up to an average of 120
hours per fiscal quarter” to Newell, and that Franklin and
Ashken waived “any and all fees and compensation” they
would have ordinarily received as directors of Newell during
the term of the agreement. 230
L. The Leak
On December 7, 2015, The Wall Street Journal reported
that Newell and Jarden were discussing a potential business
combination, though the article did not reveal the specifics
of who would be buying whom or the transaction
consideration. 231  In reaction to this news, Newell's shares
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traded up 7.4%, closing at $48.16 and Jarden's shares traded
up 3.7%, closing at $50.09. 232
Following the leak, and resulting impact on the companies'
stock prices, the parties agreed that it no longer made sense
to calculate the final exchange ratio based upon the 10-
day trailing VWAP as of the day of signing. 233  Ashken
contacted Tarchetti to re-negotiate and the parties ultimately
settled on a fixed ratio of 0.862, 234  resulting in total merger
consideration at that time of $60.03 based upon Newell's
closing stock price on December 11, 2015. 235
The 10-day trailing VWAP through the last unaffected day
prior to the leak, was $44.60. 236  If Jarden held firm to the
original agreement, on top of the $21.00 in cash, Jarden
stockholders would have received 0.874 shares of Newell
stock for every share of Jarden stock they owned. 237  In other
words, Jarden stockholders would have received $120 million
more in consideration if not for the renegotiation.
M. Jarden and Newell Stockholders Approve the
Merger
*19  On December 10, 2015, the Board met to discuss
the status of negotiations and to assess whether the
transaction continued to make sense. Lillie opened the
meeting by presenting the 2015 estimated financial results
that demonstrated 4.4% growth in organic net sales over
2014. 238  Barclays also presented a summary of the
transaction's proposed terms and an analysis of Jarden's
standalone value. 239  The meeting minutes emphasize that
“the Company has not been and is not currently for sale and
that remaining independent (as a standalone entity) is the
sole alternative to the proposed business combination with
Newell, which offers unique revenue and cost synergies and
long-term value accretion opportunities for the Company's
stockholders.” 240
Jarden's negotiating team had been discussing change of
control payments with Newell for several weeks but raised
the subject with the Board for the first time at the December
10 meeting. 241  Ashken recommended to the Board that he,
Franklin and Lillie receive their 2017 and 2018 Restricted
Stock Awards (“RSAs”) should the transaction with Newell
be approved. 242  The RSAs would not have been due
under the existing employment agreements but Franklin's
team instructed Barclays to include the RSAs in the shares
outstanding calculation used for its valuation analyses of
the transaction and they had already presented that share
calculation to Newell. 243  John Capps, Jarden's General
Counsel, advised the Board that Jarden was legally obligated
to grant the RSAs even though the agreements themselves
were, at best, ambiguous on the point. 244  Ultimately, the
Board's Compensation Committee recommended that the
Board award the 2017 and 2018 RSAs. 245
The Board met next on December 13, 2015. Barclays
presented the revised proposed deal terms and its revised
valuation of Jarden as a standalone company. 246  Barclays
also orally presented its opinion that the proposed merger
was fair from a financial point of view to Jarden and its
stockholders. 247  After hearing from Barclays and reviewing
the final deal terms, the Board approved the Merger. 248
The Board also approved the separation agreements and
amendments to the employment agreements with Franklin,
Ashken and Lillie. 249  The final Merger Agreement provided
that Jarden stockholders would receive 0.862 shares of
Newell stock plus $21.00 in cash for each Jarden share,
representing a value as of signing of $60.03. 250
*20  The Newell board also met on December 13 to consider
the final transaction terms and to receive Goldman and
Centerview's final presentations. 251  In their analyses, both
Goldman and Centerview used five-year projections for
Jarden, assuming 3.1% revenue growth during FY18–20,
consistent with the Lender Presentation and below the 5%
revenue growth forecast in the November Projections. 252
Goldman maintained its estimate of $500 million in annual
cost synergies. 253  Centerview estimated $500–$700 million
in synergies. 254  After the presentations by its advisors,
the Newell board approved the terms of the final Merger
Agreement and the parties announced the Merger. 255
N. The Market Reacts
The Merger announcement, released on December 14, 2015,
stated “[Newell] anticipates incremental annualized cost
synergies of approximately $500 million over four years.” 256
In response to the announcement, Jarden's stock price closed
at $54.09, roughly 12% above the unaffected trading price
of $48.31 from December 4, 2015. 257  The delta between
Jarden's stock price and the implied Merger Price (i.e.,
the merger arbitrage spread) slowly narrowed following the
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announcement and ultimately converged in the days leading
up to the closing. 258
Newell's stock price rose 7.4% on December 7, 2015,
when financial media outlets first reported the parties were
negotiating. 259  When the final terms of the transaction
were made public on December 14, 2015, however, Newell's
stock price declined by 6.9% to $42.15. 260  After accounting
for market fluctuations, Newell's stock price after the
announcement of the Merger terms reflected, at best, a neutral
market response. 261
On February 26, 2016, Jarden reported its 2015 year-end
results, including a considerable loss in operating income and
net income as compared to the prior two years. 262  A few days
later, on February 29, 2016, Lillie shared weak results for the
first quarter of 2016 with the Board. 263  Lillie also shared the
final 2016 budget, which was adjusted downward to reflect
year-end revenue of $9.79 billion (as compared to the $10.15
billion in the November Projections). 264
*21  During March and April 2016, before the Merger
closed, Jarden management prepared updated multi-year
projections for the period 2016 to 2020 (the “April
Projections”). 265  The original version of the April
Projections reflected a “bottoms up build” from the business
units and forecast a 4.4% compound annual revenue growth
rate. 266  This was well below the 5.0% forecast in the
November Projections. 267
Jarden and Newell stockholders voted to approve the Merger
on April 15, 2016. 268  As of the closing, the mix of cash and
Newell shares valued Jarden at $59.21 per share. 269
O. Post-Closing
By January 2016, Bain shortened the time Newell would
realize $500 million in recurring annual cost synergies from
four years to three. 270  By May 2016, Bain raised its
projection of potential cost savings to a range of $900 million
to $1 billion. 271  In February 2017, Newell announced it
would meet the initial estimate of $500 million in annual
cost synergies by Q3 2018, and doubled the size of its total
cost synergy target from $500 million to $1 billion, to be
reached by 2021. 272  Newell also announced its intention to
divest several businesses—both historical Jarden and Newell
—and to exit certain product lines. 273  In early 2018, Newell
announced it would sell businesses accounting for almost
50% of its customer base and approximately one-third of its
revenue. 274
The Jarden/Newell integration did not go smoothly. 275
Newell Brands (the combined company) faced an uphill
battle with the divestitures of highly-profitable and valuable
businesses. 276  In early 2018, Franklin resigned from
the Newell Brands board in spectacular fashion, publicly
proclaiming that Polk was “ruining the company” and calling
for Polk's ouster. 277  Ashken, L'Esperance and long-time
Newell director, Dominico De Sole, left the Newell Brands
board soon after. 278
*22  After leaving, Franklin, Ashken and Lillie united with
Starboard Value LP, an activist hedge fund, to advance a
slate of directors to challenge the Newell Brands board. 279
Carl Icahn entered the mix and ultimately was successful
in placing his slate of five directors on the Newell Brands
board, thereby effectively ending the Franklin/Starboard-led
challenge. 280  In the fallout of the proxy contest, Tarchetti,
President of Newell Brands, resigned. 281
P. Procedural Posture
Between June 14, 2016 and August 12, 2016, four petitions
for appraisal were filed in connection with the Merger. 282
By order of the Court dated October 3, 2016, the four
appraisal actions were consolidated. 283  On July 5, 2017,
Merion Capital LP, Merion Capital II LP and Merion
Capital ERISA LP were dismissed from the consolidated
action after reaching settlement agreements with Jarden. 284
On July 7, 2017, Dunham Monthly Distribution Fund,
WCM Alternatives: Event-Driven Fund, Westchester Merger
Arbitrage Strategy sleeve of the JNL Multi-Manager
Alternative Fund, JNL/Westchester Capital Even Driven
Fund, WCM Master Trust, The Merger Fund, The Merger
Fund VL and SCA JP Morgan Westchester were also
dismissed, again after reaching settlement agreements with
Jarden. 285
The Court held a four-day trial in June 2018. Three experts
testified. For Petitioners, Dr. Mark Zmijewski evaluated the
standalone value of Jarden on the Merger Date by conducting
a market multiples analysis and a DCF analysis, ultimately
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relying on his multiples (comparable company) analysis for
his fair value conclusion. He opined that Jarden's fair value on
the Merger Date was $71.35 per share. Dr. Zmijewski holds
the Charles T. Horngren Professorship at the University of
Chicago Booth School of Business.
For Respondent, Dr. Glenn Hubbard evaluated the standalone
value of Jarden on the Merger Date by analyzing market
evidence, including Jarden's unaffected market price and
the Merger Price less synergies, and traditional valuation
methodologies, including comparable companies and DCF.
Based on his DCF analysis, which he correlated to the market
evidence, Dr. Hubbard opined that Jarden's fair value on the
Merger Date was $48.01 per share. Dr. Hubbard holds the
Russell L. Carson Professorship in Finance and Economics
in the Graduate School of Business of Columbia University,
where he is also the Dean. 286
Respondent also presented the testimony of Dr. Marc Zenner,
a retired investment banker. Dr. Zenner testified that the
projected synergies estimates reported in the joint proxy
statement issued by Jarden and Newell in connection with
the Merger were conservative and that the synergies were
taken by Jarden stockholders. He also opined that the Board's
decision not to hold an auction for Jarden was reasonable
because Jarden's size and diverse product portfolio made it
unlikely that a merger partner more suitable than Newell
would have emerged.
*23  Following post-trial briefing and argument, the Court
wrote to the parties, as previewed at the conclusion of post-
trial oral argument, to advise that it would postpone the
issuance of its post-trial opinion in this case until our Supreme
Court issued its decision in Aruba. 287  The parties submitted
brief (and unsolicited) letters regarding Aruba on April 30
and May 1, 2019, at which time the matter was submitted for
decision.
II. ANALYSIS
Delaware's appraisal statute, 8 Del. C. § 262(h) provides, in
part:
Through [the appraisal] proceeding,
the Court shall determine the fair
value of the shares exclusive of any
element of value arising from the
accomplishment or expectation of the
merger or consolidation, together with
interest, if any, to be paid upon the
amount determined to be the fair
value. In determining such fair value,
the Court shall take into account all
relevant factors. 288
“Section 262(h) unambiguously calls upon the Court of
Chancery to perform an independent evaluation of ‘fair value’
at the time of a transaction ... [and] vests the Chancellor and
Vice Chancellors with significant discretion to consider ‘all
relevant factors’ and determine the going concern value of
the underlying company.” 289  “By instructing the court to
‘take into account all relevant factors’ in determining fair
value, the statute requires the Court of Chancery to give
fair consideration to ‘proof of value by any techniques or
methods which are generally considered acceptable in the
financial community and otherwise admissible in court.’ ” 290
Since “ ‘[e]very company is different; [and] every merger
is different,’ the appraisal endeavor is ‘by design, a flexible
process.’ ” 291
I have carefully considered all relevant factors. I have
weighed those factors according to the credible evidence
in the record and applied “accepted financial principles” as
derived from that evidence. 292  To follow is my independent
evaluation of Jarden's fair value as informed by my findings
of fact.
A. Merger Price Less Synergies
Respondent has proffered the Merger Price less synergies
as a reliable indicator of fair value, and for good reason.
Our Supreme Court has stated, “a buyer in possession of
material nonpublic information about the seller is in a strong
position (and is uniquely incentivized) to properly value the
seller when agreeing to buy the company at a particular deal
price, and that view of value should be given considerable
weight by the Court of Chancery absent deficiencies in
the deal process.” 293  This court has heeded the Supreme
Court's guidance and regularly rests its appraisal analysis
on the premise that when a transaction price represents
an unhindered, informed and competitive market valuation,
that price “is at least first among equals of valuation
methodologies in deciding fair value.” 294
- 195 - 
In re Appraisal of Jarden Corporation, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
2019 WL 3244085
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 14
In PetSmart, I observed, “[a]fter years of striving for it, Vince
Lombardi finally arrived at the understanding that perfection
in human endeavors is not attainable.” 295  “Even in the best
case, a process to facilitate the sale of a company, constructed
as it must be by the humans who manage the company and
their human advisors, will not be perfect.” 296  With that said,
I am mindful of our Supreme Court's guidance in Dell, where
the Court observed that certain factors, including “fair play,
low barriers to entry, [and] outreach to all logical buyers,”
are reflective of the kind of “robust sale process” that will
discover a company's fair value. 297
*24  The “sale process” for Jarden, if one can call it that,
raises concerns. To be sure, there was no need for a full-blown
auction of Jarden. In this regard, Dr. Zenner's testimony,
corroborated by other evidence, was credible. 298  Moreover,
there were signs of arms-length, provocative negotiating
between Jarden and Newell. 299  This is not surprising given
that Jarden's negotiators owned millions of Jarden's shares
and had every incentive to negotiate a good deal. 300  But the
evidence revealed a troubling theme. Franklin immediately
took charge and, consistent with a stereotypical “cut to the
chase” CEO mentality, 301  he laid Jarden's cards on the table
before the negotiations began in earnest and before the Board
and its financial advisors had a chance to formulate a plan.
Petitioners are right to complain that Franklin's approach may
well have set an artificial ceiling on what Newell was willing
to pay.
Franklin did not inform the Board he was meeting with
Polk at the Back-to-School Meeting or the Boat Meeting,
and he certainly did not receive authority from the Board
to suggest a price (“beginning with a 6”) at which the
Board might agree to sell the Company. 302  Franklin made
counteroffers unauthorized by the Board. 303  He negotiated
his change-in-control compensation with no authorization
from (or knowledge of) the Board. 304  And he recommended
Barclays as the lead financial advisor for the deal without fully
disclosing his prior substantial relationship with the bank, just
as he nudged the Board to hire UBS as a second banker as a
“kiss” in gratitude for its prior uncompensated work for the
Company. 305
*25  As factfinder, these flaws in the sale process, coupled
with the fact that there was no effort to test the Merger
Price through any post-signing market check, raise legitimate
questions regarding the usefulness of the Merger Price as an
indicator of fair value. 306  As explained below, the difficulty
in assessing the extent to which Newell ceded synergies to
Jarden in the Merger makes the Merger Price less synergies
an even less reliable indicator of fair value.
In Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software Inc., the court
set forth a useful framework to approach the appraisal
statute's mandate that the court appraise “the fair value
of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger
or consolidation.” 307  BMC recommends a “two-step
analysis[:]” “first, were synergies realized from the deal; and
if so, were they captured by the sellers in the deal price?” 308
There is no dispute here that synergies were realized in the
Merger, as one would expect when two strategic partners
combine. 309  Indeed, the synergies created the “logic for the
deal” from Newell's perspective. 310  The first announcement
of the Merger stated, “[Newell] anticipates incremental
annualized cost synergies of approximately $500 million over
four years.” 311  This remained the case through the release of
the joint proxy statement. 312  Internally, Newell believed the
$500 million estimate was conservative. 313  Nevertheless, the
experts have focused on the expected synergies as disclosed
in the joint proxy statement ($500 million), and they have
assumed that estimate is accurate. 314  In the absence of any
real expert analysis of the issue, I have no basis in the evidence
to depart from that assumption.
As for whether Jarden captured the synergies in the Merger,
the evidence is less clear. There is evidence in the trial record
that would suggest Newell believed it was not paying any of
the synergies at the $59.21 per share Merger Price. 315  During
negotiations, Polk told his board that if Newell could “get the
deal done between $60 and $65 [per share], we are basically
getting the synergies with no value ascribed to them.” 316
After the Merger, Polk further suggested that the premium
over market price that Newell paid in the Merger was not
for synergies but instead was for control of the combined
company. 317  Polk explained, “Jarden shareholders get a
premium versus their current stock price for [Jarden]. The
Newell shareholders get ownership of [Jarden], and after the
synergies are delivered, the future value creation that comes
through the new combination.” 318  Even Franklin questioned
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whether the premium to market price that Newell paid was
for control of the combined entity. 319
*26  On the other hand, Jarden points out that there is
evidence Newell was keenly aware of synergies and that
it was incorporating synergies into its value thesis for the
Merger. 320  Dr. Hubbard supported Jarden's view of the
evidence that Jarden stockholders realized the value of the
synergies by conducting two separate analyses. First, he
performed a “discounted value of cash flows” analysis, in
which the expected future cash flows from the synergies
(net of the costs to achieve them) were discounted to their
value as of the Merger Date, to conclude that the synergies
had a value of $4.2 billion, or $17.43 per Jarden share.
This happens to line up nicely with the delta between
the unaffected market price ($48.31) and the Merger Price
($59.21), indicating that the delta, or premium, represented
expected synergies. 321  He then prepared a market-based
analysis of the expected synergy value in which he observed
that the rise in stock price of both companies after the leak
of merger negotiations revealed that the market appreciated
the presence of significant synergies. The fact that Newell's
stock price fell when Jarden's rose after announcement of the
Merger indicates the market appreciated that the anticipated
synergies would accrue to the Jarden stockholders. 322
Jarden bears the burden of demonstrating “what, if any,
portion of [the synergies] value was included in the price-per-
share ....” 323  The evidence on this point stands in equipoise.
It is difficult to square Polk's contemporaneous assessment
of where the synergies would land with Newell's internal
valuation exercises and Dr. Hubbard's straightforward
analysis of the issue. Given the state of the evidence, I give
little weight to the Merger Price less synergies evidence
when assessing fair value. 324  Not because I believe the
Merger created no synergies. And not because I believe that
Jarden stockholders probably did not receive the value of the
synergies that were created by the deal. I place less weight on
this market-based valuation approach in this case because the
sales process was not well-conceived or well-executed and
the expert analysis of the transaction synergies raised more
questions than it answered.
B. Unaffected Market Price
Jarden has proffered its unaffected stock trading price, $48.31
per share (the “Unaffected Market Price”), as strong evidence
of the Company's fair value. 325  According to Jarden, “[t]his
value impounded the collective judgments of thousands of
stockholders, as well as the more than twenty professional
analysts that followed Jarden.” 326  Jarden supports its
position that the Unaffected Market Price is indicative of fair
value with detailed analysis from Dr. Hubbard. 327  Petitioners
elected not to counter that evidence with expert evidence
of their own. 328  Instead, they attacked Dr. Hubbard's
opinion as lacking in doctrinal and factual foundation. For
reasons explained below, I find Dr. Hubbard's analysis of the
reliability of Jarden's Unaffected Market Price as an indicator
of fair value both credible and persuasive.
1. The Market for Jarden's Stock Was Efficient
*27  In an efficient stock market, “a company's market price
quickly reflects publicly available information.” 329  In this
environment, the company's trading price “balances investors'
willingness to buy and sell the shares in light of [available]
information, and thus represents their consensus view as to
the value of the equity in the company.” 330  Efficient markets
aggregate all available information and quickly digest new
information, which is then reflected by proportionate changes
in market price. 331  When the market is efficient, the trading
price of a company's stock can be a proxy for fair value. 332
As Dr. Hubbard explained, several factors support the
conclusion that Jarden's stock traded in a semi-strong efficient
market. 333  The stock was traded on the New York Stock
Exchange (“NYSE”) and Jarden became a member of
the S&P 400 index in 2012. 334  In 2015, Jarden's shares
traded with a daily and weekly average trading volume in
the top 25% of the S&P 500. 335  High trading volume
contributes to the efficiency of the market. 336  Jarden's
market capitalization of approximately $10.2 billion placed
it in the top 20% of all publicly traded firms. 337  High
market capitalization leads to greater “interest in the security
being analyzed,” which, in turn, “increases the likelihood that
new information will be quickly incorporated into the stock
price.” 338
Jarden had no controlling shareholder. 339  In fact, Jarden
had a 94% public float. 340  A high public float is another
factor indicating an efficient market for Jarden's stock
because the more holders of a security that are not insiders
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with access to non-public information, the more likely
the market will demand that information be released for
public consumption. 341  Jarden stock exhibited a “bid-ask
spread” of only 0.02%. 342  A narrow bid-ask spread indicates
minimal information asymmetry between insiders and the
public markets and, as a result, higher market efficiency. 343
Approximately twenty professional market analysts covered
and disseminated reports on Jarden in the year prior to
the Merger Date. 344  Jarden exhibited no serial correlation,
meaning there were no patterns detached from events or
news from the Company that would enable the market
to divine future price movements based purely on past
performance. 345  Additionally, Jarden's Unaffected Market
Price aligned with options market pricing, suggesting there
were no arbitrage opportunities for Jarden stock. 346
*28  Dr. Hubbard summarized the factors allowing him to
conclude that Jarden's stock traded in a semi-strong efficient
market in a helpful chart:
For context, and to illustrate that Jarden's stock price
historically reacted appropriately to material information, Dr.
Hubbard performed an event study to trace how, in the two
years prior to the Merger, Jarden's stock price responded
quickly and appropriately to earnings announcements and
other performance guidance, even when the news was
unanticipated. 347  In each instance, Dr. Hubbard traced the
public disclosure of material information, the reaction of
analysts to the information and the commensurate adjustment,
up or down depending upon whether the news was positive or
negative, in the trading price of the stock. 348
The evidence shows that Jarden's stock reached a pre-Merger
peak of $56.25 on July 20, 2015, and then declined gradually
over the next few months in response to poor earnings
reports. 349  The decline was marked by low quarterly growth
and it prompted Jarden to lower its guidance for the second
and third quarters of 2015. 350  Jarden's stock price recovered
somewhat in the fourth quarter and closed at $48.31 on
December 4, 2015 (i.e., the Unaffected Market Price). 351
After The Wall Street Journal article reported on the merger
negotiations the following Monday, Jarden's stock price rose
and continued to rise to $54.09 on December 14, 2015, the
day Jarden and Newell officially announced the Merger. 352
The steady climb continued following the announcement and
then plateaued before the calendar year ended. 353  Jarden's
stock price oscillated between $59.00 and $50.00 until early
March 2016. 354  In March, as the negotiations finalized and
the Merger Date neared, Jarden's share price approached
but never exceeded the Merger Price of $59.21. 355  As Dr.
Hubbard explained:
The fact that Jarden's stock price
never closed above the Merger Price
is a strong indicator that fair value is
no greater than the Merger Price. If
investors believed that the Company
was worth materially more, then one
would expect to see the market
price exceeding the Merger Price in
anticipation of a topping bid. In more
than five percent of M&A deals since
2001, the merger arbitrage spread the
day after the merger announcement
was negative, implying that the market
expected a topping bid. 356
Newell's stock also traded in an efficient market and the
market's reaction to the announcement of the Merger with
respect to Newell's trading price provides further evidence
that the Unaffected Market Price is reflective of Jarden's
fair value. 357  Newell's stock price jumped after the leak of
negotiations when the terms of the deal were unknown. 358
The market reacted differently, however, when the terms of
the Merger were announced. Newell's stock price dropped
significantly (6.9%). Dr. Hubbard explained the significance:
“The initial positive reaction to the deal rumors suggests
that the market was hopeful that some value would accrue
to Newell, but after learning the terms of the deal and
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additional information about synergies, the market reassessed
and shifted the value from Newell to Jarden.” 359
*29  After carefully reviewing the evidence, I am satisfied
that Jarden's Unaffected Market Price is a powerful indicator
of Jarden's fair value on the Merger Date. Petitioners' attempts
to undermine this evidence, as explained below, were not
persuasive.
2. Petitioners Did Not Persuasively
Rebut Jarden's Market Evidence
Petitioners mount three challenges to the reliability of
Jarden's Unaffected Market Price: (a) as of the date fixed
for the Unaffected Market Price (December 4, 2015), the
market lacked material information concerning Jarden (i.e.,
information asymmetry) that skewed the trading price; (b) the
Unaffected Market Price must be adjusted to account for a
so-called “conglomerate discount” and a “minority discount;”
and (c) the Unaffected Market Price was stale by the time the
Merger closed on April 15, 2016. 360  I address each in turn.
a. Information Asymmetry
According to Dr. Zmijewski, Jarden's market-based evidence
should be disregarded because the market lacked material
information as of the date fixed for Jarden's Unaffected
Market Price. 361  Dr. Zmijewski cited the decline in the
federal risk-free rate, the rise in Jarden's share price and the
divergence between Jarden management and market analysts'
projections for Jarden's future performance as reasons the
Unaffected Market Price was not a reliable indicator of
fair value. 362  Importantly, Dr. Zmijewski also observed
that Jarden stockholders had no access to the November
Projections as of the date fixed for the Unaffected Market
Price. The evidence supports the factual predicates for these
observations, but it does not support a conclusion that the
absent facts resulted in the kind of information asymmetry
that would render the Unaffected Market Price unreliable.
As for the decline in the federal risk-free rate, Dr. Zmijewski
states that, “[a]ll else equal, the decline in the risk-free rate
results in an increase in Jarden's Fair Value,” and goes on
to argue that because the federal risk-free rate declined from
December 2015 to April 2016, Jarden's fair value must be
higher than the Unaffected Market Price. 363  Interest rates
on U.S. Treasury 20-year constant maturity bills declined
19%, from 2.65% to 2.14%, between December 4, 2015 and
April 15, 2016. 364  Dr. Hubbard conceded that, if “all else”
were, in fact, “equal,” as Dr. Zmijewski posited, then Jarden's
fair value would increase as the risk-free rate decreased. 365
But then Dr. Hubbard exposed the flaw in Dr. Zmijewski's
elephant-sized assumption that “all else” remained “equal.”
Specifically, Dr. Hubbard referred directly to market data
showing that, as the interest rate on 20-Year Treasury Bonds
declined between December 2015 and April 2016, stock
prices in general, represented by the S&P 500 Market Index,
did not increase in response. 366  Contrary to Dr. Zmijewski's
“all else equal” assumption, the evidence shows that the stock
market declined just as the risk-free rate declined. 367  In other
words, the correlation that supports the supposed information
asymmetry is no correlation at all.
*30  Regarding the lack of consensus between Jarden
management and third-party analysts' projections, Dr.
Hubbard emphasized the qualitative difference between
unvarnished raw information tracking Jarden's performance
and well-reasoned opinions about Jarden's prospects. 368
Jarden's revenue projections for 2016, 2017, and 2018
were 1.0%, 1.7% and 2.6% higher, respectively, than
financial analysts' consensus forecast. 369  Jarden's EBITDA
projections for 2016, 2017 and 2018 were 1.3%, 6.6% and
9.0% higher, respectively, than financial analysts' consensus
forecasts. Jarden's November Projections incorporated this
data but were not released to the public until March 2016, and
thus would not have been incorporated into the Unaffected
Market Price. 370  But is this evidence of information
asymmetry? Dr. Hubbard hypothesized the answer is no. 371
To test his hypothesis, Dr. Hubbard turned to his event
study. The November Projections were disclosed in the joint
proxy in March 2016. If the November Projections revealed
information not previously incorporated in Jarden's stock
price, Hubbard reasoned, then both Jarden and Newell's stock
price should have proportionately reflected that information.
In other words, if the November Projections justified more
value (according to Dr. Zmijewski substantially more value),
then Newell's stock price should have increased substantially
to reflect that Newell was acquiring Jarden at less than fair
value. 372  But, of course, that is not what happened; Jarden's
stock price climbed while Newell's stock price dropped. 373
Moreover, Jarden's April Projections lowered the Company's
financial guidance to forecasts more in line with the analysts'
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earlier projections. 374  Dr. Hubbard persuasively opined that
the April Projection's convergence with the analysts' forecasts
was a strong indication that the difference between the
November Projections (as disclosed in the joint proxy) and
the analysts' projections was not attributable to unreasonable
market pessimism, but instead showed that market analysts
had more accurately estimated Jarden's 2016 outlook than
Jarden's management (who may have been motivated by
factors other than actual anticipated results when making their
forecasts). 375
The credible evidence reflects no information asymmetry.
The market was well informed and the Unaffected Market
Price reflects all material information.
b. The Conglomerate and Minority Discounts
Dr. Zmijewski also criticizes Dr. Hubbard's Unaffected
Market Price analysis because it does not account for Jarden's
massively diversified portfolio of operating companies (the
conglomerate discount) and does not adjust for embedded
agency costs (the minority discount). 376  Here again, Dr.
Zmijewski flags the issues but makes no attempt to quantify
their impact, if any. 377
*31  As for the conglomerate discount, the evidence does not
support that this is even “a thing,” meaning it is not clear that
this notion is accepted within the academy or among valuation
professionals. 378  With that said, there is evidence that
Jarden's unique structure and diversified portfolio did pose
valuation challenges. Newell's Tarchetti described Jarden as
a “fast-changing company” that was difficult to appraise, in
part, due to its complexity and tendency to grow and evolve
at any point in time. 379  Even so, the Company's high trading
volume and the intense scrutiny paid it by market analysts
has convinced me that the market understood Jarden's holding
company structure as an operative reality, considered the high
overhead costs associated with decentralized management
and imputed those factors into Jarden's Unaffected Market
Price. 380
The minority discount, likewise, does not fit here. For a
company without a controlling stockholder, the premise is that
the appraiser must consider the conflict of interest between
Company management and a diffuse stockholder base and
account for minority trading multiples. 381  Setting aside
that Petitioners have offered no credible evidentiary basis
to quantify any minority discount here, I see no basis to
even try given that the foundation for applying the discount
has not been laid. Jarden's management was well known
to stockholders and well known to the market. But for the
Merger, they were not going anywhere as the Company
was not for sale. 382  As Dr. Hubbard explained, under
these circumstances, Jarden's agency costs were embedded
in its operative reality and reflected in its Unaffected Market
Price. 383
c. Staleness of the Unaffected Market Price
Petitioners also argue that the Unaffected Market Price was
stale as of the Merger Date. 384  I disagree. There is no
evidence to suggest that Jarden gained value from the date set
for the Unaffected Market Price and the closing of the Merger,
or that the market was deprived of information that might
have been perceived as enhancing value. Indeed, following
a period where Jarden had been especially acquisitive, the
Company was experiencing declines in operating income
and net income and management was giving the Board
revised, more conservative projections for 2016. 385  The
April Projections forecasted reduced revenue growth and
increased working capital investment for FY17–20. 386  This
is not a case where the credible evidence reveals that the
Unaffected Market Price was demonstrably below Jarden's
fair value as of the Merger.
* * * * * * * * * *
After carefully considering the evidence, I find that the
Unaffected Market Price is a reliable indicator of Jarden's
value as a going concern on the Merger Date. I have given it
substantial weight in my assessment of fair value.
C. The Other Market Evidence
As Jarden was negotiating with Newell, it was also pursuing
an acquisition of Jostens. To raise capital for that deal, Jarden
initiated a share offering priced at $49.00 per share. 387  At
the time, the stock was trading in the mid-$40s. 388  When the
market reacted poorly to the Jostens acquisition, and the stock
price fell, the Board believed it needed to send a signal that the
Company and its management were optimistic about Jostens.
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So it authorized a $50 million stock buyback, 389  and it set the
price cap again at $49.00 because, after internal assessments,
it believed that price reflected Jarden's value. 390  Ultimately,
Jarden repurchased 276,417 shares on November 2, 2015, at
an average price of $45.96 per share, and another 775,685
shares on November 3, 2015, at an average price of $48.05
per share. 391  This evidence is by no means dispositive. But
it is persuasive evidence that, in the weeks leading up to the
leak of the merger negotiations, uncluttered by transactional
or forensic incentives, both the Company and the market saw
Jarden's value well below what Petitioners seek here.
D. Comparable Companies
*32  Both parties' experts performed comparable companies
analyses to estimate Jarden's value relative to sets of proposed
peer firms. Applying his comparable companies analysis, Dr.
Zmijewski concluded that Jarden's fair value on the Merger
Date, based on Jarden's 2016 forecasted EBITDA using the
90th, 75th and 50th percentiles of his peer set, was $81.44,
$70.49 and $66.30, respectively. 392  Based on Jarden's 2017
forecasted EBITDA, the market multiples based-valuation
using the 90th, 75th and 50th percentiles of his peer set,
revealed a per share value of $77.39, $72.20 and $65.56,
respectively. 393  For his part, Dr. Hubbard disclaimed the
efficacy of a comparable companies valuation for Jarden, but
then performed his own comparable analysis for the sake
of completeness, resulting in a value range of $40.12 to
$55.21 per share. 394  Before addressing the experts' divergent
analyses and conclusions, it is useful to review basic concepts,
separated from forensics.
1. The Comparable Companies Methodology
As a threshold matter, before a comparable companies
multiples analysis can be undertaken with any measure
of reliability, it is necessary to establish a suitable peer
group through appropriate empirical analysis. 395  In fact,
nearly every text in the record states that the accuracy of a
multiples-based valuation depends entirely on the existence
of comparable peers:
• Holthausen & Zmijewski (JX 242): “While selecting
comparable companies might not appear to be too
difficult, we often quickly conclude that not many, if
any, companies are truly comparable to the company we
are valuing for purposes of a market multiple valuation
once we understand all the different dimensions of
comparability and begin to analyze the potential
comparable companies ... simply selecting close
competitors is not sufficient to ensure the companies
are comparable, as we observe a substantial amount of
variation in multiples within an industry.” 396
• Koller (JX 2516): “Selecting the right peer group is
critical to coming up with a reasonable valuation using
multiples.” 397
• Damodaran (JX 2515): “... finding similar and
comparable firms is often a challenge, and frequently we
have to accept firms that are different from the firm being
valued on one dimension or the other. When this is the
case, we have to either explicitly or implicitly control for
differences across firms on growth, risk, and cash flow
measures.” 398
• Berk & DeMarzo (JX 2032): “Of course, firms are not
identical. Thus, the usefulness of a valuation multiple
will depend on the nature of the differences between
firms and the sensitivity of the multiples to these
differences.” 399
McKinsey recommends beginning the peer group
identification process with the Standard Industrial
Classification (“SIC”) or Global Industry Classification
Standard (“GICS”) codes. 400  While these codes are a good
starting point for selecting a peer group, the industry-specific
company lists they produce require significant refinement to
identify truly comparable firms. 401
To isolate a relevant peer group from a larger industry data
set, the appraiser must identify firms with similar risk profiles,
costs of capital, return on invested capital and growth. 402  It
is better to have a smaller number of peers that truly compete
in the same markets with similar products than including
aspirational or nearly comparable companies. 403  In order
effectively to narrow down a list of potential comparables
according to growth and risk, the analysis must consider
whether the companies have similar “value drivers” as the
target. 404  As Dr. Zmijewski described in his text:
*33  [A] company's product lines,
customer types, market segments,
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types of operation, and so forth are
all important aspects to consider when
we identify comparable companies.
Even after all these are taken into
consideration, two companies can be
in the same industry yet not be
comparable on all of the characteristics
that are important for a market
multiple valuation. 405
In addition, the finance literature advises against relying
on peers provided by the target company's management.
This reasoning reflects common sense; optimistic executives
often provide “aspirational peers” rather than companies that
actually compete head-to-head with their firm. 406
The importance of selecting a proper peer set in the
performance of a proper comparable companies analysis
cannot be overstated. Because this threshold task is so
important, and yet so difficult, the valuation treatises
generally view the comparable companies methodology as
inferior to other methodologies: “a key shortcoming of the
comparables approach is that it does not take into account
the important differences among firms,” therefore “[u]sing
a valuation multiple based on comparables is best viewed
as a ‘shortcut’ to the discounted cash flow methods of
valuation.” 407
If, and only if, a proper peer set can be selected, the
next step in the comparable companies analysis is to select
an appropriate multiple and then determine where on the
distribution of peers the target company falls. 408  The
Enterprise Value to EBITDA multiples valuation (“EV/
EBITDA”) is widely accepted as the most reliable data set
for a comparable companies analysis. 409  In this regard,
it appears that the preference is to use forward-looking
projections instead of a firm's historical earnings data. 410
Forward-looking multiples are deemed more consistent with
the principles of valuation, especially in the context of
estimating the present value of a company as a going
concern. 411  Projections generally exhibit less variation
across peer companies compared to historical data, and
although long-term earnings projections are favored, one- and
two-year forecasts are reliable when they uniformly represent
the firm's long-term prospects. 412
*34  With these generally accepted features of a proper
comparable companies valuation in mind, I turn to the experts'
comparable companies valuation of Jarden.
2. The Experts Attempt But
Fail to Select a Valid Peer Set
Both experts developed their peer set by drawing from the
peer set developed by Barclays in its valuation work for
the Company with regard to the Merger. They then made
adjustments based on their own sense of comparability.
For his part, Dr. Zmijewski conceded that he “did not
do any qualitative assessment of any inherent differences
between the Jarden business and the business of its
peers companies.” 413  Giving such deference to the peer
set selected by management, without any meaningful,
independent assessment of comparability, is not useful and,
frankly, not credible. 414  Dr. Zmijewski made no mention of
GICS or SIC codes in his report and there is no indication
that he employed them, or any other objective criteria, in his
selection of a peer set. 415
Failing to ground his peer set in any objective methodology
is all the more problematic given Dr. Zmijewski's apparent
willingness to adjust the management/Barclays' peer set when
it suited him to yield a higher valuation for Jarden. As
stated in his report, Dr. Zmijewski excluded Kimberly-Clark
Corporation and Colgate-Palmolive Company, which were
both included in the Barclays list, because both companies
maintain a significantly larger market capitalization than
Jarden and the other comparables. 416  The notion that a
company with a very large market capitalization is not a
true peer of a company with a relatively smaller market
capitalization has a certain lay appeal. But Dr. Zmijewski's
own text makes clear that “there is no theoretical model
we are aware of that includes size as a determinant of
market multiples.” 417  It may well be that Kimberly-Clark
and Colgate-Palmolive are not “comparables” for Jarden, but
the absence of any meaningful analysis or explanation in Dr.
Zmijewski's report leaves the Court with no way to determine
if the exclusion was arbitrary or principled. 418
*35  Before addressing Dr. Hubbard's peer set, it must
be emphasized that Dr. Hubbard does not sponsor the
comparable companies methodology as the appropriate
means by which to assess Jarden's fair value. 419  His
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preferred methodology is DCF. 420  Nevertheless, Dr.
Hubbard engaged with Dr. Zmijewski on comparable
companies and, not surprisingly, reached a very different
conclusion after doing so.
Dr. Hubbard assessed Jarden's peers by using GICS
codes. 421  He then cited to over a dozen industry analyst
reports that corroborated his peer set, which included
companies that were larger and smaller than Jarden and
companies that were not on the Barclays list. 422  Once he
completed his peer set, however, Dr. Hubbard emphasized
his view that Jarden's unique and highly diversified portfolio
of businesses, its aggressively acquisitive growth strategy
and its holding company structure made the selection of
a valid peer set for a comparable companies analysis a
fundamentally flawed exercise since Jarden “lack[ed] truly
comparable peers.” 423
After carefully reviewing the evidence, I am convinced that
Dr. Hubbard is correct—Jarden had no comparable peers, at
least not as developed in the credible evidence presented at
trial. Under these circumstances, the fact that Dr. Zmijewski
engaged in no real analysis when developing his peer set is
not surprising. 424
Having found that the first, and most important, element of
a proper comparable companies analysis is lacking in this
record, I give the experts' comparable companies conclusions
no weight in my fair value determination. 425  Accordingly, I
move next to the parties' competing DCF valuations.
E. Discounted Cash Flow
*36  As I approach the parties' fantastically divergent
conclusions following their DCF analyses, I am mindful of
our Supreme Court's admonition that, tempting as it is to
select the entirety of one expert's analysis over the other's,
my review of the experts' opinions must not be presumptively
binary:
The role of the Court of Chancery
has evolved over time to the
present requirement that the court
independently determine the value of
the shares that are the subject of
the appraisal action. Even though
today a Chancellor may be faced with
wildly divergent values presented by
the parties' experts, the acceptance of
one expert's value, in toto, creates
the risk that the favored expert will
be accorded a status greater than
that of the now eliminated [expert
appraiser]. This is not to say that
the selection of one expert to the
total exclusion of another is, in itself,
an arbitrary act. The testimony of a
thoroughly discredited witness, expert
or lay, is subject to rejection under
the usual standards which govern
receipt of such evidence. The nub
of the present appeal is not merely
that the Chancellor made an uncritical
acceptance of the evidence of SAP's
appraiser but that he announced in
advance that he intended to choose
between absolutes. 426
As I discuss below, in many important respects, the experts
have utilized very different inputs in their DCF models
leading to a substantial delta between their ultimate DCF
valuations—Dr. Zmijewski's DCF valuation produced a range
of $70.36 and $70.40 per share; 427  Dr. Hubbard's DCF
valuation is $48.01 per share. 428  The number and degree of
their differences has necessitated the lengthy discussion that
follows. For reasons I explain, I have adopted some of both
expert's inputs to construct my own DCF model. Based on
that model, my DCF valuation is $48.13 per share.
I begin by noting where the experts agree. First, they
agree that DCF is a widely used and industry-accepted
means of calculating the value of a corporation as a going
concern. Dr. Hubbard likes DCF best to value Jarden, while
Dr. Zmijewski uses his DCF valuation to corroborate his
comparable companies analysis. 429  Both experts used the
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (“WACC”) method to
determine the appropriate discount rate. Both agreed that
the November Projections were the appropriate cash flow
forecasts upon which their DCF models should be based. Both
largely agreed on the required net investment to drive growth
through the year 2020, which is the last year included in
the November Projections. And both agreed that the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”) was appropriate to calculate
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Jarden's Cost of Equity. Because I see no basis in the evidence
to depart from these stipulations, I adopt them without further
analysis.
*37  The bulk of the experts' disagreements relate to how
Jarden will perform in the terminal period beyond the
November Projections' explicit forecasts. 430  I address and do
my best to resolve each of the disagreements below.
1. Jarden's Future Cash Flows
As noted, both experts used the November Projections
for their DCF analyses. 431  Even so, both made different
adjustments to the projections to calculate Jarden's unlevered
free cash flows. 432  After reviewing the adjustments, I
find that their adjustments for EBITDA, depreciation and
amortization, and Dr. Zmijewski's adjustment for projected
taxes, are appropriate. 433  These adjustments yield the






















Using Jarden's NOPAT, I have calculated Jarden's unlevered
free cash flows for each projection year by: (1) adding
back depreciation; (2) deducting Jarden's year-over-year
change in working capital; and (3) deducting Jarden's capital
expenditures. These adjustments track those made by Dr.
Hubbard (albeit at a 35% marginal rate), 435  and yield the






















2. Jarden's Terminal Value
Jarden's terminal value is the value of the Company beyond
the discrete projection period as defined in a discounted future
earnings model (“Terminal Value”). 436  In the context of the
experts' DCF analyses for Jarden, Terminal Value refers to
Jarden's estimated value taking into account all future cash
flows at the end of the November Projection's explicit forecast
period assuming a stable growth rate in perpetuity. 437
Dr. Zmijewski's Terminal Value calculation and
accompanying analysis mostly relies on his comparable
companies analysis, 438  which I have found not reliable for
reasons already stated. Dr. Hubbard used a formula developed
by McKinsey & Co. to calculate Jarden's Terminal Value. The
McKinsey formula involves dividing the value of cash flow
in the Terminal Period by the difference between the Discount
Rate (the rate at which future cash flows are discounted to
present) and Jarden's Terminal Growth Rate. 439  According
to Dr. Hubbard, this formula generally provides that “all
else remaining equal,” a company's terminal value is larger
when cash flow is high, and the discount rate is low or the
growth rate is high. 440  The “all else remaining equal” caveat,
Hubbard explains, assumes that increased growth will be
supported by increased investment which, in turn, reduces
cash flow. 441  In other words, increasing investment in the
Terminal Period will proportionately reduce Jarden's cash
flow and thereby lower Jarden's measurable value in the
Terminal Period. To calculate Jarden's Terminal Value, it is
necessary to estimate its Terminal Growth Rate, Terminal
Investment Rate and Discount Rate.
a. Terminal Growth Rate
*38  “Of all the inputs into a discounted cash flow
valuation model, none creates as much angst as estimating the
[terminal] growth rate. Part of the reason for it is that small
changes in the [terminal] growth rate can change the terminal
value significantly[.]” 442  The terminal growth rate (“TGR”)
describes Jarden's long-term growth in revenue, earnings and
cash flow in the Terminal Period, which includes the years
starting in 2021 and onward. Since acquisitions are typically
not considered in organic growth rate calculations, 443  a
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key question is whether Jarden's several tuck-in acquisitions
should be included in the TGR. 444
Both experts measure Jarden's TGR based on estimates of
U.S. nominal GDP growth and long-term economic inflation.
This method makes sense and is generally accepted. 445
The experts disagreed, however, as to what forecast sources
provide the most useful data. 446
Dr. Zmijewski derived a 2.1% projected long-term inflation
rate from four estimates of U.S. economic outlooks and
an expected nominal GDP growth rate of 4.3% from
three projections of U.S. GDP growth. 447  Based on these
projections, Dr. Zmijewski applied the midpoint of 3.2%,
which he asserts is a reasonable long-term growth rate
for Jarden. 448  Dr. Zmijewski's TGR analysis included an
assessment of the Company's acquisition-driven and organic
growth, and the results showed Jarden's historic organic
growth rate to be roughly 3.1%. 449  As corroboration,
Dr. Zmijewski emphasized that key players in the Merger
projected that Jarden would grow between 2.0% to 4.0%
annually in perpetuity. 450
For his Composite DCF calculation, Dr. Zmijewski used
the 2.1% projected U.S. inflationary growth rate as Jarden's
TGR. 451  Dr. Zmijewski explained he used U.S. inflation
as Jarden's TGR as a “conservative” measure because the
Composite DCF relies on calculations supplemented by
comparable companies data, and Jarden's long-term growth
was estimated to be much higher than any of the companies
in Dr. Zmijewski's peer set. 452  For his Jarden-Specific DCF
analysis, Dr. Zmijewski set Jarden's TGR at 3.2%, which he
suggested conforms to the other Jarden-only measurements
and calculations in that valuation. 453
Dr. Hubbard's report set Jarden's TGR at 2.5% based on
several inflation and nominal GDP growth forecasts for the
U.S. economy and the European Union's Eurozone. 454  He
noted that his TGR comports with the TGR utilized by
Goldman Sachs and Centerview in advising Newell, both of
which used a TGR of 2.0% in their valuations of Jarden. 455
He also pointed to analyst reports by Deutsche Bank and
RBC Capital that estimated Jarden's TGR at 1.5% and 2.5%,
respectively. 456  Finally, he noted that his TGR is consistent
with Jarden's historic organic growth, which he determined
to be 2.2% annually. 457  With all these factors considered,
Dr. Hubbard concluded that his 2.5% TGR falls squarely
between his estimated range of inflation and nominal GDP
and aligns well with Jarden's historic organic growth when
fairly adjusted for “tuck-in” acquisitions. 458
*39  Dr. Zmijewski took issue with Dr. Hubbard's
adjustments for “tuck-ins” because the adjustments result in
double counting certain companies that did not fit Jarden's
definition of a “tuck-in.” 459  Dr. Hubbard conceded this
error, revised his analysis and found Jarden's organic, non-
acquisitive growth rate to be 3.2% annually. 460  Despite
his upward revision to Jarden's historic organic growth, Dr.
Hubbard did not change his 2.5% TGR estimate. 461
Jarden's “tuck-in” acquisitions, although relatively small in
scale, are acquisition-driven growth, not organic growth. 462
Accordingly, Dr. Hubbard's attempt to account for “tuck-in”
acquisitions when estimating Jarden's TGR is well taken. Dr.
Hubbard's reluctance, however, to acknowledge the impact
of his organic growth rate miscalculation on his estimate of
Jarden's TGR is not. 463  Moreover, considering Dr. Hubbard's
revised 3.2% historic organic growth rate in light of his
economic research supporting long-run inflation in the range
of 2.0% annually, and nominal GDP growth in the range of
4.07% annually, with a midpoint of roughly 3.04%, 464  Dr.
Hubbard's 2.5% TGR is not supported.
Dr. Zmijewski calculated Jarden's historic organic growth
rate to be 3.1%. 465  His economic research supported U.S.
long-run inflation at 2.1% annually and nominal GDP growth
at 4.3% annually. 466  And his estimates are within one-
or two-tenths of a percentage point of Dr. Hubbard's. The
midpoint of each experts' inflation and GDP estimates is
approximately 3.1%, which aligns with Dr. Hubbard's 3.2%
revised historic organic growth rate and Dr. Zmijewski's 3.2%
midpoint TGR in his Jarden-Specific DCF. 467  The literature
recommends a conservative approach to estimating long-
term growth rates for a DCF valuation, in recognition that
many companies experience cyclical growth in relation to the
overall economy. 468  Jarden was considered a GDP growth
business. 469
Based on these factors, and the credible evidence in the trial
record, I apply a 3.1% TGR. In my view, this reflects the most
credible aspects of the experts' analyses and comports with
the most persuasive view of Jarden's historic growth.
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b. Terminal Investment Rate
The experts' disagreement over the terminal investment rate
(“TIR”) accounts for 87% of the disparity in their DCF
valuations. 470  In other words, of the $22.39 difference
between Dr. Hubbard's DCF per share value of $48.01 and
Dr. Zmijewski's DCF per share value of $70.40, $19.56 is
attributable to the disagreement over Jarden's TIR. After
carefully considering the experts' analyses of TIR, and
exposing what I believe to be flaws in both, I have determined
that an appropriate TIR for Jarden is 27.75%.
*40  The disagreement between the experts boils down
to whether Dr. Hubbard improperly relied upon accounting
theory when calculating TIR. 471  Dr. Zmijewski's approach
to Jarden's TIR aligns, in concept, with the Bradley-Jarrell
Plowback Formula, which provides, in broad terms, that
the rate of reinvestment must be measured by what is
realistically required to drive real growth. 472  Real growth,
under the plowback paradigm, is measured by the delta
between the company's growth rate and inflationary growth,
which is driven by the greater economy and not cash
reinvestment. 473  In other words, as Jarden's growth slowed
over time and became steadier, the Company required less
capital expenditure to drive real growth because a greater
percentage of its overall growth was driven by inflation
and broader economic factors. According to Dr. Zmijewski,
because Jarden was a steady-growth company that expected
lower growth in the Terminal Period, it required a much lower
TIR, which he calculated at only 4.9%. 474
Dr. Hubbard calculated TIR by applying a formula from
McKinsey & Co. 475  The McKinsey formula posits that
a company's return on invested capital (“ROIC”) should
converge towards its WACC over time. 476  The formula rests
on the premise that a company operating in a competitive
industry will not “have both high and rising forever returns on
invested capital.” 477  Applying the McKinsey formula, 478
Dr. Hubbard used 2.5% as his TGR and 7.38% as his WACC/
ROIC, yielding a TIR of 33.9%. 479
Dr. Zmijewski expressed four principal criticisms of Dr.
Hubbard's application of the McKinsey formula. 480  First,
according to Dr. Zmijewski, Dr. Hubbard incorrectly assumes
that any new investment Jarden made starting in 2021
would not create any value. 481  Second, Dr. Zmijewski
believes Dr. Hubbard improperly defined investments to
include only working capital and capital expenditures, which,
according to Dr. Zmijewski, is the accounting definition of
investments (meaning “what you put on a balance sheet”)
that does not account for real world economics. 482  In
other words, Dr. Hubbard's definition of investment excludes
research and development, advertising and human capital
expenditures that would create value for Jarden in years
beyond 2021. 483  Third, Dr. Hubbard's definition of net
investment as investment above depreciation is, again, an
accounting definition that does not fit when calculating
TIR. 484  Fourth, Dr. Hubbard improperly calculated WACC
by “using accounting rates of return” instead of “economic
rates of return,” which do “not measure the same thing.” 485
*41  Dr. Hubbard's testimony that, in competitive industries,
the return on new invested capital should equal the company's
WACC was credible, and it is supported by the valuation
treatises. 486  Although I found credible Dr. Hubbard's well-
reasoned premise that companies like Jarden cannot maintain
growth without sufficient investment to drive growth above
inflation over time, his relatively high TIR raises at least
yellow flags. At first glance, the empirical analysis Dr.
Hubbard undertook to support his 33.9% TIR appears
reasonable, particularly given Jarden's historic investment
rates, which averaged roughly 26.9% of comparable growth
over six years. 487  But why study six years here when Dr.
Hubbard's TGR estimation was premised on five years of
Jarden's historic growth? 488  By including the sixth year,
2010, in his calculation, Dr. Hubbard was able to reach a
significantly higher number for Jarden's historical average
growth. After excluding the 2010 investment rate of 64.3%,
Jarden's five-year average investment rate is 21.6%.
In view of Jarden's five-year 21.6% average historic
investment rate, Dr. Zmijewski's 4.6% TIR is too low; it
unreasonably assumes rising ROIC for more than 40 years
into the Terminal Period, unreasonably assumes all new
investment in the Terminal Period will be comprised entirely
of working capital, and is based on a methodology that
conflicts with the valuation goal of striking a balance between
investment and growth. 489  The November Projection's
forecast of net investment in 2021 at 9.8%, likewise, stands
out as low relative to Jarden's five-year average investment
rate. The midpoint of Dr. Hubbard's 33.9% TIR and Jarden
management's projected 9.8% TIR is roughly 21.8%. With
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a calculated TGR of 3.1%, which coincides with Jarden's
historic organic growth rate, the appropriate TIR should
reflect Jarden's historic investment rate but account for a
slight increase to accommodate sustained growth in the
Terminal Period. The credible evidence, in my view, supports
a TIR for Jarden of 27.75%. 490
c. Jarden's Weighted Average
Cost of Capital/Discount Rate
As previously stated, both experts' DCF models used Jarden's
WACC as the input for the Discount Rate in the DCF
formula. 491  The Discount Rate converts Jarden's future cash
flows from the November Projections to present value as of
the Merger Date. 492  WACC reflects Jarden's cost of equity
and debt financing and the relative weight of each in Jarden's
capital structure. 493  Given that a DCF valuation is meant to
calculate Jarden's value as a going concern, the components
relied upon to calculate WACC should represent Jarden's
prospective outlook. 494  The experts agreed on one of the
relevant inputs to calculate Jarden's WACC, the risk-free rate
of return. They differed, however, in their respective estimates
of Jarden's capital structure, beta, equity risk premium, and
whether a size premium was appropriate. 495  I address each
issue below.
*42  The application of a discount rate to financial
projections converts the target company's future income
stream at its expected opportunity cost of capital to its present
value. 496  A company's WACC represents the cost (to the
company) of financing its business operations; it comprises
the weighted average of the company's cost of debt and
equity: 497
i. Jarden's Capital Structure
A company's capital structure indicates what percentage of its
activities is financed by debt and what percentage is financed
by equity. 498  Determining the correct capital structure is
essential to WACC because without a clear picture of a
company's debt-to-equity ratio, the cost of financing future
operations will be improperly weighted. 499
Both experts recognized the impact of the substantial amount
of convertible debt in Jarden's capital structure. 500  Jarden's
convertible debt conceptually existed as both debt and equity
components in its capital structure, and both experts valued
the debt and equity components of Jarden's convertible notes
separately. 501
Dr. Zmijewski calculated Jarden's capital structure based on
Jarden's median capital structure ratios in the last four quarters
before December 4, 2015. 502  According to the previous
year's ratios, Dr. Zmijewski selected a Jarden capitalization
ratio of 69% combined equity and 31% debt. 503
For his part, Dr. Hubbard examined Jarden's capital structure
ratio for the five years prior to the Merger. 504  He noted that
Jarden maintained a debt level of roughly 50% from the last
quarter of 2010 through 2011, but beginning in 2012, Jarden's
debt to equity ratio began shifting due to Jarden's increased
acquisition activity. 505  As Jarden stepped up acquisitions
between 2012 and 2015, its total debt nearly doubled but
its equity value expanded in even greater proportions. 506
By the third quarter of 2015, Jarden's market capitalization
nearly tripled and its capital structure had shifted from nearly
a 50:50 ratio to 37.5% debt and 62.5% equity. 507  Following
the Yankee Candle acquisition in 2013, Jarden's goal was to
de-lever itself to three times its bank leverage-to-EBITDA
ratio. 508
Dr. Hubbard observed that, in order to capture Jarden's value
as a going concern, the capital structure ratio used in the
WACC analysis should reflect Jarden's long-run target capital
structure. 509  He concluded that, because Jarden was on a
trajectory of lower debt leading up to the Merger, and its long-
term goal was to achieve an even lower debt-to-equity ratio,
Jarden's average debt in the one-year period before the Merger
was the best estimate of Jarden's target capital structure for
WACC. 510  Based on that judgment, Dr. Hubbard calculated
a capital structure equal to Jarden's one-year average ratios of
36.1% debt and 63.9% equity. 511
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*43  The valuation literature suggests that because of the
increased use of convertible securities, assessing the debt-to-
EBITDA ratio alongside capital structure helps build a more
comprehensive picture of a company's leverage risk. 512  Both
experts were cognizant of the effect of Jarden's convertible
securities on its capital structure, and Dr. Hubbard went on
to consider changes in Jarden's debt-to-EBITDA ratio and the
corresponding effect on Jarden's future leverage risk. 513
The two experts relied on one year of debt-to-equity
information to calculate their capital structure estimates. Dr.
Zmijewski calculated Jarden's capital structure according to
its median debt-to-equity ratios prior to the unaffected trading
date of December 4, 2015. 514  That is where Dr. Zmijewski's
analysis ended. Dr. Hubbard made a similar assessment of
Jarden's capital structure as it stood just prior to the unaffected
trading date, but did not end his analysis there. Instead,
Dr. Hubbard assessed Jarden's target debt-to-EBITDA ratios,
which reflected the capital structure Jarden set as a forward-
looking goal well before merger negotiations began. 515
This further analysis makes sense. The cost of capital analysis
should be based on target debt-to-equity ratios instead of
current ratios. 516  Target capital structure represents the
ratios expected to prevail over the life of the business and
the literature stresses that relying solely on current capital
structure can distort the cost of capital analysis. 517  Overly
optimistic capital structure targets must be accounted for if
they are expected to take many years to be realized. 518
Jarden's target capital structure and debt-to-EBITDA ratio
was not overly optimistic under the circumstances. As of
2015's third quarter, Jarden's leverage had shifted downward
to 37.5% as its market capitalization grew, 519  and Jarden
planned to continue its deleveraging strategy until it reached a
debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 3.0x. 520  Adjusting Jarden's 37.5%
debt as of September 30, 2015, to conform to its target
leverage ratio would lower Jarden's debt ratio to 33.3%. 521
Based on the dramatic swings in Jarden's capital structure in
the five years prior to the Merger, a 4.2% deleveraging was
well within Jarden's ability to achieve in the short term.
Because Dr. Hubbard's analysis conservatively includes
Jarden's forward-looking target capital structure in his
capitalization analysis, I adopt Dr. Hubbard's capital structure
of 63.9% equity and 36.1% debt. 522  Accordingly, I adopt
Hubbard's estimated equity and debt values for Jarden at
$10,596,000,000 and $5,043,000,000, respectively. 523
ii. Jarden's Cost of Debt
A company's cost of debt reflects “the current cost to the
firm of borrowing funds to finance projects.” 524  Generally,
it is derived from three variables: (1) the riskless rate, (2) the
default risk (and associated default spread) of the company
and (3) the tax advantage associated with debt. 525
*44  Dr. Zmijewski estimated Jarden's after-tax Cost of Debt
at 2.8%. 526  He arrived at this figure by calculating a Debt
Beta of 0.36 based on Moody's Long-Term Corporate Family
Rating of Ba3 for Jarden as of December 4, 2015, and the Duff
& Phelps debt beta estimate for Ba debt as of March 2016. 527
Dr. Hubbard estimated Jarden's Cost of Debt based on a tax
adjusted yield to maturity rate of 5.30%. 528  This yielded a
Cost of Debt of 3.2%. 529
I agree with Dr. Zmijewski that calculating the cost of below-
investment-grade debt by using yield to maturity sets the cost
of debt too high. 530  I adopt his Cost of Debt of 2.8%
iii. Jarden's Tax Rate
Jarden's tax rate is 35%, which is the top marginal corporate
tax rate for U.S. companies at the time of the Merger. 531
iv. Jarden's Cost of Equity
Establishing an accurate Cost of Equity is an essential
subcomponent of Jarden's WACC. Both experts used the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”) to calculate Jarden's
cost of equity capital. 532  This approach calculates Jarden's
risk separately from systematic risk to produce a reliable
estimate of Jarden's Cost of Equity. 533  CAPM has four
components: the risk-free rate, equity beta, equity risk
premium, and if necessary, a size premium. 534  Following
CAPM, a company's cost of equity is calculated as
follows: 535
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• The Risk-Free Rate
The only point of agreement between the experts in the
WACC analysis is the risk-free rate of return. Both experts set
their analyses' risk-free rate at the 20-year constant maturity
U.S. Treasury Bonds return as of the Merger. 536  That rate
was 2.14%. 537  Relying on 20-year U.S. Treasury Bonds for
the risk-free rate is universally accepted practice in corporate
valuation. 538
• Beta
Beta, in short, is a measurement of the systemic risk that
a particular security adds to a market portfolio. 539  The
consensus from the corporate finance literature in the record is
that the conventional approach for estimating equity beta for a
publicly traded company, like Jarden, is through a regression
analysis of the historical returns of its stock against the returns
of a market index. 540  In other words, equity beta is derived
by assessing a stock's sensitivity to and correlation with
changes in the aggregate market. A beta regression analysis
requires three parameter-setting choices. First, the time period
for measuring returns must be established. 541  Second, the
return interval at which measurements will be taken over the
duration of the designated time period must be specified. 542
Third, an appropriate market index must be identified that
will represent the cumulative market over time as a control to
measure the target company's market price. 543
*45  The experts disagreed on the relevant time periods and
return intervals to use in their regression analyses. From the
evidence, it appears the most appropriate (and commonly
used) parameters are two- or five-year time periods and
weekly or monthly return intervals. 544
The control market index should be one developed from the
exchange where the target company's stock trades. 545  For
companies traded on the NYSE, like Jarden, it is reasonable
to use either the NYSE Composite or the S&P 500 Index. 546
The experts agreed that the S&P 500 is an appropriate market
index and both used the S&P 500 as their control to measure
Jarden. 547
In addition, both experts relied on Jarden's historical market
returns data and estimated Jarden-specific betas. Yet, they
disputed whether it was necessary to balance Jarden's beta
with betas estimated from historical returns of comparable
companies.
In his report, Dr. Zmijewski calculated two equity betas to use
in his Jarden-Specific DCF and Composite DCF analyses. To
estimate Jarden's beta as of the Merger Date, Dr. Zmijewski
measured the equity beta for Jarden and for each of a list
of comparable companies based on five years of weekly
returns ending on the Merger Date. 548  He then performed a
regression analysis for each company against the S&P 500
for the same period that showed Jarden's unlevered beta was
1.04 and that the unlevered beta for his comparable companies
(plus Jarden) was 0.86. 549  Finally, he made adjustments
to account for Jarden's cash and other financial assets and
relevered each beta to produce a Jarden-specific equity beta
of 1.24 (the “Jarden-Specific Beta”) and a combined equity
beta for his comparable companies (plus Jarden) of 1.01 (the
“Composite Beta”). 550
Dr. Hubbard's regression analysis yielded an equity beta
of 1.18 (the “Hubbard Beta”) that was based on Jarden's
daily returns for one year ending on December 4, 2015. 551
Unlike Dr. Zmijewski, Dr. Hubbard did not balance his
Jarden-specific beta regression analysis with beta estimates of
comparable companies. Instead, he regressed Jarden's single
year daily returns against the S&P 500 during the one-year
period and calculated an unlevered beta of 0.771. 552  Like Dr.
Zmijewski, he then adjusted for cash and financial assets and
re-levered the beta to produce a Jarden equity beta of 1.18. 553
Dr. Hubbard also calculated Jarden-specific betas from two
years of weekly returns and five years of monthly returns,
but ultimately decided to use the single year daily returns
beta to mitigate the potential confounding effects of several
large acquisitions Jarden completed in the five years prior to
the Merger. 554  Dr. Hubbard explained that he chose the year
ending on December 4, 2015, in order to avoid contaminating
his regression analysis with news of the possible merger. 555
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*46  The literature in the record supports the use
of comparable companies in a beta regression because
companies in the same industry face similar “operating
risks” and therefore should have similar operating betas. 556
This, of course, assumes that “truly” comparable peers
exist that can meaningfully be compared to the target
company. 557  Here again, Dr. Zmijewski failed convincingly
to demonstrate that his comparable companies shared
similar risk profiles with Jarden. 558  As Dr. Hubbard
persuasively testified, Dr. Zmijewski provided no analysis
or discussion to support this assumption. 559  Without a
thorough explanation and corroborating evidence of how
Dr. Zmijewski's comparable companies had risk profiles
comparable to Jarden's “complex” 560  and “unique” 561
structure and business model, I am disinclined to consider on
Dr. Zmijewski's Composite Beta.
Jarden's stock consistently traded in the upper quartile of
market volume on the NYSE from 2011 to 2015. 562  And
its share price had a positive correlation with the market, as
defined by the S&P 500, throughout the same time period. 563
With this in mind, I am persuaded that Dr. Hubbard's decision
to use daily interval measurements is reasonable, and his
opinion that Jarden's market returns data provide a reliable
measurement of Jarden's beta is supported by the literature in
the record. 564
Dr. Hubbard corroborated his calculated beta with a second
regression using two-year weekly returns that yielded
a Jarden-specific beta of 1.22. 565  Dr. Zmijewski's beta
estimates were derived from a five-year period of weekly
returns, and his Jarden-specific analysis produced a beta of
1.24 for Jarden alone. 566  The spread between Dr. Hubbard's
beta and Dr. Zmijewski's Jarden-specific beta is 0.06, which,
according to the literature, suggests that the Jarden-specific
beta estimates have a low error rate across different time and
interval measurements. 567  A narrow error rate between firm-
specific beta estimates of different intervals and time periods
indicates the estimates are converging on the company's true
beta. 568
Moreover, it is important to note that, when estimating beta,
the goal is to evaluate Jarden's future beta, and by extension,
the sensitivity of Jarden's share price to future market risk
as predicted by its historical performance. 569  Because betas
generally converge on the general market beta (1.0) over
time, 570  and Jarden, by all indicators, was a mature, highly
traded company, I am satisfied that Dr. Hubbard's beta (1.18)
is a reasonable estimate of Jarden's share price sensitivity to
future market risk.
• Equity Risk Premium
*47  Equity Risk Premium (“ERP”) “captures the
compensation per unit of risk that investors demand
in order to hold risky investments rather than riskless
investments.” 571  The experts' disagreement over the proper
methodology for estimating Jarden's ERP reflects the lack
of consensus regarding this issue within the valuation
community at large. 572  One aspect of the broader debate that
has played out here is whether to approach ERP as Long-Term
Historical ERP, Supply-Side ERP, or an adjusted hybrid ERP
derived from the available data. As explained by Dr. Hubbard,
when appraisers estimate ERP from Long-Term Historical
ERP, they consult historical data regarding stock premiums,
in his case from 1926 through 2015. 573  As explained by
Dr. Zmijewski, Supply-Side ERP incorporates adjustments
to the Long-Term Historical ERP to account for a long-term
decline in risk premiums that upwardly bias the Long-Term
Historical rate in order more effectively to represent recent
market conditions. 574
Dr. Zmijewski set Jarden's ERP at the Supply-Side ERP
estimate of 6.03%. 575  Dr. Hubbard determined the proper
ERP to be 6.47%, which is the mid-point between the
Long-Term Historical ERP and Supply-Side ERP. 576  After
considering the evidence, I am satisfied that Dr. Zmijewski's
estimate of ERP reflects a more principled approach. First,
there is strong support for the use of the forward-looking
Supply-Side ERP in the valuation literature. 577  Second, as
Dr. Zmijewski persuasively observes, Dr. Hubbard's “mid-
point” ERP estimate is unexplained and appears to lack any
methodological foundation. 578
• Size Premium
Dr. Zmijewski opined that a size premium must be
incorporated in the calculation of Jarden's equity cost
of capital given that, according to the Duff & Phelps
classification, Jarden is within the second decile of public
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companies, which justifies a size premium of 0.57%. 579  Dr.
Hubbard implied that a Size Premium was not necessary but
provided no credible explanation for that position. 580  The
valuation texts in the record make the point that beta captures
some, but not all of a company's size premium and that a
size premium is an empirically observed correction to the
CAPM. 581  I agree with Dr. Zmijewski and the literature that
the CAPM should include a size premium when appropriate,
as here, and adopt his size premium of 0.57% for Jarden.
* * * * * * * * * *
Dr. Zmijewski calculated a Composite Cost of Equity, but for
reasons previously stated, I have disregarded estimates based
on Jarden's so-called comparable companies. Dr. Zmijewski
calculated a Jarden-specific Cost of Equity at 10.21%. 582  Dr.
Hubbard calculated Jarden's Cost of Equity at 9.74%. 583  In
my view, for reasons stated, neither view lines up entirely
with the credible evidence. Accordingly, I have calculated
Jarden's Cost of Equity with the following CAPM inputs
that reflect what I deem proven by a preponderance of the
evidence: Dr. Hubbard's Beta of 1.18, Dr. Zmijewski's Equity-
Risk Premium of 6.03%, Dr. Zmijewski's Size Premium of
0.57% and both experts' risk-free rate of 2.14%. With these
inputs, I have calculated Jarden's Cost of Equity to be 9.83%.
Jarden's Calculated WACC: Dr. Zmijewski calculated a
Jarden-Specific WACC of 7.88%. 584  Dr. Hubbard calculated
a WACC of 7.38%. 585  Once again, for reasons stated, I have
found that neither experts' calculated WACC is supported
entirely by the credible evidence. Instead, I calculate WACC
with the following inputs: a 9.83% Cost of Equity, a 2.8%
Cost of Debt, a 35% marginal tax rate and a capital structure
of 63.9% equity and 36.1% debt. These inputs yield a WACC
of 6.94% for Jarden. 586  Thus, I adopt a Discount Rate of
6.94%. 587
3. The Final Calculation of Terminal Value
Based on the credible evidence, I calculate Jarden's terminal
value to be $17.7 billion, using the following equation: 588
In order to arrive at the unlevered free cash flow for year
2021, I subtracted the predicted revenue for 2021 from the
predicted capital expenditures for 2021. 589  The predicted
revenue for 2021 is $12.9 billion, 4.964% higher than the
2020 revenue. 590  The predicted capital expenditure for
2021 is $334 million, 2.6% higher than the 2020 capital
expenditure. 591
4. The DCF Calculation of Fair Value
Using 6.94% as the Discount Rate, I calculate Jarden's
enterprise value using the following formula: 592
The final adjusted enterprise value is $16.6 billion. 593
5. Jarden-Specific Adjustments to the DCF Valuation
*49  In order to determine the final share price under a DCF
approach, the appraiser must account for Jarden's excess cash
and debt in its enterprise value. 594  Dr. Hubbard additionally
adjusts for tax effects related to future profits not captured
by tax rates, liability from net unrecognized tax benefits and
pensions. 595  I do not find any of Dr. Hubbard's arguments
for these additional adjustments persuasive and, in any event,
his proposed further adjustments have a marginal impact on
the final share value. 596
a. Excess Cash
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Companies commonly keep liquid cash in order to conduct
their operations. 597  If the company holds more cash than
necessary, the surplus is a source of value to the equity holders
and must be added to the DCF valuation. 598  Jarden held $799
million of cash and cash equivalents at the end of the first
quarter of 2016. 599  As of the Merger, Jarden required $50
million in cash for working capital purposes. 600  The excess
cash balance, or the difference between the total cash and the
required cash, is $749 million, which I add to the enterprise
value.
b. Nonconvertible Debt
As of March 31, 2016, Jarden's non-convertible debt totaled
$5.04 billion. 601  Debt is a claim on the assets of the firm
and must, therefore, be subtracted from the DCF enterprise
value. 602
c. Convertible Debt
To measure the value of Jarden's unconverted convertible
notes at the Merger Date, Dr. Hubbard uses a standard options
pricing methodology to estimate the embedded warrants
value since they are economically analogous to an option on
Jarden's common stock. 603  This formula relies on various
inputs for each series of notes, including the time remaining
until maturity, the conversion price, the current value of
Jarden's stock, the risk-free rate and the expected volatility
of Jarden's stock returns. 604  Using these inputs, Dr. Hubbard
estimated the equity components of the convertible notes to be
$0.71 billion in total at the Merger Date. 605  He further valued
the debt component of the convertible notes by discounting
the remaining coupons and principal value of each note at
Jarden's 5.3% cost of debt. In total, the value of the debt
component of the convertible notes is $1.00 billion. The
total value of Jarden's convertible securities is the sum of
the debt and equity components. At the Merger Date, the
value of Jarden's convertible debt totaled $1.71 billion. 606
Dr. Hubbard's approach was conservative, made sense and I
adopt it here.
6. Number of Shares
I calculate the shares outstanding, following Dr. Zmijewski's
calculation, 607  by subtracting the Jarden stock awards
issuable to executives in connection with the merger
transactions and the Jarden common stock expected to
be issued upon assumed conversion of outstanding Jarden
convertible notes from the total estimated shares of Jarden's
common stock entitled to the Merger consideration. With
these inputs, the total amount of outstanding shares and
restricted stock units as of the Merger was 219.9 million
common shares. 608
7. Equity Value per Share from DCF Analysis
*50  After adding non-operating assets to the enterprise
value, and subtracting non-operating liabilities, Jarden's
equity value as of the Merger Date was $10.59 billion. On a
per share basis, the DCF valuation is $48.13.
REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIALLY LEFT BLANK
[Editor's Note: The preceding image contains the reference
for footnote 609 , 610 , 611 , 612 ]
8. The DCF Valuation Comports
With the Market Evidence
As indicated above, I have determined that the Unaffected
Market Price, $48.31, is a reliable indicator of Jarden's fair
value as of the Merger Date. While I have questioned the
reliability of the Merger price less synergies approach, I
recognize that the most reliable estimate of fair value under
that approach is approximately $46.21. My DCF valuation
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yields a fair value of $48.13. What stands out here, of course,
is that Petitioners' proffered estimate of fair value for Jarden
of $71.35 is, to put it mildly, an outlier.
Based on the preponderance of evidence, I am satisfied
that the Unaffected Market Price is the best evidence of
Jarden's fair value on the Merger Date. Insofar as I am
obliged to articulate a principled, evidence-based explanation
for the delta between the Unaffected Market Price and the
DCF valuation (here, $0.18 per share), I am satisfied the
difference reflects the subjective imperfections of the DCF
methodology. The DCF valuation corroborates the most
persuasive market evidence and provides comfort that I have
appraised Jarden as best as the credible evidence allows.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I have found the fair value of
Jarden shares as of the Merger was $48.31 per share. The legal
rate of interest, compounded quarterly, shall accrue from the
date of closing to the date of payment. The parties shall confer
and submit an implementing order and final judgment within
ten days.
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59 JX 514 at 10.
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60 JX 1393.
61 JX 763 at 22.
62 Id. at 17.
63 JX 1795 at 21.
64 PTO ¶110.
65 JX 527 at 23, 26.
66 Id. at 23; JX 606 at 3–4.
67 PTO ¶113.
68 JX 726 at 15.
69 Id.
70 Trial Tr. 455:3–9 (Franklin) (“Q. And in 2015, you were spending real money on direct-to-consumer and
expanding your distribution channels. Correct? A. Well, we bought a business that expanded our distribution
capabilities. We bought Jostens for the same kind of reason. It gave us a different access into schools.”).
71 JX 726 at 11; JX 823 at 3–4.
72 JX 726 at 12.
73 JX 1816 at ¶¶46–48, Figure 11; JX 1439.
74 PTO ¶234. As of the Merger Date, Ashken was a director of Platform. Id. ¶61; JX 576 at 2.
75 PTO ¶235. As of the Merger Date, Lillie was a director of Nomad. Id. ¶63.
76 JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 359:15–16; PTO ¶97. Lillie and Ashken were also investors in Mariposa. Trial
Tr. 527:11–13 (Franklin).
77 PTO ¶282. But for the Merger, Franklin would have pursued the Royal Oak transaction for Jarden. Trial Tr.
559:4–560:5 (Franklin). Jarden's lead independent director, Michael Gross, also participated in the Royal
Oak acquisition. Id.; JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 14:22–15:10. Gross and Franklin have been close personal
friends for 30 years. JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 15:14–18.
78 PTO ¶249; JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 93:7–8. Ashken and Lillie were also investors in J2. JX 1770.
79 JX 765; JX 1804 (Polk Dep.) at 71:20–72:12; JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 164:14–165:3.
80 JX 533; JX 490; PTO ¶125; Trial Tr. 584:12–585:24 (Polk). Phillips previously worked opposite Franklin in a
transaction with Nomad. Trial Tr. 585:14–18 (Polk); Trial Tr. 373:6–18 (Franklin).
81 Trial Tr. 576:5–13 (Polk); JX 490; JX 524; PTO ¶123.
82 JX 533; PTO ¶125.
83 JX 576 at 2.
84 Id.
85 JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 28:9–19; JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 121:10–122:3; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at
157:25–158:14.
86 PTO ¶79. Newell was a member of the NYSE and the S&P 500. PTO ¶84. It was followed by at least 16
financial analysts and, like Jarden, its stock exhibited the attributes of a narrow “bid-ask spread,” a high
average trading volume and a large public float. JX 1816 at ¶57, Figure 15.
87 Trial Tr. 566:21–567:8 (Polk).
88 Trial Tr. 567:9–569:3 (Polk); see also Trial Tr. 721:22–722:5 (Torres).
89 PTO ¶80. Trial Tr. 566:11–20 (Polk).
90 Trial Tr. 566:11–20 (Polk).
91 Trial Tr. 567:20–569:3 (Polk).
92 Trial Tr. 571:2–7 (Polk).
93 Trial Tr. 571:20–572:2 (Polk).
94 Trial Tr. 572:6–574:19 (Polk).
95 Trial Tr. 576:12–582:1 (Polk). See JX 655; JX 860.
96 Trial Tr. 581:10–17 (Polk).
97 Trial Tr. 581:18–582:1 (Polk).
98 Trial Tr. 584:12–24 (Polk); Tr. 373:19–24 (Franklin).
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99 Trial Tr. 375:5–14 (Franklin). As Franklin explained, “[i]f a CEO wants to meet with me, I'll always want to
meet with him.” Trial Tr. 376:17–20 (Franklin).
100 JX 902; PTO ¶¶127, 129.
101 Trial Tr. 588:3–13 (Polk).
102 Trial Tr. 586:14–21 (Polk).
103 Trial Tr. 376:13–20 (Franklin); Tr. 588:22–589:7 (Polk).
104 JX 902 at 2.
105 Id.
106 JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 54:13–22; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 25:2–7, 26:10–19. The Board met on
September 28, 2015, but the minutes do not reflect any discussion of a potential transaction with Newell or
Franklin's September 9th meeting with Polk. See JX 691; PTO ¶131.
107 Trial Tr. 378:24–380:18, 480:16–17 (Franklin); JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 57:2–23, 58:22–59:3 (Franklin
called board members to advise them on meeting); JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 26:24–27:12 (same); JX 1786
(Wood Dep.) at 28:20–29:8, 33:20–34:4 (same).
108 Trial Tr. 566:9–20 (Polk).
109 Trial Tr. 598:10–16 (Polk); JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 29:18–30:9, 32:10–33:9 (explaining Jarden “was by far
the most likely [acquisition] candidate to reapply the Newell Rubbermaid business model” of consolidation,
which “could release a large amount of value”).
110 JX 685 at 2; JX 902 at 2; PTO ¶132. Trial Tr. 383:23–384:8 (Franklin). Following the Merger, Tarchetti became
the President of the combined entity. JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 14:17–21.
111 JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 58:9–21; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 31:12–25; PTO ¶133. I note that Franklin's
testimony that he did not intend to negotiate definitive deal parameters during the Boat Meeting was credible.
Trial Tr. 486:11–16 (Franklin). It appears, instead, that Franklin intended to lay out certain expectations and
then “tell[ ] [the] Newell [team that] if they had different expectations, they shouldn't bother spending time,
effort, and money.” Trial Tr. 489:14–17 (Franklin). As Franklin explained, “I didn't want to go down the path of
having any real substantive conversations unless they understood that we were looking for a real premium.”
Trial Tr. 469:2–22 (Franklin); see also Trial Tr. 384:21–385:2 (Franklin); JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 64:4–9
(explaining “we sort of made it very clear that Jarden wasn't for sale; but if we got an extraordinary offer our
job was to create value for our shareholders, so we would always listen to whatever Mike had to say”).
112 JX 1794 (Christian Dep.) at 159:9–160:14; JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 72:2–3; JX 1804 (Polk Dep.) at 85:24–
86:7; JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 305:24–306:10; PTO ¶134.
113 JX 2502; JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 64:17–65:4, 97:14–98:2; JX 1785 (LeConey Dep.) at 27:10–21; Trial
Tr. 369:22–370:2, 471:11–472:16 (Franklin). While Jarden had asked Barclays to prepare some preliminary
combination models and to do some “rough math” prior to the Boat Meeting (Trial Tr. 472:7–8 (Franklin);
JX 688), Jarden had no formal analysis of its standalone value, nor had it retained a financial advisor when
Franklin set the range for a transaction at $60–$69 per share. JX 1789 (Welsh Dep.) at 135:14–136:3; Trial
Tr. 470:18–471:8 (Franklin).
114 JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 95:15–19. See also Trial Tr. 473:24–475:1 (Franklin) (explaining his sense of
Newell's financial limits).
115 Trial Tr. 391:24–392:10 (Franklin).
116 Trial Tr. 385:10–14 (Franklin).
117 Trial Tr. 385:24–386:4 (Franklin); Trial Tr. 666:6–7 (Polk) (“And I interpreted that to be between 60 and 69,
which is a very wide range.”); see also JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 65:21–23 (referring to a price in the $60s
as “a very, very, very, very full price”).
118 Trial Tr. 474:14–475:1 (Franklin); JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 103:3–13.
119 Trial Tr. 475:18–476:22 (Franklin).
120 Trial Tr. 598:3–16 (Polk) (explaining that “the logic for the deal” was the expectation of synergies by recreating
the success of Project Renewal); see also JX 674 at 2 (Polk noting that “there are tons of synergies because
they have not done what we have done with Renewal (they are a holding company)”) (emphasis in original).
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121 Trial Tr. 387:13–388:23 (Franklin); see also Trial Tr. 664:3–665:8 (Polk).
122 Trial Tr. 391:24–392:10 (Franklin).
123 JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 60:5–13 (discussing Franklin's view that any offer “needed to start with a 6
handle” and explaining that “[g]iven where the stock was trading, that made a lot of sense”); see also JX
1786 (Wood Dep.) at 49:3–11.
124 Trial Tr. 548:22–549:4 (Franklin); JX 1789 (Welsh Dep.) at 135:14–136:3.
125 JX 769; JX 785; JX 915; JX 977; JX 1073; JX 1203; JX 1862; Trial Tr. 550:16–20 (Franklin); JX 1789 (Welsh
Dep.) at 137:22–138:18.
126 Trial Tr. 392:8–15 (Franklin); see also JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 62:23–63:2.
127 Trial Tr. 392:16–393:6 (Franklin).
128 Id.
129 Trial Tr. 393:7–394:2 (Franklin).
130 Id.
131 JX 2502 at 2, 10.
132 JX 775.
133 JX 871 at 1; JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 259:14–261:13.
134 On October 13, 2015, the day prior to the Jostens announcement, Jarden's stock price was $50.69. Jarden's
stock price fell to $44.80 by the end of October 2015. PTO Ex. A; see also JX 1816 at ¶¶66–68.
135 Trial Tr. 404:1–9 (Franklin). Franklin testified, “we were buyers up to [$]49, which we considered full value
at the time.” Trial Tr. 404:16–18 (Franklin).
136 JX 900 at 2.
137 JX 1565 at 85; PTO ¶135. Trial Tr. 394:23–395:4 (Franklin).
138 JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 136:12–15; JX 1565 at 85. See Trial Tr. 492:5–10 (Franklin) (explaining Jarden's
Board learned of the confidentiality agreement).
139 PTO ¶136.
140 JX 786 at 110; PTO ¶138; Trial Tr. 396:17–397:2 (Franklin); Trial Tr. 602:24–603:15 (Polk).
141 JX 786 at 110; JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 131:7–12, 148:6–149:5.
142 JX 786 at 111; see also Trial Tr. 827:19–828:11 (Waldron).
143 JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 24:16–25:8.
144 Tuck-in acquisitions usually amounted to less than 1% of Jarden's yearly revenue. See, e.g., JX 380 at 11;
JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 20:6–16; JX 432 at 5; JX 380 at 3, 11.
145 Trial Tr. 929:9–930:9 (Zenner).
146 JX 1816 at ¶30; JX 1831, Ex. 5A. Jarden achieved “organic growth” of 4% (including tuck-in acquisitions)
and adjusted organic growth of 3.2% (excluding all acquisitions), from 2011 to 2015. Id.
147 Trial Tr. 106:13–107:3 (Lillie).
148 Trial Tr. 106:1–9 (Lillie); JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 252:15–253:6.
149 Trial Tr. 604:3–12 (Polk) (explaining Newell did not use Jarden's projections because “I didn't believe 6
percent and 5 percent compounded. Those were really aggressive growth rates in the environment.”); see
also id. 604:22–605:21 (Polk) (explaining that Newell utilized more realistic projections when analyzing
Jarden's value).
150 JX 1252 at 12; JX 1247 at 29.
151 JX 927 at 1.
152 Id.
153 JX 1045 at 31; JX 1205 at 44. With only minor adjustments for 2015 year-end actuals, the November
Projections were also included in the Company's proxy statement regarding the Merger.
154 JX 791 (Tarchetti told a colleague that “Martin change of control” was on a list of discussion points Franklin
brought to the meeting on October 22); JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 33:20–35:4.
155 JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 38:12–16, 67:13–25; JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 89:6–8; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.)
at 67:12–15, 68:11–13.
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156 Trial Tr. 397:8–10, 399:6–10 (Franklin); see also JX 1789 (Welsh Dep.) at 154:4–10.
157 Trial Tr. 397:15–398:4 (Franklin) (“I thought it was a little odd that, you know, a potential $20 billion transaction
would all hinge on the whims of the guy who is not the CEO, who is not even on the board ....”).
158 Id.
159 Trial Tr. 398:5–20 (Franklin); JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 201:6–202:7.
160 Trial Tr. 398:16–20 (Franklin).
161 Trial Tr. 615:5–14 (Polk); see also JX 799 at 2.
162 JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 221:24–222:9; Trial Tr. 398:21–399:5 (Franklin).
163 JX 815; PTO ¶140; JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 35:9–36:17; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 58:9–14.
164 JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 94:22–95:6; JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 46:17–20; JX 1785 (LeConey Dep.) at 87:2–
13; JX 1789 (Welsh Dep.) at 162:20–163:9.
165 JX 815.
166 JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 246:17–247:7; Trial Tr. 725:7–14 (Torres).
167 Trial Tr. 734:12–14 (Torres). Bain continued to analyze Jarden's category growth rates through closing. It
eventually determined that Jarden's categories “were relatively weak and were actually losing market share,”
like the Coleman brand that lost distribution to dominant outlets such as WalMart. This prompted Bain to
downgrade its category growth rate for Jarden to 2.5% as of closing. Trial Tr. 737:16–738:8 (Torres). When
additional information became available post-closing, Bain further decreased Jarden's category growth rate
to 2.2%. Trial Tr. 739:2–8 (Torres).
168 Trial Tr. 753:1–7 (Torres).
169 Trial Tr. 600:16–601:7 (Polk); see also JX 1309 at 80.
170 JX 706 at 3; Trial Tr. 746:22–23 (Torres).
171 Trial Tr. 741:4–742:2 (Torres).
172 JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 251:9–14; Trial Tr. 722:8–16 (Torres).
173 Trial Tr. 598:10–16, 686:17–687:13 (Polk) (the “logic for the deal” was to apply the Newell integration playbook
to Jarden's businesses); see also id. 699:6–9 (Polk) (“the costs associated with [Jarden's] decentralized
model, that's where the synergies were”).
174 JX 957 at 1.
175 Id. at 1–2.
176 Id. at 3 (Bain “highlighted three key benefits of the deal: transformational scale; high cost synergies; and
likely above average revenue synergies due to channel overlap and the ability to apply the Growth Game
Plan to selected categories at [Jarden]”).
177 JX 973 at 42; Trial Tr. 767:2–24 (Torres).
178 JX 943 at 11.
179 Trial Tr. 614:4–18, 678:12–16 (Polk).
180 Id.
181 Trial Tr. 678:12–16 (Polk) (“The deal architecture assumed $500 million of gross synergies. If we didn't deliver
$500 million of gross synergies, we would not have delivered the operating margin outcomes, and we would
not have delivered accretive EPS.”).
182 Trial Tr. 616:12–23 (Polk); JX 957 at 9.
183 JX 986; PTO ¶142.
184 JX 986 at 2.
185 Id.
186 JX 976 at 1–2; PTO ¶143.
187 JX 977.
188 JX 976 at 2–3; Trial Tr. 405:12–16 (Franklin).
189 JX 976 at 2; PTO ¶145.
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190 JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 91:22–25; see also JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 48:3–8 (“Q. Did Jarden to your
knowledge ever make a counteroffer to Newell? A. Not that I'm aware of. Q. Did the Board ever discuss
parameters of the counteroffer? A. Not that I'm aware of.”).
191 Trial Tr. 406:2–5 (Franklin).
192 JX 976 at 3.
193 Trial Tr. 562:4–5 (Franklin) (“The board wanted a second advisor.”); see also JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at
100:12–101:6.
194 Trial Tr. 407:2–15 (Franklin). Barclays earned about $180 million from all of Franklin's businesses, including
nearly $70 million from Platform alone in the four years between Platform's founding and the Merger Date.
JX 1805; Trial Tr. 546:11–17 (Franklin). Barclays' history with Franklin and his businesses earned Franklin
“Platinum client” status. JX 438; JX 1789 (Welsh Dep.) at 50:25–54:4. The Board made no inquiry regarding
the thickness of Franklin's relationship with Barclays and there is no indication that either Franklin or Barclays
made any effort to disclose their past relationships to the Board. See JX 976; JX 1070.
195 Trial Tr. 407:16–408:3 (Franklin).
196 Trial Tr. 560:22–24 (Franklin). Franklin explained to the Board that UBS had done work for the Company in
the past for free, and described the UBS engagement in connection with the Newell transaction as giving
UBS a “kiss.” Trial Tr. 561:19–562:12 (Franklin) (“I described it at one point as giving them a kiss. It was a
way of saying thanks for all the work that you've done that you didn't get compensated for. We—you know,
you're on par with a couple of other firms to do this advisory work for us for the board, and we're happy to have
you do that work.”). Petitioners argue that this means UBS was paid for doing no work and that the payment
diverted value from stockholders. This is not a fair characterization of UBS's role. The record reflects that
UBS prepared Board decks, led discussions at Board meetings and was generally available to the Board as
a sounding board. Trial Tr. 560:22–24 (Franklin); JX 1785 (LeConey Dep.) at 35:23–36:10. Whether UBS's
compensation was fully earned is beyond the scope of this appraisal proceeding.
197 Trial Tr. 408:4–15 (Franklin); JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 44:10–14; JX 976 at 3; PTO ¶146. See JX 1565 at
89 (“With respect to UBS, it was noted that Ms. Ros L'Esperance is the Head of Client Corporate Solutions
of UBS, and as such she would be recused from all deliberations and votes of the Jarden board, if any, in
respect of the possible business combination with Newell Rubbermaid.”).
198 Trial Tr. 408:24–409:8 (Franklin); JX 1001 at 1.
199 Trial Tr. 411:4–10 (Franklin).
200 Trial Tr. 409:1–8 (Franklin); Trial Tr. 618:24–619:3 (Polk); JX 1789 (Welsh Dep.) at 214:2–9; JX 1779
(Tarchetti Dep.) at 297:3–12, 300:8–16; JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 48:3–8; JX 1016 at 3; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.)
at 91:15–92:2; PTO ¶148.
201 Trial Tr. 410:2–7 (Franklin).
202 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 116:22–119:20 (“[A]s we explained to them, we were not sellers. If you want to buy
it, buy it. But don't waste our time. And it was a pretty acrimonious meeting. And it didn't make any difference
to us whether we bought or sold.”); see also Trial Tr. 410:8–24 (Franklin).
203 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 116:13–21.
204 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 119:6–9. Franklin similarly explained: “I went back to the board and said, This deal
is dead. We tried to get a better offer out of them, and they refused.” Trial Tr. 504:23–505:1 (Franklin).
205 JX 1069; JX 1066 at 2; JX 1149; PTO ¶153; JX 1064 at 2; see also Trial Tr. 619:18–620:5 (Polk) ($21.00
was “the limit to what we could afford” in cash consideration). According to Franklin, Newell “blinked” and
agreed to increase its offer. Trial Tr. 412:19–413:2 (Franklin).
206 JX 1064 at 3; see also JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 307:4–8 (“So by this stage, we'd obviously recommended
to the board that we should try to consummate the transaction because we believed the synergies would
create a lot of value for both parties.”).
207 JX 1064 at 3.
208 JX 1070 at 2; PTO ¶¶155, 157. Franklin went over the terms of the revised offer, discussing the increased
proposed cash consideration from $20.00 to $21.00 per share and the formula for determining the exchange
- 220 - 
In re Appraisal of Jarden Corporation, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
2019 WL 3244085
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 39
ratio. JX 1070 at 1. Barclays also presented its analysis of the updated offer, including a revised valuation
analysis of Jarden as a standalone company. JX 1079 at 27–28.
209 JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 112:5–6.
210 Id. at 55:7–15.
211 Id. at 55:10–56:9.
212 Id. at 49:3–11. See also JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 68:19–23, 69:23–70:4 (“When we looked at it and we
thought, you know, if we can realize something that begins with a 6 for our shareholders is that more than
we could expect if we continue to run the operations and did all the stuff? And we felt the answer was yes.”).
213 Trial Tr. 415:2–11 (Franklin).
214 Trial Tr. 415:19–23 (Franklin).
215 Trial Tr. 684:13–685:22 (Polk) (explaining that $500 million in synergies was assumed in the deal model,
but “if there's future value to be created, more synergies, more growth, then any equity owner benefits from
that”); see also Trial Tr. 415:2–15 (Franklin). Franklin described the $60.00 offer as “a full and fair price by
any measure.” Trial Tr. 444:5–10 (Franklin).
216 JX 1070 at 2–3; PTO ¶¶155, 157. During the exclusivity period, Franklin and Ashken continued to negotiate
the terms of the Merger Agreement, but also negotiated for Franklin, Ashken, and Lillie to continue with the
combined company as paid consultants through Mariposa. See JX 906; JX 1061; JX 1074.
217 JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 102:6–8 (explaining the Board's view that “it would not be value enhancing and
perhaps very distracting to management to run an auction”). Respondent acknowledges that the Board never
considered authorizing its bankers to reach out to other potential strategic buyers or financial sponsors. Id.
at 94:22–95:6.
218 Id. at 100:13–23.
219 Trial Tr. 419:21–420:5 (Franklin); see also Trial Tr. 918:10–921:11 (Zenner) (explaining that other large
consumer product companies had targeted businesses and were probably not interested in a diversified
company like Jarden). Until Newell surfaced, no potential acquirer had expressed interest in Jarden during
its entire 15-year history. Trial Tr. 425:10–13 (Franklin).
220 JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 129:2–130:14; JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 65:5–10.
221 JX 1565 at 90; JX 1116 at 194–242.
222 Trial Tr. 475:2–7 (Franklin); Trial Tr. 617:5–18 (Polk).
223 Trial Tr. 621:9–13 (Polk).
224 Trial Tr. 620:17–20 (Polk); Trial Tr. 406:24–407:1 (Franklin) (“[I]t would almost look odd if I didn't agree to
serve as a director in the go-forward company.”); JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 120:3–16, 124:6–18 (discussing
Franklin's role as the “face of Jarden” and the importance of having Franklin on the board of the combined
entity, which would serve as an endorsement of the Merger); JX 1803 (Cowhig Dep.) at 153:24–154:3.
225 Trial Tr. 686:17–687:13 (Polk) (“We wanted as part of—the deal terms, to get control of the company. Because
there was no way that, without our leadership of the change agenda, those synergies were going to be
realized.”); JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 153:15–19.
226 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 163:13–14.
227 Id. at 163:14–19 (explaining Newell was “very keen to have [the noncompete period] be four years” because
Newell “had had a bad experience” before with competition from a past executive); see also JX 1807 (Gross
Dep.) at 58:16–59:9 (noting Newell was “requiring that the management team extend their non-compete
agreements from two to four years,” which was a “big ask” since management was in the prime of their
careers).
228 Trial Tr. 526:18–20 (Franklin); JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 347:15–349:7.
229 JX 1233 at 2–3.
230 Id.
231 JX 1150 at 1–2; JX 1148; PTO ¶164. According to one witness, Newell's counsel leaked news of the Merger
to a reporter. JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 322:23–323:9.
232 PTO, Exs. A, B.
- 221 - 
In re Appraisal of Jarden Corporation, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
2019 WL 3244085
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 40
233 Trial Tr. 424:1–5 (Franklin); Trial Tr. 658:16–659:2 (Polk) (explaining that after the leak, Newell “had to”
negotiate a fixed exchange rate because “we would have had exposure, potentially, if the stock had run one
way or the other”); JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 325:17–23 (fixing the exchange ratio was “in the interest of
both parties because the stock prices were very volatile, and it was against the spirit of the agreement to not
reflect the fact that there had been a leak”); JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 136:12–17 (same).
234 JX 1195 at 1.
235 JX 1241 at 5; Trial Tr. 507:1–19 (Franklin).
236 JX 1218 at 2. Had Jarden negotiated for a 0.90 exchange ratio, Jarden stockholders would have received
$380 million in additional equity. Id.
237 Id.
238 JX 1207 at 3.
239 JX 1205.
240 JX 1202 at 1.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 JX 906 at rows 15–17; JX 1057; JX 1072 at 1–2.
244 JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 158:15–159:5. In addition to his work as Jarden's General Counsel, Capps has
served as General Counsel for Platform since 2016. S&P Global Market Intelligence, Platform Specialty
Products (ESI:NYSE) (2019). Capps was also to be a beneficiary of any grant of 2017 and 2018 RSAs. JX
1565 at 146–147.
245 JX 1231 at 18. There is no evidence the Compensation Committee ever looked at the employment
agreements. JX 1231 at 16; JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 66:12–22, 81:15–82:2 (“I don't even know if I've seen
it before.”).
246 JX 1232; JX 1231 at 2.
247 JX 1231 at 2; see JX 1255. Barclays delivered its written fairness opinion the following day. JX 1255.
248 JX 1231 at 4. The Jarden board reiterated “its belief that the combined company's long-term value, prospects
and benefits from the merger would exceed the value that could be realized by Jarden's stockholders were
Jarden to continue operating on a stand-alone (independent) basis.” Id. at 3.
249 Id. at 4, 9. The amended employment agreements for Franklin, Ashken and Lillie extended the term of
their non-competes upon termination from two years to four years. JX 1326 at 15. They also confirmed the
acceleration of certain RSAs in connection with the transaction. JX 1326 at 15; see also Trial Tr. 638:11–16
(Polk) (explaining that the negotiations concerning the RSAs were between the Jarden executives and the
Jarden board). Franklin, Ashken and Lillie had three-year “evergreen” employment agreements. Under those
agreements, they each were guaranteed their 2017 and 2018 RSAs, which the Board agreed to grant prior to
the Merger. JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 142:23–143:4, 146:4–7; Trial Tr. 517:9–19 (Franklin). Using Newell's
stock price as of the Merger Date to determine the exchange ratio cash equivalent, Franklin received a total
of $71.04 per share in Merger-related consideration, Ashken received a total of $76.11 per share and Lillie
received an equivalent of $81.69 per share. JX 1818 at ¶40.
250 JX 1231 at 2. The final Merger consideration represented a premium of 24.3% over the unaffected market
price of $48.31 on December 4, 2015 (the last day of trading before the leak) and a premium of 24% over
the VWAP of $48.35 for the 30-day period prior to December 11, 2015. Id.
251 JX 1251 at 1–2.
252 JX 1252 at 12; JX 1247 at 29; see also JX 775 at 5. Newell also used numbers in line with the Lender
Presentation projections in its internal modeling and in the presentation made to rating agencies on December
7, 2015. JX 1154 at 41.
253 JX 1230 at 10.
254 JX 1228 at 7. Bain's report in advance of the meeting estimated total annual synergies ranging from $585
million to $1 billion, comprised of $500–$700 million in cost synergies and $85–$320 million in revenue
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synergies. JX 1139 at 50. Bain was “very comfortable” Newell would meet at least the low end of its estimate
range. Trial Tr. 773:14–22, 774:17–775:6 (Torres).
255 PTO ¶¶179, 181.
256 JX 1269 at 3.
257 PTO, Ex. A.
258 JX 1816 at ¶53. Jarden's stock price never closed above the implied Merger price prior to closing. Id. at ¶54.
259 Id. at ¶58.
260 Id. at ¶59.
261 Id. at ¶¶59–60.
262 JX 1519 at 68. Net income fell by nearly 40% as compared to 2014 year-end. Id. Jarden also adjusted its
guidance downward twice during 2015. JX 454 at 4, 17, 41. And, in November 2015, Lillie advised investors
that Q4 2015 organic growth would be in the 2–4% range, not the 3–5% range as earlier reported. JX 1034
at 1.
263 JX 1514 at 1–2; see also Trial Tr. 622:15–17 (Polk) (noting that Jarden fell below its goals for Q1 2016).
264 Id.; Trial Tr. 440:22–441:1 (Franklin); see also JX 1510; Trial Tr. 823:13–19, 856:1–6 (Waldron). The 2016
budget assumed Jarden would remain a standalone company. Trial Tr. 830:16–21 (Waldron).
265 JX 1562 (revised multi-year plan projecting $9.816 billion in total revenue); see also Trial Tr. 833:5–834:11
(Waldron). Newell asked for a copy of Jarden's updated multi-year plan in mid-March 2016, which Jarden
provided. Trial Tr. 833:5–834:11 (Waldron). Newell later asked Jarden to reevaluate the operating cash flow
assumptions in the plan. After doing this, Jarden circulated a revised version on April 1, 2016. Trial Tr. 832:24–
838:3 (Waldron). See also JX 1563; JX 1597; JX 1598. While this revision included minor adjustments, the
annual revenue and EBITDA projections remained the same as those estimated in the unrevised plan. Id.
266 Trial Tr. 834:12–835:11 (Waldron).
267 JX 1598; JX 1565; see also JX 1826 at ¶88, Figure 16. Newell incorporated the revised multi-year plan into
its own multi-year forecast. Newell's forecast, however, assumed growth at 3.5%. JX 1691 at 95; Trial Tr.
626:4–627:15 (Polk).
268 PTO ¶183. Over 97% of voting Jarden stockholders approved the Merger (representing 83% of the
outstanding shares). JX 1663 at 7.
269 JX 1816 at ¶10. The per share decrease in consideration from $60.03 to $59.21 reflects the change in Newell's
stock price from signing to closing.
270 Trial Tr. 780:14–781:2 (Torres); see also JX 1373 at 11.
271 Trial Tr. 781:18–782:20 (Torres); JX 1691 at 7.
272 Trial Tr. 783:4–784:7 (Torres).
273 JX 1666; JX 2015; Trial Tr. 447:16–18 (Franklin); Trial Tr. 796:22–797:11, 798:20–799:11, 800:20–801:24,
802:18–804:3 (Torres).
274 JX 1801; JX 1802; Trial Tr. 802:18–803:4 (Torres). Franklin strongly objected to this strategy. JX 1808; JX
1809; JX 1825; JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 16:9–14.
275 JX 1803 (Cowhig Dep.) at 191:13–20.
276 Newell Brands announced an agreement to sell Waddington in April 2018 for $2.3 billion, almost $1 billion
more than the price Jarden paid less than three years prior. Trial Tr. 450:18–451:2 (Franklin) (“Q. Okay.
Waddington, you bought for 1.35 million [sic] in July of 2015. Correct? A. Correct. Q. And Newell sold that
business this year for 2.3 billion. Right? A. Correct. Q. They made almost a billion on that. Right? A. Yes.”).
277 Trial Tr. 447:2–11 (Franklin); JX 1808; JX 1809; JX 1823; JX 1834.
278 JX 1803 (Cowhig Dep.) at 184:17–188:12; JX 1809.
279 Trial Tr. 447:12–15 (Franklin); JX 1809.
280 JX 1822.
281 Newell Brands, Inc., Form 8-K at 3 (dated May 17, 2018).
282 PTO ¶11.
283 D.I. 13.
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284 D.I. 35.
285 D.I. 37.
286 The expert reports were submitted under seal. At the close of this case, the Court will unseal the reports.
Perhaps the legal and business academies will find interesting, and worthy of study and classroom discussion,
how two such well-credentialed experts in their fields reached such wildly divergent conclusions regarding
the fair value of the same company as of the same date.
287 D.I. 154.
288 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
289 DFC, 172 A.3d at 364 (quoting 8 Del. C. § 262(h)).
290 Dell, 177 A.3d at 21 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983)).
291 Id.
292 Id. at 22.
293 Aruba, 2019 WL 1614026, at *6.
294 In re Appraisal of AOL Inc., 2018 WL 1037450, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2018). See also In re Appraisal of
PetSmart, Inc., 2017 WL 2303599, at *27 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017) (collecting cases).
295 In re Appraisal of PetSmart, Inc., 2017 WL 2303599, at *27 (citing Chuck Carlson, Game of My Life: 25
Stories of Packer Football (Sports Pub. 2004) (quoting Coach Lombardi as opening his first Packers team
meeting in 1959, after twenty years of coaching, by saying: “Gentleman, we are going to relentlessly chase
perfection, knowing full well we will not catch it, because nothing is perfect.”)).
296 Id. (citing Merlin P'rs LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., 2015 WL 2069417, at *14 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015) (observing that
no “real-world sales process” will live up to “a perfect, theoretical model”)).
297 Dell, Inc., 177 A.3d at 35.
298 Dr. Zenner testified that auctions are less effective as companies increase in scale and complexity. Trial Tr.
915:3–14, 916:17–917:17 (Zenner). For sale transactions over $5.4 billion, as here, only one in five are the
product of an auction. Id.; JX 1817, App'x C-5. See also JX 1827 at ¶¶53–54 (explaining that the most logical
strategic partners were too small to buy the Company); JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 101:18–102:11 (Jarden
routinely “looked at likely people we could have business combinations with or that we could acquire ...
[and] didn't think there was anybody out there who would come in and make a preemptive offer to buy the
company”); Trial Tr. 921:12–923:16 (Zenner); JX 1817 at ¶95 (explaining that financial sponsors were not
interested in Jarden because its leverage was too high); Trial Tr. 419:6–8 (Franklin) (“In 15 years of building
the company, I haven't had one company come and sort of make an offer to buy Jarden.”); JX 1789 (Welsh
Dep.) at 143:5–10 (“The combination with Newell was viewed to be a highly strategic combination that couldn't
necessarily be replicated with other counterparties....”); JX 1785 (LeConey Dep.) at 88:3–4 (“UBS was not
aware of any other buyers that were interested in acquiring all of Jarden.”).
299 Trial Tr. 504:23–505:1 (Franklin) (“I went back to the board and said, This deal is dead. We tried to get a
better offer out of them, and they refused.”); JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 119:6–9; see also JX 1807 (Gross
Dep.) at 41:3–15.
300 JX 1816 at ¶169, Figure 23.
301 I appreciate Franklin was no longer CEO when he negotiated with Newell. With regard to M&A, however,
his role as Executive Chairman was tantamount to that of a typical CEO. Trial Tr. 367:15–22, 467:20–22
(Franklin).
302 JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 54:13–22, 58:9–21, 121:10–122:3; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 25:2–7, 26:10–19,
31:12–25, 32:2–17, 157:25–158:14. Franklin's revelation at the Boat Meeting that he would like to exit from
Jarden in order to have more time to pursue business ventures with his sons also made an impression on Polk
and, when coupled with his direction regarding an acceptable offer price, likely communicated to Newell that
he was eager, maybe overly eager, to do a deal. See JX 765 (Tarchetti reporting that Franklin revealed “his
desire for an exit, which as the company figurehead is difficult. He says he would like to inve[st] in business
with his sons having taken some money off the table (assuming he has about 0.5bn if this happened”)); Trial
Tr. 71:20–72:12 (Polk); Trial Tr. 164:14–165:3 (Tarchetti). There is other evidence in the record that Franklin
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was perceived as an anxious seller. See JX 576 (Bill Ackman's July 2015 email to Warren Buffett, copying
Franklin, attempting to interest Buffett in acquiring Jarden); JX 533; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 157:25–158:14;
JX 860 (Centerview set up the first meeting between Franklin and Polk, marketing Jarden to Newell as a
“willing seller.”); JX 902 at 2 (Polk stating that Franklin “cut straight to the chase” about his willingness to
sell Jarden).
303 JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 38:12–16, 48:3–8, 67:13–25; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 72:9–18, 91:15–92:2; JX
1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 89:6–8.
304 JX 1049. The Board justified the compensation awards after the fact. JX 1212 at 15; JX 1565 at 146.
Moreover, as Franklin and Ashken were telling Newell they were entitled to the 2017 and 2018 RSAs, Jarden's
Compensation Committee had not discussed the possibility of awarding those grants. JX 1145; JX 1202. The
Board was told by in-house counsel Capps—who was also receiving 2017 and 2018 RSAs—that Jarden was
contractually obligated to make these awards even though the agreements at issue were not clear on the
point. JX 1629 at 5; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 158:15–159:5. There are other troubling facts relating to the
change-in-control payments, including that Franklin arranged for his long-time legal counsel to advise the
Board with respect to the payments and the payments ultimately resulted in the lead negotiators for Jarden
receiving substantially more in Merger consideration than Jarden's other stockholders. See JX 1145; JX 1234;
JX 1235; JX 1236; Trial Tr. 534:18–536:11–18 (Franklin); JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 362:20–22. Respondent
argues the RSAs that made up most of the Merger consideration differential Franklin and the other Jarden
managers received were owed to them “in the regular course absent a sale.” Resp't Jarden Corp.'s Opening
Post-Trial Br. (“ROB”) at 57. The Merger agreement, however, terminated the employment contracts under
which the RSAs were granted. See JX 1235. Franklin and the other Jarden managers claimed they were
contractually owed the 2017 and 2018 RSAs under their employment agreements before the separation
agreements even existed. JX 906 at rows 15–17; JX 1057; JX 1072; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 158:15–159:5.
The Board then justified the disconnect by explaining the 2017 and 2018 RSAs served as consideration for
the commitment to add two more years to the non-compete covenants. JX 1565 at 146. Of course, when
the dust settled, the separation agreements extended the term of the non-compete covenants by only one
year. JX 1234; JX 1235; JX 1236.
305 JX 1805; Trial Tr. 546:11–17 (Franklin); JX 438; JX 1789 (Welsh Dep.) at 50:25–54:4; JX 1780 (Franklin
Dep.) at 269:6–19.
306 By so finding, I do not intend to suggest that Franklin or any Jarden fiduciary breached any fiduciary duty.
That inquiry is beyond the scope of this appraisal proceeding. See In re Unocal Expl. Corp. S'holders Litig.,
793 A.2d 329, 340 (Del. Ch. 2000) (noting that a breach of fiduciary finding is beyond the scope of statutory
appraisal).
307 Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software Inc., 2015 WL 6164771 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015).
308 Id. at *17.
309 JX 1817 at ¶¶32–33, 41–43.
310 Trial Tr. 686:17–687:13 (Polk) (“We wanted as part of—the deal terms, to get control of the company. Because
there was no way that, without our leadership of the change agenda, those synergies were going to be
realized.”); JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 153:15–19.
311 JX 1269 at 3.
312 JX 1565 at 85.
313 JX 1228 at 7. Bain had estimated synergies ranging from $585 million to $1 billion, comprised of $500–$700
million in cost synergies and $85–$320 million in revenue synergies. JX 1139 at 50.
314 JX 1817 at ¶40; JX 1816 at ¶183;
315 JX 1100 at 18; JX 1804 (Polk Dep.) at 100:2–5, 101:15–16.
316 JX 1100 at 18.
317 Trial Tr. 649:5–8 (Polk); JX 2022 (“The premium is designed to get Newell management control.”); JX 1804
(Polk Dep.) at 100:2–5, 101:15–16 (When asked “how did you come to the conclusion that a modest premium
to their current market valuation would give Newell control,” Polk responded “I knew that it was a quid pro
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quo” and “[i]f we were going to pay a premium for the asset, we need management control.”). Of course,
Polk clarified that control was necessary to achieve the synergies since Newell was not satisfied that Jarden
management would take the steps needed to create synergies. See Trial Tr. 686:17–22 (Polk).
318 JX 1804 (Polk Dep.) at 115:4–9.
319 Trial Tr. 476:3–5 (Franklin).
320 Trial Tr. 598:10–21, 599:14–600:6, 614:4–18, 678:12–6 (Polk); JX 1803 (Cowhig Dep.) at 62:20–63:2; JX
1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 29:6–30:9; JX 674 at 2 (September 2015 Polk email, emphasizing the “tons of
synergies” to be realized by employing the Project Renewal strategy) (emphasis in original); Trial Tr. 725:7–
14, 742:3–743:19 (Torres); JX 973 at 36; JX 1139 at 50, 56; JX 1565 at 67.
321 JX 1816 at ¶¶181–83; JX 1831 at ¶4, Figure 25; Trial Tr. 1087:23–1091:9 (Hubbard).
322 JX 1816 at ¶188 (“These results indicate that the market expected nearly all of the synergy value to accrue to
Jarden shareholders, consistent with academic research finding that most of the benefits of mergers accrue
to target-firm shareholders.”); Trial Tr. 1090:18–20 (Hubbard).
323 BMC Software, 2015 WL 6164771, at *17.
324 To be clear, and as explained below, I am satisfied from the evidence that the Merger Price exceeded fair
value. It is less clear, however, what exactly justified the premium Newell was willing to pay for Jarden. This is
partially a product of the complications in valuing synergies where the merger consideration includes stock,
versus a strictly cash-for-stock merger.
In such a transaction, shareholders of both constituent corporations remain shareholders in the
continuing combined enterprise. Thus, both groups—acquirer shareholders and target shareholders—
are able to participate pro rata in gains arising out of the merger. Therefore, a premium to the target's
shareholders cannot be justified, as in a cash acquisition, on the premise that it is the only way to permit
those shareholders to share in the gains arising from the merger.
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Premiums in Stock-for-Stock Mergers and Some Consequences in the Law of
Director Fiduciary Duties, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 881, 884 (2003).
325 As noted, news of the potential merger between Jarden and Newell leaked to the public on Monday,
December 7, 2015. See JX 1150 at 1–2; JX 1148; PTO ¶164; JX 1164; Liz Hoffman, Dana Mattioli & Dana
Cimilluca, Newell Rubbermaid, Jarden in Merger Talks, The Wall Street Journal (2015), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/newell-rubbermaid-jarden-in-merger-talks-1449521419 (last visited July 19, 2019). The last day
Jarden stock was traded without being affected by news of the merger negotiations was Friday, December
4, 2015. JX 1231 at 2. On that day, Jarden stock closed at $48.31 per share. JX 1816 at ¶47.
326 ROB at 2.
327 Trial Tr. 1267:17–1268:5 (Hubbard) (“I've seen nothing in the record that would suggest to me the unaffected
stock price is not the right anchor [for fair value].”).
328 Trial Tr. 323:15–326:14 (Zmijewski). See also Trial Tr. 1021:2–9 (Hubbard) (“Does Dr. Zmijewski in his reports
dispute that either Newell or Jarden traded in an efficient market? A. Not in his reports, no. Q. And did you
hear that in his testimony? A. I did not. I was present, and I didn't hear that.”).
329 JX 1816 at ¶45. See also JX 2032, Jonathan Berk & Peter DeMarzo, Corporate Finance 301 (Pearson
Education Limited, 4th ed. 2017) (“Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance”); JX 2515, Aswath Damodaran,
Investment Valuation: Tools and Techniques for Determining the Value of Any Asset 4 (Wiley, 3d ed. 2012)
(Damodaran, Investment Valuation); JX 2516, Tim Koller et al., McKinsey & Co., Valuation: Measuring and
Managing the Value of Companies 37–38 (Wiley, 6th ed. 2015) (“Koller, Valuation”).
330 JX 1816 at ¶45.
331 JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 302.
332 JX 1816 at ¶45; Trial Tr. 323:15–324:4 (Zmijewski) (acknowledging that one “can look to stock price to
corroborate a fair value conclusion”); Trial Tr. 1017:11–14 (Hubbard) (“For the unaffected stock price to be
relevant, Your Honor, to your consideration, you need to believe that it's an unbiased indicator of the value
of the firm. That's an efficient market.”).
333 Dr. Hubbard stated,
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[t]here are tests for whether a market is efficient, tests that economists suggest, but tests that have been
widely used in courts. So I used a number of factors that capture the scope of the firm, whether analysts
follow it, transactions cost, liquidity, and so on. I do those tests for both Jarden and Newell and conclude
that both trade in an efficient market, semi-strong form.
Trial Tr. 1017:11–14 (Hubbard).
334 Resp't Jarden Corp.'s Pre-Trial Br. at 6.
335 JX 1816 at ¶44, Figure 10.
336 JX 242, Robert W. Holthausen & Mark E. Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation: Theory, Evidence & Practice 301–
03 (Cambridge Business Publishers, 1st ed. 2014) (“Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation”).
337 JX 1345, Duff & Phelps LLC, 2016 Valuation Handbook: Guide to Cost of Capital (Chapter 3) 9 (John Wiley,
2016) (“Duff & Phelps, Valuation Handbook”).
338 JX 1816 at ¶46.
339 Id. at ¶48.
340 Id.
341 JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 73.
342 JX 1816 at ¶¶47–48.
343 Id. at ¶47.
344 Id. at ¶48.
345 Id.
346 Id.; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 73 (“The term efficient market is also sometimes used to
describe a market that, along with other properties, is without arbitrage opportunities.”) (emphasis in original).
347 JX 1816 at ¶49; JX 2514 at 8–11; Trial Tr. 1019:2–16 (Hubbard).
348 Id.
349 JX 1816 at ¶51.
350 Id.
351 Id.
352 Id. at ¶52.
353 Id. at ¶¶52–53.
354 Id.
355 Id. at ¶54.
356 Id.
357 The Merger marks the rare instance where two public companies of comparable size, comparable capital
structure and comparable stock trading patterns combine. As Dr. Hubbard explained, for most of the reasons
one can conclude that Jarden traded in an efficient market, the same can be said for Newell. Id., Figure 15.
358 Id. at ¶58.
359 Id. at ¶60. See also id. at ¶62 (“According to the analysts covering Newell at the time, consumer recession
fears, merger integration risks, and the high initial leverage resulting from the Merger were key factors
affecting Newell's stock price.”).
360 Jarden is justified in pointing out that while he raised the criticisms, Dr. Zmijewski did “not explicitly opine
on whether or not any of these factors actually depressed Jarden's [unaffected] market price relative to fair
value.” JX 1826 at ¶98. See also JX 1828 at ¶90 (Dr. Zmijewski making observations regarding the Unaffected
Market Price but not correlating them).
361 JX 1828 at ¶90; JX 1826 at ¶98.
362 Id.
363 JX 1818 at ¶30.
364 Id. at ¶¶29–31.
365 JX 1826 at ¶¶99–100.
366 Id., Figure 17.
367 Id.
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368 Id. at ¶¶101–04.
369 JX 1818 at ¶31.
370 Id.
371 Trial Tr. 1022:21–1023:14 (Hubbard).
372 JX 1826 at ¶¶101–04.
373 Id. at ¶¶103–04. I acknowledge, and understand, Petitioners' “tethering” argument, but I reject it as not
supported by the credible evidence. The argument is that the market was not efficient as of the Merger
because, after the announcement of the Merger, “Jarden's stock price was tethered to Newell and to the
perception of the stockholders of both companies that there was a large risk that Jarden could not be
successfully integrated.” Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. at 60. Newell's stockholders may have reacted to that
risk, as reflected in the stock's performance after the announcement, but there is no evidence that Jarden's
stockholders, or the market, associated that risk with Jarden. See Trial Tr. 1020:12–23 (Hubbard); JX 2514
at 9; JX 1816 at ¶¶184–90.
374 JX 1826, Figures 18, 19.
375 Id. That the November Projections did not really move the needle is not surprising. They were optimistic, to
be sure, but their projected growth was consistent with prior forecasts, albeit at the top of the range. JX 927 at
1; Trial Tr. 106:1–107:3 (Lillie). They were also not out of line with the views of several of the many analysts
that followed the Company. See, e.g., JX 1401; JX 1407; JX 1439.
376 JX 1818 at ¶¶37–39.
377 JX 1826 at ¶¶108–12; JX 2505 (Zmijewski Dep.) 318:23–319:4, 320:8–11. Dr. Zmijewski's opinion that the
market had not assessed Jarden's acquisitions of Jostens and Waddington, as best I can tell, is nothing more
than speculation. The fact that the market reacted poorly to the Jostens acquisition does not mean it did not
understand it. Nor is there credible evidence that the market did not know, or understand, that Jarden had
leveraged up to do the Jostens and Waddington deals.
378 Trial Tr. 1029:3–9 (Hubbard) (“academics differ in opinions on whether there is or isn't [a conglomerate
discount]”); JX 1826 at ¶111 & n.176 (citing academic commentary rejecting the notion of a conglomerate
discount).
379 JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 32–33.
380 JX 1826 at ¶¶108–10; Trial Tr. 1029:10-21 (Hubbard); Trial Tr. 335:9–21 (Zmijewski) (“Q. So the holding
company structure of Jarden, whatever its affects may be, were the operative reality of Jarden. Correct? As
of the merger date? A. That's true.”).
381 JX 2505 (Zmijewski Dep.) at 319:22–320:16; JX 1818 at ¶¶37–39.
382 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) 117:10–17; Trial Tr. 378:14–17 (Franklin).
383 JX 1826 at ¶¶106–07. See also JX 59, Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Short and
Puzzling Life of the “Implicit Minority Discount” in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2007).
384 JX 1818 at ¶30.
385 JX 1519 at 68; JX 1514 at 2.
386 JX 1562; Trial Tr. 821:6–828:1, 830:7–835:11 (Waldron).
387 JX 2502.
388 JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) 201:19–24.
389 Trial Tr. 404:1–9 (Franklin); JX 900.
390 JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) 241:11–14.
391 JX 900 at 2.
392 Id. at 65.
393 Id. It is not entirely clear to me that Dr. Zmijewski feels as strongly about his comparable companies valuation
of Jarden as Petitioners do. See JX 1828 at ¶8 (“I do not consider revenue multiples to be reliable to value
Jarden ....”).
394 JX 1816 at ¶200.
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395 JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 510, 527–30; Trial Tr. 1068:13–15 (Hubbard) (“If
you use [a] comparables [analysis], you have to be sure they are really comparable or you are introducing
error yourself.”).
396 JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 527–29.
397 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 345.
398 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 20.
399 JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 296.
400 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 345–46.
401 Id. at 346; JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 528–29.
402 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 346. See also JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 710; Damodaran,
Investment Valuation at 462 (“A comparable firm is one with cash flows, growth potential, and growth risk
similar to the firm being valued .... The implicit assumption being made here is that firms in the same sector
have similar risk, growth, and cash flow profiles and therefore can be compared with much more legitimacy”).
403 Id. Trial Tr. 1068:13–15 (Hubbard) (“I mean, it's really just a restatement of garbage in, garbage out. If you
don't have genuine comparables, you're not going to get much out of the approach.”)
404 JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 529–30.
405 Id. at 529.
406 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 346.
407 JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 296–97 (emphasis supplied). See Trial Tr. 1068:13–15
(Hubbard) (“Given the difficulty of finding comparables for this company in particular, this is a methodology
that I used for completeness and for the record for the Court, but it would not be a principal method I would
advocate that the Court center on.”). See also JX 1826 at ¶17.
408 JX 1816 at ¶194; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 335 (“Empirical evidence shows that forward-looking multiples
are indeed more accurate predictors of value than historical multiples are.”).
409 The EBITDA multiples valuation is generally considered more reliable than a revenue multiples approach
because the EBITDA approach accounts for firms' operating efficiency and is not affected by leverage
differences between firms. JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 710.
410 Id. at 710, 714; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 334–36; JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation
at 532.
411 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 334; Trial Tr. 159:7–14 (Zmijewski) (“Well, value is derived from what's going to
happen or what you expect to happen in the future, so looking forward is always better than looks backward....
If historical information doesn't predict the future, it's not useful at all. It's only the forward-looking information
that's useful.”).
412 Id. at 335–36.
413 Trial Tr. 294:16–20 (Zmijewski); JX 1818 at ¶55 (“I base my set of comparable companies on those companies
identified by Jarden's CEO, Mr. Lillie and the comparable companies used by Jarden's financial advisor,
Barclays.”); JX 1828 at ¶¶68–70. I note it is not clear that Dr. Zmijewski drew his peer set from the right
Barclays list. The list endorsed by management was prepared by Barclays' equity analyst team while Dr.
Zmijewski drew his list from the one prepared by Barclays' investment banking team. Trial Tr. 264:23–268:14
(Zmijewski). Moreover, I find Dr. Zmijewski's narrow focus on the Barclays list as the sole basis for his
comparable companies peculiar given the extent to which he is critical of the Barclays Fairness Opinion. See
JX 1818 at ¶¶1–42; JX 1826 at ¶¶46–47.
414 JX 1826 at ¶17; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 346; JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation
at 511 (“The key issues in valuing companies using market multiples are choosing appropriate comparable
companies that would be priced similar to the company being valued and the making adjustments to the
financial numbers used so that distortions to the valuation do not arise from accounting differences or certain
events that can affect the financial statements in ways that render the numbers less useful for a market
multiple valuation.”). Dr. Zmijewski's decision apparently to ignore Barclays' qualification that its peer set
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would have to be adjusted to account for qualitative differences between Jarden and the peer set was never
adequately explained. Trial Tr. 294:24–296:24 (Zmijewski); JX 1565 at 127–28; JX 1205 at 11, 17.
415 JX 1816 at ¶¶194–96.
416 JX 1818 at ¶57.
417 JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 525. Given his willingness to defer to peer sets
prepared by others, it is surprising that Dr. Zmijewski failed to reconcile his exclusion of Kimberly-Clark
and Colgate-Palmolive from his peer set with the fact that those companies were included in the peer sets
developed by several of the analysts who followed Jarden. JX 1826 at ¶¶43–45.
418 Dr. Hubbard flagged Dr. Zmijewski's size discrepancy in his rebuttal report. As Dr. Hubbard noted, although
the market capitalization of Kimberly-Clark and Colgate-Palmolive were, respectively, 4.6 and 6.0 times larger
relative to Jarden, three of Dr. Zmijewski's selected peers were correspondingly smaller than Jarden. JX 1826
at ¶¶40–43. WD-40 Company, Energizer Holdings and Helen of Troy were 7.3, 3.9 and 3.7 times smaller than
Jarden, respectively, yet each of these firms remained in Dr. Zmijewski's peer set. Id. Dr. Zmijewski provided
no credible justification for the disparate, asymmetrical treatment of large and small companies in his peer
set. Id. See also Trial Tr. 935:6–936:17 (Zenner); JX 1827 at ¶¶45–47 (credibly addressing the fallacy created
by Dr. Zmijewski's inconsistent approach to exclusion and inclusion of comparables based on size).
419 JX 1826 at ¶¶15–17.
420 Trial Tr. 1103:21–24 (Hubbard).
421 JX 1816 at ¶195.
422 JX 1826 at ¶¶38–35. Dr. Hubbard's peer set included firms with core business lines comparable to Jarden's
core business, namely housewares, household appliances, consumer durables, apparel and personal
products industry actors. JX 1816 at ¶195.
423 JX 1826 at ¶17.
424 JX 1818 at ¶¶55–57. As noted, Dr. Zmijewski offered no empirical analysis of Jarden's growth, risk, or
value drivers as compared to any of the firms in his peer group. Id. But see JX 242, Holthausen &
Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 529–30 (“... simply selecting close competitors is not sufficient to ensure
the companies are comparable .... Once we identify competitors, we analyze both the company being valued
and the competitors with respect to characteristics that determine the variation in market multiples—such as
future growth prospects, risk future profitability, and future expected investment requirements.”).
425 The party sponsoring a comparable companies valuation has the burden of proving that the target has
validly assessed peers. See In re Appraisal of SWS Gp., Inc., 2017 WL 2334852, at *10 (Del. Ch. May
30, 2017). Petitioners have not met that burden. In reaching this conclusion, I am mindful that Jarden,
itself, employed a comparable companies analysis, among other approaches, when it performed internal
valuations. But Petitioners have not proffered those valuations as evidence of Jarden's fair value. Instead,
they have presented Dr. Zmijewski's version of a comparable companies analysis, which differed substantially
from the Company's valuations. Accordingly, they had the burden of proving that the Zmijewski comparable
companies valuation was a reliable indicator of fair value. For reasons I have explained, I have determined
they have not carried that burden. In other words, the fact the Company employed comparable companies
analyses in the past to value Jarden might be evidence that the methodology can work for Jarden, but the
appraiser still has to apply the methodology in a principled way. That principled application of the methodology
is what is lacking here. As a final note, for what it's worth, I did find Dr. Zmijewski's approach to selecting a
proper multiple for Jarden to be more credible than Dr. Hubbard's approach, particularly given that he focused
his multiples analysis on Jarden's 2016 and 2017 projected earnings, as prescribed in the valuation texts,
while Dr. Hubbard based his multiples analysis on Jarden's historical EBITDA and revenue data. Compare JX
1818 at ¶¶74–76 (Zmijewski) with JX 1816 at ¶¶194–200. See JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance
at 710, 714; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 334–36; JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at
532 (expressing preference for using forward-looking projections over a firm's historical earnings data when
determining a proper multiple). Of course, this observation is worth little given the lack of credible evidence
that Dr. Zmijewski created a proper peer set.
- 230 - 
In re Appraisal of Jarden Corporation, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
2019 WL 3244085
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 49
426 Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publ'rs, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 361 (Del. 1997). See also M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. Le
Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 525–26 (Del. 1999) (reiterating the Chancellor's role “as an independent appraiser” and
observing that “[i]n discharging its statutory mandate, the Court of Chancery has the discretion to select one
of the parties' valuation models as its general framework or to fashion its own”).
427 Dr. Zmijewski made two DCF calculations: an industry-specific DCF, which incorporated his comparable
companies analyses (“Composite DCF”), and a Jarden-specific DCF (“Jarden-Specific DCF”). JX 1818 at
¶¶70–72.
428 JX 1816 at ¶149; JX 1831 at ¶3.
429 Pet'rs' Pre-Trial Br. at 33.
430 JX 2514 at 14. Indeed, as Jarden points out, “over 83% of value in each of [Dr.] Zmijewski's DCFs is from
the terminal period.” Resp't Jarden Corp.'s Answering Post-Trial Br. at 60.
431 JX 1565 at 143.
432 JX 1816 at ¶¶75–78, Ex. 9; JX 1818 at ¶51, Ex. VI-7A.
433 I adopt Dr. Zmijewski's 35.0% marginal tax rate for Jarden because Dr. Hubbard made no effort to support
his effective tax rate of 36.3%. JX 1816 at ¶¶96–97; JX 1828 at ¶¶9–11. A 35% marginal tax rate comports
with the tax rates applied by Barclays, Centerview, Goldman Sachs and Jarden management—all of which
set Jarden's marginal tax rate between 33% and 35%. JX 1828 at ¶¶9–10, 24.
434 JX 1816 at ¶¶75–78, Ex. 9; JX 1818 at ¶51, Ex. VI-7A.
435 JX 1816 at ¶¶75–78, Ex. 9. I track Dr. Zmijewski's free cash flows analysis with respect to the tax rate because
I agree with him that Dr. Hubbard's approach to estimating Jarden's tax rate in the projected years is not
adequately supported. JX 1828 at ¶¶9–11.
436 JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 256.
437 Id. (“[W]e estimate the value of the remaining free cash flow beyond the forecast horizon by including a[ ] ...
one-time cash flow at the end of the forecast horizon .... [The terminal value] represents the market value (as
of the last forecast period) of the free cash flow ... at all future dates.”).
438 Trial Tr. 300:17–24 (Zmijewski) (“I paired the comparable companies risk assessment with a lower growth
rate because the comparable companies ... were expected to perform at a lower growth rate. And for the
Jarden-specific risk assessment, I used the midpoint of the expected inflation and expected GDP growth.”)
439 JX 1816 at ¶¶84–85.
440 Id.
441 Id.
442 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 308.
443 Trial Tr. 930:2–9 (Zenner) (“So it's a little bit like saying I baked gluten-free bread for you, but I added some
wheat because the consistency is going to be better. So it's kind of saying I'm providing organic growth, but
I'm adding some tuck-in transactions.”).
444 For Jarden, “tuck-ins” were defined as an acquisition where the target company's last twelve months (“LTM”)
of revenue was less than 1.0% of Jarden's LTM revenue. JX 1828 at ¶¶46–47.
445 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 306–07 (“no firm can grow forever at a rate higher than the
growth rate of the economy in which it operates”); JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 122.
446 JX 1816 at ¶¶87–92; JX 1818 at ¶¶52–53.
447 JX 1818 at ¶¶52–53.
448 Id. at ¶¶53–54.
449 JX 1828 at ¶¶46–47.
450 JX 1818 at ¶¶52–54, Ex. VI-2. Polk estimated Jarden would grow at 3.0% (mirroring U.S. GDP growth), while
Bain forecasted Jarden's growth to be between 2.0% and 4.0%. Id.
451 Id. at ¶¶67–69.
452 Id.
453 Id. at ¶¶70–72.
454 JX 1816 at ¶¶86–92.
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455 Id. at ¶¶89–90, Figure 20.
456 Id. at ¶¶89–92, Ex. 5A.
457 JX 1826 at ¶¶32–34, Figure 6. Dr. Hubbard maintains that the Company's 3.0% to 5.0% growth projections in
the years following 2015 do not agree with its 2.2% historic organic growth because management incorrectly
failed to account for “tuck-in” acquisitions. Id.; JX 1816 at ¶¶90–92.
458 JX 1816 at ¶¶90–92, Ex. 5A; JX 1826 at ¶¶32–34, Figure 6.
459 JX 1828 at ¶¶46–48.
460 Trial Tr. at 1116–18 (Hubbard); JX 1831 at ¶8.
461 JX 1831 at ¶8.
462 JX 1826 at ¶32 (“[I]n recent history, tuck-ins contributed approximately 1.8 percentage points to the “organic”
growth reported by management, indicating that Jarden would need to continue tuck-in acquisitions in order
to achieve the five percent growth in the Proxy Projections.”).
463 Trial Tr. at 1116–18 (Hubbard); JX 1831 at ¶8.
464 JX 1816 at ¶¶86–90.
465 JX 1828 at ¶¶46–48.
466 JX 1818 at ¶¶52–53.
467 I note that the literature cautions against relying on comparable companies when estimating terminal value
because inconsistencies in projected growth rates between the target company and those of the peer group
can either overvalue or undervalue the target business. JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation
at 212.
468 Trial Tr. 215:20–216:17 (Zmijewski); JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 216–17.
469 JX 1818 at ¶¶52–53.
470 JX 1816 at ¶¶149–150; JX 1818 at ¶¶70–72; JX 1831 at ¶3.
471 Trial Tr. 195:18–20 (Zmijewski) (“He's using accounting data as if it were economic concepts. That doesn't
work. And so that's my major disagreement with him.”); Trial Tr. 197:14–17 (Zmijewski) (“These are all
economic concepts. They're not—you can't sort of say here's an accounting number and it matches this.
These are economic concepts, not accounting concepts”).
472 JX 63; JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 235–37.
473 Id.; JX 1828 at ¶¶37–38.
474 JX 1828 at ¶¶34–35, 45. Dr. Zmijewski never expressly sets his TIR at 4.9%, but implicitly determines that
net investment in 2021 and onward will equal $60 million, or approximately 4.9% of operating profits. JX
1826 at ¶¶54–55, 62, 66–67, Figure 14. Dr. Zmijewski also assumed that depreciation will equal capital
expenditures in the Terminal Period, and that Jarden's cash investment required to drive terminal growth
will grow coequally with Jarden's other financial metrics. JX 1818, Ex. VI-6A (Dr. Zmijewski made some
adjustments to the historical financial data such that normalized depreciation is equal to normalized capital
expenditures of $308 million).
475 Trial Tr. 1045:21–1046:2 (Hubbard).
476 JX 1816 at ¶94.
477 Trial Tr. 1055:16–18 (Hubbard).
478 IR = g/RONIC, where g is the terminal growth rate and RONIC is the return on new invested capital. JX 1816
at ¶94; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 31; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 312–14.
479 JX 1816 at ¶94. As discussed in more detail below, Dr. Hubbard calculates WACC as follows: Jarden's capital
structure weights 36.1% debt and 63.9% equity, coupled with a cost of debt (after tax) of 3.20% and a cost
of equity of 9.74%, results in a WACC of 7.38%. JX 1816 at ¶128, Ex. 15.
480 Trial Tr. 196:9 (Zmijewski) (“Well, I have four issues.”).
481 Trial Tr. 196:11–16 (Zmijewski).
482 Trial Tr. 197:19–198:17 (Zmijewski).
483 Trial Tr. 198:7–15 (Zmijewski).
484 Trial Tr. 198:18–199:6 (Zmijewski).
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485 Trial Tr. 199:7–11 (Zmijewski).
486 Trial Tr. 1046:11–1049:23 (Hubbard); JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 102, 250–56; JX 2515, Damodaran,
Investment Valuation at 291, 299–300.
487 JX 1816 at ¶¶93–95, Ex. 10A; JX 1826 at ¶¶54–61.
488 JX 1816, Exs. 5A–5D (compare Ex. 10A starting at FY10 with Exs. 5A, C, D starting at FY11).
489 Trial Tr. 1055:14–18 (Hubbard) (“I just don't know of firms and industries that have both high and rising
forever returns on invested capital.”); Trial Tr. 1051:12–16 (Hubbard) (“you can't simply change your growth,
particularly your real growth, which is what is being done in this experiment, and not have any additional
investment”); JX 2514 at 21 (a graph depicting the dramatically outsized ROIC implicated by Dr. Zmijewski's
TIR); JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 19; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 302; JX 2032, Berk &
DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 711.
490 This sets the TIR at the midpoint between Dr. Hubbard's TIR of 33.9% and Jarden's historic average
investment rate of 21.6%. It also assumes a ROIC for Jarden of 11.2%, which is reasonable given Jarden's
innovative and highly acquisitive growth strategy and a WACC of 6.94% (as discussed below). JX 1828 at ¶39.
491 Trial Tr. 1066:21–23 (Hubbard) (“Q. And if we could, did you estimate the weighted average cost of capital for
purposes of your DCF analysis? A. I did. Both Professor Zmijewski and I tendered estimates of the weighted
average cost of capital.”); JX 1816 at ¶¶98–129; JX 1818 at ¶¶65–66.
492 JX 1816 at ¶¶98–99.
493 Id.; JX 1818 at ¶¶46–49; Trial Tr. 190:1–3 (Zmijewski) (“[WACC] is a standard calculation. You calculate the
equity costs of capital, the after-tax debt cost of capital. You weight those two.”).
494 Id.; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 295–97.
495 Trial Tr. 244:2–6 (Zmijewski) (“[W]e have the same risk-free rate. We have a different equity risk premium, a
slightly different beta. He doesn't use a size premium. I do. So we have some differences in our calculations
here.”).
496 JX 1818 at ¶68; JX 1816 at ¶98; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 269.
497 JX 1818 at ¶49; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 269–72.
498 JX 1816 at ¶99; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 215–19.
499 See Trial Tr. 1070:2–6 (Hubbard).
500 JX 1816 at ¶¶100–03; JX 1818 at ¶63.
501 Id.
502 JX 1818 at ¶64.
503 Id.
504 JX 1816 at ¶98.
505 Id. at ¶¶100–04, Figure 21.
506 Id.
507 Id.
508 Id. at ¶¶100–07, Figure 21; JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 86–87.
509 JX 1816 at ¶¶98–99.
510 Id. at ¶¶104–05.
511 Id.
512 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 217.
513 JX 1816 at ¶¶100–07, Figure 21; JX 1818 at ¶63. See also Trial Tr. 161 (Zmijewski) (explaining how he
accounted for convertible securities).
514 JX 1818 at ¶64.
515 JX 1816 at ¶¶103–07, Figure 21.
516 JX 1816 at ¶105; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 295–97.
517 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 295–97.
518 Id. at 295; JX 1816.
519 JX 1816.
- 233 - 
In re Appraisal of Jarden Corporation, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
2019 WL 3244085
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 52
520 Id. at ¶¶100–07, Figure 21; JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 86–87.
521 JX 1816 at ¶¶103–07, Figure 21.
522 Id. at ¶105.
523 Id., Ex. 11A.
524 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 211. See also JX 1816 at ¶106; JX 1818 at ¶63.
525 Id.
526 JX 1818, Ex. VI-5.
527 Id. at ¶64.
528 JX 1816 at ¶¶108–09. Trial Tr. 1218:11–13 (Hubbard) (Q. “You measured Jarden's cost of debt by using
yield to maturity. Correct? A. I did.”).
529 Id.
530 JX 1828 at ¶20; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 412 (“When the firm's debt is risky, however,
the debt yield will overestimate the debt cost of capital, with the magnitude of the error increasing with the
riskiness of the debt.”).
531 Trial Tr. 1213:16–18 (Hubbard).
532 JX 1818 at ¶64; JX 1816 at ¶110.
533 Id.
534 JX 1816 at ¶110; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 278–87; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at
385–92.
535 JX 1818 at ¶64; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 279; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 208; JX
2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 387.
536 JX 1816 at ¶111; JX 1818 at ¶64.
537 Id.
538 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 155; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 275–76; JX 2032, Berk &
DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 411–12.
539 JX 1818 at ¶58; JX 1816 at ¶112; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 279; JX 1345, Duff & Phelps, Valuation
Handbook at 2–14; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 183; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate
Finance at 413. See Trial Tr. 187:10–13 (Zmijewski) (“beta is a measure of risk of a company or an asset
that you—that you can measure statistically using a statistical model.”).




544 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 283–84. See JX 1816 at ¶114.
545 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 188.
546 Id.; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 413. See JX 1816 at ¶115.
547 JX 1816 at ¶¶111–20; JX 1818 at ¶¶58–61.
548 JX 1818 at ¶¶58–61.
549 Id. at ¶¶60–61, Ex. VI-4.
550 Id. at ¶¶59–61, Ex. VI-5; JX 1828 at ¶16. Dr. Zmijewski explained that the Jarden-Specific Beta was higher
due to a “lack of precision relative to the precision [of] using a set of comparable companies” and because
of Jarden's higher long-term growth relative to that of his comparable companies. JX 1818 at ¶¶60–61.
551 JX 1816 at ¶¶114–16.
552 Id. at ¶¶117–20.
553 Id.
554 Id. at ¶¶114–16. Dr. Hubbard noted that the single year daily beta of 1.18 was “not substantially different”
from his two-year weekly beta of 1.22. Id. at ¶¶117–20.
555 Id. at ¶¶114–16.
556 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 286.
- 234 - 
In re Appraisal of Jarden Corporation, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
2019 WL 3244085
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 53
557 Id. at 283–85; JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 306 (“... if we have a set of truly
comparable companies, we feel we can gain precision in our estimate of the cost of capital by using multiple
companies.”) (emphasis supplied).
558 JX 1828 at ¶¶12–16.
559 Trial Tr. 1068:13–1069:15 (Hubbard); JX 1826 at ¶¶72–75.
560 JX 1818 at ¶29 (“More specifically, I discuss ... complexity of Jarden's information and holding company (or
platform) business model strategy”).
561 Trial Tr. 104:7–105:18 (Lillie), 262:19–263:23 (Zmijewski) (“None of those companies is an apple-to-apple
comparison to Jarden or each other. Comparable Companies—there just isn't any such thing as a twin
company. It doesn't exist.”).
562 JX 1816 at ¶¶45–50. In addition, both experts' beta estimates are positive, which indicates a parallel
correlation with changes in the overall market.
563 JX 1816 at ¶¶112–20.
564 Id.; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 284; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation 183, 187–95.
565 Id.
566 JX 1818 at ¶¶58–61.
567 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 192–95; JX 1816, Ex. 22F; JX 1818 at ¶¶60–61.
568 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 286; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 192–93.
569 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 281; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 413; JX 241, Holthausen
& Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 295.
570 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 187.
571 JX 1816 at ¶121.
572 See Trial Tr. 1072:2–4 (Hubbard) (“So the question is, what is the equity risk premium. And this is one where
economists have a range of views.”).
573 JX 1816 at ¶¶122–24. See Trial Tr. 1072:5–8 (Hubbard) (“My own view in my own work and in the work I'm
tendering here is that the so-called historical risk premium is the best measure of the equity risk premium.”).
See also JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 161 (“In practice, we usually estimate the risk
premium by looking at the historical premium earned by stocks over default-free securities over long time
periods.”).
574 JX 1828 at ¶18. See Trial Tr. 1072:8–15 (Hubbard) (“There is an alternative view ... a so-called supply-side
risk premium. I'm not quite sure why that word, because it's not about supply and demand, it's really about
whether you include price earnings multiples expansion. That number is lower.”) See also JX 1345, Duff &
Phelps, Valuation Handbook at 11.
575 JX 1828 at ¶17.
576 JX 1816 at ¶126. Dr. Hubbard took the mid-point of the Long-Term Historical ERP at 6.9% and Supply-Side
ERP at 6.03% to produce his 6.47% ERP estimate for Jarden. Trial Tr. 1072:16–19 (Hubbard) (“I prefer the
historical risk premium. I'm cognizant of the fact Delaware courts have also paid attention to the supply-side
risk premium. So I picked the midpoint of the two.”).
577 JX 1345, Duff & Phelps, Valuation Handbook at 5.
578 JX 1828 at ¶18. The lower Supply-Side ERP is supported by Duff & Phelps' later recommended estimates of
adjusted Long-Term ERP of 5.0% as of March 31, 2018. See Trial Tr. 1073:1–4 (Hubbard) (“But if one's view
is your interest in supply side is governed by Duff & Phelps' recommendation, Duff & Phelps has, indeed,
changed its recommended approach.”).
579 JX 1818 at ¶64.
580 JX 1826 at ¶78; Trial Tr. at 1078:4–9 (Hubbard) (“I don't have a size premium. He does. My quibble is more
the way he's estimated it, given the data source he has. But, again, for the Court's consideration in the interest
of the Court's time, I don't think these are super important.”).
581 JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 320–21 (discussing the “empirical evidence that the
CAPM overstates the returns to large firms and understates the returns to small firms”).
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582 JX 1818, Ex. VI-5.
583 JX 1816 at ¶127.
584 JX 1818 at ¶66.
585 JX 1816 at ¶11.
586 I note that this WACC is within the range calculated by Centerview but below the WACC calculated by
Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, RBC and Barclays.
587 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 295–97.
588 JX 1816 at ¶95; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 313.
589 See JX 1818 at ¶51.
590 I took the average of the revenue growth rates for the provided fiscal years of 2017–20 to determine the
percentage increase.
591 I took the average of the capital expenditure growth rates for the provided fiscal years of 2017–20 to determine
the percentage increase.
592 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 585. See JX 1818 at ¶60.
593 In other words, I added the discounted cash flows from each time period in the FY16–FY21 range—$558
million, $646 million, $675 million, $687 million, $698 million, $13.3 billion respectively—to arrive at the total
enterprise value.
594 JX 1818 at ¶¶69–72; JX 1816 at ¶¶130–47.
595 JX 1816 at ¶¶143–47.
596 See Trial Tr. 1079:17–21 (Hubbard) (“Maybe I should start with the bottom line. If you were to look at all
of these [enterprise value adjustments], they're a little over a dollar a share, and I think $1.06 altogether,
because they go in different directions.”).
597 JX 1816 at ¶139.
598 Trial Tr. 1081:17–20 (Hubbard) (“[E]ssentially you want to add back excess cash that the company has. And
we both agree on that, and we both agree on what the total cash was. It was $799 million.”).
599 JX 1816 at ¶140.
600 Id.
601 Id. at ¶141.
602 Id.; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 309; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 440.
603 JX 1816 at ¶142.
604 Id., Ex. 18C.
605 Id., Ex. 18A.
606 Id.
607 JX 1818 at ¶70. Dr. Hubbard adjusted his final share count number to align with Dr. Zmijewski's number after
double counting Jarden's restricted stock. JX 1831.
608 JX 1565 at 242.
609 As explained above, the DCF Analysis makes the following assumptions: WACC equals 6.9%; Terminal
Growth equals 3.1%; ROIC equals 11.2%; FY21 Revenue Growth equals 5%; FY21 Capital Expenditure as
a percent of Revenue equals 2.6%; Fully Diluted Share Count equals 219.9 million.
610 Drs. Hubbard and Zmijewski both agree on Jarden's Revenue numbers for FY16–FY20 reported in Standard
and Poor's Capital IQ. See JX 1816, Ex. 9; JX 1818, Ex. VI-7A.
611 Drs. Hubbard and Zmijewski both agree on Jarden's Capital Expenditure numbers for FY16–FY20 as derived
from Standard and Poor's Capital IQ and Jarden's FY10-15 10K. See JX 1816, Ex. 9; JX 1818, Ex. VI-1.
612 Time Period is calculated based on the mid-year convention used by Dr. Hubbard. JX 1816, Ex. 16. I note,
for 2016, the mid-point uses the period from April 15, 2016 to December 31, 2016. Id.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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In this appraisal action, I must determine the fair value of
each share of the subject company on the closing date of its
acquisition. I find that the process by which the company was
sold bore several objective indicia of reliability, which were
not undermined by flaws in that process. I therefore find that
the deal price is persuasive evidence of fair value, and give
no weight to other valuation metrics. I deduct some synergies,
but find others were not adequately proven. I undergo that
synergies analysis solely to fulfill my statutory mandate,
rather than to effectuate any transfer of funds between the
parties, because the company prepaid the entire deal price and
has no recourse for a refund under the appraisal statute.
I. BACKGROUND 1
This appraisal action generated an extensive record. During
six days of trial, the parties introduced 1,336 exhibits and
lodged seventeen depositions in evidence. 2  Five experts and
six fact witnesses testified live. These are the Court's findings
based on a preponderance of the evidence.
Respondent Panera Bread Company (“Panera” or the
“Company”) is a national bakery-cafe concept in the United
States and Canada. 3  Panera is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of Delaware, with headquarters in St.
Louis, Missouri. 4  Until July 18, 2017, Panera's stock was
listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange under the symbol
“PNRA.” 5
On that date, JAB Holdings B.V. purchased Panera for
$315.00 per share. 6  That entity is a private limited liability
company incorporated under the laws of the Netherlands that
indirectly has a controlling interest in JAB Holding Company,
LLC. 7  JAB Holding Company, LLC is a private limited
liability company incorporated under the laws of Delaware
and headquartered in Washington D.C. that indirectly has held
a controlling interest in Panera since the acquisition. 8  JAB
Holding Company S.à.r.l. has an ultimate controlling interest
in JAB Holdings B.V., JAB Holding Company, LLC and
Panera. 9  I refer to all of these entities collectively as “JAB.”
In the wake of JAB's acquisition, certain dissenting Panera
stockholders (“Petitioners” or “Dissenting Stockholders”) are
entitled to an appraisal of the fair value of their Company
shares in accordance with their demands. 10  Petitioners hold
785,108 shares of Panera's common stock. 11  Petitioners
include Short Hills Capital Partners, holding 35,800 shares
of Panera common stock; 12  Weiss Asset Management,
including 2017 Arlington, LLC, holding 154,669 shares of
Panera common stock; 13  Canyon International LLC, holding
31,794 shares of Panera common stock; 14  and Yellowstone
Global LLC, holding 47,692 shares of Panera common
stock. 15  Each of the Petitioners demanded appraisal before
the vote on the merger, held the appraisal shares through the
merger date, and maintained their appraisal demand.
*2  Relevant non-parties include Panera board members
Domenic Colasacco, Fred K. Foulkes, Larry J. Franklin,
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Diane Hessan, Thomas E. Lynch, William W. Moreton,
Ronald M. Shaich, Mark Stoever, and James D. White. 16
Shaich founded Panera in 1981. 17  He served on the board
from 1981 to December 2018 in various capacities, including
Chairman, Co-Chairman, Executive Chairman, and Non-
Executive Chairman. 18  Shaich served as Chief Executive
Officer from 1984 to May 2010, when he stepped back from
the Company to co-found an organization called “No Labels,”
which he hoped would reduce partisanship in American
politics. 19  During this time, Shaich remained Panera's largest
stockholder and Executive Chairman, and Moreton served
as CEO. 20  In 2012, Moreton had a family issue and asked
Shaich to return to a greater leadership position. 21  Shaich
agreed and served as Co-Chief Executive Officer, along with
Moreton, from March 2012 to August 2013. 22  At that time,
Moreton stepped down as Co-Chief Executive Officer, and
Shaich resumed his role as sole Chief Executive Officer until
January 1, 2018. 23  The market and the restaurant industry
both recognize Shaich as a visionary. 24
Moreton joined Panera's board in May 2010, after serving as
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer from
October 1998 to March 2003 and Executive Vice President
and Co-Chief Operating Officer from November 2008 to
May 2010. 25  Moreton also served as President and Co-Chief
Executive Officer from March 2012 to August 2013, Chief
Financial Officer (Interim) from August 6, 2014 to April 15,
2015, and Executive Vice Chairman from August 2013 to July
18, 2017. 26
Colasacco, the lead independent director, served as an outside
director along with directors Hessan, Foulkes, Franklin,
Lynch, Stoever, and White. 27
Panera's relevant management includes Blaine Hurst, who
began serving as Panera's Chief Executive Officer after
Shaich left that post in January 2018. 28  Prior to that
time, Hurst served as Executive Vice President and Chief
Transformation and Growth Officer from December 2010 to
December 2016. 29  Then, Hurst served as Panera's President
from December 2016 to January 2018. 30
Michael Bufano has served as Panera's Chief Financial
Officer, since April 2015. 31  Bufano also served as the Vice
President of Planning from July 2010 to August 2014. 32
Andrew Madsen was Panera's President from May 2015 to
December 9, 2016, when he left the Company. 33
A. Shaich Founds Panera And Leads
It Through Unmatched Growth.
In 1980, Shaich founded a single 400-square-foot cookie
store. 34  That store would eventually become Panera. In 1982,
Shaich merged the cookie store with a small regional bakery
called Au Bon Pain. 35  That entity purchased the Saint Louis
Bread Company in 1987. 36  Shaich took this company public
in 1991, 37  rebranded the Saint Louis Bread Company as
Panera in 1997, and divested the Au Bon Pain division in
1999. 38  After the divestiture, Shaich changed the company's
name to Panera Bread Company. 39  After divesting Au Bon
Pain, Panera stock traded at $6.00 per share. 40
*3  Panera pioneered a new restaurant segment called
“fast casual,” which found a niche between “quick service
restaurants like McDonald's and Wendy's and restaurants like
that and casual dining, full sit-down service.” 41  From 2000
to 2010, Panera expanded rapidly into a national restaurant
chain. 42  Panera operated in three segments: company
bakery-cafe operations, franchise operations, and fresh dough
and other product operations. 43  By 2004, Panera's stock was
trading around $30.00 per share, and by 2010, it was trading
around $70.00 per share. 44
Despite the Company's growth, by 2010 or 2011, Shaich
felt “great distress” because Panera's same store sales
were weakening and market share gains slowed. 45
Increasingly, Panera faced competitive pressures and needed
to differentiate for future growth. 46  In response to these
pressures, Shaich spent his time as Executive Chairman
focusing almost exclusively “on a range of strategic and
innovation efforts for Panera.” 47  During this time, Shaich
wrote “the Amazon memo” on how he would compete with
Panera if he were not part of the Company. 48  His vision
focused on changing the guest experience, creating a new
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ordering system, and providing a delivery service. 49  After
discussing these initiatives with Moreton, Shaich led the
effort to prototype these ideas during the 2010–2012 period
before re-assuming a management post as co-CEO in 2012. 50
In 2013, Panera signaled to the market that it was “deploying
significant transaction-driving initiatives.” 51  By early 2014,
Fortune magazine featured Panera's “big bet on tech,”
detailing how Shaich's early prototypes had developed into
new company initiatives. 52  After launching that technology
in fourteen cafes, the Company formally announced the
Panera 2.0 initiative in April 2014. 53  Panera 2.0 offered
“a series of integrated technologies to enhance the guest
experience” 54  through “new mechanisms for ordering,
payment, food production, and, ultimately, consumption.” 55
Panera 2.0 enhanced ordering through Rapid Pick-Up, fast
lane kiosks, and online/mobile ordering. 56  Panera also
committed to “operational excellence” with new production
equipment and systems to increase capacity and accuracy. 57
Along with these changes, Panera focused on “activat[ing]
innovation in store design.” 58  To adopt these initiatives,
Hurst “create[d] a ‘digital flywheel’ whereby all systems
and consumer touchpoints—point of sale (PoS), back of
house, integrated customer data, big customer data, one-to-
one marketing—are interconnected for operational gain.” 59
These initiatives rolled out in stages. In 2014, the Company
kicked off Panera 2.0 with Rapid Pick-Up, an advanced
ordering system. 60  Over the next two years, the Company
rolled out the remaining Panera 2.0 initiatives to all company-
owned bakery-cafes. 61
*4  Panera developed other initiatives during this period of
innovation. In 2013, the Company rolled out two initiatives
including Panera at Home, providing consumer packaged
goods, as well as Panera catering hubs, which were attached
to bakery-cafes. 62  In 2015, Panera launched its “Food As
It Should Be” campaign, developing “clean food” without
“artificial colors, flavors, preservatives, and sweeteners.” 63
In 2016, Panera rolled out its national delivery program. 64
While leading Panera through these initiatives, in early
February 2015, Shaich informed the board that he wanted to
step away from Panera and pursue other endeavors. 65  Shaich
had returned to Panera when Moreton needed him. And
although Shaich extended his time with the Company through
2015, he did not want to remain at Panera forever. 66  Shaich
explained to the board that after working on innovations as
Executive Chairman during the 2010 to 2012 period, he “had
come back to transform” Panera and felt he had “done [his]
work in getting [Panera 2.0] going.” 67  The board outlined
a succession plan during a board meeting held on February
26, 2015. 68  The identified succession candidate, Madsen,
became Panera's president in May 2015 with the intention
of replacing Shaich as CEO in 2016. 69  But the board did
not view Madsen as a suitable replacement, 70  so Shaich
stayed on as CEO. Shaich annually reminded the board of his
desire to leave. 71  At the time of the merger, Shaich owned
approximately six percent of Panera's outstanding stock. 72
B. Panera Tracks Its Initiatives Through A Five-
Year Strategic Plan And Five-Year Financial Model.
In May 2015, management assembled all of Panera's new
initiatives into a strategic plan (the “Five-Year Strategic
Plan”). 73  To track the financial effects of these initiatives,
management also created a five-year financial model (the
“Five-Year Financial Model”) that tracked “between 15 and
30 key initiatives and many projects underneath each of them
that we had various assumptions on, how they would perform,
how they would roll out” and forecasted five years of future
results. 74  Management based the Five-Year Financial Model
on the Five-Year Strategic Plan and would evaluate them side-
by-side “to really understand what the vision involved and the
costs involved in what we saw.” 75  This Five-Year Financial
Model operated as a “roadmap” that management updated
every six months and that the board discussed, at least in part,
at every meeting. 76
*5  At its core, the 2015 Five-Year Financial Model set a goal
to double earnings per share over the next five years and “re-
engage” double-digit earnings growth, including projected
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization
(“EBITDA”) of nearly $750 million by 2019. 77  Shaich
recognized that “[f]ew companies have taken on as audacious
a path to renewal.” 78
Some board members were skeptical. Moreton described the
Five-Year Financial Model as “what's classically called a
hockey stick projection” that faced “healthy skepticism in the
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board.” 79  Lynch wrote to Shaich in October 2016, “I worry,
though not with a lot of basis, that we are overestimating
our future earnings power. We are now in a negative 3
transaction comp environment and I am concerned that we
could be overestimating our ability to fight this headwind.” 80
Moreton recognized management risk-adjusted the Five-
Year Financial Model “in part,” but “major” risk remained
around execution. 81  Colasacco considered Panera's Five-
Year Strategic Plan as “not impossible, not a lie, not a bad
faith effort in any way,” but “one possible range of scenarios
that could play out[.]” 82  Some analysts agreed: “[W]e remain
on the sidelines as PNRA's stock appears to incorporate the
benefits of its strategic initiatives and the outlook is not
without risks.” 83
C. Investors React, And Panera Weighs Its Options.
In reaction to the Five-Year Strategic Plan, an investment fund
called Luxor Capital threatened a proxy contest because it
opposed the “very significant capital spending” necessary to
support the plan. 84  The board engaged Goldman Sachs & Co.
LLC (“Goldman”) in March 2015 to advise it in a strategic
review of potential opportunities to maximize stockholder
value. 85  On June 25, 2015, Goldman presented potential
strategic alternatives alongside valuation scenarios under the
Five-Year Strategic Plan. 86
*6  Consistent with the Five-Year Financial Model,
Goldman “assume[d] 100% implementation success with
no probability weighting adjustment.” 87  For this reason,
Goldman called the Five-Year Strategic Plan “aggressive”
because “everything would have to go exactly as was
foreseen,” which “[t]hey didn't think [ ] was very likely.” 88
Goldman advised that Panera's “growth initiatives were too
early on in the game for the market ... to give [Panera]
full credit for [the Five-Year Strategic Plan].” 89  Goldman
evaluated a potential sale and advised that a financial sponsor
would not have interest in Panera, 90  but identified a “limited
number of potential strategic buyers,” with Starbucks as
the most likely. 91  At the end of the meeting, the board
determined
that while the Company would, as
it had done in the past, continue
to observe the markets and consider
activities in the best interest of
shareholders on an ongoing basis,
given current conditions it was not in
the best interest of the Company and
its stockholders to engage in a process
to initiate and pursue a strategic
transaction or solicit interest from
potential purchasers at this time. 92
After consulting with Goldman, Panera agreed to some of
Luxor's demands. 93  Luxor dropped their remaining demands
after Panera “convince[d] them that [its] G&A actually was
average to low for the industry as a whole, and the technology
investments were necessary for initiatives.” 94
D. Panera Counteracts Failures And
Plants Seeds For Future Rewards.
In 2016, following the adoption of the Five-Year Strategic
Plan, Panera reduced its estimate for 2019 EBITDA by almost
$128 million as “revenues hadn't increased in line with”
expectations and the Plan was not “going quite as smoothly
as [Panera] had hoped.” 95  Panera offset the initiatives’ high
costs by orchestrating share buybacks, refranchising, and
implementing nonstrategic cost reduction. 96
In the wake of this setback, Shaich led efforts to publicize
the Five-Year Strategic Plan to generate market recognition.
Through “hundreds” 97  of presentations, Shaich shared
Panera's plan of “sustained double-digit EPS earnings
growth.” 98  The market responded and gave Panera “a great
deal of credit for the initiatives already done.” 99  Panera's
stock rose to $214.54 by July 2016. 100
E. Panera and Shaich Weigh Their Options.
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In the midst of Shaich's PR campaign, Shaich received an
unusual call from Starbucks CEO Howard Schultz, proposing
a visit. 101  Shaich discussed the visit with Colasacco and
other board members, explaining, “Howard doesn't come up
on a Saturday afternoon for just anything. Maybe he [i]s
interested in a transaction.” 102  To prepare, Shaich asked
Goldman for an updated comparison of selected restaurant
companies that Goldman had presented the year before
in 2015. 103  This comparison included updated financial
metrics for Starbucks and other restaurants in the fast growth,
quick service, and casual dining segments. 104
*7  When Schultz and Shaich met on July 31, 2016, Schultz
proposed a collaboration between Starbucks and Panera
“whereby Panera would provide food to Starbucks for lunch
and breakfast and [Starbucks] would upgrade [Panera's]
coffee program.” 105  After the meeting, Shaich updated
Moreton, Colasacco, and Lynch. 106  Lynch viewed this as
“[t]he first step of the dance,” so that Starbucks could pursue
“a potential acquisition attempt by Starbucks of Panera.” 107
Colasacco commented that the proposed collaboration was
“[c]ertainly worth exploring further, though raises many
questions.” 108  And Moreton thought it was “interesting ...
even if not tying every thing up in a nice bow.” 109
At the August 2 board meeting, the board reviewed elements
of the Five-Year Strategic Plan and Five-Year Financial
Model, per usual. 110  During the executive session of
that meeting, Shaich informed the board about Starbucks’
proposed collaboration. 111  Moreton characterized the
board's response by explaining, “if [Starbucks] wanted to
take advantage of our food and things, the best way to
do that would be to acquire the company.” 112  With that
directive, Shaich had a new focus for future conversations
with Schultz. 113
Schultz had invited Shaich to Seattle to visit Starbucks’
roastery that fall; 114  the teams met October 4 through 5. 115
Starbucks came to discuss a joint venture, with Starbucks
selling Panera's food and Panera selling Starbucks coffee. 116
Shaich used this opportunity to attempt to solicit an offer. 117
Both Shaich and Schultz discussed their companies' “very
intimate strategic plans.” 118  During the visit, Shaich pitched
Schultz the Five-Year Strategic Plan. 119  On October 26,
Shaich rejected Schultz's joint-venture idea, but floated
the idea that Starbucks could purchase Panera. 120  Schultz
responded: “we're really interested in this. Let's get a group
of people to work on it.” 121
Moreton worked with Shaich to interface with Starbucks
and help conduct financial analyses. 122  In November,
the companies discussed their shared goal “to determine
whether [the] companies can unlock significant value by
combining.” 123  Panera proposed EBITDA and synergies
figures for the combined companies, which Starbucks
generally found reasonable. 124  Starbucks took this analysis
and ran the numbers internally. 125  At the end of
November, 126  Schultz called Shaich to explain that after
giving it “some serious thought,” 127  Starbucks was “not
going forward” with the transaction. 128  Although Starbucks
viewed the combination as a “pretty good idea,” Starbucks
could not “get to [Panera's] public market price, let alone pay
a premium” 129  and “there were other things going on within
Starbucks.” 130  The parties did not discuss any further. 131
*8  In tandem with Panera's conversations with Starbucks,
in August 2016, Shaich acted on his own initiative and asked
Goldman to facilitate an introductory meeting with JAB. 132
Goldman inquired after JAB's CEO Olivier Goudet, 133  but
JAB postponed meeting with Panera until “early the next
year” 134  because JAB was busy pursuing an acquisition that
fall. 135
F. Panera Reaches An “Inflection
Point,” And Shaich Engages With JAB.
Although Panera continued to face competitive pressures,
it experienced impressive growth and success with its
initiatives. Panera's stock price rose from $170.00 per share
in 2014 to $210.00 per share in early December 2016. 136
As of October 2016, Panera was the ninth most valuable
restaurant company in America with a market capitalization
of $4.5 billion. 137  Panera completed its Panera 2.0 rollout for
company-owned bakery-cafes by the end of 2016. 138  And
by the end of 2016, Panera served approximately 9 million
customers per week, making it one of the largest food service
companies in the United States. 139
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By January 13, 2017, Panera removed all of its “No No List”
ingredients in pursuit of its “clean food” goal. 140  Panera hit
another benchmark on February 8, 2017, when MyPanera
accounted for 51% of the Company's transactions, becoming
the largest customer loyalty program in the restaurant
industry. 141  Other Panera 2.0 initiatives experienced success,
with digital orders representing 26% of sales 142  and the
Rapid Pick-Up Program representing about 9% of sales. 143
On February 7, 2017, Shaich announced 2017 to be
Panera's “inflection point” 144 : “[w]ith peak investments and
significant scale behind us, we are now focused on completing
the rollout of our initiatives and reaping the benefits.” 145  In
particular, “[t]he company has guided to double digit EPS
growth for 2017.” 146  The market reacted positively to this
announcement and Panera's stock rose $20.00 that day. 147
In this positive environment, Shaich prepared to meet
JAB's Chief Executive Officer, Olivier Goudet, and
Head of M&A, David Bell. 148  Shaich prepared for the
meeting with Goldman, who arranged his introduction
to JAB. 149  Shaich informed some of Panera's directors
before the meeting, and Colasacco helped Shaich gather
JAB's public information. 150  JAB hosted Shaich at its
Washington, D.C. office on February 9. 151  During the
meeting, Shaich presented Panera's standard external investor
presentation. 152  Bell interpreted the presentation as a way to
try to entice JAB to come and make an offer for Panera. 153
During his pitch, Shaich discussed his thirty-year career at
Panera, but was “very uncertain” about his personal plans. 154
Shaich saw that Goudet's eyes lit up as Shaich discussed
Panera. 155
*9  On Friday, February 24, Shaich, Goudet, and Bell had
a follow-up phone discussion during which JAB expressed
its interest in acquiring Panera. 156  The next day, Shaich and
Colasacco met to discuss JAB's expression of interest. 157
At this time, Shaich did not engage a financial advisor or
engage in negotiations. 158  Shaich planned to inform the rest
of the board at the upcoming Wednesday, March 1 board
meeting. 159
At that board meeting, Shaich informed the full board of
JAB's interest. 160  Shaich did not mention that he had
initiated the conversation with JAB. 161  The board discussed
Shaich's introductory meeting and conversations with JAB,
as well as JAB's potential interest in an acquisition of
the Company. 162  “[T]he Board authorized Mr. Shaich to
continue conversations with JAB and to report back to the
Board with an update as to the discussions and the status of
any offer.” 163  At that time, the board did not retain a financial
advisor, as it had not received a formal offer. 164
At this same meeting, the board reviewed 2016 financial
results and tracked them against the Five-Year Strategic
Plan and the projections in the Five-Year Financial
Model. 165  Panera management typically updated the Five-
Year Financial Model every spring and fall since May
2015. 166  In March, management updated the Five-Year
Financial Model in preparation for merger discussions with
JAB. 167
G. JAB Makes An Offer, And
Both Parties Secure Advisors.
On March 10, 2017, Shaich met with Bell and Goudet in
Washington D.C. 168  JAB offered to acquire Panera at a
price of $286.00 per share in cash. 169  At this time, Panera's
stock was trading at $234.91; the offer represented a 21.7%
premium. 170
JAB was a serial acquirer that maintained a “playbook”
for their acquisitions. 171  Following that playbook, JAB
conditioned their offer to Panera on (i) a confidentiality
provision; (ii) a public support measure for Shaich and certain
affiliates; (iii) a no-shop provision with a fiduciary out; (iv)
matching rights; and (v) a 4.0% termination fee. 172  JAB's
terms did not include a financing or regulatory condition. 173
JAB expressed the desire and ability to sign on April 7,
2017, with an announcement on April 10, 2017. 174  At
trial, Bell explained the “playbook.” 175  Regarding the deal's
speed, JAB was “not interested in a protracted negotiation
that results in significant management distraction, so they
always go very quickly.” 176  Because of this short timeline,
JAB also never discusses post-merger leadership roles during
negotiations. 177  Bell also explained that a bilateral deal is
part of the JAB playbook in part because it typically leads to
the lowest price. 178
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*10  JAB hired Ernst & Young in March 2017 to conduct
their due diligence review of Panera. 179  JAB conducted their
diligence in five days because Panera's public information
and “transparency is off the charts.” 180  During the process,
Bell expressed satisfaction with the smooth diligence and was
“really impressed by the speed and quality of the data.” 181
He also noted that Panera was one of the “cleanest companies
they have ever seen.” 182
As for financing, Goudet told Shaich that JAB would
“use [Goldman] for our financing, so it is logical we take
them on the buyside.” 183  Shaich and Moreton were not
concerned about using another advisor, despite Panera's
prior relationship with Goldman. 184  JAB recommended that
Panera use Adam Taetle from Barclays or David Ciagne from
Morgan Stanley because it was “important [for Panera] to
pick someone who understands [JAB's] playbook, otherwise
could be dangerous.” 185  Ciagne was JAB's coverage banker
at Morgan Stanley. 186
Upon receipt of an offer, on March 14, the board engaged
advisors. The board retained Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
(“Sullivan & Cromwell”) as the board's outside legal counsel
for the potential transaction with JAB. 187  Frank Aquila
served as Sullivan & Cromwell's lead partner on the
matter. 188  Shaich proposed engaging Barclays Capital or
Morgan Stanley as Panera's financial advisor, 189  but did
not tell the board that JAB had suggested those firms, or
specifically Ciagne. 190  After deliberation and discussion,
the board directed the Company to explore a potential
engagement and selected Morgan Stanley as its financial
advisor. 191  Specifically, on Aquila's recommendation,
Panera selected Michael Boublik of Morgan Stanley. 192
Boublik had not worked for JAB, and neither Bell, nor anyone
else at JAB, knew him. 193
*11  On March 15, Morgan Stanley cleared an initial
conflicts check. 194  Two days later, Morgan Stanley gave
Panera a key request list that included the Five-Year Strategic
Plan, and started putting together initial valuation metrics. 195
Then, on March 20, Sullivan & Cromwell informed the
board that Morgan Stanley “had cleared an initial conflicts
check on March 15 and the parties were now negotiating an
engagement letter for the transaction.” 196
On March 29, Panera management and Morgan Stanley
met to review the Five-Year Strategic Plan and Five-
Year Financial Model as updated after the March 1 board
meeting. 197  Paul Kwak, a Vice President of M&A at Morgan
Stanley, 198  prepared questions about Panera's Five-Year
Financial Model. 199  In conducting its analysis, Morgan
Stanley “immediately noticed that [management projections]
were clearly more bullish and had higher growth, higher
margins than what the street consensus was,” 200  but used the
Five-Year Financial Model to develop its management case
DCF analysis. 201
On March 30, the bank sent its engagement letter. 202  Panera
agreed to pay Morgan Stanley $42 million: $8 million
became payable upon execution of the merger agreement,
and the remainder was contingent upon closing. 203  The
disclosure letter identified the scope of conflict and formally
disclosed all of Morgan Stanley's prior dealings with JAB. 204
Morgan Stanley disclosed they “have provided, currently
are providing, and/or in the future may provide, certain
investment banking and other financial services to the
Company, The Potential Buyer, and the Buyer Related
entities.” 205  Morgan Stanley also included in the letter that
other than Patrick Gallagher, no senior deal team member “is
a member of the coverage team for the Potential Buyer or the
Buyer Related Entities.” 206
Even though Panera's deal team did not include any JAB
coverage bankers, a JAB coverage banker twice passed
messages between the JAB and Panera deal teams. First, on
March 27 (before execution of the engagement letter), Ciagne
emailed Boublik to communicate JAB's fears that Morgan
Stanley was not doing enough to assure Panera that JAB could
finance the deal. 207  Second, on April 1, Boublik caused
Ciagne to deliver the board's message to JAB that “Panera
is serious, and there has to be a higher price.” 208  The board
did not know that Ciagne had previously communicated with
Boublik about financing. 209  Indeed, Shaich and Moreton
learned about that communication for the first time at trial. 210
H. Panera Rejects JAB's Offer, And
JAB Compresses The Timeline.
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On March 14, the board met to discuss JAB's $286.00
offer. 211  The board agreed that JAB would need to raise its
offer and authorized Shaich to pursue further discussions in
pursuit of a higher price. 212  The board instructed Shaich to
inform JAB “that the Board would not agree to any proposed
offer for the Company that was not significantly higher than
the $286.00 per share currently proposed by JAB.” 213
*12  The next day, Morgan Stanley conducted initial
valuation work with Panera's trading history, trading
multiples, and precedent transaction multiples. 214  From
this and JAB's bidding precedents, Morgan Stanley was
comfortable that it could negotiate a price that was above
$300.00. 215
On March 17, Morgan Stanley advised Shaich and Moreton
on JAB's historical bidding approach and helped them
formulate a strategy to raise JAB's offer price. 216  Shaich
stayed up until 3 a.m. digesting JAB's historical bidding
approach. 217  While reviewing, Shaich wrote to Moreton that
he wanted to push JAB on price; Moreton cautioned him not
to push it too hard by being too greedy, because “pigs get fat,
hogs get slaughtered.” 218
The next day, on March 18, Shaich informed JAB that
although the board approved continued discussions and
targeted due diligence, it expected that JAB would have to
increase their $286.00 offer north of $300.00 per share. 219
JAB agreed to discuss the possibility of offering a higher price
internally and to get back to Shaich on March 20. 220
On March 20, JAB made a second offer of $296.50 per share,
with the warning that JAB would “not go one penny over 299.
We're not going to hit 300.” 221  Panera's stock had closed
at $255.24 the day before, so the offer represented a 16.2%
premium to that trading price. 222  The board met that same
day to review the second offer. 223  The board “supported
continued discussions with JAB and JAB initiating due
diligence on the Company but expressed its expectation that
any final offering price be significantly higher.” 224  Boublik
agreed and commented, “I would hope that we get another
collective move of at least the same magnitude.” 225
On March 22, Shaich and Moreton communicated to Bell and
Goudet the board's expectation to Bell and Goudet that JAB
find additional value in the Company. 226  Shaich explained,
“You've made a meaningful move once, and I and my board
appreciate that, but it's going to take another meaningful move
once again ... I'm confident that once we sit down and go
through our business plan and you've done your diligence
you'll be able to get there.” 227
A few days later, on March 26, JAB and Panera signed a
confidentiality agreement and discussed the due diligence
process. 228  Bell testified that when JAB makes an offer
without a financing contingency, they conduct due diligence
at “the appropriate level” “to have this minimum amount of
information in order to ensure that [they] could get the debt
commitments” from their lenders. 229  In these discussions,
JAB asked Panera to move up the transaction with an
anticipated announcement during the week of April 3. 230
Shaich recognized that JAB wanted to move quickly, 231  but
responded that it was “material” to Panera that JAB “robustly
(and genuinely) understand the drivers in the business [s]o
they can fully appreciate the value that we understand is here
and seek from them.” 232
*13  Shaich and Moreton also spoke with their legal and
financial advisors about the feasibility, benefits, and risks
of JAB's proposed accelerated timeline. 233  The transaction
was the fastest in Kwak's career. 234  Nevertheless, Panera's
advisors said that they had adequate time. 235  The board liked
the shortened timeline, valuing less distraction. 236  It was
feasible for the board because of its extensive review of the
Five-Year Strategic Plan, Panera's financial results, and the
Five-Year Financial Model. 237  Shaich understood that the
Company's future value lay in its initiatives, so he conditioned
the compressed timeline on meeting with JAB to review the
Five-Year Strategic Plan and Five-Year Financial Model. 238
JAB agreed and the parties agreed to work toward entering
into a definitive agreement during the week of April 3. 239
On March 27, JAB's counsel provided Sullivan & Cromwell
a draft merger agreement and a draft voting agreement. 240
The board did not counteroffer on deal price or deal terms at
that time.
Also on March 27, the Company learned that a Bloomberg
reporter had called Bell inquiring about a possible sale
of Panera. 241  Shaich wrote in an email that he learned
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this through “a desperate call from [D]avid [B]ell [after]
Bloomberg called him inquiring about Panera.” 242  At trial,
Shaich commented that during the call, Bell had “anxiety in
his voice” and “was very nervous and concerned about it.” 243
Despite the JAB playbook's tenet of confidentiality, 244  JAB
did not walk after the leak. Instead, JAB began their diligence
in Panera's data room on March 28. 245
While JAB was conducting their due diligence, Morgan
Stanley presented its initial valuation analysis to the
board. 246  At the March 30 board meeting, Morgan
Stanley presented seven different valuation metrics to guide
the negotiations and frame JAB's outstanding offer of
$296.50. 247  Morgan Stanley also identified and ranked
“Potential Interlopers” by their strategic rationale and ability
to pay. 248  In order, these included Starbucks, Chipotle,
Restaurant Brands International (“RBI”), Dunkin’, Domino's,
McDonald's, Yum!, and Darden. 249  Morgan Stanley ruled
out financial sponsors, 250  focused on strategic buyers like
Starbucks, and explained why others were unlikely to
compete. 251  In its analysis, Morgan Stanley recognized
that Starbucks had “[p]reviously engaged with [Panera] in
acquisition discussions,” and “[h]ad mentioned concerns
that acquisition multiple would be above where Starbucks
traded.” 252
*14  This analysis fit with Shaich's and the board's deep
knowledge of the industry. 253  According to Shaich, the “big
three” were not viable options: Starbucks had just passed on
Panera months earlier; Chipotle was in an E. coli crisis; and
RBI had just acquired Popeyes. 254  As for the remainder,
Shaich knew Dunkin’ very well, had discussions with them,
and knew they were 100% franchised, operated at smaller
volume, and would not be interested in Panera. 255  Shaich
knew Domino's CEO as a dear friend and understood their
business was 100% franchised and 100% pizza and that they
were not acquiring. 256  Shaich previously had discussions
with McDonald's and knew that, based on mistakes in their
acquisition history, they had pulled back and were not
acquiring, so Panera “wouldn't be for them.” 257  Shaich also
had discussions with Yum! years earlier and knew that, at
the time of the merger, Yum! faced activist pressure to leave
China and also would not run company stores. 258  Finally,
Shaich knew that Darden was acquiring Cheddars and faced
activist pressure. 259  Shaich explained: “[I]t was just patently
clear to me that, knowing what I know, and knowing these
people and where this had played out, that there really wasn't
a viable interested party.” 260  The board agreed. Moreton
explained that “there was nobody else out there talking to
[the board] about potentially acquiring [the Company], nor
did [the board] think there would be.” 261
I. JAB Reviews Panera's Five-Year
Strategic Plan And Five-Year Financial
Model And Makes Their Final Offer.
Shaich met with four JAB leaders on March 31, as well as
two of their advisors. 262  The group met for three to four
hours, and Shaich presented a deck titled “Five-Year Strategy
& Financial Model.” 263  The Company presented nonpublic
information, including the status of the Five-Year Strategic
Plan and the financial projections contained in the Five-Year
Financial Model. 264  Days later, on April 2, JAB confirmed
its pre-diligence estimates for cost savings 265  and internally
revised their target price upwards from $290.00 to $305.00
per share. 266
The next day, on the morning of April 3, Bloomberg reported
that Panera was exploring strategic options, including a
possible sale of the Company to potential suitors such as JAB,
Starbucks, and Domino's. 267  In response to the leak, Panera's
stock price jumped to $261.87, an 8% increase from the pre-
public speculation price, and closed at $282.63. 268
Later that day, on April 3, Shaich, Hurst, and Bufano met with
JAB's senior partners including Goudet, Bell, Peter Harf (JAB
senior partner), Bart Becht (JAB partner and chairman), and
two of their advisors. 269  The Company presented a deck also
titled “Five-Year Strategy & Financial Model,” 270  which
was substantially similar to the deck delivered to the other
JAB leaders on March 31. 271  Both decks contained an in-
depth look into the Five-Year Strategic Plan and the Five-
Year Financial Model. 272  Both decks discussed Panera's
opportunities in international franchising, 273  “Panera At
Home” (including coffee), 274  and technology. 275
The April 3 deck contemplated “other opportunities”
that would stem from combining JAB and Panera. 276
These opportunities included joint efforts in consumer
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packaged goods (“CPG”), coffee, international expansion,
technology, marketing, real estate modeling, sourcing, and
franchising. 277  The parties did not quantify the amount of
savings generated by these efforts. 278  After this discussion,
Bell explained that JAB
*15  did some back-of-the-envelope
math and got excited about it. But since
we had no discussion with anyone
about it, and it was a short period of
time, we didn't, quote/unquote, put it
in the model, financially. But I will
tell you––you even heard it earlier
—coffee was core to our strategy of
doing this. It's just something that was
difficult for us to quantify at the time
we were doing diligence. 279
JAB did not quantify any growth opportunity synergies either
before or after diligence. 280
Also on April 3, Panera countered JAB's draft merger
agreement and proposed lowering the termination fee from
4.0% to 2.5% of the equity value of the transaction. 281  In
response to that counter, also on April 3, JAB communicated
to Shaich a “best and final” offer of $315.00 per share and
a 3.0% termination fee. 282  The $315.00 offer represented
a 34.1% premium from the March 10 trading price of
$234.91 and a 20.3% premium from the March 31 pre-public
speculation trading price of $261.87. 283  JAB informed
Panera that this offer would expire when the United States
market opened on April 5. 284
J. Morgan Stanley Offers Its Fairness
Opinion, And Panera Approves The Deal.
At 9:00 p.m. on April 3, Morgan Stanley's fairness committee
met to discuss the proposed transaction between Panera and
JAB, and found that the $315.00 per share offer exceeded
the historical trading range, analyst price targets, public
trading benchmarks, and the street discounted equity value
analysis. 285  The analysis also showed that the $315.00 per
share offer fell within the range of precedent transactions,
management discounted equity value analysis, and both the
street and management discounted cash flow analyses. 286
The committee prepared to present these findings to the board
the next day.
On April 4 at 9:30 a.m., the board held a meeting to
discuss JAB's “last and final” offer. 287  Shaich, Bufano,
and Hurst presented highlights from the “Five-Year Strategic
Plan & Financial Model” previously shared with JAB
leaders. 288  During this meeting, management also reviewed
the Company's full Five-Year Financial Model with the
board. 289
Morgan Stanley presented its fairness committee's
findings. 290  The analysis included the evolution of merger
discussions; a summary of JAB proposals with implied
transaction multiples; a JAB company and precedent
transaction overview; Panera's historical stock performance,
next-twelve-month multiple measurements, and valuation
comparables; and analyst perspectives on Panera. 291
Morgan Stanley also presented its preliminary standalone
valuation summary from both a street case and an internal
management case based on the Five-Year Model. 292  The
discounted cash flow analysis for the street case ranged
from $231.00 to $318.00 per share, while the management
case ranged from $300.00 to $410.00 per share. 293  The
board discussed these valuations at length and asked Morgan
Stanley questions about the underlying assumptions. 294
Morgan Stanley explained that the management case reflected
assumptions for Panera's various initiatives and that “all those
initiatives had to go right in order to achieve this management
case and then ... there was execution risks in executing or
in getting all those initiatives to the point that management
was assuming within their management case.” 295  While
Morgan Stanley highlighted the effect of these assumptions,
it accepted management's data in creating the management
case and did not test it for reasonableness. 296  Morgan Stanley
concluded that the merger consideration of $315.00 per share
“was fair to and in the best interests of, from a financial point
of view, the Company's shareholders and that it would be
prepared to issue an opinion to the Company and its Board to
that effect.” 297
*16  After the board discussed their perspectives on the
proposed transaction and the valuation of the Company, “[t]he
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directors expressed their strong support for the proposed
transaction, noting particularly that the price was fair for
the Company's shareholders and that the deal protection
mechanisms in the merger agreement were not preclusive to
an alternative proposal for the Company's shares.” 298  The
board then recessed and reconvened at 4:00 p.m. for the final
review of the proposed transaction. 299
At that time, Sullivan & Cromwell updated the board
about the merger agreement, the voting agreement, and
the non-competition agreement. 300  Boublik orally delivered
Morgan Stanley's fairness opinion (confirmed the next day
in writing) 301  that the merger was fair from a financial
point of view to Panera and its stockholders. 302  The board
unanimously approved the proposed resolutions to adopt,
execute, and deliver the merger agreement. 303
On April 5, Panera and JAB issued a joint press release
announcing the merger. 304
K. Panera Solicits And Obtains Stockholder Approval.
On May 12, Panera filed a preliminary proxy statement
on Schedule 14A recommending that Panera's stockholders
vote in favor of the merger. 305  On June 1, Panera issued a
definitive Schedule 14A proxy statement, by which Panera
notified all stockholders of their appraisal rights for their
shares of Panera common stock pursuant to 8 Del. C. §
262, and attached a copy of 8 Del. C. § 262 as Annex C
to the proxy. 306  On June 16, Panera issued supplemental
disclosures. 307  On July 11, Panera stockholders approved the
merger at a special meeting, at which over 97% of votes cast
favored the merger, representing 80.26% of the outstanding
shares. 308
The merger closed on July 18. 309  No potential bidders
emerged at any time, including after Bloomberg's March 27
request for comment or after the parties announced the deal
on April 5. 310  As of the merger date, Panera operated 910
company-owned bakery-cafes and 1,132 franchisee bakery-
cafes across 46 states, the District of Columbia, and Ontario,
Canada. 311
On November 8, Panera announced that effective January 1,
2018, Shaich would step down as Chief Executive Officer
of Panera and remain with the Company as Executive
Chairman, and Hurst would succeed Shaich as Chief
Executive Officer. 312
L. Dissenting Stockholders Seek Appraisal.
In early July 2017, thirty Dissenting Stockholders notified
Panera of their desire to exercise their appraisal rights
pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 262 over a collective 1,863,578 shares
of Panera common stock. 313  The Dissenting Stockholders
did not withdraw their demands within sixty days of the
effective date of the merger. 314
Between August 16, 2017 and September 13, 2017,
Dissenting Stockholders filed five separate petitions seeking
appraisal relating to the merger. The Court consolidated those
petitions into this action. 315
Between December 19, 2017 and May 10, 2018, Panera
prepaid twenty-nine of the Dissenting Stockholders the full
amount of the merger consideration, $315.00, and statutory
interest accrued through the payment date, for each share of
Panera common stock beneficially owned. 316
*17  Certain Dissenting Stockholders withdrew their
demands, and Panera and these Dissenting Stockholders
jointly stipulated to dismiss their petitioners from this
action. 317
The Court held a six-day trial between April 1 and April 8,
2019. Post-trial briefing was completed on August 1. 318  The
Court ordered supplemental briefing on August 22, 319  which
the parties completed on September 27. 320  The Court held
post-trial argument on October 7. 321
II. ANALYSIS
Petitioners contend that the fair value of their shares is
$361.00. 322  Petitioners support this valuation with a three-
pronged approach. They give no weight to deal price. 323
Instead, they give 60% weight to a discounted cash flow
model prepared by their expert, Israel Shaked, professor
of finance and economics at Boston University's Questrom
School of Business. 324  Petitioners attribute 30% of their
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valuation to Shaked's comparable companies analysis, and
10% to his precedent transaction analysis.
Throughout this proceeding, including at trial, Respondent
pursued a valuation of $304.44. 325  Respondent argued
that deal price minus synergies deserves dispositive weight.
Respondent's expert was Glenn Hubbard, the Dean and
Russell L. Carson Professor in finance and economics at
the Graduate School of Business of Columbia University, as
well as professor of economics at Columbia University. 326
Seizing on Bell's trial testimony regarding revenue synergies,
Respondent lowered its valuation to $293.44 in post-trial
briefing. Respondent seeks a refund of any difference
between its prepayment at $315.00 per share and fair value.
A. Legal Standard
“An appraisal proceeding is a limited legislative remedy
intended to provide shareholders dissenting from a merger
on grounds of inadequacy of the offering price with a
judicial determination of the intrinsic worth (fair value)
of their shareholdings.” 327  “Section 262(h) unambiguously
calls upon the Court of Chancery to perform an independent
evaluation of ‘fair value’ at the time of a transaction ... [and]
vests the Chancellor and Vice Chancellors with significant
discretion to consider ‘all relevant factors’ and determine
the going concern value of the underlying company.” 328
The determination of fair value is intended to ensure the
stockholder is “paid for that which has been taken from
him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going concern.” 329
Valuation of the corporation as a going concern must be
“based upon the operative reality of the company as of the
time of the merger, taking into account its particular market
position in light of future prospects.” 330  “Given that ‘[e]very
company is different; every merger is different,’ the appraisal
endeavor is ‘by design, a flexible process.’ ” 331
*18  “In a statutory appraisal proceeding, both sides have
the burden of proving their respective valuation positions
by a preponderance of [the] evidence.” 332  In evaluating
the parties’ positions, “[n]o presumption, favorable or
unfavorable, attaches to either side's valuation,” 333  and
“[e]ach party also bears the burden of proving the
constituent elements of its valuation position ..., including the
propriety of a particular method, modification, discount, or
premium.” 334  Because the Court determines fair value based
on an adversarial presentation blending facts, opinions, and
argument, the Court's conclusions in one appraisal proceeding
may not squarely inform its conclusions in another. 335
The appraisal exercise occurs in the context of the efficient
market hypothesis, “long endorsed” by the Delaware
Supreme Court. 336  “It teaches that the price produced by an
efficient market is generally a more reliable assessment of fair
value than the view of a single analyst, especially an expert
witness who caters her valuation to the litigation imperatives
of a well-heeled client.” 337  In view of this principle, the
Delaware Supreme Court has acknowledged “the economic
reality that the sale value resulting from a robust market check
will often be the most reliable evidence of fair value, and ...
second-guessing the value arrived upon by the collective
views of many sophisticated parties with a real stake in the
matter is hazardous.” 338  At the same time, the Delaware
Supreme Court does not view “the market [a]s always the
best indicator of value, or that it should always be granted
some weight.” 339  “There is no presumption that the deal
price reflects fair value.” 340  “[T]he persuasiveness of the
deal price depends on the reliability of the sale process that
generated it.” 341  If the sale process is not open or sufficiently
reliable, “the deal price should not be regarded as persuasive
evidence of fair value.” 342
*19  There is no checklist or set of minimum characteristics
for giving weight to the deal price. 343  Indeed, Delaware
Supreme Court precedent announced in “Aruba, Dell, and
DFC do[es] not establish legal requirements for a sale
process.” 344  A deal price serves as a persuasive indicator
of fair value where the sale process bears “objective indicia
of fairness that rendered the deal price a reliable indicator
of fair value.” 345  Vice Chancellor Glasscock described a
“Dell compliant” process as one “where (i) information
was sufficiently disseminated to potential bidders, so that
(ii) an informed sale could take place, (iii) without undue
impediments imposed by the deal structure itself.” 346
In Stillwater, Vice Chancellor Laster recited several
objective indicia of reliability approved by the Delaware
Supreme Court: negotiations “[at] arm's-length”; 347  board
deliberations without “any conflicts of interest”; 348  buyer
“due diligence and recei[pt of] confidential information
about [the company's] value”; 349  and seller “extract[ion of]
multiple price increases.” 350  The Delaware Supreme Court
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has particularly stressed the absence of post-signing bidders
as an objective indicator that the sale process was reliable and
probative of fair value. 351
The presence of objective indicia of reliability does not
establish a presumption in favor of the deal price. 352
Where these indicia are present, I must determine whether
they outweigh weaknesses in the sale process, or whether
those weaknesses undermine the persuasiveness of the deal
price. 353
B. Panera's Sale Process Was Sufficiently Reliable To
Make Deal Price Persuasive Evidence Of Fair Value.
I find several objective indicia of reliability in this case. As a
prefatory matter, Panera's stock traded in an efficient market,
such that indicia of reliability in Panera's sale process support
giving weight to deal price. 354  First, as Petitioners’ process
expert James Redpath recognized, the parties negotiated in an
arm's-length transaction. 355  Redpath similarly conceded that
the board was independent, and labored without conflicts of
interest. 356
*20  Second, JAB assessed Panera's value using both
Panera's extensive public information and focused due
diligence into Panera's confidential information. 357  In DFC,
deal price was the best evidence of fair value in part because
it was “informed by robust public information[ ] and easy
access to deeper, non-public information.” 358  Bell found
Panera's “transparency [was] off the charts[,]”and JAB's legal
advisors shared the view that “much of [JAB's diligence]
is check the box and that they have reviewed everything
that is public.” 359  Shaich explained that he presented the
Five-Year Strategic Plan “hundreds of times” to “internal
groups, external groups” and “every investment conference”
he attended (“twenty a year”) “to get everybody to understand
[ ] what's the vision and where we were.” 360
In addition, JAB received and reviewed the specific
nonpublic information that Shaich believed would lead JAB
to see greater value in Panera. 361  After reviewing that
information, JAB internally raised their offer from $296.50
to $305.00, as the information confirmed a “[s]ignificant
[c]ash [o]pportunity” through working capital and other cost
savings. 362  Ultimately, JAB offered Panera $315.00. 363
Although JAB limited their access to non-public information,
they did so as a natural result of Panera's widespread public
dissemination of meaningful information.
Third, Panera used Boublik's guidance 364  and Shaich's
doggedness to extract two price increases. 365  Even operating
under their own preferred terms of engagement, JAB raised
their price twice. The board rejected JAB's initial $286.00
offer, communicating its expectation that JAB would find
more value for the Company during the diligence process. 366
Boublik agreed and encouraged Shaich, the lead negotiator,
and Moreton, a board negotiation advisor, to seek additional
value. 367  When JAB revised their offer to $296.50, JAB
also explained that they would not raise the offer a penny
over $299.00. 368  This was still too low for the board. 369
Shaich and Moreton listened to Morgan Stanley's guidance
and believed the Company could break JAB's stated ceiling
price without giving a counteroffer. 370  Morgan Stanley was
right. After conducting diligence, confirming its anticipated
cost savings, and reviewing the Five-Year Strategic Plan and
Five-Year Model, JAB raised its price to $315.00. 371
*21  Fourth, no other potential bidders emerged, despite
a leak during negotiations and nonpreclusive deal
protections. 372  A leak gives potential bidders notice of the
transaction and an opportunity to bid. 373  According to Kwak,
leaks typically happen at the tail end of a process, 374  and a
potentially interested buyer with the capacity to acquire a $7
billion company would “have the experience and the know-
how and the team members to know that you do need to move
swiftly because at any point they could sign a transaction with
the rumored buyer.” 375  Kwak explained that when a rumored
transaction surfaces, coverage bankers immediately identify
and contact potential buyers “to explore whether th[ose]
compan[ies] ha[ve] interest in pursuing an acquisition.” 376
The first evidence of a leak emerged on March 27, when
Bloomberg called JAB for a comment. The leak concerned
Bell greatly, evidencing that JAB feared another bidder might
surface. The transaction became public on April 3, when
Bloomberg published its article. 377  No bidders surfaced.
Further, no third-party bidders expressed interest or submitted
a bid during the three-month post-signing period after the
parties announced the deal. 378  Panera's deal protections
included a no-shop provision with a fiduciary out, matching
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rights, a 3% termination fee, and 104 days between signing
and closing. 379  Morgan Stanley considered each post-
signing protection to be customary or insufficiently preclusive
to post-signing bidders. 380  Kwak viewed a 3 to 4% break-up
fee as “typical” and 3% as “customary,” 381  and recognized
that even “customary” matching rights “may discourage in a
way and make it more challenging” for other bidders to come
forward, but such rights would not prevent them. 382  Kwak
testified at trial that an interested bidder “could contact and
put forth an offer to the company.” 383  Kwak concluded there
was sufficient time between signing and closing, noting, “[I]f
there was someone, we would have expected to at least get
some form of an inbound.” 384
Petitioners have not meaningfully challenged the terms
Panera's post-signing passive market check, or offered
any evidence that an interested bidder did not have a
reasonable chance to bid. 385  To the contrary, Redpath
conceded, “[t]here was sufficient time for a topping bidder to
emerge post-signing.” 386  After the leak and the public deal
announcement, other market participants “failed to pursue
a merger when they had a free chance to do so.” 387  “The
failure of any other party to come forward provides significant
evidence of fairness, because ‘[f]air value entails at minimum
a price some buyer is willing to pay—not a price at which no
class of buyers in the market would pay.’ ” 388
*22  In particular, none of the “big three” 389  potential
bidders that Morgan Stanley identified—Starbucks, Chipotle,
and RBI—showed any interest in bidding for Panera, both
before and after the parties announced the deal. Chipotle knew
about the leak before the deal signed, but did not express
interest before or after signing. 390  Both RBI and Chipotle
sent post-announcement congratulatory messages to Morgan
Stanley after the parties announced the deal. 391
Finally, Panera solicited all logical buyers consistent with
its knowledge of the Company's value and the market.
The Delaware Supreme Court has identified “outreach to
all logical buyers” as a key indicator of reliability. 392
Petitioners contend that Panera engaged in a closed, single-
bidder strategy during the pre-signing process. Respondent
asserts that Panera engaged “all logical buyers.” 393
In Dell, the board similarly limited its pre-signing canvass to
two bidders, based on its financial advisor's recommendation
that those two firms were “among the best qualified potential
acquirers” and that “there was a low probability of strategic
buyer interest in acquiring the company.” 394  The Dell board
also conducted a go-shop, soliciting interest from sixty-
seven potential bidders. 395  As a result, the Supreme Court
determined the deal price “deserved heavy, if not dispositive,
weight.” 396
Panera led outreach to all logical buyers: Starbucks and
JAB. The negotiations with the two companies followed the
same pattern. Shaich asserted Panera's value based on the
Five-Year Strategic Plan to “sell[ ]” the company, or solicit
interest, 397  listened to gauge interest, and then consulted
with the board. 398  The failed negation with Starbucks
prepared Shaich and the board to negotiate with JAB.
As a recap, in June 2015, Goldman identified several potential
strategic bidders, and identified Starbucks as Panera's most
likely buyer. 399  Starbucks was the most likely bidder
because Panera was “such a valued company” “trading at very
high multiples.” 400  Goldman concluded a financial buyer
was unlikely, and the board understood that financial sponsors
were limited and none could afford the Company. 401  With
that analysis, the board decided that it should remain an
independent company, but that “the Company would, as it had
done in the past, continue to observe the markets and consider
activities in the best interest of shareholders on an ongoing
basis.” 402
*23  About a year later, in July 2016, Starbucks initiated
a possible collaboration 403  and the board instructed Shaich
to solicit Starbucks’ interest in an acquisition. 404  In August
2016, Shaich started the conversation with JAB, another
potential buyer that was conducting acquisitions at “huge
multiples.” 405  Shaich explained:
I saw an article in Nation's Restaurant
News, I think [JAB] had just done
an acquisition. They were buying
companies every six months at huge
multiples. And I thought they were at
least worth getting to know in some
way, so I picked up the phone and
called Goldman, said do you know
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these guys and can you introduce me.
That was August. 406
After August, Panera continued its negotiations with
Starbucks, which concluded by December 2016. 407  JAB
expressed interest in meeting with Shaich, but with another
ongoing acquisition, JAB did not engage with Shaich until
February 2017. 408  After JAB expressed interest in acquiring
Panera on March 24, Shaich probed Goldman for more
information about the acquisition landscape, especially after
RBI announced its acquisition of Popeyes on February 21. 409
Goldman replied, “Best buyer today is a JAB, with a long
term perspective that counters near term valuation trends.
Or Starbucks. Or a merger with someone like Chipotle.” 410
Shaich shared Goldman's analysis with Colasacco. 411
As conversations with JAB proceeded, Morgan Stanley
identified the same four strategic primary strategic buyers as
Goldman: JAB, Starbucks, Chipotle, and RBI. 412  Morgan
Stanley also excluded other potential acquirers. Morgan
Stanley recognized that Dunkin and Dominos were highly
leveraged like RBI and all three would have difficulty paying
all cash. 413  Beyond this, Morgan Stanley recommended that
Dunkin and Dominos also had “slightly different business
models” and lacked a clear strategic fit. 414  With this
guidance from both Goldman and Morgan Stanley, the board
viewed JAB as the only remaining logical bidder. Like
Goldman, Morgan Stanley viewed Starbucks as the only
other potential buyer that could afford Panera, 415  but the
board had already exhausted that option. 416  The board knew
that Chipotle was recovering from a food safety crisis and
otherwise focused on share buybacks. 417  And the board
knew that RBI had agreed to acquire Popeyes. 418  The board
concluded that no other bidders were out there. 419  Morgan
Stanley confirmed the board's conclusion: “JAB represents
the buyer with the most interest, wherewithal, and ability to
pay and would be a good fit.” 420  Moreton summarized, “we
had just gone through the key strategic buyer. Starbucks had
told us no. And Morgan Stanley and Goldman had told us
there were no financial bidders out there. So we really thought
this was an opportunity to see if we could get a price that was
reasonable for shareholders.” 421  The leak added certainty to
the board's conclusion. 422
*24  Petitioners argue that a logical buyer universe of only
two buyers is “absurd” because “Panera could not have
known buyers were ‘out’ without ever conducting a market
check.” 423  The Delaware Supreme Court has held that when
“the directors possess a body of reliable evidence with which
to evaluate the fairness of a transaction, they may approve
that transaction without conducting an active survey of the
market.” 424  And “if a board fails to employ any traditional
value maximization tool, such as an auction, a broad market
check, or a go-shop provision, that board must possess an
impeccable knowledge of the company's business for the
Court to determine that it acted reasonably.” 425
I find that the board possessed a robust body of evidence
that it used to determine the universe of logical buyers.
The board's impeccable knowledge of the market in the pre-
signing phase, and the lack of interested bidders in the post-
signing phase, leads me to find that the board led outreach
to all logical buyers. Because Panera engaged with Starbucks
first, JAB's confidentiality requirement did not preclude the
board's outreach to all logical buyers. The absence of a wider
canvass or go-shop does not change the reliability of Panera's
outreach. 426  This decision was confirmed when no other
bidders came forward either after the leak or during the
post-signing passive market check. The preponderance of the
evidence shows that the board used its knowledge of the
market and its advisors’ advice to engage all logical buyers in
a value-maximizing process.
Panera's deal process bears many indicia of reliability,
including an arm's length negotiation, a disinterested and
independent board, numerous price increases, no emerging
bidders post-leak or post-announcement, and outreach to
all logical buyers. The process also terminated with an
open passive post-signing market check. I therefore turn to
the weaknesses in the process to determine whether they
undermine its reliability.
C. Weaknesses In Panera's Process Do Not
Undermine The Deal Price's Reliability.
Petitioners point to weaknesses in the pre-signing process that
they believe undermine the deal price's reliability. They focus
on actions taken by the board, Shaich, and Morgan Stanley.
In all, I find that the transaction's flaws do not undermine its
numerous indicia of reliability.
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1. The board did not undermine the deal process.
Petitioners characterize the pre-signing phase as exhibiting
the board's “apathy,” ignorance, and “flat-footed[ness].” 427
According to Petitioners, these traits manifested in the board's
failures to 1) authorize Shaich's initial outreach to JAB, 2)
oversee the negotiations, 3) negotiate with a proper valuation,
4) reject JAB's confidentiality and speed provisions, and 5)
negotiate deal protections.
First, while the board had authorized Shaich to solicit
Starbucks’ interest in acquiring Panera, 428  Shaich did not
obtain specific board authorization for his August 2016
outreach to JAB. Shaich's independent outreach did not
generate a response until early 2017. At that time, when JAB
offered to meet with Shaich, Shaich informed Colasacco and
other board members. 429  When JAB expressed an interest
in acquiring Panera on February 24, 2017, Shaich informed
Colasacco the next day, 430  and informed the board three
business days later on March 1. 431  Thus, although Shaich
initiated Panera's outreach to JAB, he timely and fully updated
the board when JAB expressed interest in a transaction. 432
Shaich did not negotiate for a role post-merger or negotiate for
change-in-control compensation. 433  Petitioners provided no
evidence that the outreach alone––Shaich's only act that was
not specifically authorized—led to any diminution in value
or in the board's power to negotiate or decline a transaction
with JAB.
*25  Second, while Shaich initiated and led the negotiations,
the board exercised active oversight. The board of directors
“has the sole power to negotiate the terms on which the merger
will take place and to arrive at a definitive merger agreement
embodying its decisions as to those matters.” 434  The
preponderance of the evidence shows the board negotiated
the terms of the merger and unanimously approved the final
merger agreement.
A CEO's rogue negotiations can undermine a deal process.
In Jarden, the CEO “immediately took charge and, consistent
with a stereotypical ‘cut to the chase’ CEO mentality, he laid
Jarden's cards on the table before the negotiations began in
earnest and before the board and its financial advisors had
a chance to formulate a plan.” 435  Beyond this, the Jarden
CEO failed to inform the board of the negotiations. 436  He
also did not receive authorization from the board to suggest
a price, make counteroffers, or negotiate his “change-in-
control compensation,” but did so anyway. 437  These facts
contributed to the Court's finding that the merger price was
not a reliable indicator of fair value. 438
I do not find similar troubling facts in this case. Unlike in
Jarden, the board directed Shaich's negotiations, and Shaich
observed the bounds of the board's authorization. Shaich
informed the board of JAB's interest before JAB made
an offer. 439  At that time, the board authorized Shaich to
“continue the conversations with JAB and report back to the
Board with an update as to the discussions and the status of
any offer.” 440  When JAB offered to acquire Panera on March
10, 2017, for $286.00 per share, Shaich formally informed
the board on March 14. 441  The board instructed Shaich to
move forward with the discussions, 442  but directed him to
communicate to JAB that the board “would not agree to any
proposed offer for the Company that was not significantly
higher than the $286.00.” 443
The board also used Sullivan & Cromwell as its outside legal
counsel for the potential transaction with JAB. 444  Sullivan
& Cromwell advised the board during its March 14 meeting
and helped the board select financial advisors. 445  On March
15, the board initiated the process to retain Morgan Stanley as
its financial advisor. 446  From then on, Shaich and Moreton
worked with the board and Morgan Stanley to adopt a proven
strategy to raise JAB's price through diligence. 447
When JAB raised their offer to $296.50 per share on March
20, 448  Shaich informed the board that same day. 449  At
the meeting, the board considered the offer, and “various
directors asked questions and provided their thoughts and
comments.” 450  Shaich testified that “the board supported
[him] in pushing” JAB to a higher price 451  and “expressed
its expectation that any final offering price be significantly
higher.” 452
*26  Shaich conveyed that message to JAB and focused on
generating additional value through the diligence process. 453
When JAB asked to move up the announcement by a week,
Shaich discussed this proposal with Moreton, Bufano, and the
Company's legal and financial advisors, and explained he did
not find the compressed timeline material; he cared about JAB
understanding Panera's value. 454  Accordingly, Shaich told
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JAB that “[w]e think we need to spend some more time with
you so we can show you the prospects in our plan, in order
to get you comfortable at a value that my board and I can
support.” 455  While Shaich led diligence meetings between
Panera and JAB, the board counteroffered against JAB's 4.0%
termination fee, proposing 2.5%. 456
At the culmination of JAB's diligence, Shaich informed the
board of JAB's final offer. 457  The board then reviewed the
Five-Year Strategic Plan and Five-Year Model, 458  vetted
the deal with Morgan Stanley, 459  and ultimately “expressed
their strong support for the proposed transaction.” 460  Later
that same day, the board reconvened to discuss the proposed
merger with Sullivan & Cromwell. 461  After discussing
the proposed merger, the board unanimously approved the
proposed resolutions to adopt, execute and deliver the merger
agreement. 462  The preponderance of the evidence shows
that the board directed Shaich's negotiations and “arrive[d]
at a definitive merger agreement embodying its decisions as
to th[ose] matters.” 463  Petitioners have likewise failed to
prove that Shaich acted outside the bounds of the board's
authorization.
Third, Petitioners assert the board negotiated in the dark,
without a formal valuation by its advisors. The board entered
negotiations with an existing deep knowledge of internal
metrics of Panera's value. During the negotiations, the board
analyzed seven valuation metrics with Morgan Stanley. When
considering JAB's final offer, the board evaluated Morgan
Stanley's standalone valuation for Panera.
Initially, the board did not have a full valuation, but it
had steeped itself in management's numbers. At several
prior board meetings, the board reviewed parts of the
Five-Year Strategic Plan and Five-Year Financial Model.
Without a valuation, the board was not prepared to make
a counteroffer when JAB's initial offer came in, 464  so it
limited its negotiating position to general pricing guidance.
This dovetailed with Morgan Stanley's advice, based on JAB's
bidding precedents, to focus on raising JAB's ceiling. 465
On March 14, the board instructed Shaich to convey to JAB
that it would not agree to any proposed offer for the company
that was not significantly higher than $286.00. 466  Again,
when JAB raised its offer to $296.50 and stated a max price
of $299, 467  the board did not think JAB's $296.50 was high
enough and directed Shaich to communicate to JAB that they
expected additional value. 468
*27  Morgan Stanley met with management to review
Panera's updated Five-Year Financial Model, an essential
input for Morgan Stanley's valuation. 469  Morgan Stanley
incorporated these numbers into its implied transaction
multiples and illustrative valuation matrices. 470  On
March 30, Morgan Stanley presented its preliminary
valuation analysis to the board. 471  This presentation
contained two illustrative valuation matrices, Panera's
historical stock performance, next-twelve-month multiples,
operating comparables, valuation comparables, precedent
transactions, and JAB's precedent transaction overview. 472
This presentation did not include Panera's standalone
valuation.
Morgan Stanley's full valuation, including Panera's
standalone valuation, came on April 4, the day after the
board received JAB's final $315.00 per share offer. 473
Also on April 4, the board discussed the updated Five-
Year Financial Model. 474  The standalone valuation included
two DCFs: the management case generated from Panera's
Five-Year Financial Model, and the street case generated
from consensus of broker projections. 475  The board assessed
these metrics using its knowledge of the Five-Year Financial
Model. When reviewing the management case DCF, Morgan
Stanley cautioned the board that risks could prevent Panera
from reaching the valuation predicted using the Five-Year
Financial Model. Morgan Stanley explained that “[y]ou've got
to believe that 80+% of your value is in the terminus” and
highlighted risks in competition and execution. 476  The board
asked questions about “assumptions used in the presentation
and differences among the various valuation techniques.” 477
The board ultimately decided that the management case
“wasn't the proper way to look at the valuation.” 478  Morgan
Stanley presented its oral fairness opinion for the transaction,
which it would provide in writing the following day. 479  After
Morgan Stanley left, the board met in executive session and
discussed the transaction and the Company's valuation. 480
The board found JAB's $315.00 offer consistent with its
understanding of Panera's value and unanimously approved
the transaction. 481
It is problematic that the board, through Shaich, gave
early guidance toward a price that was not “deeply in the
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$300s,” 482  but this pricing guidance was not a potentially
binding counteroffer, and did not set a ceiling on the price.
The board rejected JAB's initial offer because it knew Panera's
value from its continual review of the Five-Year Financial
Model. Panera's strategy of pressuring JAB to raise its ceiling
ushered in an offer that Morgan Stanley opined was fair and
the board found consistent with its understanding of Panera's
value. The board checked its understanding of Panera's value
against Morgan Stanley's seven valuation metrics on March
31. And the board reviewed and discussed the Company's
standalone value in depth on April 4 by reviewing the Five-
Year Financial Model and Morgan Stanley's DCF valuations.
Although the board did not have each of these valuation
metrics at the outset of the negotiations, it reviewed each of
them before it accepted JAB's final offer.
*28  Fourth, while JAB conditioned its offer on
confidentiality and speed, Panera's board valued those traits
as a way to minimize disruption. The board had enacted
confidentiality protections in its discussions with Starbucks,
too. In both negotiations, Shaich and other board members
used their Gmail accounts. 483  Shaich did this because he
worried “intensely” about disruption. 484  At trial, Shaich
explained:
I am very sensitive to any discussion
about anything that could be perceived
as a potential acquisition and upsetting
the company. ... It would upset our
relationships with our franchisees, our
vendors, and, quite frankly, would shut
down the work on this transformation
plan for three to six months, whatever
time period that would be the basic
discussion in the company. 485
Thus, JAB's desire for speed benefitted the Company. 486
Moreton explained it was “to our advantage to go quickly
from the standpoint we don't want to disrupt our people
either, if things got out in the press. So everyone said they
had adequate time, so we said, Okay. Let's shoot for it.” 487
Colasacco agreed: “I would like this period to be as short
as possible, because I believe that eventually management
becomes aware, general management becomes aware. In the
due diligence process—other processes, it's hard—it's very
hard to keep a secret.” 488
This internal practice aligned with Morgan Stanley's guidance
to limit outreach outside of Panera. Morgan Stanley advised
that JAB would “walk away if [Panera] or its advisors
talk[ed] to other parties.” 489  Morgan Stanley encouraged
compliance:
Based on our familiarity with [JAB's]
behavior, we did believe that their
threat to walk was real. And we do
see potential buyers throughout our
projects really do walk away if, for
example, a deal leaks or they get roped
into an auction process, because there
are certain buyers that just have no
interest being in part of an auction
process. 490
Redpath confirmed that “if you were serious about JAB,
you would need to pursue those discussions on an exclusive
basis.” 491
When JAB sought to accelerate the process by one week,
Shaich conditioned the tight timeframe on “a full vetting
of the five-year and our strategic presentation because for
[Panera] this is a discussion of value” to ensure that JAB
would “robustly (and genuinely) understand the drivers in
the business [s]o they [could] fully appreciate the value
that we understand is here and seek from them.” 492  The
board also ensured Panera's advisors had adequate time. 493
After conducting diligence and attending these meetings, JAB
internally revised their target price upwards to $305.00 per
share 494  and eventually offered $315.00. 495
*29  Finally, contrary to Petitioners’ complaint, the board
negotiated for less restrictive deal protections. Panera's
deal protections included a no-shop provision with a
fiduciary out, matching rights, and a 3% termination fee. 496
During negotiations, the board achieved a reduction in
the termination fee from 4.0% to 3.0% by counteroffering
2.5%. 497  Kwak testified, “a 3 percent break-up fee is
customary. And our rule of thumb is, generally for a
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transaction of this size, 3 to 4 percent is typical.” 498  Kwak
testified that the deal's no-shop with the fiduciary out and
matching rights were also customary. 499  Redpath agreed. 500
The board successfully negotiated a lower termination fee.
Otherwise, it assented to the no-shop with a fiduciary
out because the board understood that JAB was the only
remaining logical buyer. The board otherwise assented to
the deal terms, including matching rights, which its advisors
viewed as “customary.” 501  Petitioners have not shown
that the board failed to challenge JAB's suggested deal
protections. Instead, the board “bargain[ed] for value in
negotiating the deal protections and only acceded to the
termination fee when it reached terms regarding price and deal
certainty that it viewed as attractive.” 502
The preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding
that the Panera board was apathetic, ignorant, or flat-footed.
Rather, I find that the board started the negotiations well
versed in Panera's financials and projections; empowered
Shaich to press JAB to raise its price and fully consider
Panera's internal evidence of value, and supervised the
negotiations; obtained a full valuation in time to meaningfully
consider JAB's final offer within JAB's compressed timeline;
and successfully negotiated less restrictive deal protections.
The board's performance does not render Panera's pre-signing
process unreliable.
2. Shaich's personal interests did
not undermine the sale process.
Petitioners contend that Shaich led negotiations despite
personal conflicts, specifically his desire to retire. Shaich's
prior attempts to step down had been unsuccessful, and
Shaich disliked aspects of running a public company. 503
According to Petitioners, Shaich acquiesced to JAB's demand
for exclusivity and left value on the table so that he could
separate from the Company. 504
In Aruba, the Delaware Supreme Court used the deal price as
the most reliable indicator of value when making its fair value
determination. 505  That was true even though the company's
top executive had conflicting incentives over retirement. At
trial, this Court found that these conflicts did not undermine
the deal price as an indicator of fair value because the
conflict “would not have changed [the company's] standalone
value.” 506  The Stillwater Court recently synthesized the role
of conflicts in evaluating fair value: the “critical question” in
considering a CEO's motivation is whether “personal interests
undermined the sale process.” 507
*30  A CEO's significant stock holdings may align her
personal interests with the company's. “When directors or
their affiliates own ‘material’ amounts of common stock, it
aligns their interests with other stockholders by giving them
a ‘motivation to seek the highest price’ and the ‘personal
incentive as stockholders to think about the trade off between
selling now and the risks of not doing so.’ ” 508  Alternatively,
a CEO's personal interests can derail negotiations and cast
doubt on the reliability of deal price as a fair value. In
Norcraft, the Court found the CEO was as focused on securing
a role with the future company as he was on securing the
best deal price. 509  During the process, the CEO negotiated to
divert funds from the merger into tax receivable agreements
that would benefit him personally. 510
Petitioners have not proven that Shaich was conflicted or
otherwise uncommitted to obtaining the best price possible
because he wanted to retire. The record shows that when the
Company needed him, Shaich came back to his role as Co-
CEO with Moreton. And when Moreton had to step down,
Shaich stayed on. Then, when Shaich's successor failed to
materialize, he promised he would not leave the Company
in a lurch. 511  Shaich repeatedly prioritized the Company's
success over his preferred professional trajectory. Unlike
the executive in Norcraft, Shaich did not negotiate future
employment with JAB, 512  even with analyst speculation at
closing that Shaich could now “run the company privately[,]
[n]ot a bad deal!” 513
The record shows that Shaich was intent on driving the
price upwards. During the negotiations, the board cautioned
Shaich, holding him back: on March 17, Moreton cautioned
not to push it too hard by being too greedy, because “pigs
get fat, hogs get slaughtered.” 514  The next day, Shaich
informed JAB that they would have to increase their initial
offer beyond $300.00 per share. 515  During the negotiations,
Morgan Stanley described Shaich as “supremely focused
on finding a good home for the company and preserving
the legacy of the business he's built for 35 years.” 516  No
evidence disturbs this conclusion.
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My perceptions of Shaich from trial do not fit with
Petitioners’ theory. Shaich testified that he would not have
sold Panera without getting the best price. 517  I believe him.
Shaich's commitment to realizing value for Panera appeared
to run deep. In my view, his commitment stemmed from
his pride in Panera, a desire to reward those who had built
Panera with him, and an attachment to Panera itself. 518
Correspondence between Moreton and Shaich on the date of
the sale shows Shaich's perspective. Moreton wrote:
Ron - I imagine that you have thought
about Louie and your Dad more than
a few times these past few days. This
morning I woke up thinking of George
Kane and him asking you: Ronnie
- how much cash do we have. The
answer today would be quite a lot. I am
sure George (and your Dad and Louie)
are resting peaceful and are incredibly
proud of you. You have touched so
many lives ... especially mine. 519
Shaich replied, “Wonderful and very sad ... Indeed I was
thinking about my dad yesterday. He always told me to take
the money ... I always ignored him ... Though that has never
been my way [t]his is probably the right time ...” 520  Shaich's
trial testimony on this email was credibly emotional.
*31  After weighing all the evidence, I am convinced that
Shaich would not, and did not, agree to a deal after a 35-year
career before he found the right place and value for Panera.
Shaich wanted to exit Panera and he led the negotiations.
Those parallel facts do not convince me that either he or the
impartial board accepted a low offer—or any offer—because
of Shaich's personal goals. Shaich's desire to retire did not
undermine the deal process or diminish Panera's standalone
value. “As a matter of professional pride, he wanted to sell
[Panera] for the best price he could.” 521
3. Morgan Stanley's actions and advice
did not undermine the pre-signing process.
Petitioners view Morgan Stanley as a conflicted advisor
because of the firm's late conflict disclosures, financial
incentives, and backchannel discussions about financing via
a JAB coverage banker. Petitioners also try to cast doubt on
the adequacy of Morgan Stanley's representation. Respondent
counters that Morgan Stanley informed the board of its prior
work with JAB, and the board determined Morgan Stanley
was not conflicted; Panera and Morgan Stanley used JAB's
coverage banker to drive up value; and Morgan Stanley's
financial incentives aligned with Panera's stockholders. I take
each in turn.
a. Morgan Stanley disclosed its
prior JAB work to the board. 522
On March 15, the board initiated the process to retain Morgan
Stanley as its financial advisor. 523  Moreton testified that he
participated in those discussions, and that Morgan Stanley
had disclosed its prior work for JAB. 524  Nothing in the
record casts doubt on this testimony. 525  Then, on March
20, Sullivan & Cromwell informed the board that Morgan
Stanley “had cleared an initial conflicts check on March 15
and the parties were now negotiating an engagement letter
for the transaction.” 526  Morgan Stanley provided its formal
disclosure of past work with JAB on March 30, but the board
already knew that Morgan Stanley had previous engagements
with JAB. 527  There is no indication that these disclosures
changed the board's view of Morgan Stanley's ability to serve
as its financial advisor. Moreton reflected on the disclosures
and testified:
[Y]ou wonder if it might be
an advantage because they might
understand JAB. And certainly, I had
faith in the fact that the people that
were going to work on the transaction
on our behalf were of the utmost
integrity, and so it didn't bother
me individually or the board as a
collective whole. 528
*32  The facts here diverge from those in Jarden, in which
the board “made no inquiry” about advisor conflicts and
“there [wa]s no indication that either [the CEO] or [the
advisor] made any effort to disclose their past relationships
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to the board.” 529  In this case, Morgan Stanley shared its
past JAB work twice, including a formal representation letter.
The board reviewed the formal disclosure in advance, even
if only by a few days, before approving the deal. Petitioners
have provided no basis to conclude that the timing of Morgan
Stanley's disclosures undermined Panera's sale process.
b. Morgan Stanley's financial incentives
were commonplace and unremarkable.
Contingency clauses are standard in financial advisor
agreements and seldom create a conflict of interest.
“Contingent fees for financial advisors in a merger context
are somewhat ‘routine’ and previously have been upheld
by Delaware courts.” 530  This Court has recognized that
“[c]ontingent fees are undoubtedly routine; they reduce the
target's expense if a deal is not completed; perhaps, they
properly incentivize the financial advisor to focus on the
appropriate outcome.” 531
Petitioners contend that Morgan Stanley's compensation
relied on the signing and closing of the deal with JAB. Morgan
Stanley's $40 million fee was contingent in part on signing
for $8 million and in part on closing for $32 million. 532
The fee contingency does not specify that the signing and
closing must have involved JAB for Morgan Stanley to be
compensated under the terms of the agreement. Contrary to
Petitioners’ contention, the fact remains that, had another
bidder emerged, Morgan Stanley's compensation would result
from a “proposed sale of the Company” to “any buyer.” 533
A conflict in advising a company in favor of a sale rather
than in remaining a standalone company is possible. No
such conflict exists here. Morgan Stanley presented the board
with a full valuation analysis that included a standalone
valuation based on a number of metrics, including the
comparatively high management case based on the Five-
Year Strategic Plan. And although Petitioners contend that
Panera should not have agreed to JAB's price because its
standalone value was far higher, the $315.00 offer still fell
within the management case's valuation range. 534  Rather
than accepting the management case, the board recognized
that there was execution risk to the Five-Year Strategic Plan,
including that Shaich would not be there to guide Panera
3.0 and beyond. Both the board and Morgan Stanley found
that the price was fair for the Company's stockholders. In
any event, Morgan Stanley's fairness opinion would not have
precluded a board determination that it was better for Panera
to remain a standalone company.
c. Both parties used Morgan Stanley
coverage contacts outside the deal team
to press their respective advantages.
In its disclosure letter, Morgan Stanley advised that with the
exception of Gallagher, no senior deal team member “is a
member of the coverage team for the Potential Buyer or the
Buyer Related Entities.” 535  Morgan Stanley did not create
a wall between its JAB coverage team, including Ciagne,
and its Panera senior deal team. 536  Kwak testified that
Morgan Stanley “didn't set up a wall because there was no
conflict[.]” 537
*33  Ciagne, as a member of JAB's coverage team, relayed
two communications between the deal teams. In the first, on
March 27, JAB told Ciagne to tell Boublik that JAB feared
Morgan Stanley was not doing enough to assure Panera that
JAB could finance the deal. 538  In the second, on April 1,
Boublik told Ciagne to tell JAB “Panera is serious, and there
has to be a higher price.” 539  Although the board did not know
that Ciagne passed JAB's message to Boublik, 540  the board
used Ciagne to pass its own message to JAB. 541
Petitioners point to Ciagne's involvement as a fatal flaw
in Panera's process. If this channel affected the deal price,
it would have increased it. JAB limited their message to
JAB financing, while the Company used it to ratchet up
pressure and leverage the price. In my view, this flaw did not
undermine a fair process.
d. Petitioners have not shown that
Morgan Stanley's advice was inadequate.
JAB's negotiation playbook contains four key principles:
bilateral, confidential, friendly, and fast. 542  The playbook
earned respect in the marketplace because JAB had intimated
they would walk if their counterpart did not follow it. 543
But on one occasion when a JAB target, Krispy Kreme,
pushed JAB to deviate to the target's advantage, JAB still
closed the deal. 544  Morgan Stanley knew about Krispy
Kreme's success, and Petitioners fault Morgan Stanley for not
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counseling Panera to similarly pursue a go-shop or reduced
termination fee.
Petitioners fail to acknowledge that Morgan Stanley informed
the board of Krispy Kreme's negotiation process and advised
Panera to adopt a similar negotiation strategy. 545  Morgan
Stanley educated Shaich and Moreton “very quickly” on
JAB's negotiation playbook and assisted them in developing
their own strategy. 546  On March 17, Boublik sent Shaich
and Moreton a proposed script and slide decks summarizing
“JAB Historical Bidding Precedents” and “JAB Merger
Backgrounds.” 547  Morgan Stanley presented these detailed
precedent analyses when the board was “thinking about
strategies in terms of how to go back to JAB in terms of
negotiation ... to show that JAB has bid up from their initial
bid in the past and ... to show how much they had bid up after
their initial bid.” 548  Shaich reviewed this deck and used it to
inform his negotiation strategy. 549
Moreton viewed these decks as “very important” because
“they were able to show us, in the bidding precedents, how
JAB's transactions had gone from the initial discussions and
initial bids, through due diligence, to the end, and how
they had a history of raising their offer price as they went
through.” 550  Shaich stayed up digesting this deck until 3
a.m., 551  and later thanked Boublik “for [his] very valued
input,” noting “it really made a difference in how [Shaich]
approached it ... particularly relative to the history of their
other deals.” 552
*34  The JAB Merger Backgrounds deck detailed the Krispy
Kreme offer, strategy, and negotiation timeline. After JAB
made Krispy Kreme an initial offer, Krispy Kreme asked
for more time because it did not have a complete long-term
financial plan and felt it could not yet “appropriately assess
JAB Holdings’ indication of interest.” 553  While Krispy
Kreme was securing this information and advisors, JAB
postponed the Krispy Kreme negotiations until after it closed
an acquisition with Keurig Green Mountain, Inc. 554  While
JAB was working on the Keurig deal, a financial buyer
expressed interest in Krispy Kreme, but did not engage in
negotiations. 555  Four and a half months after the initial
offer, JAB and Krispy Kreme resumed their negotiations. 556
Krispy Kreme's board insisted on additional value based on
their internal diligence, and threatened a go-shop unless JAB
increased the price and reduced the termination fee. 557  JAB
accepted Krispy Kreme's counteroffer, resulting in a 12%
bid premium and a reduced termination fee. 558  Petitioners
assert that Krispy Kreme negotiated for six months, when in
reality, JAB postponed negotiations while pursuing another
deal. Once they resumed negotiations, they lasted forty-five
days.
In comparison, Shaich initially reached out to JAB in August
2016, but JAB was pursuing another transaction at the time.
At the conclusion of that deal, Panera and JAB negotiated
for forty days. Unlike Krispy Kreme, Panera's board did not
need additional time to educate itself on Panera's long-term
financial plan: the Five-Year Financial Model was the board's
catechism. Like Krispy Kreme, the board insisted that JAB
find additional value through diligence.
Petitioners assert that Morgan Stanley should have advised
the board to seek a go-shop like Krispy Kreme. Krispy Kreme
had another interested bidder. Panera's board and Morgan
Stanley understood that there were no other bidders out
there with the interest and capacity to purchase Panera. 559
Accordingly, instead of pursuing a go shop, the board
obtained a lower 3.0% termination fee and conditioned JAB's
timeline on a review of the Five-Year Strategic Plan and
Five-Year Financial Model, which generated an additional
$18.50 in value. 560  In the end, no other party expressed
an interest in acquiring Panera, which confirms the board's
understanding that a go-shop would not result in a higher
price for Panera stockholders. Morgan Stanley did not fail to
advise the board about prior negotiating strategies. Rather, I
find Morgan Stanley helped the board implement a proven
negotiation strategy, with the lessons learned from the Krispy
Kreme transaction, to generate additional value.
Next, Petitioners contend that Morgan Stanley provided
inadequate substantive advice by failing to perform a
leveraged buyout (“LBO”) analysis, thereby failing to assess
a financial sponsor's ability to purchase Panera. Morgan
Stanley understood that “for an LBO of [$]6 to $7 billion,
putting in equity that represents more than 60 percent of the
total purchase price is just not what financial sponsors do
for their LBO.” 561  Petitioners’ process expert agreed that it
was unlikely that a financial sponsor would be interested in
Panera, 562  and Petitioner's valuation expert failed to perform
an LBO analysis. 563  Petitioners have not shown any flaw
with Morgan Stanley's focus on strategic bidders. This is
especially true when Morgan Stanley found that financial
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sponsors could not afford Panera, and identified only one
bidder besides JAB that could afford Panera: Starbucks. 564
*35  To Petitioners, Morgan Stanley's most significant
shortcoming is its failure to evaluate Panera's standalone
value until the final day of the transaction. Petitioners have
not shown that the board did not know Panera's standalone
value before it approved the merger. The board had a deep
knowledge of Panera's performance and projections derived
from the Five-Year Strategic Plan that it reviewed at every
meeting, 565  including the March 1 board meeting. 566  The
board received and reviewed Morgan Stanley's full valuation
before voting for the merger. 567  That valuation included a
standalone valuation derived from the Five-Year Strategic
Plan. 568  Petitioners have not shown that reviewing the
valuation earlier would have convinced the board to reject
JAB's offer, or that the valuation even encouraged remaining
a standalone entity. The deal price fell within the range of the
management case DCF. 569  While the board had very little
time with the valuation, this flaw did not undermine value,
particularly given the board's facility with Panera's financials.
In all, I find that some of the Company's pre-signing deal
decisions were sub-optimal. Morgan Stanley's JAB coverage
banker was involved in the deal communications, Shaich
pushed for an offer “not deep in the 300s” before the board
received a full valuation, and the accelerated timeline meant
the board had very little time with Morgan Stanley's valuation.
I find that these issues did not undermine the sale process
“so as to prevent the deal price from serving as a persuasive
indicator of fair value.” 570
Panera's board had a deep knowledge of the market and
of Panera's value. The board led discussions with the two
logical bidders, which were identified by the board through
their extensive personal knowledge, and by Goldman in
2015, Goldman in 2017, and Morgan Stanley in 2017. The
board negotiated with JAB according to their advisors’
strategy, which was tailored to JAB and executable based
on the board's working knowledge of Panera's value. The
board authorized Shaich to lead these negotiations, which he
did in reliance on board members and Morgan Stanley; in
full transparency to the board; and in relentless pursuit of
value. That strategy successfully extracted two price increases
totaling $18.50 per share and a lower termination fee, and
generated a final offer that the board concluded was fair in
view of Morgan Stanley's comprehensive valuation. Panera's
outreach to the only two logical buyers resulted in a deal
that both the board and its advisors identified as fair to its
stockholders. Accordingly, I find Panera's deal process to be
persuasive evidence of fair value.
D. Respondent Has Proven $11.56 In Synergies.
Section 262 mandates that I determine fair value “exclusive
of any element of value arising from the accomplishment
or expectation of the merger or consolidation.” 571  I must
“exclude from any appraisal award the amount of any
value that the selling company's shareholders would receive
because a buyer intends to operate the subject company,
not as a stand-alone going concern, but as a part of
a larger enterprise, from which synergistic gains can be
extracted.” 572  This excludes not only “the gains that the
particular merger will produce, but also the gains that might
be obtained from any other merger.” 573  And because deal
price is a persuasive metric of fair value in this case, I must
also “excise[ ] a reasonable estimate of whatever share of
synergy or other value the buyer expects from changes it plans
to make to the company's ‘going concern’ business plan that
has been included in the purchase price as an inducement to
the sale.” 574  Respondent bears the burden of proving any
downward adjustment to deal price.
*36  Respondent contends that the Court should excise
$21.56 per share from the deal price because it proved that
JAB anticipated, and paid for, synergies from deploying their
characteristic management framework. Respondent identifies
three categories of such synergies: incremental cost savings,
incremental leverage tax benefits, and revenue synergies.
Petitioners generally assert that JAB is a financial sponsor,
not a strategic buyer, and specifically challenge Respondent's
evidence of synergies.
Panera's board and financial advisors viewed JAB as a
strategic buyer, 575  and JAB identified Panera as a strategic
acquisition. 576  JAB had previously acquired Einstein Bros.,
Caribou Coffee, and Krispy Kreme. 577  JAB identified
Panera as a “Fresh Baked / Coffee Adjacency” that would
fill gaps in their portfolio by expanding JAB's holdings in the
coffee and fresh baked lunch category. 578  Even if JAB were
not a strategic buyer, labeling them as a financial acquirer
would not do the work Petitioners hope it would. “[I]n theory,
if the acquisition of a company by a financial acquirer is at
a market price that includes speculative elements of value
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which arise only from the merger, that acquisition value may
exceed the going-concern value.” 579  That is the case here.
JAB has a three-pronged “playbook” that they implement
after a deal closes. That playbook addresses people,
cost and cash, and growth. 580  Under the people prong,
JAB develops a “short list of CEO candidates,” installs
a “CFO and establish[es] Product Management Office,”
assesses the “management team,” and deploys the “JAB
ownership model.” 581  Under their cost and cash prong,
JAB identifies “[q]uick wins in cash, working capital
(particularly AP), [and] cost structure” to implement a “cash
and cost discipline culture.” 582  As for growth, JAB conducts
target-specific analyses and identifies strategic opportunities
from combining companies under its umbrella. 583  JAB
approached Panera with the intention of extracting synergies
through these plays. JAB's pre-diligence model, setting a
target price of $290.00, was based in part on value gains from
implementing their playbook at Panera. 584
First, JAB measured the investment opportunity for its cash
and cost prong, recognizing Panera's lack of “discipline
culture” in working capital and supply chain. 585  JAB's initial
investment model outlined $300 million in working capital
savings. 586  JAB had successfully implemented working
capital changes at Krispy Kreme, Caribou Coffee, and Peet's
Coffee. 587  JAB planned similar changes for Panera by
increasing the Company's days payable outstanding from
about four to about fifty to ninety days. 588
*37  As for cost savings opportunities, JAB identified
potential savings in SG&A, store level efficiency, and
supply chain amounting to $70 to over $100 million. 589  To
accomplish this, JAB hoped to cut public company expenses,
optimize franchise costs, introduce procurement savings, and
reduce waste. 590
After performing due diligence, JAB concluded their
diligence confirmed “significant” opportunities for cash and
for cost savings. 591  JAB confirmed $300 to $500 million
by maximizing working capital, more than $30 million in
procurement savings, $18 million in SG&A optimization,
$15 million in supply chain optimization, and $2.5 to $5
million in public company costs. 592  JAB expanded working
capital estimates as “[Panera] currently has the lowest [days
payable outstanding] across nearly all public peers and much
lower than other JAB Beech assets.” 593  At this point, JAB
recognized that they would have to pay more than their early
target price 594  and raised their internal target offer from
$290.00 to $305.00. 595
In addition to the management playbook, JAB applied their
bedrock negotiation playbook principle of not conditioning
their deal on receiving financing approval, and securing
financing during the diligence phase. 596  Respondent noted
that because JAB financed $3 billion for the deal, Panera
would carry greater debt than it did as a standalone value. 597
JAB quantified their anticipated debt and associated tax
effects when they formulated their target deal price. 598
Hubbard found that “[i]nternal documents show that JAB
anticipated significant synergies from the acquisition of
Panera, and factored these synergies into their valuation
of Panera.” 599  Hubbard found that with increased debt,
Panera would have higher interest tax deductions, generating
a merger-specific tax synergy of $9.18 per share. 600  Hubbard
agreed with the cost and cash synergies as well, finding
synergies totaling $37.29 per share.
Petitioners argue that these cost savings and tax synergies are
not merger-specific synergies because Panera management
could have also made these changes. 601  In support,
Petitioners cite Huff Fund Investment Partnership v. CKx,
Inc., in which this Court found that the record contained
insufficient evidence to support a finding that the respondent
formed its bid on, or believed that there were, merger-specific
cost savings. 602
That is not true of this case. Panera's management culture
and priorities did not support the changes JAB intended to
make. Panera was in the “habit” of paying its vendors within
four to six days 603  and invested in extensive initiatives. 604
JAB's “Cash Opportunities” arose from Panera's failure to
“focus on working capital at all” while spending “top dollar
to get the best without ever re-engineering costs out of the
business.” 605  Panera forecasted cost savings, but limited
its changes to sourcing and process improvements. 606
Any overlap between Panera's forecast and JAB's playbook
demonstrates differences in scale. As an example, Panera
evaluated “FDF” and G&A savings in its forecast, predicting
new cost savings between $300,000 and $600,000 each year
from 2018–2021; 607  JAB projected $18 million in its first
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year alone. 608  JAB believed that it could achieve much
greater savings because of its expertise in executing those
savings across their portfolio companies. 609  When Hurst saw
JAB's plan, he thought JAB had “lost their freakin’ minds
based on SG&A savings.” 610  JAB contemplated “Day 1
[p]laybook implementation.” 611
*38  As for the tax synergies, Petitioners argue that
Panera could “re-leverage its balance sheet as it saw fit”
so the tax deductions associated with JAB's $3 billion
financing were not an element of value arising from the
merger. 612  Petitioners concede that Panera's debt increased
“dramatically” after the transaction, from $480 million to
$2.7 billion. 613  Here, unlike in Huff, the evidence shows
JAB had similarly financed other deals in the past and saw
value in doing it again with Panera, while Panera intentionally
maintained low debt. 614
The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that JAB
formed its bid in anticipation of applying its management
playbook to Panera to generate merger-specific savings.
Before JAB made an offer, it recognized that it could realize
working capital and cost savings when it ran its plays on
Panera. JAB formed its initial offer in view of that predicted
value. JAB confirmed it could realize that value during due
diligence, and that conclusion informed their offer price. JAB
predicted additional value in tax savings from increasing
the Company's debt through JAB's characteristic financing
technique. Hubbard calculated the combined value of these
synergies at $37.29 per share. 615  I find that by running its
plays on Panera, JAB predicted $37.29 in value arising out of
the merger.
Hubbard estimated that JAB built in 31% of these synergies,
or $11.56, into the merger price. 616  In support, Hubbard
cites a 2013 Boston Consulting Group study of 365 deals
that analyzes the “median portion of synergies shared with
the seller.” 617  Petitioners object to the BCG study's breadth
and its lack of specificity across industry or comparable
companies. Respondent cites Solera for the proposition that
this study is an appropriate estimation of synergies belonging
to the buyer. 618  But the adoption of a methodology, expert
opinion, or metric in one appraisal action does not mandate
its adoption in a different appraisal action. 619  This Court's
previous acceptance of Hubbard's proffered study is not
conclusive in this case. Instead, I find that Petitioners have
not cast doubt on the reliability of this study, or put forward
a more appropriate percentage. Respondent has proven
deduction of cost and tax synergies of $11.56 per share by a
preponderance of the evidence. 620
*39  I turn now to JAB's third playbook prong of growth,
in which Respondent sees revenue synergies. Unlike the cost
and cash playbook prongs, JAB did not quantify these growth
opportunities in its models. JAB recognized that while it is
“relatively simplistic to quantify potential cost savings[,] [i]t's
much more difficult to quantify for-sure growth areas, even
though they may be extremely important.” 621  Leading up
to and throughout trial, Respondent and its expert presented
a fair value that did not quantify any revenue synergies
attributable to JAB's growth opportunities. This is consistent
with the record evidence and both parties’ experts’ opinions.
In their pre-diligence model, JAB identified growth
opportunities for coffee, technology, international expansion,
and CPG. 622  At a March 31 meeting, Panera also identified
opportunities in international franchising, CPG (including
coffee), and technology. 623  After this meeting, on April 2,
JAB created its post-diligence model, expressly clarifying
that CPG, coffee, and international expansion were “Growth
Areas Not in [the] Investment Model[.]” 624  In this same
model, as explained, JAB increased its internal target price to
$305.00 based on quantified anticipated cost savings. 625
At an April 3 meeting, the parties again discussed
opportunities for CPG, coffee, international expansion,
technology, as well as marketing, real estate, food sourcing,
and franchising. 626  Bell testified that these strategic growth
opportunities played a role in JAB's decision to increase their
offer from $305.00 to $315.00 627  because JAB
did some back-of-the-envelope math
and got excited about it. But since we
had no discussion with anyone about
it, and it was a short period of time,
we didn't, quote/unquote, put it in the
model, financially. But I will tell you
—you even heard it earlier—coffee
was core to our strategy of doing this.
It's just something that was difficult
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for us to quantify at the time we were
doing diligence. 628
Bell testified that JAB took a “leap of faith” on these “strategic
opportunities,” and justified the $10.00 increase with their
“back-of-the-envelope” calculations. 629  Later, Bell testified
that coffee procurement was not a “back-of-the-envelope”
calculation because JAB “hadn't done the analysis.” 630
After trial, Respondent latched onto a new synergy theory
that deducted $10.00 per share for these growth or revenue
synergies. Respondent's post-trial position finds no support
from its expert. Hubbard did not include any revenue
synergies in his analysis. 631  When pressed, Hubbard
affirmatively declined to adopt Bell's testimony, as he saw
no support for it in the trial exhibits or in his work for
Respondent. 632  “Thus, in its zeal to reach a desired litigation
outcome, Respondent finds itself in the awkward position
of advancing a position at odds with its own expert ....” 633
At post-trial argument, Respondent's counsel explained that
they “never asked [Hubbard] to adjust his opinion” because
the trial strategy required Hubbard to stick with his synergy
analysis, leaving counsel to argue the additional $10.00 in
synergies in post-trial briefing. 634
*40  This series of events casts doubt over Respondent's
post-trial position on revenue synergies. At bottom,
Respondent puts forward conclusory fact testimony
contradicted by JAB's contemporaneous financial modeling
and rejected by its expert. There is no evidence that
JAB quantified revenue synergies. JAB's financial modeling
assumes the opposite: “no uplift ... from any strategic synergy
opportunities.” 635  JAB's contemplation of potential growth
opportunities is insufficient to prove ten dollars’ worth of
revenue synergies in JAB's best and final offer price. Further,
JAB provided no evidence to support the conclusion that all
ten dollars inured to JAB's benefit and should be excised
from the amount paid to stockholders. Hubbard did not find
any revenue synergies, and therefore did not apportion any.
Respondent has failed to prove revenue synergies that would
support an excise of $10.00 from the deal price. In all,
Respondent has proven $11.56 from its cost savings and tax
synergies. The deal price minus synergies valuation method
yields a price per share of $303.44.
E. The Supplied Alternative Valuation
Methodologies Are Unreliable.
While Respondent asserts that deal price minus synergies
deserves dispositive weight, Petitioners press three alternative
valuation methodologies: discounted cash flow (“DCF”),
comparable companies, and precedent transactions. 636  In
the context of a persuasive deal price, I disregard those
methodologies for the reasons that follow.
1. Petitioners have not proven
their DCF model's reliability.
“While the particular assumptions underlying its application
may always be challenged in any particular case, the validity
of [the DCF] technique qua valuation methodology is no
longer open to question.” 637  Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court “cautioned against using the DCF methodology when
market-based indicators are available.” 638  Compared to
a persuasive, market-based deal price metric, “the DCF
technique ‘is necessarily a second-best method to derive
value.’ ” 639
Petitioners and Respondent each introduced a DCF valuation
prepared by their expert. Hubbard introduced a DCF that
generated a value of $291.71 per share. 640  He gave his DCF
no independent weight, but viewed it solely as corroborative
of his deal-price-minus-synergies value of $303.44. 641
In a “very subjective” weighting exercise, Shaked gave sixty
percent weight to his DCF model, which generated a value
of $354.00 per share, exceeding the deal price by $39.00. 642
By this model, Shaked asserted over a billion dollars was
left on the table. 643  The experts are approximately $63.00
per share apart. Because Petitioners are urging the Court to
give significant weight to Shaked's DCF model, they bear the
burden of convincing the Court that the model is sufficiently
reliable to merit weight in the face of Panera's reliable deal
process.
Petitioners have fallen short: Shaked's model as presented
at trial is of questionable reliability. The primary flaw is
Shaked's concession regarding the investment rate for the
terminal period. In his report, he put forward an investment
rate of 3.1% that he “conservative[ly]” cushioned with a
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$116 million buffer, as “kind of an extra slack for the
maintenance.” 644
*41  Hubbard put forward a 35.6% investment rate. 645  This
rate was based on the principle that “growth isn't free,” 646
particularly in the extraordinarily competitive restaurant
industry. 647  He anchored his investment rate in Panera's
historical investment rate, 648  and utilized the formula IR=g/
RONIC, where the investment rate equals the terminal
growth rate over the return on new invested capital. 649
Hubbard set RONIC equal to the weighted average cost of
capital (“WACC”) on the premise that “[i]n a competitive
industry, abnormal profits tend to vanish over time.” 650
In Respondent's view, Shaked's original investment rate
assumed “startlingly high returns on ROIC [ ( [return on
invested capital) ] forever.” 651
When Shaked took the stand at trial, he addressed this
criticism by presenting for the first time a “corrected”
ROIC chart with an investment rate that diverged from,
and was significantly higher than, the investment rate in his
report. 652  Shaked did not base his “corrected” chart on the
analysis found in his report or mentioned in his deposition.
Notwithstanding this correction, Shaked did not adjust his
DCF with the “corrected” investment rate.
When Hubbard applied Shaked's corrected investment rate
to his other DCF inputs, he found “the valuation attached to
this [investment rate] is $100 off the one he is tendering.” 653
Hubbard testified that if Shaked were to plug his corrected
33% investment rate into his DCF, this would erase much of
the difference between the experts’ DCF calculations. 654
After Hubbard's testimony, Shaked took the stand as a rebuttal
witness, but did not address his failure to adjust his DCF
in light of his corrected investment rate. 655  Shaked's trial
concession on his investment rate weakens his credibility: he
abandoned the rate in his report after learning of Hubbard's
criticisms, but stood by his DCF reliant on that rate, even after
Hubbard pointed out the inconsistency.
Shaked's original, unadjusted investment rate is a significant
driver of his DCF model. Hubbard pointed to this aspect
of Shaked's model to explain the wild swings in value
when substituting different perpetuity growth rate (“PGR”)
inputs. Under Shaked's initial model, inputting the different
growth rates from banker-supplied DCFs creates outputs that
are $1.3 billion apart. 656  This sensitivity to PGR arises
because Shaked initially assumed such a low investment
rate while predicting outsized growth. 657  Because “the
perpetuity growth rate and the investment rate are linked,”
changing the PGR in Shaked's original model would cause “a
very large swing in his DCF value.” 658  Shaked described his
model's sensitivity to PGR based on his low investment rate
as a “built-in problem.” 659  Given the significant impact of
Shaked's initial investment rate on his DCF, his concession
on that input and failure to adjust the model introduces fatal
unreliability.
Above, I determined that the market guides my analysis of
this transaction. The Supreme Court has “cautioned against
using the DCF methodology when market-based indicators
are available.” 660  Shaked's shift in his investment rate, the
fact that he did not adjust his DCF to accommodate that shift,
and the significance of his original investment rate to the
output of his DCF render his model unreliable. Petitioners
have failed to carry their burden to establish that Shaked's
DCF model is a sufficiently reliable indicator, particularly in
the shadow of a reliable market-based deal price. I do not
attribute any weight to this metric. 661
2. There is not a suitable peer group for a
reliable comparative companies analysis.
*42  “[B]efore a comparable companies multiples analysis
can be undertaken with any measure of reliability, it
is necessary to establish a suitable peer group through
appropriate empirical analysis.” 662  “If, and only if, a proper
peer set can be selected, the next step in the comparable
companies analysis is to select an appropriate multiple and
then determine where on the distribution of peers the target
company falls.” 663  Where the experts’ identified companies
are “too divergent from [the company] in terms of size,
public status, and products, to form meaningful analogs
for valuation purposes,” 664  this Court will disregard this
valuation metric. 665
The parties dispute the relevant peer group and argue that
neither expert tested the reasonableness of the comparable
companies selected. Hubbard selected comparable companies
by reviewing equity analysts’ reports in the year before the
merger date and selecting the firms mentioned by three or
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more analysts at least once. 666  As a result, Hubbard included
companies that operate outside the fast casual segment,
including full-service restaurants like Brinker International,
Darden Restaurants, Texas Roadhouse, and The Cheesecake
Factory. 667  Hubbard found this analysis produced fair values
ranging from $218.58 to $310.99 668 ; he did not afford any
weight to his comparable companies analysis, but viewed
it as corroborative of deal price. 669  Petitioners question
Hubbard's peer group as it includes much smaller companies,
including sectors other than fast casual, and does not
widely overlap with the comparable companies the bankers
identified.
Meanwhile, Respondent highlights that weakness in Shaked's
metric. Shaked used a peer group identified by at least 75%
of bankers involved. 670  These results exclude all of the fast
casual companies the bankers contemporaneously identified,
except for Chipotle. 671  It also included and excluded
similarly situated companies. For example, Shaked included
McDonald's and Burger King, but excluded Wendy's; he
included Domino's, but excluded Papa John's. 672  Shaked
found this approach resulted in fair values falling between
$377.00 and $382.00 per share; he weighed this valuation at
30%. 673
Where an expert defers to a peer set without conducting
a “meaningful, independent assessment of comparability”
between the seller's business and the business of its peer
companies it “is not useful and, frankly, not credible.” 674
Neither expert presents a reliable empirical analysis to show
a suitable peer group; both sets have material weaknesses.
For that reason, I do not find comparable companies as
a fair measure of value. Instead, I view both parties’
comparable companies analyses as an attempt to corroborate
their preferred valuation. I decline to afford them any weight.
3. There are insufficient comparable precedent
transactions to generate a reliable valuation metric.
*43  Both parties’ experts performed a precedent transaction
analysis. 675  Hubbard selected precedent transactions by
reviewing eleven transactions that Morgan Stanley included
in its April 4, 2017 presentation to the board. 676  He
“calculated valuations that are corroborative using multiples
of EV/EBITDA based on ... precedent transactions” that led
to a price per share range of $143.58 to $236.22. 677  Hubbard
used this data point as corroborative and gave it no weight 678
because a precedent transaction analysis is “model-based”
while “the market evidence is the real world.” 679
Shaked conducted a precedent transaction analysis by using
data from the FactSet database filtered by acquisitions of
restaurant companies in the United States or Canada with
an enterprise value over $1 billion. 680  He then compared
Panera's forecasted revenue growth to the upper quartile
EBITDA multiples of three comparative transactions and
conducted an analysis that led to a price per share range of
$338.00 to $361.00 with a midpoint of $350.00 per share. 681
Even though Shaked explained at trial that he “was not really
very thrilled with getting only three transactions[,]” 682  he
still afforded it 10% weight.
The accuracy of these analyses depends, as with a comparable
companies analysis, on the closeness of the comparable
transaction. As Morgan Stanley recognized, there was not
a “particular transaction that should serve as a direct
comparable.” 683  I find that neither sample size is reliable
enough to afford it weight.
F. Respondent Is Not Entitled
To A Refund Of Its Prepayment.
I turn now to the relief sought. The Company prepaid
Dissenting Stockholders the full deal price, or $315.00 per
share. Petitioners have obtained more than fair value, which I
have found to be $303.44. The Company seeks a refund in the
amount of the deducted synergies, or the difference between
fair value and prepayment, plus interest on that amount.
Petitioners and Respondent did not agree to a clawback
provision in the event Respondent overpaid. Respondent cites
no support for its request. Like others who have thought
about this issue, including counsel's firm, I find the request
for a refund has no present basis in Delaware's appraisal
statute. 684
Under Section 262(h), a surviving corporation seeking
to lessen the significant amount of interest that can
otherwise accrue in an appraisal action can prepay petitioning
stockholders “an amount in cash.” 685  As the General
Assembly explained, “[t]here is no requirement or inference
that the amount so paid by the surviving corporation is equal
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to, greater than, or less than the fair value of the shares to
be appraised.” 686  Upon prepayment, interest accrues only
upon the sum of the difference between the amount prepaid
and the judicially determined fair value, and any interest
accrued to date unless paid at that time. 687  Section 262 does
not explicitly contemplate any refund. Accordingly, appraisal
litigants sometimes stipulate to a clawback provision in their
prepayment agreement. 688
*44  “Under Delaware law, the appraisal remedy is entirely
a creature of statute.” 689  “The goal of statutory construction
is to determine and give effect to legislative intent.” 690  “The
courts may not engraft upon a statute language which has been
clearly excluded therefrom by the Legislature.” 691  “[S]uch
action would place the court in a position of making law.” 692
Nor may this Court “assume that the omission was the result
of an oversight on the part of the General Assembly.” 693
Where, as with Section 262, “a statute is silent on a particular
matter, the otherwise detailed nature of the statute in other
respects can be significant.” 694  “[I]n drafting Section 262(h),
the General Assembly made a determination as to the proper
balance of the competing interests of appraisal petitioners,
who have been cashed out of their preferred investment
and denied the ability to invest the merger consideration in
the market pending outcome of the case, and respondents,
against whom too large an interest award may operate as a
penalty.” 695
Here, the only permissible conclusion is fortunately a logical
one: the General Assembly intended to omit a refund
mechanism. In 2016, the General Assembly enacted an
optional and scalable prepayment scheme without mention
of a refund. It did so in the shadow of the Model Business
Corporation Act (the “Model Act”), adopted by the majority
of other states, which is a mandatory and fixed prepayment
scheme: it mandates prepayment of what the corporation
believes is fair value to stockholders who purchased their
stock before the merger was announced, and permits it for
stock acquired after the merger announcement. 696  Other
amendments to Section 262 have tracked the Model Act,
evidencing a legislative awareness of its content. 697  The
Model Act is silent on the effects of overpayment, like
Section 262, and has been interpreted to allow petitioning
stockholders to keep any overpayment. 698
Commentators have also interpreted Section 262’s silence as
an indication that overpayment is not recoverable. 699  This
Court has not yet resolved the issue. 700  I conclude Section
262 does not explicitly provide for a refund, and that therefore
I cannot order one. I am not the first to conclude that the
Court must stay within the bounds of Section 262’s plain
language. In 1948, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded
that because the operative version of Section 262 did not
provide for interest, the judiciary could not award it. 701
More recently, before the prepayment provision was enacted,
Vice Chancellor Glasscock found he was unable to order
prepayment. 702  After those exercises in judicial restraint,
amendments in the statute soon followed. 703  I will not
encroach on the General Assembly's prerogative. 704
III. CONCLUSION
*45  For the reasons discussed above, I find the fair value
of the Company's common stock at time of the merger
was $303.44, calculated as deal price minus synergies.
Respondent chose to prepay the $315.00 deal price to the
Dissenting Stockholders. Because Respondent is not entitled
to a refund of the difference between $315.00 and $303.44,
Petitioners have received more than fair value. The parties
shall submit a stipulated implementing order.
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court has heeded the Supreme Court's guidance and regularly rests its appraisal analysis on the premise that
when a transaction price represents an unhindered, informed and competitive market valuation, that price
‘is at least first among equals of valuation methodologies in deciding fair value.’ ” (quoting In re Appraisal of
AOL Inc., 2018 WL 1037450, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2018))).
343 See Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *21.
344 Id. at *22.
345 Id. at *44.
346 AOL, 2018 WL 1037450, at *8.
347 Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *22 (citing DFC, 172 A.3d at 349).
348 Id.; see also DFC, 172 A.3d at 375–76.
349 Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *23 (citing Aruba, 210 A.3d at 137–38); see also Dell, 177 A.3d at 30 (review
of “the Company's confidential information”); DFC, 172 A.3d at 355–56 (same).
350 Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *23 (citing Aruba, 210 A.3d at 139; Dell, 177 A.3d at 28).
351 Id. (citing Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136 (“It cannot be that an open chance for buyers to bid signals a market failure
simply because buyers do not believe the asset on sale is sufficiently valuable for them to engage in a bidding
contest against each other.”); Dell, 177 A.3d at 29 (“Fair value entails at minimum a price some buyer is willing
to pay—not a price at which no class of buyers in the market would pay.”); id. at 33 (finding that absence of
higher bid meant “that the deal market was already robust and that a topping bid involved a serious risk of
overpayment,” which “suggests the price is already at a level that is fair”)).
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352 Id. at *22.
353 Cf. id. (synthesizing the three recent Supreme Court appraisal decisions in Aruba, Dell, and DFC).
354 This point does not appear to be in serious dispute. Petitioners’ opening post-trial brief did not assert that
Panera's stock did not trade in an efficient market. The parties discussed the efficiency of the market for
Panera's stock only while talking past each other about whether weight should be given to Panera's stock
price. Compare D.I. 138 at 60–65, and D.I. 141 at 23, with D.I. 140 at 40–46. Out of an abundance of caution, I
make the unsurprising finding that Panera “ha[d] many stockholders; no controlling stockholder; ‘highly active
trading’; and ... information about the company [was] widely available and easily disseminated to the market.”
See Dell, 177 A.3d at 25 (citation omitted). Panera also had a large market capitalization, substantial public
float and trading volume, a low bid-ask spread, a high number of equity analysts, and a rapid response to
transaction rumors. See id. at 7, 25. Hubbard's report on these factors was persuasive and supported by
evidence presented at trial. JX0982 at 58–61; Hubbard Tr. 1504:11–1505:14, 1506:11–24. In my view, these
straightforward factors are plainly present and provide conclusive evidence of an efficient market for Panera's
stock. This conclusion is undisturbed by Shaked's analyses of market reactions to Panera news, which I find
to be plagued by subjectivity in what is “new and material” information, and a failure to account for trading
volume. See JX0988 at 83–84, 90–92.
355 Redpath Tr. 635:6–9. Redpath is a senior investment banking partner at Cypress Associates, a “nationally
recognized investment banking firm.” See id. 499:9–14, 505:18–21.
356 Id. 635:24–638:9, 643:12–644:8. Petitioners claim a special committee was necessary here, but Petitioners
cannot point to a conflict that a special committee could remedy where Panera had seven independent board
members on its nine-member board.
357 JX0476 at 2; JX0583 at 1.
358 172 A.3d at 349.
359 JX0461 at 1; JX0581; accord JX0476 at 2 (“Remember, this is a very clean public company, so have to tone
down the voluminous generic requests ....”).
360 Shaich Tr. 921:7–9, 948:2–18, 960:8–961:3, 962:17–23; see, e.g., JX0194 at 1; JX0192 at 5, 11; JX2028 at
3, 17; JX0032 at 51; JX0041 at 5, 22; JX0064 at 2; JX0260 at 4–5, 15; JX0331 at 3–4; JX0345 at 4–5, 14;
JX0029; JX1039; JX0063 at 3; JX0304.
361 JX0490; accord Moreton Tr. 840:7–23.
362 JX0593 at 49–50. These findings are discussed further in Section II(D), infra.
363 PTO ¶ 161.
364 Kwak Tr. 1206:15–1207:6; accord Moreton Tr. 821:7–14 (“Q. Did Panera at any time in the negotiations give
a, quote, unquote, counteroffer in the sense of a specific price point at which it would agree to a deal? A. No.
We never did. This was part of the strategy that Morgan Stanley helped craft, that there was no reason to
do that. At this point, it was just a push for more.”).
365 Shaich Tr. 999:9–1002:4.
366 PTO ¶¶ 139, 141; JX0448 at 1; accord Moreton Tr. 822:1–8 (“JAB's transactions had gone from the initial
discussions and initial bids, through due diligence, to the end, and how they had a history of raising their
offer price as they went through.”).
367 Moreton Tr. 820:4–13; accord JX0519 at 1.
368 PTO ¶ 140; accord Shaich Tr. 1002:9–23; JX0483.
369 PTO ¶ 141 (“The Board supported moving forward with further discussions and due diligence but again
expressed its expectation that any final offering price be significantly higher.”).
370 See Moreton Tr. 821:7–822:8.
371 PTO ¶ 161.
372 Id. ¶¶ 148, 159; Kwak Tr. 1215:24–1218:2.
373 In re Appraisal of Solera Hldgs., Inc., 2018 WL 3625644, at *14 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2018) (analyzing Dell and
commenting that “[g]iven leaks in the press that Dell was exploring a sale ... the world was put on notice of
the possibility of a transaction so that any interested parties would have approached the Company before
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the go-shop if serious about pursuing a deal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. DFC, 172 A.3d at 376
(identifying “the failure of other buyers to pursue the company when they had a free chance to do so” as an
objective indicator of fairness supporting deal price).




378 Kwak Tr. 1242:11–1243:3. In Kwak's view, the leak gave interested bidders sufficient time to come forward
before signing. Id. 1242:11–23. Redpath agreed. JX0985 at 76 (“There was sufficient time for a topping bidder
to emerge post-signing.”).
379 PTO ¶¶ 132, 161; JX0789 at 71–75, 79–81; see also JX0772 at 97–100, 106–107.





385 This Court has recently posited that deal price is persuasive evidence of fair value, even with a limited pre-
signing outreach, if the merger agreement's deal protections are sufficiently open to permit a post-signing
passive market check in line with what decisions have held is sufficient to satisfy enhanced scrutiny. Stillwater,
2019 WL 3943851, at *24–30. As Stillwater’s holdings have been appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court,
I limit my holding today to the unremarkable conclusion that no bidders emerged in the face of nonpreclusive
deal protections. But with the aid of the parties’ briefing on the issue, it seems to me that Panera's post-signing
market check would survive enhanced scrutiny and therefore under Stillwater, would support deal price as
fair value. For example, in C & J Energy, the parties bargained for a suite of deal protections, including a
no-shop clause subject to a fiduciary out, a 2.27% termination fee, and a post-signing passive market check
lasting 153 days. See C & J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps., 107 A.3d 1049, 1063 (Del.
2014). The Delaware Supreme Court explained that under this suite, “a potential competing bidder faced only
modest deal protection barriers,” id. at 1052, and “there were no material barriers that would have prevented
a rival bidder from making a superior offer,” id. at 1070. In support, the Delaware Supreme Court approvingly
cited In re Dollar Thrifty Shareholder Litigation, 14 A.3d 573, 612–13, 615 (Del. Ch. 2010). In Dollar Thrifty,
this Court found the board used reasonable judgment to deal exclusively with the buyer without conducting a
pre-signing market check where deal protections included a no-shop provision with a fiduciary out, matching
rights, a 3.9% termination fee, and a passive post-signing market check lasting 126 days. Id. at 592–93,
614–16. And in In re PLX Technology Inc. Stockholders Litigation, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed
this Court's damages ruling where the trial court determined damages based on a quasi-appraisal theory
that the company should have remained a standalone company. 211 A.3d 137 (Del. 2019) (TABLE), aff'g
In re PLX Tech. Inc. S'holders Litig., 2018 WL 5018535 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018). At trial, this Court found
that the sale process as a whole was sufficiently reliable to reject a DCF methodology where the process
included a fifty-day passive, post-signing market check with a suite of deal protections, including a no-shop
with a fiduciary out, unlimited matching rights, and a 3.5% termination fee. PLX, 2018 WL 5018535 at *2,
*26–27, *44, *55. Panera's deal protections differ little from those in C & J Energy, Dollar Thrifty, and PLX.
Panera's 3.0% termination fee falls on the low end of the range presented by these deals. As for the time
between announcement and closing or injunction, Panera's falls in the middle. Each deal contained a no-shop
provision with a fiduciary out, and Dollar Thrifty and PLX included matching rights. Panera's deal protections
fall within what Delaware courts have held to satisfy enhanced scrutiny.
386 JX0985 at 76.
387 DFC, 172 A.3d at 376; accord Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *35.
388 Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *42 (quoting Dell, 177 A.3d at 29); see also Dell, 177 A.3d at 32–34; Aruba,
210 A.3d at 136.
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389 Shaich Tr. 1019:18–1020:13.
390 See JX0700 at 2.
391 See id.; JX0654 at 1–2. The other referenced potential bidder in the Bloomberg article, Domino's, expressed
that it was not interested and was not “having any conversations regarding the purchase of Panera” because
it has “a lot more opportunity for growth in pizza.” JX0609 at 2, 4.
392 Dell, 117 A.3d at 35.
393 Id.
394 Id. at 9 (quoting In re Appraisal of Dell, 2016 WL 3186538, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part sub nom. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017)).
395 Id. at 12.
396 Id. at 23.
397 Compare Shaich Tr. 970:14–21; 971:20–973:3, with id. 978:8–979:18; accord Bell. Tr. 1147:11–1148:8.
398 Compare Shaich Tr. 968:9–969:5, with id. 980:8–981:4, 983:7–984:13.
399 JX0019 at 18; Shaich Tr. 955:7–956:3, 958:1–19; accord Moreton Tr. 770:22–771:19.
400 Shaich Tr. 955:18–23; accord Moreton Tr. 770:22–771:19.
401 Shaich Tr. 956:14–957:7.
402 JX0019 at 2; accord JX0022 at 3–4 (Goldman's November 4, 2015 board presentation confirming the board's
decision to remain a standalone company due to the broader market trends).
403 See JX0110; JX0118; JX0772 at 56.
404 JX0125 at 4; Moreton Tr. 795:10–796:17.
405 Shaich Tr. 976:11–23.
406 Id.
407 Id. 975:15–24; Moreton Tr. 798:23–799:10.
408 Shaich Tr. 976:24–977:6; accord JX0318; JX0334.
409 JX0399 at 1–2.
410 Id.
411 Id. at 1.
412 JX0625 at 4; JX0631 at 23. The companies that Petitioners cite as potential buyers were identified by Morgan
Stanley and passed over because of fit or limitations. See JX0631 at 23–24; JX0625 at 4.
413 See JX0625 at 4.
414 Id.
415 JX0631 at 23; accord Kwak Tr. 1226:21–1227:12.
416 Shaich Tr. 974:11–22, 975:23–976:10, 1019:18–1020:5; accord JX0625 at 4 (“There were conversations with
Starbucks last year, they ultimately declined to proceed citing that Panera was trading too richly (and it has
since only traded up).”); JX0772 at 56; Moreton Tr. 798:23–799:10.
417 Shaich Tr. 1020:6–9; JX0631 at 23.
418 See JX0631 at 23.
419 Moreton Tr. 811:19–812:17 (“[T]here was nobody else out there talking to [the board] about potentially
acquiring [the Company], nor did [the board] think there would be.”); see also id. 912:7–11 (“[T]here was
nobody else to reach out to ... [w]e went through the process.”). Market analysts confirmed this conclusion
after the Bloomberg leak: “[W]e believe Starbucks is the only one with any real (even slight) probability.
We also note that JAB might be interested, given its acquisitions of Krispy Kreme, Einstein/Noah, Keurig,
Caribou, and Peet's Coffee. ... All-in, we suspect JAB would be the more likely suitor than Starbucks, as
we believe a newly minted CEO and a relatively sizable acquisition would increase Starbucks’ risk profile.”
JX0609 at 12–13.
420 JX0625 at 4.
421 Moreton Tr. 824:3–12.
422 JX0625 at 4 (“Since the leak yesterday, no one has come forward to express an interest.”).
423 D.I. 140 at 17.
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424 Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989).
425 In re OPENLANE, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2011 WL 4599662, at *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011).
426 Petitioners point to Morgan Stanley's label of “Potential Interlopers” in claiming that Panera should have
contacted additional potential bidders. As explained herein, the preponderance of the evidence shows
that Panera contacted all logical buyers. Morgan Stanley's label, which they later changed to “Potentially
Interested Parties,” does not disturb this result. Compare JX0552 at 14–15, with JX0631 at 23–24; accord
Kwak Tr. 1237:11–20. And even if the use of the term “interlopers” signaled a fear of intruders, as explained
herein, Morgan Stanley advised the board to negotiate for less restrictive deal terms, enabling another
interested party to bid.
427 D.I. 139 at 20, 48.
428 See JX0116; JX0122 at 1; JX0125 at 4; accord Moreton Tr. 794:8–795:13, 796:3–8.
429 See JX0338; Shaich Tr. 977:17–978:7; accord Moreton Tr. 803:7–11 (“Did any of the directors know about
Mr. Shaich's discussions with JAB before the March 1st board meeting? A. Certainly, I did. I believe Domenic
did, and perhaps Tom [Lynch] did.”).
430 See JX0287 at 9; accord Shaich Tr. 980:11–981:4.
431 JX0408 at 3–4; accord Moreton Tr. 802:17–803:11. Moreton described Shaich's “typical way of
communicating [as] concentric circles, first with [him], and then Domenic [Colasacco], our lead director, and
Tom Lynch, and then the board as a whole.” Moreton Tr. 794:2–7. Shaich testified about this procedure, and
explained that on an unspecified date he informed the board that he used Goldman to reach out to JAB. See
Shaich Tr. 1048:2–23. Shaich had followed this same pattern in the Starbucks negotiations. When Schultz
proposed a collaboration with Panera on July 31, 2016, Shaich informed Moreton, Lynch, and Colasacco that
evening, and informed the board two days later on August 2. See JX0118; JX0116; JX0122 at 1; JX0125 at
4; accord Moreton Tr. 793:14–795:13.
432 JX0408; Shaich Tr. 983:7–984:13.
433 JX0421 at 1; Bell Tr. 1109:17–1111:8.
434 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mergers and Acquisitions 56 (2d ed. 2009) (citing 8 Del. C. § 251(b)); accord 8 Del.
C. § 141 (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by
or under the direction of a board of directors ....”).
435 Jarden, 2019 WL 3244085, at *24 (footnote omitted).
436 Id. at *9, *24.
437 Id. at *24.
438 Id. at *25.
439 JX0408 at 3–4 (Shaich reported, “while no offer had been made during those discussions, Olivier Goudet,
Chief Executive Officer of JAB, and David Bell, Head of M&A of JAB, indicated that JAB had internally
discussed the potential for a transaction with the Company and JAB was considering making an offer to buy
the Company”); accord Shaich Tr. 977:23–978:7.
440 JX0408 at 4.
441 PTO ¶ 134.
442 JX0421 at 1–2.
443 PTO ¶ 134.
444 Id. ¶ 77.
445 Id. ¶¶ 134–135; JX0466 at 2.
446 PTO ¶ 137.
447 JX0455, JX2019; Kwak Tr. 1206:15–1207:6, 1208:6–1209:9; Moreton Tr. 821:7–14, 821:15–822:8; Shaich
Tr. 996:15–1000:11.
448 PTO ¶ 140;
449 Id. ¶¶ 140–41; see JX0448 at 1.
450 See JX0448 at 1.
451 Shaich Tr. 1004:14–18.
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452 PTO ¶ 141; JX0448 at 1.
453 See JX0494 at 1; JX0491; JX0490; JX0519.
454 See JX0491.
455 JX0494 at 1; accord JX0490.
456 PTO ¶ 160.
457 Id. ¶ 163.
458 Id. ¶ 164; JX0608; JX0629.
459 PTO ¶ 165; JX0631.
460 JX0628 at 3.
461 PTO ¶ 167.
462 Id.; JX0630 at 2.
463 Bainbridge, supra note 434, at 56.
464 See Kwak Tr. 1214:18–1215:14 (“I don't remember that we suggested that [the board] not offer a number.
But ... as an advisor, we certainly were not in a position to make any recommendations of a number at that
time because we had not completed our valuation analysis.”).
465 See supra Section II(C)(3)(d).
466 PTO ¶ 136. Moreton explained that “significantly higher” would “convey that [the board] had to get the best
price that we could, and that we thought that they had to go over their ceiling. And we thought that when
they had a chance to go through and do the diligence on the company, that they would be able to do that.”
Moreton Tr. 823:14–824:2. In rejecting JAB's initial offer, Shaich explained, “[i]n order for our Board to get
fully comfortable with and supportive of a transaction, your value will need to reflect a price ‘that begins with
a 3’ ... [a]lthough I am not suggesting you need to be deeply in the $300s, I am also not talking about $300.00
either.” JX2019 at 2.
467 PTO ¶140; accord Shaich Tr. 1002:9–23; JX0483.
468 PTO ¶ 141; JX0448 at 1.
469 PTO ¶ 151.
470 See JX0552 at 3, 6.
471 PTO ¶ 153; JX0545; JX0552.
472 See JX0552.
473 PTO ¶¶ 161, 165.
474 Id. ¶ 164; JX0608; JX0629; Moreton Tr. 831:22–832:5.
475 See JX0628 at 2.
476 JX0625 at 3–4.
477 JX0628 at 2; accord Moreton Tr. 843:14–845:3.
478 Moreton Tr. 843:14–845:3.
479 PTO ¶¶ 167, 171; JX0630 at 1; JX0647.
480 JX0628 at 3.
481 PTO ¶ 167; JX0628 at 3 (stating that after conferring as a board, “[t]he directors expressed their strong support
for the proposed transaction, noting particularly that the price was fair for the Company's shareholders and
that the deal protection mechanisms in the Merger Agreement were not preclusive to an alternative proposal
for the Company's shares”); JX0630 at 2.
482 JX2019 at 2.
483 Compare JX0118, and Shaich Tr. 969:6–10, with JX0318 at 1, and JX0435, and JX0491, and Shaich Tr.
1000:12–23; 1004:19–1005:7.
484 Shaich Tr. 1000:15–23, 1004:19–1005:13.
485 Id. 969:6–16; accord id. 957:8–24.
486 JX0581 (stating JAB is “not interested in a protracted negotiation that results in significant management
distraction, so they always go very quickly”).
487 Moreton Tr. 827:17–24.
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488 Colasacco Dep. 142:11–25; see also id. 143:6–9 (“[A] short period, a yea or nay period on whether [JAB]
would ... have an actual interest in signing an agreement was a positive.”).
489 JX0418 at 2.
490 Kwak Tr. 1197:16–1198:7.
491 Redpath Tr. 658:1–11.
492 JX0491.
493 Moreton Tr. 827:17–24; accord Kwak Tr. 1233:14–20.
494 JX0593 at 65.
495 PTO ¶ 161.
496 Id. ¶¶ 132, 161; JX0789 at 71–75, 79–81; see also JX0772 at 97–101, 106–107.
497 PTO ¶¶ 160–61.
498 Kwak Tr. 1241:10–15.
499 Id. 1240:14–21, 1241:16–24.
500 JX0990 at 39.
501 Kwak Tr. 1241:16–22 (“Q. And there were also matching rights in the merger agreement here. In Morgan
Stanley's view, did matching rights prevent other bidders from coming forward? A. It doesn't prevent. It may
discourage in a way and make it more challenging, but it doesn't prevent other bidders from coming forward.”).
502 Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 614.
503 See Shaich Tr. 1077:11–1079:14.
504 Petitioners present a secondary contention that Shaich was apathetic on price because he focused on closing
a deal so that he could liquidate and diversify his assets. There is no evidence in the record that he wished
to liquidate. Redpath Tr. 645:12–646:11 (identifying no evidence of Shaich's intent to liquidate his Panera
assets); Shaich Tr. 1022:20–1023:1 (“I hadn't diversified in 36 years. Why was I going to start now?”). For
this reason, I focus my analysis on the potential conflict from Shaich's desire to step away from Panera.
505 Aruba, 210 A.3d at 141–42.
506 See Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *32–34 (citing Verition P'rs Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc.,
2018 WL 922139, at *7–8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018), reargument denied, 2018 WL 2315943 (Del. Ch. May 21,
2018), judgment entered (Del. Ch. 2018), rev'd and remanded, 210 A.3d 128 (Del. 2019)).
507 Id. at *32.
508 Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 670–71 (Del. Ch. 2014) (quoting Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 600); see
also Merion Capital, 2016 WL 7324170, at *22 (noting the CEO in “particular had an incentive to maximize
the value of his shares, because he planned to retire.”).
509 Blueblade Capital Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft Cos., Inc., 2018 WL 3602940, at *25 (Del. Ch. July 27, 2018),
judgment entered, (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2018).
510 Id.
511 Shaich Tr. 1017:23–1018:10.
512 Bell Tr. 1109:17–1111:8; Shaich Tr. 1023:10–13; Hurst Tr. 1349:14–1350:10.
513 JX0777 at 2.
514 JX0435; accord Moreton Tr. 822:9–823:1.
515 JX2019 at 2.
516 JX0582 at 1.
517 Shaich Tr. 1024:7–1025:14.
518 See, e.g., Moreton Tr. 856:11–857:15 (“Mr. Shaich went to bed thinking about Panera and how to make it
better and woke up thinking about Panera and how to make it better. He had the shareholders’ interests in
mind at all times.”); Shaich Tr. 1021:10–1022:19 (“This was my life, and I very much wanted to maximize the
value for that, and I very much wanted to do something that served all the constituencies of our company.
In particular, our shareholders, who had hung with me through some tough times, and I wanted to deliver
for them.”).
519 JX0657.
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520 Id.
521 Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *34.
522 As I determined above, although Shaich passed along JAB's suggestion that the board should choose either
Barclays or Morgan Stanley, the board's legal advisor recommended Michael Boublik of Morgan Stanley, and
the board followed that recommendation. See JX0466 at 2. Boublik did not have preexisting relationships
with JAB. JAB did not select Panera's financial advisors.
523 PTO ¶ 137.
524 Moreton Tr. 816:11–21.
525 Even Petitioners’ process expert conceded that Morgan Stanley cleared conflicts. Redpath Tr. 673:16–674:1.
526 JX0448 at 1.
527 JX0562; Kwak Tr. 1222:7–16; accord Moreton Tr. 833:21–834:1 (“[Q.] Was this the first time that the board
was learning that Morgan Stanley had previous engagements with JAB? A. No. The board knew about it
immediately, as we did, so this was just more formal.”).
528 Moreton Tr. 816:22–817:7; see also Kwak Tr. 1197:6–1197:10 (testifying that “because [Morgan Stanley]
had team members that [were] familiar with [JAB's] strategy, we were able to, very quickly, have discussions
with Ron Shaich and Bill Moreton and to educate them on JAB's practices in the past”).
529 Jarden, 2019 WL 3244085, at *15 n.194.
530 Smurfit-Stone, 2011 WL 2028076, at *23 (citing In re Atheros Commc'ns, Inc., 2011 WL 864928, at *8 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 4, 2011); In re Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1005 (Del. Ch. 2005)).
531 Atheros, 2011 WL 864928, at *8.
532 JX0789 at 52–53.
533 JX0594 at 1; Kwak Tr. 1190:15–17.
534 JX0631 at 19, 38; Kwak Tr. 1280:22–1281:5.
535 JX0562 at 3.
536 Kwak Tr. 1195:1–16, 1293:3–12, 1294:24–1295:2.
537 Id. 1293:3–12.
538 See JX2021.
539 Moreton Tr. 837:9–838:9; accord JX0582 at 1 (“[O]ur goal is to have [Ciagne] deliver a message that
(i) suggests our very strong confidence in [the] business and (ii) points to our valuation expectations,
directionally.”).
540 Shaich Tr. 1068:21–1070:1; Moreton Tr. 905:7–908:11.
541 Moreton Tr. 837:23–838:9 (“The purpose was not for this individual, who I never met, to negotiate. It was
simply for one more message to Olivier that the price has to be over $300 and they have to do the best that
they can. So we were pulling every lever we could think of to try to get the price increase.”).
542 Bell Tr. 1107:24–1108:17.
543 Kwak Tr. 1197:16–1198:7.
544 JX0455 at 13–23.
545 Id. at 5, 13–23.
546 Kwak Tr. 1196:22–1197:10 (attributing Morgan Stanley's insights into the JAB playbook to Gallagher, who
was a JAB coverage team member), 1206:15–1207:6; accord JX0431 at 1; JX0432.
547 PTO ¶ 138; JX0455.
548 Kwak Tr. 1202:5–1203:9.
549 Shaich Tr. 997:6–998:3.
550 Moreton Tr. 821:15–822:8.
551 See Shaich Tr. 996:10–997:5.
552 JX0456 at 2. At trial, Shaich explained how Boublik “pushed [him] at some critical times when there was a
question to push for more price, and to push against JAB for more price.” Shaich Tr. 995:18–996:6; see also
id. 1003:11–21 (“He pushed me intensely. I mean, you know, there's this question, you don't want to blow
this up. On the other hand, you want to push for as much as you can get, X plus 1. And Michael and I went
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through, and we went through their precedent history, and I think the sense was it was a wise, all considered,
smart bet to push this deal further, even though this was already a very attractive offer for the company.”).
553 JX0455 at 15.
554 Id. at 17.
555 Id.
556 Id. at 18.
557 Id. at 21.
558 Id. at 5.
559 Kwak Tr. 1200:4–17 (sharing Morgan Stanley's perspective with the board that “it wasn't likely that the
potentially interested parties that we had, considering at that time their strategic rationale and a potential
combination with Panera, and ... their ability to pay an all-cash offer ... [were] going to be likely to compete
with a transaction that JAB had put forth”); Shaich Tr. 1021:13–16 (“[I]t was just patently clear to me that,
knowing what I know, and knowing these people and where this had played out, that there really wasn't a
viable interested party.”).
560 JX0491; accord JX0490.
561 Kwak Tr. 1199:9–24; see also id. 1228:18–1229:5.
562 See Redpath Tr. 663:10–664:22.
563 See generally JX0983.
564 Kwak Tr. 1226:21–1227:12; Shaich Tr. 1019:18–1020:5.
565 Shaich Tr. 951:21–952:2.
566 See JX0407 at 1, 46–205; JX0408 at 2–3.
567 See JX0631.
568 Id. at 15–20.
569 Id. at 19.
570 Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *30.
571 8 Del. C. § 262(h) (“[T]he Court shall determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value
arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation ....”).
572 Aruba, 210 A.3d at 133 (quoting Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 356
(Del. Ch. 2004)).
573 Id. (citing Solera, 2018 WL 3625644, at *1; Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 60–64 (Del.
Ch. 2007); Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 355–56).
574 Id. (citing Solera, 2018 WL 3625644, at *1; Highfields Capital, 939 A.2d at 59–61; Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 343);
see also DFC, 172 A.3d at 368 (recognizing that a “going concern” valuation requires the court to excise “any
value that might be attributable to expected synergies by a buyer, including that share of synergy gains left
with the seller as a part of compensating it for yielding control of the company”).
575 Shaich Tr. 956:4–957:7; Moreton Tr. 824:3–12; Kwak Tr. 1200:18–1201:14.
576 See JX0400 at 3–4.
577 Id. at 4.
578 Id. at 3–4.
579 Huff Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx, Inc., 2014 WL 2042797, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 19, 2014), judgment entered,
(Del. Ch. June 17, 2014), aff'd, 2015 WL 631586 (Del. Feb. 12, 2015) (TABLE); see also Petsmart, 2017
WL 2303599, at *31 n.364 (recognizing “synergies financial buyers may have with target firms arising from
other companies in their portfolio”).




584 See id. at 43–44.
585 Id. at 32, 34, 37.
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586 Id. at 43.
587 JX0554 at 15 (“Cost rationalization and synergies. JAB's plans to achieve cost synergies and working capital
improvements could fail to materialize .... Mitigating factors: JAB has a long-track record of successful
acquisitions and integration, and have delivered expected cost savings on recent deals including Keurig
Green Mountain and Krispy Kreme.”); JX0589 at 19 (“Working Capital—Panera currently has ~ 4 days
payable compared to Keurig at ~50, Caribou at >90, and Peet's at ~ 85.”); accord Bell Tr. 1121:13–1122:10,
1123:3–23; Hubbard Tr. 1495:8–19.
588 JX0982 at 51; accord Hubbard Tr. 1666:5–13.
589 JX0400 at 37.
590 Id.; JX0589 at 23.
591 See JX0593 at 49–50.
592 JX0593 at 49–50, 52–54, 78; JX0982 at 49–50; Bell Tr. 1131:12–22. Shaked agreed with the public company
cost savings. See Shaked Tr. 368:4–16.
593 JX0593 at 49.
594 Bell Tr. 1133:9–18.
595 See JX0593 at 65.
596 Bell Tr. 1106:21–1107:23.
597 Hubbard Tr. 1493:24–1494:7.
598 See JX0593 at 69.
599 JX0982 at 41.
600 Id. at 54; Hubbard Tr. 1493:24–1494:7.
601 Petitioners’ expert testified “the company elected not to” increase its days payable outstanding. Shaked Tr.
451:2–8.
602 2014 WL 2042797, at *3. The Court explained it was not “reaching the theoretical question of under what
circumstances cost-savings may constitute synergies excludable from going-concern value under Section
262(h).” Id.
603 Hurst Dep. 219:4–23 (“[T]he general philosophy had been pay quickly, use that as leverage in some of the
vendor relationships to actually get a lower price. But it ultimately became just the habit of Panera.”); accord
Shaked Tr. 451:21–452:13.
604 JX0984 at 42 (“Panera invested over $120 million in IT from mid-2014 through mid-2017.”).
605 JX0400 at 37.
606 See JX0607 at 181–85.
607 See id. at 185.
608 See JX0593 at 78.
609 Bell Tr. 1122:4–1123:23; cf. JX0904 at 1.
610 Hurst Dep. at 203:8–24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
611 See JX0593 at 48.
612 PTO ¶ 76.
613 D.I. 139 at 58.
614 JX0593 at 77 (“The company had $332.0 million of net debt in December 2016.”); JX0238 at 16.
615 JX0982 at 55.
616 Id. at 55–56.
617 Solera, 2018 WL 3625644, at *28 & n.364.
618 Id. at *28 & n.364.
619 Jarden, 2019 WL 3244085, at *1 (“The appraisal exercise is, at bottom, a fact-finding exercise, and our courts
must appreciate that, by functional imperative, the evidence, including expert evidence, in one appraisal
case will be different from the evidence presented in any other appraisal case.”); accord Stillwater, 2019 WL
3943851, at *20 (“[T]he approach that an expert espouses may have met ‘the approval of this court on prior
occasions,’ but may be rejected in a later case if not presented persuasively or if ‘the relevant professional
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community has mined additional data and pondered the reliability of past practice and come, by a healthy
weight of reasoned opinion, to believe that a different practice should become the norm ....’ ” (quoting Golden
Telecom Trial, 993 A.2d at 517)).
620 Petitioners argue that the Court should not agree with Hubbard's analysis because he “ignores the negative
synergies, or costs, that resulted from the acquisition.” D.I. 140 at 81. Petitioners have not shown that JAB
failed to consider these costs when JAB evaluated their implementation of their playbook, calculated Panera's
resulting value, or formed their offer price. I do not find that this undermines Hubbard's synergy analysis.
621 Bell Tr. 1127:13–21.
622 See JX0400 at 38–41. Possible plans included leveraging Panera's technology platform across JAB's
portfolio, enhancing Panera's in-store coffee program, focusing on CPG, increasing K-cup sales, and
expanding internationally. Id. at 32.
623 See JX0564 at 131, 141–152, 154–158.
624 See JX0593 at 57–62. Although JAB had developed a “coffee procurement savings program,” they did not
include these synergies in the post-diligence model. Id. at 60–61; accord Bell Tr. 1123:3–1126:19, 1129:2–24.
625 See JX0593 at 65.
626 See JX0607 at 145, 155–169, 171–175, 229.
627 See Bell Tr. 1135:1–10 (“Q. And when you went higher, to 315, did those strategic opportunities or synergies
play a role in the decision to raise your offer from 305 to 315? A. I would say they did, because, you know,
again, as a long-term holder, we ended up for this one going to a price that was below ... a return. That we
priced into a return that was below what we initially thought we would have to do. But we took a big leap of
faith on these strategic opportunities, which we didn't quantify in the model.”).
628 Id. 1129:5–24.
629 Id. 1132:5–21; 1134:19–1135:10.
630 Id. 1168:8–21 (“Q. Coffee procurement, was that one of the ones that was on the back of the envelope? A.
I don't even think it was that, because we hadn't done the analysis.”).
631 See JX0982 at 55–56; accord Hubbard Tr. 1593:17–1594:3, 1694:22–1695:8.
632 Hubbard Tr. 1482:18–24, 1663:6–14, 1664:20–24, 1665:24–1666:4.
633 Manichaean Capital, LLC v. SourceHOV, C.A. No. 2017-0673-JRS, at 54 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2020).
634 D.I. 154 at 117:21–120:13 (“We never asked him to adjust his opinion. ... And, you know, frankly, Your Honor,
that's a trial strategy decision that I made, right? These are the sort of things that we do. And I still think that
we have a strong record evidence for this $10.”).
635 JX0593 at 64.
636 Neither party argues in favor of the unaffected stock price.
637 Pinson, 1989 WL 17438, at *8 n.11. “The DCF model entails three basic components: an estimation of net
cash flows that the firm will generate and when, over some period; a terminal or residual value equal to the
future value, as of the end of the projection period, of the firm's cash flows beyond the projection period;
and finally a cost of capital with which to discount to a present value both the projected net cash flows and
the estimated terminal or residual value.” Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1990 WL 161084, at *7 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 19, 1990).
638 Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *60 (citing Dell, 177 A.3d at 37–38, and DFC, 172 A.3d at 369–370, 369
n.118).
639 Id. at *61 (quoting Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 359).
640 JX0982 at 84.
641 As explained, Hubbard did not accept Respondent's post-trial market value of $293.44.
642 Shaked Tr. 179:12–181:12, 239:24–241:17.
643 Hubbard Tr. 1483:15–1584:11.
644 Shaked Tr. 203:9–19 (explaining the reason for the buffer as a hypothetical: “let's assume that in my terminal
year, the maintenance will be 259, not 143. This is 81 percent increase compared to what it used to be.
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Last year is 143, and I assume that it will be 259. So I build in $116 million, kind of an extra slack for the
maintenance”).
645 JX0982 at 95–96.
646 D.I. 141 at 67 (citing Hubbard Tr. 1536:22–1537:7).
647 Id. (citing JX0982 at 14–20; Goldin Tr. 1409:22–1411:24).
648 See id. at 68 (citing Hubbard Tr. 1546:17–1547:6; 1687:7–19).
649 JX0982 at 96.
650 Id.
651 See D.I. 141 at 63.
652 Shaked Direct Demonstrative Deck at 148 (“Assumed Panera will be using 2/3 of its net income to pay out
dividends and/or repurchase shares, and will have 1/3 of it flow to retained earnings (grow book value of
equity).”); see Hubbard Tr. 1571:21–1572:18.
653 Hubbard Tr. 1571:21–1572:18.
654 See id. 1570:9–1571:15.
655 See Shaked Tr. 1699:14–1742:7.
656 See id. 486:5–18.
657 See Hubbard Tr. 1536:3–21.
658 Id. 1572:19–1574:6.
659 Shaked Tr. 311:11–312:8.
660 See Dell, 177 A.3d at 37–38; DFC, 172 A.3d at 369–370, 369 n.118.
661 See Solera, 2018 WL 3625644, at *29 (citing Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 359); id. at *32.
662 Jarden, 2019 WL 3244085, at *32.
663 Id. at *33.
664 Hoyd v. Trussway Hldgs., LLC, 2019 WL 994048, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2019).
665 See Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., 2013 WL 3793896, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013) (“[W]hen the
‘comparables’ involve companies that offer different products or services, are at a different stage in their
growth cycle, or have vastly different multiples, a comparable companies or comparable transactions analysis
is inappropriate.”).
666 JX0982 at 115.
667 Hubbard Dep. 360:5–361:23.
668 JX0982 at 12–13, 120–21.
669 Id. at 123.
670 Shaked Tr. 439:23–440:18.
671 Compare JX0983 at 150–51, with JX0554 at 44, and JX0589 at 39, and JX0826 at 37.
672 See Shaked Tr. 441:9–14, 439:16–22.
673 JX0983 at 59–61.
674 Jarden, 2019 WL 3244085, at *34.
675 See JX0982 at 121–22; JX1023; JX0983 at 59–60.
676 JX0982 at 121.
677 See id. at 123.
678 See id.
679 Hubbard Tr. 1481:13–23.
680 JX0983 at 59.
681 Id. at 59–60.
682 Shaked Tr. 255:4–17; see also id. 180:24–181:12.
683 Kwak Tr. 1210:8–1211:6.
684 See generally Charles K. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Interest in Appraisal, 42 J. Corp. L. 109 (2016); R. Garrett
Rice, Give Me Back My Money: A Proposed Amendment to Delaware's Prepayment System in Statutory
Appraisal Cases, 73 Bus. Law 1051 (2018); Abigail Pickering Bomba et al., Proposed Appraisal Statute
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Amendments Would Permit Companies To Reduce Their Interest Cost—Likely To Discourage “Weaker”
Appraisal Claims And Make Settlement Of “Stronger Claims” Harder, Fried Frank M&A Briefing (Mar. 23,
2015), https://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/FINAL% 20-% 203-23-2015% 20-% 20Proposed%
20Appraisal% 20Statute% 20Amendments.pdf; Arthur R. Bookout et al., Delaware Appraisal Actions: When
Does It Make Sense to Prepay?, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (May 29, 2018), https://
www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2018/05/insights-the-delaware-edition/delaware-appraisal-actions.
685 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
686 Del. H.B. 371, 148th Gen. Assem., 80 Del. Laws, ch. 265, §§ 8–11 (2016).
687 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
688 E.g., Artic Invs. LLC v. Medivation, Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0009-JRS, D.I. 20 at 5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2016)
(stipulating for clawback rights if the prepayment amount were to exceed the Court's fair value determination
of the appraisal shares along with any accrued interest); see Rice, supra note 684, at 1082 (recognizing that
petitioners sometimes stipulate to clawbacks).
689 Ala. By-Prods. Corp. v. Cede & Co. ex rel. Shearson Lehman Bros., 657 A.2d 254, 258 (Del. 1995) (citation
and internal quotations omitted).
690 One-Pie Invs., LLC v. Jackson, 43 A.3d 911, 914 (Del. 2012) (quoting LeVan v. Indep. Mall, Inc., 940 A.2d
929, 932 (Del. 2007)).
691 Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 238 (Del. 1982).
692 Goldstein v. Mun. Court for City of Wilm., 1991 WL 53830, at *5 (Del. Super. Jan. 7, 1991) (citing State v.
Rose, 132 A. 864, 867 (Del. Super. 1926)).
693 Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 238.
694 Terex Corp. v. S. Track & Pump, Inc., 117 A.3d 537, 544 (Del. 2015), as revised (June 16, 2015).
695 Huff Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx, Inc., 2014 WL 545958, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 2014).
696 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 13.24(a) (2016).
697 Compare Del. H.B. 160, 144th Gen. Assem., 76 Del. Laws, ch. 145 §§ 13, 16 (2007), and 8 Del. C. § 262(h),
with Model Bus. Corp. Act § 13.01 (adopting the legal rate as the applicable interest rate for dissenting
stockholders).
698 See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 13.30(e); see also Rice, supra note 684, at 184–86; Mary Siegel, An Appraisal
of the Model Business Corporation Act's Appraisal Rights Provisions, 74 Law & Contemp. Probs. 231, 236
(2011) (“[I]f the corporation's estimate of fair value is greater than the amount ultimately determined by
the court, the corporation will have paid this greater amount to the shareholder without any statutory right
to require the shareholder to return the difference between the court's determination of fair value and the
corporation's estimate of fair value.” (footnote omitted)).
699 See Korsmo & Meyers, supra note 864, at 125; Bookout et al., supra note 864.
700 In Artic Investments LLC v. Medication, Inc., the company argued under an unjust enrichment theory that the
Court should find the corporation entitled to a refund for overpayment after trial. See C.A. No. 2017-0009-
JRS, D.I. 15 at 24 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2017). The Court did not resolve this issue, or grant the party's proposed
stipulation for a clawback provision, before the parties stipulated to dismissal. See id. D.I. 23 (Del. Ch. Mar.
6, 2018).
701 Meade v. Pac. Gamble Robinson Co., 58 A.2d 415, 417–18 (Del. 1948).
702 See Huff, 2014 WL 545958 at *3.
703 See 47 Del. Laws ch. 136, § 7 (1949) (affording the Court the power to award interest); Del. H.B. 371, 148th
Gen. Assem., 80 Del. Laws, ch. 265, §§ 8–11 (2016) (creating the possibility of prepayment).
704 “[T]he expression of dictum is ordinarily to be avoided.” State ex rel. Smith v. Carey, 112 A.2d 26, 28 (Del.
1955). Accordingly, I note only that refraining from awarding a refund here does not offend my sensibilities.
A refund is not available under the Model Act, which tethers the mandatory prepayment amount to the
corporation's position on fair value, and therefore gives the prepayment amount significance in the litigation
context. Under the DGCL, prepayment is optional, and a corporation can pay any amount it chooses
without making a commitment to fair value. Prepayment under the DGCL is a business decision, made with
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knowledge of the company's sale process that is superior to the stockholder's, and with counsel's prediction of
how long the litigation may take and how much interest may accrue. In my view, expressed in dictum, the case
for a refund under the DGCL is less compelling than under the Model Act, which does not provide for one.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
BOUCHARD, C.
*1  In this appraisal action, the court must determine the
fair value of petitioners' shares of Solera Holdings, Inc. as of
March 3, 2016, when Vista Equity Partners acquired Solera
for $55.85 per share, or approximately $3.85 billion in total
equity value, in a merger transaction. Unsurprisingly, the
parties have widely divergent views on this question.
Relying solely on a discounted cash flow analysis, petitioners
contend that the fair value of their shares is $84.65 per share
—approximately 51.6% over the deal price. Until recently,
respondent consistently argued that the “best evidence” of the
fair value of Solera shares is the deal price less estimated
synergies, equating to $53.95 per share. After an appraisal
decision in another case recently used the “unaffected market
price” of a company's stock to determine fair value, however,
respondent changed its position to argue for the same measure
of value here, which respondent contends is $36.39 per share
—about 35% below the deal price.
Over the past year, our Supreme Court twice has heavily
endorsed the application of market efficiency principles in
appraisal actions. With that guidance in mind, and after
carefully considering all relevant factors, my independent
determination is that the fair value of petitioners' shares is the
deal price less estimated synergies—i.e., $53.95 per share.
As discussed below, the record reflects that Solera was sold in
an open process that, although not perfect, was characterized
by many objective indicia of reliability. The merger was the
product of a two-month outreach to large private equity firms
followed by a six-week auction conducted by an independent
and fully authorized special committee of the board, which
contacted eleven financial and seven strategic firms. Public
disclosures made clear to the market that the company was for
sale. The special committee had competent legal and financial
advisors and the power to say no to an underpriced bid, which
it did twice, without the safety net of another bid. The merger
price of $55.85 proved to be a market-clearing price through
a 28-day go-shop that the special committee secured as a
condition of the deal with Vista, one which afforded favorable
terms to allow a key strategic competitor of Solera to continue
to bid for the company.
The record further suggests that the sales process was
conducted against the backdrop of an efficient and well-
functioning market for Solera's stock. Before the merger, for
example, Solera had a deep base of public stockholders, its
shares were actively traded on the New York Stock Exchange
and were covered by numerous analysts, and its debt was
closely monitored by ratings agencies.
In short, the sales process delivered for Solera stockholders
the value obtainable in a bona fide arm's-length transaction
and provides the most reliable evidence of fair value.
Accordingly, I give the deal price, after adjusting for
synergies in accordance with longstanding precedent, sole
and dispositive weight in determining the fair value of
petitioners' shares as of the date of the merger.
I. BACKGROUND
*2  The facts recited in this opinion are my findings based
on the testimony and documentary evidence submitted during
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a five-day trial. The record includes over 400 stipulations of
fact in the Stipulated Joint Pre-Trial Order (“PTO”), 1  over
1,000 trial exhibits, including fourteen deposition transcripts,
and the live testimony of four fact witnesses and three expert
witnesses. I accord the evidence the weight and credibility I
find it deserves.
A. The Parties
Respondent Solera Holdings, Inc. (“Solera” or the
“Company”) is a Delaware corporation with headquarters
in Westlake, Texas. 2  Solera was founded in 2005 and was
publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange from May
2007 until March 3, 2016, when it was acquired by an affiliate
of Vista Equity Partners (“Vista”) in a merger transaction (the
“Merger”). 3
From Solera's inception through the Merger, Tony Aquila
served as Chairman of the Board of Directors (the “Board”),
Chief Executive Officer, and President of Solera. 4  Over
this time period, Aquila made all top-level decisions
about product innovation, corporate marketing, and investor
relation efforts. 5  After the Merger, Aquila remained the CEO
of Solera. 6
Petitioners consist of seven funds that were stockholders
of Solera at the time of the Merger: Muirfield Value
Partners LP, Fir Tree Value Master Fund, L.P., Fir Tree
Capital Opportunity Master Fund, L.P., BlueMountain Credit
Alternatives Master Fund L.P., BlueMountain Summit
Trading L.P., BlueMountain Foinaven Master Fund L.P.,
and BlueMountain Logan Opportunities Master Fund L.P.
Petitioners collectively hold 3,987,021 shares of Solera
common stock that are eligible for appraisal. 7
B. Solera's Business
In early 2005, Aquila founded Solera with aspirations to bring
about a digital evolution of the insurance industry, starting
with the processing of automotive insurance claims. 8  Aquila
viewed Solera as a potential disruptor, akin to Amazon.com,
Inc., in its specific industry. 9
Solera, in its current form, is a global leader in data
and software for automotive, home ownership, and digital
identity management. 10  At the time of the Merger,
Solera's business consisted of three main platforms: (i)
Risk Management Solutions; (ii) Service, Maintenance, and
Repair; and (iii) Customer Retention Management. 11  The
Risk Management Solutions platform helps insurers digitize
and streamline the claims process with respect to automotive
and property content claims. 12  The Service, Maintenance,
and Repair platform digitally assists car technicians and auto
service centers to diagnose and repair vehicles efficiently,
accurately, and profitably, and to identify and source
original equipment manufacturer and aftermarket automotive
parts. 13  The Customer Retention Management platform
provides consumer-centric and data-driven digital marketing
solutions for businesses that serve the auto ownership
lifecycle, including property and casualty insurers, vehicle
manufacturers, car dealerships, and financing providers. 14
Solera was operating in 78 countries at the time of the
Merger. 15
C. Solera Expands Aggressively Through Acquisitions
*3  Solera's business was not always so diverse. During the
Company's early years, the vast majority of Solera's revenues
was derived from claims processing. 16  But the claims
business was facing pressure 17  as a result of maturation, 18
advances in automotive technology like collision avoidance
and self-driving cars, 19  and competition. 20
In August 2012, Aquila implemented a plan called “Mission
2020” to increase Solera's revenue and EBITDA through
acquisitions and diversification. 21  Solera aspired to become
a “cognitive data and software and services company” that
would address the entire lifecycle of a car. 22
The Mission 2020 goals included growing revenue from
$790 million in fiscal year 2012 to $2 billion by fiscal year
2020, and increasing adjusted EBITDA from $345 million
to $800 million over that same period. 23  To meet these
benchmarks, Solera implemented its “Leverage. Diversify.
Disrupt.” (“LDD”) business strategy. 24
LDD was a three-pronged strategy. First, Solera sought
to “leverage” its claims processing revenue in a given
geographic area to gain a foothold in that area. Second,
Solera sought to “diversify” its service offerings in the
given geographic area. Third, Solera's longer-term objective
was to “disrupt” the market by integrating its service
offerings such that vehicle owners and homeowners could
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use Solera's software to manage their purchases, maintenance,
and insurance claims all in one place. 25
D. The Market's Reaction to LDD
Between the formulation of Mission 2020 and the Merger,
Solera invested approximately $2.1 billion in acquisitions. 26
These acquisitions often were “scarcity value transactions”
that involved Solera paying a premium for unique assets. 27
The multiples Solera paid in these acquisitions not only were
relatively high but were increasing over time, generating
lower returns on invested capital. 28  As a result, Solera's
leverage increased while its EPS essentially remained flat and
its EBITDA margins shrank. 29
Some analysts were skeptical of Solera's evolution-through-
acquisitions strategy, taking a “show me” approach to the
Company. 30  These analysts struggled to understand Solera's
diversification plan 31  and complained that management's
lack of transparency about the Company's strategy impeded
their ability to value Solera appropriately. 32  Aquila,
the Board, and other analysts believed that the market
misunderstood Solera's value proposition and that its stock
traded at a substantial discount to fair value. 33
Compounding the challenges Solera was facing in the equity
markets, Solera was encountering difficulties in the debt
markets. Solera needed to have access to debt financing
to execute its acquisition strategy, but by the time of the
Merger, Solera was unable to find lenders willing to finance
its deals due to its highly-levered balance sheet. For example,
upon the announcement that Solera planned to issue tack-
on notes in November 2014, “the proceeds of which, along
with balance sheet cash, [were] expected to effect a strategic
acquisition,” Moody's Investors Service downgraded Solera's
credit rating from Ba2 to Ba3. 34  Moody's noted that “the
company has been actively pursuing acquisitions, often at
very high purchase multiples,” and warned that “[r]atings
could be downgraded [further] if the company undertakes
acquisitions that, after integration, fail to realize targeted
margins.” 35
*4  In late May 2015, management began discussing
an $850 million notes offering with Goldman Sachs, the
proceeds of which the Company planned to use to fund
acquisitions and refinance outstanding debt. 36  The offering
fell approximately $11.5 million short, and Goldman was
forced to absorb the notes that it could not sell into
the market. 37  In July 2015, Moody's downgraded Solera
again, 38  commenting “[t]he ongoing, cumulative impacts
of debt assumed for acquisitions and for the buyout of its
joint venture partner's 50% share ... plus ramped up share
buybacks and dividends, have pushed Moody's expectations
for [Solera's] intermediate-term leverage to approximately
7.0 times, a level high even for a B1-rated credit.” 39  As
Aquila testified, Solera was “out of runway” shortly before
the Merger to execute the rest of its acquisition strategy
because creditors were unwilling to loan funds to Solera at
tolerable interest rates. 40
E. Aquila Expresses Displeasure with his
Compensation at Solera
Solera's stock price affected Aquila personally. His
compensation was tied to “total shareholder return,” and the
majority of his stock options were underwater. 41  Aquila did
not receive a performance bonus in 2011, 2012, or 2013. 42
In February 2015, he emailed Thomas Dattilo, Chair of
the Compensation Committee, saying “I've poured a great
deal of time, inventions and sacrifice during this time in
the company's transition and I really need to get something
meaningful for it.” 43  At one point, Aquila threatened to leave
Solera if his compensation was not reconfigured. 44
The Board recognized Aquila's value to the Company
and took his request and threat to leave seriously. Dattilo
commented “the way [S]olera is structured, we would
probably need three people to replace him, and even that
would not really fulfill the Solera requirements because of the
pervasive founder[']s culture found there. ... Solera possibly
couldn't exist without Tony.” 45  Although the Compensation
Committee was looking for a solution to address Aquila's
underwater stock options, they ultimately “didn't get it
done.” 46
F. Aquila Privately Explores a Sale of Solera
Around the time that Aquila complained to the Board about
his compensation, he began to engage in informal discussions
with private equity firms regarding a potential transaction
to take the Company private. In December 2014, Aquila
was introduced to David Baron, an investment banker at
Rothschild Inc. (“Rothschild”). 47  Aquila and Baron met
again in January 2015, when they “talked through a bunch
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of buy-side ideas” and Aquila expressed his frustration at the
disconnect between Solera's stock price performance relative
to its peers and his own views on the Company's growth
opportunities. 48
In March 2015, Aquila was introduced to Orlando Bravo,
a founder of the private equity firm Thoma Bravo LLC
(“Thoma Bravo”), and Robert Smith, the founder of Vista. 49
Before these two meetings, Aquila was aware that both
Thoma Bravo and Vista recently had launched new multi-
billion dollar funds. 50
On April 29, 2015, Baron contacted Brett Watson, the head
of Koch Equity, to tell him, without identifying Solera as the
target, about an opportunity to invest in preferred equity. 51
Baron wrote in an email to Watson: “I'd like you to speak for
as much of pref[erred stock] as possible – Ceo objective is to
try to get control back[.] I'm going to clear it w[ith] chairman/
ceo next week.” 52
*5  On May 4, 2015, Baron travelled to Aquila's ranch in
Jackson Hole, Wyoming, bringing with him a presentation
book that included leverage buyout (“LBO”) analyses that
the two had previously discussed. 53  Two days later, during
an earnings call on May 6, Aquila raised the possibility of
taking Solera private as a means of returning money to its
stockholders while still pursuing its growth strategy:
Q (Analyst): And just if I can bring that around to [the
Solera CFO's] comment about being opportunistic in share
repurchases when you think the stock is detached from
intrinsic value, you haven't bought a lot of stock. So how
do we square that circle in terms of what you think the
Company is worth today?
A (Aquila): Look, you're bringing up a great point. So,
look, it is a chicken-or-egg story. We're going to make
some of you happy, which we're trying to go down—we're
trying to keep the ball down the middle of the fairway.
We definitely like to hit the long ball as much as we can.
But in reality, we have to do what we're doing, and we
have to thread the needle the way we are. Our only other
alternative is either to take up leverage, buy stock right now.
That's going to cause a ratings issue. That's going to cause
some dislocation. We want to buy content because we want
double-digit businesses in the emerging content world as
apps take a different role on your phone to manage your
risks and your asset. So when you think of that, we've done
a decent job. We bought, I don't know, $300 million worth
of stock back since we did the stock buying program, and
our average price is, like, $52, $53.
So we're kind of dealing with all the factors—we got the
short game playing out there. And we've got to thread the
needle. And the only other option to that is to go private
and take all the shares out. 54
Aquila testified that this comment was “not preplanned,” and
he was not “trying to suggest that [going private] was a
decision that had been made.” 55
A few days later, on May 11, 2015, Aquila met with
Smith from Vista and his partner Christian Sowul in Austin,
Texas. 56  After the meeting, Sowul followed up with Baron,
saying “we are very interested. [T]ony sounded like now is
the time. [N]ext 4-6 weeks.” 57
Also on May 11, the Board commenced a series of meetings
and dinners in Dallas, Texas. 58  Before these meetings,
Aquila discussed with every Board member the possibility
of pursuing strategic alternatives, given that Solera was “out
of runway” to execute its growth-by-acquisition strategy. 59
Company director Stuart Yarbrough encouraged Aquila to
have these conversations with the other directors, and
explained that the Board felt Solera was “being criticized in
the market” and knew that the Company was paying higher
multiples for larger acquisitions. 60
On May 12, 2015, Company director Michael Lehman
emailed Yarbrough and Larry Sonsini of the law firm Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati about the possibility of retaining
his firm to assist in reviewing strategic alternatives. Lehman
stated in the email: “Tony and the board have just begun
conversations about ‘evaluating strategic alternatives,’ ” of
which “[o]ne of the more attractive conceptual alternatives
is a ‘going private,’ which would likely mean that the CEO
would have significant stake in that entity [ ] (think Dell
computer type transaction).” 61
*6  In an executive session on May 13, the Board
unanimously agreed that Aquila should “test the waters” with
financial sponsors. 62  In doing so, the Board recognized that
Aquila would probably have a significant equity stake in a
private Solera, posing an “inherent” conflict in his outreach to
private equity firms. 63  The Board authorized Aquila to “put
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together a target list” of large private equity firms and to “go
have discussions and see what the interest was.” 64  The Board
decided to start with private equity firms and add strategic
firms later in the process because it believed that strategic
firms presented a greater risk of leaks 65  and an interested
strategic bidder could get up to speed quickly. 66  The Board
also wanted to focus on larger private equity firms to avoid
the complexity of firms having to partner with each other. 67
At this stage, the Board prohibited “any use of nonpublic
information.” 68
G. A Special Committee is Formed after Aquila “Tests
the Waters”
Between May 13 and June 1, 2015, Aquila, with assistance
from Rothschild, contacted nine private equity firms:
Pamplona, Silver Lake, Apax, Access Industries, Hellman
& Friedman, Vista, Blackstone, CVC Capital Partners, and
Thoma Bravo. 69  Aquila and Rothschild had follow-up
contact with at least Silver Lake, 70  Blackstone, 71  and
Thoma Bravo 72  between June 1 and July 14, 2015. After his
meeting with Aquila, Orlando Bravo emailed Baron, saying
“Unreal meeting. I love Tony man. We want to do this
deal.” 73  On July 18, 2015, Aquila reported back to the Board
that Thoma Bravo was going to make an offer for Solera. 74
On July 19, 2015, Thoma Bravo submitted an indication of
interest to purchase Solera at a price between $56-$58 per
share. In the letter submitting their bid, Thoma Bravo stated
that they “are contemplating this deal solely in the context of
being able to partner with Tony Aquila and his management
team.” 75
On July 20, 2015, the Board discussed the indication of
interest received from Thoma Bravo and formed a special
committee of independent directors to review the Company's
strategic alternatives (the “Special Committee”). 76  The
Special Committee consisted of Yarbrough (Chairman),
Dattilo, and Patrick Campbell, each of whom had served on
multiple boards and had extensive M & A experience. 77  The
Special Committee was granted the “full power and authority
of the Board” to review, evaluate, negotiate, recommend, or
reject any proposed transaction or strategic alternatives. 78
The Board resolution establishing the Special Committee
further provided that “the Board shall not recommend a
Possible Transaction or alternative thereto for approval by
the Company's stockholders or otherwise approve a Possible
Transaction or alternative thereto without a prior favorable
recommendation of such Possible Transaction or alternative
thereto by the Special Committee.” 79
H. The Special Committee Begins its Work
On July 30, 2015, the Special Committee met with its legal
advisors, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP and Richards, Layton
& Finger P.A., and financial advisor Centerview Partners
LLC (“Centerview”). 80  Rothschild remained active in the
sales process and was formally engaged to represent the
Company, 81  but, in reality, it also continued to represent
Aquila personally. 82
*7  At its July 30 meeting, the Special Committee approved
a list of potential buyers to approach, including six strategic
companies that were selected based on their business
initiatives and stated future plans, and six financial sponsors
(including Vista) that were selected based on their experience
and interest in the technology and information services
industry and their capability to execute and finance a
transaction of this size. 83  The Special Committee also
distributed to management a short document that Sullivan &
Cromwell prepared concerning senior management contacts
with prospective bidders, which, aptly for a company
focused on the automotive industry, was referred to as
the “Rules of the Road.” 84  The document stated, among
other things, that “senior management must treat potential
Bidders equally” and refrain from “any discussions with any
Bidder representatives relating to any future compensation,
retention or investment arrangements, without approval by
the independent directors.” 85
Between July 30 and August 4, 2015, Centerview contacted
11 private equity firms and 6 potential strategic bidders,
including Google and Yahoo!, the two that Special Committee
Chair Yarbrough believed were most likely to bid. 86  Aquila
already had “tested the waters” with some of the private equity
firms that the Special Committee contacted. All six strategic
firms contacted declined to explore a transaction involving
Solera. 87  At this time, the Special Committee did not contact
IHS Inc. (“IHS”), another possible strategic acquirer, because
IHS was one of Solera's key competitors and the Special
Committee had “a low level of confidence” in IHS's ability to
finance a transaction. 88
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From time to time, Aquila, through Rothschild and his
legal counsel, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, 89  apprised the Special
Committee on his thoughts about the sales process. On July
30, 2015, Baron told the Special Committee's legal and
financial advisors in an email that Aquila did not want IHS
included in the sales process, stating “fishing expedition, too
competitive, need 50% stock ...” 90
On August 3, 2015, Aquila's counsel sent the Special
Committee a proposed “Management Retention Program.” 91
This proposal stated that “an incremental $75 million cash
retention pool” should be created to align management
and shareholder incentives, and to “enhance impartiality of
management among all potential buyers.” 92  The proposal
warned that under the current compensation plan, “the
program inadequately aligns management's interests with
those of stockholders and exposes the Company to risks of
losing key managers through closing” of a transaction. 93
Solera did not implement this proposed “Management
Retention Program,” but the Compensation Committee did
award Aquila a $15 million bonus in August 2015. 94
I. The Special Committee Solicits First-Round Bids
and News of the Sales Process Leaks
By August 11, 2015, Yarbrough viewed “the state of the world
to be one where if there's going to be a deal, it's going to
be with a private equity firm.” 95  On August 10, 2015, at
the direction of the Special Committee, Centerview sent a
letter to the five remaining parties inviting them to submit
first-round bids by August 17, 2015. 96  These parties had
signed confidentiality agreements and were provided Board-
approved five-year projections for the Company, which were
based on projections created in the normal course of business
but then modified in connection with the sales process (the
“Hybrid Case Projections”). 97  Before the August 17 bid
deadline, Baron spoke to certain potential bidders directly
without involving Centerview. 98
*8  By August 17, 2015, two potential bidders had dropped
out of the sales process, believing “that they would not be able
to submit competitive bids.” 99  The remaining three financial
sponsors provided indications of interest: Vista offered $63
per share, Thoma Bravo offered $60 per share, and Pamplona
offered $60-$62 per share. 100  Each made clear that they
wanted Aquila's participation in the deal. 101
On August 19, 2015, news of the sales process leaked when
Bloomberg reported that Solera was “exploring a sale that has
attracted interest from private equity firms.” 102  The next day,
the Company issued a press release announcing that it had
formed the Special Committee and that it was contemplating
a sale. 103  Also on August 20, the Financial Times reported
that Vista was “considering a bid of $63 per share” and that
Thoma Bravo and Pamplona were “considering separate bids
for $62 per share.” 104
In a further development on August 20, Advent International
Corporation, a private equity firm, reached out to Centerview
and Rothschild separately to express interest in the
Company. 105  Centerview confirmed to Baron that it planned
to ignore the inquiry, 106  about which the members of the
Special Committee were never informed. 107  The Special
Committee also was not made aware of interest that
Providence Equity Partners, L.L.C., 108  another private
equity firm, expressed to Centerview on August 26. 109  When
Centerview made Baron aware of this inquiry, he responded:
“Too late obv[iously] but Tony not a fan ...” 110  Neither
Advent nor Providence gave any indication as to the price
they would be willing to pay for Solera or the amount of time
they would need to get up to speed. 111
During the August 22-23, 2015 weekend, Smith traveled to
Aquila's ranch en route to his own ranch in Colorado. 112
Before the meeting, Smith's team at Vista researched the size
of the option pools that Vista had offered management in
its “recent take privates” so that Smith would “know the
comps before his meeting with [T]ony.” 113  Aquila did not
have authorization from the Special Committee to discuss his
post-transaction compensation at this time. 114  Shortly after
the meeting, Vista began to model a 9% option pool with a
1% long-term incentive plan (LTIP), up from the 5% option
pool with a 1% LTIP that Vista had modeled before Aquila's
meeting with Smith. 115
J. IHS Expresses Interest in a Potential Transaction
On August 21, 2015, IHS contacted Centerview to express its
interest in a potential acquisition of Solera at an unspecified
valuation and financing structure. 116  By August 23, IHS
suggested that it would be able to submit a bid in excess of
$63 per share, and it indicated that it could complete due
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diligence and execute definitive transaction documents within
ten calendar days despite not yet having received nonpublic
information. 117  The parties entered into a confidentiality
agreement on August 24. 118
*9  On August 26, 2015, senior representatives of IHS,
including its CFO, attended a meeting with the Company's
management, before which Aquila had a one-on-one
conversation with IHS's CFO for 90 minutes. 119  Centerview
requested numerous times that IHS's CEO Jerre Stead
attend the management meeting, but he declined even
though the acquisition would have been the largest in IHS's
history. 120  By August 27, Solera had provided IHS with
non-public Company information, including the Hybrid Case
Projections. 121
On September 1, IHS submitted a bid of $55-$58 per share,
comprised of 75% cash and 25% stock, and included “highly
confident” letters from financing sources. 122  On September
2, Aquila travelled separately to meet with Stead personally,
who commented that IHS was “looking at another big deal as
well.” 123  The next day, IHS submitted a revised bid of $60
per share, but did not specify the mix of consideration and
did not include any indication of financing commitments. 124
IHS said it could complete diligence “within a matter of
days.” 125
K. The Special Committee Negotiates with Potential
Buyers
On September 4, 2015, Vista and Thoma Bravo submitted
revised bids. 126  Pamplona had dropped out of the sales
process by this point, 127  and the Special Committee felt like
it was “moving backwards” in its negotiations with IHS. 128
Both of the active bidders lowered their offers. Thoma Bravo
lowered its bid to $56 per share, attributing the drop to
“challenges in availability and terms of financing (both debt
and equity) due in part to turbulence in global financial
markets.” 129  Vista lowered its bid to $55 per share, but
subsequently indicated that it could increase its price to
$56 per share. 130  Vista explained that it dropped its bid
because of changes to Solera's balance sheet, increased
financing costs, and a decline in Vista's forecasted EBITDA
for Solera. 131  Unbeknownst to Solera, one of the reasons
Vista lowered its bid is that it had made a spreadsheet error
in its financial model before submitting its first-round bid,
resulting in the model overstating Solera's future equity value
by approximately $1.9 billion. 132  If this error had been
noticed and corrected, Vista's first-round bid would have been
closer to $55 per share, rather than $63 per share. 133
On September 5, 2015, Aquila signaled that he was willing to
roll over $15 million of his Solera shares in a transaction with
any bidder. 134  That day, the Special Committee met 135  and
decided to press for more from the bidders, proposing to Vista
that it either raise its price to $58 per share, or agree to a go-
shop and reduced termination fee to enable Solera to continue
discussions with IHS. 136  Vista agreed to the go-shop and
the termination fee reduction on September 7, but also told
Centerview that day that one of its anticipated sources of
equity financing had withdrawn its commitment and that it
would need additional time to obtain replacement financing
to support its bid. 137
*10  On September 8, Vista lowered its bid to $53 per
share. 138  Vista told Solera that its bid would expire at
midnight, and that “[a]fter midnight, we will not be spending
any more time on” Solera. 139  The Special Committee
rejected Vista's bid as inadequate that same day, 140  and
decided “to let the process play out.” 141  The Special
Committee set September 11, 2015 as a deadline for Vista
and Thoma Bravo to make final bids. 142  On September 9,
Bloomberg reported that Solera had received bids from Vista
and Thoma Bravo, and that the Company was “nearing a deal
to sell itself for about $53 a share.” 143
When September 11 arrived, Thoma Bravo offered $54
per share, expiring at midnight and contingent on Solera
“shutting off dividends” and reducing advisory fees. 144  The
Special Committee said “no.” 145  The press again reported
in real time, with Reuters writing that Vista and Thoma
Bravo had “made offers that failed to meet Solera's valuation
expectations,” and that Solera was “trying to sell itself
to another company”—IHS—“rather than an investment
firm.” 146
The next morning, on September 12, Vista submitted an all-
cash, fully financed revised bid of $55.85 per share that
also included the go-shop and termination fee provisions
the Special Committee had requested. 147  The Special
Committee tried to push Vista up to $56 per share, but
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Vista refused, saying $55.85 was its best and final offer. 148
Centerview opined that $55.85 per share was fair, from a
financial point of view, to Solera stockholders. 149  Later in
the day on September 12, the Special Committee accepted
Vista's offer after receiving Centerview's fairness opinion,
and the Board approved the transaction. 150  On September
13, the Company and Vista entered into a definitive merger
agreement (the “Merger Agreement”). 151
L. The Go-Shop Period Expires and the Merger
Closes
On September 13, 2015, Solera announced the proposed
Merger. 152  The press release stated that the purchase price
valued Solera at approximately $6.5 billion, including net
debt, “represent[ing] an unaffected premium of 53% over
Solera's closing share price of $36.39 on August 3, 2015.” 153
In advance of the press release, Baron sent a celebratory
email to his colleagues, in which he noted “we were the
architects with the CEO from the beginning as to how to
engineer the process from start to finish.” 154  The next
morning, an internal email of the Fir Tree petitioners praised
the transaction as yielding a “Good price!” 155
The Merger Agreement provided for a 28-day go-shop period
during which the termination fee would be 1% of the equity
value for any offer made by IHS, a reduction from the 3%
termination fee applicable to any other potential buyer. 156
The Special Committee reached out to IHS the day after
signing the Merger Agreement and gave IHS nearly full
access to the approximately 12,000-document data room that
the private equity firms had been given access to during the
pre-signing sales process. 157
*11  On September 29, 2015, with two weeks left in the
go-shop, IHS informed Solera that it would not pursue
an acquisition of the Company. IHS noted that it “was
appreciative of the go-shop provisions negotiated in the
merger agreement ... and the fact that [Solera] had provided
equal access to information in order for IHS to consider a
bid.” 158  On October 5, 2015, Solera issued its preliminary
proxy statement, which disclosed a summary of the Hybrid
Case Projections. 159  The go-shop expired on October 11,
without Solera receiving any alternative proposals. 160
On October 15, 2015, Vista sent Aquila a proposed
compensation package, offering Aquila the opportunity to
obtain up to 6% of Solera's fully-diluted equity. 161  This
amount was later revised up, with Vista offering Aquila up
to 10% of the fully-diluted equity. Under the revised plan,
Aquila would invest $45 million in the deal—$15 million
worth of his shares of Solera and $30 million borrowed from
Vista. 162  Vista's proposal positioned Aquila to earn up to
$969.6 million over a seven-year period if Vista achieved a
four-times cash-on-cash return. 163
On October 30, 2015, Solera issued its definitive proxy
statement concerning the proposed Merger, which also
included a summary of the Hybrid Case Projections. 164
On December 8, Solera's stockholders voted to approve the
Merger. Of the Company's outstanding shares, approximately
65.4% voted in favor, approximately 10.9% voted against,
and approximately 3.4% abstained. 165  The Merger closed
on March 3, 2016. 166  The next day, Aquila signed a new
employment agreement with Solera. 167
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE
On March 7 and March 10, 2016, petitioners filed their
petitions for appraisal. The court consolidated the petitions on
March 30, 2016. A five-day trial was held in June 2017, and
post-trial argument was held on December 4, 2017.
At the conclusion of the post-trial argument, the court asked
the parties to confer to see if they could agree on an expert
the court might appoint to opine on a significant issue of
disagreement concerning the methods the parties' experts
used to determine the terminal period investment rate in
their discounted cash flow analyses. On December 19, 2017,
the parties advised the court that they were unable to reach
agreement on a suggested expert and each submitted two
candidates for the court's consideration.
On February 22, 2018, Solera filed a motion requesting
the opportunity to submit supplemental briefs to address
the implications of certain appraisal decisions issued after
the post-trial argument. The court granted this motion on
February 26, 2018, noting in its order that it had “made
no decision about whether to proceed with an independent
expert” and would “revisit the issue after reviewing the
supplemental submissions.” 168  Supplemental briefing was
completed on April 6, 2018. 169
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
Petitioners request appraisal of their shares of Solera under
8 Del. C. § 262. “An action seeking appraisal is intended
to provide shareholders who dissent from a merger, on
the basis of the inadequacy of the offering price, with a
judicial determination of the fair value of their shares.” 170
Respondent has not disputed petitioners' eligibility for an
appraisal of their shares.
*12  In an appraisal action, the court has a statutory mandate
to:
[D]etermine the fair value of the
shares exclusive of any element of
value arising from the accomplishment
or expectation of the merger or
consolidation, together with interest,
if any, to be paid upon the amount
determined to be the fair value. In
determining such fair value, the Court
shall take into account all relevant
factors. 171
Appraisal excludes any value resulting from the merger,
including synergies that may arise, 172  because “[t]he basic
concept of value under the appraisal statute is that the
stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been
taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going
concern.” 173  In valuing a company as a “going concern” at
the time of a merger, the court must take into consideration
the “operative reality” 174  of the company, viewing the
company as “occupying a particular market position in the
light of future prospects.” 175  A dissenting stockholder is then
entitled to his proportionate interest in the going concern. 176
In using “all relevant factors” to determine fair value, the
court has significant discretion to use the valuation methods it
deems appropriate, including the parties' proposed valuation
frameworks, or one of the court's own fashioning. 177  This
court has relied on a number of different approaches to
determine fair value, including comparable company and
precedent transaction analyses, a discounted cash flow model,
and the merger price. 178  “This Court may not adopt at the
outset an ‘either-or’ approach, thereby accepting uncritically
the valuation of one party, as it is the Court's duty to determine
the core issue of fair value on the appraisal date.” 179  “In an
appraisal proceeding, the burden to establish fair value by a
preponderance of the evidence rests on both the petitioner and
the respondent.” 180
B. DFC, Dell, and Recent Court of Chancery
Appraisal Decisions
*13  Over the past year, the Delaware Supreme Court has
issued two decisions providing important guidance for the
Court of Chancery in appraisal proceedings: DFC Global
Corporation v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P. 181  and Dell,
Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd. 182
Given their importance, a brief discussion of each case is
appropriate at the outset.
In DFC, petitioners sought appraisal of shares they held
in a publicly traded payday lending firm, DFC, that was
purchased by a private equity firm. 183  This court attempted
to determine the fair value of DFC's shares by equally
weighting three measures of value: a discounted cash flow
model, a comparable company analysis, and the transaction
price. 184  The court gave equal weight to these three measures
of value because it found that each similarly suffered
from limitations arising from the tumultuous regulatory
environment that was swirling around DFC during the period
leading up to its sale. 185  The court's analysis resulted in a
fair value of DFC at approximately 8% above the transaction
price. 186
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the
trial court. 187  Based on its own review of the trial record, the
Supreme Court held that the Court of Chancery's decision to
afford only one-third weight to the transaction price was “not
rationally supported by the record,” 188  explaining:
Although there is no presumption
in favor of the deal price ...
economic principles suggest that the
best evidence of fair value was the
deal price, as it resulted from an
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open process, informed by robust
public information, and easy access
to deeper, non-public information, in
which many parties with an incentive
to make a profit had a chance to
bid. 189
The Supreme Court further explained that the purpose of
appraisal “is not to make sure that the petitioners get the
highest conceivable value,” but rather “to make sure that they
receive fair compensation for their shares in the sense that it
reflects what they deserve to receive based on what would
fairly be given to them in an arm's-length transaction.” 190
*14  According to the Supreme Court, “[m]arket prices
are typically viewed superior to other valuation techniques
because, unlike, e.g., a single person's discounted cash flow
model, the market price should distill the collective judgment
of the many based on all the publicly available information
about a given company and the value of its shares.” 191
The “collective judgment of the many” may include that
of “equity analysts, equity buyers, debt analysts, [and] debt
providers.” 192  The Supreme Court cautioned that “[t]his, of
course, is not to say that the market price is always right,
but that one should have little confidence she can be the
special one able to outwit the larger universe of equally avid
capitalists with an incentive to reap rewards by buying the
asset if it is too cheaply priced.” 193
Several months after deciding DFC, the Supreme Court
reiterated the same appraisal thesis in Dell, where the
trial court had reached a determination of fair value at
approximately 28% above the transaction price. 194  In Dell,
the Supreme Court found that the Court of Chancery erred
by relying completely on a discounted cash flow analysis
and affording zero weight to market data, i.e., the stock price
and the deal price, because “the evidence suggests that the
market for Dell's shares was actually efficient and, therefore,
likely a possible proxy for fair value.” 195  With respect to the
company's stock price, the Supreme Court explained:
Dell's stock traded on the NASDAQ
under the ticker symbol DELL. The
Company's market capitalization of
more than $20 billion ranked it in the
top third of the S & P 500. Dell had
a deep public float and was actively
traded as more than 5% of Dell's shares
were traded each week. The stock
had a bid-ask spread of approximately
0.08%. It was also widely covered
by equity analysts, and its share price
quickly reflected the market's view on
breaking developments. 196
The Supreme Court thus held that “the record does not
adequately support the Court of Chancery's conclusion that
the market for Dell's stock was inefficient and that a valuation
gap in the Company's market trading price existed in advance
of the lengthy market check, an error that contributed to the
trial court's decision to disregard the deal price.” 197
With respect to the deal price, the Supreme Court said that
“it is clear that Dell's sale process bore many of the same
objective indicia of reliability” as the one in DFC, which
“included that ‘every logical buyer’ was canvassed, and all
but the buyer refused to pursue the company when given
the opportunity; concerns about the company's long-term
viability (and its long-term debt's placement on negative
credit watch) prevented lenders from extending debt; and
the company repeatedly underperformed its projections.” 198
Given leaks in the press that Dell was exploring a sale,
moreover, the world was put on notice of the possibility
of a transaction so that “any interested parties would have
approached the Company before the go-shop if serious about
pursuing a deal.” 199
Dell's bankers canvassed the interest of 67 parties, including
20 possible strategic acquirers during the go-shop, and the
go-shop's overall design was relatively open and flexible. 200
The special committee had the power to say “no,” and it
convinced the eventual buyer to raise its bid six times. 201
The Supreme Court thus found that “[n]othing in the record
suggests that increased competition would have produced a
better result. [The financial advisor] also reasoned that any
other financial sponsor would have bid in the same ballpark
as [the buyer].” 202  Significantly, the Court did not view a
dearth of strategic buyer interest as negatively impacting the
reliability of the deal price, explaining:
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*15  Fair value entails at minimum a
price some buyer is willing to pay—
not a price at which no class of buyers
in the market would pay. The Court of
Chancery ignored an important reality:
if a company is one that no strategic
buyer is interested in buying, it does
not suggest a higher value, but a lower
one. 203
In sum, the Supreme Court held that “[o]verall, the weight
of evidence shows that Dell's deal price has heavy, if not
overriding, probative value.” 204  It summarized its decision
as follows:
In so holding, we are not saying that
the market is always the best indicator
of value, or that it should always be
granted some weight. We only note
that, when the evidence of market
efficiency, fair play, low barriers to
entry, outreach to all logical buyers,
and the chance for any topping bidder
to have the support of Mr. Dell's own
votes is so compelling, then failure to
give the resulting price heavy weight
because the trial judge believes there
was mispricing missed by all the Dell
stockholders, analysts, and potential
buyers abuses even the wide discretion
afforded the Court of Chancery in
these difficult cases. 205
Shortly after Dell was decided, the Court of Chancery
rendered appraisal decisions in Verition Partners Master
Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc. 206  and In re Appraisal of
AOL Inc. 207
In Aruba, the court observed that the Supreme Court's
decisions in DFC and Dell “endorse using the deal price
in a third-party, arm's-length transaction as evidence of fair
value” and “caution against relying on discounted cash flow
analyses prepared by adversarial experts when reliable market
indicators are available.” 208  The court further observed that
DFC and Dell “recognize that a deal price may include
synergies, and they endorse deriving an indication of fair
value by deducting synergies from the deal price.” 209  Rather
than hold that the deal price less synergies represented fair
value, however, the Aruba court determined that fair value
was “the unaffected market price” of petitioners' shares,
which was more than 30% below the transaction price. 210
The court identified “two major shortcomings” of its “deal-
price-less-synergies figure” that supported this conclusion
and explained its rationale for using the “unaffected market
price” as follows:
First, my deal-price-less-synergies figure is likely tainted
by human error. Estimating synergies requires exercises of
human judgment analogous to those involved in crafting
a discounted cash flow valuation. The Delaware Supreme
Court's preference for market indications over discounted
cash flow valuations counsels in favor of preferring market
indications over the similarly judgment-laden exercise of
backing out synergies.
Second, my deal-price-less-synergies figure continues to
incorporate an element of value derived from the merger
itself: the value that the acquirer creates by reducing agency
costs. A buyer's willingness to pay a premium over the
market price of a widely held firm reflects not only the
value of anticipated synergies but also the value created by
reducing agency costs. The petitioners are not entitled to
share in either element of value, because both arise from the
accomplishment or expectation of the merger. The synergy
deduction compensates for the one element of value arising
from the merger, but a further downward adjustment would
be necessary to address the other.
*16  Fortunately for a trial judge, once Delaware law has
embraced a traditional formulation of the efficient capital
markets hypothesis, the unaffected market price provides
a direct route to the same endpoint, at least for a company
that is widely traded and lacks a controlling stockholder.
Adjusting down from the deal price reaches, indirectly, the
result that the market price already provides. 211
In AOL, the court similarly construed DFC and Dell to
mean that where “transaction price represents an unhindered,
informed, and competitive market valuation, the trial judge
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must give particular and serious consideration to transaction
price as evidence of fair value” and that where “a transaction
price is used to determine fair value, synergies transferred
to the sellers must be deducted.” 212  In doing so, the court
coined the phrase “Dell Compliant” to mean a transaction
“where (i) information was sufficiently disseminated to
potential bidders, so that (ii) an informed sale could take
place, (iii) without undue impediments imposed by the deal
structure itself.” 213  The court found that the sales process
did not satisfy this standard and ultimately determined the fair
value of petitioners' shares based on its own discounted cash
flow analysis ($48.70 per share), which was about 2.6% less
than the deal price ($50 per share). 214
C. The Parties' Contentions
Petitioners contend that the fair value of their shares is $84.65
per share—approximately 51.6% over the deal price. Their
sole support for this valuation is a discounted cash flow
model prepared by their expert, Bradford Cornell, Visiting
Professor of Financial Economics at the California Institute
of Technology. 215  Cornell also performed a multiples-based
comparable company analysis “as a reasonableness check”
but gave it no weight in his valuation. 216
Respondent's expert was Glenn Hubbard, the Dean and
Russell L. Carson Professor in Finance and Economics at
the Graduate School of Business of Columbia University,
as well as Professor of Economics at Columbia University.
He concluded that the “best evidence of Solera's value is
the market-generated Merger price [$55.85], adjusted for
synergies [$1.90] to $53.95.” 217  Hubbard also conducted
a valuation based on a discounted cash flow model,
which resulted in a valuation of $53.15 per share,
but found the methodology to be less reliable in this
instance. 218  Hubbard further considered, as a “check,”
Solera's historical valuation multiples, analysts' stock price
targets, and valuation multiples from comparable companies
and precedent transactions. 219
This sharp divide of $31.50 per share between the experts'
DCF models is the result of a number of disagreements
regarding the proper inputs and methods to use in the analysis.
The most significant disagreements are explained later.
*17  Throughout trial and post-trial briefing, respondent
consistently maintained that the best evidence of Solera's
value at the time of the Merger was the deal price minus
synergies. Seizing on the Aruba decision, respondent changed
course during supplemental briefing, arguing that “[i]n light
of recent cases, the best evidence of Solera's fair value is its
unaffected stock price of $36.39 per share.” 220
D. Determination of Solera's Fair Value
I now turn to my own independent determination of the fair
value of Solera's shares with the guidance from DFC and
Dell in mind. Those decisions teach that deal price is “the
best evidence of fair value” 221  when there was an “open
process,” 222  meaning that the process is characterized by
“objective indicia of reliability.” 223  Such “indicia” include
but, consistent with the mandate of the appraisal statute to
consider “all relevant factors,” 224  are not limited to:
• “[R]obust public information,” 225  comprised of the
stock price of a company with “a deep base of public
shareholders, and highly active trading,” 226  and the
views of “equity analysts, equity buyers, debt analysts,
debt providers and others.” 227
• “[E]asy access to deeper, non-public information,” 228
where there is no discrimination between potential
buyers and cooperation from management helps
address any information asymmetries between potential
buyers. 229
• “[M]any parties with an incentive to make a profit
had a chance to bid,” 230  meaning that there was a
“robust market check” 231  with “outreach to all logical
buyers” 232  and a go-shop characterized by “low barriers
to entry” 233  such that there is a realistic possibility of
a topping bid.
• A special committee, “composed of independent,
experienced directors and armed with that power to say
‘no,’ ” 234  which is advised by competent legal and
financial advisors.
• “[N]o conflicts related to the transaction,” 235  with the
company purchased by a third party in an arm's length
sale 236  and “no hint of self-interest.” 237
If the process was open, then “the deal price deserve[s]
heavy, if not dispositive, weight.” 238  This is not to say that
the market is always correct: “In some cases, it may be
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that a single valuation metric is the most reliable evidence
of fair value and that giving weight to another factor will
do nothing but distort that best estimate. In other cases,
it may be necessary to consider two or more factors.” 239
Whichever route it takes, however, the Court of Chancery
is required to “justify its methodology (or methodologies)
according to the facts of the case and relevant, accepted
financial principles.” 240
1. The Deal Price Less Synergies
Deserves Dispositive Weight
*18  For the reasons explained below, I find that the Merger
was the product of an open process that, although not perfect,
has the requisite objective indicia of reliability emphasized
in DFC and Dell. Thus, I conclude that the deal price, minus
synergies, is the best evidence of fair value and deserves
dispositive weight in this case. My consideration of the
evidence supporting this conclusion follows in three parts
focusing on (i) the opportunity many potential buyers had to
bid, (ii) the Special Committee's role in actively negotiating
an arm's-length transaction, and (iii) the evidence that the
market for Solera's stock was efficient and well-functioning.
a. Many Heterogeneous Potential Buyers
Had a Meaningful Opportunity to Bid
Appraisal decisions have placed weight on the deal
price when the process “involved a reasonable number
of participants and created credible competition” among
bidders. 241  Here, Solera reached out to nine large private
equity funds in May and June 2015 during the “test the
waters” period. 242  Then, after Thoma Bravo submitted an
indication of interest on July 19, 2015, 243  the Special
Committee engaged with 18 potential bidders, 11 financial
and 7 strategic firms. 244  As Hubbard testified, a “broad
range of sophisticated buyers,” both financial and strategic,
had the chance to bid for Solera. 245  Petitioners' own expert
offered no opinion “that more bidders should have been
contacted.” 246
Not only were the 18 potential bidders directly contacted and
aware that Solera could be acquired at the right price, but “the
whole universe of potential bidders was put on notice,” 247
with increasing specificity over time, that the Company
was considering strategic alternatives. 248  Aquila publicly
presaged the sales process during the Company's earnings call
on the May 6, 2015, 249  and the Company confirmed it had
formed a Special Committee and was contemplating a sale on
August 20, 2015, 250  the day after Bloomberg reported that
Solera was “exploring a sale that has attracted interest from
private equity firms.” 251
The press revealed not only the identities of potential buyers,
but also the approximate amounts of their bids. On August
20, 2015, for example, the Financial Times reported that
Vista was “considering a bid of $63 per share,” with Thoma
Bravo and Pamplona “considering separate bids for $62 per
share.” 252  On September 9, 2015, Bloomberg reported that
Solera had received bids from Vista and Thoma Bravo, and
that the Company was “nearing a deal to sell itself for about
$53 a share.” 253  Two days later, Reuters wrote that Vista and
Thoma Bravo “had made offers that failed to meet Solera's
valuation expectations,” and that the Company was “trying
to sell itself to another company”—IHS—“rather than an
investment firm.” 254  The visible threat of other buyers made
the sales process more competitive. 255  Given these public
disclosures, any potential bidder knew in essentially real time
that Solera was exploring a sale and the approximate price
levels of the offers. 256  Yet no one else ever seriously showed
up to make a topping bid.
*19  Petitioners point out that Advent and Providence were
excluded from the sales process, but whether either would
have bid competitively is unknown. Notably, when Advent
and Providence expressed interest to Solera's bankers, neither
provided any indication as to their ability to pay or their
sources of financing; rather, their introductory emails were
perfunctory, suggesting to me that they were just “kicking
the tires.” 257  There also is no evidence that either of them
followed up to express any further interest in Solera, either
before or during the go-shop period. 258
The fact that only one potential strategic bidder—IHS—made
a bid does not undermine the reliability of the sales process
as a price discovery tool. That six potential strategic acquirers
declined to explore a transaction involving Solera shows that
six sophisticated, profit-motivated actors were offered the
opportunity to participate in a sales process to acquire the
Company, yet none was interested enough to even sign a
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non-disclosure agreement. 259  As noted above, our Supreme
Court forcefully made this point in Dell:
The Court of Chancery stressed its
view that the lack of competition
from a strategic buyer lowered the
relevance of the deal price. But its
assessment that more bidders—both
strategic and financial—should have
been involved assumes there was
some party interested in proceeding.
Nothing in the record indicates that
was the case. Fair value entails at a
minimum a price some buyer is willing
to pay—not a price at which no class
of buyers in the market would pay.
The Court of Chancery ignored an
important reality: if a company is one
that no strategic buyer is interested in
buying, it does not suggest a higher
value, but a lower one. 260
The record shows, furthermore, that the mere presence in the
sales process of IHS, as a strategic bidder that was one of
Solera's key competitors, incentivized the financial sponsors
to put forth more competitive bids. 261
The record also reflects that the Company provided all
seriously interested bidders access to deeper, non-public
information after they signed non-disclosure agreements.
Although the Special Committee initially excluded IHS from
the process due to competitive concerns and doubts about
its ability to finance a deal, 262  once news of the sales
process leaked out, the Special Committee worked promptly
to accommodate IHS. After IHS contacted Centerview on
August 21, 2015 to express interest, 263  representatives of
Solera and IHS held a management meeting by August
26, 264  and Solera provided IHS with the Hybrid Case
Projections by August 27. 265  And, after IHS's CEO failed
to attend the management meeting on August 26, Aquila
traveled separately to meet him. 266  IHS ultimately declined
to make a topping bid during the go-shop period, but it was not
for lack of access to information. Solera gave IHS nearly full
access to the approximately 12,000-document data room, 267
and IHS specifically commented that it “was appreciative
of ... the fact that [Solera] had provided equal access to
information in order for IHS to consider a bid.” 268
*20  Finally, I am not persuaded by petitioners' argument
that “[t]he sale of Solera took place against the backdrop
of extraordinary market volatility,” such that it “was not
the product of a well-functioning market.” 269  According to
petitioners, the court should not rely on the Merger price
as evidence of fair value because there was macroeconomic
volatility, “evidenced by the VIX spiking to an [sic] historic
high [on August 24, 2015] and sharp declines in global equity
markets,” 270  which constrained potential bidders' ability to
finance and willingness to enter a deal. 271  In support of this
theory, petitioners called Dr. Elaine Buckberg as an expert on
market volatility. 272
Buckberg testified that “investors are less willing to proceed
with investments in the face of substantial uncertainty and
volatility,” and that when investors “do decide to proceed
with an investment in the face of such uncertainty, they
would expect to be compensated for the additional risk with
a lower price.” 273  In that vein, Yarbrough, the Chairman of
the Special Committee, candidly acknowledged that market
volatility impacted “the financing side, [it] was making it
more difficult on the debt financing side, and I think it also
trickled over into the equity piece, too.” 274
As an initial factual matter, it is questionable whether the
level of market volatility during the sales process was as
extraordinary as petitioners suggest. On August 24, 2015,
the VIX closed at 40.74. 275  Although petitioners describe
this as the VIX's “highest point since January 2009” and “a
level exceeded only six times in the VIX's twenty-seven year
history,” 276  that assertion appears to be an exaggeration.
As Hubbard testified, the August 24 closing VIX has been
exceeded on 157 days in the VIX's history. 277  The August 24
spike also was relatively short-lived. By August 28, just four
days after closing at 40.74, the VIX had fallen back to “about
26,” and had fallen further by September 11, the last trading
day before the Special Committee accepted Vista's $55.85
bid. 278  Including the spike on August 24, the “average VIX
was 19.4 in August 2015 and 24.4 in September, as compared
to an average of 19.7 since 1990.” 279
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Even accepting that market volatility impacted the sales
process by increasing financing costs and decreasing the
price that financial sponsors were willing to pay, petitioners'
argument is unavailing in my opinion for two reasons. First,
Buckberg made no attempt to quantify the impact of volatility
on the Merger price. 280  Second, and more importantly,
petitioners' position ignores that they are only entitled to the
fair value of Solera's stock at the time of the Merger, not to the
best price theoretically attainable had market conditions been
the most seller-friendly. 281  As the Supreme Court pointedly
explained in DFC:
Capitalism is rough and ready, and the
purpose of an appraisal is not to make
sure that the petitioners get the highest
conceivable value that might have
been procured had every domino fallen
out of the company's way; rather, it
is to make sure that they receive fair
compensation for their shares in the
sense that it reflects what they deserve
to receive based on what would fairly
be given to them in an arm's-length
transaction. 282
*21  The record demonstrates that the Merger price “resulted
from an open process, informed by robust public information,
and easy access to deeper, non-public information, in which
many parties with an incentive to make a profit had a chance
to bid.” 283  Thus, consistent with our high court's recent
teachings, economic principles suggest that the Merger price
is what petitioners “deserve to receive” for their shares.
b. A Fully-Empowered Special Committee
Actively Negotiated the Merger
Reliance on the deal price as evidence of fair value is
strengthened when independent representatives of a target
company actively negotiate with potential buyers and
demonstrate a real willingness to reject inadequate bids. 284
Here, the record indicates that Solera's Special Committee
was both competent and effective.
On July 20, 2015, the day after receiving an indication
of interest from Thoma Bravo, the Board delegated to the
Special Committee the “full power and authority of the
Board” to review, evaluate, negotiate, recommend, or reject
any proposed transaction or strategic alternative. 285  The
authorizing resolution further provided that Solera could not
do a deal without the Special Committee's approval. 286  All
three directors on the Special Committee were independent
and experienced. 287  Yarbrough, the Chairman of the Special
Committee, testified knowledgeably and forthrightly at trial
about the process undertaken by the Special Committee,
which was aided by reputable legal and financial advisors. 288
Petitioners tellingly make no effort to impugn the motives of
any of the members of the Special Committee.
The record also demonstrates that the Special Committee
actively engaged with the bidders, did not favor any one
in particular, and expressed a willingness to walk away
from bids that it did not find satisfactory. The Special
Committee twice rejected bids that it considered inadequate
—Vista's bid at $53 per share 289  and Thoma Bravo's bid
at $54 per share 290 —each time without the safety net of
another offer. 291  The Special Committee's initial decision
to defer inviting IHS into the sales process was reasonable,
given its concerns about protecting Solera's competitively
sensitive information and about IHS's ability to finance a
transaction. 292  In any event, that decision became academic
after news of the sales process leaked in the press, at which
point the Company promptly engaged with IHS for over
two weeks before signing a deal with Vista. Critically, as
a condition of that deal, the Special Committee extracted
the right to conduct a go-shop and for a reduced 1%
termination fee for IHS (as opposed to 3% for other bidders)
to facilitate continued discussions with IHS. 293  And, for
reasons explained below, the negotiations with all bidders
were not skewed by an artificially low stock price, since the
market for Solera's stock before the Merger appears to have
been efficient. 294
*22  Finally, the evidence shows that the Special Committee
made a thoughtful, reasoned decision to accept Vista's “last
and final” offer at $55.85 after countering with $56 and
being rejected. 295  Before the Special Committee did so,
Centerview counseled the Special Committee that “[i]t is
uncertain whether extending the process will result in higher
and fully financed offers, or will lead to further deterioration
in Vista's bid” and that the “Vista bid can act as a pricing floor
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while IHS is given a further opportunity to bid at a reduced
termination fee pursuant to the go-shop negotiated by the
Committee.” 296  As Yarbrough testified, with that advice in
mind, the Special Committee unanimously decided to accept
Vista's offer after comparing it to the Company's stand-alone
prospects:
We then asked for Centerview to
go through a presentation analysis
of [Vista's bid], with the preliminary
steps to their fairness opinion. And
then we ultimately had a vote on
it, discussed stand-alone, decided that
we preferred the 55.85 and moving
forward with an all-cash, riskless
deal. And so we had a unanimous
vote on the special committee, and
then we had a board meeting shortly
thereafter where Centerview again
presented to the board. We made our
recommendation to the board and then
the board unanimously accepted the
recommendation. 297
In response to this evidence, petitioners advance essentially
two arguments challenging the integrity and quality of the
sales process. I address each in turn.
Petitioners' primary challenge is that Aquila's conflicts of
interest tainted the sales process through meetings he (with
Baron's assistance) held with private equity firms before,
and on one notable occasion after, the Special Committee
was formed. Although Solera's Board could have done a
better job of monitoring Aquila and his interactions with
potential buyers, particularly after the Special Committee was
in place, those interactions did not compromise the integrity
or effectiveness of the sales process in my opinion.
The reality is that Aquila's participation in a transaction was a
prerequisite for a financial sponsor to do a deal. As petitioners
put it, “Aquila is Solera.” 298  Consistent with that reality,
all of the private equity firms that later submitted bids made
clear that those bids depended on Aquila continuing to lead
the Company. 299  In other words, a go-private transaction
never would have been a possibility without buyers becoming
personally acquainted and comfortable with Aquila. Thus,
Aquila engaging in one-on-one conversations with private
equity firms before the Special Committee was formed had
the utility of gauging interest in the Company to see if
undertaking a formal sales process made sense. Critically,
there is no indication in the record that any of those contacts
predetermined or undermined the process when the Special
Committee took charge.
That said, once the Company had received an indication
of interest and put the Special Committee in place, the
Special Committee should have monitored Aquila's contacts
with potential bidders more carefully. Petitioners justifiably
criticize Aquila's private two-hour meeting with Vista in
August, shortly after which Vista began to model a larger
option pool for post-Merger Solera executives. 300  Although
Aquila and Sowul (a principal at Vista) both testified that
compensation was not discussed during that meeting or at
any time before the deal with Vista was signed 301 —and
there is no direct evidence that it was—the timing is certainly
suspicious and casts doubt on whether Aquila abided by
the “Rules of the Road” advice the Special Committee's
counsel provided, i.e., to refrain from discussing post-Merger
employment and compensation during the sales process. 302
If best practices had been followed, a representative of the
Special Committee would have accompanied Aquila to the
August meeting with Vista as a precaution. 303
*23  Even if it is assumed that compensation discussions
did occur during this meeting, nothing in the record indicates
that any of Aquila's (or Baron's) actions before or during
the sales process compromised or undermined the Special
Committee's ability to negotiate a deal. 304  The record is
devoid of any evidence, for example, that Aquila participated
in price discussions with any of the bidders or influenced the
outcome of a competitive sales process. Indeed, petitioners do
not contend that Aquila ever discussed price with the Special
Committee or any bidder, nor do they contend that he played
any role in the deliberations or decision-making process of
the Special Committee more generally.
Further, the record does not show that structural issues
inhibited the effectiveness of the go-shop. 305  To the contrary,
IHS indicated that it appreciated that the Company was
transparent and facilitated its diligence. There also was a
lower termination fee if IHS submitted a topping bid. In short,
IHS had a realistic pathway to success, 306  but it ultimately
decided not to submit a topping bid.
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As a secondary matter, petitioners advance a one-paragraph
argument that the Merger was a de facto MBO (management
buyout) because the Special Committee “knew” that if Solera
was to be sold, it was going to be sold to a private equity
firm, and all the private equity firms made clear that they
“only wanted Solera if Aquila was part of the deal.” 307
Petitioners thus contend that the Merger warrants “heightened
scrutiny.” 308  This argument fails for essentially two reasons.
First, contrary to petitioners' characterization of the
transaction, the Merger did not have the requisite
characteristics of an MBO. Petitioners' own expert (Cornell)
agreed that the common definition of an MBO is a transaction
“where, when it was negotiated, senior management was
a participant in the transaction as an acquirer,” but then
conceded that the Merger was not an MBO because “it
was not a joint purchase between management and another
party.” 309  During the sales process, Aquila did not have an
agreement with Vista or any other bidder to participate as
a buyer in a particular transaction. 310  To the contrary, he
expressed a willingness to invest $15 million in a transaction
with any of the potential buyers, not just Vista. 311  Further,
Aquila was a not an “acquirer” in the Merger 312  because,
before the transaction, Aquila's holdings at the $55.85 per
share were worth approximately $55 million, 313  and after
the Merger, Aquila invested $45 million into the post-Merger
company. 314  In short, as Cornell admitted, the Merger was
not even “similar to an MBO.” 315
*24  Second, petitioners contend that MBOs should be
subject to “heightened scrutiny” but fail to explain why. As
the Supreme Court stated in Dell, even though there may be
“theoretical characteristics” of an MBO that could “detract[ ]
from the reliability of the deal price,” 316  the deal price that
results from an MBO is not inherently suspect or unreliable
per se. 317  Here, to repeat, the Special Committee had the
full authority to control the sales process, and exercised
that authority by deciding which bidders to contact, how
to respond to bids, and ultimately whether to approve the
Merger.
c. The Equity and Debt Markets
Corroborate that the Best Evidence of
Solera's Fair Value was the Merger Price
In DFC, the Supreme Court endorsed the economic
proposition that the “price at which [a company's] shares
trade is informative of fair value” in an appraisal action when
“the company had no conflicts related to the transaction,
a deep base of public shareholders, and highly active
trading,” because “that value reflects the judgments of many
stockholders about the company's future prospects, based on
public filings, industry information, and research conducted
by equity analysts.” 318  The Court in Dell reiterated the
same point, explaining that in an efficient market “a
mass of investors quickly digests all publicly available
information about a company, and in trading the company's
stock, recalibrates its price to reflect the market's adjusted,
consensus valuation of the company.” 319  My inference from
DFC and Dell is that the Supreme Court has emphasized this
point because the price of a widely dispersed stock traded
in an efficient market may provide an informative lower
bound in negotiations between parties in a potential sale of
control. 320
Here, the record supports the conclusion that the market for
Solera's stock was efficient and well-functioning, since: (i)
Solera's market capitalization of about $3.5 billion placed it
in the middle of firms in the S & P MidCap 400 index; 321
(ii) the stock was actively traded on the New York Stock
Exchange, as indicated by weekly trading volume of 4%
of shares outstanding; 322  (iii) the stock had a relative bid-
ask spread of approximately 0.06%, in line with a number
of S & P MidCap 400 and S & P 500 companies; 323  (iv)
the Company's short interest ratio indicated that, on average,
investors who had sold the stock short would be able to cover
their positions in about two days, which was faster than about
three-quarters of S & P 400 MidCap companies and about half
of S & P 500 companies; 324  (v) at least eleven equity analysts
covered Solera during the year before the Merger; 325  and
(vi) Solera's stock price moved sharply as rumor of the sales
process leaked into the market. 326
*25  The proxy statement for the Merger identified August
3, 2015 as the unaffected date for purposes of calculating a
premium. 327  As of that date, a well-informed, liquid trading
market determined, before news of a potential transaction
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leaked into the market, that the Company's stock was worth
$36.39. 328  Significantly, research analysts' price targets had
been declining in the months before news of a potential
transaction, and these targets remained below the deal price
through announcement of the Merger. 329  As Hubbard put it,
the takeaway from these two objective indications of value
is that “market participants playing with real money, looking
at the information that they have, don't think that the stock is
worth $55.85 during that period.” 330
Despite these market realities, petitioners contend that Solera
was worth $84.65 per share—more than double its unaffected
stock price of $36.39 per share as of August 3. 331  Although
one would expect a control block to trade at a higher price
than a minority block, 332  petitioners are unable to explain
such a gaping disconnect between Solera's unaffected market
price and the Merger price.
Petitioners argue that the pre-Merger stock price was
artificially low because the market for Solera was not
efficient due to asymmetric information. More specifically,
petitioners contend that Solera was “poised to ‘harvest
returns’ ” 333  from acquisitions it made between 2012
and 2015, but management struggled to disclose sufficient
information, due to competitive concerns, to allow the market
to value the Company properly. 334  This argument ignores
evidence that many equity investors and analysts actually did
understand Solera's long-term plans, with some approving of
management's strategy but others not buying the story. 335
Consider the following varied perspectives that analysts (and
one of the petitioners) expressed within just a few months
before news of the sales process leaked to the press:
[Editor's Note: The preceding image contains the reference
for footnotes 336 , 337 , 338 , 339 , 340 , 341 , 342 ]
*26  These reviews suggest that there was disagreement in
the financial community over Solera's strategy, not that the
market as a whole did not understand it. Given the many
factors indicating that the market for the Company's stock was
efficient, the market presumably would have digested all of
these sentiments and incorporated them into Solera's stock
price. Yet Solera's pre-Merger unaffected stock price as of
August 3 was still only $36.39.
The debt market further corroborates that, given its operative
reality, Solera was not as valuable as petitioners contend.
Petitioners do not dispute that the debt market had run dry
for Solera as a public company as of the Merger. With its
leverage already rising, the Company made an acquisition in
November 2014, financing the deal with a $400 million notes
offering. 343  Moody's promptly downgraded the Company's
credit rating from Ba2 to Ba3. 344  In July 2015, after Solera
issued $850 million of senior unsecured notes to finance
another acquisition and retire outstanding debt, Moody's
downgraded Solera again, from Ba3 to B1. 345  Further
exemplifying Solera's challenges in taking on additional debt
to finance acquisitions, the July 2015 debt offering fell short,
and Goldman Sachs had to absorb $11.5 million of notes that
it was unable to syndicate into the market. 346
By July 2015, “despite the lucrative fees that investment
bankers make from refinancing a large tranche of public
company debt and syndicating a new issue,” 347  Solera had
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run “out of runway” in the debt market. 348  “In other words,
participants in the public bond markets weren't convinced
they would get their money back if they gave it to [Solera],
and [Solera] was not offering enough interest to compensate
investors for the risk they saw in the company.” 349
Petitioners' own expert admitted that the acquisition debt
market for Solera was tight at equity values greater than the
Merger price. 350  In short, the debt market, like many equity
market participants, viewed Solera skeptically and perceived
its growth-by-acquisition strategy as laden with risk. 351
*27  * * * * *
To summarize, the Merger was the product of a two-month
outreach to large private equity firms in May and June, a
six-week auction by an independent Special Committee that
solicited eleven private equity and seven strategic firms, and
public announcements that put a “For Sale” sign on the
Company. The Special Committee had competent advisors
and the power to say no to an underpriced bid, which it did
twice. The Merger price of $55.85 proved to be a market-
clearing price through a 28-day go-shop and a three-month
window-shop. No one was willing to pay more. Thus, as this
court once put it, the “logical explanation ... is self-evident”:
Solera “was not worth more” than $55.85 per share. 352
2. Merger Fees Should not be Added to the Deal Price
Petitioners argue that, “if deal price is an indicator of fair
value,” the court should add nearly $450 million—or $6.51
per share—to the Merger price. According to petitioners, this
is the amount of transaction costs Vista incurred in connection
with the Merger for buyer fees and expenses, seller fees,
debt fees, and an “early participation premium” to retire
debt in connection with the transaction. 353  Petitioners offer
no precedent or other legal support for this request. They
simply contend that these costs should be added because the
court's “focus should be on what Vista was actually willing to
spend to buy the Company.” 354  This argument fails for two
independent reasons.
First, petitioners' argument cannot be squared with the
definition of “fair value” in the appraisal context that our
Supreme Court recently articulated in DFC when explaining
the purpose of appraisal:
[F]air value is just that, “fair.” It does
not mean the highest possible price
that a company might have sold for
had Warren Buffet negotiated for it
on his best day and the Lenape who
sold Manhattan on their worst. ... [T]he
purpose of appraisal is not to make
sure that the petitioners get the highest
conceivable value that might have
been procured had every domino fallen
out of the company's way; rather, it
is to make sure that they receive fair
compensation for their shares in the
sense that it reflects what they deserve
to receive based on what would fairly
be given to them in an arm's-length
transaction. 355
The Merger price was the result of arm's-length bargaining
between the Special Committee and Vista. Perhaps Vista
would have been willing to pay more than $55.85 for the
Company, but that is irrelevant to the court's independent
determination of fair value as that term was explained in
DFC. 356
*28  Second, policy concerns counsel against adding
transaction fees to the deal price in determining Solera's
fair value. If stockholders received payment for transaction
fees in appraisal proceedings, then it would compel rational
stockholders in even the most pristine deal processes to seek
appraisal to capture their share of the transaction costs (plus
interest) that otherwise would be unavailable to them in
any non-litigated arm's-length merger. This incentive would
undermine the underlying purpose of appraisal proceedings
as explained in DFC.
3. Deduction for Merger Synergies
The appraisal statute provides that “the Court shall determine
the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of
value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the
merger.” 357  Thus, the “appraisal award excludes synergies in
accordance with the mandate of Delaware jurisprudence that
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the subject company in an appraisal proceeding be valued as
a going concern.” 358
Synergies do not only arise in the strategic-buyer context. It is
recognized that synergies may exist when a financial sponsor
is an acquirer. 359  As of trial, Vista owned 40 software
businesses, three of which (EagleView, Omnitracs, and
DealerSocket) Vista believed had significant “touch points”
with Solera from which synergies could be realized. 360
Vista modeled out four different categories of synergies in
its financial analysis of the Company during the bidding
process. 361  Respondent's expert presented evidence at trial
concerning three of those categories: portfolio company
revenue synergies, private company cost savings, and the tax
benefits of incremental leverage. 362  In total, he calculated
total expected synergies of $6.12 per share. 363  From there,
respondent's expert made a “conservative” estimate that 31%
of the value of the synergies—equating to $1.90 per share
—remained with the seller by using the lowest percentage
identified in one of three empirical studies. 364
I find this evidence, which petitioners made no effort to rebut,
convincing. 365  Deducting $1.90 from the Merger price of
$55.85 leads to a value of $53.95 per share. For all the reasons
discussed above, and based on my lack of confidence in the
DCF models advanced by the parties (as discussed next),
I conclude that this amount ($53.95 per share) is the best
evidence of the fair value of petitioners' shares of Solera at
the time of the Merger.
4. The Dueling Discounted Cash Flow Models
*29  Consistent with the court's duty to consider “all relevant
factors” in determining Solera's fair value, 366  I consider next
the DCF models the parties' experts prepared. Compared with
a market-generated transaction price, “the use of alternative
valuation techniques like a DCF analysis is necessarily a
second-best method to derive value.” 367
In this action, both parties' experts created “three-stage” DCF
models consisting of (i) the five-year Hybrid Case Projections
(fiscal years 2016 through 2020), (ii) a five-year transition
period (fiscal years 2021 through 2025), and (iii) a terminal
period beginning in fiscal year 2026. 368  The outcome of
these models nonetheless resulted in widely divergent DCF
valuations—$84.65 per share for petitioners, and $53.15 per
share for respondent.
As a preliminary matter, I find comfort that respondent's DCF
analysis is in the same ballpark as the deal price less estimated
synergies. 369  On the other side of the ledger, given my
conclusions about the quality of the sales process for Solera,
petitioners' DCF analysis strikes me as facially unbelievable
as it suggests that, in a transaction with an equity value of
approximately $3.85 billion at the deal price, 370  potential
buyers left almost $2 billion on the table by not outbidding
Vista. Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that a DCF that
results in a valuation so substantially below the transaction
price may indeed lack “credibility on its face.” 371
*30  “Delaware courts must remain mindful that ‘the DCF
method is [ ] subject to manipulation and guesswork [and
that] the valuation results that it generates in the setting of
a litigation [can be] volatile.” 372  “[E]ven slight differences
in [a DCF's] inputs can produce large valuation gaps.” 373
A number of factors explain the gaping difference between
petitioners' and respondent's DCF analyses, and, notably,
many of these disagreements relate to how to value Solera
into perpetuity. Such assumptions about Solera's business in
the terminal period, i.e., ten-plus years into the future, are
unavoidably tinged with a heavy dose of speculation.
I highlight below some of the major areas of disagreement
between the parties. This discussion is meant to be illustrative
and not exhaustive. All of these disagreements predictably
result in a higher asserted valuation by petitioners and a lower
asserted valuation by respondent.
The most significant point of contention in the DCF models
concerns the estimated amount of cash that Solera would need
to reinvest over the terminal period. 374  This “plowback”
rate is the percentage of after-tax operating profits that the
Company would need to invest to grow at a specified rate into
perpetuity. 375  Using the method identified in “many leading
valuation texts including Damodaran (2012) and Koller,
Goedhart and Wessels (2015),” which petitioners' expert has
called the “traditional model,” 376  respondent argues that
the required reinvestment rate is 37.1%. 377  Petitioners, on
the other hand, argue that the inflation plowback formula
published in articles written by Bradley and Jarrell should
be used, resulting in a required reinvestment rate of only
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16.4%. 378  According to petitioners, holding all else constant
in respondent's DCF analysis, the difference between using
these two reinvestment rates yields a huge $23.90 per share
difference in Solera's valuation. 379
Another notable area of disagreement in the DCF models
is Solera's return on invested capital (“ROIC”) in the
terminal period. Respondent assumed, consistent with “a
theory this court has repeatedly cited with approval,” 380
that in the long run the present value of Solera's growth
opportunities would disappear due to increased competition,
so the Company's ROIC would gradually converge with its
weighted average costs of capital (“WACC”). 381  Petitioners
disagree with applying the convergence model to Solera.
They contend that the Company possesses “moats” around its
business, such as barriers to entry, competitive advantages,
and market dominance, that will give it perpetual advantages
over potential competitors. 382  Petitioners thus argue that
Solera will earn a return of 4.5% above its WACC in
perpetuity during the terminal period. 383  When the court
asked petitioner's expert how he landed on 4.5%, his response
was candid: “It's a little bit of a finger in the wind.” 384
*31  The parties also disagree about how to account for
stock-based compensation (“SBC”) in their DCF models,
both for the discrete period and the terminal period.
Respondent applied the “cash basis” method to stock-based
compensation expense, using the cash amount that the
Company would have to spend to account for SBC as a
normalized percentage of revenue. 385  Petitioners did not
independently calculate SBC and instead used the Company's
projections. 386  These projections were calculated on a
book basis, benchmarked to Solera's actual stock price, and
assumed to grow at 5% annually. 387
The parties also handled the contingent tax liability attached
to Solera's foreign earnings very differently. As of the Merger,
the Company had earned approximately $1.2 billion in
foreign profits, for which it had only paid taxes where those
profits were earned. 388  Solera historically designated these
profits as permanently reinvested earnings (“PRE”). Before
these earnings can be repatriated to the United States or paid
to stockholders, the Company must pay the residual tax, i.e.,
the marginal amount between the U.S. tax rate and the amount
already paid internationally. 389  Respondent assumed that
$350 million of foreign earnings that had been de-designated
as PRE would be repatriated as of the Merger had there
not been a deal, and that the rest of Solera's foreign profits,
both past and future, would be repatriated on a rolling basis
following a five-year deferral period. 390  This repatriation
would cause Solera to pay more in taxes, decreasing the
Company's value. Petitioners, by contrast, assumed that such
taxes would never be paid because they contend the timing
of repatriation is unknown and thus these tax liabilities are
speculative. 391
Finally, the parties disagreed about the amount of cash to be
added back to Solera's enterprise value in order to convert it to
equity value. This court has repeatedly held that only “excess
cash” is to be added back. 392  Solera had approximately
$480 million of cash at closing. 393  During the sales process,
the Company's CFO did a country-by-country analysis and
determined that Solera needed $160 million to $165 million
to fund its operations. 394  Respondent used that analysis to
deduct $165 million from the Company's $480 million of
cash at closing and added back the difference, i.e., $315
million. 395  Petitioners, on the other hand, added back all
of the $480 million, reasoning that “with modern computer
technology, a good CFO doesn't need any wasting cash,” and
that “it would require an incompetent corporate treasurer for
a big chunk of the cash balance to be wasting cash.” 396
* * * * *
There are other points of disagreement in the parties' DCF
models, but it is not necessary to detail them here. As
explained above, the Merger price was the product of “an
open process, informed by robust public information, and
easy access to deeper, non-public information, in which many
parties with an incentive to make a profit had a chance
to bid.” 397  Given the huge gap between petitioners' DCF
valuation and the Merger price, which I have found to be a
reliable indicator of value in accordance with the teachings
of DFC and Dell, I find petitioners' DCF valuation not to be
credible on its face and accord it no weight. 398
*32  My decision to do so is corroborated by the fact that
nearly 88% of petitioners' enterprise valuation is attributable
to periods after the five-year Hybrid Case Projections. 399  In
other words, petitioners' DCF valuation is largely a prediction
about the Company's operations many years into the future.
Such predictions, even when informed, are unavoidably
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speculative, where small variances in a DCF's inputs can lead
to wide valuation swings. 400
I also give no weight to respondent's DCF valuation, but
for a different reason. Although that valuation is close to
my Merger price less synergies calculation, respondent's
own expert opined that his DCF valuation is “less reliable”
than the Merger price minus synergies valuation “given
the uncertainties ... surrounding several inputs to the DCF
valuation.” 401  I agree, and will accord the value of the
Merger price minus synergies dispositive weight in this
case. 402
5. Respondent's Unaffected Stock
Price Argument is Unavailing
In the wake of our Supreme Court's decisions in DFC and
Dell, the Court of Chancery determined in Aruba that the
fair value of petitioners' shares in an appraisal proceeding
was the thirty-day average unaffected market price of the
company's shares, i.e., $17.13 per share. 403  In reaching this
conclusion, Vice Chancellor Laster declined to adopt his deal
price ($24.67 per share) less synergies figure of $18.20 per
share because of his concerns that this figure (i) “likely was
tainted by human error,” and (ii) “continues to incorporate an
element of value derived from the merger itself: the value that
the acquirer creates by reducing agency costs.” 404
In its supplemental brief, respondent argues that, “in light
of recent cases, the best evidence of Solera's fair value is
its unaffected stock price of $36.39 per share.” 405  This
argument, which advocates for a fair value determination
about 35% below the deal price, reflects a dramatic
change of position that I find as facially incredible as
petitioners' DCF model. Before, during, and after trial (until
Aruba was decided), respondent and its highly credentialed
expert—a former chairman of the President's Council
of Economic Advisors 406 —consistently asserted that the
“market-generated Merger price, adjusted for synergies” of
$53.95 per share is the “best evidence of Solera's value” as of
the date the Merger. 407  For the reasons explained above, the
court independently has come to the same conclusion.
Notably, nothing prevented respondent from advancing at
trial the “unaffected market price” argument the Aruba court
embraced. The scholarship underpinning the notion that both
synergies and agency costs are elements of value derived
from a merger that should be excluded under Section 262(h)
has been in the public domain for many years and was
readily available when this case was tried. 408  Yet respondent
made no effort to advance this theory at trial and, thus,
petitioners were afforded no opportunity to respond to it.
In this respect, I agree with the sentiment Vice Chancellor
Glasscock expressed in a similar situation that “the use of
trading price to determine fair value requires a number of
assumptions that ... are best made or rejected after being
subject to a forensic and adversarial presentation by interested
parties.” 409
*33  As an example, even if one were to accept the legal
theory that agency costs represent an element of value derived
from the merger itself, little exists in the record to give
the court any comfort about Solera's true unaffected market
price. The $36.39 per share figure on which the Company
relies represents the closing price on a single day, August 3,
2015. 410  Although the Company used that date in its proxy
statement as the unaffected date for purposes of calculating
a premium, 411  and I have referenced it in this opinion a
number of times for context, the parties never litigated the
issue of Solera's unaffected market price and the court is in
no position based on the trial record to reliably make such a
determination.
With respect to the merits of the theory that agency costs
represent an element of value derived from the merger itself,
the Aruba court explained that the “concept of reduced
agency costs is the flipside of the benefits of control,” with
the “key point” being that “control creates value distinct
from synergy value.” 412  This is because, as Professors
Hamermesh and Wachter explain, “the aggregation of the
shares is value-creating because a controller can then
exercise the control rights involving directing the strategy
and managing the firm.” 413  They go on to argue that the
“normative justification for awarding the value of control to
the controller parallels the rationale for awarding the value
of synergies to the bidder. Efficiency requires that those
who create an efficient transaction—either through creating
synergies or eliminating agency costs—should receive the
value that they create.” 414
Significantly, however, a number of this court's appraisal
decisions, one of which was affirmed in relevant part on
appeal, suggest that the value of control is properly part
of the going concern and not an element of value that
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must be excised under Section 262(h). 415  In Le Beau v.
M.G. Bancorporation., Inc., for example, respondent used
a “capital market” approach that “involved deriving various
pricing multiples from selected publicly-traded companies,
and then applying those multiples to MGB,” the target
corporation. 416  Then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs rejected the
methodology because it “results in a minority valuation.” 417
The Supreme Court affirmed this determination, explaining
that the trial court's conclusion that the “capital market
approach contained an inherent minority discount that
made its use legally impermissible in a statutory appraisal
proceeding [was] fully supported by the record evidence that
was before the Court of Chancery and the prior holdings of
this Court construing Section 262.” 418
Similarly, in Borruso v. Communications Telesystems
International, Vice Chancellor Lamb held that “a control
premium should be added to adjust the market value of the
equity derived from the comparable company method.” 419
The court explained it reasoning as follows:
*34  [T]he comparable company
method of analysis produces an equity
valuation that inherently reflects a
minority discount, as the data used for
purposes of comparison is all derived
from minority trading values of the
comparable companies. Because that
value is not fully reflective of the
intrinsic worth of the corporation on
a going concern basis, this court has
applied an explicit control premium in
calculating the fair value of the equity
in an appraisal proceeding. 420
More recently, then-Vice Chancellor Strine took the same
approach in Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc. 421  There, the
court approved adjusting a comparable companies analysis by
adding a control premium where “[w]hat is being corrected
for is the difference between the trading price of a minority
share and the trading price if all the shares were sold.” 422
Our Supreme Court held long ago that the going concern
value of a company must be determined in an appraisal
case “irrespective of the synergies involved in a merger.” 423
DFC and Dell both make the same point. 424  Although
DFC and Dell are transformative decisions in my view
in their full-throated endorsement of applying market
efficiency principles in appraisal actions, 425  I do not read
those decisions—both of which unmistakably emphasize the
probative value of deal price 426 —to suggest that agency
costs represent an element of value attributable to a merger
separate from synergies that must be excluded under Section
262(h). Had that been the Supreme Court's intention, I believe
it would have said so explicitly.
Accordingly, I reject respondent's newly-minted argument
that Solera's closing price on August 3, 2015 of $36.39 is
the best evidence of Solera's fair value as of the date of the
Merger.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, petitioners are entitled to
$53.95 per share as the fair value of their shares of Solera,
plus interest accruing from the date the Merger closed, March
3, 2016, at the rate of 5% percent over the Federal Reserve
discount rate from time to time, compounded quarterly. 427
The parties should confer and submit a form of implementing
order for the entry of final judgment consistent with this
opinion within ten business days. It is the court's intention
to unseal the expert reports in this case in their entirety
upon entry of a final judgment. If, however, a party believes
good cause exists to maintain any portion of any of the
expert reports under seal, that party must file a motion within
ten business days identifying the specific part that warrants
further confidential treatment and explaining the basis for
continuing such treatment.
*35  IT IS SO ORDERED.
All Citations
Not Reported in Atl. Rptr., 2018 WL 3625644
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90 JX0378.0001.
91 Tr. 546 (Aquila); JX0402.
92 JX0402.0003, 07.
93 JX0402.0003.
94 Tr. 558, 589 (Aquila).
95 Id. at 854 (Yarbrough).
96 PTO ¶ 299; JX0756.0044.
97 PTO ¶ 388; JX0445.0005.
98 See JX0467.0001 (Silver Lake); JX0456.0001 (Pamplona).
99 JX0465.0001.
100 PTO ¶ 302.
101 JX0340.0003; JX0464.0005, 08.
102 PTO ¶ 305.
103 Id. ¶ 306.
104 JX0499.0002.
105 JX0497.0001-02 (August 20, 2015 email from Advent to Centerview); JX0517.0001 (August 21, 2015 email
referencing Advent call to UK head of Rothschild).
106 JX0497.0001.
107 Tr. 844-45 (Yarbrough).




112 Tr. 597-98 (Aquila); JX0523; JX0525.
113 JX0525.0002.
114 Tr. 833 (Yarbrough).
115 JX0525.0001; JX0541.0001.
116 PTO ¶ 307.
117 Id. ¶ 308.
118 Id. ¶ 309.
119 Id. ¶ 312.
120 Id. ¶ 312; Tr. 441 (Aquila), 793 (Yarbrough).
121 PTO ¶ 313.
122 Id. ¶ 317.
123 Tr. 442-44 (Aquila).
124 PTO ¶ 321.
125 JX0611.0002.
126 PTO ¶¶ 322, 324.
127 Id. ¶ 311.
128 Tr. 796-97 (Yarbrough).
129 PTO ¶¶ 322-23.
130 Id. ¶ 324.
131 JX0620.0001-02; JX0626.0001.
132 Tr. 934-35, 964-67 (Sowul). Petitioners question the veracity of this explanation, but I found Sowul's testimony
on the point to be credible and one of petitioners' own experts confirmed the spreadsheet error. Id. at 301-04
(Buckberg).
133 Id. at 934-35 (Sowul).
134 PTO ¶¶ 382-84; Tr. 589 (Aquila); JX0623.
135 JX0628.
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136 PTO ¶ 325.
137 Id. ¶¶ 329-31.
138 Id. ¶ 332.
139 JX0638.0001.
140 PTO ¶ 334.
141 Tr. 969-70 (Sowul).
142 Id. at 806 (Yarbrough).
143 JX0644.0001.
144 PTO ¶ 338; Tr. 806 (Yarbrough).
145 Tr. 807 (Yarbrough).
146 JX0651.0001.
147 PTO ¶ 339; JX0756.0052; Tr. 807-08 (Yarbrough).
148 PTO ¶ 339.
149 Id. ¶ 341; Tr. 807-08 (Yarbrough); JX0661.0001-04.
150 Id. ¶¶ 346-47.





156 PTO ¶ 350.
157 Id. ¶ 351; Tr. 811 (Yarbrough). Solera withheld six documents. Four of the six documents concerned
Digital Garage, a strategically sensitive new smartphone application, and the other two concerned personnel
matters. Tr. 811 (Yarbrough); PTO ¶ 139-44.
158 PTO ¶ 354.
159 Id. ¶ 355.
160 Id. ¶ 356.
161 JX0744.0001, 03; Tr. 611-614 (Aquila).
162 PTO ¶¶ 382-387; JX0760.0004.
163 JX0760.0004, 09-10.
164 PTO ¶ 5; JX0756.0069.
165 PTO ¶¶ 6-7.




170 Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1142 (Del. 1989) (citation omitted).
171 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
172 See M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 797 (Del. 1999).
173 Tri-Cont'l Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950).
174 M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 525 (Del. 1999).
175 Matter of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1218 (Del. 1992).
176 Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1144.
177 In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 WL 399726, at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (citing Glob. GT LP
v. Golden Telecom, Inc. 11 A.3d 214, 218 (Del. 2010) ).
178 See Laidler v. Hesco Bastion Envtl., Inc., 2014 WL 1877536, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2014) (compiling
authorities); see also In re Lane v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 1994 WL 263558, at *2 (Del. Ch. May
25, 1994) (“[R]elevant factors to be considered include ‘assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and
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any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company's stock.’ ”) (quoting Weinberger,
at 711).
179 In re Appraisal of Metromedia Int'l Gp., Inc., 971 A.2d 893, 899-900 (Del. Ch. 2009) (citation omitted).
180 Laidler, 2014 WL 1877536, at *6 (citing M.G. Bancorporation., Inc., v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d at 520).
181 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017).
182 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017).
183 DFC, 172 A.3d at 348.
184 In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., 2016 WL 3753123, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016), rev'd, DFC, 172 A.3d 346.
185 See id. at *21 (“Each of these valuation methods suffers from different limitations that arise out of the same
source: the tumultuous environment in the time period leading up to DFC's sale. As described above, at the
time of its sale, DFC was navigating turbulent regulatory waters that imposed considerable uncertainty on
the company's future profitability, even its viability. Some of its competitors faced similar challenges. The
potential outcome could have been dire, leaving DFC unable to operate its fundamental businesses, or could
have been very positive, leaving DFC's competitors crippled and allowing DFC to gain market dominance.
Importantly, DFC was unable to chart its own course; its fate rested largely in the hands of the multiple
regulatory bodies that governed it. Even by the time the transaction closed in June 2014, DFC's regulatory
circumstances were still fluid.”).
186 DFC, 172 A.3d at 360-61.
187 Id. at 351.
188 Id. at 349.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 370-71.
191 Id. at 369-70.
192 Id. at 373.
193 Id. at 367.
194 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2016 WL 3186538, at *1, 18 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016), rev'd, Dell, 177 A.3d 1.
195 Dell, 117 A.3d at 6.
196 Id. at 7.
197 Id. at 27.
198 Id. at 28 (citing DFC, 172 A.3d at 374-77); see also id. (“[The financial advisor] did not initially solicit the
interest of strategic bidders because its analysis suggested none was likely to make an offer.”).
199 Id.
200 Id. at 29.
201 Id. at 28.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 29 (citation omitted).
204 Id. at 30. See also id. at 23 (“In fact, the record as distilled by the trial court suggests that the deal price
deserved heavy, if not dispositive, weight.”).
205 Id. at 35.
206 2018 WL 922139 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018), reargument denied, 2018 WL 2315943 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2018).
207 2018 WL 1037450 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2018).
208 2018 WL 922139 at *1-2 (citations omitted).
209 Id. at *2 (citation omitted).
210 Id. at *1, 4.
211 Id. at *2-4 (internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted).
212 2018 WL 1037450, at *1.
213 Id. at *8.
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214 Id. at *21. Just last week, the Court of Chancery similarly found in another case that flaws in a sales process
leading to a merger undermined the reliability of the merger price as an indicator of fair value. Blueblade
Capital Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft Cos., Inc., 2018 WL 3602940, at *1-2 (Del. Ch. July 27, 2018).
215 JX0898.0094-95, 200.
216 JX0898.0098.
217 Resp't's Post-Trial Opening Br. 1 (Dkt. 106); see also JX0894.0125-26.
218 JX0894.0126.
219 Id.
220 Resp't's Suppl. Post-Trial Br. 5 (Dkt. 123).
221 DFC, 172 A.3d at 349.
222 Id.
223 Dell, 177 A.3d at 28.
224 8 Del. C. § 262(h) (“In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant factors.”); see
also DFC, 172 A.3d at 364 (affirming Golden Telecom and restating that “§ 262(h) gives broad discretion to
the Court of Chancery to determine the fair value of the company's shares, considering ‘all relevant factors’ ”).
225 DFC, 172 A.3d at 349.
226 Id. at 373.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 349.
229 Dell, 177 A.3d at 32-34.
230 DFC, 172 A.3d at 349.
231 Id. at 366.
232 Dell, 177 A.3d at 35.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 28.
235 DFC, 172 A.3d at 373.
236 Id. at 349.
237 Id.
238 Dell, 177 A.3d at 23.
239 DFC, 172 A.3d at 388.
240 Dell, 177 A.3d at 22 (citation omitted).
241 Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *18 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016).
242 PTO ¶¶ 268, 271-78.
243 Id. ¶ 285.
244 Id. ¶¶ 295, 307-09.
245 Tr. 1029-31, 1036-37 (Hubbard).
246 Id. at 132 (Cornell).
247 In re Appraisal of PetSmart, Inc., 2017 WL 2303599, at *28 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017); see also Tr. 1036
(Hubbard) (“Once a sales process became public in the Bloomberg story, anyone who wished to bid on this
asset could certainly have jumped in.”); Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (“[G]iven leaks that Dell was exploring strategic
alternatives, record testimony suggests that [Dell's banker] presumed that any interested parties would have
approached the Company before the go-shop if serious about pursuing a deal.”).
248 Tr. 789 (Yarbrough) (“And then an upside of that is that everybody in the world knew that we were looking
at strategic alternatives at that point.”).
249 JX0214.0014-15.
250 PTO ¶ 306.
251 Id. ¶ 305.
252 JX0499.0002.
253 JX0644.0001.
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254 JX0651.0001.
255 Lender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *18 (“Importantly, however, if bidders perceive a sale process to
be relatively open, then a credible threat of competition can be as effective as actual competition.”).
256 Leaks of the amounts of the bids theoretically could have functioned to anchor the bidding process, but Solera
never publicly confirmed the validity of these reports and petitioners have never argued that these leaks had
any impact on the competitive dynamic among bidders.
257 See JX0497; JX0556.
258 As petitioners acknowledge, it also is doubtful whether including more financial sponsors in the sales process
(beyond the eleven that the Special Committee contacted) would have meaningfully increased competition
between the bidders. Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 27-28 (Dkt. 105). See also Lender Processing, 2016 WL
7324170, at *17 (citation omitted) (“Financial sponsors ... predominately use the same pricing models, the
same inputs, and the same value-creating techniques.”).
259 See DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (“Any rational purchaser of a business should have a targeted rate of return that
justifies the substantial risks and costs of buying a business. That is true for both strategic and financial
buyers.”).
260 177 A.3d at 29 (citing DFC, 172 A.3d at 375 n.154 (“[T]he absence of synergistic buyers for a company is
itself relevant to its value.”) ).
261 See Tr. 973-74 (Sowul) (“And so that party, that IHS, that strategic, could, in theory, pay a lot more than we
could. And we knew they were interested.... So we would have to pay as little as we can to maximize our
returns but pay as much as we can so that we can be competitive against a strategic.”); see also PetSmart,
2017 WL 2303599, at *29 (citation omitted) (“Importantly, the evidence reveals that the private equity bidders
did not know who they were bidding against and whether or not they were competing with strategic bidders.
They had every incentive to put their best offer on the table.”).
262 Tr. 780-82 (Yarbrough).
263 PTO ¶ 307.
264 Id. ¶ 312.
265 Id. ¶ 313.
266 Id. ¶ 312; Tr. 442-43 (Aquila).
267 PTO ¶ 351; Tr. 811 (Yarbrough).
268 PTO ¶ 354.
269 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 28.
270 Id. at 28-29. VIX stands for the CBOE Volatility Index, which Buckberg described as “a measure of market
expectations of near-term volatility conveyed by S & P 500 stock index option prices.” JX0895.0012 (Buckberg
expert report).
271 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 28-33.
272 Tr. 250 (Buckberg).
273 Id. at 253 (Buckberg).
274 Id. at 852 (Yarbrough).
275 JX0895.0026.
276 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 15.
277 Tr. 1042-43 (Hubbard).
278 Id. at 337-38 (Buckberg).
279 JX0899.0027.
280 See Tr. 295-96 (Buckberg); see also DFC, 172 A.3d at 350 (“[T]he fact that a financial buyer may demand a
certain rate of return on its investment in exchange for undertaking the risk of an acquisition does not mean
that the price it is willing to pay is not a meaningful indication of fair value.”).
281 DFC, 172 A.3d at 370.
282 Id. at 370-71.
283 Id. at 349.
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284 See Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (“The Committee, composed of independent, experienced directors and armed with
the power to say ‘no,’ persuaded [the bidder] to raise its bid six times. Nothing in the record suggests that
increased competition would have produced a better result.”); PetSmart, 2017 WL 2303599, at *30 (“Had the
auction not generated an offer that the Board deemed too good to pass up, I am satisfied that the Board was
ready to pursue other initiatives as a standalone company.”); Lender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *19
(“Reinforcing the threat of competition from other parties was the realistic possibility that the Company would
reject the [ ] bid and pursue a different alternative.”).
285 JX0359.0002.
286 Id.
287 Tr. 754-56, 771-72 (Yarbrough).
288 Id. at 776-78 (Yarbrough).
289 PTO ¶ 334.
290 Id. ¶ 338.
291 Tr. 806-07 (Yarbrough).
292 See PetSmart, 2017 WL 2303599, at *28 (emphasis in original) (“I note that the Board considered inviting
the most likely strategic partner ... into the process, but made the reasoned decision that, without a firm
indication of interest from [the competitor], the risks of providing [the company's] most direct competitor with
unfettered access to [the company's] well-stocked data room outweighed any potential reward. Nevertheless,
the evidence revealed that the Board held the door open for [the competitor] to join the auction if it expressed
serious interest in making a bid.”).
293 PTO ¶¶ 325, 339, 350.
294 See infra Section III.D.1.c.
295 Tr. 807-08 (Yarbrough).
296 JX0633.0013.
297 Tr. 807-08 (Yarbrough).
298 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 4 (emphasis in original).
299 JX0340.0003 (“We are contemplating this deal solely in the context of being able to partner with Tony Aquila
and his management team.”) (Thoma Bravo); JX0464.0005 (“We have been impressed by the high caliber
of the management team we have met, and look forward to forming a successful and productive partnership
with them and the other members of the Solera management team.”) (Vista); JX0464.0008 (“Our team is
ecstatic about the opportunity to partner with Tony and other members of senior management.”) (Pamplona).
300 JX0525; JX0541.
301 Tr. 452 (Aquila), 971-73 (Sowul).
302 Tr. 782-83 (Yarbrough); JX0380.0003-05.
303 See In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 117 (Del. Ch. 2007) (Strine, V.C.) (“I believe it would have
been preferable for the Special Committee to have had its chairman or, at the very least, its banker participate
with [the CEO] in negotiations with [the buyer]. By that means, there would be more assurance that [the CEO]
would take a tough line and avoid inappropriate discussions that would taint the process.”).
304 I view Baron's statement in an email to his colleagues at Rothschild that “we were the architects with the CEO
from the beginning as to how to engineer the process from start to finish” to be puffery. The email completely
ignores Centerview's role in the sales process, and Baron's statement that he is “excited to ... market the
heck out of this for future business” betrays his motivation for exaggerating his involvement in the transaction.
Notably, three recipients of Baron's email were his superiors at Rothschild. JX0670.0002.
305 Dell, 177 A.3d at 31-32.
306 Id.
307 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 26.
308 Id. at 27.
309 JX0902.0005; see also Tr. 148-49 (Cornell).
310 JX0899.0011.
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311 Tr. 589 (Aquila).
312 Tr. 1034 (Hubbard) (“Q. Was Mr. Aquila a net buyer in this transaction? A. Not the way economists would
use that term, no. Q. And how do you understand that term? A. Actually, the economic definition is pretty
much as the plain English. It would mean contributing new cash as a net buyer. That did not happen.”).
313 JX0899.0009.
314 PTO ¶¶ 382-387.
315 Tr. 148-49 (Cornell).
316 Dell, 177 A.3d at 31.
317 See id. at 6 (noting that the features of an MBO transaction that may render the deal price unreliable “were
largely absent” in the Dell MBO).
318 DFC, 172 A.3d at 373.
319 Dell, 177 A.3d at 25 (citation omitted); see also JX0894.0034 (Hubbard expert report) (“In a well-functioning
stock market, a company's market price quickly reflects publicly available information. A market price
balances investors' willingness to buy and sell the shares in light of this information, and thus represents their
consensus view as to the value of the equity of the company. As a result, finance academics view market
prices as an important indicator of intrinsic value absent evidence of frictions that impede market efficiency.”).
320 See Dell, 177 A.3d at 27 n.131 (“This is evident as the court observed that the stock price anchors negotiations
and, if the stock price is low, the deal price necessarily might be low.”).
321 JX0894.0035. The S & P MidCap 400 contains 400 firms that are generally smaller than those in the S & P
500 but “capture a period in the typical enterprise life cycle in which firms have successfully navigated the
challenges inherent to small companies, such as raising initial capital and managing early growth.” Mid Cap:






326 See JX0842-43 (observing that Solera's stock rose more than ten percent on multiple times its normal daily
trading volume on August 4 and 5, 2015, and concluding that “this trading activity is consistent with trading
on rumors of a transaction”).
327 PTO ¶ 363.
328 Id. ¶ 364 & Ex. A.
329 Tr. 1052-53 (Hubbard); JX0894.0047-48.
330 Tr. 1053 (Hubbard). See also DFC, 172 A.3d at 369 (quoting Applebaum v. Avaya, Inc., 812 A.2d 880, 889-90
(Del. 2002) ) (“[A] well-informed, liquid trading market will provide a measure of fair value superior to any
estimate the court could impose.”).
331 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 4.
332 See, e.g., DFC, 172 A.3d at 369 n.117 (“One of the reasons, of course, why a control block trades at a
different price than a minority block is because a controller can determine key issues like dividend policy.”);
IRA Tr. v. Crane, 2017 WL 7053964, at *7 n.54 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2017) (“That control of a corporation has
value is well-accepted.”).
333 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 6.
334 See, e.g., PTO ¶¶ 243-44.
335 Dell, 177 A.3d at 26-27; see also id. at 24 (“[A]nalysts scrutinized [the company's] long-range outlook
when evaluating the Company and setting price targets, and the market was capable of accounting for [the
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343 Tr. 393-96 (Aquila).
344 JX0140.0003.
345 JX0310.0004.
346 Tr. 413-14 (Aquila); JX0318.0001.
347 DFC, 172 A.3d at 355.
348 Tr. 399-401 (Aquila).
349 DFC, 172 A.3d at 374.
350 See Tr. 114 (Cornell) (“[I]n this market condition, for whatever reason, there wasn't a lot of cheap debt
available, and that limited what a private equity firm's going to be able to pay and satisfy itself and its
shareholders.”); see also DFC, 172 A.3d at 375 (“As is the case with refinancings, so too do banks like to
lend and syndicate the acquisition debt for an M & A transaction if they can get it done. That is how they make
big profits. That lenders would not finance a buyout of DFC at a higher valuation logically signals weakness
in its future prospects, not that debt providers and equity buyers were all mistaken. So did the fact that DFC's
already non-investment grade debt suffered a downgrade in 2013 and then was put on a negative credit
watch in 2014.”).
351 See DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (“Like any factor relevant to a company's future performance, the market's
collective judgment of the effect of ... risk may turn out to be wrong, but established corporate finance theories
suggest that the collective judgment of the many is more likely to be accurate than any individual's guess.
When the collective judgment involved, as it did here, not just the views of the company stockholders, but
also those of potential buyers of the entire company and those of the company's debtholders with a self-
interest in evaluating the regulatory risks facing the company, there is more, not less, reason to give weight
to the market's view of an important factor.”).
352 Highfields Capital. Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 60 (Del. Ch. 2007).
353 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 34-35.
354 Id. at 35.
355 DFC, 172 A.3d at 370-71 (emphasis added).
356 The Supreme Court also made clear that a deal price arrived at by using an LBO model can be the most
reliable evidence of fair value of a target company. See DFC, 172 A.3d at 350 (“[T]he fact that a financial buyer
may demand a certain rate of return on its investment in exchange for undertaking the risk of an acquisition
does not mean that the price it is willing to pay is not a meaningful indication of fair value.”).
357 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
358 Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Gp., Ltd., 847 A.2d, 340, 343 (Del. Ch. 2004) (Strine, V.C).
359 See, e.g., PetSmart, 2017 WL 2303599, at *31 n.364 (citation omitted) (noting “synergies financial buyers
may have with target firms arising from other companies in their portfolio”); Lender Processing, 2016 WL
7324170, at *17 n.14 (noting that “a source of private value” to a financial buyer is “a synergistic portfolio
company”).
360 Tr. 908-16 (Sowul); JX0613.0033.
361 Id. at 908-09 (Sowul).
362 Id. at 1045-48 (Hubbard); JX0894.0066-71.
363 Id. at 1045-46 (Hubbard); JX0894.0070-71.
364 Tr. 1047-48 (Hubbard); JX0894.0070-71. This 31% figure is the “median portion of synergies shared with the
seller” as determined by a 2013 Boston Consulting Group study of 365 deals. JX0894.0070-71. Although the
appraisal statute mandates excision of synergies specific to the merger at issue, this court has used general
estimates of the percentage of synergies shared, as provided by experts, to derive appraisal value from deal
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price. See Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 353 & n.26 (relying on a “reasonable synergy discount” propounded by a
party's expert).
365 See DFC, 172 A.3d at 371 (“Part of why the synergy excision issue can be important is that it is widely
assumed that the sales price in many M & A deals includes a portion of the buyer's expected synergy gains,
which is part of the premium the winning buyer must pay to prevail and obtain control.”).
366 See 8 Del. C. § 262(h) (“In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant factors.”);
DFC, 172 A.3d at 388 (“But, in keeping with our refusal to establish a ‘presumption’ in favor of the deal
price because of the statute's broad mandate, we also conclude that the Court of Chancery must exercise
its considerable discretion while also explaining, with reference to the economic facts before it and corporate
finance principles, why it is according a certain weight to a certain indicator of value.”).
367 Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 359.
368 JX0894.0075 (Hubbard); JX0898.0098, 0124 (Cornell).
369 See S. Muio & Co. LLC v. Hallmark Entm't Invs. Co., 2011 WL 863007, at *20 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2011) (quoting
Hanover Direct, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2010 WL 3959399, at *2-3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 24, 2010) ) (noting that the
court “gives more credit and weight to experts who apply ‘multiple valuation techniques that support one
another's conclusions’ and that ‘serve to cross-check one another's results.’ ”), aff'd, 35 A.3d 419 (Del. 2011).
370 JX0835.
371 See Dell, 177 A.3d at 36 (citations omitted) (“As is common in appraisal proceedings, each party—petitioners
and the Company—enlisted highly paid, well-credentialed experts to produce DCF valuations. But their
valuation landed galaxies apart—diverging by approximately $28 billion, or 126%.... The Court of Chancery
recognized that ‘[t]his is a recurring problem,’ and even believed the ‘market data is sufficient to exclude the
possibility, advocated by the petitioners' expert, that the Merger undervalued the Company by $23 billion.’
Thus, the trial court found petitioners' valuation lacks credibility on its face. We agree.”); PetSmart, Inc.,
2017 WL 2303599, at *2 (“Moreover, the evidence does not reveal any confounding factors that would have
caused the massive market failure, to the tune of $4.5 billion (a 45% discrepancy).”); Highfields, 939 A.2d
at 52 (citation omitted) (disregarding analysis that was “markedly disparate from market price data for [the
company's] stock and other independent indicia of value”).
372 PetSmart, 2017 WL 2303599, at *40 n.439 (quoting William T. Allen, Securities Markets as Social Products:
The Pretty Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 28 J. CORP. L. 551, 560 (2003) ).




377 JX0894.0082; Tr. 1067-68, 1189 (Hubbard).
378 JX0900.0027; Tr. 64-66, 77-81 (Cornell). Respondent not only argues that it is incorrect to apply Bradley/
Jarrell, but that petitioners also misapplied the formula. Specifically, respondent argues that petitioners erred
by applying their Bradley/Jarrell-derived investment rate to net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) instead of
net cash flow (NCF). According to respondent, this mistake resulted in improperly assuming away Solera's
required maintenance investment into perpetuity. Resp't's Post-Trial Opening Br. 47, 51-52.
379 Tr. 103; JX0900.0007-08.
380 PetSmart, 2017 WL 2303599, at *39; see also In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S'holder Litig., 2011 WL
227634, at *4 n.16 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 2011) (stating that the convergence model is “a reflection of the widely-
accepted assumption that for companies in highly competitive industries with no competitive advantages,
value-creating investment opportunities will be exhausted over a discrete forecast period, and beyond that
point, any additional growth will be value-neutral,” leading to “return on new investment in perpetuity [that]
converge[s] to the company's cost of capital”); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1990 WL 161084, at *26 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) (discussing that “profits above the cost of capital in an industry will attract competitors,
who will over some time period drive returns down to the point at which returns equal the cost of capital”),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
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381 Tr. 1085-87 (Hubbard).
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LASTER, V.C.
*1  This post-trial decision determines the fair value of the
common stock of Stillwater Mining Company (“Stillwater”
or the “Company”) as of May 4, 2017, which is when Sibanye
Gold Limited completed its acquisition of Stillwater through
a reverse-triangular merger (the “Merger”). Pursuant to an
agreement and plan of merger dated December 9, 2016 (the
“Merger Agreement”), each share of Stillwater common stock
was converted at closing into the right to receive $18.00,
subject to the right of each holder to eschew the merger
consideration and seek appraisal.
The petitioners perfected their appraisal rights and litigated
this appraisal proceeding. They contended that Stillwater's
fair value was $25.91 per share. To justify this outcome, they
relied on an expert who valued Stillwater using a discounted
cash flow (“DCF”) model.
The respondent in an appraisal proceeding is technically the
surviving corporation, but the real party in interest is the
acquirer. The petitioners' true opponent in this proceeding was
Sibanye.
Sibanye contended that Stillwater's fair value was $17.63
per share. To justify this outcome, Sibanye relied on a
combination of metrics, including the deal price, Stillwater's
unaffected trading price with an adjustment for a valuation
increase between the unaffected date and closing, and an
expert valuation based on a DCF model.
Sibanye proved that the sale process was sufficiently reliable
to make the deal price a persuasive indicator of fair value.
Although Sibanye argued for a deduction from the deal price
to account for value arising from the Merger, Sibanye failed
to prove that an adjustment was warranted.
The parties engaged in lengthy debate over whether
Stillwater's adjusted trading price could provide a persuasive
indicator of fair value. The reliability of the adjusted trading
price depended on the reliability of the unaffected trading
price, and both sides engaged experts who conducted analyses
and offered opinions about the attributes of the market for
Stillwater's common stock. The evidence demonstrated that
Stillwater's trading price could provide a persuasive indicator
of value, but that it was a less persuasive indicator than the
deal price. This decision therefore does not use a trading price
metric.
Neither side proved that its DCF valuation provided a
persuasive indicator of fair value. The experts disagreed over
too many inputs, and the resulting valuation swings were too
great, for this decision to rely on a model when a market-
tested indicator is available.
This decision concludes that the deal price is the most
persuasive indicator of fair value. Relying on any of the other
valuation metrics would introduce error. The fair value of
the Stillwater on the valuation date was therefore $18.00 per
share.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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The parties generated an extensive evidentiary record. They
commendably reached agreement on 283 stipulations of
fact. During four days of trial, they introduced 909 exhibits
and lodged twenty-one depositions in evidence. Three fact
witnesses and seven expert witnesses testified live. What
follows are the court's findings based on a preponderance of
the evidence. 1
A. The Company
*2  At the time of the Merger, Stillwater was a Delaware
corporation engaged in the business of extracting, processing,
smelting, and refining minerals from an orebody known as the
J-M Reef. Located in in the western United States, the J-M
Reef contains deposits of palladium, platinum, and rhodium,
which are known in the mining industry as “platinum group
metals” or “PGMs.” These metals are rare, and the J-M Reef
is the only PGM asset in the United States. The other principal
sources of PGMs are located in South Africa, Russia, and
Zimbabwe, which present significantly greater political risk.
Stillwater was headquartered in Littleton, Colorado, and its
common stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange under
the symbol “SWC.” Stillwater's trading price was heavily
influenced by commodity prices for palladium and, to a lesser
degree, platinum.
At the time of the Merger, Stillwater's operations consisted of
two producing mines in south central Montana: the Stillwater
Mine and the East Boulder Mine. Stillwater's other assets
were development projects or exploratory properties that
were not yet generating revenue.
At the time of the Merger, Stillwater's two development
projects were Blitz and Lower East Boulder. Blitz expanded
the Stillwater Mine eastward. Lower East Boulder was a
contemplated expansion of the East Boulder mine. Stillwater's
two exploratory properties in the J-M Reef were Iron
Creek and the Boulder Extension. Outside of the J-M Reef,
Stillwater owned two other exploratory properties: (i) Altar,
a copper-gold-porphyry deposit in the San Juan province
of Argentina, and (ii) Marathon, a copper-PGM deposit in
Ontario, Canada.
At the time of the Merger, Michael “Mick” McMullen served
as Stillwater's President and CEO and as a member of its
board of directors (the “Board”). The other six members of
the Board were independent, outside directors:
• George Bee was a mining engineer who had held senior
management positions or served on the boards of other
mining companies.
• Patrice Merrin had served as an executive or director for
numerous companies and was a director of Glencore plc,
a multi-national mining firm. Merrin chaired the Board's
Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee.
• Peter O'Hagan had worked at Goldman Sachs for nearly
twenty-three years, including as co-head of its global
commodities business.
• Michael Parrett was a Chartered Professional Accountant
who had served in senior management positions and as
a director for other mining companies.
• Brian Schweitzer had served as Governor of Montana. He
was Chairman of the Board.
• Gary Sugar had spent thirty-two years at RBC Capital
Markets, where he specialized in the mining sector. He
served on the boards of other mining companies.
B. McMullen Convinces The Board To Build A Mid-Cap
Mining Company.
McMullen was hired in December 2013 as a “turnaround
CEO.” McMullen Tr. 814–16; see Schweitzer Tr. 170. By
early 2015, McMullen had refocused Stillwater's operations,
cut costs, and generally turned the Company around. At this
point, McMullen believed that market conditions favored
the creation of a mid-cap mining company. He thought
Stillwater could achieve this outcome either by growing
through acquisitions or by combining with another industry
player through a merger of equals.
During a meeting of the Board in June 2015, McMullen gave
a lengthy presentation on Company strategy that devoted
twenty-six slides to various alternatives. See JX 44 at '848 to
'874. McMullen's presentation discussed means of increasing
earnings, increasing the trading multiple, and optimizing the
capital structure, and then turned to the pros and cons of
selling some or all of the business. The presentation was
particularly negative about the prospect of a sale. See id.
at '866 to '868. In another presentation, McMullen devoted
over forty slides to discussing candidates for acquisitions or
mergers of equals. See id. at '929 to '970.
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*3  In addition to his own presentation, McMullen provided
the Board with presentations from three investment banks.
McMullen had a close relationship Dan Vujcic, then an
investment banker with Jefferies Financial Group, Inc.,
and the Jefferies presentation was the most detailed. It
analyzed an acquisition of another base metals company,
focusing on Sandfire Resources NL, Western Areas Ltd.,
and Panoramic Resources Ltd. It also analyzed the possible
acquisition of a downstream company, a possible spinoff of
Stillwater's processing and trading business, and the option
of maintaining the status quo. See id. at '014 to '080. A
presentation from BMO Capital Markets was more of a
high-level pitch book, but it identified selected acquisition
opportunities. See id. at '081 to '183. A presentation from
Nomura Holdings, Inc. discussed alternatives for refinancing
Stillwater's convertible bonds. See JX 44 at '164 to '182.
Sibanye has argued that this meeting marked the start of the
Board's careful and thoughtful consideration of a sale of the
Company, but the purpose of the meeting was not to prepare
the Board for a sale. McMullen hoped to convince the Board
to back him in creating a mid-cap mining company. 2  The
Board, however, resisted, recalling unsuccessful acquisitions
that had necessitated hiring a turnaround CEO in the first
place. During the June 2015 meeting, the Board did not
provide McMullen with a mandate to pursue any strategic
options. See JX 43.
After the June 2015 meeting, McMullen kept looking for
opportunities to build a mid-cap mining company. During
the second half of 2015, McMullen worked with Jefferies,
BMO, and Citigroup to identify acquisition targets and
merger-of-equals candidates. 3  McMullen was focused on an
acquisition, particularly “something not in the PGM space to
diversify risk.” JX 59.
During a meeting of the Board in October 2015, McMullen
gave another presentation on the Company's strategy. See
JX 61 at '102 to '127. He highlighted the risks Stillwater
faced because of its dependence on palladium, which was
used principally in catalytic converters. His presentation
discussed the disruptive threat posed by electric cars, which
could displace gasoline-powered cars and render catalytic
converters obsolete. See id. at '105 (“Know Your Enemy
—Electric Cars”). He recommended making a diversifying
acquisition from which Stillwater would “emerge as a multi
mine, multi commodity and multi jurisdiction mid cap miner
with a bullet proof balance sheet.” Id. at '127. He then
reviewed six possible candidates: Sandfire, Western Areas,
Panoramic, Northern Star Resources Ltd., Imperial Metals,
and Hecla Mining Co. See id. at '128 to '179. He also
circulated a presentation from Jefferies that discussed an
acquisition of Sandfire. See id. at '249 to '292. During the
weeks after the meeting, Jefferies provided McMullen with
more detailed analyses of a deal with Northern Star, a large
gold producer in Australia. See JX 67; JX 68.
*4  In December 2015, McMullen and a team from Stillwater
visited the mining operations of Northern Star, where
McMullen had a close relationship with senior management.
During the visit, McMullen met with the CEO and CFO of
Northern Star and discussed a potential merger of equals. See
PTO ¶ 145; JX 73 at '867; see also JX 61 at '282 to '286; JX
67. At this point in time, a merger of equals with Northern
Star was McMullen's top choice among Stillwater's strategic
options.
During meeting of the Board in January 2016, McMullen
gave another presentation on the Company's strategy. See
JX 86 at '002 to '040. As with the meetings in June
and October 2015, his goal was to convince the Board
to authorize him to build Stillwater into a mid-cap metals
company. See JX 78 (McMullen discussing his desire to
“come away from [the January] board meeting with a clear
mandate”). McMullen recommended a merger of equals
with Northern Star as the best option, telling the Board
that the transaction “would make a very strong mid cap
precious metals miner.” JX 86 at '038. If Northern Star
would not engage, then he recommended acquiring Sandfire
or Western Areas. See id. at '039. He also identified some
smaller acquisitions that “should be pursued independently”
and “[r]egardless of whether Stillwater completes one of the
larger deals.” Id. at '040. Later in the meeting, he provided
additional information about the proposed M&A strategy and
further detail about Northern Star, Sandfire, Western Areas,
Panoramic, Hecla, and Imperial. See id. at "320 to '367.
McMullen also distributed a presentation from Jefferies that
analyzed mergers with Northern Star and Western Areas. See
id. at '275 to '319
At the conclusion of the January 2016 meeting, the Board
gave management a mandate, but it was broad and vague.
According to the minutes, “[t]he Board provided management
with a sense of the Board for management to continue to
pursue the options as discussed, but to return to the Board for
any final decision.” JX 90. During this litigation, Sibanye has
argued that this mandate authorized management to pursue
a sale of the Company, but that is not accurate. 4  McMullen
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put it best when he told a banker at Blackstone that he had
“finally convinced the Stillwater board to go off and buy some
things.” JX 93 at '628; see Schweitzer Tr. 187.
C. The Company's Stock Price
While McMullen was trying to convince the Board to let
him “buy some things,” Stillwater's stock price was falling.
The decline began in June 2016 and continued steadily
through December. Over the course of this six month period,
Stillwater's stock price fell by over 40%, dropping from
$14.46 per share on June 1 to $8.57 per share on December 31.
The market drop did not reflect any problems with Stillwater's
operations. Instead, it reflected a decline in the spot price of
palladium, which fell by 27% from $773.70 per ounce on June
1 to $562.98 per ounce on December 31. PTO Exs. A, B.
During the Board meeting in January 2016, McMullen had
told the Board that “[d]espite our stock being down 40%, we
still have options open to us today.” JX 86 at '012. But during
the weeks following the January 2016 meeting, the stock price
fell further. On January 19, it closed at $5.29 per share, down
38% from its closing price of $8.57 per share on December
31. The drop corresponded with further declines in the spot
price of palladium, which closed on January 19 at $494.83
per ounce, down another 12% from its close of $562.98 per
ounce on December 31.
*5  The Company's dismal stock performance caused
McMullen to conclude that Stillwater did not have a currency
that it could use for either an acquisition or a merger of equals.
JX 93 at '628 (“[U]nfortunately the stock price has collapsed
in the last 2 weeks and I don't think Stillwater has the currency
to do anything anymore. Ce [sic] la vie.”); see McMullen Tr.
826; JX 97 at '308 to '310, '313. He felt Stillwater had missed
its opportunity to expand and was now just an “an option play
on the P[alladium] price.” JX 93 at '628; see JX 97 at '313
At this point, McMullen told a banker at Blackstone that
“[s]itting around for one or two years waiting for the price to
recover” was “not my idea of a job.” McMullen Tr. 828; JX
93 at '628. McMullen did not view himself as an “operational
CEO.” McMullen Tr. 814–16. He thought he “would become
bored.” McMullen Tr. 828. With his contract set to expire at
the end of the year, McMullen began thinking about what he
would do next, including the possibility of building a mining
portfolio company for Blackstone. See McMullen Tr. 828; JX
93 at '627 to '628.
D. Sibanye Contacts McMullen.
On January 30, 2016, Sibanye reached out through BMO
to arrange a meeting between McMullen and Sibanye's
CEO, Neal Froneman. Without telling the Board, McMullen
accepted.
The meeting took place at an industry conference on March
1, 2016. PTO ¶ 161. When Froneman broached the subject
of buying Stillwater, McMullen was receptive. He asked
Froneman to provide “an informal proposal” in writing that
included “an idea of valuation” and “transaction structure.”
JX 109 at '976; see PTO ¶ 164. Froneman had the impression
that a deal “was doable if we got the valuation right.” JX 109
at '976.
After the meeting, Froneman asked McMullen for “specific
guidance” about what would be acceptable. JX 110.
McMullen indicated that Sibanye's offer should include “a
large cash component.” JX 113 at '175. He also told Froneman
during these early discussions that an acceptable transaction
should be priced at a premium of 30% over Stillwater's thirty-
day volume-weighted average price (“VWAP”). Stewart Dep.
39; see also JX 162 at '283. Froneman agreed in principle
to this pricing metric, and he began organizing a team to
visit Stillwater's mines. See JX 113 at '174 to '175. Froneman
asked to enter into a confidentiality agreement to facilitate
diligence, but McMullen rejected the request, commenting
that he wanted “to see some form of indicative, non-binding
and highly confidential terms of a transaction before we go
too far down the path.” Id. at '174.
McMullen took all of these actions without involving the
Board. Indeed, he did not even inform the Board about
Sibanye's approach. See Schweitzer Tr. 189–92; Wadman
Tr. 657. Instead, on March 25, 2016, he agreed to extend
his employment for an additional two years. JX 114 § 4.1.
His original employment agreement had been scheduled to
terminate on December 31, 2016, and the Board had expected
that because McMullen was a short-term, turnaround CEO,
he would not stay beyond that date. Wadman Tr. 670–71;
see Wadman Dep. at 341; Schweitzer Tr. 170, 193. But with
acquisition talks in the offing, McMullen agreed to a new deal.
See JX 114.
The new employment agreement permitted McMullen to
serve concurrently as a director of Nevada Iron Limited and
New Chris Minerals Limited, which later became GT Gold
Corp. See JX 114 § 3.1, Ex. A. During 2016, McMullen
did more than serve on the boards of these companies. He
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became Executive Chairman and CEO of Nevada Iron, and
he served as Non-Executive Chairman and President of New
Chris. See McMullen Tr. 863–64; McMullen Dep. 45, 553;
JX 93 at '628. Both companies were Australian resource firms
whose equity comprised a significant portion of McMullen's
net worth. JX 157 at '315; see McMullen Tr. 709, 863–64.
Over the next year, while McMullen was busy selling the
Company, he also caused Nevada Iron and New Chris to
engage in transformative transactions. 5
*6  In May 2016, the Board held its next regular meeting.
In connection with that meeting, McMullen did not inform
the Board about Sibanye's approach or his discussions with
Sibanye. 6
E. Sibanye Submits An Indication Of Interest.
During the first week of June 2016, executives from both
Sibanye and Northern Star toured the Company's mines. PTO
¶¶ 171–72. Sibanye toured as part of their exploration of a
potential acquisition of the Company. Northern Star toured
separately, ostensibly as part of a mutual benchmarking
exercise but really in connection with a potential merger
of equals. McMullen and the Company's CFO, Christopher
Bateman, led Sibanye and Northern Star on separate tours
and ensured that neither saw one another. McMullen claimed
that despite keeping the two teams separate, each knew that
the other was on site because McMullen and Bateman would
alternate between the tours and McMullen had them both sign
the visitors log. McMullen said he did this as a clever way
to create competition between the firms. See McMullen Tr.
726–27.
After the visits, McMullen believed that a deal with Sibanye
was more likely than with Northern Star. See JX 140 at
'048; JX 142. Toward the end of June 2016, Northern
Star reported that they were primarily interested in a joint
venture involving Blitz. JX 145 at '845. That possibility did
not interest McMullen. Id. Meanwhile, McMullen pushed
Sibanye to provide an indication of interest in advance of
the Board's next meeting, which was scheduled for July 28,
2016. 7
Sibanye began working with Citigroup to develop its bid. Two
of the Citigroup bankers had previously advised McMullen
and Bateman about the Company's alternatives. As part of
its advice, Citigroup had recommended against a sale of the
Company because of the limited universe of potential buyers.
See JX 32 at '829; cf. JX 42 at '422.
On July 21, 2016, Sibanye provided McMullen with a non-
binding indication of interest to acquire Stillwater at $15.75
per share in cash, which valued the Company at $1.9 billion.
PTO ¶ 177; JX 165. The letter described that price as
reflecting “a 30% premium to Stillwater's volume-weighted
average share price [ (VWAP) ] of US$12.12 over the last 20
trading days prior to 20 July 2016.” JX 165 at '880; see PTO
¶ 178.
As suggested by Sibanye's offer, Stillwater's stock price
had mostly recovered, reflecting a recovery in the price of
palladium. At the beginning of July 2016, the stock closed
at $12.25 per share, up 132% from its low of $5.29 in
January. During that same period, the palladium spot price
had increased 22% to $605.63 per ounce. PTO Exs. A, B.
Despite the stock's performance, McMullen did not revisit
potential acquisitions or a merger of equals. He was now
focused on selling the Company. See JX 156 (email from
Vujcic to McMullen stating, “[W]e'll make sure the company
gets sold. Don't worry about that.”).
F. McMullen Presents The Indication Of Interest To The
Board.
*7  On July 27 and 28, 2016, the Board held a regularly
scheduled meeting. At the end of the two-day meeting,
the directors held a forty-five minute “executive session”
with McMullen, who distributed and walked through a
presentation titled “Business Development Update.” JX 151
at '551; see Schweitzer Tr. 193; JX 526 at '377; Wadman
Tr. 657–64. The presentation compared the Company's recent
performance to various potential transaction partners, then
described the pros and cons of transactions with Northern
Star and Sibanye. After summarizing the terms of Sibanye's
expression of interest, the presentation described the premium
as “within the right range for shareholder value” and “broadly
within the range of mining transactions.” JX 151 at '568.
McMullen gave his “strong recommendation ... to engage
with Sibanye and attempt to conclude [due diligence] as
quickly as possible (likely to take 2 months) and achieve
a higher price.” Id. McMullen added that he would “look
to engage with other potential bidders on a low key and
informal basis to determine if there are alternative bidders.”
Id. He warned: “The list of other potential bidders is
short given the commodity, size of transaction and whether
[Stillwater's] shareholders would want their paper. The
process of determining if there are alternatives will not be a
long process.” Id. He also told the directors that “[t]he market
appears to be open for people to carry out M+A, and asset
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values have risen to a level where you want to be a seller rather
than a buyer.” Id.
Brent Wadman, the Company's General Counsel, became
concerned about what took place during the July meeting.
He had not been asked to stay for the executive session and
was not given access to McMullen's presentation. See JX 526
at '377; Wadman Tr. 657–64. He suspected that McMullen
was running a sale process on his own, without Board
oversight, and potentially using it as a means of exiting from
the Company. Wadman believed that as General Counsel,
he should have been involved. After the July meeting,
Wadman asked McMullen to include him in the planning
process. McMullen rebuffed him, saying that Wadman would
be “brought in at a later date” and “offer[ing] no other
information.” JX 526 at '377; Wadman Tr. 658.
After the July meeting, McMullen told Sibanye to submit its
list of due diligence questions so the Company could start
pulling the information together. He told Sibanye to direct all
inquiries to himself or Bateman. See PTO ¶ 181; JX 183.
G. McMullen Remains Committed To Sibanye.
On August 9, 2016, Stillwater and Sibanye entered into a
confidentiality agreement, and Sibanye gained access to the
data room. PTO ¶ 183; JX 525 at 26; see also JX 194. On
August 10, the Board met again. See JX 193. McMullen
testified that at this meeting, the Board instructed him “to go
out and ... to sign the NDAs with the likes of Sibanye, and
then, also, ... to get as much interest as possible.” McMullen
Tr. 835.
Rather than working closely with an investment bank to
develop a process designed to generate “as much interest
as possible,” McMullen pressed forward with Sibanye. He
interacted with some investment banks, but in a haphazard
and unstructured way. For example, back in July 2016, a
Macquarie banker had asked McMullen to meet for a market
update. See JX 167. On August 10, the same day that the
Board met, Macquarie proposed a formal engagement. Five
days later, McMullen told Macquarie that it was “a bit early
for us I think to be signing anyone up.” JX 196.
One week after the Board meeting, on August 18, 2016,
McMullen and Bateman met with Bank of America Merrill
Lynch (“BAML”), who had arranged the meeting to pitch
Stillwater on possible mergers of equals. See JX 199; see
also JX 163; JX 190. The BAML presentation materials did
not discuss a sale of the Company or mention Sibanye, and
McMullen and Bateman did not use the meeting to identify
other possible acquirers. Instead, the BAML bankers got “the
sense ... that a sale was a possibility,” and so they decided on
their own to “pivot[ ] to focus more, as time went on, on that.”
Hunt Dep. 35.
Acting on their own, the BAML bankers developed a
list of fifteen possible acquirers whom they approached
independently, pitching a potential acquisition of Stillwater as
“a banker idea.” JX 206 at '360. The record does not reveal
exactly how many companies BAML contacted, what the
BAML bankers said, or how seriously the companies took
the pitch. Because BAML did not know that Stillwater was
in discussions with Sibanye, they reached out to Sibanye
as part of these efforts, ironically describing that a deal for
Stillwater would be “[a] little pricey.” JX 207 at '093. In
the end, five companies expressed interest: Sibanye; Hecla;
Coeur Mining, Inc.; CITIC Resources Holdings Limited, and
Anemka Resources Ltd. See JX 211; JX 213; JX 214; JX 217
at '588 to '591.
*8  Having made these calls on their own, the BAML bankers
held a follow-up meeting with McMullen and Bateman on
September 7, 2016. The pitch book identified the parties
contacted and expressing interest. It then described three
types of sale processes Stillwater could pursue: a “proprietary
process” with a single bidder, a targeted auction involving
a limited number of likely buyers, or a broad auction
involving outreach to many potentially interested parties. JX
217 at '603. BAML recommended against the proprietary
process because the absence of competition would minimize
Stillwater's negotiating leverage. BAML also recommended
against a broad auction, given the existence of a “narrow list
of most likely buyers.” Id. This left a targeted auction as the
recommended route.
The pitch book described an illustrative timeline for a
sale process. BAML recommended allocating the rest
of September 2016 to contact potential buyers. During
October and early November, the Company would enter into
confidentiality agreements, respond to diligence requests, and
then receive and evaluate initial indications of interest. From
mid-November through early January 2017, the Company
would host site visits, provide additional diligence, and then
solicit and receive final bids. JX 217 at '605.
Nothing formal came out of the September 7 meeting.
McMullen and Bateman did not instruct BAML to proceed,
nor did they take BAML's recommendation to the Board.
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Instead, McMullen and Bateman asked BAML and Vujcic,
the investment banker who had been with Jefferies and
was now working on his own, to arrange meetings with
potential suitors at an industry conference during the week of
September 20, 2016. BAML arranged a meeting with Coeur,
and McMullen arranged a meeting with Hecla. See JX 220 at
'609; JX 222; JX 224; PTO ¶ 190–91. Vujcic set up meetings
with Kinross Gold Corporation and Gold Fields Limited,
neither of whom had expressed interest. During each meeting,
McMullen conducted what he called a “soft sound” regarding
potential interest in buying the Company. PTO ¶ 192; see id.
¶¶ 193–97.
On the last night of the conference, McMullen had dinner
with Froneman. McMullen told him that he “remain[ed]
committed” to a deal with Sibanye and that “no one else is in
the data room,” but cautioned that he was “being flooded by
investment banks” pitching ideas for deals with gold-mining
companies. JX 231 at '711.
After the conference, BAML sent McMullen “a fairly detailed
timeline” for a more compressed sale process. JX 225 at '629.
The new timeline contemplated the process starting during
the last week of September and ending during the first week
of December. See id. at '632. BAML anticipated site visits
taking place during November as part of the due diligence
phase, but McMullen told BAML that the site visits needed to
take place earlier in the process before parties sent their initial
indications of interest: “Unless people get to site, they can't
appreciate the scale of it and will not be putting their best foot
forward in the indicative, non binding offers.” JX 229 at '603.
BAML revised the timeline, noting that they were “putting
[it] together in a vacuum of info on what's taken place.” Id.
At this point, BAML had not been retained and did not yet
know about Sibanye's bid. They only knew about their own,
independent efforts to solicit interest.
H. The Board Decides Not To Form A Special
Committee.
In anticipation of a board meeting on October 3, 2016,
Wadman circulated a “list of potential buyers” to the directors.
JX 234. The list identified eighteen companies and the
status of Stillwater's discussions with each. According to
the list, Sibanye had completed its first phase of diligence
and was working with Citigroup to secure financing. Hecla
and Coeur had expressed interest, entered into non-disclosure
agreements (“NDAs”), and scheduled site visits. Northern
Star was listed as “interested but very foucssed [sic] on a
gold deal.” Id. at '630. Six other companies were described
as “[p]otentially interested” or as having “some interest,”
including Anglo American Platinum Limited (“Amplats”). Id.
Six candidates were described as “[u]nlikely” and two as “not
interested.” Id. The list omitted CITIC and Anemka, even
though both had expressed interest when BAML called with
its “banker's idea.”
*9  The list identified a representative who was responsible
for interacting with each company. Evidencing the
uncoordinated, unstructured nature of the Company's process,
the list identified a hodgepodge of names. Vujcic was the
contact for eight companies. BAML was the contact for
four companies. Jefferies was the contact for another three.
Macquarie was the contact for one company. An executive
at New Chris, the company where McMullen served as Non-
Executive Chairman and President, was listed as the contact
for another company. No one had been formally engaged. Two
companies had no contact listed.
During the meeting, McMullen reported on the Company's
outreach to the various parties. After his presentation, the
directors instructed McMullen to obtain formal proposals
from investment banks for a sell-side engagement. The Board
also instructed McMullen to create a cash flow model that
could be used to value the Company. See JX 246 at '308 to
'309.
Ever since the July 2016 meeting, Wadman had been
concerned that McMullen was running a sale process to
facilitate his exit from the Company. After McMullen
rebuffed him, Wadman had shared his concerns privately with
Schweitzer and Merrin. See Wadman Tr. 664–65; Schweitzer
Tr. 157–58, 194. Neither took action.
During the October meeting, Wadman presented his concerns
to the full Board and recommended the formation of a special
committee to oversee the sale process. Lucy Stark of Holland
& Hart LLP, the Company's longstanding outside counsel,
disagreed and advised the Board that she did not believe
any conflict existed that warranted the creation of a special
committee. JX 246 at '309; see Schweitzer Tr. 159.
The directors other than McMullen then met in executive
session. Schweitzer reported to Wadman that the Board had
decided to form a special committee, and Wadman drafted
a set of minutes memorializing the decision. See JX 238 at
'245; Wadman Dep. 134–35; see also Schweitzer Tr. 205–06.
But in the meantime, McMullen learned of the decision from
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two other directors. McMullen Tr. 745–47. The final minutes
described the outcome of the executive session as follows:
- No decision was made to pursue
or not pursue a potential strategic
transaction at this time. The Board
further discussed the potential for a
committee and agreed that, should
the need arise, the committee would
consist of the entire Board with the
exception of the CEO. It also discussed
timing and the potential engagement of
an investment banking firm to assist in
the assessment process.
JX 246 at '310.
I. McMullen Continues To Focus on Sibyane.
On October 15, 2016, almost two weeks after the Board
directed McMullen to solicit terms from investment bankers,
McMullen finally drafted and sent out an email asking
bankers to respond “by no later than COB Wednesday
Oct 19 2016.” JX 279 at '867. Other than Macquarie, the
record does not reflect what bankers received the email or
whom McMullen solicited, but Macquarie, BMO, BAML,
and Jefferies submitted proposals.
On October 17, 2016, Froneman told McMullen that
Sibanye's offer of a “30% premium to VWAP remained
unchanged” and that Sibanye's board of directors
unanimously supported the transaction. JX 281 at '425.
McMullen responded that he remained fully supportive of
the deal. He also shared that Stillwater did not yet have a
banker, telling Froneman that he had started reaching out
to investment banks on a no-names basis. Demonstrating
his commitment to the deal, McMullen told Froneman that
he would be happy to have Stillwater's legal advisors start
putting together an initial sales agreement. Id.
The Board met again on October 26 and 27, 2016. After
reviewing the proposals from the investment banks, the Board
narrowed the list to BMO and BAML. JX 295 at '790.
Vujcic, whom McMullen regarded as his “in house banker,”
summarized the state of the Company's outreach. JX 293
at '521. Compare JX 262 at '485, with JX 234 at '630.
He reported that third parties exhibited a general “[l]ack of
knowledge around the significant improvement in operations
and general performance,” and he reported that a number of
parties were either focused on other deals, not considering
M&A because of prior bad acquisitions, or not considering
PGM companies because of negative associations with risky
jurisdictions like South Africa and Russia. JX 293 at '522. For
the first time, the Board authorized management “to engage
in discussions with strategic buyers, financial buyers or any
other party interested in consummating a potential strategic
transaction with the [Company].” JX 296 at '791.
*10  After the meeting, McMullen scheduled a second site
visit for Sibanye and discussed the “timelines to and post
announcement” with Froneman. JX 315 at '291 to '292; see
PTO ¶ 214. Sibanye convinced McMullen that they needed
to announce the deal by mid-December 2016. See JX 281 at
'425; JX 282 at '776; see also PTO ¶ 241.
J. BAML Begins An Abbreviated Pre-Signing Market
Check.
On November 7, 2016, the Board formally retained BAML.
PTO ¶¶ 216–17; see JX 323 at '371. The Board also decided
to hire “additional legal counsel with substantial experience
in advising Delaware publicly traded companies in respect of
potential strategic transactions.” JX 323 at '372. Four days
later, the Board retained Jones Day. PTO ¶ 232.
On November 8, 2016, Bateman sent BAML a package
of information that included Sibanye's indication of interest
from July, the non-disclosure agreements with Hecla and
Coeur, a cash flow model, and instructions for accessing the
data room. See JX 325; JX 326; JX 327; JX 328; JX 329. The
next day, BAML sent management a slide deck titled “M&A
Process Considerations.” JX 331 at '277.
BAML understood from management that Sibanye wanted
to sign up a deal in December 2016, so BAML proposed to
complete its outreach to a list of parties in just two days.
That timeframe was drastically shorter than the four weeks
that BAML had recommended in September 2016. Anyone
who expressed interest would have three weeks to conduct
diligence and submit an indication of interest, just half of
the six weeks that BAML had recommended in September.
At that point, the Board would decide whether to proceed
with Sibanye or engage with the other bidders. PTO ¶ 226;
see JX 331 at '280. Even though McMullen had previously
told BAML that it was critical for potential bidders to visit
the Company's mines before making an initial indication of
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interest, BAML's compressed timeline did not contemplate
that step.
BAML's presentation identified twenty-eight third parties
divided into four categories:
• “Interested Parties”—Sibanye, Coeur, and Hecla.
• “Possibly Interested Parties”—Gold Fields,
Independence Group NL, Kinross, MMG Limited, Rio
Tinto, and South32 Limited.
• “Additional Parties To Contact”—Alamos Gold
Inc., Anemka, CITIC, Fresnillo plc, Goldcorp Inc.,
IAMGOLD Corporation, Impala Platinum Holdings
Limited, New Gold Inc., Northam Platinum Limited,
Pan American Silver Corporation, X2 Resources, and
Yamana Gold Inc.
• “Not Interested”—Northern Star, Amplats, Eldorado
Gold Corporation, Evolution Mining Limited, Newcrest
Mining Limited, Newmont Mining Corporation, and OZ
Minerals.
JX 331 at '279. Anemka and CITIC were listed as “Additional
Parties to Contact,” even though they had expressed interest
during BAML's earlier independent outreach. OceanaGold
Corporation and Boliden AB, whom Vujcic had included in
his review of the Company's outreach, were omitted from
BAML's list.
BAML's presentation included scripts for its bankers to use
when making their calls. For “Possibly Interested Parties,” the
script stated:
• Announce participants and remind parties of
confidentiality;
• BofA Merrill Lynch has been retained by Stillwater
Mining Company to explore strategic alternatives;
• We understand you have had some discussions previously
with our client;
• We would like to further clarify your potential interest in
Stillwater as the process moves forward;
*11  • Do you have any interest to learn more?
• If so, we would suggest you sign an NDA for access to
diligence on the company.
PTO ¶ 225 (formatting added); JX 331 at '281. For
the “Additional Parties To Contact,” the script omitted
Stillwater's name and asked generally about interest in the
PGM sector.
• Announce participants and remind parties of
confidentiality;
• We are calling to gauge your potential interest in a
situation in the PGM sector;
• Our client is a leading player and low cost producer of
PGMs and substantial organic production growth;
• Do you have any interest to learn more?
• If yes, disclose that our client is Stillwater and suggest
they sign an NDA for access to diligence.
PTO ¶ 224 (formatting added); JX 331 at '281. For Hecla and
Coeur, BAML planned to skip the call and send instructions
for submitting an indication of interest by November 23. PTO
¶ 231; JX 336; JX 337.
Because of the expedited timeline, BAML decided not to
contact companies in the “Not Interested” category, even
though many of those companies had said they were not
interested when BAML previously called them with “a banker
idea.” The response could have been different with a formal
mandate. BAML's script for “Additional Parties to Contact”
was not likely to generate interest because it did not say
anything more than “a situation in the PGM sector.” Because
almost every other PGM company was located in a politically
unstable jurisdiction, additional parties were less likely to
have interest without a signal that the company involved was
Stillwater. And because Stillwater had been advertising its
interest in acquisitions, there was no reason for the additional
parties to think that the situation involved Stillwater. See JX
124 at '074.
Using its scripts, BAML contacted five of the six possibly
interested parties, missing Gold Fields. See JX 351. BAML
contacted eight of the twelve additional parties, missing
Alamos, Goldcorp, New Gold, and Yamana Gold. See PTO
¶ 230; JX 338; JX 339; JX 340; JX 341; JX 342. BAML
contacted Northern Star, even though they were listed as not
interested. See JX 351 at '953.
Three of the companies expressed interest: Anemka, Northern
Star, and X2. BAML sent a confidentiality agreement and an
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invitation to submit a bid by November 29 to Anemka and
Northern Star. BAML sent only a confidentiality agreement
to X2, which quickly retracted its interest. See JX 395 at '412;
see also JX 359 at '413.
Sibanye learned about BAML's market check from Bateman.
JX 332 at '969. Sibanye perceived that a compressed timeline
was its “only real advantage” in the process. Id.
K. The Abbreviated Pre-Signing Market Check
Continues.
On November 17, 2016, the Board met again, with Jones Day
attending for the first time. BAML and McMullen updated the
Board on the outreach and “the Board directed management
to continue the strategic assessment process.” 8  Sibanye had
already sent a draft merger agreement to Jones Day.
*12  On November 18, 2016, BAML suggested contacting
Norilsk Nickel, a Russian mining company that had owned a
majority stake in the Company between 2003 and 2010. JX
367. McMullen decided against it. See McMullen Dep. 476.
On November 20, 2016, the CFO of Northern Star informed
McMullen that they were not interested in buying Stillwater
but remained interested in a merger of equals. Northern Star
asked McMullen to send a proposal. PTO ¶ 242.
On November 22, 2016, the CEO of Independence informed
McMullen that they were not interested in buying Stillwater
but were interested in a merger of equals. PTO ¶ 246.
Independence asked to sign a confidentiality agreement and
perform diligence, explaining that they had trouble reaching
BAML. Independence did not receive a confidentiality
agreement until November 25. See JX 403; JX 405.
The Board met again on the afternoon of November 23,
2016. McMullen reported that he had told Sibanye that
its July proposal of $15.75 per share was not sufficient.
He also reported that Sibanye needed the transaction to be
“announced by the second week in December”; otherwise,
Sibanye would need to delay the deal until the following
year so that it could obtain stockholder approval to raise
the capital needed to fund the Merger. JX 395 at '411.
McMullen viewed a December signing as “ambitious given
that ... the Company's assessment process with other potential
parties was ongoing and would need to be concluded prior to
proceeding with a transaction with Sibanye.” Id.
By the time of the board meeting, twenty-four parties had
received some type of formal or informal contact from BAML
or Stillwater management. Four parties—Sibanye, Hela,
Coeur, and Anemka—had signed NDAs and accessed the data
room. Four parties—Sibanye, Hela, Coeur, and Northern Star
—had conducted site visits. Two parties—Coeur and Anemka
—had notified BAML that they would not proceed further.
PTO ¶ 235; JX 393 at '868. Two other parties—Northern Star
and Independence—had informed Stillwater that they were
only interested in a merger of equals. Hecla had reported
that it needed to find a partner and had asked Stillwater to
extend its bid deadline from November 23 to November 30.
PTO ¶ 247; JX 383. The Board extended Hecla's deadline to
November 28. JX 395 at '413. By comparison, the Board had
given Sibanye until November 30 to update its expression of
interest from July. See JX 359 at '414.
After receiving these updates, the Board met in executive
session, and the minutes reflected for the first time that
McMullen did not participate. See JX 395 at '413. The Board
instructed BAML to evaluate a merger of equals as a potential
alternative. Id. When McMullen learned of the decision,
he was skeptical, believing that a merger of equals could
not compete with “a circa $18/share [ ]all cash offer from
S[ibanye].” JX 406 at '376. He shared his negative opinion
with one of the directors, who replied that a merger of equals
was actionable and needed to be explored as an alternative to
Sibanye. See JX 401.
McMullen and BAML worked together to update the
presentation that McMullen had given the Board in January
2016 on a potential merger of equals. See JX 384; JX 396.
McMullen ranked the Company's options as follows: 1)
Sibanye's acquisition; 2) a merger of equals with Northern
Star; and 3) do nothing or a merger of equals with
Independence. JX 396 at '707.
*13  After the board meeting on November 23, 2016, BAML
followed up with Hecla to solicit a specific indication of
interest. See JX 394 at '214. Hecla did not respond, and the
Company treated Hecla as having dropped out of the process.
On November 29, 2016, Northam asked to be included in
the process. JX 414. BAML sent Northam a confidentiality
agreement and invited them to submit a bid by December 7.
PTO ¶ 258; see JX 423; JX 424. That same day, Independence
asked for an extension to the bid deadline since they were still
negotiating the confidentiality agreement. JX 411. McMullen
decided that meant that Independence was not interested.
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L. Sibanye Revises Its Price.
As of November 20, 2016, Sibanye anticipated borrowing
$2.5 billion to complete the Merger. Of this amount, $1.98
billion would be used to pay for the Company's stock, with the
consideration priced at a 30% premium over the Company's
thirty-day VWAP, just as McMullen and Froneman had
agreed in March. See JX 378 at '979, '009, '016, '017.
The additional $500 million would be used to pay off
the Company's debt, fund change-of-control payments for
management, and pay transaction fees.
But on November 30, 2016, Sibanye ran into problems. First,
Sibanye realized that the Company's stock price had increased
to a point where the pricing metric would cause the total
purchase price to exceed Sibanye's financing. Using the 30%
premium over the thirty-day VWAP, Sibanye would have to
pay approximately $18.25 per share, an amount that would
require Sibanye to supplement the transaction financing with
cash on hand or from its revolving credit line. See JX 420 at
'876.
Second, Sibanye realized that it had calculated the purchase
price in its indication of interest using a twenty-day VWAP
rather than a thirty-day VWAP. Id. at '874. The Sibanye team
recognized that they had agreed in principle to a thirty-day
VWAP, but when they sent their initial indication of interest,
they used a twenty-day VWAP because the Company's stock
had been in a declining trend, so the shorter period resulted
in a lower price. Id. at '873.
Citigroup recommended pretending that Sibanye had never
agreed to a pricing mechanism and had instead offered a fixed
price. Id. The Sibanye team went along and disavowed all of
the communications in which they had agreed in principle to
a 30% premium over the thirty-day VWAP. See Stewart Dep.
147–48; PTO ¶¶ 243, 245; JX 397 at '448; JX 378 at '009,
'016. Going forward, Sibanye would discuss price based on
an indication of interest of $15.75 per share.
M. Stillwater Negotiates With Sibanye.
On December 1, 2016, the deal teams from the Company and
Sibanye met in New York City. Sibanye proposed to acquire
the Company for between $17.50 and $17.75 per share in
cash. PTO ¶ 261.
On December 2, 2016, the Board met in New York City.
See JX 432; JX 430. McMullen shared Sibanye's revised
offer. The minutes do not reflect any discussion of Sibanye's
departure from the prior agreement in principle on a 30%
premium over the thirty-day VWAP or the fact that the
agreed-upon pricing metric would have supported a price
around $18.25 per share. Even though BAML had worried
about Sibanye using precisely this tactic, and even though
McMullen had assured BAML that Sibanye would stick to the
agreed-upon pricing metric, see JX 343 at '740 to '741, no one
appears to have mentioned the change to the Board. See JX
432 at '414.
*14  During the meeting, BAML presented its preliminary
financial analysis of the Company. Using a discounted cash
flow analysis, BAML valued the Company at between $10.78
and $14.14 per share. Id. at '416. That same day, the
Company's stock closed at $15.17 per share. PTO Ex. A.
BAML also reviewed potential merger of equals transactions
with Northern Star and Independence. JX 432 at '417.
According to the minutes, the Board decided not to pursue
either transaction because: (i) the lack of synergies; (ii) “the
significant disparity in trading multiples”; (iii) “no merger-
of-equals or similar transaction appeared to be available
to the Company at this time”; (iv) “neither Northern
Star nor Independence Mining had signed a confidentiality
agreement”; and (v) “a substantial delay in the process
to pursue such a possible transaction could result in the
loss of a potential transaction with Sibanye.” JX 432 at
'417; see McMullen Tr. 769. At the time, Northern Star
and Independence had both proposed a merger-of-equals
transaction and both had signed confidentiality agreements.
There was also a meaningful probability that the Sibanye
transaction would slip into the following year.
During the meeting, the Board instructed management to
seek a higher price from Sibanye. That evening, McMullen
and Bateman had dinner with Richard Stewart, Sibanye's
Executive Vice President of Business Development. PTO ¶
265. After the dinner, Stewart emailed Froneman that “Mick's
number is 18$+ and that he thinks he can get his board across
the line on that.” JX 434 at '426. Froneman, Stewart, and
Citigroup discussed the limits of Sibanye's financing, which
would support a bid up to $18.20 per share. A 30% premium
on the twenty-day VWAP for the Company's common stock
was $19.20 per share. Id. The group decided to bid $18.00 per
share, observing that “if this is truly not good enough – they
will come back but we need to be firm.” JX 434 at '425.
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On December 3, 2016, Stewart called McMullen and offered
$18 per share. PTO ¶ 267. BAML had been expecting $19 per
share. See JX 438.
On the evening of December 3, 2016, Bateman had “a
very open discussion” with one of Sibanye's bankers from
Citigroup, sharing information about the Board's internal
dynamics, the Company's lack of other prospects, and his
preferences for employment. See JX 444. The Citigroup
banker reported on the conversation as follows:
- 1. Value. Didn't push back, as knows we're at our limits.
Said Mick will recommend our proposal to the Board,
[that two directors] are “very commercial”. [Schweitzer]
is the one most focused on 30% premium to 20D VWAP.
I reiterated that we've truly been talking about 30D
VWAP internally and with [Stillwater], which he seems to
understand.
- ...
- 3. MOE. He seemed quite dismissive of the MOE
candidate, but said certain Board members are keen to not
shut it down completely (I suspect more from a litigation
perspective).
- 4. Chris' Plans. Said he honestly hasn't given a lot of
thought to what's next, and he's generally open minded
about it. ... He could be open to staying with [Sibanye],
but depends on the vision and the role. He would have no
desire to be a divisional CFO, but potentially interested in
an Americas Head position. ...
Id. Bateman participated in this discussion one day after Jones
Day had advised the Board and senior management about the
risk of conflicts during the negotiations. In response, Bateman
and other members of management had represented to the
Board that they had not had any discussions with Sibanye
about their roles. See JX 432 at '418.
*15  On December 4, 2016, Stewart called McMullen and
told him that $18.00 was Sibanye's best and final offer. PTO
¶ 270. After Bateman's dinner with the Citigroup banker,
Sibanye knew it did not have to bid higher.
Later that afternoon, McMullen shared the offer with the
Board. Fearing that the timeline might slip into 2017, the
directors instructed management “to progress discussions
with Sibanye” and to find out whether Northam remained
interested. JX 440 at '742.
On December 5, 2016, BAML reported that it had not heard
anything from Northam. JX 445. That same day, Froneman
called McMullen to reiterate that $18.00 per share was the
best Sibanye could do given their financing constraints. PTO
¶ 272.
N. McMullen Demands His Stock Awards.
On December 7, 2016, McMullen asked Sibanye to “put
something into the merger agreement” about his 2017 stock
awards. JX 451. According to McMullen, Sibanye had
previously agreed to the following terms:
- On Closing of the deal, the value
of the awards would be converted to
cash based on the metrics of the deal
(share price etc) and the amount paid
out as per the normal vesting schedule
in cash, namely 1/3 of the RSU value
at each of the end of 2017, 2018
and 2019, and all the PSU value is
paid out at the end of 2019. If any
employee leaves for Good Cause (fired
or diminution of job role) then the
RSU's accelerate in accordance with
our plan docs, but the PSU amount is
still paid out at the end of 2019.
Id. McMullen told Sibanye that the Compensation Committee
had “decided that the 2015 and 2016 PSU's would vest at
150% for each series in the event of an $18 bid.” Id.
O. The Board Approves The Merger.
On December 8, 2016, the Board met to consider the Merger
Agreement and decide whether to proceed with the Merger.
McMullen reported that Northam had withdrawn from the
process. JX 454 at '744; see JX 459. By this point, BAML
had interacted with fourteen parties since being formally
retained. Five had signed NDAs and conducted diligence.
Only Sibanye had made a bid.
BAML rendered its opinion that Sibanye's offer of $18 per
share was fair. The consideration of $18 per share represented
a 21% premium to the Company's then-current stock price, a
21% premium to the 20-day VWAP, and a 25% premium to
the 30-day VWAP. JX 453 at '260. In its presentation, BAML
- 335 - 
In re Stillwater Mining Company, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
2019 WL 3943851
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 13
valued the Company between $10.58 per share and $13.98 per
share using a discounted cash flow analysis. Id. at '279 to '281.
The Merger Agreement contained a no-shop clause with
a fiduciary out that permitted the Company to provide
information to and negotiate with a third-party bidder if the
bidder made an “Acquisition Proposal” that constituted or
was reasonably likely to lead to a “Superior Proposal” and
the Board concluded that its fiduciary duties required it. See
JX 525 Annex A § 6.2.4. The Board had the right to change
its recommendation in favor of the Merger if a competing
bidder made a superior proposal and the Board concluded
that its fiduciary duties required it. The Board did not have
the right to terminate the Merger Agreement to pursue the
superior proposal. The Company had to proceed through the
stockholder meeting and only gained the right to terminate if
the stockholders voted down the deal.
*16  If the Company exercised its right to terminate after a
negative stockholder vote, then the Company was obligated
to pay Sibanye a termination fee of $16.5 million plus
reimbursement of Sibanye's expenses up to $10 million, for a
total payment of $26.5 million. The total payment represented
approximately 1.2% of equity value, with the termination-fee
portion reflecting 0.76% of equity value. The Company had
approximately $110 million more cash than debt, resulting in
a slightly smaller enterprise value than equity value. The total
payment represented approximately 1.3% of enterprise value.
The Board adopted the Merger Agreement and resolved to
recommend that the Company's stockholders approve it. JX
454 at '746. On December 9, 2016, Sibanye and the Company
announced the Merger. Sibanye's stock price dropped 18%
from $8.20 per share to $6.96 per share.
The last day of unaffected trading in Stillwater's common
stock was December 8, 2016. On that date, the Company's
shares closed at $14.68, equating to a market capitalization
of approximately $1.8 billion. The deal price represented a
22.6% premium over the unaffected trading price and a 24.4%
premium over the 30-day VWAP. During the previous two
years, Stillwater's stock price had never traded above $15.58,
a level it reached on August 1, 2016.
P. Vujcic Gets Paid.
After the Merger was signed, McMullen sent Vujcic a
retroactive consulting agreement to compensate him for
assisting with the Merger. Vujcic had two comments. First,
he wanted confirmation that he would “not be named in the
proxy.” JX 474 at '101. Second, he was disappointed with his
compensation, stating:
- I'm a little perplexed as to why you
are being so aggressive on the comp,
especially when you are exposed to a
potentially large claim from Jefferies
and when I feel I have been pretty
fair all along in (a) not locking you
in earlier (trusted your guidance on
compensation in July) and (b) in
making every effort leading up to
the board meetings in late October to
give you the comfort to reiterate that
Sibanye were the only show in town.
Id. at '100.
The petitioners argue that Vujcic's statement that he made
“every effort ... to give you comfort to reiterate that Sibanye
were the only show in town” shows that McMullen and
Vujcic had been trying to eliminate the competition for
Sibanye. That is a conspiratorial reading, rather than a
credible reading. Vujcic was attempting to justify receiving
greater compensation by pointing to his efforts to solicit other
potential bidders. He showed that Sibanye was “the only show
in town” by engaging in outreach and demonstrating that
no one else wanted to bid. The record does not support an
inference that McMullen and Vujcic deceived the Board. See
also McMullen Dep. 442–46.
McMullen and Vujcic agreed on a fixed fee of $20,000 per
month beginning on October 24, 2016, plus a discretionary
bonus of $100,000. JX 477. Vujcic's name and compensation
arrangement did not appear in the proxy statement. See JX
525.
Q. Wadman's Noisy Withdrawal
In February 2017, McMullen and Bateman negotiated the
terms of their post-closing employment with Sibanye. As
part of those discussions, Sibanye agreed to treat the Merger
as triggering McMullen and Bateman's change-of-control
payments, without the need for a second trigger such as
termination or a resignation for “Good Reason.” None of the
Company's other employees received this special treatment.
For the other employees, the Merger was only the first trigger,
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and no change-in-control benefits would be paid absent a
second trigger.
When McMullen reported on this agreement to the Board
during a meeting on February 23, 2017, Wadman objected.
He had been concerned since July 2016 that McMullen and
Bateman had pursued a sale of the Company in their own
interest and had used the deal to advantage themselves. He
regarded their special deal on change-in-control benefits as
“clearly self-dealing.” JX 526 at '376. The Board did not
address Wadman's concerns during the meeting.
*17  One month later, Wadman resigned. In his resignation
letter, Wadman restated his concerns about how the deal
process unfolded. He noted that after the board meeting
on February 23, 2017, McMullen and Bateman “removed
[me] from all legal conversations and decision-making” and
“prohibited me from doing my job.” Id. at '377 to '378.
Quoting his employment agreement, Wadman resigned for
“Good Reason” based on a “material diminution” to his
“nature of responsibilities, or authority.” Id.
Over the next several days, the Company's counsel negotiated
a settlement with Wadman. On March 30, 2017, the Company
released a Form 8-K, which stated:
On March 29, 2017, Brent R. Wadman,
our Vice President, Legal Affairs
& Corporate Secretary, terminated
employment. In connection therewith,
we entered into an agreement with Mr.
Wadman with respect to his separation
pursuant to which we will pay him
up to approximately $1.49 million.
This amount includes the settlement
of Mr. Wadman's outstanding equity
awards, which will continue to vest in
accordance with their terms, including
in connection with the previously
announced merger with Sibanye Gold
Limited.
JX 527. The Form 8-K did not mention Wadman's letter or
the reasons for his resignation.
R. Stockholder Approval And Closing
During Stillwater's annual meeting on April 26, 2017,
the stockholders approved the Merger Agreement. Under
Delaware law, a merger requires the approval of holders of
a majority of the outstanding shares, making a non-vote the
equivalent of a “no” vote. Because stockholders can vote no
by not voting, the percentage of the outstanding shares is
the appropriate metric for evaluating the level of stockholder
support for a merger. The Company had 121,389,213 shares
outstanding. Holders of 91,012,990 shares voted in favor of
the Merger, representing 75% of the issued and outstanding
equity. Holders of 103,088,167 shares were present at the
meeting in person or by proxy, so the same number of
affirmative votes results in a misleadingly higher approval
percentage of 88%. See JX 549 at 1.
The Merger closed on May 4, 2017. Between signing and
closing, the spot price of palladium increased by 9.2%.
The spot price of a weighted basket of Stillwater's products
increased by 5.9%.
S. Post-Closing Developments
On July 1, 2017, Sibanye entered into employment
agreements with Bateman and McMullen. Bateman agreed
to serve as Executive Vice President—US Region, reporting
directly to Froneman. Bateman waived his change-of-control
benefits in return for a higher base salary and additional
incentive compensation. See JX 585.
McMullen agreed to serve as a Technical Advisor to Sibanye.
His employment agreement permitted him “to perform the
functions of that role while residing in the Turks and Caicos.”
JX 586 at '041. Like Bateman, McMullen waived his change-
of-control benefits in return for an annual salary of $712,000
plus incentive compensation. See id.
In November 2017, Sibanye issued a Competent Person's
Report that valued the Company's operating mines at $2.7
billion as of July 31, 2017. This valuation was 23%
greater than the total consideration that Sibanye paid for the
Company at closing, just three months before the valuation
date for the report. PTO ¶ 102; JX 615 at 205.
T. This Appraisal Proceeding
Holders of 5,804,523 shares of the Company eschewed the
consideration offered in the Merger and pursued appraisal.
In August 2018, the holders of 384,000 shares settled
their claims. The remaining petitioners litigated their claims
through trial.
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II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
*18  “An appraisal proceeding is a limited legislative remedy
intended to provide shareholders dissenting from a merger on
grounds of inadequacy of the offering price with a judicial
determination of the intrinsic worth (fair value) of their
shareholdings.” Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor
I), 542 A.2d 1182, 1186 (Del. 1988). Section 262(h) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law states that
the Court shall determine the fair
value of the shares exclusive of any
element of value arising from the
accomplishment or expectation of the
merger or consolidation, together with
interest, if any, to be paid upon the
amount determined to be the fair
value. In determining such fair value,
the Court shall take into account all
relevant factors.
8 Del. C. § 262(h). The statute thus places the obligation to
determine the fair value of the shares squarely on the court.
Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publ'rs, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 361
(Del. 1997).
Because of the statutory mandate, the allocation of the burden
of proof in an appraisal proceeding differs from a traditional
liability proceeding. “In a statutory appraisal proceeding, both
sides have the burden of proving their respective valuation
positions ....” M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513,
520 (Del. 1999). “No presumption, favorable or unfavorable,
attaches to either side's valuation ....” Pinson v. Campbell-
Taggart, Inc., 1989 WL 17438, at *6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 1989).
“Each party also bears the burden of proving the constituent
elements of its valuation position ..., including the propriety
of a particular method, modification, discount, or premium.”
Jesse A. Finkelstein & John D. Hendershot, Appraisal Rights
in Mergers and Consolidations, Corp. Prac. Series (BNA) No.
38-5th, at A-90 (2010 & 2017 Supp.) [hereinafter Appraisal
Rights].
As in other civil cases, the standard of proof in an
appraisal proceeding is a preponderance of the evidence.
M.G. Bancorp., 737 A.2d at 520. A party is not required to
prove its valuation conclusion, the related valuation inputs,
or its underlying factual contentions by clear and convincing
evidence or to exacting certainty. See Triton Constr. Co. v. E.
Shore Elec. Servs., Inc., 2009 WL 1387115, at *6 (Del. Ch.
May 18, 2009), aff'd, 2010 WL 376924 (Del. Jan. 14, 2010)
(ORDER). “Proof by a preponderance of the evidence means
proof that something is more likely than not. It means that
certain evidence, when compared to the evidence opposed to
it, has the more convincing force and makes you believe that
something is more likely true than not.” Agilent Techs., Inc. v.
Kirkland, 2010 WL 610725, at *13 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
“In discharging its statutory mandate, the Court of Chancery
has discretion to select one of the parties' valuation models
as its general framework or to fashion its own.” M.G.
Bancorp., 737 A.2d at 525–26. “[I]t is entirely proper for
the Court of Chancery to adopt any one expert's model,
methodology, and mathematical calculations, in toto, if that
valuation is supported by credible evidence and withstands
a critical judicial analysis on the record.” Id. at 526. Or
the court “may evaluate the valuation opinions submitted
by the parties, select the most representative analysis, and
then make appropriate adjustments to the resulting valuation.”
Appraisal Rights, supra, at A-31 (collecting cases). The court
may also “make its own independent valuation calculation
by ... adapting or blending the factual assumptions of the
parties' experts.” M.G. Bancorp., 737 A.2d at 524. “If neither
party satisfies its burden, however, the court must then
use its own independent judgment to determine fair value.”
Gholl v. eMachines, Inc., 2004 WL 2847865, at *5 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 24, 2004). But the court must also be cautious
when adopting an approach that deviates from the parties'
positions. Doing so “late in the proceedings” may “inject[ ]
due process and fairness problems” that are “antithetical to
the traditional hallmarks of a Court of Chancery appraisal
proceeding,” because the court's approach will not have
been “subjected to the crucible of pretrial discovery, expert
depositions, cross-expert rebuttal, expert testimony at trial,
and cross examination at trial.” Verition P'rs Master Fund Ltd.
v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 140-41 (Del. 2019).
*19  In Tri-Continental Corporation v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71
(Del. 1950), the Delaware Supreme Court explained in detail
the concept of value that the appraisal statute employs:
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The basic concept of value under the
appraisal statute is that the stockholder
is entitled to be paid for that which
has been taken from him, viz., his
proportionate interest in a going
concern. By value of the stockholder's
proportionate interest in the corporate
enterprise is meant the true or intrinsic
value of his stock which has been taken
by the merger. In determining what
figure represents the true or intrinsic
value, ... the courts must take into
consideration all factors and elements
which reasonably might enter into
the fixing of value. Thus, market
value, asset value, dividends, earning
prospects, the nature of the enterprise
and any other facts which were known
or which could be ascertained as of
the date of the merger and which
throw any light on future prospects of
the merged corporation are not only
pertinent to an inquiry as to the value
of the dissenting stockholder's interest,
but must be considered .... 9
Subsequent Delaware Supreme Court decisions have adhered
consistently to this definition of value. 10  Most recently, the
Delaware Supreme Court reiterated that “[f]air value is ...
the value of the company to the stockholder as a going
concern,” i.e., the stockholder's “proportionate interest in a
going concern.” Aruba, 210 A.3d at 132–33.
The trial court's “ultimate goal in an appraisal proceeding is
to determine the ‘fair or intrinsic value’ of each share on the
closing date of the merger.” Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global
Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 20 (Del. 2017)
(quoting Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1142–43). To accomplish
this task, “the court should first envisage the entire pre-
merger company as a ‘going concern,’ as a standalone entity,
and assess its value as such.” Id. (quoting Cavalier Oil,
564 A.2d at 1144). When doing so, the corporation “must
be valued as a going concern based upon the ‘operative
reality’ of the company as of the time of the merger,” taking
into account its particular market position in light of future
prospects. M.G. Bancorp., 737 A.2d at 525 (quoting Cede
& Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor IV), 684 A.2d 289,
298 (Del. 1996)); accord Dell, 177 A.3d at 20. The concept
of the corporation's “operative reality” is important because
“[t]he underlying assumption in an appraisal valuation is
that the dissenting shareholders would be willing to maintain
their investment position had the merger not occurred.”
Technicolor IV, 684 A.2d at 298. Consequently, the trial court
must assess “the value of the company ... as a going concern,
rather than its value to a third party as an acquisition.” M.P.M.
Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 795 (Del. 1999).
*20  “The time for determining the value of a dissenter's
shares is the point just before the merger transaction ‘on
the date of the merger.’ ” Appraisal Rights, supra, at A-33
(quoting Technicolor I, 542 A.2d at 1187). Put differently,
the valuation date is the date on which the merger closes.
Technicolor IV, 684 A.2d at 298; accord M.G. Bancorp., 737
A.2d at 525. If the value of the corporation changes between
the signing of the merger agreement and the closing, then the
fair value determination must be measured by the “operative
reality” of the corporation at the effective time of the merger.
See Technicolor IV, 684 A.2d at 298.
The statutory obligation to make a single determination
of a corporation's value introduces an impression of false
precision into appraisal jurisprudence.
[I]t is one of the conceits of our
law that we purport to declare
something as elusive as the fair value
of an entity on a given date ....
[V]aluation decisions are impossible
to make with anything approaching
complete confidence. Valuing an entity
is a difficult intellectual exercise,
especially when business and financial
experts are able to organize data in
support of wildly divergent valuations
for the same entity. For a judge who
is not an expert in corporate finance,
one can do little more than try to
detect gross distortions in the experts'
opinions. This effort should, therefore,
not be understood, as a matter of
intellectual honesty, as resulting in the
fair value of a corporation on a given
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date. The value of a corporation is
not a point on a line, but a range of
reasonable values, and the judge's task
is to assign one particular value within
this range as the most reasonable value
in light of all the relevant evidence and
based on considerations of fairness. 11
As the Delaware Supreme Court recently explained, “fair
value is just that, ‘fair.’ It does not mean the highest possible
price that a company might have sold for had Warren Buffet
negotiated for it on his best day and the Lenape who sold
Manhattan on their worst.” DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield
Value P'rs, 172 A.3d 346, 370 (Del. 2017).
Because the determination of fair value follows a litigated
proceeding, the issues that the court considers and the
outcome it reaches depend in large part on the arguments
advanced and the evidence presented.
An argument may carry the day in
a particular case if counsel advance
it skillfully and present persuasive
evidence to support it. The same
argument may not prevail in another
case if the proponents fail to generate a
similarly persuasive level of probative
evidence or if the opponents respond
effectively.
Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., L.P., 2016
WL 7324170, at *16 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016). Likewise,
the approach that an expert espouses may have met “the
approval of this court on prior occasions,” but may be
rejected in a later case if not presented persuasively or if “the
relevant professional community has mined additional data
and pondered the reliability of past practice and come, by a
healthy weight of reasoned opinion, to believe that a different
practice should become the norm ....” Glob. GT LP v. Golden
Telecom, Inc. (Golden Telecom Trial), 993 A.2d 497, 517
(Del. Ch.), aff'd, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010).
A. The Deal Price
*21  Sibanye contends that the deal price of $18.00 per share
is a persuasive indicator of fair value if adjusted downward
to eliminate elements of value arising from the Merger. The
petitioners argue that the deal price should receive no weight.
As the proponent of using the deal price, Sibanye bore the
burden of establishing its persuasiveness. Sibanye also bore
the burden of proving its downward adjustment.
1. The Standard For Evaluating A Sale Process
There is no presumption that the deal price reflects fair value.
Dell, 177 A.3d at 21; DFC, 172 A.3d at 366–67. Relying on
the statutory requirement that the Court of Chancery must
consider “all relevant factors” when determining fair value,
the Delaware Supreme Court has rejected “requests for the
adoption of a presumption that the deal price reflects fair
value if certain preconditions are met, such as when the
merger is the product of arm's-length negotiation and a robust,
non-conflicted market check, and where bidders had full
information and few, if any, barriers to bid for the deal.” Dell,
177 A.3d at 21. Yet the Delaware Supreme Court has also
cautioned that its
refusal to craft a statutory presumption
in favor of the deal price when certain
conditions pertain does not in any way
signal our ignorance to the economic
reality that the sale value resulting
from a robust market check will often
be the most reliable evidence of fair
value, and that second-guessing the
value arrived upon by the collective
views of many sophisticated parties
with a real stake in the matter is
hazardous.
DFC, 172 A.3d at 366. The Delaware Supreme Court has
likewise cautioned that “we have little quibble with the
economic argument that the price of a merger that results
from a robust market check, against the back drop of a rich
information base and a welcoming environment for potential
buyers, is probative of the company's fair value.” Id. Based on
the facts presented in DFC and Dell, the Delaware Supreme
Court endorsed using the deal price as a persuasive indicator
of fair value in those cases. Based on the facts presented in
Aruba, the Delaware Supreme Court used a deal-price-less-
synergies metric to make its own fair value determination.
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As a general matter, the persuasiveness of the deal price
depends on the reliability of the sale process that generated it.
When assessing whether a sale process results in fair value,
the issue “is not whether a negotiator has extracted the highest
possible bid.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 33. “[T]the purpose of an
appraisal is ... to make sure that [the petitioners] receive fair
compensation for their shares in the sense that it reflects what
they deserve to receive based on what would fairly be given to
them in an arm's-length transaction.” DFC, 172 A.3d at 370–
71. “[T]he key inquiry is whether the dissenters got fair value
and were not exploited.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 33.
Relying on the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in DFC,
the petitioners assert that the deal price “deserves weight only
if the merger is the product of a ‘robust market search’ and
an arm's-length third party transaction with ‘no hint of self-
interest that compromised the market check.’ ” Dkt. 210 at 36
[hereinafter PTOB] (quoting DFC, 172 A.3d at 349). That is
not what DFC held.
The petitioners have accurately quoted phrases from the
decision in DFC, but when the Delaware Supreme Court
made those observations, it was describing the trial court's
findings regarding the sale process that took place in that
case. The Delaware Supreme Court then determined that
given those attributes, “the best evidence of fair value was
the deal price.” DFC, 172 A.3d at 349. The high court's
comments in DFC explained why the particular sale process
in that case was so good as to make the deal price “the
best evidence of fair value.” The decision did not identify
minimum characteristics that a sale process must have before
a trial court can give it weight. The decision also did not
address what makes a sale process sufficiently bad that a
trial court cannot give it weight. Technically, the decision did
not even delineate when a sale process would be sufficiently
good that a trial court should regard it as “the best evidence
of fair value.” The Delaware Supreme Court could have
believed the sale process in DFC warranted that level of
consideration without excluding the possibility that a not-as-
good sale process could warrant the same treatment.
*22  The same is true for the Delaware Supreme Court's
comments about the sale process in Dell. There, the Delaware
Supreme Court described the sale process as having featured
“fair play, low barriers to entry, outreach to all logical
buyers, and the chance for any topping bidder to have the
support of Mr. Dell's own votes ....” Dell, 177 A.3d at
35. Based on its view of the sale process, the Delaware
Supreme Court suggested that “the deal price deserved heavy,
if not dispositive weight.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 23. After
describing the sale process in greater detail, the Delaware
Supreme Court observed, “Overall, the weight of evidence
shows that Dell's deal price has heavy, if not overriding,
probative value.” Id. at 30. As in DFC, the Delaware Supreme
Court was explaining why it regarded a particular sale
process as so good that it deserved “heavy, if not dispositive
weight.” The Delaware Supreme Court was not identifying
the minimum requirements for a sale process to generate
reliable information about fair value, nor was it enumerating
qualities which, if absent, would render the outcome of a sale
process so unreliable as to provide no insight into fair value.
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Aruba likewise
did not address the minimum requirements for a sale process
to generate reliable information about fair value. There, the
trial court found the sale process to be sufficiently reliable
to use the deal price as a valuation indicator, but declined to
give it weight. The Delaware Supreme Court accepted that the
sale process was sufficiently reliable and used the deal price
as the exclusive basis for its own fair value determination.
As with Dell and DFC, the Aruba decision did not have to
address when a sale process was sufficiently bad that a trial
court should decline to rely on the deal price.
The decisions in DFC, Dell, and Aruba are highly informative
because they analyze fact patterns in which the Delaware
Supreme Court viewed the sale processes as sufficiently
reliable to use the deal price as either (i) the exclusive
basis for its own fair value determination (Aruba), (ii) as a
valuation indicator that “deserved heavy, if not dispositive
weight” (Dell), or (iii) as a valuation indicator that provided
“the best evidence of fair value” (DFC). But Aruba, Dell, and
DFC do not establish legal requirements for a sale process.
Whether a sale process is sufficiently good that the deal price
should be regarded as persuasive evidence of fair value, or
whether a sale process is sufficiently bad that the deal price
should not be regarded as persuasive evidence of fair value
are invariably fact-specific questions, and the answers depend
on the arguments made and the evidence presented in a given
case.
2. Objective Indicia Of Reliability
In the recent appraisal decisions that have examined the
reliability of a sale process, the Delaware Supreme Court has
cited certain “objective indicia” that “suggest[ ] that the deal
price was a fair price.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 28; accord DFC, 172
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A.3d at 376. The presence of objective indicia do not establish
a presumption in favor of the deal price. The indicia are a
starting point for analysis, not the end point, and in each of
its recent appraisal decisions, the Delaware Supreme Court
has determined that a combination of the objective indicia
and other evidence outweighed the shortcomings in the sale
processes that the petitioners had identified (Aruba) or which
the trial court had regarded as undermining the persuasiveness
of the deal price (Dell and DFC).
First, the Merger was an arm's-length transaction with a
third party. See DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (citing fact that “the
company was purchased by a third party in an arm's length
sale” as factor supporting fairness of deal price). It was not
a transaction involving a controlling stockholder. See Dell,
177 A.3d at 30 (citing fact that “this was not a buyout led by
a controlling stockholder” as a factor supporting fairness of
deal price). Sibanye was an unaffiliated acquirer with no prior
ownership interest in Stillwater.
Second, the Board did not labor under any conflicts of
interest. Six of the Board's seven members were disinterested,
outside directors, and they had the statutory authority under
the Delaware General Corporation Law to say “no” to any
merger. See 8 Del. C. § 251(b) (requiring board adoption
and recommendation of a merger agreement); Dell, 177 A.3d
at 28 (citing fact that special committee was “composed
of independent, experienced directors and armed with the
power to say ‘no’ ” as factor supporting fairness of deal
price). Stillwater's stockholders were widely dispersed, and
the petitioners have not identified divergent interests among
them. Cf. id. at 11 (citing the fact that “any outside bidder
who persuaded stockholders that its bid was better would have
access to Mr. Dell's votes” as a factor supporting fairness of
deal price).
*23  Third, Sibanye conducted due diligence and received
confidential information about Stillwater's value. See Aruba,
210 A.3d at 137 (emphasizing that buyer armed with
“material nonpublic information about the seller is in a strong
position (and is uniquely incentivized) to properly value the
seller”). Like the acquirer in Aruba, Sibanye “had signed
a confidentiality agreement, done exclusive due diligence,
gotten access to material nonpublic information,” and had a
“sharp[ ] incentive to engage in price discovery ... because it
was seeking to acquire all shares.” Id. at 140.
Fourth, Stillwater negotiated with Sibanye and extracted
multiple price increases. See id. at 139 (citing “back and forth
over price”); Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (citing fact that special
committee “persuaded Silver Lake to raise its bid six times”).
In July 2016, when Sibanye indicated interest in a transaction
at $15.75 per share, Stillwater did not rush into a deal. In
December 2016, when Sibanye raised its indication of interest
to a range of $17.50 to $17.75 per share, Stillwater again did
not proceed. With the Board's backing, McMullen demanded
a higher price. When Sibanye offered $18.00 per share, the
Board did not immediately accept. Only after Sibanye twice
stated that $18.00 per share was its best and final offer did the
Board accept that price.
Most importantly, no bidders emerged during the post-signing
phase, which is a factor that the Delaware Supreme Court
has stressed when evaluating a sale process. 12  The Merger
Agreement did not contain any exceptional deal protection
features, and the total amounts due via the termination fee and
expense reimbursement provision were comparatively low,
representing approximately 1.2% of equity value. Excluding
the expense reimbursement, the termination fee reflected only
0.76% of equity value. The absence of a topping bid was thus
highly significant.
As noted, these are fewer objective indicia of fairness than the
Delaware Supreme Court identified when reviewing the sale
processes in DFC, Dell, or Aruba, and the presence of these
factors does not establish a presumption in favor of the deal
price. Nevertheless, the objective indicia that were present
provide a cogent foundation for relying on the deal price as
a persuasive indicator of fair value, subject to further review
of the evidence.
3. The Challenges To The Pre-Signing Phase
The petitioners have advanced a multitude of reasons why
they believe the deal price for Stillwater does not provide a
persuasive indicator of fair value. The bulk of their objections
concern the pre-signing phase.
As a threshold matter, the petitioners argue generally that
a reliable sale process requires some degree of pre-signing
outreach, citing a comment from the Union Illinois decision
in which this court used a deal-price-less-synergies metric
to value a privately held company after concluding that the
company was “marketed in an effective manner.” Union
Ill., 847 A.2d at 350. The petitioners also cite a statement
from the AOL decision to the effect that a sale process will
provide persuasive evidence of statutory fair value when
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“(i) information was sufficiently disseminated to potential
bidders, so that (ii) an informed sale could take place, (iii)
without undue impediments imposed by the deal structure
itself.” In re Appraisal of AOL Inc., 2018 WL 1037450, *8
(Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2018). Neither decision established a rule
that pre-signing outreach is invariably required before the
deal price can serve as persuasive evidence of fair value.
At least for a widely held, publicly traded company, a sale
process could justify both sets of observations through the
public announcement of a transaction and a sufficiently open
post-signing market check.
*24  The petitioners' myriad arguments about the pre-signing
process in this case raise a fundamental question: Would
the deal price provide persuasive evidence of fair value
if Stillwater had pursued a single-bidder strategy in which
it only interacted with Sibanye before signing the Merger
Agreement, recognizing that the Merger Agreement was
sufficiently open to permit a meaningful post-signing market
check? If the deal price would have provided persuasive
evidence of fair value under those circumstances, then the
additional efforts that Stillwater made before signing, even if
disorganized and flawed, should not change the outcome. It is
conceivable that a pre-signing process could involve features
that undermined the effectiveness of a post-signing market
check, such as never-waived standstill agreements containing
don't-ask-don't-waive provisions, but that was not the case
here. At least on the facts presented, Stillwater's efforts were
additive, not subtractive. They might not have added much,
but they did not detract from what Stillwater could have
achieved through a single-bidder process focused on Sibanye
followed by a post-signing market check.
a. The Possibility Of A Single-Bidder Strategy
Although the Delaware Supreme Court has not had the
opportunity to consider a single-bidder strategy for purposes
of determining the persuasiveness of a deal-price metric
in an appraisal proceeding, extant precedent suggests that
if Stillwater had pursued a single-bidder strategy in which
it only interacted with Sibanye before signing the Merger
Agreement, then the deal price would provide persuasive
evidence of fair value because the Merger Agreement was
sufficiently open to permit a meaningful post-signing market
check. The reasoning that leads to this endpoint starts not
with the recent triumvirate of appraisal cases, but rather with
an important Delaware Supreme Court decision that restated
the high court's enhanced scrutiny jurisprudence for purposes
of applying that standard of review in a breach of fiduciary
duty case. C & J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen.
Empls.' & Sanitation Empls.' Ret. Tr., 107 A.3d 1049 (Del.
2014). The Delaware Supreme Court's enhanced scrutiny
jurisprudence becomes pertinent to appraisal proceedings
because, as commentators have perceived, the deal price will
provide persuasive evidence of fair value in an appraisal
proceeding involving a publicly traded firm if the sale process
would satisfy enhanced scrutiny in a breach of fiduciary duty
case. 13
In C & J Energy, the Delaware Supreme Court held
that plaintiffs who challenged a transaction involving only
a passive, post-signing market check had not shown a
reasonable likelihood that the director defendants had
breached their fiduciary duties under the enhanced scrutiny
standard of review. The transaction in C & J Energy was
a stock-for-stock merger between C & J Energy Services,
Inc. and a subsidiary of Nabors Industries Ltd. Although C
& J Energy was nominally the acquirer, it would emerge
from the transaction with a controlling stockholder, and the
Delaware Supreme Court therefore examined whether the
directors had fulfilled their situationally specific duty to seek
the best transaction reasonably available. See C & J Energy,
107 A.3d at 1067.
*25  The merger in C & J Energy resulted from a CEO-driven
process. Joshua Comstock, the founder, chairman, and CEO
of C & J Energy, spearheaded the discussions. Talks between
Comstock and the CEO of Nabors started in January 2014,
and although Comstock discussed the deal with some of C &
J Energy's directors, he did not receive formal board approval
to negotiate until April. Later in the process, he made a revised
offer to Nabors without board approval. The plaintiffs argued
that Comstock acted without authority and misled the board
about key issues. The Delaware Supreme Court found “at
least some support for the plaintiffs' contention that Comstock
at times proceeded on an ‘ask for forgiveness rather than
permission’ basis.” Id. at 1059.
There was evidence in C & J Energy that Comstock had
personal reasons to favor a deal with Nabors. The Nabors
CEO “assured Comstock throughout the process that he
would be aggressive in protecting Comstock's financial
interests if a deal was consummated.” Id. at 1064. After the
key terms of the transaction had been negotiated, but before
it was formally approved, Comstock asked for a side letter
“affirming that C & J's management would run the surviving
entity and endorsing a generous compensation package.” Id.
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When the Nabors CEO balked, Comstock threatened to not
sign or announce the deal. The Nabors CEO gave in, and the
deal was announced as planned. Id. at 1064–65. In addition,
there was evidence that C & J Energy's primary financial
advisor was less than optimally effective and seemed to
be advocating for the deal rather than advocating for C &
J Energy. See id. at 1056. The banker also had divergent
interests because of its role as a financing source for the deal.
Id. at 1057. There were thus reasons to think that the two
principal negotiators for C & J—its CEO and its banker—
had personal reasons to favor a transaction with Nabors and
to push for that outcome.
The merger agreement in C & J Energy included a no-shop
clause subject to a fiduciary out and a termination fee equal
to 2.27% of the deal value. Id. at 1063. The period between
the announcement of the deal on June 25, 2014, and the trial
court's issuance of the injunction on November 25, 2014,
lasted 153 days. No competing bidder emerged during that
period.
On these facts, the Delaware Supreme Court found no
grounds for a potential breach of duty, explaining that “[w]hen
a board exercises its judgment in good faith, tests the
transaction through a viable passive market check, and gives
its stockholders a fully informed, uncoerced opportunity to
vote to accept the deal, we cannot conclude that the board
likely violated its Revlon duties.” Id. at 1053. Elaborating,
the senior tribunal explained that a board may pursue a
single transaction partner, “so long as the transaction is
subject to an effective market check under circumstances in
which any bidder interested in paying more has a reasonable
opportunity to do so.” Id. at 1067. The high court emphasized
that “[s]uch a market check does not have to involve an
active solicitation, so long as interested bidders have a fair
opportunity to present a higher-value alternative, and the
board has the flexibility to eschew the original transaction
and accept the higher-value deal.” Id. at 1067–68. The
transaction in C & J Energy satisfied this test. Describing
the suite of deal protections, the Delaware Supreme Court
observed that “a potential competing bidder faced only
modest deal protection barriers.” Id. at 1052. Later, the court
reiterated that “there were no material barriers that would
have prevented a rival bidder from making a superior offer.”
Id. at 1070; accord id. (“But in this case, there was no
barrier to the emergence of another bidder and more than
adequate time for such a bidder to emerge.”). The Delaware
Supreme Court also cited with approval precedents in which
a sell-side board had engaged exclusively with a single
buyer, had not conducted a pre-signing market check, then
agreed to a merger agreement containing a no-shop clause,
a matching right, and a termination fee, and the resulting
combination was found sufficient to permit an effective post-
signing market check that satisfied the directors' duties under
enhanced scrutiny. 14
*26  Procedurally, the Delaware Supreme Court's decision
in C & J Energy vacated an injunction that the trial court
had entered in advance of the stockholder vote. In holding
that the trial court had issued the injunction improvidently,
the high court noted that “[t]he ability of the stockholders
themselves to freely accept or reject the board's preferred
course of action is also of great importance in this context.”
Id. at 1068. The role of the vote, however, should not detract
from the high court's observations about the adequacy of the
single-bidder process. Underscoring that point, the Delaware
Supreme Court cited the trial court's apparent belief “that
Revlon required C & J's board to conduct a pre-signing
active solicitation process in order to satisfy its contextual
fiduciary duties,” then explicitly rejected that understanding
of the enhanced scrutiny standard. Id. at 1068. As a result,
the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in C & J Energy has
implications that go beyond the injunction context.
One area where its implications subsequently became
manifest was in a post-closing liability action where plaintiffs
sought to recover from an alleged aider-and-abettor under a
quasi-appraisal theory of damages. See In re PLX Tech. Inc.
S'holders Litig., ––– A.3d ––––, 2019 WL 2144476 (Del.
May 16, 2019) (TABLE). The PLX litigation challenged a
merger agreement in which the acquirer (Avago) purchased
the target (PLX) for cash. As in C & J Energy, the sale
process was not pristine. The trial court found that a key
director and the company's investment banker had divergent
interests that caused them to favor a sale over having PLX
remain independent, that Avago tipped the director and the
banker about the timing and pricing of a deal, that the director
and the banker failed to disclose the tip to the board while
using the information to help them position PLX to be sold,
and that the proxy statement failed to disclose these issues.
See In re PLX Tech. Inc. S'holders Litig. (PLX Trial), 2018
WL 5018535, at *32–35, *44–47 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018)
(subsequent history omitted). Based on these findings, the
trial court found a predicate breach of fiduciary duty under
the enhanced scrutiny standard. The trial court also found
that the sole remaining defendant—an activist stockholder
affiliated with the key director—had participated knowingly
in the breach. See id. at *48–50.
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The plaintiffs' claim foundered, however, at the damages
stage. The plaintiffs sought to recover compensatory damages
on behalf of a class of stockholders based on the theory that
PLX should have remained independent rather than being
sold. Under this theory, the plaintiffs sought “out-of-pocket
(i.e., compensatory) money damages equal to the ‘fair’ or
‘intrinsic’ value of their stock at the time of the merger, less
the price per share that they actually received,” with “[t]he
‘fair’ or ‘intrinsic’ value of the shares ... determined using
the same methodologies employed in an appraisal.” Id. at
*50 (internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases). The
plaintiffs' expert used a DCF methodology to value PLX at
$9.86 per share, well above the deal price of $6.50 per share.
See id. at *51.
Although PLX's pre-signing process was marred by breaches
of fiduciary duty resulting from Avago's tip to the key director
and the company's banker, the trial court found that the
sale process as a whole was sufficiently reliable to warrant
rejecting the plaintiffs' valuation. The trial court explained
that “[m]ore important than the pre-signing process was the
post-signing market check.” Id. at *55. After discussing the
outcome in C & J Energy, the trial court reasoned that “the
structure of the Merger Agreement satisfied the Delaware
Supreme Court's standard for a passive, post-signing market
check.” Id. The merger agreement (i) contained a no-shop
with a fiduciary subject an unlimited match right that gave
Avago four days to match the first superior proposal and two
days to match any subsequent increase, and (ii) required PLX
to pay Avago a termination fee of $10.85 million, representing
3.5% of equity value ($309 million) and 3.7% of enterprise
value ($293 million). See id. at *26, *44. Avago launched its
first step-tender offer on July 8, 2014. No competing bidder
intervened, and the merger closed thirty-five days later on
August 12. Id. at *27. This time period compared favorably
with other passive, post-signing market checks that Delaware
decisions had approved. 15
*27  On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment based solely on the trial court's damages ruling and
without reaching or expressing a view on any of the other
issues raised by the case. See PLX, 2019 WL 2144476, at
*1. For present purposes, the damages issue is the important
one, because the trial court had determined that the suite
of defensive measures in the merger agreement, together
with the absence of a topping bid, provided a more reliable
indication of value than the plaintiffs' discounted cash flow
model. See PLX Trial, 2018 WL 5018535, at *44, *54–56.
Notably for present purposes, although the burden of proof
rested solely with the plaintiffs, the trial court in PLX made its
determination using the same valuation standard that would
apply in an appraisal proceeding. Id. at *50.
To reiterate, in its appraisal jurisprudence, the Delaware
Supreme Court has not yet been asked to rule on the reliability
of a sale process involving a single-bidder strategy, no pre-
signing outreach, and a passive post-signing market check.
The closest precedent is Aruba, where the dynamics of the
sale during the pre-closing phase resembled a single-bidder
strategy, although the company's banker did engage in some
minimal outreach.
The pre-signing phase of the sale process in Aruba had two
stages. See Verition P'rs Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks,
Inc. (Aruba Trial), 2018 WL 922139, at *7–8 (Del. Ch. Feb.
15, 2018) (subsequent history omitted). The first stage began
in late August 2014, when HP approached Aruba about a deal.
Aruba hired an investment banker (Qatalyst), who identified
thirteen potential partners and approached five of them. For
reasons having “nothing to do with price,” no one was
interested. Id. at *10. Aruba and HP entered into an NDA that
restricted HP from speaking with Aruba management about
post-transaction employment, and HP began conducting due
diligence. Id. at *11. Despite the restriction in the NDA, HP
asked Aruba's CEO, Dominic Orr, if he would take on a key
role with the combined entity. Orr replied that he had no
objection. Id.
The parties seemed to be making progress towards a deal,
but the HP board of directors balked at making a bid
without further analysis, recalling the fallout from a disastrous
acquisition in 2011. In November 2014, Aruba terminated
discussions, bringing the first stage of the pre-signing process
to a close. Id. at *12.
For its part, HP continued to evaluate an acquisition of Aruba.
In December 2014, HP tapped Barclays Capital Inc. as its
financial advisor. That firm had worked for Aruba and had
been trying to secure the sell-side mandate. Id. at *13. On
January 21, 2015, HP's CEO met with Orr for dinner. During
the meeting, when HP's CEO proposed resuming merger
talks, Orr responded with enthusiasm and suggested trying
to announce a deal by early March. But HP's CEO also told
Orr that because Qatalyst had represented the seller in HP's
disastrous acquisition from 2011, HP would not proceed if
Aruba used Qatalyst. Id. at *14.
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The Aruba board decided to move forward with the deal and
informed Qatalyst about HP's ukase. Aruba was obligated to
pay Qatalyst a fee in the event of a successful transaction, so
it kept Qatalyst on as a behind-the-scenes advisor. From then
on, Qatalyst's primary goal was to repair its relationship with
HP, and Qatalyst regarded a successful sale of Aruba to HP
as a key step in the right direction. Aruba also needed a new
HP-facing banker. It hired Evercore, a firm that was trying to
establish a presence in Silicon Valley. During the sale process,
Evercore likewise sought to please HP, viewing HP as a major
source of future business. See id. at *9, *15–16, *19, *21.
The ensuing negotiations proceeded quickly. HP had
anticipated making an opening bid of $24 per share, but after
Orr's enthusiastic response, HP opened at $23.25 per share. Id.
at *16–17. Qatalyst reached out to a sixth potential strategic
partner, but it was not interested. Id. at *17. The Aruba board
decided to counter at $29 per share. Evercore conveyed the
number to Barclays, but when Barclays dismissed it, Evercore
emphasized Aruba's desire to announce a deal quickly. Id. at
*17–18. On February 10, 2015, twenty days after HP resumed
discussions with Orr, the Aruba board agreed to a price of
$24.67 per share. Id. at *19. The parties negotiated a merger
agreement, and on March 1, 2015, the Aruba board approved
it.
*28  The post-signing phase was uneventful. On March 2,
2015, Aruba and HP announced the merger. The merger
agreement (i) contained a no-shop clause subject to a
fiduciary out, (ii) conditioned the out for an unsolicited
superior proposal on compliance with an unlimited match
right that gave HP five days to match the first superior
proposal and two days to match any subsequent increase,
and (iii) required Aruba to pay HP a termination fee of
$90 million, representing 3% of Aruba's equity value. No
competing bidder emerged, and on May 1, 2015, Aruba's
stockholders approved the merger. Id. at *21–22.
Although the sale process in Aruba had flaws, the trial court
found that it was sufficiently reliable to make the deal price
a persuasive indicator of fair value. Overall, the trial court
viewed the HP-Aruba merger as “a run-of-the-mill, third
party-deal,” where “[n]othing about it appear[ed] exploitive.”
Id. at *38. The petitioners argued that the deal price resulted
from a closed-off sale process in which HP had not faced a
meaningful threat of competition. Id. at *39. The trial court
rejected that contention, noting that the petitioners failed “to
point to a likely bidder and make a persuasive showing that
increased competition would have led to a better result.” Id.
(citing Dell, 177 A.3d at 28–29, 32, 34).
The petitioners also argued that the negotiators' incentives
undermined the pre-signing phase, citing the desire of Aruba's
bankers to cater to HP and the more subtly divergent interests
of Aruba's CEO. The trial court found that although the
petitioners proved that Aruba could have negotiated more
aggressively, they did not prove that “the bankers, [the CEO],
the Aruba Board, and the stockholders who approved the
transaction all accepted a deal price that left a portion of
Aruba's fundamental value on the table.” Id. at *44.
In other portions of the decision, the trial court found that
Aruba's unaffected trading price was a reliable indicator
of fair value and rejected the parties' DCF valuations as
unreliable. These holdings left the trial court with two reliable
valuation indicators: the unaffected trading price and the deal
price. The trial court determined that the unaffected trading
price was the better measure of the fair value of Aruba's
shares. See id. at *53–55.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed. The high
court found that the trial court had incorrectly relied on
the unaffected trading price, but it accepted the trial court's
finding that the deal price was a reliable indicator of fair value.
Aruba, 210 A.3d at 141–42.
Addressing the petitioners' claim that the pre-signing phase
of the sale process was insufficient to establish a competitive
bidding dynamic, the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized
that
when there is an open opportunity
for many buyers to buy and only a
few bid (or even just one bids), that
does not necessarily mean that there
is a failure of competition; it may
just mean that the target's value is
not sufficiently enticing to buyers to
engender a bidding war above the
winning price.
Id. at 136. Applying this principle to the facts in Aruba, the
high court explained:
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Aruba approached other logical
strategic buyers prior to signing the
deal with HP, and none of those
potential buyers were interested. Then,
after signing and the announcement of
the deal, still no other buyer emerged
even though the merger agreement
allowed for superior bids. It cannot
be that an open chance for buyers to
bid signals a market failure simply
because buyers do not believe the asset
on sale is sufficiently valuable for
them to engage in a bidding contest
against each other. If that were the
jurisprudential conclusion, then the
judiciary would itself infuse assets
with extra value by virtue of the fact
that no actual market participants saw
enough value to pay a higher price.
That sort of alchemy has no rational
basis in economics.
*29  Id. On the facts presented, the level of competition in
Aruba was sufficient to support the reliability of the deal
price.
The Delaware Supreme Court also explained that the
negotiations between Aruba and HP over price had important
implications for the reliability of the deal price:
[A] buyer in possession of material
nonpublic information about the seller
is in a strong position (and is uniquely
incentivized) to properly value the
seller when agreeing to buy the
company at a particular deal price, and
that view of value should be given
considerable weight by the Court of
Chancery absent deficiencies in the
deal process.
Id. at 137. The high court noted that HP and Aruba went “back
and forth over price” and that HP had “access to nonpublic
information to supplement its consideration of the public
information available to stock market buyers ....” Id. at 139.
The Delaware Supreme Court elsewhere emphasized that “HP
had signed a confidentiality agreement, done exclusive due
diligence, gotten access to material nonpublic information,”
and “had a much sharper incentive to engage in price
discovery than an ordinary trader because it was seeking to
acquire all shares.” Id. at 140. On the facts presented, the
extent of the negotiations in Aruba was sufficient to support
the reliability of the deal price.
The high court ultimately concluded that Aruba's sale process
was sufficiently reliable to render the deal price the best
measure of fair value. The Delaware Supreme Court declined
to use the trial court's estimate of the deal price minus
synergies, instead adopting HP's contemporaneous synergies
estimate and remanding with instructions that “final judgment
be entered for the petitioners in the amount of $19.10 per share
plus any interest to which the petitioners are entitled.” Id. at
142.
The Aruba decision technically did not involve a single-
bidder process, but the dynamics closely resembled one.
Although Qatalyst reached out to five bidders at the beginning
of the first phase of the pre-signing process, none of those
parties had any interest in Aruba. After this development,
both Qatalyst and Aruba's CEO concluded that Aruba's “only
(but strong) weapon is to say we go alone.” Aruba Trial,
2018 WL 922139, at *10. Later, Aruba's CEO had a “pretty
open dialogue” with HP during which he informed HP
that Aruba was “not running a sales process” and did not
attempt to posture about pitting HP against anyone else. Id.
at *40 (internal quotation marks omitted). During the second
phase of the pre-signing process, after HP re-engaged, HP
understood that Aruba was not pursuing other options. Id. at
*41. The negotiations unfolded in a manner consistent with a
single-bidder dynamic. See id.
In concluding that the deal price was a reliable indicator of
fair value, the trial court considered a number of factors,
including that “HP and Aruba agreed to terms for the
merger agreement that the petitioners have not meaningfully
challenged.” Id. at *38. After describing the suite of defensive
measures in the merger agreement, the trial court noted that
“[t]his combination of defensive provisions would not have
supported a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.” Id. The
petitioners had argued about a lack of competition during the
pre-signing phase, and the trial court had discussed that factor
at length, ultimately rejecting the objection. See id. at *39–41.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized that a
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failure of competition does not result simply because a limited
number of parties bid, “or even just one bids.” Aruba, 210
A.3d at 136. The Delaware Supreme Court also emphasized
the reliability of the price that resulted from the “back and
forth” between Aruba and HP. Id. at 139.
*30  Given these precedents, I cannot agree that a reliable
sale process must invariably involve some level of active
outreach during the pre-signing phase. By making this
observation, I am not suggesting that the Delaware Supreme
Court has ever endorsed a single-bidder process for purposes
of appraisal, nor that any of the precedents that this decision
has discussed are squarely on point. Nor am I claiming to
have any privileged insight into how the Delaware Supreme
Court would or should evaluate the persuasiveness of a
single-bidder strategy on the facts of any particular case. It
nevertheless seems to me that if the proponent of a single-
bidder process could show that the merger agreement allowed
for a passive post-signing market check in line with what
decisions have held is sufficient to satisfy enhanced scrutiny,
and if there were no other factors that undermined the
sale process, then the deal price would provide persuasive
evidence of fair value.
This decision has already found that the sale process exhibited
objective indicia of reliability. As noted and as discussed
in greater detail below, the petitioners have not raised a
meaningful challenge to the post-signing market check. The
operative question for purposes of examining the pre-signing
phase is not whether Stillwater's process fell short of what
would have been optimal, but rather whether the pre-signing
process sufficiently impaired the sale process as a whole,
including the post-signing phase, so as to prevent the deal
price from serving as a persuasive indicator of fair value.
b. The Relative Involvement Of McMullen
And The Board In The Pre-Signing Phase
In their initial challenge to the pre-signing phase, the
petitioners attack McMullen's role in the pre-signing process.
They contend that McMullen acted improperly by pursuing
Sibanye's indication of interest without authorization from
the Board and contrary to its direction to pursue acquisitions
or a merger of equals. See PTOB at 37. They also criticize
McMullen for starting to engage with Sibanye in January
2016, but failing to inform the Board until after receiving
an expression of interest from Sibanye in July. During
this period, McMullen met with Sibanye's senior executives
at least twice to discuss a sale of Stillwater, reached an
understanding with Sibanye's CEO on pricing the deal at
a 30% premium over Stillwater's thirty-day VWAP, and
arranged a multi-day site visit for Sibanye personnel.
The petitioners also contend that after the Board learned
of Sibanye's expression of interest in July 2016, the Board
did not exercise meaningful oversight over the sale process.
They accurately observe that the record lacks any evidence
of meaningful engagement by the Board until October 3,
2016, two months before signing, when the Board received
a report on the Company's outreach to various parties,
instructed McMullen to obtain formal proposals for retaining
an investment bank, instructed McMullen to create a cash
flow model that could be used to value the Company, and
decided not to form a special committee. See JX 246.
The petitioners correctly contend that these facts could have
contributed to findings that McMullen and the directors
breached their duty of care under the enhanced scrutiny
standard of review. 16  But the enhanced scrutiny analysis
would not have ended there. The C & J Energy decision
likewise involved a CEO that began deal discussions without
formal board authorization, engaged for months without
formally reporting to the board, made a revised offer without
board approval, and generally proceeded by asking for
forgiveness rather than by getting permission. See C & J
Energy, 107 A.3d at 1059. After considering the totality of
the sale process, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that
the facts would not support a fiduciary breach, placing heavy
reliance on the directors' decision to “test[ ] the transaction
through a viable passive market check ....” Id. at 1053.
*31  The outcome in PLX likewise shows that the existence
of problems during the pre-signing process does not
necessarily undermine the reliability of the deal price. The
trial court in PLX found that the directors had breached
their fiduciary duties under the enhanced scrutiny standard
because of an undisclosed tip from the eventual buyer to a
key director and the company's banker. PLX Trial, 2018 WL
5018535, at *15–16, *32–35, *44–47. Despite this defect,
the sale process provided reliable evidence of the company's
value based primarily on the adequacy of the company's post-
signing market check. See id. at *55 (“More important than
the pre-signing process was the post-signing market check.”).
Applying the same damages standard that would govern in an
appraisal proceeding, the trial court found that the sale process
was sufficiently reliable to render the plaintiffs' damages
calculation unpersuasive, resulting in a failure of proof. Id. at
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*50–55. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
based solely on the trial court's damages ruling. See PLX,
2019 WL 2144476, at *1.
McMullen's unsupervised activities and the Board's failure to
engage in meaningful oversight until October 2016 represent
flaws in the pre-signing process. They are factors that must be
taken into account, but they do not inherently disqualify the
sale process from generating reliable evidence of fair value.
In this case, McMullen's unsupervised activities did not
comprise the entirety of the Company's sale process.
Ultimately, after the Board engaged, Stillwater formally
retained BAML, conducted an expedited pre-signing canvass,
and entered into the Merger Agreement. The terms of the
Merger Agreement facilitated a meaningful post-signing
market check, and no other buyer emerged even though the
merger agreement allowed for superior bids. As in Dell, the
petitioners did not point to any evidence that another party
was interested in proceeding and would have bid if McMullen
and the Board had acted differently. See Dell, 177 A.3d at 29.
c. McMullen's Personal Interest In A Transaction
In their next challenge to the pre-signing process, the
petitioners contend that McMullen undermined the sale
process because he planned to leave Stillwater, and “he
wanted the benefit of a strategic transaction (i) to boost
the Company's stock price prior to his departure and (ii) to
maximize his payout upon stepping down as CEO.” PTOB at
39. The petitioners correctly observe that by leaving after a
transaction, McMullen would be entitled to unvested equity
awards and accelerated retention payments that he could not
obtain if he left without a transaction.
The petitioners also point out that McMullen devoted
considerable time to developing and selling his personal
investments outside of Stillwater. They cite McMullen's
contemporaneous service in 2016 as CEO of Nevada Iron
and as President of New Chris, even though McMullen's
employment agreement with Stillwater limited McMullen's
outside activities to board service and otherwise required him
to devote his full efforts to Stillwater. See JX 114. During
2016, McMullen raised money for the successor company to
New Chris and sold Nevada Iron. See McMullen Tr. 709, 863–
64. The petitioners cite McMullen's activities (i) to show that
McMullen was trying to maximize his personal wealth before
retiring to Turks & Caicos, (ii) to suggest that McMullen
might have done a better job with the sale process if he had
not been pursuing his other investments, and (iii) as further
evidence that the Board failed to provide active oversight.
Sibanye takes the extreme position that “there is no evidence
to suggest that Mr. McMullen was motivated by anything
other than maximizing stockholder value.” Dkt. 211 at 59.
Sibanye points to McMullen's decision in March 2016 to
extend his employment by two years, claiming simplistically
that if “McMullen's intention was truly to do a quick sale and
leave the company, there would have been no need for him to
renew his employment agreement since his prior contract did
not expire until December 31, 2016 and contained essentially
the same termination benefits as the new contract.” Id. at 60.
To the contrary, McMullen understood that completing a sale
to Sibanye or another buyer might extend past December 31.
Extending his employment agreement was the smart play for
McMullen personally. Although Sibanye has not argued this
point, it was also likely good for Stillwater, because it avoided
the prospect of a near-term issue with CEO succession.
*32  Sibanye has no meaningful response to McMullen's
pursuit of his other activities. Sibanye says they were
permitted, but the petitioners have correctly described
McMullen's employment agreement as only authorizing
board service, not his more active roles. Sibanye also
contends that his outside interests were disclosed in public
filings, but that is not the point. The issue is whether the
interests undermined the sale process, not whether they
were disclosed. On this final point, Sibanye asserts that the
petitioners “have pointed to no evidence that these outside
interests presented an actual conflict, that these interests
competed with or were adverse to Stillwater's interests, or that
they otherwise interfered with Mr. McMullen's ability to carry
out his duties as CEO of Stillwater.” Id.
Sibanye has focused on the critical question: whether
McMullen's personal interests undermined the sale process.
Senior executives almost invariably have divergent incentives
during a sale process, often because of change-in-control
agreements, and equally often because the transaction will
have implications for their personal employment situations.
Two Delaware appraisal precedents provide insight into
factual scenarios involving divergent incentives of this type.
The Aruba decision involved a sale process where the
top executive and the company's investment bankers had
conflicting incentives. The CEO wanted to retire, but he
cared deeply about the company and its employees. When
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HP proposed to acquire Aruba and keep the CEO on to
integrate the companies, it offered the perfect path “to an
honorable personal and professional exit.” Aruba Trial, 2018
WL 922139, at *5; see id. at *43 (analyzing CEO's conflict).
Aruba's investment bankers both wanted to curry favor
with HP. Qatalyst was desperate to save its Silicon Valley
franchise, and Evercore was auditioning for future business.
Id. at *43. The trial court acknowledged the petitioners'
concerns, but found that the conflicting incentives did not
undermine the deal price as an indicator of fair value:
The evidence does not convince me
that the bankers, Orr, the Aruba
Board, and the stockholders who
approved the transaction all accepted
a deal price that left a portion of
Aruba's fundamental value on the
table. Perhaps different negotiators
could have extracted a greater share
of the synergies from HP in the
form of a higher deal price. Maybe
if Orr had been less eager, or if
Qatalyst had not been relegated to
the back room, then HP would have
opened at $24 per share. Perhaps
with a brash Qatalyst banker leading
the negotiations, unhampered by the
Autonomy incident, Aruba might have
negotiated more effectively and gotten
HP above $25 per share. An outcome
along these lines would have resulted
in HP sharing a greater portion of
the anticipated synergies with Aruba's
stockholders. It would not have
changed Aruba's standalone value.
Hence, it would not have affected
Aruba's fair value for purposes of an
appraisal.
Id. at *44. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court accepted
the reliability of the deal price as a valuation indicator and
used it when making its own fair value determination. Aruba,
210 A.3d at 141–42.
The Dell decision also involved a conflict: Mr. Dell, the
company's founder and top executive, was a buy-side
participant in the management buyout and would emerge from
the transaction with a controlling stake. A special committee
negotiated the terms of the transaction with the financial
sponsor backing the deal, but the trial court regarded Mr.
Dell's involvement on the buy side as a factor cutting against
the reliability of the deal price. For example, the trial court
found that Mr. Dell gave the buyout group a leg-up given his
relationships within the company and his knowledge of its
business, and the trial court accepted the testimony of a sale-
process expert that if bidders competed to pay more than what
Mr. Dell's group would pay, then they risked overpaying and
suffering the winner's curse. In re Appraisal of Dell Inc. (Dell
Trial), 2016 WL 3186538, at *42–43 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016)
(subsequent history omitted). Equally important, Mr. Dell was
a net purchaser of shares in the buyout, so any increase in the
deal price cost him money.
*33  If Mr. Dell kept the size
of his investment constant as the
deal value increased, then Silver
Lake would have to pay more and
would demand a greater ownership
stake in the post-transaction entity.
[The petitioners' sale-process expert]
showed that if Mr. Dell wanted to
maintain 75% ownership of the post-
transaction entity, then he would
have to contribute an additional $250
million for each $1 increase in the deal
price. If Mr. Dell did not contribute
any additional equity and relied on
Silver Lake to fund the increase, then
he would lose control of the post-
transaction entity at a deal price above
$15.73 per share. Because Mr. Dell
was a net buyer, any party considering
an overbid would understand that
a higher price would not be well
received by the most important person
at the Company.
Id. at *43 (footnote omitted). The trial court found that for
purposes of price discovery in an appraisal case, Mr. Dell's
involvement and incentives undermined the reliability of the
sale process and the persuasiveness of the deal price. Id. at
*44.
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On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that Mr. Dell's
involvement in the buyout group had not undermined the sale
process. See Dell, 177 A.3d at 32–33. The high court noted
that “the [trial court] did not identify any possible bidders that
were actually deterred because of Mr. Dell's status.” Id. at
34. The Delaware Supreme Court also emphasized Mr. Dell's
willingness to work with rival bidders during due diligence
and the absence of evidence that Mr. Dell would have left the
company if a rival bidder prevailed. Id. at 32–34. The high
court concluded that the lack of a higher bid did not call into
question the sale process, because “[i]f a deal price is at a
level where the next upward move by a topping bidder has a
material risk of being a self-destructive curse, that suggests
the price is already at a level that is fair.” Id. at 33.
The facts of C & J Energy are also relevant. The merger in
C & J Energy resulted from a CEO-driven process, and there
was evidence that the sell-side CEO had personal reasons to
favor the deal because he would be in charge of the combined
company and receive significantly greater compensation. See
C & J Energy, 107 A.3d at 1064. After the key terms of the
transaction had been negotiated, but before it was formally
approved, the CEO went so far as to demand a side letter
“affirming that C & J's management would run the surviving
entity and endorsing a generous compensation package.” Id.
When the acquirer balked, the CEO threatened to terminate
the discussions. He got his way, and the deal was announced
as planned. Id. at 1065. There was also evidence that C &
J Energy's primary financial advisor acted as a banker for
the deal rather than for C & J Energy, and the banker had
divergent interests as a source of financing for the deal. See id.
at 1056–57. The Delaware Supreme Court held that the facts
could not support a reasonable probability that the defendants
had failed to obtain the best transaction reasonably available,
relying heavily on the post-signing market check. See id. at
1053, 1067–68.
In this case, McMullen's personal interests are not as serious
as the buy-side conflict that failed to undermine the sale
process in Dell. They more closely resembled the divergent
sell-side interests that affected the negotiators in Aruba
and C & J Energy. Like the CEOs and bankers in those
cases, McMullen's change-of-control benefits gave him a
personal reason to secure a deal under circumstances where
a disinterested participant might prefer a standalone option.
McMullen appears to have been motivated by his desire
to maximize his personal wealth and retire to a greater
degree than the negotiators in Aruba. Stillwater's general
counsel (Wadman) recognized McMullen's conflict, voiced
his concerns to the Board, and ultimately resigned when
McMullen secured more favorable treatment in the Merger
for his own change-in-control benefits and for his CFO. See
JX 526. As a result, McMullen's motivations most closely
resembled the incentives of the CEO in C & J Energy, who
held up the entire transaction until the acquirer agreed to a
side letter “affirming that C & J's management would run
the surviving entity and endorsing a generous compensation
package.” C & J Energy, 107 A.3d at 1064. The Delaware
Supreme Court held that the facts in C & J Energy did not
provide reasonable grounds for a breach of fiduciary duty
under the enhanced scrutiny standard of review.
*34  At the same time, McMullen had ample reason to pursue
the best deal possible for Stillwater. From his testimony
and demeanor, McMullen seems like someone who took
considerable satisfaction in his ability to achieve outcomes.
As a matter of professional pride, he wanted to sell Stillwater
for the best price he could. He also had economic reasons to
extract a higher price. As disclosed in the proxy statement for
the Merger, McMullen held 131,248 common shares, 155,891
restricted stock unit awards, and 222,556 performance based
restricted stock unit awards, for a total of 509,695 common
shares or share equivalents. See JX 525 at 78. At the deal
price, these common shares and share equivalents had a value
of $9,174,510. To state the obvious, every $1 increment in
the deal price generated another half-a-million dollars for
McMullen.
When directors or their affiliates own “material” amounts
of common stock, it aligns their interests with other
stockholders by giving them a “motivation to seek the
highest price” and the “personal incentive as stockholders
to think about the trade off between selling now and the
risks of not doing so.”
Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 670–71 (Del. Ch.
2014) (quoting Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 600); see also
Lender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *22 (discussing
incentive to maximize deal price where target managers were
net sellers and would not retain jobs post-merger).
Consistent with his personal desire to obtain a good price
for Stillwater, McMullen negotiated with Sibanye to increase
the consideration. When Sibanye indicated interest at $15.75
per share in July 2016, McMullen did not rush to sign up a
deal. When Sibanye raised indication of interest to $17.50
to $17.75 per share in December 2016, McMullen and the
Board demanded a higher price. Even after Sibanye offered
$18.00 per share, McMullen wanted more. Only after Sibanye
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twice said that $18.00 per share was its best and final offer
did McMullen and the Board finally agree to transact.
As with McMullen's initiation of the sale process and
the Board's failure to engage in meaningful oversight of
his activities until October 2016, McMullen's personal
motivation to exit from Stillwater and maximize his
personal wealth represents a flaw in the sale process.
Although Wadman's noisy withdrawal highlighted these
issues, McMullen's personal interests as a whole do not
appear materially different from interests that have not been
sufficient in other cases to undermine the reliability of sale
processes. On balance, the evidence does not convince me
that McMullen's divergent interests led either McMullen
or the Board to accept a deal price that left a portion of
Stillwater's fundamental value on the table, particularly in
light of the effective post-signing market check that Stillwater
conducted.
d. The “Soft-Sell”
Turning to the details of the pre-signing phase, the petitioners
contend that Stillwater's pre-signing market check fell short
because until BAML was formally retained, McMullen relied
on a “soft sell” approach that provided potential buyers with
insufficient information to conclude that Stillwater was for
sale and used unauthorized agents who could not formally
engage on Stillwater's behalf. See PTOB at 44–45.
The evidence demonstrates that on the facts of this case, the
“soft sell” strategy was not an effective means of generating
interest in the Company. At the same time, the “soft sell”
effort did not do anything to harm either BAML's abbreviated
pre-signing process or the post-signing market check. The soft
sell strategy was not a positive feature of the sale process, and
it does not help support the persuasiveness of the deal price,
but it does not detract from it either.
e. BAML's Compressed Pre-Signing Market Check
In a further criticism of the pre-signing phase, the petitioners
contend that after BAML was formally retained, BAML did
not have time to run an organized and meaningful process.
The petitioners complain that BAML hastily called a list
of potentially interested parties, who then were given only
days after signing an NDA to prepare an expression of
interest. Contrary to McMullen's strong recommendation in
September 2016 that any bidder visit the Company's mines
before providing an expression of interest, the November
timeline did not accommodate site visits until after a party
made an expression of interest. See JX 229 at '603. At trial, the
petitioners introduced testimony from a sale process expert
who questioned the effectiveness of BAML's abbreviated pre-
signing process. See Gray Tr. 567–68. Even Sibanye's sale
process expert questioned the effectiveness of the type of
condensed outreach that BAML attempted to conduct. See
Stowell Tr. 947–48.
*35  The petitioners have made a persuasive case that the
BAML's pre-signing process was suboptimal, but they have
not shown that it was worthless, nor that it was harmful. To
the contrary, when evaluated against Delaware precedents, the
pre-signing efforts, while rushed, were a positive factor for
the sale process.
BAML received its formal mandate on November 7, 2016.
The next day, BAML received a package of information from
the Company, including Sibanye's indication of interest from
July, the non-disclosure agreements with Hecla and Coeur,
a cash flow model, and instructions for accessing the data
room. BAML understood that Sibanye was pushing to close
a deal by December and swung into action to do what it
could. By November 9, BAML had generated a plan for an
expedited market check that contemplated reaching out to
twenty parties over the next two days, working with parties
who expressed interest for the rest of the month, and then
receiving expressions of interest at the end of the month. At
that point, the Board would decide how to proceed.
In accordance with its expedited plan, BAML engaged
directly with Sibanye, Coeur, and Hecla. BAML contacted
five of the six parties that BAML regarded as “Possibly
Interested,” missing one. BAML contacted eight of the
twelve additional parties that BAML had identified, missing
four. BAML also contacted Northern Star, even though they
originally had been listed as not interested.
Ten of the fourteen parties had no interest, but four engaged.
One quickly withdrew, two ultimately expressed interest in
a merger of equals, and the fourth dropped out by late
November. Coeur also dropped out, and Hecla indicated that it
needed to find a partner to pursue a transaction. Although the
Board extended Hecla's deadline for submitting an indication
of interest, and BAML followed up with Hecla, Hecla did
not respond. At the end of November, an additional party—
Northam—asked to be included in the Company's process.
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During a meeting on December 2, 2016, the Board considered
the status of the Company's process. At that point, the
Board's only definitive expression of interest was a proposal
that Sibanye had submitted on December 1 to acquire the
Company for between $17.50 and $17.75 per share in cash.
The Board decided to focus on Sibanye, which later raised its
offer to $18 per share. Northam decided to withdraw, and on
December 8, the Board approved the Merger Agreement.
Although compressed and expedited, BAML's outreach
resulted in fourteen other parties hearing about Stillwater. In
addition to Sibanye, a total of seven parties engaged to some
degree. Ultimately, no one other than Sibanye submitted an
indication of interest. The plaintiffs have criticized the timing,
pacing, and scope of the pre-signing process, but it resulted
in BAML contacting the “logical strategic buyers” before
Stillwater signed up its deal with Sibanye. Cf. Aruba, 210
A.3d at 136 (observing that “Aruba approached other logical
strategic buyers prior to signing the deal with HP, and none
of those potential buyers were interested.”). The number of
meaningful contacts compares favorably with or is similar
to the facts in the Delaware Supreme Court precedents. 17
When considering whether a deal price provides persuasive
evidence of fair value, it is pertinent that the parties contacted
failed to pursue a merger when they had a free chance to do
so. See DFC, 172 A.3d at 376 (citing “failure of other buyers
to pursue the company when they had a free chance to do so”
as factor supporting fairness of deal price).
*36  On balance, BAML's pre-signing efforts were helpful.
At a minimum, the abbreviated process generated incremental
interest in Stillwater and gave those parties who engaged a leg
up for the post-signing market check. Even the parties who
were contacted but did not engage had the benefit of knowing
that a transaction potentially was afoot. As with the “soft
sell” strategy, there is no evidence that BAML's abbreviated
process did anything to harm the sale process. The bidders
who participated in the abbreviated pre-signing phase were
free to bid during the post-signing phase. There is no evidence
that any were alienated or put off by the Company's pre-
signing efforts.
BAML's abbreviated pre-signing process was not ideal.
Nevertheless, contrary to the petitioners' contentions, it was a
positive factor for the reliability of the sale process.
f. The Negotiations With Sibanye
In their penultimate objection to Stillwater's pre-signing
process, the petitioners contend that Sibanye pressured
Stillwater to sign a merger agreement before the Company's
rising stock price made what Sibanye was willing to pay
look inadequate. The evidence demonstrates that early in
his discussions with Sibanye, McMullen and Froneman
recognized that any transaction would require a premium over
Stillwater's trading price and agreed in principle on a 30%
premium over the thirty-day VWAP. On October 17, 2016,
Froneman told McMullen that Sibanye's offer of a “30%
premium to VWAP remained unchanged” and that Sibanye's
board of directors unanimously supported the transaction. JX
281 at '425. Another Sibanye executive repeated this message
on November 22. PTO ¶ 243.
Sibanye, however, needed to borrow the funds to acquire
Stillwater, and by November 30, 2016, Stillwater's share price
had recovered to a point where a 30% premium over the
thirty-day VWAP equaled $18.25 per share. Sibanye could
not pay more than $18 per share without supplementing the
consideration with cash on hand or a draw from its revolving
credit line, which Sibanye did not want to do. Rather than
sticking with the concept of a 30% premium over a thirty-day
VWAP, Sibanye disavowed that concept, instead treating its
prior indication of interest from July 2016 as a fixed price of
$15.75 per share. On December 1, 2016, Sibanye proposed a
transaction in a range of $17.50 to $17.75 per share, below
what the 30% premium to the thirty-day VWAP would have
contemplated.
The petitioners object that rather than breaking off discussions
or continuing the sale process, the Board negotiated a price
of $18.00 per share, representing the maximum that Sibanye
could pay under its financing arrangements. They argue
that the highest price a bidder is willing to pay is not the
same as fair value. See, e.g., M.P.M. Enters., 731 A.2d at
797 (cautioning that the merger price must be supported
“by evidence tending to show that it represents the going
concern value of the company rather than just the value of the
company to one specific buyer”); In re Appraisal of Orchard
Enters., Inc., 2012 WL 2923305, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 18,
2012) (“[A]lthough I have little reason to doubt Orchard's
assertion that no buyer was willing to pay Dimensional
$25 million for the preferred stock and an attractive price
for Orchard's common stock in 2009, an appraisal must be
focused on Orchard's going concern value.”).
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The petitioners' objection resembles similar arguments that
the Delaware Supreme Court rejected in Dell and DFC. In
Dell, the trial court found that the price negotiations during
the pre-signing phase were limited by what the financial
sponsors could pay based on their leverage-buyout pricing
models. The respondent had conceded that the LBO model
was not “oriented toward solving for enterprise value,” and
the special committee's financial advisors had briefed the
committee about the LBO model and how financial sponsors
would use it. Dell Trial, 2016 WL 3186538, at *29 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The committee's financial advisors
used a similar model to calculate the maximum prices that
a financial sponsor could pay. See id. at *30. The evidence
indicated that the financial sponsors bid consistently with
the results of an LBO model, and their negotiations with the
committee proceeded within that framework. See id. at *30–
32. In addition to the record evidence, the trial court relied on
treatises which explained how the price generated by an LBO
model can diverge from fair value. 18  Based on this evidence,
the trial court found that the original merger consideration
“was dictated by what a financial sponsor could pay and still
generate outsized returns,” rather than Dell's value as a going
concern. Id. at *32.
*37  Three months later, the trial court in DFC reached a
similar conclusion when evaluating the deal price paid by a
financial sponsor (Lone Star) to acquire the company (DFC)
that was the subject of the appraisal proceeding. Although the
trial court regarded the deal price as sufficiently reliable to use
as a valuation input, the court expressed concern that “Lone
Star's status as a financial sponsor ... focused its attention on
achieving a certain internal rate of return and on reaching
a deal within its financing constraints, rather than on DFC's
fair value.” In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp. (DFC Trial),
2016 WL 3753123, at *22 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016) (subsequent
history omitted).
The appeal from the trial-level ruling in DFC reached the
Delaware Supreme Court before the appeal in Dell. The
Delaware Supreme Court rejected the trial court's finding that
the buyer's financial constraints limited the price it could pay
and caused the deal price to diverge from fair value, stating:
To be candid, we do not understand
the logic of this finding. Any rational
purchaser of a business should have a
targeted rate of return that justifies the
substantial risks and costs of buying
a business. That is true for both
strategic and financial buyers. It is,
of course, natural for all buyers to
consider how likely a company's cash
flows are to deliver sufficient value
to pay back the company's creditors
and provide a return on equity that
justifies the high costs and risks of
an acquisition. But, the fact that a
financial buyer may demand a certain
rate of return on its investment in
exchange for undertaking the risk of
an acquisition does not mean that the
price it is willing to pay is not a
meaningful indication of fair value.
That is especially true here, where
the financial buyer was subjected
to a competitive process of bidding,
the company tried but was unable
to refinance its public debt in the
period leading up to the transaction,
and the company had its existing
debt placed on negative credit watch
within one week of the transaction
being announced. The “private equity
carve out” that the Court of Chancery
seemed to recognize, in which the deal
price resulting in a transaction won by
a private equity buyer is not a reliable
indication of fair value, is not one
grounded in economic literature or this
record.
DFC, 172 A.3d at 349–50. When the Delaware Supreme
Court subsequently ruled on the discussion of the LBO model
in the appeal from the trial-level ruling in Dell, the high court
relied on its decision in DFC, explaining:
[W]e rejected this view [in DFC] and do so again here
given we see “no rational connection” between a buyer's
status as a financial sponsor and the question of whether the
deal price is a fair price. After all, “all disciplined buyers,
both strategic and financial, have internal rates of return
that they expect in exchange for taking on the large risk of
a merger, or for that matter, any sizeable investment of its
capital.”
Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (quoting DFC, 172 A.3d at 374–76).
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The reasoning that led the Delaware Supreme Court to
reject the implications of the LBO model for deal pricing
indicates that comparable constraints on a prevailing bidder's
ability or willingness to pay—whether resulting from IRR
hurdles, a comparatively higher cost of capital, or limits on
the availability of financing—should not undermine the deal
price as an indicator of fair value if the sale process was
otherwise sufficiently open. Both Dell and DFC suggest that
a post-signing market test can be the predominant source of
price competition. In Dell, the only participants during the
pre-signing phase were the two financial sponsors, whom the
committee permitted to participate at any one time and each of
whom priced their deals using an LBO model. See Dell Trial,
2016 WL 3186538, at *9–10, *30–31, *37. In DFC, although
the company initially engaged in a broad solicitation, the only
bidders who engaged and submitted indications of interest
during the pre-signing phase were two financial sponsors,
one of whom soon dropped out. See DFC Trial, 2016 WL
3753123, at *4.
*38  On the facts of this case, Sibanye had the ability to pay
more. Although it had not secured transactional financing that
would have supported a price greater than $18.00 per share,
Sibanye could have deployed cash on hand or drawn on its
revolving line of credit. As a rational bidder for Stillwater,
Sibanye understandably had a targeted rate of return that it
needed to satisfy to justify the substantial risks and high costs
of the acquisition. That Sibanye did not bid higher does not
mean that the price it agreed to pay did not reflect fair value
when its bid prevailed. See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136; Dell, 177
A.3d at 28; DFC, 172 A.3d at 349–50, 374–76.
The negotiations between Stillwater and Sibanye over price,
together with Sibanye's refusal to pay more, provides strong
evidence of fair value. In Aruba, the Delaware Supreme Court
explained that
a buyer in possession of material
nonpublic information about the seller
is in a strong position (and is uniquely
incentivized) to properly value the
seller when agreeing to buy the
company at a particular deal price, and
that view of value should be given
considerable weight by the Court of
Chancery absent deficiencies in the
deal process.
Id. at 137. The high court observed that HP and Aruba went
“back and forth over price” and that HP had “access to
nonpublic information to supplement its consideration of the
public information available to stock market buyers ....” Id.
at 139. The Delaware Supreme Court elsewhere emphasized
that “HP had signed a confidentiality agreement, done
exclusive due diligence, gotten access to material nonpublic
information” and “had a much sharper incentive to engage
in price discovery than an ordinary trader because it was
seeking to acquire all shares.” Id. at 140. Given these facts, the
extent of the negotiations in Aruba supported the reliability
of the deal price. The same observations apply to Sibanye
on the facts of this case. Sibanye entered into an NDA
with Stillwater, conducted extensive due diligence, obtained
access to material nonpublic information, and was “in a strong
position (and is uniquely incentivized) to properly value the
seller when agreeing to buy the company at a particular deal
price.”
The fact that Stillwater and Sibanye reached agreement at
$18.00 per share is entitled to considerable weight. Although
the petitioners perceive it to be a weakness of the pre-sale
process, the Delaware Supreme Court's precedents indicate
that it was a strength.
4. The Challenges To The Post-Signing Phase
In contrast to their many objections to the pre-signing phase,
the petitioners have relatively few disagreements with the
post-signing phase. They advance perfunctory challenges to
the terms of the Merger Agreement, claiming that it prevented
the stockholders from capturing the value of an increasing
palladium price and foreclosed other bids. They also contend
that the proxy statement contained disclosure violations.
a. The Merger Agreement And The Price Of Palladium
The petitioners observe that the price of palladium increased
between signing and closing. They then object that the
Merger Agreement “provided no practical way for Stillwater's
stockholders to receive that additional value.” PTOB at 51. In
cursory fashion, they criticize the Board for not asserting the
existence of a Company Material Adverse Effect or invoking
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the fiduciary-out clause. Id. at 52. This objection is not really
a criticism of the sale process, but so be it.
The petitioners never engage with the terms of the Merger
Agreement and how it uses the concept of a Company
Material Adverse Effect. The definition of a Company
Material Adverse Effect turns on any “facts, circumstance,
condition, event, change, development, occurrence, result,
or effect” that is materially adverse to the Company. JX
575, Annex A, at A-3. The arising of a Company Material
Adverse Effect does not mean that something good has
happened to Stillwater, like an increase in value due to
rising commodity prices. It means something very bad has
happened to Stillwater. In the Merger Agreement, Stillwater
represented that it had not suffered a Company Material
Adverse Effect, and the Merger Agreement made the accuracy
of this representation a condition to Sibanye's obligation to
close. See id. §§ 4.10.2, 7.2.1. The Merger Agreement also
made the absence of a Company Material Adverse Effect a
separate condition to Sibanye's obligation to close. See id. §
7.2.3. Stillwater did not obtain the right to declare something
akin to a Company Material Beneficial Effect and terminate
the Merger Agreement on that basis. The petitioners' criticism
that the Board did not declare a Company Material Adverse
Effect is a turn down a blind alley.
*39  The petitioners likewise never engage with the terms
of the Merger Agreement and the scope of the fiduciary out.
The Board had the right to change its recommendation in
favor of the Merger based on (i) its receipt of a “Superior
Proposal” or (ii) the occurrence of an “Intervening Event.”
See JX 525, Annex A, § 6.2.4. As permitted by Delaware
law, see 8 Del. C. § 146, the Merger Agreement contained
a force-the-vote provision that obligated Stillwater to take
the Merger to a stockholder vote even if the Board changed
its recommendation, but the stockholders would have the
benefit of the Board's negative recommendation when voting.
See id. § 6.17.2 (“Without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, the Company shall submit this Agreement for the
adoption by its stockholders ... whether or not a Company
Adverse Recommendation Change shall have occurred or an
Acquisition Proposal shall have been publicly announced or
otherwise made ....”). If the Company's stockholders voted
down the Merger, or under other defined circumstances,
then the Company had the ability to terminate the Merger
Agreement. See id. § 8.1.2(ii). The Board's ability to change
its recommendation for an Intervening Event, however,
did not include changes in commodity prices. The Merger
Agreement defined the concept of an “Intervening Event” as
any material change, event,
effect, occurrence, consequence or
development with respect to the
Company or Parent, as applicable, that
(i) is unknown and not reasonably
foreseeable as of the date hereof, (ii)
does not relate to any Acquisition
Proposals, and (iii) does not arise out
of or result from changes after the date
of this Agreement in respect of prices
or demand for products.
Id. at A-6; cf. R. Franklin Balotti & A. Gilchrist Sparks, III,
Deal Protection Measures and the Merger Recommendation,
96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 467, 468 (2002) (explaining the
importance of an intervening event provision for the target
who “discover[s] the world's largest deposit of gold under
its headquarters, causing the value of the target to increase
dramatically”). Post-signing changes “in respect of prices
or demand” for palladium thus would not qualify as an
Intervening Event and would not support a change of
recommendation. The petitioners' criticism that the Board did
not exercise its fiduciary out based on changes in commodity
prices is another wrong turn.
The record reflects that Stillwater did not want the merger
consideration to float with the price of palladium. McMullen
testified that “we wanted to know with certainty what was
the number that we were taking to shareholders as the value
proposition.” McMullen Tr. 770. That was a legitimate goal.
The petitioners may well take these explanations and run with
them, claiming that the situation was even worse than they
thought because the Board lacked the power to do things
that the petitioners previously believed the Board had merely
failed to consider. Regardless, the petitioners' bottom-line
criticism of the Merger Agreement misses the point of what
the contract was trying to accomplish. The Merger Agreement
was not attempting to give the stockholders the benefit of
a transaction that included the potential upside or downside
that would result from changes in the price of palladium
after signing. The Merger Agreement was trying to provide
stockholders with the ability to opt for the comparative
certainty of deal consideration equal to $18.00 per share.
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More broadly, the petitioners are mistaken when they claim
that there was no practical way for Stillwater's stockholders
to receive the additional value that the increased commodity
price could generate. If Stillwater's stockholders had wanted
to capture the increased value of palladium, then they could
have voted down the Merger and kept their shares. The spot
price of palladium was readily available public information
that Stillwater's stockholders could take into account when
deciding how to vote.
b. The Merger Agreement And Competing Bids
In conclusory fashion, the petitioners object that the Merger
Agreement “contained a no solicitation provision and 5-
day matching rights,” which the petitioners characterize as
“more buyer friendly than the protections provided in AOL
that this Court described as creating ‘structural disadvantages
dissuading any prospective bidder.’ ” PTOB at 51–52
(quoting AOL, 2018 WL 1037450, at *9, and noting that
the decision “describe[ed] a no-shop provision with a 3.5%
termination fee and unlimited 3-day matching rights”). The
petitioners argue that Sibanye's matching rights deterred
interested buyers from making a topping bid because Sibanye
could simply match any competing proposal.
*40  The AOL decision was a fact-specific ruling that turned
on the court's view of the sale process in that case, after
hearing the witnesses at trial and considering the evidentiary
record. The Dell and DFC decisions issued while the matter
was pending, and the trial court requested supplemental
briefing on the effect of those decisions. Both sides continued
to argue for determining fair value based on financial metrics
rather than by relying on the deal price. AOL, 2018 WL
1037450, at *1. The court nevertheless examined the sale
process and regarded the persuasiveness of the deal price as “a
close question.” Id. On balance, the court decided not to rely
on the deal price, except as cross check to a DCF valuation.
In reaching this outcome, the court placed heavy weight on
a comment made by AOL's CEO, shortly after the signing of
the deal, in which he said he was “committed to doing the
deal with Verizon” and emphasized that he “gave the team
at Verizon my word that ... this deal is going to happen.” Id.
at *9. The court found that the comment “could reasonably
cause potential bidders to pause when combined with the deal
protections here.” Id. A trial court's job is to make that type
of decision and determine when the evidence warrants a case-
specific departure from a general rule.
The broader Delaware corpus supports the general principle
that the package of defensive measures found in the Merger
Agreement in this case is sufficient to permit an effective
post-signing market check, even when matching rights are
present. As noted, commentators have perceived that under
the Delaware Supreme Court's recent appraisal decisions, a
sale process involving a publicly traded firm will function as a
reliable indicator of fair value as long as it would pass muster
if reviewed under enhanced scrutiny in a breach of fiduciary
duty case. See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra, at 962, 982–
83; Korsmo & Myers, supra, at 269. Based on numerous
trial court precedents, the suite of deal protection measures
in the Merger Agreement would not have supported a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty. 19  The suite of deal protections
in the Merger Agreement compared favorably with the deal
protections in C & J Energy and PLX, which this decision has
discussed at length.
*41  The Aruba decision involved a similar suite of deal
protections. The merger agreement in that case “prohibited
Aruba from soliciting competing offers and required the
Aruba Board to continue to support the merger, subject to a
fiduciary out and an out for an unsolicited superior proposal”
and included a termination fee equal to 3% of the merger's
equity value. Aruba Trial, 2018 WL 922139, at *21, *38.
The matching rights were similar too: HP had “an unlimited
match right, with five days to match the first superior proposal
and two days to match any subsequent increase, and during
the match period Aruba had to negotiate exclusively and in
good faith with HP.” Id. at *38 (footnote omitted). Viewing
the deal protections holistically, the Delaware Supreme Court
found that potential buyers had an open chance to bid, which
supported the high court's use of a deal-price-less-synergies
metric to establish fair value. See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136.
The Delaware Supreme Court has explained that a post-
signing market check is effective as long as “interested
bidders have a fair opportunity to present a higher-value
alternative, and the board has the flexibility to eschew the
original transaction and accept the higher-value deal.” C &
J Energy, 107 A.3d at 1068. This description comports with
guidance from a frequently cited treatise, which identifies
“critical aspects” of a merger agreement that does not
“preclude or impermissibly impede a post-signing market
check.” 1 Lou R. Kling & Eileen T. Nugent, Negotiated
Acquisitions of Companies, Subsidiaries and Divisions §
4.04[6][b], at 4-89 to -90 (1992 & Supp. 2019).
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First, the economics of the executed agreement must be
such that it does not unduly impede the ability of third
parties to make competing bids. Types of arrangements
that might raise questions in this regard include asset lock-
ups, stock lock-ups, no-shops, force-the-vote provisions,
and termination fees. The operative word is “unduly;” the
impact will vary depending upon the actual type of device
involved and its specific terms.
* * *
Second, the target should be permitted to disclose
confidential information to any third party who has on
its own (i.e., not been solicited) “shown up” in the sense
that it has submitted a proposal or, at a minimum, an
indication of interest which is, or which the target believes
is, reasonably likely to lead to (and who is capable of
consummating) a higher competing bid. In this regard,
the target should also be able to negotiate with such third
parties. This removes any informational advantage that the
initial (anointed) purchaser may have.
* * *
Finally, the target board of directors should have
the contractual right, without violating the acquisition
agreement, to withdraw or modify its recommendation to
shareholders with respect to the transaction provided for in
the executed acquisition agreement.
Id. at 4-90 to -94.1 (footnotes omitted).
Using this framework, the deal protections did not preclude
or impermissibly impede a post-signing market check.
For starters, any party could submit a bona fide written
Acquisition Proposal. If the Board determined that the
Acquisition Proposal “constitutes, or could reasonably be
expected to result in, a Superior Proposal” and entered
into an “Acceptable Confidentiality Agreement” with the
party making the proposal, then the Board could “engage in
negotiations or discussions with, or furnish any information
to,” the party making the Acquisition Proposal. JX 545,
Annex A, § 6.2.2. Additional requirements included that
the Company notify Sibanye within twenty-four hours of its
determination, furnish Sibanye “substantially concurrently”
with any information provided to the third party, and not share
any of Sibanye's confidential information unless required by
law. Id. The Company also had to notify Sibanye of the terms
of the Acquisition Proposal and the identity of the third party
making it, then keep Sibanye informed of any developments
on a reasonably prompt basis. Id. § 6.2.3.
*42  After that point, if the Board determined that the
Acquisition Proposal constituted a Superior Proposal and
that its fiduciary duties required it, then the Board could
change its recommendation in favor of the Merger, provided
that before doing so, the Board gave Sibanye five days in
which to match the Superior Proposal or otherwise offer
changes to the Merger Agreement to avoid the change
of recommendation. The Board could also withdraw or
modify its recommendation for an Intervening Event, again
conditioned on giving Sibanye five days in which to propose
changes to the Merger Agreement to avoid the change
of recommendation. If the stockholders voted down the
deal, then Stillwater could terminate the Merger Agreement,
subject only to paying a termination fee and expense
reimbursement equal to 1.2% of the Merger's equity value.
The post-signing market check began on December 9, 2016,
when Sibanye and the Company announced the Merger. It
ended on April 26, 2017, when the Company's stockholders
approved the Merger Agreement. The resulting passive
market check lasted 138 days, close to the 153 days in C & J
Energy and far longer than many of the passive, post-signing
market checks that the Delaware courts have approved. See
App.
During the post-singing market check, no one bid. The failure
of any other party to come forward provides significant
evidence of fairness, because “[f]air value entails at minimum
a price some buyer is willing to pay—not a price at which no
class of buyers in the market would pay.” Dell, 177 A.3d at
29; see id. at 32, 34. The absence of a higher bid indicates
“that the deal market was already robust and that a topping
bid involved a serious risk of overpayment,” which in turn
“suggests the price is already at a level that is fair.” Id. at 33.
As in Aruba, “[i]t cannot be that an open chance for buyers
to bid signals a market failure simply because buyers do not
believe the asset on sale is sufficiently valuable for them to
engage in a bidding contest against each other.” Aruba, 210
A.3d at 136. Instead it suggests that “the target's value is
not sufficiently enticing to buyers to engender a bidding war
above the winning price.” Id.
c. The Stockholder Vote
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In their last challenge to the post-signing phase, the petitioners
assert that the stockholders approved the Merger based on
incomplete and misleading information. They devote only
two pages in their opening brief to this argument, the bulk
of which describes the legal principles that apply in fiduciary
duty cases. See PTOB at 53–54 (citing Morrison v. Berry,
191 A.3d 268, 282–83 (Del. 2018); and Corwin v. KKR Fin.
Hldgs., LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312 (Del. 2015)). The factual
description of their disclosure theory appears in just three
sentences:
Stillwater's stockholders were told
McMullen led the sale process, but
they were never informed that he was
preparing to leave the Company or the
scope of his outside business ventures.
In addition, Stillwater stockholders
were told that Wadman left the
Company prior to closing, but they
were never informed of the context
of his departure or his “noisy exit.”
Stillwater's stockholders were also
provided no information regarding the
Company's exploration zones.
PTOB at 53–54. They devote the same amount of space to
this theory in their reply brief, although the text extends over
three pages. Dkt. 228 at 26–28. In their reply brief, they
argue that stockholders should have been told that Wadman
raised concerns about McMullen's conflicts of interest and
“his manner of soliciting interest from third parties,” and
that Wadman was “retaliated against for doing so.” Id. at
27. They also argue that stockholders should have been told
that McMullen “was in violation of his 2016 employment
agreement” while running the sale process because of his
roles with Nevada Iron and New Chris. Id.
*43  The petitioners' argument about Stillwater's exploration
zones does not appear to hold up under their own
understanding of the law. The petitioners elsewhere argued
persuasively that under Industry Guide 7, promulgated by
the Securities and Exchange Commission, Stillwater was
not permitted to disclose information about the value of the
Company's exploration zones. See, infra, Pt. II.B.3.a.
The disclosure theories about McMullen and Wadman would
likely have some merit if the petitioners had done more to
articulate them, support them with case law, and explain
their relationship to a determination of fair value. Presumably
the petitioners' believe that if stockholders had been told
that McMullen was pursuing a sale in part because of his
personal interest in exiting the Company and that Wadman
resigned because of disputes over how McMullen handled the
sale process, then some stockholders might have questioned
whether the deal price reflected fair value.
These contentions would have to overcome the doctrine
against self-flagellation. See, e.g., Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-
Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 143 (Del. 1997). That said, the
proxy statement should have disclosed McMullen's interest
in retiring, his roles with GT Gold and New Chris, and their
implications for his employment agreement. Stockholders
also should have been told that Wadman resigned because of
disputes with senior management about the conduct of the
sale process.
Although I have tried to give the petitioners the benefit of
the doubt by crediting their conclusory assertions in this
fashion, I am not convinced that their arguments are sufficient
to undermine the stockholder vote as an expression of the
preference of a supermajority of Stillwater's stockholders
for a sale rather than having the Company continue as
a standalone entity. The Delaware Supreme Court has
explained that “[t]he issue in an appraisal is not whether a
negotiator has extracted the highest possible bid. Rather, the
key inquiry is whether the dissenters got fair value and were
not exploited.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 33. The disclosures that the
petitioners say the Company should have made could have
affected stockholders' views about whether their negotiators
had extracted the highest possible bid. If stockholders had
been provided with information about McMullen's interests
and Wadman's withdrawal, then perhaps some stockholders
would have inferred that a different negotiator might have
pushed for more from Sibanye or worked harder during the
pre-signing phase to find a bidder who could have paid
a higher price (an inference undercut by the absence of
any topping bid during the post-signing phase). They would
not have had any reason to revise their assessment of the
Company's prospects as a standalone entity or to vote down
the Merger in the belief that the Company was more valuable
as a going concern in its operative reality as a widely held,
publicly traded firm.
Because of the disclosure issues, this decision does not give
heavy weight to the stockholder vote. Nevertheless, the vote
remains a positive factor when evaluating whether the deal
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price reflected fair value. If stockholders believed that the
Company was worth more, they could have voted down the
Merger and retained their proportionate share of the Company
as a going concern. By approving the Merger at $18.00 per
share, they evidenced their belief that the deal price provided
fair value and was not exploitive.
5. The Sale Process Was Reliable.
*44  Sibanye proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
the sale process made the deal price a persuasive indicator of
fair value. The sale process was not perfect, and the petitioners
highlighted its flaws, but the facts of this case, when viewed
as a whole, compare favorably or are on par with the facts in
C & J Energy, PLX, DFC, Dell, and Aruba.
The sale process that led to the Merger bore objective
indicia of fairness that rendered the deal price a reliable
indicator of fair value. To reiterate, it was an arm's-length
transaction. It was approved by an unconflicted Board and
by Stillwater's stockholders. And it resulted from adversarial
price negotiations between Stillwater and Sibanye. Most
significantly, no bidders emerged during the post-signing
phase, despite a Merger Agreement that contained a suite
of deal protections that would pass muster under enhanced
scrutiny.
The petitioners pointed to problems during the early phases
of the sale process before the Board began exercising serious
oversight and before BAML was retained. Those flaws are
factors to consider, but they do not undermine the reliability
of the sale price given what happened later. BAML's pre-
signing canvass was a positive factor. The negotiations
with Sibanye were also a positive factor. And the process
culminated in an effective, albeit passive, post-signing market
check. If Stillwater had pursued a single-bidder strategy and
only engaged with Sibanye, then the terms of the Merger
Agreement would have facilitated a sufficiently reliable post-
signing market check to validate the deal price. Stillwater did
more than what would have been sufficient under a single-
bidder scenario.
It is theoretically possible that a more thorough pre-signing
process or more vigorous negotiations might have generated
a higher transaction price for Stillwater's stockholders, but the
issue in an appraisal “is not whether a negotiator has extracted
the highest possible bid.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 33.
Capitalism is rough and ready, and
the purpose of an appraisal is not
to make sure that the petitioners get
the highest conceivable value that
might have been procedure had every
domino fallen out of the company's
way; rather, it is to make sure that they
receive fair compensation for their
shares in the sense that it reflects what
they deserve to receive based on what
would fairly be given to them in an
arm's-length transaction.
DFC, 172 A.3d at 370–71. “[T]he key inquiry is whether the
dissenters got fair value and were not exploited.” Dell, 177
A.3d at 33.
The Merger in this case was rough and ready. McMullen and
the Board did not adhere to the best practices and transactional
niceties that an advisor steeped in Delaware decisions would
recommend. Nevertheless, given the arm's-length nature of
the Merger, the premium over market, and the substance of
what took place during the sale process, it is not possible
to say that an award at the deal price would result in the
petitioners being exploited.
6. The Adjustment For Value Arising From The Merger
Section 262 provides that “the Court shall determine the
fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value
arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger
or consolidation ....” 8 Del. C. § 262(h). “[I]t is widely
assumed that the sale price in many M&A deals includes a
portion of the buyer's expected synergy gains, which is part
of the premium the winning buyer must pay to prevail and
obtain control.” DFC, 172 A.3d at 371. “In an arm's-length,
synergistic transaction, the deal price generally will exceed
fair value because target fiduciaries bargain for a premium
that includes ... a share of the anticipated synergies ....” Olson
v. ev3, Inc., 2011 WL 704409, at *10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21,
2011). “[S]ection 262(h) requires that the Court of Chancery
discern the going concern value of the company irrespective
of the synergies involved in a merger.” M.P.M. Enters., 731
A.2d at 797. To derive an estimate of fair value, the court
must exclude “any synergies or other value expected from
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the merger giving rise to the appraisal proceeding itself ....”
Golden Telecom Trial, 993 A.2d at 507. This means the
trial court “must exclude ... the amount of any value that
the selling company's shareholders would receive because a
buyer intends to operate the subject company, not as a stand-
alone going concern, but as part of a larger enterprise, from
which synergistic gains can be extracted.” Aruba, 210 A.3d
at 133 (internal quotation marks omitted).
*45  Sibanye's valuation expert was Mark Zmijewski, an
emeritus professor of finance at the University of Chicago
and a consultant at Charles River Associates. Zmijewski
opined that the evidence he reviewed did “not indicate that
the Transaction resulted in quantifiable synergies.” JX 652
¶ 66 [hereinafter Zmijewski Rep.]; see Zmijewski Tr. 1146.
Sibanye told its stockholders that the price did not reflect
any synergies. JX 421 at '224. McMullen testified at trial that
he did not believe there were any synergies arising from the
Merger. McMullen Tr. 801. There is accordingly no reason to
exclude any value from the deal price based on synergies.
In this proceeding, Sibanye argued that despite the absence
of quantifiable cost synergies or revenue synergies, it
willingly paid more than fair value for Stillwater, resulting
in a portion of the consideration reflecting value “arising
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation ....” 8 Del. C. § 262(h). In its opening brief,
Sibanye argued that it paid a premium for two strategic
reasons: (i) to facilitate entry into the United States and (ii)
to expand its share of the PGM market. Sibanye also argued
that it could pay a premium in the Merger because after the
Merger, it could obtain a better rating on its debt. See also
Zmijewski Tr. 1120–22; JX 397 at '452; JX 498 at 20; JX
486 at 1; Rosen Tr. 407–08. Each of these reasons identifies a
valuable aspect of Stillwater based on its operative reality as a
going concern. Stillwater was the only PGM producer located
in the United States, and it generated significant cash flow.
None of these features represented a source of value “arising
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation.”
Sibanye failed to meet its burden of proof to establish a
quantifiable amount that the court should deduct from the deal
price. This decision does not make any downward adjustment
to the deal price to compensate for combinatorial value.
7. The Adjustment For Changes In
Value Between Signing And Closing
Under Section 262, the time for determining the value of a
dissenter's shares is the point just before the merger closes.
See Appraisal Rights, supra, at A-33. The deal price provides
a data point for the value of the company as of the date
of signing, but the valuation date for an appraisal is the
date of closing. Consequently, if the value of the corporation
changes between the signing of the merger and the closing, the
fair value determination must be measured by the “operative
reality” of the corporation at the effective time of the merger.
Technicolor II, 684 A.2d at 298.
In a merger involving a widely held, publicly traded company,
some gap between signing and closing will usually exist.
The customary need to prepare and disseminate disclosure
documents, then complete a first-step tender offer or obtain
a stockholder vote will typically result in several months
elapsing between signing and closing. See Robert T. Miller,
The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through MAC
Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 50 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 2007, 2018–19 (2009) (discussing timelines
for various transaction structures). If regulatory approvals are
required, the temporal gap can expand. Id. at 2020–23. During
this period, the value of the company could rise or fall.
Despite the customary existence of a temporal gap between
signing and closing, Delaware appraisal decisions have
typically not made adjustments to the deal price to reflect
a valuation change during the post-signing period. In Union
Illinois, this court relied for the first time on a deal-price-
less-synergies metric when determining the fair value of a
privately held bank (UFG). See Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 343.
Six months elapsed between signing and closing, and the
petitioners objected to using the deal price because of the
temporal gap. The trial court described this argument as a
“quibble” and as “not a forceful objection,” because “[t]he
negotiation of merger terms always and necessarily precedes
consummation.” Id. at 358. Turning to the facts of the case,
the court found that the petitioners were not able “to cite
any rational explanatory factor that indicates why an investor
would perceive UFG's future more optimistically on New
Year's Eve 2001 than they did on the preceding Fourth of
July.” Id. UFG had experienced “a modest upward adjustment
in its [net income margin] in the second half of 2001,” but
the court saw no evidence that the increase was sustainable
or would alleviate UFG's problems complying with capital
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adequacy standards. Id. Although UFG had refinanced its
debt, the loan came from the acquirer, and UFG was not in a
position to either service that debt or refinance it completing
the merger. Id. The court concluded that “[c]onsidered fairly,
the record does not support the idea that UFG was more
valuable at the end of 2001 than it was when the Merger
Agreement was signed.” Id.
*46  In PetSmart, this court awarded fair value based on
the deal price in a case involving a publicly traded firm. See
In re PetSmart, Inc., 2017 WL 2303599, at *2 (Del. Ch.
May 26, 2017). The court regarded the petitioners' argument
that the merger price “was stale by the time of closing” as
“at best speculative.” Id. at *31. Citing Union Illinois, the
court explained that “[m]ergers are consummated after the
consideration is set. That temporal separation, however, does
not in and of itself suggest that the merger consideration does
not accurately reflect the company's going concern value as of
the closing date.” Id. The court then turned to the petitioners'
case-specific arguments:
Petitioners would have me conclude
that the Merger Price was stale
because, in the gap between signing
and closing, PetSmart's fortunes took
a miraculous turn for the better.
While the record indicates that the
Company did enjoy some favorable
results in Q4 2014, such as an uptick
in comparable store sales growth, I
am not convinced that these short-
term improvements were indicative
of a long-term trend. In fact, all
testimony at trial was to the contrary—
the Board, as well as Teffner, believed
that the Q4 results were temporary and
provided no basis to alter their view
of the Company's long-term prospects.
These perceptions were born out in
Q1 2015 (when the Merger closed)
during which PetSmart's comparable
store sales dropped to 1.7%. At year
end, PetSmart reported comparable
store sales growth of 0.9%, a 40% miss
from the Management Projections in
just the first projection year.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The petitioners in PetSmart thus
failed to carry their burden of proving that the value of the
company had changed.
Most recently, in Columbia, this court awarded fair value
based on the deal price in another case involving a publicly
traded firm. See In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Gp.,
Inc., 2019 WL 3778370, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 2019).
The company developed, owned, and operated natural gas
pipelines, storage facilities, and other midstream assets, and
it had a business plan that called for raising large amounts
of equity financing through a master limited partnership
(“MLP”). Before agreeing to be acquired, the company
had been unable to use the MLP structure to raise capital
because of adverse trends in the MLP financing market.
The merger agreement was signed on March 17, 2016,
and the transaction closed on July 1, 2016. The petitioners
argued that in the interim, the market for MLP equity had
improved and prices for energy commodities had increased.
See id. at *45. The court found that the petitioners had not
carried their burden of proving how to quantify the alleged
improvements in the form of a higher deal price. Id. The
court also found that the improvement in two MLP indices
did not persuasively support the claim that the company
would have been able to raise capital efficiently through its
MLP. The court similarly rejected any valuation increase
based on the prices of energy related commodities, because
everyone agreed that the company's value did not depend on
commodities. As a midstream company, it did not own, buy,
or sell the commodities that it transported or stored. Id.
The one arguable exception is Lender Processing, where
this court awarded fair value based on the value of the
deal price at closing, rather than at signing, where the deal
consideration consisted of 50% cash and 50% stock. See
Lender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *1, *8. Because of
the stock component, the value of the merger consideration
increased from $33.25 per share at signing to $37.14 per share
at closing. Id. The petitioners pointed to the existence of the
temporal gap as a reason not to rely on the deal price or
other market-based metrics associated with the signing of the
deal. The respondent pointed to the absence of a topping bid
as validating the deal price. After reviewing the evidence,
the court concluded that the final merger consideration “was
a reliable indicator of fair value as of the closing” and
that “because of synergies and a post-signing decline in the
Company's performance, the fair value of the Company as
of the closing date did not exceed” that amount. Id. at *23.
The acquirer's expert had not tried to quantify the synergies
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or the amount of the post-signing valuation decline, and the
court concluded that the respondent had failed to carry its
burden of proof on those issues. Id. at *33. By using the
deal price as measured at closing rather than at signing, the
Lender Processing decision accounted for changes in value
between signing and closing, but without making an explicit
adjustment.
*47  All four precedents considered whether the deal-price
metric needed to be adjusted to reflect changes in value
between signing and closing. The decisions thus indicate that
an adjustment to the deal price can be warranted. But the
decisions also show that the proponent of the adjustment must
carry its burden by identifying a persuasive reason for the
change and proving the amount.
At a minimum, it would seem to make sense to adjust the
deal price for inflation. When the parties agreed to the deal
price on December 8, 2016, they reached agreement on a price
measured in dollars valued as of that date. Between that date
and the closing on May 4, 2017, the purchasing power of those
dollars declined. If Stillwater had precisely the same value in
the abstract on May 4, 2017, as it did on December 8, 2016, it
would still be necessary to adjust the number of dollars used
to express that value to reflect the intervening decline in what
the value of a dollar represented. Adjusting the deal price for
inflation would achieve this result. 20
As their valuation expert, the petitioners relied on Howard
Rosen, a senior managing director at FTI Consulting. When
adjusting the unaffected trading price, Rosen used an inflation
rate of 2% per annum to account for the decrease in the value
of dollars between signing and closing, then made further
adjustments. See JX 728 ¶¶ 5.19, 5.25 to 5.28. A similar
inflation-based adjustment could be made to the deal price,
generating a value on the closing date of $18.14 per share, but
no one argued for it.
The nature of Stillwater's business makes this case a plausible
one for an upward adjustment that goes beyond inflation.
Stillwater was a mining concern that primarily produced
palladium and platinum. Stillwater's cash flows depended on
the prices of those metals, so when the prices of those metals
increased or decreased materially, the value of the Company
increased or decreased materially as well. The Company's
annual report for 2016 explained the relationship as follows:
*48  The Company's earnings and
cash flows are sensitive to changes in
PGM prices – based on 2016 revenue
and costs, a 1% (or approximately $7
per ounce) change in the Company's
average combined realized price for
palladium and platinum would result
in approximately a $7.1 million change
to before-tax net income and a change
to cash flows from operations of
approximately $3.9 million.
JX 728 ¶ 5.21 (quoting Stillwater Mining Company, Annual
Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 16, 2017)). The Merger was
signed on December 9, 2016. The Merger closed on May 4,
2017. Between signing and closing, the prices of palladium
and platinum increased materially, with a direct effect on
Stillwater's value. Id. ¶ 5.20.
Rosen determined that the sales-weighted price of Stillwater's
commodities increased by 5.9% between signing and closing.
Using the formula in Stillwater's annual report, Rosen
calculated the valuation impact of the additional cash flow as
ranging from $248 million (using a 11.2% WACC) to $285
million (using a 10% WACC), which equated to an increase of
between $2.00 to $2.30 per share. Id. He regarded his estimate
as conservative because he kept production constant and did
not account for new sources, such as Blitz, coming on line. Id.
¶¶ 5.23 to 5.25. Rosen used this figure to make adjustments
to the unaffected trading price. In theory, he could have made
similar adjustments to the merger price.
As this discussion indicates, the petitioners never argued for
an adjustment to the deal price based on an increase in value
between signing and closing. As discussed in the next section,
Sibanye argued that the court could make an adjustment to
the unaffected trading price and use the adjusted trading
price as an indicator of fair value. The petitioners countered
that argument by proposing an adjustment of their own that
resulted in the adjusted trading price exceeding the deal
price. Those arguments addressed the trading price, not the
deal price. There could be considerable conceptual overlap
between the approaches, but there could also be significant
differences.
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A petitioner seeking to make valuation-based adjustments
to a reliable deal price also would need to confront the
implications of the post-signing market check. As in Lender
Processing, a respondent in an appraisal case could easily
argue that if a company's value increased between signing and
closing, then a competing bidder would have perceived that
value and offered more than the deal price. The respondent
would argue that if no one bid, then that fact would call
for rejecting the petitioners' evidence of a valuation increase.
There are several possible responses to this argument.
One response is a relatively small point from a valuation
perspective: the termination fee. Using this case as an
example, if a topping bidder made a Superior Proposal,
and if the Board changed its recommendation, and if the
stockholders voted down the Merger, then Stillwater would
have to pay Sibanye a termination fee of $16.5 million plus
reimbursement of Sibanye's expenses up to $10 million, for a
total payment of $26.5 million or 21.6 cents per share. Those
amounts would reduce Stillwater's value to the acquirer,
making the acquirer neutral as to any increase in Stillwater's
value that did not clear that level. The point of indifference
is actually higher, because a competing bidder would incur
expenses of its own to make the competing bid. Ignoring
those incremental expenses and focusing only on the sell-side
fees, Stillwater's value could increase by up to $26.5 million
without a rational acquirer having any reason to bid. The
absence of a topping bid could not rule out a valuation change
of this magnitude, but an award above the deal price that fell
within the range permitted by the termination fee would likely
be cold comfort to the typical appraisal petitioner.
*49  A more significant counterargument would focus on
the timing of the valuation change. A premise that underlies
the effectiveness of the post-signing market check is that
other bidders learn that the target is for sale when the deal is
announced, can examine the target for themselves, and if they
value the target more highly (taking into account synergies
and other sources of bidder-specific value), then they can
intervene. Under this theoretical framework, competing
bidders can begin work shortly after the announcement,
giving them the full timeline between the signing and the
vote in which to intervene. When the potential overbid would
be induced by a change in the value of the target company,
the time for the competing bidder to act does not begin with
the announcement of the deal, but rather when the bidder
learns of the valuation change. The delayed signal shortens
the amount of time for the bidder to intervene. As the date
of the stockholder vote approaches, it becomes less likely (all
else equal) that a bidder will intervene, if only because less
time is available in which to do so. Because of this effect, a
failure to bid during the post-signing phase provides a much
noisier signal about changes in the target's value than it does
about the absence of higher-valuing bidders. In this case, the
increase in value that resulted from changes in the spot price
did not really begin until February 2017, two months after
signing. It dropped in March, then picked up again in April,
when the stockholder vote took place.
A third counterargument would examine the possibility of
changes in value after the stockholder vote but before
closing. As this case illustrates, a competing bidder's
only meaningful opportunity to intervene is before the
stockholders approve the transaction. In a case where closing
is delayed significantly after the stockholder vote because of
issues such as the need for regulatory approvals, the post-vote
temporal gap would matter more.
Perhaps the most significant problem with relying on a post-
signing market check to rule out an increase in the target's
standalone value is that the resulting valuation improvement
would be available to any bidder. The competition for the
incremental value would likely operate as a common value
auction, defined as an auction in which “every bidder has
the same value for the auctioned object.” Peter Cramton &
Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover
Regulation, 75 L. Econ. & Org. 27, 28–29 (1991). In a
competition for that incremental value, the incumbent bidder's
matching right would loom large. To make it worthwhile
to bid, a potential deal jumper would not only have to
perceive that the value of the target had increased above the
level set by the deal price plus the termination fee and fee
reimbursement plus the deal jumper's likely transaction costs,
but also perceive a pathway to success that was sufficiently
realistic to warrant becoming involved, taking into account
the potential reputational damage that could result from
being unsuccessful. Unless the competitor had a unique
reason to value the increased cash flows more highly than
the incumbent, the competitor should expect the incumbent
to match any incremental bid. 21  In a case like this one,
where the valuation increment would result from improved
commodity prices that would be available to all bidders, a
strong argument can be made that a competitor would not
think that it had the ability to outbid the incumbent and would
not try.
*50  The respondent in an appraisal proceeding could make
similar arguments about the stockholder vote. If the reasons
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for the valuation increase were public, and stockholders still
voted for the deal, then their behavior would provide contrary
market evidence undermining the claim of increased value.
In this case, the increase in commodity prices was publicly
available information, and Stillwater's stockholders had the
ability to vote down the deal if they thought the increased
value from improving commodity prices changed matters.
One obvious response to this argument is that to vote down
the deal, stockholders would have had to prefer returning
to Stillwater in its operative reality as a widely traded firm,
where their only the options for liquidity were either to sell
into the market or hold out for a higher-priced takeover down
the road. Given these choices, stockholders might well have
preferred the surer option of the deal price, even if they
believed that the Company's value had increased between
signing and closing such that the deal price no longer reflected
fair value.
As this discussion shows, whether to adjust the deal price
for an increase in value between signing and closing presents
numerous difficult questions. In this case, the petitioners did
not argue for an adjustment to the deal price, and so the parties
did not have the opportunity to address these interesting
issues. The court will not take them up at this late stage in the
proceeding. The petitioners accordingly failed to prove that
the deal price should be adjusted upward to reflect a change
in value between signing and closing. See Columbia, 2019
WL 3778370, at *45. This decision finds that the deal price
of $18.00 per share provides reliable evidence of fair value.
B. The Adjusted Trading Price
Sibanye contended that Stillwater's adjusted trading price
is a reliable indicator of the fair value of the Company.
Sibanye generates the adjusted trading price by making
adjustments to the unaffected trading price, so the reliability
of the adjusted trading price depends on the reliability of
the unaffected trading price. As the proponent of using this
valuation indicator, Sibanye bore the burden of establishing
its reliability and persuasiveness.
Assessing the reliability of the trading price for Stillwater's
common stock means getting “deep into the weeds of
economics and corporate finance.” In re Appraisal of Jarden
Corp., 2019 WL 3244085, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 19, 2019).
The thicket of market efficiency is one such place where
“law-trained judges should not go without the guidance of
experts trained in these disciplines.” Id. In this case, both
sides retained financial experts who tried to lead the court
through the undergrowth. Zmijewski addressed these issues
for Sibanye. Israel Shaked, a professor of economics and
finance at Boston University, addressed these issues for
petitioners.
1. Informational Efficiency and Fundamental-Value
Efficiency
The experts agreed on the difference between informational
efficiency and fundamental-value efficiency. See Zmijewski
Tr. 1087; JX 651 ¶¶ 13–27, 33–41 [hereinafter Shaked Rep.].
“[I]nformational Efficiency ... is concerned with how rapidly
security prices reflect or impound new information that
arrives to the market.” Shaked Rep. ¶ 33 (quoting Alex Frino
et al., Introduction to Corporate Finance 305 (5th ed. 2013)).
There are three recognized types of informational efficiency:
• Weak: a company's stock price reflects all historical price
information.
• Semi-Strong: a company's stock price reflects all
publicly available information.
• Strong: a company's stock price reflects both publicly
available information and inside information.
No one claimed that the market for Stillwater's common
stock could be informationally efficient in the strong sense.
Everyone focused on whether the market for Stillwater's
common stock was informationally efficient in the semi-
strong sense. All of the references in this decision to
informational efficiency as it relates to Stillwater's common
stock therefore contemplate informational efficiency in the
semi-strong sense.
*51  “While informational efficiency is a function of speed
and how quickly new material information is incorporated
into a stock's price, fundamental value efficiency is
an incremental function of how accurately a market in
which a stock trades discretely incorporates new material
information.” Shaked Rep. ¶ 42. The price of a security in
a market that is fundamental-value efficient should reflect
its intrinsic value, defined as “the present value of all cash
payments to the investor in the stock, including dividends
as well as the proceeds from the ultimate sale of the stock,
discounted at the appropriate risk adjusted rate.” Shaked Rep.
¶ 40. (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, a
stock trading in a market that is fundamental-value efficient
is one in which the trading price “fully reflects all estimates,
guidance and other public, material information that portray
the risks and returns of a stock accurately, including all key
drivers.” Id. ¶ 41.
- 365 - 
In re Stillwater Mining Company, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
2019 WL 3943851
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 43
The experts agreed that it is impossible to observe whether a
stock trades in a market that is fundamental-value efficient.
See Zmijewski Tr. 1088, 1153–54; Shaked Report ¶ 41.
According to the petitioners, this concession means that
Sibanye cannot meet its burden of proof.
While theoretically valid, the petitioners' argument goes too
far. Whether called fundamental value, true value, intrinsic
value, or fair value, the really-real value of something is
always an unobservable concept. No valuation methodology
provides direct access to it. Fundamental value is like a
Platonic form, and the various valuation methodologies only
cutouts casting shadows on the wall of the cave. The real issue
is not whether a particular method generates a shadow (they
all do), but rather whether the shadow is more or less distinct
than what other methods produce.
Reliance on the trading price of a widely held stock is
generally accepted in the financial community, and the trading
price or metrics derived from it are regularly used to estimate
the value of a publicly held firm based on its operative reality
in that configuration. For purposes of determining fair value
in an appraisal proceeding, therefore, the trading price has a
lot going for it. 22  Like democracy, the trading price may be
imperfect, but it often will serve better than the other metrics
that have been tried. Cf. Winston Churchill, Churchill by
Himself 574 (Richard Langworth ed., 2008). The petitioners'
admittedly valid objection that it is impossible to prove that
a trading price reflects fundamental value is thus not one that
automatically disqualifies the use of the trading price as a
valuation indicator in an appraisal.
*52  In this regard, it is important to recognize that
informational efficiency and fundamental-value efficiency
are not all-or-nothing concepts. See Bradford Cornell & John
Haut, How Efficient Is Sufficient: Applying the Concept of
Market Efficiency in Litigation, 74 Bus. Law. 417, 418 (2019).
A stock trading in a national market like the New York
Stock Exchange will have more attributes of informational
efficiency than a stock trading over the counter, but a party
might be able to show that the particular over-the-counter
market had sufficient attributes to regard the trading price
as informationally efficient. The attributes of the over-the-
counter market are likely to be consistent with a greater
degree of informational efficiency than thinner and chunkier
markets, such as markets for houses or entire companies.
Fundamental-value efficiency is likewise a matter of degree.
A market could be precisely fundamental-value efficient in
that it accurately prices the asset at exactly its true value.
Or it might be nearly fundamental-value efficient in that it
accurately prices the asset within some percentage, say plus
or minus 3%, of its true value. Or it might be approximately
fundamental-value efficient in that it accurately prices the
asset within some wider range of its true value, such as a factor
of two. See id. at 422 (“We might define an efficient market as
one in which price is within a factor of 2 of value, i.e., the price
is more than half of value and less than twice value.” (quoting
Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. Fin. 553 (1986))).
Although it is impossible to test for fundamental value,
there are indicators of fundamental-value efficiency. One
indicator is directional consistency, in which the market for
a security reacts positively to new material information that
is positive, and negatively to new material information that
is negative. See Shaked Rep. ¶¶ 43–44. Another indicator
is proportionality, which examines not only whether the
direction of the reaction to new material information is
consistent with its content, but also whether the extent of
the reaction corresponds with the informational content.
See id. ¶ 45. In simplified terms, if a company announces
a positive earnings surprise and its stock price increases,
then that outcome is directionally consistent. If the stock
price increases by an amount generally proportionate to
the present value of the earnings surprise, then that
outcome is proportionally consistent. A market that evidences
directionality and proportionality is more likely to be
fundamental-value efficient. A market that lacks evidence
of directionality and proportionality is less likely to be
fundamental-value efficient. See id. ¶ 46.
The question in this case is thus not whether the market for
Stillwater's common stock was or was not informationally
efficient. Nor is it whether the market for Stillwater's common
stock was or was not fundamental-value efficient. The
question is whether the market for Stillwater's common stock
was informationally efficient enough, and fundamental-value
efficient enough, to warrant considering the trading price
as a valuation indicator when determining fair value. Put
differently, the operative question in this case is whether
Sibanye proved that Stillwater's common stock traded in
a market having attributes that made the trading price a
sufficiently reliable valuation indicator to be taken into
account when determining fair value, either in conjunction
with other metrics, or even as the sole metric, with the
answer turning on both the attributes of the market for
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Stillwater's common stock, and also on the relative reliability
of the trading price compared to other metrics like the deal
price and the outputs of DCF models. See, e.g., Jarden,
2019 WL 3244085, at *4, *27–31 (determining fair value
based on the unaffected trading price after concluding that
it was comparatively the most reliable valuation indicator);
Cornell & Haut, supra, at 425 (“What is important in legal
applications is not some abstract notion of market efficiency.
Rather, what is important is whether the market is sufficiently
efficient in any particular situation.”).
2. Evidence Of Market Efficiency
*53  The experts disagreed about the extent to which the
market for Stillwater's shares was efficient. The experts
discussed factors that courts have considered as indicative of
informational efficiency. The experts also conducted event
studies and opined on their implications for informational
efficiency, directionality, and proportionality.
a. The Cammer And Krogman Factors
Zmijewski examined whether the market for Stillwater's
shares exhibited attributes that courts have associated
with informational efficiency. He relied on an instruction
from Sibanye's counsel that “Delaware Courts cite as
attributes of market efficiency characteristics such as market
capitalization, public float, weekly trading volume, bid-ask
spread, analyst following, and market reaction to breaking
news and information.” Zmijewski Rep. ¶ 49. He also
analyzed the existence of market makers, eligibility to file
SEC Form S-3, institutional ownership, and autocorrelation
of stock returns, noting that these additional factors were
considered in Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J.
1989), and in Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. Tex.
2001). Zmijewski Rep. ¶ 51. For simplicity, and following
the parties' lead, this decision refers to these attributes as the
“Cammer and Krogman factors,” even though not all of them
were considered in those two cases.
Based on his review of the record, Zmijewski reached the
following conclusions about these attributes:
• Market Capitalization: Zmijewski opined that “firms
with a larger market capitalization tend to have larger
institutional ownership,” “tend to be listed on the
New York Stock Exchange,” and are therefore more
likely to have shares that trade in markets that are
informationally efficient. Zmijewski Rep. App. C ¶ 35
(citing Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Measuring
Securities Market Efficiency in the Regulatory Setting,
63 L. & Contemp. Probs. 105, 115 (2000) (JX
896)). The Company's market capitalization averaged
approximately $1.3 billion, exceeding roughly 60% of
the combined equities of companies listed on the New
York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. Id.
• Public Float: Zmijewski opined that having a large
percentage of shares in the public float is indicative of
a trading market that is informationally efficient. Id. ¶¶
42–43 (noting that the Delaware Supreme Court in Dell
cited a public float of 1.5 billion shares representing
84.29% of the outstanding stock, and in DFC cited a
public float of 37.5 million shares representing 95%
of the outstanding stock). The Company's public float
consisted of 106 million shares representing 87.4% of
the outstanding stock. Id. ¶ 44.
• Weekly Trading Volume: Zmijewski opined that an
average weekly trading volume of at least 2% warrants
a “strong presumption” of informational efficiency. Id. ¶
2 (quoting Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286). The average
weekly turnover for Stillwater was 6.8%. Id. ¶ 3.
• Bid-Ask Spread: Zmijewski opined that a bid-ask spread
of less than 2.5% is indicative of a trading market that
is informationally efficient. Id. ¶¶ 37–38 (citing DFC,
172 A.3d at 352; Dell, 177 A.3d at 1, 5–6, 24–27, 41;
In re Sci.-Atlanta, Inc. Sec. Litig., 571 F. Supp. 2d 1315,
1340 (N.D. Ga. 2007); Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp., 213
F.R.D. 484, 501 (S.D. Fla. 2003); and Krogman, 202
F.R.D. at 478). The Company's average daily bid-ask
spread was 0.10%. Id. ¶ 39.
*54  • Analyst Coverage: Zmijewski opined that the
presence of at least five analysts following a company
is indicative of a trading market that is informationally
efficient. Id. ¶¶ 4–6 (relying on Thomas & Cotter, supra,
at 115). Seven analysts followed the Company. Id. ¶ 7.
• Market Makers: Zmijewski opined that the presence
of at least nineteen market makers is indicative of a
trading market that is informationally efficient and that
the same inference can be drawn when a company's
shares trade on a centralized auction market like the New
York Stock Exchange. Id. ¶¶ 8–9 (citing Cammer, 711
F. Supp. at 1293; Cheney, 213 F.R.D. at 499–500; In
re Dynex Capital, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2011 WL 781215,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2011); and Zvi Bodie et al.,
Investments 62–70 (12th ed. 2018)). The Company's
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stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange and had
eighty-two market makers. Id. ¶ 10.
• SEC Form S-3 Eligibility: Zmijewski opined that a
company's eligibility to register shares using SEC Form
S-3 eligibility is indicative of a trading market that is
informationally efficient. Id. ¶ 11 (citing Cammer, 711
F. Supp. at 1284). A company is eligible for Form S-3 if
it, among other things, has been subject to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 reporting requirements for more
than one year, filed documents in a timely manner, and
shown that it has not failed to pay certain obligations.
Id. The Company filed Forms S-3 in 1996, 1998, 2001,
2009, and 2010. Id. ¶ 12.
• Institutional Ownership: Zmijewski opined that having
a significant percentage of stock owned by institutional
investors is indicative of a trading market that is
informationally efficient. Id. ¶ 46 (citing Thomas &
Cotter, supra, at 106, 119). As of September 30, 2016,
institutions held approximately 90% of the Company's
outstanding stock. Id. ¶ 47.
• Autocorrelation: Zmijewski opined that a lack of
autocorrelation in a company's stock return is indicative
of a trading market that is informationally efficient.
Id. ¶ 48. Autocorrelation measures the extent to which
the next day's stock price movement can be predicted
based on the current day's stock price. Zmijewski found
no evidence of statistically significant autocorrelation
during the 254 trading days preceding the announcement
of the Merger. Id.
• Cause And Effect: Zmijewski opined that market
reactions to significant events are indicative of
informational efficiency. Id. ¶ 13 (citing Cammer, 711
F. Supp. at 1287). Zmijewski found that after the
Merger announcement, there was a quick and significant
increase in trading volume. Id. ¶ 17. The first news of
the Merger was released at 1:04 a.m on December 9,
2016. Pre-market trading opened at 4:00 a.m. The first
trade occurred at 4:01 a.m. at $17.50. The Company's
stock closed that day at $17.32 per share, with 38 million
shares having traded. The day before, the Company's
stock closed at $14.68 per share, and only 3.2 million
shares were traded. Id. ¶¶ 15–16; see Zmijewski Tr.
1096.
Having considering the Cammer and Krogman factors,
Zmijewski opined that “[t]he evidence indicates that
Stillwater's common stock traded in a semi-strong efficient
market.” Zmijewski Rep. ¶ 49.
In response, Shaked disputed whether the Cammer and
Krogman factors established informational efficiency to a
sufficiently reliable degree. He opined that “the Cammer and
Krogman factors have not been academically tested and are
not truly conclusive in judging a market as semi-strong form
efficient, but merely an indicator that a market is likely semi-
strong form efficient.” Shaked Rep. ¶ 23. The petitioners
did not cite any academic studies or provide other forms of
evidence that would undermine the use of the Cammer and
Krogman factors, at least as a starting point for assessing
informational efficiency. Zmijewski did not engage on this
issue. He analyzed the factors because he understood that
courts considered them.
b. The Event Studies
*55  The experts also conducted event studies. Zmijewski's
event study tested for a cause-and-effect relationship between
new information and a trading price reaction, which would
provide evidence of informational efficiency. He examined
five events—the four quarterly earnings releases leading up
to the announcement of the Merger plus the announcement
itself. Zmijewski characterized the events as positive or
negative, and examined the market evidence to determine if
the observations resulted in statistically significant abnormal
returns. Three of the five did, but one of those was the reaction
to the announcement of the Merger. Shaked persuasively
observed that finding a statistically significant relationship
between the trading price and the announcement of the
Merger was trivial. See Shaked Tr. 468–69.
For the remaining four observations, Zmijewski found that
only two resulted in statistically significant abnormal returns,
and he admitted that he would have expected the rate of
statistically significant results in an informationally efficient
market to be higher. Zmijewski Tr. 1101. The events
themselves do not suggest any reason why the market would
have reacted in one instance and not the other. For example,
for both the fourth quarter of 2015 and the third quarter of
2016, Stillwater announced higher earnings per share, yet
only the former resulted in a statistically significant abnormal
return.
Shaked conducted three event studies, and he analyzed the
results not only for evidence of a cause-and-effect relationship
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consistent with informational efficiency, but also for evidence
of directionality and proportionality that would provide
indications of fundamental value efficiency. In his first study,
Shaked looked at eleven quarterly earnings releases during
the three-year period leading up to the announcement of
the Merger and characterized their informational content
as positive or negative. He then examined whether the
announcement resulted in abnormal returns consistent with
the direction of the news. Shaked observed that only six of the
eleven releases resulted in a directionally consistent reaction;
five of the eleven did not.
In his second study, Shaked examined articles, analyst reports
and SEC filings during the same three-year period, yielding
a total of 181 events that he believed contained material new
information. News of the 181 events was published on a total
of fifty-six days, resulting in fifty-six observations. Although
there are reasons to question some of Shaked's events,
on the whole, his identification appears credible. Of these
fifty-six observations, only twelve resulted in statistically
significant abnormal returns that were consistent with the
directional content of the information. Moreover, there were
thirty-eight days in the study period when there was a
statistically significant abnormal return but no material news
announcement.
In his third study, Shaked tested for proportionality by
examining the reaction of the Company's stock to the
announcement of a significant increase in the expansion of
its mining operations in its earnings announcement for the
third quarter of 2016. In the prior quarterly earnings releases,
the Company forecast that the expansion would produce
between 150,000 and 200,000 PGM ounces per year. JX
134 at 13; JX 187 at 17. In the earnings announcement
for the third quarter of 2016, the Company increased the
projection to between 270,000 and 330,000 PGM ounces per
year. JX 309 at 16; see JX 306. Shaked estimated the pre-
tax net income that would result from the increased output,
taking into account the additional costs. He then prepared a
discounted-cash-flow model that assumed production would
ramp up by 25,000 ounces per year until 2022, continue at
125,000 ounces per year until 2031, then stop with no terminal
value. Based on this model, Shaked calculated a net present
value of $111.6 million for the increased production, which
should have equated to a 7.08% abnormal return. Although
the stock reacted positively, the observed abnormal return was
only 0.39%. Shaked concluded that the Company's stock did
not react in a proportionate manner, further undermining the
claim of informational efficiency.
c. The Assessment Of Market Efficiency
*56  Absent any countervailing evidence, Zmijewski's
analysis of the Cammer and Krogman factors would support a
finding that the trading market for Stillwater's common stock
had sufficient attributes to be regarded as informationally
efficient. Shaked pointed out that the Cammer and Krogman
factors have not been shown to provide a reliable indication
of informational efficiency, but given the weight of authority
on this issue, an absence of evidence on this point is no longer
enough. 23
The event studies, however, cut in the opposite direction.
Courts applying the Cammer and Krogman factors have
generally given greater weight to event studies compared
to the other factors. 24  Based on his studies, Shaked
opined that Stillwater's stock did not trade in a manner
consistent with informational efficiency, and Zmijewski's
event study generated relatively unconvincing results. Given
this evidence, it is difficult to conclude that Stillwater's stock
was informationally efficient to a degree sufficient to use the
trading price as an indicator of fair value when a superior
market-based metric, like the deal price, is available. That
does not mean that Stillwater's stock was not informationally
efficient, only that the deal price is a superior market-based
metric for purposes of determining fair value.
*57  Shaked's event studies also raised questions about the
degree of directionality and proportionality exhibited by the
market for Stillwater's common stock. This evidence does
not mean that Stillwater's stock price was unreliable, but it
does make it difficult to conclude that Stillwater's stock was
fundamental-value efficient to a degree sufficient to use the
trading price as an indicator of fair value when a superior
market-based metric like the deal price is available.
3. Evidence Of Information Gaps
The petitioners advance two other challenges to the reliability
of Stillwater's trading price. Because everyone agrees that
the market for Stillwater's common stock could only
be informationally efficient in the semi-strong sense, the
trading price could only account for publicly available
information. The petitioners argue that material information
about Stillwater's inferred reserves was not publicly available,
meaning that the trading price could not be a reliable indicator
of fundamental value. They also cite evidence indicating that
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the parties themselves did not trust the market's estimation
of the Company's value. The former point is another strike
against the trading price; the latter is not.
a. Industry Guide 7
The petitioners argue that Stillwater's trading price is not a
reliable indicator of value because the market did not have
access to material information related to the Company's value.
On this issue, the petitioners relied on another expert: Thomas
Matthews, a Principal Resource Geologist at Gustavson
Associates. Matthews discussed the constraints imposed by
Industry Guide 7, which specifies what the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission permits a mining
company to disclose. See JX 843 [hereinafter Industry Guide
7]; 17 C.F.R. 229.801(g).
To oversimplify a significantly more complex area, Industry
Guide 7 only permits a mining company to disclose
information about proven reserves or probable reserves. A
proven reserve is a mineral deposit where (i) “quantity is
computed from dimensions revealed in outcrops, trenches,
workings or drill holes,” (ii) “grade or quality are computed
from the results of detailed sampling,” and (iii) “the sites
for inspection, sampling and measurement are spaced so
closely and the geologic character is so well defined that
size, shape, depth and mineral content of reserves are well-
established.” Industry Guide 7 ¶ (a)(2). A probable reserve is
a mineral deposit where “the sites for inspection, sampling,
and measurement are farther apart or are otherwise less
adequately spaced,” resulting in a “degree of assurance” that
is “lower than that for proven reserves” but still “high enough
to assume continuity between points of observation.” Id. ¶
(a)(3). Industry Guide 7 does not permit a mining company
to disclose information about inferred resources, which are
mineral deposits where the quantity, grade, and quality
“can be estimated” based on “geological evidence,” “limited
sampling,” and “reasonably assumed, but not verified,
geological and grade continuity.” JX 7 at 4; see Industry
Guide 7 ¶ (b)(5), Instruction 3.
Since at least 2012, the Society for Mining, Metallurgy and
Exploration, Inc. has criticized this aspect of Industry Guide
7, complaining that the restrictions on reporting “limits the
completeness and relevance of SEC reports for investors.”
JX 15 at 1. The Society contrasted Industry Guide 7 with
the standards applied in other countries, which permit this
disclosure. Id. at 2. In 2016, the SEC acknowledged the issue
and proposed revisions to Industry Guide 7, but the new
rules did not go into effect until 2018, long after the Merger
closed. See Modernization of Property Disclosures for Mining
Registrants, Exchange Act Release No. 34-84509, 2018 WL
5668900 (Oct. 31, 2018).
*58  Under Industry Guide 7 as it existed during the
period leading up to the Merger, Stillwater could disclose
information about the Stillwater Mine and East Bolder
Mine, but could not disclose information about the inferred
resources at Blitz, Lower East Boulder, Iron Creek, Altar,
and Marathon. See JX 727 ¶ 13 (Matthews Reb. Rep.).
For Blitz, the Company possessed but could not disclose
“a resource estimation, a conceptual mine plan, material
movement schedules, a capital and operating cost review, and
a preliminary economic analysis for the Blitz expansion.” Id.
¶ 12. The Company could only disclose certain drill data and
briefly describe production target ranges, estimated capital
spend, and timeframes. See id. ¶ 14.
The parties disagreed about whether disclosure of this
information would cause investors to place a higher or lower
valuation on the Company, but they agreed that it created
an information gap for purposes of trading in the Company's
stock. See id. ¶ 16; Zmijewski Tr. 1151. Zmijewski argued
that because the effect of the information was unknowable,
the court should assume that the absence of the information
did not bias the trading price up or down. Sibanye also pointed
out that some of the information was available in a filing that
Stillwater made in March 2011 under the laws of Canada. See
JX 9 at '055; cf. JX 501 at '345.
Stillwater's inability to disclose information about inferred
resources under Industry Guide 7, combined with its partial
disclosure of some of this information in a Canadian filing
from 2011, are negative factors for purposes of using the
Company's trading price as a valuation indicator. They are not
dispositive in their own right, but they undermine the relative
persuasiveness of the trading price.
b. Contemporaneous Evidence Of A Valuation Gap
The petitioners also cite contemporaneous evidence in the
record in which knowledgeable insiders affiliated with
Stillwater, its advisors, or Sibanye regarded the trading price
as an unreliable indicator of value. For example:
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• In May 2015, Stillwater management told the Board that
“[m]uch of the value from Blitz, Lower East Boulder and
recycle ramp up yet to be recognized by the market and
potential buyers.” JX 41 at '715.
• In January 2016, the Board thought that “the stock had
been forced down significantly and ... didn't feel it really
was reflective of what was going on in the business.”
McMullen Dep. 145.
• In June 2016, Froneman described the markets as “a bit
all over the place lately.” JX 152 at '532.
• In their second and third quarter 2016 reports,
BMO analysts thought the Company's stock price
did not reflect the value of Blitz. See JX 766
(stating in October 2016 that “[e]ven with arguably
conservative assumptions, we maintain our opinion that
the magnitude of the growth potential at Blitz is not
factored into SWC shares”); Shaked Rep. ¶ 124 (quoting
a June 2016 BMO report stating that “Blitz remains an
underappreciated growth opportunity”).
• In October 2016, Vujcic told the Board that the market
perceived PGMs as “exposed to irrational producer
behaviour in both South Africa and Russia.” JX 293 at
'522.
• During October, November, and December 2016, Stewart
repeatedly stated that “[a]t an offer price of ~US$2bn
(30% premium to 30 day VWAP) we are effectively
paying a full price for the existing operations, 50% of
Blitz and getting the remaining upside optionality for
free.” JX 282 at '775; see JX 410; JX 378 at '009;
JX 447 at '981. He did not believe the market was
“really considering Blitz.” JX 397 at '451; see JX 280
at '279 (describing the Company's underperformance as
“unlikely to remain as market recognises improvements
are sustainable and Blitz comes on line”).
*59  • In late November 2016, two weeks before signing,
Stewart stated that the market was “currently at or near
the bottom of the PGM cycle,” suggesting a depressed
stock price. JX 410 at '099; see PTO ¶ 257; see also JX
280 at '279; JX 399 at '407.
• In early December 2016, days before signing, McMullen
commented on how the price of palladium had been
artificially depressed. See JX 437 at '471 (noting
that palladium was “finally starting to reflect the
fundamentals”)
• After announcing the Merger, Sibanye received two “deal
of the year” awards and commented in both instances
that the Merger was signed “at an opportune time in the
commodity price cycle.” JX 511; JX 641 at 1.
• At trial, Schweitzer testified that “[t]he company's stock
price was all over the place from 2013 to 2016” and that
he and “McMullen both believed there was a disconnect
between the price of metals and the share price for
Stillwater stock.” Schweitzer Tr. 173.
This evidence as a whole is less extensive and persuasive than
what the record demonstrated about the contemporaneous
views of knowledgeable insiders regarding the existence of a
valuation gap in Dell, and the Delaware Supreme Court in that
case found that the trial court erred by giving weight to that
evidence. See Dell, 177 A.3d 25–26; cf. Dell Trial, 2016 WL
3186538, at *33–36. This decision therefore does not give any
weight to the petitioners' weaker showing in this case.
4. The Comparative Reliability Of The Trading Price
Through Zmijewski's analysis of the Cammer and Krogman
factors, Sibanye made an initial showing that would be
sufficient to support the reliability of the trading price as
a valuation indicator absent contrary evidence. The results
of the experts' event studies and the limitations imposed
by Industry Guide 7 provided contrary evidence. Based on
the parties' showings, the trading price is a less persuasive
and less reliable valuation indicator in this case than the
deal price. The lack of a reliable trading price does not
undermine a court's ability to rely on the deal price, where
the persuasiveness of the deal price has been established by
analyzing the sufficiency of the sale process. See Columbia,
2019 WL 3778370, at *49.
This decision does not find that the trading price was so
unreliable that it could not be used as a valuation indicator. If
a market-tested indicator like the deal price was unavailable,
then this decision might well have given weight to the trading
price. Had this decision been forced to take that route, it
would not have relied on the unaffected trading price, because
Sibanye did not argue for its use, but instead would have taken
into account the adjusted trading price.
Based on the record that the parties generated, Sibanye did not
carry its burden to establish that the adjusted trading price was
- 371 - 
In re Stillwater Mining Company, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
2019 WL 3943851
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 49
a sufficiently reliable valuation indicator for the court to use in
determining fair value. The reliability of the adjusted trading
price depended on the reliability of the unaffected trading
price, and the record provides sufficient reason for concern
about incorporating a trading price metric. This decision
therefore does not give any weight to the adjusted trading
price.
C. The Discounted Cash Flow Models
The petitioners and Sibanye each introduced a DCF valuation
prepared by an expert. The petitioners relied on Rosen, whose
DCF model generated a value of $25.91 per share. Sibanye
relied on Zmijewski, whose DCF model generated a value of
$17.03 per share. The difference amounts to approximately
$1 billion in value.
*60  The DCF method is a technique that is generally
accepted in the financial community. “While the particular
assumptions underlying its application may always be
challenged in any particular case, the validity of [the DCF]
technique qua valuation methodology is no longer open
to question.” Pinson, 1989 WL 17438, at *8 n.11. It is a
“standard” method that “gives life to the finance principle that
firms should be valued based on the expected value of their
future cash flows, discounted to present value in a manner that
accounts for risk.” Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005
WL 2045640, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005).
The DCF model entails three basic
components: an estimation of net cash
flows that the firm will generate and
when, over some period; a terminal
or residual value equal to the future
value, as of the end of the projection
period, of the firm's cash flows beyond
the projection period; and finally a cost
of capital with which to discount to
a present value both the projected net
cash flows and the estimated terminal
or residual value.
In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del.
Ch. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Dell and DFC, the Delaware Supreme Court cautioned
against using the DCF methodology when market-based
indicators are available. In Dell, the high court explained
that “[a]lthough widely considered the best tool for valuing
companies when there is no credible market information and
no market check, DCF valuations involve many inputs—
all subject to disagreement by well-compensated and highly
credentialed experts—and even slight differences in these
inputs can produce large valuation gaps.” Dell, 177 A.3d at
37–38. The high court warned that when market evidence
is available, “the Court of Chancery should be chary about
imposing the hazards that always come when a law-trained
judge is forced to make a point estimate of fair value based on
widely divergent partisan expert testimony.” Id. at 35. Making
the same point conversely in DFC, the Delaware Supreme
Court advised that a DCF model should be used in appraisal
proceedings “when the respondent company was not public
or was not sold in an open market check ....” DFC, 172 A.3d
at 369 n.118. The high court commented that “a singular
discounted cash flow model is often most helpful when there
isn't an observable market price.” Id. at 370.
This case illustrates the problems that the Delaware Supreme
Court identified. The experts disagreed over many inputs,
with small changes producing large swings in value. The
briefing focused on eight inputs, with four generating the bulk
of the difference.
First, the experts debated whether to apply a small-company
risk premium, otherwise known as a size premium. Zmijewski
applied a size premium of 1.66%, relying on Duff &
Phelps, 2017 Valuation Handbook – U.S. Guide to Cost of
Capital (2017). Rosen did not apply one, arguing that it
was not warranted. To the extent the court disagreed, he
argued for using a premium of 1.5% drawn from Ibbotson
Associates, SBBI 2013 Valuation Yearbook (2013). The
scholarly literature on whether and how to apply a size
premium is less than enlightening. The same respected
scholars have found different results depending on the data
set, 25  and others have engaged in vigorous debate about how
to interpret the data and what inferences to draw. 26  This
one dispute results in a valuation swing of $2.13 per share,
accounting for approximately 24% of the difference between
the two models.
*61  Second, the experts debated the size of the equity risk
premium. Zmijewski used a historic supply-side risk premium
of 5.97% published by Duff & Phelps. See JX 837; JX 893.
Duff & Phelps advised practitioners to deduct 1.08% from
this measurement to account for “the WWII Interest Rate
Bias.” JX 893 at 34. Zmijewski did not make the adjustment,
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explaining that it would not make sense to exclude the effect
of interest rate controls during World War II, while failing
to account for other periods of government control, such as
the extreme phases of interest rate repression and quantitative
easing that followed the 2008 financial crisis. Zmijewski Tr.
1042–43. Rosen used a forward-looking premium of 5.34%,
derived from a model created by Aswath Damodaran. See JX
678. Zmijewski criticized the model, explaining that a user
could generate approximately seventy different equity risk
premiums by manipulating the inputs and objecting to some
of Rosen's selections. See JX 893 at 47; JX 894; Zmijewski
Tr. 1053–54. This one dispute results in a valuation swing
of $1.33 per share, accounting for approximately 15% of the
difference between the two models.
Third, the experts disputed which set of commodity price
forecasts to use to generate cash flows. Zmijewski relied on
price forecasts prepared by another expert for Sibanye. JX
710 (Burrows Rep.). Rosen relied on price forecasts from
Bloomberg. JX 654 ¶ 8.21 (Rosen Rep.). This one dispute
results in a valuation swing of $0.82 per share, accounting for
approximately 9% of the difference between the two models.
Fourth, the experts diverged in their treatment of Stillwater's
exploration areas. Sibanye argued that any valuation of these
properties would be speculative and instructed Zmijewski
not to try. Zmijewski Tr. 1074–75. Rosen estimated an “in-
ground metal dollar value” for the properties, then relied
on a report that examined PGM transactions in South
Africa to estimate that exploration properties could be worth
“between .5 percent and 2.5 percent of the estimated in
situ dollar value of metal.” Rosen Tr. 277–78; see JX 765.
The respondent's mining expert identified many problems
with Rosen's method. See JX 768. The dispute over the
exploration areas results in a valuation swing of more than
$2.00, accounting for approximately 23% of the difference
between the two models.
Four other disputes account for the remaining valuation swing
of $3.00 per share. Those disagreements concern how to
account for the resources in mine-adjacent areas, the amount
of excess cash, the value of inventory, and the value of Altar.
As with the four major disputes, both sides have good reasons
for their positions.
The legitimate debates over these inputs and the large swings
in value they create undercut the reliability of the DCF
model as a valuation indicator. If this were a case where
a reliable market-based metric was not available, then the
court might have to parse through the valuation inputs and
hazard semi-informed guesses about which expert's view was
closer to the truth. In this case, there is a persuasive market-
based metric: the deal price that resulted from a reliable sale
process. Dell and DFC teach that a trial court should have
greater confidence in market indicators and less confidence
in divergent expert determinations. See Dell, 177 A.3d at 35–
38; DFC, 172 A.3d at 368–70 & n.118. Compared to the deal-
price metric, the DCF technique “is necessarily a second-best
method to derive value.” Union Illinois, 847 A.2d at 359.
This decision therefore does not use it. See In re Appraisal of
Solera Hldgs., Inc., 2018 WL 3625644, at *32 (Del. Ch. July
30, 2018).
III. CONCLUSION
The fair value of the Company's common stock at the effective
time of the Merger was $18.00 per share. The legal rate of
interest, compounded quarterly, shall accrue on the appraised
value from the effective date until the date of payment. The
parties shall cooperate to prepare a form of final order. If there
are additional issues that need to be resolved, then the parties
shall submit a joint letter within fourteen days that identifies
them and proposes a path to bring this matter to a conclusion
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Footnotes
1 Citations in the form “PTO ¶ ––” refer to stipulated facts in the pre-trial order. Dkt. 209. Citations in the form
“[Name] Tr.” refer to witness testimony from the trial transcript. Citations in the form “[Name] Dep.” refer to
witness testimony from a deposition transcript. Citations in the form “JX –– at ––” refer to a trial exhibit with
the page designated by the last three digits of the control or JX number. If a trial exhibit used paragraph or
section numbers, then references are by paragraph or section.
2 The two slides in the management presentations that addressed a sale contained comments like “[f]inding
a willing buyer with higher priced currency is difficult,” “[m]uch of the value from Blitz, Lower East Boulder
and recycle ramp up yet to be recognized by the market and potential buyers,” and the “[r]ecent downward
trend in PGM prices not the right environment in which to be a seller.” Id. at '866 to '867. Out of the nearly
190 slides in the banker presentations, only one discussed a possible sale. There, BMO opined that selling
was “unlikely to be a value maximizing strategy until value has been extracted from all the other alternatives”
available to the Company. Id. at '108.
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3 See, e.g., JX 50 at '586 to '594; JX 52; JX 53; JX 55; JX 57; JX 58; JX 67; JX 68; PTO ¶¶ 138–39. Although
principally focused on acquisitions, McMullen asked BMO in an October 2015 email for its views about “who
would potentially be a buyer of Stillwater in an M+A deal?” JX 57 at '920. BMO sent back a list of twenty-one
candidates, but warned that “[g]enerally as a whole we would say that we do not believe there is a high level
of current interest and capability for an acquisition of Stillwater.” Id. at '919.
4 Only one slide in McMullen's presentation referenced a sale of the Company, and it advised that there was
a “[v]ery limited number of potential buyers” and that because “commodity prices and sentiment are low,”
the Company “would not realize full value potentially.” JX 86 at '025. By contrast, he presented multiple
slides discussing positively how the Company could deploy its “capital and currency” (its stock) to make an
acquisition. See id. at '026 to '035.
5 See JX 138; JX 139 at '831; JX 154 at '087; JX 155; JX 157 at '315; McMullen Tr. 709–10; see also JX 349.
6 See Schweitzer Tr. 189–90. McMullen testified that he told Schweitzer and Merrin about Sibanye's approach
after his initial meeting with Froneman. He also claimed that he kept the Board informed as discussions
progressed. McMullen's self-interested testimony conflicted with Schweitzer's more credible testimony and
other record evidence.
7 See JX 152 at '532 '533. At trial, McMullen testified that after Sibanye conducted its site visit, the Board
told him that they wanted “some sort of written expression of interest” before starting “a data room process.”
McMullen Tr. 728–29. That testimony was not credible. The evidence indicates that McMullen did not brief
the Board about a potential transaction with Sibanye until the July 2015 board meeting. See Schweitzer Tr.
189–90.
8 JX 364 at '374. At trial, Schweitzer testified that this was the meeting at which the Board finally decided it
did not need a special committee. See Schweitzer Tr. 157–58, 194. The minutes omit any discussion of the
matter.
9 Id. at 72. Although Battye is the seminal Delaware Supreme Court case on point, Chancellor Josiah Wolcott
initially established the meaning of “value” under the appraisal statute in Chicago Corporation v. Munds, 172
A. 452 (Del. Ch. 1934). Citing the “material variance” between the Delaware appraisal statute, which used
“value,” and the comparable New Jersey statute that served as a model for the Delaware statute, which
used “full market value,” Chancellor Wolcott held that the plain language of the statute required “value” to be
determined on a “going concern” basis. Id. at 453–55. But see Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Gp.,
Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 355–56 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“This requirement that the valuation inquiry focus on valuing the
entity as a going concern has sometimes been confused as a requirement of § 262's literal terms. It is not.”).
10 See, e.g., Montgomery Cellular Hldg. Co. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 222 (Del. 2005); Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma
Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 553 (Del. 2000); Rapid-Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 802 (Del. 1992); Cavalier
Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989); Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 141 (Del.
1980); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218 (Del. 1975).
11 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 2003 WL 23700218, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003, revised July 9, 2004),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005); accord Finkelstein v. Liberty Dig., Inc.,
2005 WL 1074364, at *12 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2005) (“The judges of this court are unremittingly mindful of the
fact that a judicially selected determination of fair value is just that, a law-trained judge's estimate that bears
little resemblance to a scientific measurement of a physical reality. Cloaking such estimates in grand terms
like ‘intrinsic value’ does not obscure this hard truth from any informed commentator.”).
12 See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136 (“It cannot be that an open chance for buyers to bid signals a market failure
simply because buyers do not believe the asset on sale is sufficiently valuable for them to engage in a bidding
contest against each other.”); Dell, 177 A.3d at 29 (“Fair value entails at a minimum a price some buyer
is willing to pay—not a price at which no class of buyers in the market would pay.”); id. at 33 (finding that
absence of higher bid meant “that the deal market was already robust and that a topping bid involved a
serious risk of overpayment,” which “suggests the price is already at a level that is fair”).
13 See Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, Finding the Right Balance in Appraisal Litigation: Deal
Price, Deal Process, and Synergies, 73 Bus. Law. 961, 962 (2018) (commending outcomes in Dell and DFC
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and arguing that “the Delaware courts' treatment of the use of the deal price to determine fair value does
and should mirror the treatment of shareholder class action fiduciary duty litigation”); id. at 982–83 (citing
Dell and DFC in observing, “What we discern from the case law, however, is a tendency to rely on deal price
to measure fair value where the transaction would survive enhanced judicial scrutiny .... Thus, in order to
determine whether to use the deal price to establish fair value, the Delaware courts are engaging in the same
sort of scrutiny they would have applied under Revlon if the case were one challenging the merger as in
breach of the directors' fiduciary duties.” (footnote omitted)); Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Flawed
Corporate Finance of Dell and DFC Global, 68 Emory L.J. 221, 269 (2018) (explaining that Dell and DFC
“conflate questions of fiduciary duty liability with the valuation questions central to appraisal disputes”).
14 See id. at 1068 n.87 (citing cases including In re Dollar Thrifty S'holders Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 612–13, 615 (Del.
Ch. 2010) (finding that the target board's use of no-shop, matching rights, and termination fee provisions
were reasonable even though the company had agreed to deal exclusively with the buyer without conducting
a pre-signing market check); and In re MONY Gp. Inc. S'holders Litig., 852 A.2d 9 (Del. Ch. 2004) (finding
that the board acted reasonably even though it did not actively shop the company because the board was
financially sophisticated, had knowledge of the relevant industry, and there was a “substantial opportunity for
an effective market check” after the agreement was announced)); id. at 1069 (citing Lyondell Chem. Co. v.
Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009)).
15 See id. at *44. The PLX Trial decision included an appendix that collected decisions approving a passive
market check. The table somehow swapped the details of the passive market check in Braunschweiger v.
American Home Shield Corporation, 1989 WL 128571 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 1989), with the details from In re
Formica Corporation Shareholders Litigation, 1989 WL 25812 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 1989). A corrected version
is attached to this decision as an appendix.
16 See Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instr. Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989) (“[I]n change of control situations,
sole reliance on hired experts and management can taint[ ] the design and execution of the transaction. Thus,
we look particularly for evidence of a board's active and direct role in the sale process.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Mills Acq. Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1281 (Del. 1989) (“[A] board of directors ...
may not avoid its active and direct duty of oversight in a matter as significant as the sale of corporate control.”);
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor II), 634 A.2d 345, 368 (Del. 1993) (explaining that directors
must maintain “an active and direct role in the context of a sale of a company from beginning to end”); In
re Rural Metro Corp. S'holders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 91 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“As a threshold matter, the decision
to initiate a sale process falls short under enhanced scrutiny because it was not made by an authorized
corporate decisionmaker. The Board did not make the decision to launch a sale process, nor did it authorize
the Special Committee to start one.”), aff'd sub nom. RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816 (Del.
2015); id. (“One of the Delaware Supreme Court's clearest teachings is that ‘directors cannot be passive
instrumentalities during merger proceedings.’ ” (quoting Technicolor II, 634 A.2d at 368)).
17 See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136–39, 142 (adopting deal price less synergies as fair value where company's banker
contacted five potential buyers after HP's initial outreach, none were interested, sale process terminated,
and sale process later resumed as single-bidder engagement with HP, with only one quick contact to a sixth
party); Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (finding competitive pre-signing process where Silver Lake competed one-at-a-
time with interested parties); DFC, 172 A.3d at 350, 355, 376 (finding “competitive process of bidding” where
company's banker contacted “every logical buyer,” three expressed interest, and two named a preliminary
price with one dropping out before serious negotiations commenced).
18 See Dell Trial, 2016 WL 3186538, at *29 & n.24 (citing Joshua Rosenbaum & Joshua Pearl, Investment
Banking: Valuation, Leveraged Buyouts, and Mergers & Acquisitions 195–96 (2009) (“[An LBO model] is
used ... to determine an implied valuation range for a given target in a potential LBO sale based on achieving
acceptable returns....”); and Donald M. DePamphilis, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Other Restructuring
Activities 506 (7th ed. 2014) (“[T]he DCF analysis solves for the present value of the firm, while the LBO
model solves for the internal rate of return.”)); id. at *29 nn. 25, 26 (citing Rosenbaum & Pearl, supra, at
195–96 (“In an M&A sell-side advisory context, the banker conducts LBO analysis to assess valuation from
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the perspective of a financial sponsor. This provides the ability to set sale price expectations for the seller
and guide negotiations with buyers accordingly ....” (emphasis added)); id. at 235–36 (“Traditionally, the
valuation implied by LBO analysis is toward the lower end of a comprehensive analysis when compared
to other methodologies, particularly precedent transactions and DCF analysis. This is largely due to the
constraints imposed by an LBO, including leverage capacity, credit market conditions, and the sponsor's own
IRR hurdles.”)).
19 See, e.g., Dent v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., 2014 WL 2931180, at *8–10 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014) (rejecting
fiduciary challenge to “(1) a no-solicitation provision; (2) a standstill provision; (3) a change in recommendation
provision; (4) information rights for [the acquirer]; and (5) a $5 million termination fee” where termination
fee represented 4.5% of equity value and change-of-recommendation provision included unlimited matching
right); In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2013 WL 396202, at *13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2013)
(rejecting fiduciary challenge to a merger agreement with a no-shop provision, matching and information
rights, a termination fee representing 3.1% of deal value, and a force-the-vote provision; observing that “under
Delaware law, these deal protection measures, individually or cumulatively, have routinely been upheld as
reasonable”); In re Novell, Inc. S'holder Litig., 2013 WL 322560, at *10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 2013) (describing
“the no solicitation provision, the matching rights provision, and the termination fee” as “customary and well
within the range permitted under Delaware law” and observing that “[t]he mere inclusion of such routine terms
does not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty”); In re Synthes, Inc. S'holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1049 (Del.
Ch. 2012) (finding that a termination fee of 3.05% of equity value, a no-solicitation provision with a fiduciary
out and matching rights, a force-the-vote provision, and a voting agreement that locked up at least 33% of
the company shares in favor of the merger were not unreasonable deal protection devices); In re Answers
Corp. S'holders Litig., 2011 WL 1366780, at *4 & n.47 (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2011) (describing “a termination fee
plus expense reimbursement of 4.4% of the Proposed Transaction's equity value, a no solicitation clause, a
‘no-talk’ provision limiting the Board's ability to discuss an alternative transaction with an unsolicited bidder,
a matching rights provision, and a force-the-vote requirement” as “standard merger terms” that “do not alone
constitute breaches of fiduciary duty” (quoting In re 3Com S'holders Litig., 2009 WL 5173804, at *7 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 18, 2009))); In re Atheros Commc'ns, Inc. S'holder Litig., 2011 WL 864928, at *7 n.61 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 4, 2011) (same analysis for no-solicitation provision, matching right, and termination fee); In re 3Com,
2009 WL 5173804, at *7 & n.37 (rejecting challenge to merger agreement with a no-solicitation provision,
matching rights, and a termination fee in excess of 4% of equity value; describing provisions as having been
“repeatedly” upheld by this court and collecting authorities).
20 The pop-culture illustration of this principle is J. Wellington Wimpy's offer to “gladly pay you Tuesday for a
hamburger today.” See J. Wellington Wimpy, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._Wellington_Wimpy
(last visited Aug. 20, 2019). Setting aside credit risk, dollars paid next Tuesday are worth less than dollars
paid today, so the same price paid next Tuesday is a pleasant deal for Wimpy. The same is true for Sibanye
in an appraisal. Valuing Stillwater at $18.00 per share based on an agreement reached on December 8,
2016, then using that figure to determine value as of May 4, 2017, lets Sibanye use December's dollars for
a valuation in May. The statutory interest award is measured from closing, so that aspect of the appraisal
remedy does not pick up the decline in the purchasing power of dollars used to measure the deal-price metric.
In this respect, the petitioners are differently situated than stockholders who did not pursue their appraisal
rights. They accepted the $18.00 per share and received it, without interest, shortly after May 4, 2017, once
the merger consideration payouts were processed through the clearing system. The appraisal petitioners did
not accept that outcome. They opted for appraisal and sought a determination of Stillwater's fair value as
of May 4, 2017. Sibanye can argue legitimately that the deal price of $18.00 per share provides the best
evidence of fair value, but that is a price calculated in December 2016 dollars, not May 2017 dollars.
21 See Fernán Restrepo & Guhan Subramanian, The New Look of Deal Protection, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 1013,
1058–63 (2017) (analyzing implications of matching rights); Brian JM Quinn, Bulletproof: Mandatory Rules
for Deal Protection, 32 J. Corp. L. 865, 870 (2007) (analyzing matching rights as the functional equivalent
of a right of first refusal and explaining that “[t]he presence of rights of first refusal can be a strong deterrent
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against subsequent bids” because “[s]uccess under these circumstances may involve paying too much and
suffering the ‘winner's curse’ ”); see also Marcel Kahan & Rangarajan K. Sundaram, First-Purchase Rights:
Rights of First Refusal and Rights of First Offer, 12 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 331, 331 (2012) (finding “that a right
of first refusal transfers value from other buyers to the right-holder, but may also force the seller to make
suboptimal offers”); Frank Aquila & Melissa Sawyer, Diary of a Wary Market: 2010 in Review and What to
Expect in 2011, 12 M & A Law. Nov.-Dec. 2010, at 1 (“Match rights can result in the first bidder 'nickel bidding'
to match an interloper's offer, with repetitive rounds of incremental increases in the offer price.... [M]atch
rights are just one more factor that may dissuade a potential competing bidder from stepping in the middle
of an already-announced transaction.”); David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of First Refusal, 5 Stan. J.L. Bus.
& Fin. 1, 20–21 (1999) (discussing how a right of first refusal affects bidders).
22 See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Minority Discounts and Control Premiums in Appraisal Proceedings, 57 Bus. Law.
127, 151 n.130 (2001) (“[M]arket price should ordinarily equal going concern value if the market is efficient.”);
William J. Carney & Mark Heimendinger, Appraising the Nonexistent: The Delaware Court's Struggle with
Control Premiums, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 845, 847–48, 857–58 (2003) (“The basic conclusion of the Efficient
Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) is that market values of companies' shares traded in competitive and
open markets are unbiased estimates of the value of the equity of such firms.”); id. at 879 (noting that the
appraisal statute requires consideration of all relevant factors and stating that “in an efficient market, absent
information about some market failure, market price is the only relevant factor”); Lawrence A. Hamermesh &
Michael L. Wachter, The Short and Puzzling Life of the “Implicit Minority Discount” in Delaware Appraisal Law,
156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 52 (2007) (“Take the case of a publicly traded company that has no controller. Efficient
market theory states that the shares of this company trade at the pro rata value of the corporation as a going
concern.”); id. at 60 (“As a matter of generally accepted financial theory ..., share prices in liquid and informed
markets do generally represent th[e] going concern value ....”); see also Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael
L. Wachter, Rationalizing Appraisal Standards in Compulsory Buyouts, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1021, 1033–34 (2009)
(positing trading prices should not be used to determine fair value if there is either no public market price at all,
if the shares are illiquid or thinly traded, or if there is a controlling stockholder, implying that outside of these
scenarios, “because financial markets are efficient, one can simply use the market value of the shares”).
23 The experts' exploration of the Cammer and Krogman factors has left me with significantly less confidence
in them than I had before this litigation. There appears to be substantial overlap among the factors, such that
a single attribute, like a New York Stock Exchange listing, would correlate with and lead to the satisfaction of
multiple factors. For an issuer to satisfy multiple Cammer and Krogman factors is thus likely less significant
than it might seem. It is also striking how many of the Cammer and Krogman, at least based on Zmijewski's
report, stem from judicial opinions or law review articles, rather than from financial or economic papers. I am
left with the concern that the Cammer and Krogman factors may be a convenient heuristic that law-trained
judges deploy as a matter of routine, rather than because they have support in reliable research. That said,
the absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of absence, and the record in this case does not provide
grounds to call the Cammer and Krogman factors into doubt.
24 See, e.g., In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 634 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[B]ecause an efficient market is one
in which information important to reasonable investors ... is immediately incorporated into stock prices, the
cause-and-effect relationship between a company's material disclosures and the security price is normally
the most important factor in an efficiency analysis.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), abrogated on other
grounds by Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455 (2013); In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig.,
430 F.3d 503, 512 (1st Cir. 2005) (describing the cause and effect prong of Cammer as “in many ways the
most important” and explaining that “[i]n the absence of such a relationship, there is little assurance that
information is being absorbed into the market and reflected in its price”); Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1287
(“[S]howing a cause and effect relationship between unexpected corporate events or financial releases and
an immediate response in the stock price” is “the essence of an efficient market and the foundation for
the fraud on the market theory.”); see also Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension, Fund v. Bombardier
Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 207 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Xcelera.com for the import of the cause and effect prong
- 379 - 
In re Stillwater Mining Company, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
2019 WL 3943851
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 57
of Cammer). That said, the cause-and-effect factor is not dispositive. Beaver Cty. Empls.' Ret. Fund v. Tile
Shop Hldgs., Inc., 2016 WL 4098741, at *10–11 (D. Minn. July 28, 2016) (collecting cases and explaining
that “[t]he weight of authority on this issue favors” a finding of market efficiency without a favorable resolution
of the cause and effect factor).
25 Compare Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, A Five-Factor Asset Pricing Model, 116 J. Fin. Econ. 1
(2015) (JX 681) (finding evidence of size premium in asset pricing models), and Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth
R. French, Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds, 33 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (1993) (JX 680)
(finding evidence that stocks with smaller market capitalizations tended to have higher average returns), with
Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Size, Value, and Momentum in International Stock Returns, 105 J.
Fin. Econ. 457 (2012) (JX 679) (finding no evidence of a size premium in any region based on analyses of
international stock returns from November 1989 to March 2011).
26 Compare, e.g., Cliff Asness et al., Size Matters, If You Control Your Junk, 129 J. Fin. Econ. 479, 479
(2018) (finding “[a] significant size premium ..., which is stable through time, robust to the specification,
more consistent across seasons and markets, not concentrated in microcaps, robust to non-price based
measures of size, and not captured by an illiquidity premium” and arguing that challenges to the existence
of the size premium “are dismantled when controlling for the quality, or the inverse ‘junk’, of a firm”),
and Roger Grabowski, The Size Effect Continues To Be Relevant when Estimating the Cost of Capital,
37 Bus. Valuation Rev. 93 (2018) (responding to criticisms of Ang, infra), with Aswath Damodaran,
The Small Cap Premium: Where is the Beef?, Musings on Markets (Apr. 11, 2015) (JX 682 at 1)
(commenting that “the historical data, which has been used as the basis of the argument [for size premia],
is yielding more ambiguous results and leading us to question the original judgment that there is a
small cap premium” and that “forward-looking risk premiums, where we look at the market pricing of
stocks to get a measure of what investors are demanding as expected returns, are yielding no premium
for small cap stocks”), http://aswathdamodaran.blogspot.com/2015/04/the-small-cap-premium-fact-fiction-
and.html, and Clifford Ang, The Absence of a Size Effect Relevant to the Cost of Equity, 37 Bus. Valuation
Rev. 87 (2018) (JX 732 at 3–4) (concluding from survey of empirical literature that either “(1) investors ... do
not believe a size effect exists and, therefore, do not demand compensation for it, or (2) investors ... believe
a size effect exists, but believe the adjustment for the size effect is not made in the cost of equity”). Zmijewski
has acknowledged that “there is much weaker evidence of a size effect since the original [article finding the
effect] was published.” JX 836 at 322.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
LASTER, Vice Chancellor.
*1  The petitioners in this appraisal proceeding seek a
judicial determination of the fair value of their proportionate
interest in ExamWorks Group, Inc. (“ExamWorks” or the
“Company”). The Company has filed two motions for
discovery sanctions.
The first motion seeks sanctions against five funds who
retained the law firm of Entwistle & Cappucci, LLC as
their principal counsel. 1  The Entwistle Petitioners failed to
produce any documents during the period allotted for fact
discovery and said nothing about any delays in production.
Six weeks after the discovery cutoff, and four days after the
exchange of expert reports, the Entwistle Petitioners produced
68,052 pages of documents.
The second motion seeks sanctions against all petitioners. 2
In their discovery responses, the petitioners agreed to provide
the Company with copies of documents obtained from third
parties. In March 2017, the petitioners obtained documents
from Barclays Bank PLC. The petitioners did not produce
copies of the documents. Ten weeks after the discovery cutoff,
the petitioners produced over 60,000 pages of documents
from Barclays.
Both motions seek sanctions for the belated production of
privilege logs. None of the petitioners produced privilege logs
during the discovery period. Almost two months after the
discovery cutoff, the Entwistle Petitioners produced sloppy
and inadequate logs. Five other petitioners had retained
the law firm of Grant & Eisenhofer P.A. as their principal
counsel. 3  Ten weeks after the discovery cutoff, the G &
E Petitioners produced their logs. Although the G & E
Petitioners did a better job than the Entwistle Petitioners, the
logs arrived too late to be of any use for discovery.
This decision grants the motions and imposes sanctions
for the petitioners' failures to comply with their discovery
obligations.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts are drawn from the submissions made in connection
with the motions. The parties devoted much more attention
to argument and invective than to the underlying facts,
making it more difficult than necessary to derive the
applicable timeline. The following discussion does not
comprise findings of fact in the post-trial sense, but rather
represents how the record appears at this preliminary stage.
A. The ExamWorks Merger
*2  ExamWorks is a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in Atlanta, Georgia. ExamWorks completed
an initial public offering in 2010, and its stock traded on
NASDAQ under the symbol “EXAM.”
On April 27, 2016, ExamWorks announced that it had entered
into a merger agreement with affiliates of Leonard Green &
Partners, L.P. The merger closed on July 27, 2016. Pursuant to
the merger agreement, ExamWorks' publicly traded common
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stock was converted into the right to receive $35.05 per share,
subject to the holder's statutory right to eschew the merger
consideration and seek appraisal.
B. This Appraisal Proceeding
After the announcement of the merger, the following
investment funds perfected their appraisal rights and filed
appraisal petitions in this court:
• Hudson Bay Master Fund Ltd. and Hudson Bay Merger
Arbitrage Opportunities Master Fund Ltd. (together,
“Hudson Bay”).
• Lord Abbett Series Fund Inc.—Value Opportunities
Portfolio; Lord Abbett Securities Trust—Lord Abbett
Value Opportunities Fund; and Lord Abbett Research
Fund, Inc.—Small Cap Value Series (collectively, the
“Lord Abbett Funds”).
• Water Island Global Master LP, The Arbitrage Fund,
The Arbitrage Event–Driven Fund, Columbia Active
Portfolio Multi–Manager Alternative Strategies Fund,
and Litman Gregory Masters Alternative Strategies
Fund (collectively, the “Entwistle Petitioners”).
• Brookdale International Partners, L.P. and Brookdale
Global Opportunity Fund (together, the “Brookdale
Funds”).
• Sunrise Partners Limited Partnership (“Sunrise”).
• Pivot Point Capital Master LP (“Pivot Point”).
• Magnetar Capital Master Fund, Ltd. and Third Motion
Equities Master Fund Ltd. (together, the “Magnetar
Petitioners”).
Certain petitioners moved to consolidate the appraisal
proceedings and for the appointment of lead counsel. By order
dated September 1, 2016, the court consolidated the actions
and appointed as Co–Lead Counsel the law firms of Grant &
Eisenhofer, P.A. and Entwistle & Cappucci, LLC. 4  The order
placed Co–Lead Counsel in charge of the consolidated action,
stating:
10. Petitioners' Co–Lead Counsel shall set policies for
the prosecution of the Consolidated Action, shall delegate
and monitor the work performed by petitioners' attorneys
to avoid duplication of effort or unnecessary expense,
shall coordinate on behalf of petitioners the initiation and
conduct of discovery proceedings, shall have responsibility
for all Court filings and appearances (except with respect
to any Entitlement Hearing), and shall have the authority to
negotiate a settlement of the Consolidated Action subject
to approval of petitioners and the Court.
11. Co–Lead Counsel shall be available and responsible
for communications to and from this Court, including
distributing orders and other directions from the Court to
counsel.
12. No motion, request for discovery or other pre-trial or
trial proceedings shall be initiated or filed by any petitioner
except through Co–Lead Counsel. Respondent's counsel ay
rely upon all agreements made with Co–Lead Counsel, or
other duly authorized representative of Co–Lead Counsel,
and such agreements shall be binding on all petitioners. 5
The Consolidation Order provided that “[a]ny disputes among
Co–Lead Counsel which cannot be resolved after consultation
shall be decided based on a vote of the Petitioners in the
Constituent Actions.” 6
C. The Scheduling Orders
*3  The parties agreed on a schedule for the action, which
the court approved by order dated September 26, 2016. 7
Paragraphs 1(a)-(d) of the Initial Scheduling Order stated:
(a) The parties shall produce documents on a rolling basis
and shall substantially complete document production
on or before December 2, 2016, in response to any
document requests that are served on or before October
3, 2016;
(b) The parties shall produce documents on a rolling
basis in response to any document requests served
after October 3, 2016, and shall substantially complete
document production in response to such requests by the
later of February 24, 2017, or eight weeks after service;
(c) The parties shall produce an initial privilege log
on or before January 31, 2017, and shall promptly
provide supplemental privilege logs if productions made
subsequent to this date withhold privileged materials;
(d) All fact discovery shall be completed by July 26,
2017, including any party and third-party depositions
but excluding any fact discovery subject to a motion to
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compel or motion for protective order pending on July
26, 2017. 8
The petitioners had already served their first set of requests for
production of documents on August 25, 2016. On January 24,
2017, they served subpoenas on Barclays; Leonard Green &
Partners, L.P.; Bank of America Corporation; Deutsche Bank
Securities, Inc.; Evercore Partners LLC; Goldman Sachs
Group, Inc.; and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. 9  Barclays was one of the banks that provided debt
financing for the merger. The petitioners served a second
set of requests for production of documents on February 24,
2017.
D. The Amended Scheduling Order
On April 25, 2017, the parties submitted an amended schedule
for the action, which the court entered the same day. 10
Paragraphs 1(a)-(c) of the Amended Scheduling Order stated:
(a) The parties shall produce documents on a rolling basis
and shall substantially complete document production
on or before May 31, 2017;
(b) The parties shall produce an initial privilege log
on or before June 30, 2017, and shall promptly
provide supplemental privilege logs if productions made
subsequent to this date withhold privileged materials;
(c) All fact discovery shall be completed by October 2,
2017, including any party and third-party depositions
but excluding any fact discovery subject to a motion
to compel or motion for protective order pending on
October 2, 2017. 11
The Company did not serve any requests for production
of documents until May 31, 2017, which was the date for
substantial completion of production under the Amended
Scheduling Order.
Request Number 25 in the Company's requests for production
of documents asked the petitioners to produce “all Documents
received [by petitioners] from third parties in connection with
this Action, including all Documents received in response
to a subpoena or other request.” 12  On June 30, 2017, the
petitioners served their responses and objections. They agreed
to “produce documents pursuant to document productions
received from third parties subpoenaed in connection with the
Action.” 13
E. The Petitioners' Motion For A Protective Order
*4  On July 31, 2017, the Company moved for a commission
to serve a subpoena on Berkshire Partners LLC. 14  On August
10, 2017, the Company gave notice that it had served a
subpoena on Berkshire seeking documents and testimony. 15
Berkshire had been a potential co-investor in the merger and
participated in the negotiations before dropping out.
On September 26, 2017, during a meet-and-confer session,
the petitioners asked about the status of documents
produced by Berkshire. The Company produced the Berkshire
documents on September 27, five days before the fact
discovery cutoff of October 2. 16
During the meet-and-confer session, the Company mentioned
that it was considering a deposition of a Berkshire
representative. The Company subsequently notified the
petitioners that it intended to depose a Berkshire witness on
November 9, 2017, after the discovery cutoff of October 2,
2017. 17
The petitioners moved for a protective order, describing
the post-cutoff deposition as “an abuse of the discovery
process” that “completely disregards this Court's Amended
Scheduling Order.” 18  After briefing and argument, I granted
the motion. 19  I explained that I was not granting the motion
based on any finding of “conscious sandbagging or some type
of intentional discovery misconduct.” 20  Rather, I described
the situation as one where “not enough was done to coordinate
with the petitioners to provide documents on time, to be
transparent about what was going on, and then ultimately it
simply happened that the deposition did not get done within
the discovery time frame.” 21  I ruled that in light of the
timeline, “there needs to be a consequence,” and “[a] fitting
consequence is not to permit an exception to the discovery
cutoff.” 22
F. The Entwistle Petitioners' Post–Discovery–Cutoff
Production
On November 14, 2017, the Entwistle Petitioners produced
6,058 documents. 23  The documents arrived six weeks after
the fact discovery cutoff of October 2 and four days after
the parties exchanged initial expert reports. The Entwistle
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Petitioners had not produced any documents before the
discovery cutoff.
The Company determined that 4,020 of the 6,058 documents
contained redactions. 24  On November 24, 2017, the
Company emailed Co–Lead Counsel to ask for an
explanation. 25  On November 28, the Entwistle Petitioners
produced a log indicating that, for 4,073 of the 4,546
documents containing redactions, the reason for the redaction
was “Confidential/Not Relevant.” The log shows that many
of the redacted documents were copies of press releases, news
articles, or other publicly available information. 26
The Entwistle Petitioner's production included a discounted
cash flow analysis that appears to value ExamWorks in
the range of $39.84 to $41.72 per share. By contrast, the
petitioners' expert valued ExamWorks at $50.14 per share. 27
G. The Petitioners' Post–Discovery Production Of The
Barclays Documents
On December 6, 2017, the petitioners produced their
valuation expert's rebuttal report. The report cited two
documents that the petitioners had obtained from Barclays. 28
The petitioners had never provided the Company with any
documents from Barclays. On December 13, the Company
asked about the documents and demanded immediate
production of all documents produced by Barclays or by any
other party in response to a subpoena. 29
*5  On December 14, 2017, the petitioners produced
over 60,000 pages of documents that they had obtained
from Barclays (the “Barclays Documents”). Since then, the
parties have analyzed the documents and determined that
approximately 90% were documents that the Company placed
in a data room for Barclays and its other lenders. Forty-six
documents were not in the data room and not otherwise found
in the production. 30
H. The G & E Petitioners' Privilege Logs
Meanwhile, on December 12, 2017, the G & E Petitioners
produced their privilege logs. 31  They arrived ten weeks after
the discovery cutoff.
On December 15, 2017, the G & E Petitioners produced an
additional 231 documents, consisting of over 1,300 pages of
information. 32  The G & E Petitioners previously had asserted
privilege for the documents, but after further consideration
they removed them from their logs.
If the G & E Petitioners had taken this step earlier, it would
have been a good thing. Instead, the documents arrived after
the Company had completed the depositions of the petitioners'
representatives. The late documents included a Hudson Bay
email containing valuation parameters and a Lord Abbett
email referring to communications with other stockholders
about the merger. By themselves, the two documents do
not appear momentous, but they should have been produced
earlier so that the Company could have questioned the
petitioners' witnesses about them. One can never predict what
memories a document can unlock or refresh, nor the types of
testimony that resulting lines of inquiry can elicit.
I. The Meet-and-Confer Sessions
The parties held meet-and-confer sessions on December 8,
11, and 12, 2017. 33  Under the consolidation order, Co–Lead
Counsel were supposed to handle the case together and take
joint responsibility for the litigation. But once the Company
raised the Entwistle Petitioners' late production, Grant &
Eisenhofer tried to go its own way, leaving Entwistle and its
Delaware counsel, Rosenthal Monhait & Goddess, to clean up
their clients' mess. They offered to re-produce the documents
without redactions for relevance. They also offered to produce
a witness for deposition, provide a privilege log, and allow the
Company to propound additional discovery on the Entwistle
Petitioners. They even offered to re-open expert discovery so
that the Company's expert could take into account information
learned from the production and deposition. On December
11, the Entwistle Petitions re-produced the belatedly produced
documents without relevancy redactions. 34
Grant & Eisenhofer sought to deal with the Barclays
Documents. They proposed to strike the references to the two
Barclays Documents from their expert's rebuttal report and to
not rely on any of the other Barclays Documents at trial.
No one offered to do anything about the belated privilege logs.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
“[T]he purpose[s] of discovery [are] to advance issue
formulation, to assist in fact revelation, and to reduce the
element of surprise at trial.” 35  These instrumental purposes
in turn serve the overarching and “well established policy”
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underlying pretrial disclosure, which is that “a trial decision
should result from a disinterested search for truth from all the
available evidence rather than tactical maneuvers based on the
calculated manipulation of evidence and its production.” 36
“Candor and fair-dealing are, or should be, the hallmark of
litigation and required attributes of those who resort to the
judicial process. The rules of discovery demand no less.” 37
*6  “Scheduling orders and discovery cutoffs further these
important purposes and policies by ensuring that parties
provide discovery in a timely fashion, thereby avoiding
trial by surprise and the prejudice that results from belated
disclosure.” 38  “Parties must be mindful that scheduling
orders are not merely guidelines but have the same full force
and effect as any other court order.” 39  “Generally speaking,
Delaware courts strictly adhere to discovery cut-off dates.” 40
A party that disregards the provisions in a scheduling order
that govern discovery is engaging in discovery abuse. If a
party cannot meet a deadline, the onus is on that party to
be forthcoming and transparent about the situation and the
reasons for it. Humans are not psychic. The other side does
not know that the production may be late, much less how
late or why. When parties are transparent, they can cooperate
to address problems without judicial involvement. Acting as
officers of the court, attorneys can find solutions to keep a
case on track and prepare the matter for decision. Attorneys
shirk their obligations to the court and make matters worse
when they fail to communicate with the other side, allow
problems to escalate, and miss critical deadlines. Then they
impair their credibility when they try to make excuses that do
not hold up.
“Discovery abuse has no place in [Delaware] courts, and
the protection of litigants, the public, and the bar demands
nothing less than that [Delaware] trial courts be diligent in
promptly and effectively taking corrective action to ‘secure
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
proceeding’ before them.” 41  “Trial courts should be diligent
in the imposition of sanctions upon a party who refuses
to comply with discovery orders, not just to penalize those
whose conduct warrants such sanctions, but to deter those
who may be tempted to abuse the legal system by their
irresponsible conduct.” 42
“In the event this Court determines that sanctions for
discovery abuses are appropriate, the sanction must be
tailored to the culpability of the wrongdoer and the harm
suffered by the complaining party.” 43  Sanctions may
serve one or more of three proper purposes: “punishment,
deterrence[,] or coercion.” 44  Court of Chancery Rule 37(b)
(2) identifies possible sanctions that a trial court can impose
for violating a discovery order, including but not limited to:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was
made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be
established for the purposes of the action in accordance
with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party
to support or oppose designated claims or defenses,
or prohibiting that party from introducing designated
matters in evidence; [or]
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or
staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed,
or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part
thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the
disobedient party[.] 45
*7  A trial court also “has the power to issue sanctions for
discovery abuses under its inherent equitable powers, as well
as the Court's inherent power to manage its own affairs.” 46
Delaware Supreme Court decisions teach that the entry
of a default judgment under Rule 37(b)(2)(C) is “the
ultimate sanction for discovery violations and should be used
sparingly.” 47  “Judgment by default is, of course, the extreme
remedy and generally speaking the Rule has been interpreted
to require some element of willfulness or conscious disregard
of the order before such a sanction is imposed.” 48
“A less final but still serious discovery sanction is the entry
of an order under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) that deems designated
facts to be established or which draws an inference as to
a particular issue that is adverse to the party that failed to
comply with its discovery obligations.” 49  “A more moderate
but still significant discovery sanction is to alter the burden
of proof on a particular issue, either by shifting it to the party
that failed to comply with its discovery obligations or by
increasing or decreasing the relevant standard.” 50
More typical remedies for late production are to allow
additional discovery or to preclude the use of the belatedly
produced material. Rule 37(b)(2) further provides that if a
defendant has violated a discovery order, the court “shall
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require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney
advising that party or both to pay the reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees, caused by the failure.” 51  Under
this rule, expenses should be awarded “unless the Court
finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other
circumstances made an award of expenses unjust.” 52  The
Delaware Supreme Court has explained that under Rule
37, “when a party fails to comply with discovery orders
of the Court or otherwise engages in discovery abuses, the
award of attorneys' fees and expenses to the opposing party
is mandatory, absent a showing by the wrongdoer that his
actions were substantially justified or that other circumstances
make the award unjust.” 53  The current framing of the rule
with its presumptive award of fees represented a change from
prior practice. 54  It was adopted “in order to encourage such
sanction under such circumstances, and to that end the Rule
places a burden on the disobedient party to show that his
failure was justified or that the other circumstances exist
making an award unjust.” 55
A. The Entwistle Petitioners' Late Production
*8  The Entwistle Petitioners violated a court order by
failing to comply with the discovery cutoff in the Amended
Scheduling Order. They did not produce any documents
before the discovery cutoff. They did not communicate with
the Company about any delay in production. They did not
move to modify the discovery cutoff or seek leave to produce
documents late. Six weeks after the discovery cutoff, they
produced 6,058 documents consisting of 68,052 pages.
The Entwistle Petitioners have argued that they should not
be held accountable for violating the Amended Scheduling
Order because it took time for Co–Lead Counsel to negotiate
search terms, then it took additional time for the Entwistle
firm to gather and review documents from the Entwistle
Petitioners. According to the Entwistle Petitioners, this is
the ordinary method of collecting and producing documents,
so it should not have been a problem for them to produce
documents after the cutoff.
The fault lies not in the tasks that the Entwistle firm was
performing but in the rate at which the firm performed
them. Parties must deploy the resources necessary to
meet deadlines. If meeting a deadline appears difficult or
impossible, then the party facing the deadline needs to confer
with the other side or seek a modification of the schedule.
The Entwistle Petitioners had sufficient resources to meet
the discovery cutoff. They are sophisticated investment funds
who collectively owned one million shares. At the deal price,
their stake was valued at $35,050,000. At the value claimed
by their expert, their stake would be worth $50,140,000. They
had access to Co–Lead Counsel and Rosenthal Monhait. If
they had wanted to get the collection done, they could have.
The other petitioners produced documents before the
discovery cutoff. The following chart identifies the date
of production, the petitioner producing documents, and the
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There were some other petitioners who produced documents
after the fact discovery cutoff, but only dribs and drabs.
The Magnetar Funds produced nine additional documents
on October 3, 2017, the Lord Abbett Funds produced
one additional document on October 12, and Pivot Point
produced three additional documents on November 8. 56
These documents should have been produced earlier, but
humans are not perfect, and sometimes documents come in
late. No one else made the type of massive, post-discovery
production of their own documents that the Entwistle
Petitioners made.
The Entwistle Petitioners have argued that the Company's
failure to request documents until May 31, 2017, somehow
excused their failure to comply with the Amended Scheduling
Order. The Entwistle Petitioners also have argued that
because the Company was not pressing them for documents in
September and October, the Company must not have wanted
the documents. Both responses seek to blame the injured
party and deflect attention from the Entwistle Petitioners'
misconduct.
When the Company served its discovery requests, there were
still four months in the schedule. That was plenty of time for
the Entwistle Petitioners to gather and produce documents.
If they needed more time, it was their obligation to seek it,
either from the Company or the court. Whether or not the
Company nagged the Entwistle Petitioners about producing
documents has no effect on the locus of the obligation. The
Entwistle Petitioners had a duty to produce documents in
a timely fashion. They cannot shift that obligation to the
Company.
*9  The bottom line is that even though the Entwistle
Petitioners chose to file and litigate an appraisal claim, they
shirked one of a litigant's basic obligations: gathering and
producing responsive material in a timely fashion. They were
happy to let the Company bear the expense of litigation
while giving themselves a pass. Even when they did produce
documents, the production was sloppy and haphazard.
This type of misconduct has consequences at two levels.
One level involves actual prejudice in the specific case.
Here, the belated production contained documents that
the Company could have used in discovery, including a
discounted cash flow analysis, a leveraged buy-out analysis,
and communications about the Entwistle Petitioners' decision
to buy or sell ExamWorks' stock and seek appraisal. The
Company could have questioned representatives of the
Entwistle Petitioners about these documents and used them
with other witnesses as well.
A second level of prejudice involves the degradation of the
litigation process. For the litigation system to function, parties
must follow the rules. If participants suspect that others are
not following the rules, then the process deteriorates. People
who follow the rules feel like chumps when others seem to
be cutting corners or breaking rules and getting ahead. People
who otherwise might not think of pushing limits become more
aggressive if they think everyone else is doing it. It is this
broader, systemic interest that the Delaware Supreme Court
seems to have had in mind when stressing that courts must
address discovery abuse not only to protect litigants, but also
to protect the public and the bar. 57
As a remedy for the Entwistle Petitioners' discovery abuse,
the Company seeks a terminating sanction that would dismiss
the Entwistle Petitioners from the case and leave them with
the deal price, without interest. They observe that, unlike in
a traditional liability case, this sanction would not leave the
Entwistle Petitioners empty handed. They would get $35.05
per share. They also would receive the per-share amount
that was recovered in a settlement in a companion case for
breach of fiduciary duty. Ironically, this sanction would let
them avoid the downside risk of an appraisal award below the
deal price. Depending on how the case turns out, the sanction
might be a blessing.
The Delaware Supreme Court has cautioned that “a default
judgment should be granted if no other sanction would
be more appropriate under the circumstances.” 58  Trial in
this case originally was scheduled to begin on February
13, 2018, which would have limited my ability to craft an
alternative sanction. After reviewing the parties' submissions,
I postponed the trial so that I would have “greater flexibility
in crafting a remedy, should the court conclude that a remedy
is warranted.” 59  Trial has not yet been rescheduled.
With the time afforded by the continuance, a lesser
sanction than a default judgment becomes feasible and
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sufficient to remedy the Entwistle Petitioners' misconduct.
The Entwistle Petitioners have already re-produced the
documents without relevancy redactions. They also shall
produce additional documents called for by this court's ruling
on their post-discovery-cutoff privilege logs. 60  Once the
Entwistle Petitioners have completed this production, they
shall produce witnesses for deposition as requested by the
Company. The Company is not limited to one witness, but the
Company should be responsible and only request additional
witnesses if the contents of the documents and the results of
an initial deposition truly warrant questioning more than one
witness.
*10  The Company's expert may take into account
information learned from the Entwistle Petitioners'
production and any depositions. The Company's expert
may file a sur-rebuttal report addressing these matters.
The petitioners contend that this remedy is disproportionate
because it will prejudice all of the petitioners, not just the
Entwistle Petitioners. That claim is overblown. As a threshold
matter, Co–Lead Counsel had responsibility for conducting
discovery on behalf of all petitioners, and depriving the
Company of the Entwistle Petitioners' documents during
discovery benefitted all petitioners. Consequently, imposing
a remedy that affects all petitioners is not disproportionate.
More importantly, the remedy is not excessive. The Company
can file a sur-rebuttal report limited to the new material. The
Company is not getting a complete do-over.
The Entwistle Petitioners shall bear all expenses associated
with their late production of documents and the remedy
imposed by this decision. The Company is awarded the
expenses it has incurred and will incur, including attorneys'
fees, for
• reviewing the Entwistle Petitioners' original production;
• following up with the Entwistle Petitioners;
• reviewing the unredacted production;
• briefing and arguing the Entwistle Motion;
• reviewing the additional documents produced in response
to this decision;
• conducting the depositions contemplated by this decision;
and
• working with the Company's expert to prepare the sur-
rebuttal report.
Once the remedial discovery process is complete, the
Company shall prepare and provide the Entwistle Petitioners
with a Rule 88 affidavit documenting its fees and expenses.
If the Entwistle Petitioners dispute the amount due and the
parties cannot reach agreement, then the Company may file
a motion to quantify the award, supported by the Rule 88
affidavit it provided to the Entwistle Petitioners.
B. The Barclays Documents
The petitioners violated a court order by failing to comply
with the discovery cutoff in the Amended Scheduling Order.
They agreed to produce documents from third parties, but they
did not produce the Barclays Documents before the discovery
cutoff. Ten weeks after the discovery cutoff, they produced
the Barclays Documents.
A key difference between the Entwistle Petitioners'
production and Co–Lead Counsel's production of the
Barclays Documents is that the latter appears to have
been inadvertent. Co–Lead Counsel explained that for all
other third-party witnesses, the Company obtained copies of
documents directly from the third party, rather than from
the petitioners. It was no secret that the petitioners had
subpoenaed documents from Barclays. The petitioners filed
their notice of service for the Barclays subpoena on the same
day that they gave notice of subpoenas served on six other
third parties. Co–Lead Counsel reasonably believed that the
Company's attorneys would handle Barclays the same way
they handled the other six third parties. The failure to produce
the Barclays Documents constituted excusable neglect.
The Company again seeks a terminating sanction because
of the late production of the Barclays Documents, this time
for all petitioners. In my view, a terminating sanction is
too severe. Other, less drastic remedies are available and
sufficient to address the discovery issues in this case.
One option for leveling the playing field is to hold that no
one can use the Barclays Documents. Co–Lead Counsel has
proposed that option, which includes striking the references
to the documents from the petitioners' expert report and not
using the documents at trial.
Another option for leveling the playing field is to let everyone
use the Barclays Documents. Under this option, the parties
would have leave to depose a Barclays witness. Both sides
could prepare supplemental expert reports addressing any
information in the Barclays Documents or obtained from the
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Barclays witness. Both sides would be able to use the resulting
discovery at trial.
*11  Because the Company was harmed by the late
production of the Barclays Documents, the Company can
choose which remedy it prefers. The Company has ten days
to notify Co–Lead Counsel of its election.
Having found that the failure to produce the Barclays
Documents was inadvertent, I will not require petitioners
to reimburse the Company for the expenses incurred in
reviewing the Barclays Documents or pursuing any further
Barclays-related discovery, if they choose that option. I could
require the petitioners to reimburse the Company for the
expenses incurred briefing and arguing the Barclays Motion,
but I did not require the Company to reimburse the petitioners
for the expenses incurred briefing and arguing the motion
for a protective order involving Berkshire. This is a similar
situation and should be treated similarly.
C. The Privilege Logs
The Entwistle Petitioners and the G & E Petitioners violated
a court order by failing to produce their privilege logs until
after the discovery cutoff. Privilege logs are part of discovery.
Producing a timely log is part of a party's obligation when
asserting privilege.
In their responses to the Company's discovery requests, the
Entwistle Petitioners and the G & E Petitioners represented
that they would produce documents subject to claims of
privilege. The burden of establishing privilege rests on the
party asserting it. 61
[A] bare allegation that information
and documents are protected from
discovery by the attorney-client
privilege is insufficient without
making more information available ....
It is incumbent on one asserting the
privilege to make a proper showing
that each of the criteria [underlying the
attorney-client privilege] exist[s] ....
A proper claim of privilege requires
a specific designation and description
of the documents within its scope as
well as precise and certain reasons for
preserving their confidentiality. 62
An insufficiently supported claim of privilege can result in
waiver. 63
*12  The privilege log enables the party that requested
documents to evaluate the producing party's claim of
privilege. “The log is supposed to provide sufficient
information to enable the adversary to assess the privilege
claim and decide whether to mount a challenge .... Just as you
can't hit what you can't see, you can't challenge what the other
side hasn't described.” 64  Producing a privilege log after the
discovery cutoff prevents the opposing party from evaluating
the log, making timely challenges, and using the resulting
documents in discovery. Producing a post-cutoff log has the
same effect as not producing a log, which is the same thing
as not providing any support for a claim of privilege. “An
improperly asserted claim of privilege is no claim of privilege
at all.” 65
The Entwistle Petitioners and the G & E Petitioners failed to
produce their logs until months after the discovery cutoff. On
the facts of this case, waiver is an appropriate consequence.
The Entwistle Petitioners and G & E Petitioners need not
produce entries where (i) counsel was the author or a principal
recipient (not simply a copy recipient) and (ii) the item post-
dates the filing of the appraisal proceeding on August 25,
2016.
The Company has leave to conduct supplemental depositions
of the petitioners' representatives to explore any materials
produced after their depositions or as a result of this
decision. Each of the petitioners shall bear the cost of the
supplemental depositions of its own representatives. As with
any supplemental depositions resulting from the Entwistle
Petitioners' late production, the Company should not abuse
this opportunity. It should only take the depositions that are
necessary.
III. CONCLUSION
The motions for sanctions are granted. The parties shall
proceed as directed in this decision.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GOLDEN, J.
*1  Appellants Paul and Dawn Trostle appeal the February
3, 2006 Speaking Order of the Bankruptcy Court granting
Appellee's motion in limine and entering judgment in favor of
appellee and against appellants. After carefully considering
the parties' submissions on appeal, and oral argument, the
Court affirms in part and reverses in part the Speaking Order
of the Bankruptcy Court.
Appellants' 14-year-old son Jeremiah was killed when
Appellee Michael Wagner struck him with a car while
traveling on a busy Whitehall Township road in 1997. As a
suit over the accident was pending in the Court of Common
Pleas of Lehigh County, Appellee filed for bankruptcy.
Appellants filed an adversary action claiming that Appellee's
debts were non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6),
which forbids discharge of debts incurred through willful
and malicious injury to another, and 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9),
which forbids discharge of debts incurred through “death or
personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor
vehicle ... if such operation was unlawful because the debtor
was intoxicated from using alcohol ...” Following a trial,
the Bankruptcy Court granted Appellee's motion in limine to
strike the report and testimony of Appellant's expert Samuel
Land, M.D., and held that the debts were dischargeable.
The Court reverses in part and affirms in part the Bankruptcy
Court's Speaking Order. The Court reverses the portion of
the Speaking Order granting Appellee's motion in limine
which precluded the report and testimony of Dr. Land. The
Court also reverses the portion of the Speaking Order entering
judgment in favor of Appellee and against Appellants and
finding that the debt is dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)
(9). The remainder of the Speaking Order is affirmed, as are
all of the factual findings of the Bankruptcy Court. The Court
remands the case to the Bankruptcy Court for consideration of
Dr. Land's report and testimony in conjunction with the record
and factual findings of the Bankruptcy Court.
Facts and Issues on Appeal
Appellee admitted to drinking alcohol before the fatal
accident, but was not charged with driving under the
influence. His blood alcohol content (BAC) was measured
as .04% when tested more than two hours after the accident.
Appellants intended to offer the report and testimony of Dr.
Samuel Land, a pathologist, who opined that Appellee's blood
alcohol content could be extrapolated to have been over .08%
at the moment of the accident. Under Pennsylvania law at
the time of the accident, a driver whose BAC measured less
than .05% was presumed to be unimpaired. 75 Pa.C.S.A. §
1547(d)(1). No presumption attached to a BAC between .05%
and .10%, but such a BAC reading could be introduced, along
with other competent evidence, to prove intoxication. Id. at
§ 1547(d)(2) (repealed). Thus, if believed, Land's testimony
would have cast doubt on Appellee's claim that he was not
impaired.
The Bankruptcy Court did not consider Land's report, but
did listen to evidence from witnesses to the accident and
its aftermath. The Bankruptcy Court concluded that the
witnesses had credibly rebutted the suggestion that Appellee
was operating his vehicle while impaired. The parties raise a
number of issues on appeal, including:
*2  1. Whether Appellants' appeal should be dismissed
because their brief did not comply with Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 8010?
2. Whether Appellants must establish a causal connection
between driving while intoxicated and the accident for the
section 523(a) (9) exception to apply?
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3. Whether the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in
granting Appellee's motion in limine to strike the testimony
of Appellants' expert Samuel Land?
4. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in stating that
Appellants' other evidence of intoxication, besides Land's
report, was irrelevant?
5. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in determining that
Appellants had failed to satisfy their burden of proving
that Appellee's operation of his vehicle at the time of the
accident was unlawful because he was intoxicated, without
Land's report and testimony? Appellants argue that this
conclusion is against the weight of the evidence.
6. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in determining that
the Appellants failed to meet their burden of proving
Appellee's debts were incurred as a result of a willful and
malicious injury under section 523(a)(6)?
The Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court abused its
discretion in granting the motion in limine to strike the report
and testimony of Samuel Land. The Court holds that the law
does not require Appellants to establish a causal link between
driving while intoxicated and the accident for the section
523(a)(9) exception to apply. As to all other issues raised on
appeal, the Court affirms the holding of the Bankruptcy Court.
The case is remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for review
consistent with this opinion.
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 158(a). A district court may not set aside the factual
findings of the Bankruptcy Court unless they are clearly
erroneous. In re: TWA, 145 F.3d 124, 131 (3d Cir.1998). The
review of a Bankruptcy Court's factual findings is highly
deferential. Kool, Mann, Coffee and Co. v. Coffey, 300 F.3d
340, 353 (3d Cir.2002) (“It is the responsibility of an appellate
court to accept the ultimate factual determination of the fact-
finder unless that determination either is completely devoid
of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of
credibility or bears no rational relationship to the supportive
evidentiary data.”) The Bankruptcy Court's conclusions of
law are subject to de novo review. In re: TWA, 145 F.3d at 131.
The Court reviews the decision to exclude an expert report for
abuse of discretion, which occurs when a ruling was founded
on an error of law, a clearly erroneous view of the facts, or
a misapplication of law to the facts. Marco v. Accent Pub.
Co., 969 F.2d 1547, 1548 (3d Cir.1992); Reinert v. Larkin, 211
F.Supp.2d 589, 607 (E.D.Pa.2002). Moreover, the Court may
consider legal issues presented by the record, even if those
issues were not decided by the Bankruptcy Court, when they
are inextricably intertwined with other issues on appeal. In re:
Watts, 876 F.2d 1090, 1095 n. 8 (3d Cir.1989).
Bankruptcy Rule of Procedure 8010
*3  The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure require that
briefs not exceed fifty pages and contain a statement of
the case, a statement of the basis of appellate jurisdiction,
a table of contents and authorities, an argument, and a
short conclusion. Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8010. Appellants' original
brief exceeded the page limit of Rule 8010 and contained
other flaws. For these reasons, Appellee urges the Court to
dismiss the appeal. In re: Gulf Woods Corp., 189 B.R. 320,
323 (E.D.Pa.1995). Nonetheless, because Appellants quickly
submitted an amended brief that complies with the Rule, the
Court will not dismiss the appeal.
The Exclusion of the Testimony of Samuel Land, M.D.
Appellants' expert Samuel Land, a forensic pathologist, based
his opinion on the report of George Jackson, Ph.D., a forensic
toxicologist who had been retained by the District Attorney's
office to opine in the criminal investigation of the accident
and resulting case. Jackson prepared his report by reviewing
documents and records related to the accident, including lab
and toxicology results, as well as police incident reports.
(Jackson Report p. 427A-428A).
Jackson did not claim in his report that he was present
at the accident, and his report was explicitly based on
certain assumptions. For example, he notes that, in preparing
his report, he assumed that Appellee had no food in his
stomach. (Id. at p. 429A ¶ i). Jackson prepared calculations
and an extrapolation of Appellee's BAC at the time of the
accident based on the written information provided, including
Appellee's height and weight, and his stated assumptions.
(Id. at p. 428A ¶ a). Jackson concluded that Appellee's
extrapolated BAC at the time of the accident was .08%. (Id.
at p. 429A ¶ f).
In preparing his report, Land reviewed Jackson's opinion and
the attached background materials. (Land Dep. p. 13). He
also reviewed a blood alcohol and toxicological report on
Appellee, police reports, and witness depositions. (Id. at p.
12, 13, 21). He testified at deposition that such materials
are the type of materials upon which an expert in his
field would rely in reaching a conclusion regarding the
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toxicological consequences of alcohol consumption. (Id. at p.
13). Considering the metabolic rate of the average male, the
expired time between the drawing of Appellee's blood and the
accident, and Appellee's reported BAC, Land calculated that
Appellee's BAC was likely between .08% and .086% at the
time of the accident. (Id. at p. 23-27). Land was deposed by
Appellee's counsel.
The Bankruptcy Court excluded Land's testimony because
“Dr. Land ... offers no independent factual basis to support his
conclusion, but instead relies upon and repeats the opinions
of Dr. Jackson.” Op. at 2 n. 1. The Bankruptcy Court noted
that Jackson was unavailable to be cross-examined at trial. Id.
The Bankruptcy Court also found it significant that Land was
unable to testify about facts relating to the accident, including
when Appellee had his first and last alcoholic drink, what kind
of drink he had, whether he had consumed the entire drink,
and whether he had eaten before the accident. Id.
*4  The Federal Rules of Evidence do not permit experts
to simply “parrot” the ideas of other experts or individuals.
See, e.g., Loeffel Steel Prod.s v. Delta Brands, 387 F.Supp.2d
794, 824 (N.D.Il.2005) (expert testimony that simply repeated
the assertions of non-expert company employees was
inadmissable). Having reviewed both reports, the Court
concludes that Land has done more than parrot Jackson.
As Appellants point out, Land discussed his methodology
at some length, recalculated the extrapolation put forward
by Jackson, and actually disagreed with Jackson in some
results. (Land Dep. p. 22-28). In addition to using Jackson's
report, Land examined police reports and witness statements
to determine whether Appellee was intoxicated. (Id. at 11).
In his deposition, Land states specifically that these materials
are the kind that are reasonably relied upon by experts in his
field. (Id. at p. 13).
Moreover, experts are permitted to rely on materials used by
other experts in developing their own opinions. See United
States v. Posey, 647 F.2d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir.1981) (in a
drug prosecution, it was permissible for one chemist to rely
on tests run by another in testifying that a substance was
cocaine: “It is quite reasonable for a chemist to review another
chemist's analysis when forming an opinion as to the veracity
of the latter's test results.”) The Advisory Committee notes to
Federal Rule of Evidence 703 specifically approve of medical
experts' practice of gathering data and anecdotes from other
doctors and nurses in developing their opinions. In a manner
similar to a doctor making a diagnosis, Land used a mix of
objective data and subjective analysis from another expert
to opine about Appellee's physical status at the time of the
accident, and to create an admissible report.
The list of specific facts about the accident with which Land is
allegedly unfamiliar-such as the time of Appellee's last drink,
or the contents of his last meal before his accident-would
go to the weight accorded to Land's report and testimony,
rather than its admissibility. It is unclear that Jackson, the
initial expert, was aware of those facts, either; for example,
Jackson based his report on the assumption that Appellee had
no food in his stomach. (Jackson Report at 429A ¶ i). Thus,
the Bankruptcy Court's doubts about the quality of Land's
testimony do not relate to the evidentiary rule about experts
who “parrot.” As a result, the Bankruptcy Court abused its
discretion in excluding Dr. Land's report.
Causation under § 523(a)(9)
Appellee argues that Appellants' claim fails not only because
they did not prove intoxication, but also because they did
not establish a causal link between the alleged intoxication
and the accident, which Appellee maintains is required under
section 523(a) (9). The statute provides that debt is non-
dischargeable if it was “caused by the debtor's operation of a
motor vehicle ... if such operation was unlawful because the
debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another
substance.” Because the question of whether creditors must
prove causation is inextricably intertwined with the question
of whether the Appellants have met their burden of proof,
and because both parties address the issue of causation in
their briefs, the Court has considered the issue although the
Bankruptcy Court did not render a decision on it. Op. at 4 n. 3.
The Court finds that the law does not require the Appellants
to prove that Appellee's intoxication was the cause of the
accident.
*5  Appellee points to case law in which courts have
found a debt discharged, even when the debtor was driving
while impaired, because the creditor failed to prove that the
intoxication caused the accident. Those cases, however, are
easily distinguished from this one. In In re: Mutschler, 1994
Bankr.LEXIS 1294, at *13 (Bankr.W.D.Pa. Aug, 26, 1994),
the plaintiff failed to include in the record any evidence to
suggest that the intoxication of the debtor caused the fatal
accident. There was simply no discussion of vehicle speed,
road conditions, or the impact of the crash on the victim
and vehicles, beyond the simple assertion that a collision had
occurred and a driver was impaired. Id. In In re: Christiansen,
80 B.R. 481, 483 (W.D.Mo.1987), the court noted that both
the debtor and the creditor were intoxicated at the time of
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the accident, creating an issue regarding whose intoxication
caused the collision. In this case, in contrast, the record
contains significant detail about driving conditions and the
impact of the accident. Moreover, there is no question that
Appellant's decedent was sober at the time of the accident.
In addition, this Court is persuaded by the reasoning of the
court in General Casualty Company of Wisconsin v. Keating,
80 B.R. 115, 118 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1987). The General
Casualty court noted that Congress enacted section 523(a)
(9) to create an objective standard for non-dischargeability
cases-if a driver is impaired, the debt is non-dischargeable. Id.
Moreover, the court held that the debtor's preferred reading
of the statute was grammatically incorrect. At the time, the
non-dischargeability provision applied “wherein liability was
incurred by such debtor as a result of the debtor's operation of
a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated.” As the court stated,
“ ‘[Debtor] argues that it should be construed to provide
that the liability must arise as a result of intoxication;
however, the statute states that the cause of the defendant's
liability is “as a result of the debtor's operation of a
motor vehicle.” The phrase “while legally intoxicated”
modifies the word “operation,” denoting only a condition
in existence at the time of operation. If the condition exists
at that moment, inquiry need go no further.” Id.
This logic and application of grammatical rules still applies
today. Accepting this reading of the statute and unpersuaded
by the authority provided by the Appellee, the Court holds
that Appellants need not prove that Appellee's intoxication
was the cause of the accident for section 523(a)(9) to apply.
Other Evidence of Intoxication and the Appellants'
Burden of Proof
Appellants argue that the Bankruptcy Court erred in deeming
their other proffered evidence of Appellee's intoxication
“irrelevant.” The Bankruptcy Court found Appellants'
evidence was unconvincing for two reasons: first, because it
was irrelevant in light of the lack of a criminal charge against
Appellee; and second, because Appellee had offered “credible
rebuttal evidence to establish that he was not intoxicated at the
time of the accident.” Op. at p. 4-5 n. 3. The Bankruptcy Court
clearly evaluated Appellants' other evidence of intoxication,
but did not credit it more than the rebuttal evidence of
sobriety. Because the Bankruptcy Court weighed Appellants'
other evidence of intoxication, this Court need not reach the
question of whether the evidence was also “irrelevant.”
*6  Appellants also argue that they met their burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Appellee
was intoxicated, even absent the report and testimony of Dr.
Land. Their evidence suggested, for example, that following
the accident Appellee failed some roadside sobriety tests,
walked and acted strangely, drank copious amounts of fluids,
and spoke in a “mush-mouthed” manner. (Appellants' Br.
at 32-33). The Bankruptcy Court considered this evidence.
The Bankruptcy Court was persuaded, however, by other
evidence from police officers at the scene who reported that
the Appellee performed some sobriety tests correctly, that
his speech was not slurred, and that he walked normally.
Op. at p. 5 n. 3. Moreover, the Bankruptcy Court concluded
that the shock of the accident, as well as the profusion of
shattered glass in the Appellee's hair, mouth, eyes, and on
his feet, accounted for irregularities in Appellee's behavior.
Id. Because there is evidentiary support for the Bankruptcy
Court's conclusion that the Appellants did not meet their
burden of proof without Land's report and testimony, this
Court affirms the Bankruptcy Court's holding.
The § 523(a)(6) exception to non-dischargeability
The Court affirms the Bankruptcy Court's conclusion that
Appellants did not meet their burden of proving Appellee's
actions willful and malicious under section 523(a)(6). The
Supreme Court has stated clearly that reckless or negligent
acts will not produce liability under section 523(a)(6).
Kawaauhua v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 63, 118 S.Ct. 974, 140
L.Ed.2d 90 (1998). The Bankruptcy Court determined that
Appellee acted in a manner “at most, negligent or reckless,”
op. at 5 n. 4, and this Court will not disrupt this factual finding
because it is not clearly erroneous.
Appellants argue that in determining whether Appellee
acted in a willful and malicious manner, the Bankruptcy
Court should have focused on whether Appellee intended
to commit the act which caused the injury, rather than
whether he intended to cause the injury itself. The Supreme
Court has rejected this approach. Id. at 61 (“The word
‘willful’ in (a)(6) modifies the word “injury,” indicating that
nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury,
not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury.”)
Moreover, as Appellee rightly points out, Appellants' reading
of the statute would render section 523(a)(9) superfluous-if
driving under the influence could be considered willful and
malicious under average circumstances, Congress would have
had no need to add a specific provision to the Bankruptcy
Code to address dischargeability and drunken driving. Id. at
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62. Thus, this Court affirms the Bankruptcy Court's ruling that
the debt is dischargeable under section 523(a)(6).
In sum, the Court affirms all of the Bankruptcy Court's
factual findings. The Court also affirms all of the Bankruptcy
Court's conclusions of law, with the exception of the decision
to exclude the expert report of Samuel Land, and to enter
judgment for Appellee and against Appellants and finding
that the debt is dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9). The
Court will remand this matter to the Bankruptcy Court solely
for the consideration of the report and testimony of Samuel
Land in conjunction with the record and the previous factual
findings of the Bankruptcy Court.
ORDER
*7  AND NOW, this 27th day of March, 2007, after review of
all the briefs in this bankruptcy appeal, and oral argument, it is
hereby ORDERED that the Speaking Order of the Bankruptcy
Court dated February 3, 2006 is REVERSED in part and
AFFIRMED in part as follows:
1. The portion of the Speaking Order granting the
Appellee's Motion in Limine which precluded the report
and testimony of Dr. Samuel Land is REVERSED.
2. The portion of the Speaking Order entering judgment
in favor of Appellee and against Appellants and finding
that the debt is dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)
(9) is REVERSED.
3. The remainder of the Speaking Order is AFFIRMED as
are all of the factual findings of the Bankruptcy Court.
The Court REMANDS the case to the Bankruptcy Court
for the sole purpose of considering Dr. Land's report and
testimony in conjunction with the record and factual findings
of the Bankruptcy Court.
All Citations
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2007 WL 966010
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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*1  In this appraisal action, the petitioner asks the Court to
determine the fair value of its shares in the respondent. On
November 10, 2012, a third party acquired the respondent in a
hostile cash merger for $3.10 per share. The deal had an equity
value of approximately $110 million and paid a 71% premium
over the respondent's unaffected stock price of $1.81.
The petitioner acquired its shares after the announcement of
the merger and demanded appraisal pursuant to 8 Del. C. §
262. The respondent contends the merger price less synergies
offers the most reliable measure of the fair value of its shares.
That methodology, as applied by the respondent's expert,
yields a value of $2.76 per share. The petitioner's expert,
relying on a combination of a discounted cash flow (“DCF”)
analysis and a comparable transactions analysis, contends that
the fair value is $4.96 per share.
For the reasons that follow, I conclude that a DCF analysis
is not an appropriate method of determining fair value in
this instance. The utility of a DCF ceases when its inputs
are unreliable; and, in this instance, I conclude that the
management projections that provide the key inputs to the
petitioner's DCF analysis are not reliable. The parties agree
that there are no comparable companies. The petitioner relies,
in part, upon a comparable transactions approach, but I
conclude that his two-observation data set does not provide
a reasonable basis to determine fair value. Although the
petitioner thoroughly disputes this point, I conclude that the
sales process in this instance was thorough and that the
transaction price less synergies provides the most reliable
method of determining the fair value of the petitioner's shares.
The respondent, however, has not shown that the synergies
in fact amounted to $0.34 per share, as it claims. Instead, I
adopt the petitioner's estimate of $0.03 per share in synergies,
resulting in a fair value of $3.07 per share.
I. BACKGROUND
I begin by providing a brief overview of the parties, the
respondent and its business, and the process leading up to the
merger. 1  I delve more deeply into several of these and related
topics in subsequent Sections.
A. The Parties
Petitioner, LongPath Capital, LLC (“LongPath”), is an
investment vehicle that began acquiring shares of the
respondent in mid-October 2012, about a month after the
announcement of the merger. 2  Overall, LongPath timely
demanded and perfected its appraisal rights as to 484,700
shares of common stock in the respondent. 3
Respondent, Ramtron International Corporation (“Ramtron”
or the “Company”), is a fabless semiconductor company that
produces F–RAM. A “fabless” semiconductor company is
one that does not manufacture the silicon wafers used in
its products, but instead, outsources that task to a separate
company known as a “fab” or a “foundry.” 4  RAM stands
for random access memory, a ubiquitous component of
computers. F–RAM is ferroelectric RAM. 5  The benefits of
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F–RAM are that it has fast read and write speeds, can be
written to a high number of times, and consumes low power. 6
Importantly, F-RAM will retain memory when power is
lost. 7
*2  Nonparty Cypress Semiconductor Corporation
(“Cypress”) issued a bear hug letter to Ramtron on June
12, 2012, offering to buy all of its shares for $2.48
per share. 8  After Ramtron's board rejected the offer as
inadequate, Cypress initiated a hostile tender offer on June 21,
2012, at $2.68 per share. 9  Ramtron and Cypress eventually
reached an agreement on a transaction price of $3.10 per
share and signed a merger agreement on September 18,
2012. 10  Following a subsequent tender offer—apparently
in an unsuccessful effort to acquire 90% or more of the
outstanding stock or at least solidify Cypress' stock holdings
—and a stockholder vote, the long-form merger closed on
November 20, 2012 (the “Merger”). 11
B. Ramtron's Operative Reality
Throughout this litigation, Respondent has portrayed
Ramtron as a struggling company unlikely to be able to
continue as a business had the transaction with Cypress
not concluded successfully. Petitioner, by contrast, describes
Ramtron as a company with strong patent and intellectual
property protection of its core products, a successful
new management team, and excellent business prospects.
Indeed, in relying on the management projections, Petitioner
characterizes Ramtron as a company on the verge of taking
off like a rocket. Perhaps unsurprisingly, I find that Ramtron's
operative reality at the time of the Merger was somewhere in
between these practically polar opposite characterizations.
1. Ramtron's foundry situation
As a fabless semiconductor company, Ramtron's relationships
with its foundries were vitally important. Indeed, Ramtron
depended on its foundry to manufacture its products. At the
time of the Merger, Ramtron's primary foundry was Texas
Instruments (“TI”). 12  Ramtron's contract with TI provided
that, if TI decided to terminate the contract, it would have
to provide three additional years of products to Ramtron. By
contrast, in the event of a change-in-control transaction at
Ramtron, TI could stop providing foundry services after only
ninety days. 13
Semiconductor foundries were the subject of a substantial
amount of testimony at trial. As will be seen, the subject of
foundries relates to both the reliability of the management
predictions and the disputed cause of Ramtron's poor
performance in 2012. Gery Richards, Ramtron's CFO at
the time of the Merger, 14  testified that Fujitsu previously
served as the Company's primary foundry. In 2009, Fujitsu
gave Ramtron a “last-time buy” notice under the relevant
contract, indicating that Fujitsu intended to terminate its
foundry relationship with Ramtron in two years. 15
The testimony at trial made clear that transitioning foundries
is not a simple process. Semiconductors are complex
products. In fact, even the silicon wafers from which the
semiconductors are created are not commodities but instead
vary by company. 16  Additionally, each foundry's technology
differs and F–RAM, being a relatively unique product,
complicates the process further. Thus, transitioning to a new
foundry requires understanding the foundry's manufacturing
technology and how it interacts with the semiconductors as
designed, then modifying the product design to eliminate any
resulting errors, then completing several rounds of product
testing followed by further design modifications to eliminate
any previously undiscovered errors, and then allowing the
customers to evaluate the product before finally moving
to full-scale production. 17  Unlike, for example, consumer
RAM that one could purchase at an electronics store for a PC
and then, depending on the model, simply “plug and play,”
Ramtron's F–RAM often was designed into the product being
created by another manufacturer, thus inhibiting Ramtron's
ability to unilaterally change its products in any significant
way. According to T.J. Rodgers, the CEO of Cypress, even
for a noncontroversial shift of “going to a different foundry,
to change one of your products, you're looking at two years
plus.” 18
*3  In fact, Ramtron's own track record of foundry
transitions suggests that two years probably is a significant
underestimate. When Fujitsu gave Ramtron a last-time buy
notice in 2009, Ramtron already had been attempting to
develop a second foundry relationship with TI. The effort of
transitioning to TI had begun in 2004 and took seven years
to complete. 19  That transition was not smooth, resulting in
product shortages that caused Ramtron to place its customers
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on allocation. 20  Despite the difficulty of transitioning from
Fujitsu to TI, Ramtron succeeded, eventually, in obtaining a
reliable new foundry.
To increase its flexibility and reduce its dependence on TI,
Ramtron sought to develop a second foundry relationship
with IBM. That effort, however, never succeeded. Thomas
Davenport, Ramtron's Vice President of Technology at the
time of the Merger, 21  described the Company's attempt to
work with IBM. Davenport headed up a team of six people
that worked from 2009 until spring 2012, attempting to get
IBM up and running as a second Ramtron foundry. They
incurred $17 million in direct costs in addition to $16 million
in capital equipment purchased by Ramtron and provided
to IBM to enable it to produce F–RAM. 22  But, in what
Davenport considered a “huge personal disappointment,” 23
the integration project failed and Ramtron never achieved a
single milestone. To put the IBM investment in context, in
2011 Ramtron had approximately $66 million in revenue. 24
The witnesses at trial uniformly attested to the difficulty of
transitioning foundries. 25  Ramtron's own experience with
transitioning to TI and its failed attempt to develop IBM
as a foundry confirm this fact. Nevertheless, on July 20,
2012, about a month after Cypress launched its hostile bid for
Ramtron, Ramtron entered into a manufacturing agreement
with ROHM Co., Ltd. (“ROHM”), a Japanese company, to act
as Ramtron's second fab. 26  Ramtron's management's five-
year forecasts incorporate the purported cost savings that
would derive from having ROHM operate as a second, or even
the primary, foundry for Ramtron.
2. Ramtron's business and finances
Ramtron's board of directors installed Eric Balzer as the
Company's new CEO in January 2011. 27  He hired Pete
Zimmer to lead the Company's sales department. At Zimmer's
recommendation, Scott Emley was hired to lead Ramtron's
marketing department. Both Zimmer and Emley had worked
at TI and joined Ramtron sometime in 2011. 28  Richards
officially became CFO in late 2011 or 2012. 29  Thus, as of the
time of the Merger, most of Ramtron's executives had been
in their positions for less than two years and, in the case of
Emley and Zimmer, about a year.
The difficult transition from Fujitsu to TI caused problems
for Ramtron's day-today business throughout 2011 and into
2012. A brief overview of Ramtron's sales process is required
in order to understand that effect. Ramtron sold some of its
product directly to customers, but the majority was sold to
distributors who in turn sold the products to the end users. 30
Ramtron also recognized revenue on a point-of-purchase
basis instead of a point-of-sale basis. Under the point-of-
purchase system, revenue is recognized when the product is
shipped to a distributor. By contrast, under the point-of-sale
method, revenue is only recognized when the product is sold
to the end user, whether directly by the Company or indirectly
by the distributor. 31
*4  Theoretically, the two systems should arrive at the same
results. Unless the distributors are buying exactly the same
amount of inventory as they are selling during each financial
reporting period, however, the systems will result in revenue
being recognized at different times. To take a simplistic
example, suppose a company sells 100% of its products
through distributors and that the company develops a new
product in the first quarter. The following chart provides an
example of how the company would recognize revenue under
the two different regimes assuming the company sold 100
units of the product to the distributors at $1 each over the
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This comparison deliberately highlights an important dispute
between the parties in this case: the point-of-purchase method
makes it difficult to forecast actual demand because the
distributors provide a buffer. Indeed, in this example, under
the point-of-purchase method, demand appears to be falling,
while under the point-of-sale method, it appears to be rising.
Several of the witnesses testified that they believed Ramtron's
point-of-purchase revenue system made it more difficult
accurately to forecast future sales. 32  The revenue recognition
system matters for two reasons. First, as already mentioned,
distributor activity can mask actual demand. The difficult
transition from Fujitsu to TI forced Ramtron to place
its customers on allocation in or around 2011. Because
Ramtron's F–RAM already was designed into many of their
customers' products, those customers needed to ensure that
they would have a sufficient supply of F–RAM. After
they were placed on allocation, many customers apparently
increased their orders accordingly. 33  For example, a
customer that was allocated 80% of its ordered amount
potentially would order five units for every four that it
actually needed. This increase in orders led Ramtron to
increase the number of wafers it was ordering from TI.
The upshot of this chain of events was a massive inventory
bubble, over-recognition of revenue, and a resulting cash
crunch for Ramtron because it then had to pay for the extra
inventory it ordered. 34  Because of its point-of-purchase
revenue recognition, Ramtron recognized these additional
distributor orders as revenue, even though the over-ordering
was not reflective of “real” underlying demand, but instead,
at least in part, was an effort of the customers to game the
allocation system.
The second reason that Ramtron's point-of-purchase revenue
recognition system is relevant is because it allows
management to alter the Company's revenue by forcing more
inventory into the distribution channels. This practice is
known as “channel stuffing.” As discussed in more detail in
Section III.A infra, I find that Ramtron's management did
stuff the channel in the first quarter of 2012, thereby distorting
the company's revenue.
The combination of over-orders from customers that were
placed on allocation and Ramtron's stuffing of the channel
led to a massive build-up of inventory. The chart below 35
shows the amount of inventory Ramtron had accumulated as
of the time of the Merger. Because of its point-of-purchase
accounting system, Ramtron already had recognized this
inventory as revenue. As this chart shows, in the first quarter




This inventory needed to be financed, which took a serious
toll on Ramtron's cash position. Ramtron's primary lender was
Silicon Valley Bank (“SVB”). Throughout 2011 and 2012,
the years affected by the inventory bubble, Ramtron either
missed or needed to renegotiate its loan covenants repeatedly.
For example, the Company missed its April 2011 liquidity
covenant and received a forbearance for May of that year. 36
A July 7, 2011 Form 8–K filing states that on June 30, 2011,
Ramtron entered into a Default Waiver and Fifth Amendment
to its loan agreement with SVB, an amendment that cost the
Company $20,000. 37
Around this time, Cypress began expressing an interest in
Ramtron. On March 8, 2011, Cypress made a non-public
written offer to Ramtron for $3.01 a share. 38  Ramtron
rejected the offer as inadequate later that month. The offer
represented a 37% premium over the March 8 closing price of
Ramtron's stock. 39  Rodgers described the offer as including
“a high market premium to say we were serious and not to try
to squeeze on them.” 40
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After rebuffing Cypress and renegotiating its bank covenants,
Ramtron still needed capital. SVB apparently had shifted to
lending to Ramtron on an asset-backed basis, meaning that
its loans were collateralized by the Company's receivables
instead of being unsecured. Ramtron considered borrowing
from other lenders, but concluded that the cost was too
high. 41  So, in July 2011, Ramtron launched a secondary
public offering of 4,750,000 shares, which was roughly
20% of its outstanding shares. 42  The secondary offering
occurred at $2 per share, with a net to Ramtron of $1.79
after underwriting commissions and other charges. 43  The
Company used the proceeds of this equity raise largely for
working capital to pay off its excess inventory. 44
As the above chart shows, Ramtron's inventory continued
to increase throughout 2011. Despite the recent equity raise,
Ramtron soon fell short on cash again. At least one internal
Company email from January 2012 suggests that the first
quarter covenants would be tight. 45  And, by spring 2012,
the Company was in a cash crunch of sorts. Richards emailed
Davenport on March 3, 2012, that “we are basically running
on fumes in regards to cash management and related bank
covenants, which we just announced new ones yesterday.” 46
These cash management problems continued after Cypress
announced its hostile bid for Ramtron on June 12, 2012.
Shortly after the merger agreement was signed, Richards
provided Brad Buss, Cypress' then-CFO, with cash forecasts
that showed the Company would go cash negative on October
26, 2012. 47  In response, Cypress promptly began funding
Ramtron. 48
*6  Overall, the evidence shows that Ramtron continually
had difficulty meeting its bank covenants, but that SVB
seemed willing to renegotiate those covenants. There is no
evidence that SVB ever sought to call its loans or that
the Company actually faced a serious risk of foreclosure.
Richards concisely summed up Ramtron's relationship with
SVB as “rocky in regards to the covenants” but that he “had
a good relationship with the bankers.” 49  From the evidence
of record, therefore, I conclude that the Company was cash-
strapped and struggling from a liquidity standpoint at the time
of the Merger, but that Ramtron was not, as Cypress suggests,
a bankruptcy waiting to happen.
C. The Merger
On June 12, 2012, Ramtron issued a public letter declaring its
intent to acquire Ramtron for $2.48 a share. 50  Interestingly,
the $2.48 offer reflected the same 37% premium to
market as Cypress' March 2011 offer; the decrease in
price corresponded to the fall in Ramtron's stock price. 51
Ramtron rejected that offer as inadequate in a June 18 press
release and announced that it had begun exploring strategic
alternatives. 52
Only two days after Cypress announced its public bid, Balzer,
Ramtron's CEO, ordered the creation of new long-term
management projections (the “Management Projections”).
While, as discussed infra, the parties vigorously dispute
the accuracy of Ramtron's prior forecasts, there seems to
be no dispute that the Company's management had not
previously created multi-year forecasts and instead generally
only created five-quarter forecasts. 53  Balzer oversaw the
team in charge of creating the new management projections,
which consisted of Richards, Brian Yates, who worked for
Richards, Zimmer, and Emley. 54
A June 14, 2010 email chain among those five individuals
shows a team undertaking a new and unfamiliar project.
As if emphasizing that the projections were not being
prepared in the ordinary course of Ramtron's business, Balzer
wrote that he wanted a “product by product build up,
with assumptions, for it to hold water in the event of a
subsequent dispute.” 55  Indeed, Richards testified that he
understood the purpose of the projections to be twofold:
marketing the company to a white knight and creating inputs
for a DCF analysis. 56  The Ramtron management team
had never done long-term projections before. 57  Zimmer,
the head of sales, wrote that not even the automotive
industry, which he apparently considered more predictable
than the semiconductor industry, “can do a line item 4 year
forecast.” 58  He also suggested that for “[o]ut years I would
simply plug in 30% CAGR,” 59  a comment that reinforces
the inference that these projections were not produced in
the ordinary course of business based on reliable data.
Additionally, Balzer wanted the projections done using a
point-of-sale approach, as opposed to Ramtron's standard
point-of-purchase methodology. Ramtron's management
team had never done point-of-sale projections. 60  I describe
the resulting projections in significantly more detail in
Section III.A infra.
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*7  Meanwhile, Cypress' hostile offer continued. On June
21, 2012, Cypress commenced a hostile tender offer for
Ramtron at $2.68 per share. 61  Ramtron's Board rejected
the $2.68 price as inadequate and not in the best interests
of the Company's stockholders. Accordingly, the Board
recommended that the stockholders not tender their shares. 62
Shortly thereafter, Ramtron issued its second quarter 2012
earnings, which were significantly below expectations. In the
first quarter of 2012, Ramtron had reported $15 million in
revenue and reaffirmed its public guidance for entire-year
2012 revenue of “approximately $70 million.” 63  On July
24, 2012, Ramtron reported $14.2 million in revenue for
the second quarter and projected revenue of $14 to $14.5
million for the third quarter. 64  These results and projections
placed the Company on track to undershoot its full-year 2012
estimate by at least $10 million. On July 26, 2012, shortly
after Ramtron's announcement, Merriman Capital, the only
analyst covering Ramtron, downgraded the Company from
“buy” to “neutral.” 65  Merriman also suspended its target
price and observed that “were Cypress to pull its offer for
Ramtron, these shares might very well return to the $2.00
range or perhaps lower.” 66
The witnesses at trial agreed that Ramtron's second
quarter performance was disappointing. 67  The parties,
however, vigorously dispute the reasons for that. Petitioner
assigns basically all of the blame for the poor second
quarter to Cypress and denies that it resulted from any
inherent weakness in Ramtron. According to Petitioner, the
distributors pulled back their orders dramatically in light of
Cypress' hostile bid, because they feared being terminated
after the merger. For this proposition, LongPath relies mostly
on Balzer's deposition testimony. 68  Respondent argues that
Ramtron's second quarter results reflected Ramtron's own
operational failures.
It is conceivable that Cypress' offer may have had some
negative effect on second quarter sales, but the weight of the
evidence shows that operational shortcomings of Ramtron
were the primary cause of the decline in sales. Ramtron
appears to run on a calendar fiscal year. As such, less than
three weeks remained in June (and the second quarter) when
Cypress issued its bear hug letter on June 12 and at most ten
days remained after Cypress initiated its hostile tender offer.
The most probable explanation for the poor second quarter
is that Ramtron's management had stuffed the Company's
distribution channel with inventory in the first quarter of
2012, and that caused the Company's distributors to order less
product in quarter two. I discuss channel stuffing in Section
III. A infra. Here, it suffices to note that, as of the first quarter
of 2012, Ramtron had $25.5 million in inventory, a 264%
increase over the previous year. Even assuming Ramtron's
optimistic 2012 projection of $70 million in revenue, Ramtron
had roughly nineteen weeks worth of inventory, for which
it already had recognized revenue, at the beginning of the
second quarter of 2012. 69  A fiscal quarter contains only
thirteen weeks.
Other factors support the conclusion that Cypress' hostile bid
did not drive Ramtron's poor second quarter performance.
First, Davenport disagreed with the allegation that the
distributors were pulling back because of Cypress. Davenport
viewed Zimmer's comments to that effect as excuses for not
hitting his sales targets. 70  Considering that Balzer admittedly
based his assertion that the distributors were withholding
orders on out-of-court statements made by Zimmer, who did
not testify at trial, I accord it little weight. Second, it appears
from the record that a significant number of Ramtron's
products are “designed into” the final products, meaning that
the end users would need the semiconductors to complete
their own products and thus would have relatively stable,
long-term demand. This makes it unlikely that demand dipped
sharply at the end of Q2 because of Cypress' bid. 71  For all
of these reasons, I find that, although Cypress' bid may have
contributed slightly to Ramtron's poor performance in the
second quarter of 2012, the main cause of that performance
was Ramtron's own business reality.
*8  Notwithstanding the poor second quarter, Cypress
increased its offer price to $2.88 per share on August 27, 2012,
and extended the term of the tender offer. 72  On September
10, 2012, Ramtron's Board again concluded that the offer
was inadequate and recommended that the stockholders not
tender their shares. 73  During the time Cypress was pursuing
its hostile tender offer, Ramtron actively canvassed the market
looking for other buyers. In fact, Ramtron contacted over
twenty potential suitors, a process I discuss in more detail in
Section III.C infra. None of those other companies, however,
ever made a firm offer, even though the most serious of them
had access to Ramtron's internal management projections.
Beginning on September 12, 2012, representatives of Cypress
and Ramtron engaged in active negotiations. Cypress
increased its offer to $3.01 per share on September 16 and
then again to $3.08 on September 17. Later that same day,
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Ramtron and Cypress agreed on the final transaction price of
$3.10 per share. 74  The parties signed the merger agreement
on September 18, 75  and the Merger was approved by a
stockholder vote on November 20, 2012. 76
D. Procedural History
LongPath filed this appraisal action on December 11, 2012.
After the parties engaged in discovery, the Court presided
over a three-day trial from October 7 to 9, 2014. Eight
witnesses testified, including the parties' experts. After
extensive post-trial briefing, I heard final argument on March
3, 2015.
I also note, for completeness, that a stockholder class action
challenging the Merger was filed on October 15, 2012. Those
plaintiffs moved to preliminarily enjoin the Merger, but that
motion was denied. Thereafter, the defendants in the class
action moved to dismiss. On June 30, 2014, I issued a
memorandum opinion granting those motions and dismissing
the stockholder class action with prejudice. 77
E. Parties' Contentions
Both parties base their positions on expert testimony.
Petitioner called David Clarke as its expert; Respondent relied
upon Gregg Jarrell. Not surprisingly, the experts arrived at
widely disparate conclusions. Clarke contends that the fair
value of Ramtron's stock as of the Merger was $4.96 a share.
Jarrell opines that the stock was worth only $2.76. Petitioner's
fair value of $4.96 a share is more than 274% of Ramtron's
unaffected stock price of $1.81.
Clarke bases his conclusion of $4.96 per share on a
combination of a DCF analysis and a comparable transactions
analysis, which he weighted at 80% and 20%, respectively.
Clarke relied on Ramtron's management projections and a
three-stage DCF analysis to arrive at a value of $5.20 per
share. He based his comparable transactions analysis on a
dataset consisting of only two transactions and obtained a
fair value of $3.99 per share. Because Clarke found no
comparable companies, he did not rely on that valuation
method.
Jarrell rather unusually began his analysis with two premises:
(1) that the Merger price was the result of a fair and
competitive auction; and (2) that the management projections
were overly optimistic. Based on these predicates, Jarrell
opted to examine the transaction price and back out any
synergies in order to determine fair value. This approach
resulted in a fair value of $2.76 per share. In addition, Jarrell
conducted a DCF analysis, in which he relied upon the
management projections he earlier concluded were overly
optimistic. Based on that analysis, Jarrell opined, apparently
in the alternative, that the fair value of the Company's shares
was $3.08 each, a number coincidentally only two pennies
from the Merger price. As a result of his analysis, Jarrell
also concluded that there were no comparable companies or
comparable transactions.
*9  Much has been said of litigation-driven valuations,
none of it favorable. 78  Here, the parties have proffered
widely disparate valuation numbers which differ, at the
extremes, by $2.44 as compared to an unaffected stock
price of $1.81 and a deal price of $3.10. LongPath asks
this Court to adopt its $4.96 figure and conclude that the
market left an amount on the table exceeding Ramtron's
unaffected market capitalization. This would be a significant
market failure, especially in the context of a well-publicized
hostile bid and a target actively seeking a white knight. But,
LongPath itself is a market participant. It bought its shares
after the announcement of the Merger, thereby effectively
purchasing an appraisal lawsuit. Although such arbitrage can
be profitable on the merits when flawed deals undervalue
companies, LongPath invested an amount so small that, even
if I accepted its position and concluded that Ramtron's true
value at the time of the Merger was somewhere in the range
of $4.96 per share, this lawsuit is likely a less-than-break-
even proposition for LongPath after considering its litigation
expenses. Respondent, on the other hand, has submitted an
eyebrow-raising DCF that, based on projections its expert
presumed were overly optimistic, still returns a “fair” value
two cents below the Merger price.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a statutory appraisal action brought pursuant to 8 Del.
C. § 262, the Court is tasked with “determin[ing] the fair
value of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon
the amount determined to be the fair value.” 79  The Delaware
Supreme Court has held that “fair value” is “the value to
a stockholder of the firm as a going concern, as opposed
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to the firm's value in the context of an acquisition or other
transaction.” 80  “Accordingly, the corporation must be valued
as a going concern based upon the ‘operative reality’ of
the company as of the time of the merger.” 81  Section 262
directs that, in making this determination, “the Court shall
take into account all relevant factors.” 82  Our case law has
made clear that “[a]ny ‘techniques or methods which are
generally considered acceptable in the financial community
and otherwise admissible in court’ may be used.” 83
As is well-known, the Delaware appraisal statute places
the burden of proof on both parties. 84  “If neither party
satisfies its burden, however, the court must then use its own
independent business judgment to determine fair value.” 85
III. ANALYSIS
A survey of the case law reveals that there are four main, or
at least recurring, valuation techniques generally presented in
an appraisal action: a discounted cash flow or DCF analysis, a
comparable companies approach, a comparable transactions
approach, and an examination of the merger price itself, less
synergies. Like all tools, each has its own strengths and
weaknesses. The parties agree that there are no comparable
companies. Jarrell and Clarke disagree about whether there
are comparable transactions, but the universe of potential
comparables, even according to Clarke, is limited to two.
Both sides conducted a DCF analysis, but disagree about
certain issues in addition to the reliability of the Management
Projections, such as the proper size premium, the appropriate
method of modeling future capital expenditures, and whether
a two-step or three-step DCF is more appropriate, as well
as several more minor issues. The parties strongly disagree
about the appropriate weight, if any, to give the Merger price,
which Respondent weighs at 100%. Petitioner places the most
weight on its DCF analysis. Accordingly, I begin there and
then address the utility of a comparable transactions approach
before turning to the transaction price.
A. A Discounted Cash Flow Analysis Is Inappropriate
Because the Management Projections Are Unreliable
*10  A discounted cash flow analysis “involves projecting
operating cash flows for a determined period, setting a
terminal value at the end of the projected period, and then
discounting those values at a set rate to determine the net
present value of a company's shares.” 86  “Typically, Delaware
courts tend to favor a DCF model over other available
methodologies in an appraisal proceeding. However, that
metric has much less utility in cases where the transaction
giving rise to appraisal was an arm's-length merger, [or] where
the data inputs used in the model are not reliable....” 87  The
foundational inputs of a DCF are the company's cash flows. 88
In determining those inputs, this Court has placed substantial
weight on the projections of the incumbent management.
Indeed, “this Court prefers valuations based on management
projections available as of the date of the merger and
holds a healthy skepticism for post-merger adjustments to
management projections or the creation of new projections
entirely.” 89
The reason that “Delaware law clearly prefers valuations
based on contemporaneously prepared management
projections” is “because management ordinarily has the
best first-hand knowledge of a company's operations.” 90
These projections are useful in appraisals, because they “by
definition, are not tainted by post-merger hindsight and are
usually created by an impartial body.... When management
projections are made in the ordinary course of business, they
are generally deemed reliable.” 91  By corollary, projections
prepared outside of the ordinary course do not enjoy the same
deference. In fact, management projections can be, and have
been, rejected entirely when they lack sufficient indicia of
reliability, such as when they were prepared: (1) outside of
the ordinary course of business; (2) by a management team
that never before had created long-term projections; (3) by
a management team with a motive to alter the projections,
such as to protect their jobs; and (4) when the possibility
of litigation, including an appraisal action, was likely and
probably affected the neutrality of the projections. 92  These
factors go to the reliability of the projections. In this case,
the Ramtron management projections suffer from all of these
problems.
1. A new Ramtron management team prepared
projections not in the ordinary course using a
methodology they never had employed before
*11  The team in charge of creating the new Management
Projections consisted of Richards and one of his employees,
Zimmer, and Emley, with oversight by Balzer. 93  According
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to Richards, the projections started with the numbers provided
by the sales department, because most of the Company's costs
either were fixed or a percentage of revenue, so the revenue
numbers were the most important inputs. 94  Zimmer and
Emley were the lead individuals responsible for developing
the sales (and, hence, revenue) numbers. Both had been with
the Company at most a year when they began creating the new
projections. 95
Aside from having relatively new employees tasked with
creating the inputs, the team that developed the Management
Projections utilized: (1) a new product-by-product build-
up method; (2) a point-of-sale instead of the usual point-
of-purchase methodology; and (3) a multi-year projection
period. 96  The Ramtron management team previously had not
created projections using any of these methods, much less all
three.
Additionally, the projections were not prepared in the
ordinary course of business. There is no evidence Ramtron
ever had prepared forecasts for more than five quarters, with
the exception of Richards's deferred tax asset projections. 97
Balzer ordered the projections created immediately after
Cypress issued its bear hug letter. Thus, these projections
were prepared in anticipation of potential litigation, or, at
least, a hostile takeover bid. Balzer explicitly wrote that he
wanted a “product by product build up, with assumptions,
for it to hold water in the event of a subsequent dispute.” 98
Furthermore, at least Richards understood one of the purposes
of the projections was to serve as a marketing tool in
Needham's hunt for a white knight. 99  This knowledge gave
the management team an incentive to err on the optimistic
side.
In sum, Ramtron's new management team employed a new
methodology to create long-term projections, which they
were not accustomed to doing, out of the ordinary course
of business, with knowledge that the projections could
or would be used: (1) in a subsequent dispute; (2) in
marketing the Company; (3) as the inputs for Needham's
DCF analysis; 100  or (4) any combination of those three
possibilities. These projections, therefore, facially lack the
indicia of reliability that generally have led Delaware courts to
defer to management projections. I now turn to more specific
problems with the Management Projections that reinforce the
conclusion that the Projections are unreliable.
2. Management's forecasting capabilities
The parties vigorously dispute Ramtron management's
forecasting accuracy. One dispute, for example, involves
Respondent's contention that Ramtron often missed its
publicly issued guidance for annual revenue going back to
2007, four years before Zimmer and Emley even joined the
Company. This line of attack is something of a red herring.
The proper focus should be on the forecasting accuracy of
the management team that actually made the projections.
Whether other, prior executives had or lacked the gift of
seeing into the Company's future and predicting the success
of its business is less relevant and barely probative of the
forecasting capabilities of the pre-Merger management team.
Accordingly, I would assign little weight to Ramtron's alleged
historic forecasting prowess, even assuming it was proven.
The record is surprisingly unclear on exactly what projections
were made by the then-current Ramtron management team,
aside from the occasional public guidance. 101  The parties'
main disagreement over management's forecasting abilities
concerns a waterfall chart. The chart shows forecasts
by quarter. Respondent contends that the chart represents
management's ongoing internal forecasts. Petitioner argues
that it depicts nothing but “stretch goals.” The answer is
somewhat important. If the waterfall chart in fact represents
actual forecasts, then Ramtron's ability to forecast its own
business more than two quarters out was quite poor. On the
other hand, if the chart merely reflects stretch goals, then
it loses much of its impact. The weight of the evidence
convinces me that the waterfall chart represented actual
forecasts, but I still accord that chart only moderate weight
in my evaluation of the Management Projections. Before
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Respondent's argument is straightforward: the waterfall chart
appears in a presentation to the Board, 103  and there is no
indication that the numbers are anything other than ordinary-
course forecasts. LongPath relies on a pair of “Sales Update”
presentations that refer to the numbers in the waterfall chart
as “stretch goals.” 104  Respondent advances the theory (and
urges the Court to infer) that Zimmer, as the Vice President
of Sales, referred to the forecasts as stretch goals because,
as the head of sales, he primarily was responsible for failing
to meet revenue targets. At trial, Ramtron's Vice President
of Technology, Davenport, similarly suggested that Zimmer
blamed Ramtron's poor second quarter on Cypress as an
excuse to cover up his own poor performance. 105
More practical reasons lead me to the conclusion that
the waterfall chart likely represented management's actual
forecasts. First, contemporaneous emails suggest that the
management team saw these numbers as goals they should hit.
In a late January 2012 email chain, Balzer writes to Zimmer,
Richards, and Yates that the Company “really need[s] to find a
way to hit $14.5. That is what we said we would do.” 106  The
first quarter 2012 forecast for that quarter was $14 million,
as the chart above shows. Second, the very idea of “stretch”
or “reach” goals requires targets that are, as the names
imply, actually within reach. 107  Many of these forecasts
were wildly incorrect. In December 2010, for example, the
Company forecasted $21 million for the first quarter of 2011
(the very next quarter), a quarter in which actual revenue was
$10.4 million, less than half of the forecast. Relatedly, as the
actual quarter drew closer, management generally reduced
its forecasts to better approximate the actual revenue. As the
quote from Balzer suggests, the management team treated
these numbers as real targets, not lofty stretch goals. 108
Third, if these are not actual forecasts, then the record
lacks evidence of regularly created and updated management
forecasts, i.e., if the waterfall chart only contains stretch goals,
then management's publicly issued guidance would be the
only basis for assessing its forecasting.
*13  I find it most likely that management began with
high aspirations for future quarters and reduced those
expectations toward the actual expected results as the quarter
drew nearer. This suggests that management's near-term
forecasting abilities were mediocre at best. Even so, the
waterfall forecasts and the public guidance forecasts were
done with a different methodology than the Management
Projections. Accordingly, I conclude that management, even
under its traditional forecasting system, was of middling
quality when it came to forecasting Ramtron's future business.
Several witnesses at trial testified that, in general, the
semiconductor business is difficult to forecast. 109  Indeed,
after Ramtron issued its weak second quarter 2012 earnings,
Merriman Capital issued a report that suspended its target
price for the Company and stated: “We simply can't figure
out how to model this company consistently at the current
time.” 110  Ramtron's management also recognized its own
limited success in forecasting. 111  In sum, management's lack
of success in accurately projecting future revenue in the
past provides another reason to doubt the reliability of the
Management Projections.
3. The projections incorporate unrealistic
assumptions regarding ROHM
I also note that the Management Projections assume cost
reductions, over time, associated with the transition to
ROHM's foundry. The projections reflect an assumption that
production of F–RAM at ROHM would to begin in January
2013 at 150,000 units a month and increase by 50,000
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units per month thereafter. 112  These assumptions are too
speculative to merit any deference. 113
Ramtron entered into a manufacturing agreement with
ROHM in late July 2012 pursuant to which ROHM would
serve as a second foundry for Ramtron. 114  According
to a July 23, 2012 press release, “Initial low-density F–
RAM products have already been qualified for commercial
production and Ramtron expects to receive and begin selling
the first devices produced on ROHM's manufacturing line
within approximately 60 days.” 115  As already described, it
took Ramtron seven years to transition entirely from Fujitsu to
TI. That process went so poorly that it forced Ramtron to place
its customers on allocation in 2011. Ramtron's earlier efforts
to develop IBM as a second foundry took place over three
years and caused it to incur more than $30 million in direct
costs and equipment expenses. That endeavor failed entirely.
Additionally, the evidence shows that, in July 2012, Ramtron
was not flush with cash. The IBM venture suggests that
establishing a new foundry requires a substantial monetary
investment, and Ramtron's liquidity situation in the summer
of 2012 makes it doubtful that Ramtron would have been
able to finance the continued development of ROHM as a
foundry. 116  In light of this evidence, as well as the uniform
testimony on the difficulty of transitioning foundries, I do not
find credible the proposition that Ramtron reasonably could
expect to begin commercial production at ROHM in sixty
days and start enjoying cost savings within six months. 117
*14  Additionally, evidence presented at trial buttresses
this conclusion. Consistent with the other testimony on
the lead time for getting a product from concept to full-
fledged commercial sale, 118  Davenport testified the term
“initial low-density F–RAM products” referred to sample
quantities that Ramtron was “going to take over ROHM's
design and try to commercialize them as samples. They
weren't cost-effective but they would seed the market.” 119
In fact, Ramtron never got further than this initial sample
stage. Davenport further testified that Ramtron “never
got so far as transfer[ing] our designs to the ROHM
foundry” before the Merger closed. 120  It also appears
that ROHM technologically lagged behind both TI and
IBM as a foundry. 121  I do not question the strategic
judgment of Ramtron's management in seeking to implement
the Company's manufacturing agreement with ROHM, but
the record as a whole leads me to find that the ROHM
assumptions built into the Management Projections were
speculative and further undermine the reliability of those
projections.
4. The Management Projections rely on 2011 and
2012 revenue figures that were distorted because
of customer allocation issues and channel stuffing
As discussed in the next Subsection, the Management
Projections for revenue assume a constant growth rate of 24%
for 2014, 2015, and 2016. 122  This is an arbitrary method
of predicting revenue growth if not supported by reasonable
assumptions. Such simple modeling makes the reliability of
the base year numbers crucially important—i.e., if a set of
projections assumes constant growth from a starting number,
the inaccuracy of that foundational input affects the reliability
of the entire enterprise. Substantial evidence in the record
supports the conclusion that Ramtron's revenue in 2011, the
last full year before Cypress' offer, is an unreliable figure.
In Section I.B.2 supra, I discussed the massive inventory
build-up that Ramtron experienced beginning in 2011. During
no quarter in 2010 did Ramtron have more than $7 million
in inventory. Over the course of 2011, however, Ramtron
shipped a huge amount of inventory into its distribution
channels until, in the first quarter of 2012, Ramtron had $25.5
million in inventory. Even under favorable assumptions for
Ramtron, that amounts to about nineteen weeks of inventory
in the channel and it consists of product for which Ramtron
already had recognized revenue. 123  In describing Ramtron's
background, I found that this inventory build-up resulted
at least in part from the supply shortages the Company
faced as a result of its foundry transition. Those shortages
forced the Company to place customers on allocation; the
customers responded by over ordering. Because Ramtron
recognized revenue when it shipped to distributors, it is
reasonable to infer that an unknown, but not insignificant
amount of Ramtron's revenue in 2011 actually reflected this
over-ordering by customers, as opposed to a genuine surge
in demand. In addition, because of the backlog of inventory
that existed in the first quarter of 2012, it is logical that less
revenue would be recognized later in 2012 as the inventory
bubble was burned off, unless there was a significant uptick
in demand.
*15  Ramtron's management, however, expected to hit their
reduced forecasts for the first quarter of 2012. Although
I already have discussed the difficulties with the point-of-
purchase revenue recognition system, there is another pitfall
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not yet discussed: channel stuffing. Channel stuffing is the
practice of stuffing inventory into the channel in order to
recognize the attendant revenue sooner, notwithstanding the
fact that the revenue does not correspond to underlying
increases in demand. Hence, it is a form of revenue
manipulation.
I find that Ramtron's management pushed excess inventory
into the Company's distribution channels in the first quarter
of 2012. In an already referenced email chain from
late January 2012, Balzer remarked that the Company
“really need[ed] to find a way to hit $14.5” million. 124
Zimmer responded: “I'll die trying. We'll for sure stuff
channel. Next Qtr will suffer.” 125  There is no persuasive
evidence that Balzer disagreed. Although Petitioner fights
the channel-stuffing conclusion, 126  the combination of
Zimmer's contemporaneous comments and the massive
inventory buildup strongly support the conclusion that
Ramtron stuffed the channel in order to make its first quarter
revenue forecast.
All of this matters for two reasons. First, forcing excess
inventory into the channel in early 2012 meant that there
would be a corresponding fall off in revenue at some point in
the future absent a demand spike. 127  As Zimmer predicted,
the next quarter, Q2 2012, did suffer. Petitioner's efforts to
attribute those disappointing results to Cypress' hostile offer,
rather than weaknesses in Ramtron's own business practices,
are unavailing. 128  Second, Ramtron's revenue figures for
2011 and the first half of 2012 do not accurately map to actual
demand for the Company's products. LongPath argues that the
quantification of the point-of-purchase versus point-of-sale
issue reveals that, at most, Ramtron over-recognized 3.7%
of its total revenue from 2010 through 2012. 129  Assuming
Petitioner's math is correct, that is an over-recognition, in
three years, of $6.6 million for a company that only once in its
history had had more than $70 million in revenue in a single
year.
The problem, however, goes beyond just the amount of
improperly recognized revenue. The timing of the revenue
also is affected significantly. If 2011 and 2012 are used as
base years in forecasting, but those years include inflated
revenue because of either over-ordering by customers placed
on allocation or channel stuffing, then the reliability of the
projections is affected. Thus, customer allocation issues in
2011 and channel stuffing in the first quarter of 2012 throw
significant doubt on the accuracy of the underlying revenue
figures for those periods. In that regard, I do not consider
it productive (even assuming it is feasible) to attempt to
quantify how much in extra revenue Ramtron recognized in
2011 or 2012 based on these factors. 130
5. The projections defy historical trends
*16  Historical performance does not control a company's
future performance. It is, however, a red flag when projections
suggest a dramatic turnaround in a company despite no
underlying changes that would justify such an improvement
of business. This is the classic “hockey stick” problem.
The Management Projections, prepared days after Cypress
made its bid and with knowledge that Needham would
use the Projections to market the Company, fall into this
category. Both revenue growth and gross margins are shown
as undergoing dramatic improvements. The following chart
shows Ramtron's historical revenue (for the ten years before
the projection period) versus its projected revenue. 131  As the
graphs make clear, the projection period suggests a period
of previously unknown prosperity for Ramtron. Not only is
the Company's historically volatile growth rate transformed
into a consistently high growth rate, but the downward trend
in revenue is replaced by a sharp, unprecedented increase
in absolute revenue. 132  This sharp uptick in revenue is in
contrast to the fact that, at least dating back to 1994, the
Company never has experienced four consecutive years of
growth.
Presented in another perspective, the following chart shows
the Company's compound annual growth rate (“CAGR”)
over various periods. 133  Only under the arbitrary 2005–
2008 timeframe, which appears to be the Company's best-
ever growth period, does historic growth approach projected
growth. When comparing the five or ten years preceding
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the projections period, it is clear that the Management
Projections forecast incredible growth. Indeed, the five-year
projection period implies a CAGR of 22.73%, which is
roughly 3.36 times higher than the CAGR for the five years
immediately preceding the projection period (2007–2011)
and approximately 2.46 times greater than the ten-year period











































Petitioner attempts to justify the Management Projections as
reasonable by comparing the projections to a set of internal
Cypress projections. In what was called the President's
Strategic Plan (the “PSP”), Cypress forecasted the potential
F–RAM market in terms of total available market, service
available market (which was Cypress' term for a product's
core market) and predicted share of the market. 134  Petitioner
argues that, if Ramtron simply maintained the market share
of the core F–RAM market that it had at the time of
the Merger, then the Management Projections would be
accurate. There are numerous problems with this argument:
(1) Ramtron's management did not have the PSP when they
were creating the Management Projections, so this thesis is
an entirely post hoc justification for the Projections; (2) for
the Management Projections to be accurate, Ramtron would
have had to increase its market share significantly, not just
maintain it; (3) to the extent that Cypress' predictions are
relevant, the Management Projections would require Ramtron
to capture a substantially larger portion of the market than
Cypress predicted it would; and (4) perhaps most damaging to
Petitioner's theory, Cypress predicted that Ramtron, operating
as an improved division of Cypress, would lose market share.
*17  The chart below compares Cypress' predictions for
Ramtron, as a division of Cypress, against the Ramtron
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Petitioner's argument is unpersuasive. The PSP forecasts
Ramtron as a division of Cypress—i.e., after a possible
merger. That alone makes the comparison of market share
unavailing. More importantly, Cypress predicted a moderate,
but falling market share for Ramtron or, at best, that Ramtron
would maintain its market share. 135  The Management
Projections predict an entirely different trend under which
Ramtron's market share would increase by nearly 25%, i.e.,
Ramtron would capture another nine percent of the core
F–RAM market. By the year 2016, for the Management
Projections to be accurate, Ramtron would need to hold
twice as much of the core market as Cypress predicted it
would. Considering all the evidence of record regarding
projections, I find it unlikely that Cypress substantially
would underestimate the potential of the very company it
was about to purchase. Thus, Petitioner's attempts to show
the “reasonableness” of the Management Projections by
comparing them to the Cypress PSP are unconvincing. Rather,
the Projections defy historical trends.
6. Management utilized other projections
for ordinary business purposes
The fact which I find to be the final nail in the coffin for
the Management Projections is that Ramtron did not rely
on them in the ordinary course of its business. Although
Balzer suggested that the Management Projections were
used for other purposes, such as cash management, 136  the
significance of those alleged uses is dubious. Richards, the
CFO, credibly testified that he used other sets of projections
for managing the Company's finances, such as providing
estimated revenue and cash flow numbers to SVB, the
Company's bank.
The final version of the Management Projections utilized by
Needham in preparing its fairness opinion is from September
18, 2012. 137  The Needham presentation listed $58.2 million
for estimated 2012 revenue, a slight discrepancy from the
native excel spreadsheet of the Projections, dated August 28,
2012, which listed $58 million for 2012. 138  On July 17,
2012, however, Richards sent an email to SVB projecting
$56.5 million for 2012 (the “July SVB Projections”). 139
On September 10, 2012, Richards sent another update to
SVB that reduced that projection to slightly less than $54
million (the “September SVB Projections”). 140  Both the
July and September SVB Projections pre-date the Needham
presentation. The September SVB Projections are nearly
6.9% lower than the Management Projections. If the revenue
growth assumptions from the Management Projections were
applied to the September SVB Projections, the Management
Projections would overstate five-year revenue by $31 million,
even ignoring all of the other problems with the Management
Projections I have discussed. Richards testified that he
believed that the September SVB Projections “were more
accurate” and that he provided those projections to SVB
because it was the Company's “sole source of borrowing” and
he wanted to keep the bank “apprised of the situation.” 141
7. There are insufficient reliable inputs
to produce a reliable DCF analysis
*18  In summary, the Management Projections suffer from
numerous flaws. Specifically, they: (1) were prepared by a
new management team, (2) in anticipation of future disputes
and of shopping the Company to potential white knights, (3)
using a new methodology, and (4) were for a significantly
longer period of time than previous forecasts. In addition, I
note the following problems: (5) management's track record
at forecasting was questionable even under their standard
method of forecasting; (6) the final projections incorporate
speculative elements relating to ROHM, (7) rely on distorted
base year figures that resulted from customer allocation
issues and channel stuffing, and (8) predict growth out of
line with historical trends; and, finally, (9) management
itself was providing other, “more accurate” projections to
the Company's bank. None of the indicia that often justify
deferring to management projections are present in this
case. Thus, Petitioner has not proven that the Management
Projections are reliable, and I conclude that they are too
questionable to form the basis of a reliable DCF valuation. 142
“[W]ithout reliable five-year projections, any values
generated by a DCF analysis are meaningless.” 143  Having
found that the Management Projections are unreliable and
there are no other viable projections in the record, 144  I
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therefore conclude that it would be inappropriate to determine
fair value based on a DCF analysis in this instance.
B. The Comparable Transactions Method
Does Not Produce a Reliable Value
The parties' experts agree that there are no comparable
companies to Ramtron. 145  Using another approach,
Clarke, petitioner's expert, opined that there were two
comparable transactions from which Ramtron's value could
be derived. 146  This analysis resulted in an implied value for
Ramtron of $3.99 per share, and Clarke accorded it a 20%
weight in his ultimate fair value determination. 147  Jarrell
concluded that there were no comparable transactions. 148
For the following reasons, I conclude that Petitioner has
not proven that the comparable transactions method is an
appropriate valuation technique in this case.
A comparable transactions approach requires “identifying
similar transactions, quantifying those transactions through
financial metrics, and then applying the metrics to the
company at issue to ascertain a value. The utility of a
comparable transactions methodology is directly linked to
the ‘similarity between the company the court is valuing and
the companies used for comparison.’ ” 149  “Reliance on a
comparable companies or comparable transactions approach
is improper where the purported ‘comparables’ involve
significantly different products or services than the company
whose appraisal is at issue, or vastly different multiples.” 150
*19  The purportedly comparable transactions are the
acquisitions of Actel Corporation (“Actel”) and Virage Logic
Corporation (“Virage”), both of which Clarke concluded were
companies that produced memory products but, like Ramtron,
operated without their own foundry. 151  Clarke computed
multiples for the two firms based on the transactions
involving them for the following financial metrics: (1) equity
value (“EV”)/last twelve months' revenue (“LTM”); (2) EV/
next twelve months' forecasted revenue (“NTM”); and (3)
EV/NTM + 1. 152  Clarke then averaged the Virage and Actel
multiples and derived an implied value for Ramtron from
them.
Jarrell contests Clarke's choice of comparable transactions.
He notes that the proxy statement in the Virage transaction
included a list of comparable companies from two industries
similar to Virage's and that Ramtron was not listed in either
group. 153  It is unclear whether Jarrell believes that Actel
is not comparable in and of itself, but he did observe that
the multiples for that company support the Merger price as
evidence of fair value. More importantly, Jarrell opines that
the dispersion of the multiples for Actel and Virage is too great
to be reliable and violates the “law of one price.” 154  I agree
with this criticism.
In the past, “[t]his Court has found comparable transactions
analyses that used as few as five transactions and two
transactions to be unreliable.” 155  This “dearth of data
points ... undermines the reliability” of the methodology. 156
Here, there are only two data points and the multiples (shown


























































Clarke then went on to: (1) subtract a 13% synergy discount
from each of the implied equity values; and (2) average the
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three figures to arrive at a comparable-transactions-based
equity value for Ramtron of $141.9 million.
Even assuming these two transactions qualitatively are
comparable transactions, in that the acquired companies
operated similar businesses to Ramtron, the meager number
of data points and the range of multiples indicate that
this valuation approach is of questionable reliability in this
instance. The EV/LTM multiple, for example, yields synergy-
adjusted per share values of $2.74 to $6.13, a range of $3.39,
which exceeds the Merger price of $3.10. 159  The EV/NTM
multiple suggests equity values of $2.72 to $4.55, a spread of
$1.83. 160  By contrast, the EV/NTM+1 multiple produces a
tighter range of $3.27 to $4.53.
*20  I see little justification for Clarke's simple averaging
method, particularly with only two data points. His
comparable transactions approach implies per share values
ranging anywhere from $2.72 to $6.13. Two of the multiples
have high-low ranges exceeding Ramtron's unaffected stock
price. I am not convinced it is productive to utilize a method
that implies Ramtron's fair value is somewhere between 88%
and 198% of the deal price. 161  Also, the EV/NTM and
EV/NTM+1 multiples rely on the Management Projections,
which I already have concluded are unreliable. Finally, Clarke
himself attributed minimal weight to this approach—only
one-fifth of his conclusion. For all of these reasons, I conclude
that Petitioner has not satisfied its burden of proving that
the comparable transactions approach provides a reliable
indication of Ramtron's fair value.
C. The Transaction Price Provides
the Best Evidence of Fair Value
A DCF analysis attempts to value a company by looking
within the company, extrapolating its financials into the
future, and then discounting these cash flows to present value.
A comparables approach instead looks outside the company
and attempts to value it by market analogy. The former
method is only useful to the extent its inputs are reliable; the
latter is helpful only to the extent actual comparables exist.
Neither approach yields a reliable measure of fair value in this
case. Instead, I conclude that the Merger price offers the best
indication of fair value.
A merger price does not necessarily represent the fair value of
a company, as the term “fair value” is interpreted under 8 Del.
C. § 262. For example, in a short-form merger under Section
253, the merger price is set unilaterally by the controlling
stockholder; the minority stockholders are forced out of the
company and left with appraisal as their sole remedy. To
presume that the merger price represented fair value in such
a situation would leave the minority stockholders effectively
without the remedy offered by Section 262 of an independent
analysis of a company's fair value. In 2010, the Delaware
Supreme Court in Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP 162
explicitly rejected the argument that this Court should “defer”
to the merger price. Indeed, the Supreme Court concluded that
such deference would be contrary to the statutory language
of Section 262, which requires consideration of “all relevant
factors” in determining a company's fair value. 163
Nevertheless, in the situation of a proper transactional process
likely to have resulted in an accurate valuation of an acquired
corporation, this Court has looked to the merger price as
evidence of fair value and, on occasion, given that metric one-
hundred percent weight. 164  In an oft-quoted passage, then-
Vice Chancellor Jacobs wrote: “The fact that a transaction
price was forged in the crucible of objective market reality
(as distinguished from the unavoidably subjective thought
process of a valuation expert) is viewed as strong evidence
that the price is fair.” 165  Similarly, Chief Justice Strine,
then writing as a Vice Chancellor, noted: “[O]ur case law
recognizes that when there is an open opportunity to buy a
company, the resulting market price is reliable evidence of fair
value.” 166  The inquiry here is whether the Merger process
resulted in a price indicative of Ramtron's fair value or, as the
parties have framed it, whether there was a “competitive and
fair auction” 167  for Ramtron.
*21  At the outset, I note that I am not aware of any
case holding that a multi-bidder auction of a company is
a prerequisite to finding that the merger price is a reliable
indicator of fair value. Here, unlike in Union Illinois or
Huff Fund, only one company, Cypress, made a bid. This
case also differs in that the Merger was a hostile deal. As
detailed below, however, I conclude that “the process by
which [the Company] was marketed to potential buyers was
thorough, effective, and free from any spectre of self-interest
or disloyalty,” 168  and that the resulting price accordingly
provides a reliable indication of Ramtron's fair value.
Ramtron could, and repeatedly did, reject Cypress' overtures.
Simultaneously, Ramtron actively solicited every buyer it
believed could be interested in a transaction. The Company
provided several of those potential buyers with the much-
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vaunted Management Projections. No one bid. LongPath
contends that the lack of other bidders indicates a flawed
process. I disagree. Any impediments to a higher bid resulted
from Ramtron's operative reality, not shortcomings of the
Merger process.
1. TI and Ramtron's operative reality
Much already has been said about Ramtron's operative reality
as of the Merger. Petitioner focuses on one particular factor
that it contends irredeemably corrupted the sales process:
Ramtron's foundry relationship with TI. Under Ramtron's
manufacturing agreement with TI, Ramtron was guaranteed
three additional years of production if TI terminated the
agreement. 169  But, in the event Ramtron experienced a
change in control, TI had the right to terminate the agreement
upon ninety days notice. 170  LongPath argues that this
change-in-control provision deterred prospective bidders. I
reject this contention as contrary to the evidence.
The parties do not dispute that Cypress began preparing for
its hostile bid well in advance. Part of that diligence involved
predicting potential interlopers. Another aspect of Cypress'
preparation involved essentially seeking TI's blessing for its
potential bid. Because of the change-in-control provisions,
Cypress sought to get some form of assurance from TI in
advance of issuing its bear hug letter that TI would not
exercise that right in relation to an acquisition by Cypress.
Rodgers testified that he called TI's president to discuss a
potential acquisition of Ramtron. In that regard, Cypress
offered to avoid competing with one of TI's F–RAM products
if TI agreed not to terminate the foundry relationship with
Ramtron. Cypress never received a contract or other written
agreement from TI—in fact, it appears that TI never explicitly
agreed to support Cypress' bid. Cypress did receive, however,
enough of an informal assurance that it deemed the risk of
proceeding with the acquisition acceptable. 171
As Petitioner emphasizes, Rodgers began discussing this
issue with TI in March 2011, over a year before Cypress'
bid for Ramtron. 172  Even so, the record is clear that
Cypress never obtained a contractual commitment from TI.
In an undated internal Cypress presentation analyzing the
potential bid for Ramtron, the possibility of TI dishonoring its
commitment is listed as a low risk, but Cypress (twice) listed
the lack of TI support as a major risk to any potential deal. 173
*22  LongPath argues that Cypress had an unfair tactical
advantage and that other bidders were unlikely to get
TI's support. This appears to be nothing but speculation.
Ramtron's relationship with TI was part of its operative
reality. A Cypress planning document, titled “Potential
Interlopers,” listed five such plausible interlopers. For three
of them, Cypress predicted that TI would not extend foundry
support because those companies directly competed with
TI. 174  A different document predicted the same as to a sixth
possible interloper. 175
I find these predictions and Petitioner's reliance upon them
somewhat puzzling. Even though Cypress offered not to
encroach on one specific TI product line, “low power
microcontrollers,” 176  in order to get an informal assurance
that the manufacturing agreement would continue, the
uncontradicted evidence shows that TI and Cypress directly
competed in several markets and that the two companies
had significant bad blood between them as a result of two
previous intellectual property lawsuits. 177  Thus, applying
the reasoning underlying Cypress' advisor's predictions, TI
likely would not have extended foundry services to Cypress
either. But, TI did make at least a nonbinding commitment to
continue foundry services for Cypress.
Petitioner has not shown that any other company that wanted
to acquire Ramtron was in a worse position than Cypress in
terms of getting TI's assent. Indeed, some may have been
better positioned than Cypress. Construed most favorably to
LongPath, all bidders were in the same boat as Cypress vis-
à-vis TI. Ramtron's manufacturing agreement with TI simply
was part of the Company's operative reality at the time of the
Merger.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the change-in-control
provisions in the TI manufacturing agreement actually
deterred any of the potential bidders. 178  Ramtron apparently
proceeded the furthest in discussing alternative transactions
with three companies: Atmel Corp., SMART Modular, and
ROHM. Nothing suggests that the TI agreement caused any
of those companies to back out. Davenport testified that
SMART Modular was “very hesitant due to our supply-
side cost structure and the tenuousness of our supply” and
also did not like the Company's “sole sourcing.” 179  Atmel
similarly declined because of Ramtron's “cost structure [and]
in particular our wafer supply, [which] they were very,
very concerned about.” 180  ROHM seems to have been
contemplating a minority investment, discussed in the next
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Subsection, which would not have implicated the TI concerns.
In short, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the change-
in-control provisions in the manufacturing agreement with
TI materially impaired Ramtron's sales process. Instead,
Ramtron's sole or primary reliance on TI as its foundry was
part of the Company's operative reality.
2. Ramtron tries to sell itself to anyone but Cypress
*23  Ramtron authorized Needham, its financial advisor,
to market the Company to other potential acquirers and
explore strategic alternatives. According to an August 30,
2012 Needham presentation, Needham had: (1) contacted
twenty-four third parties, including Cypress; (2) sent non-
disclosure agreements (“NDAs”) to twelve of those entities,
again including Cypress; (3) received executed NDAs from
six interested parties, which did not include Cypress; and
(4) remained in discussions with two companies other
than Cypress. 181  This market canvass reveals that six
companies were intrigued enough to enter into NDAs. It
appears that those companies received or at least had access
to Ramtron's Management Projections. 182  In addition, by
August, Ramtron had announced its new manufacturing
agreement with ROHM. Yet, despite this sales effort, not one
company besides Cypress ever made a firm bid for Ramtron.
SMART Modular and Atmel were two of the companies with
which talks proceeded the furthest. As noted, both companies
declined to pursue a transaction because of what they viewed
as problems with Ramtron's cost structure. The evidence does
not reveal why each and every other company declined to
bid for Ramtron. At least one that executed an NDA saw
no synergies in the transaction. 183  A second did not see
the acquisition fitting with the potential bidder's strategic
priorities. 184  Another that apparently did have familiarity
with Ramtron's technology was advised by its engineers not to
move forward. 185  That company was sent, but did not sign,
an NDA.
Not one of the specific explanations in the record relates to
TI. Instead, what evidence there is suggests that these other
companies did not see value in Ramtron exceeding Cypress'
bid. The importance of this point is amplified by the fact
that Needham's call log indicates that the NDAs all were
executed in late June, 186  when Cypress' bid was only $2.68
a share. According to Petitioner's position in this litigation,
at that point in time, the Company was being undervalued
by $2.28. Ramtron's hostile bid caused a significant spike
in trading volume, as revealed by Needham's stock price
analyses. 187  Aside from the prospective purchasers that
Needham contacted, therefore, the fact that Ramtron was in
play was known in the market. Purely financial purchasers
theoretically could have stepped in and made unsolicited
bids and, according to LongPath's position in this litigation,
snatched up Ramtron at a fire sale price. None did. Indeed, no
one even bid, including those with inside information, even
when Cypress' offer was $0.42 below the final Merger price.
Petitioner focuses at length on Ramtron's discussions with
ROHM. On July 17, 2012, Ramtron's management proposed
two alternative transactions to ROHM: (1) a purchase of
seven million shares of Ramtron common stock at $3.50
per share together with a board seat; or (2) seven million
shares of Ramtron convertible preferred stock at $4.00 per
share and a board seat. 188  Three days later, on July 20,
Ramtron and ROHM announced their new manufacturing
agreement. 189  ROHM apparently also was interested in
the potential purchase of Ramtron's common stock and, on
August 11, 2012, communicated to the Company that any
such purchase would be at $3.00 per share. 190
According to Petitioner, ROHM's interest in a minority
investment at a price slightly below the deal price indicates
that the Merger price undervalued Ramtron. If ROHM in fact
had made such an investment, I might be inclined to agree. 191
But, even in its email countering at $3.00, ROHM explicitly
stated the following:
*24  Actually, one of our concerns
at this time is the legal and financial
risk for purchasing stocks of a public
company with a price above the
market price. Since we have to justify
the purchasing price to achieve the
accountability to our shareholders, we
have to seek profit that can make up
for the paid premium. And we have to
be careful to decide the purchase price
in order to avoid impairment loss of
assets. 192
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ROHM itself, it seems, was concerned with justifying
the above-market premium. Perhaps, because of the
manufacturing agreement between it and Ramtron, ROHM
might have been able to exploit synergies between the
two companies or otherwise unlock value in Ramtron not
available to other bidders. Ultimately, however, ROHM
backed away from pursuing a deal for Ramtron at the end
of August. Citing “growing apprehension in ROHM's own
business environment,” ROHM determined that it was “not
in a position to make an investment under present business
outlook.” 193
3. Ramtron extracts a substantial
premium from Cypress
Finally, LongPath criticizes Cypress' hostile approach,
arguing that Cypress pounded Ramtron into submission at
a below-market rate. I already have found that, to the
extent Cypress' hostile bid negatively altered Ramtron's
performance, such effects were dwarfed by Ramtron's own
business problems, which included channel stuffing earlier
in the year. Those flaws are part of Ramtron's operative
reality. On the other hand, there is support in the case
law for disregarding temporary distortions in determining
a company's fair value. 194  In theory, then, it could be
acceptable to back out any negative effects caused by Cypress'
hostile offer. The parties, however, have offered no practical
way to quantify those effects, particularly as against the larger
effects from Ramtron's own business problems.
In that regard, there is no evidence that Cypress' hostile
approach hampered the ability of other companies to bid for
Ramtron or otherwise affected the Merger process. Only one
company contacted by Needham stated that it did not wish
to bid against Cypress. 195  By contrast, six other companies
went so far as to execute NDAs. Even if Cypress was
attempting to wear Ramtron down, 196  Cypress had every
right to do so and there is no evidence that it acted improperly
in this regard. Furthermore, the history of the Merger runs
contrary to LongPath's argument. Ramtron's Board had the
ability to say no to Cypress and repeatedly did so. The Board
advised Ramtron's stockholders on several occasions not to
tender into Cypress' bid and, over the same time period,
Cypress raised its bid five separate times. The price Cypress
ultimately paid—which was negotiated by the Ramtron Board
and Cypress—was 25% higher than Cypress' starting offer.
4. Conclusion
The Merger resulted from Cypress' hostile bid. Cypress
spent three months attempting to acquire Ramtron, during
which time the Company actively shopped itself to other
conceivable buyers, several of which indicated serious
interest. None of those potential alternative buyers made a
firm offer. Cypress, however, repeatedly raised its price until
it and Ramtron's Board agreed on final Merger price of $3.10
per share. This lengthy, publicized process was thorough and
gives me confidence that, if Ramtron could have commanded
a higher value, it would have. “For me (as a law-trained judge)
to second-guess the price that resulted from that process
involves an exercise in hubris and, at best, reasoned guess
work.” 197  As such, I conclude that the Merger price is a
reliable indication of Ramtron's fair value.
D. Transaction Price Less Synergies
*25  Thus far, I have concluded that the Management
Projections are unreliable, making the use of a DCF
inappropriate. Additionally, the parties agree that there are no
comparable companies and I concur with Respondent that the
comparable transactions approach does not provide a reliable
indication of fair value here. By contrast, the Merger process
was thorough and supports my reliance on the Merger price
as an indication of Ramtron's fair value. In the absence of
alternative methodologies, I weigh the Merger price at 100%
in determining the fair value of Petitioner's shares.
In an appraisal action, however, it is inappropriate to include
merger-specific value. Accordingly, I must exclude from the
$3.10 Merger price any portion of that amount attributable
to Cypress-specific synergies, as opposed to Ramtron's value
as a going concern. 198  Respondent argues that the synergies
amount to $0.34 per share. Petitioner contends that the net
synergies are only $0.03.
Preliminarily, I reject LongPath's contention that synergies
should be subtracted not from the Merger price, but instead
from the value that Cypress attributed to Ramtron, which,
according to Petitioner, is between $3.90 and $5.44. Those
valuations estimated Ramtron's worth as a division of
Cypress. Petitioner's requested approach is contrary to the
language of Section 262, which commands that I “determine
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the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value
arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger
or consolidation.” 199  There is no basis to deduct synergies
from the idiosyncratic value attributed to a company by its
purchaser, because it is not clear that value would provide
insight into the fair value of the target company as a going
concern. Instead, the proper way of applying a merger-price-
less-synergies approach is to determine the value paid for a
company and then subtract that portion of the purchase price
representing synergies. 200
As to the synergies in this transaction, I find Respondent's
argument that over 10% of the transaction price represented
synergies to be without merit. Jarrell first provided a market-
wide analysis of the premia paid by financial versus strategic
buyers and from this approach concluded that average
synergies could be removed from the purchase price by
applying the ratio of the average financial buyers' premium
to the average strategic buyers' premium, i.e., effectively
multiplying the Merger price by 0.73, which results in a fair
value of $2.75. 201
This general data, however, does not tell me anything about
this specific transaction, which must be the focus in a Section
262 action. With respect to Cypress-specific synergies, Jarrell
compared the Management Projections to a set of Cypress
projections 202  and quantified the cost savings, which Jarrell
determined to be $0.69 per share. He then assumed that
Ramtron's stockholders captured between 25% and 75% of
these synergies and took the midpoint of those calculations,
resulting in a fair value of $2.76. 203  In addition to its
back-of-the-envelope feel, this approach focuses solely on
cost savings, which are positive synergies, and neglects the
possibility of negative synergies, which Clarke asserts would
exist here. 204
*26  Although Clarke rejected the transaction-price-less-
synergies approach, he opined that negative revenue synergies
and transaction costs would have to be added back to any
value based on Jarrell's estimate of synergies. I find this
approach to be reasonable and supported by the record. The
testimony at trial indicates that Cypress expected significant
negative synergies from the Ramtron acquisition. 205  While
Petitioner's approach may understate the net synergies, I
find that it better conforms to the evidence adduced at trial
than Ramtron's position. Accordingly, I adopt LongPath's
approach to synergies and exclude $0.03 from the Merger
price. This results in a fair value determination of $3.07 per
share.
E. Reality Checks
As a final step, I consider it appropriate to touch briefly on
some of the “real world” evidence that Petitioner contends
undermines the Merger price as a reliable indicator of fair
value. Some of these items are entitled to zero weight. Balzer,
for example, testified at his deposition that he told Cypress
at the time of its nonpublic offer in 2011 that he believed
Ramtron's stock would be worth $6 to $8 “several years
out.” 206  This speculation, of course, is not informative as to
what Ramtron was worth at the time of the Merger. Similarly,
Ramtron's Chairman of the Board testified that he “personally
would have paid more than $3.10.” 207  The usefulness of a
transaction price, however, is that “buyers with a profit motive
[are] able to assess [company-specific] factors for themselves
and to use those assessments to make bids with actual money
behind them.” 208  By contrast, hypothetical statements about
how much money someone allegedly would have paid, if they
actually had the money to do so, which they apparently did
not, are significantly less probative.
Similarly, I give no weight to the $4 target trading price
Merriman Capital announced in January 2012, 209  and
reiterated in April 2012. 210  By late July, Merriman Capital
had pulled its target price and admitted it could not model
Ramtron accurately. 211  And, as already discussed, I do not
find informative the fact that Cypress' internal documents
suggest a value for Ramtron above the deal price; those
documents model Ramtron as a division of Cypress and are
not indicative of the fair value of Ramtron as a stand-alone
company.
The one factor that does cause me some pause, however, is the
ROHM potential investment. The fact that ROHM apparently
was seriously considering a minority equity investment at
$3.00 per share casts some doubt on the Merger price of $3.10.
Ultimately, however, ROHM did not make this investment
and, in fact, expressed serious concern about paying an
above-market price for Ramtron stock. Because ROHM
had extensive information about Ramtron and ultimately
decided not to pursue the minority investment, I discount its
importance. ROHM made exactly as many actual bids as the
rest of the market: zero. In that regard, the ROHM equity
“investment” is simply another non-event.
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Indeed, I suspect that, rather than the Merger price being low,
it was more likely that the ROHM proposal was inexplicably
high. Recall, for example, that, in 2011, long before Cypress
made its public offer, Ramtron executed a secondary public
offering in which it diluted its equity holders and sold about
20% of its shares for $2.00 each, with a net to itself of $1.79.
By July 2012, based on the findings in this Memorandum
Opinion, Ramtron's financial condition was no better than it
was when it made the secondary public offering. For these
reasons, I conclude that the ROHM investment, which never
actually occurred, does not cast doubt on the Merger price as
a reliable indicator of fair value.
IV. CONCLUSION
*27  For the foregoing reasons, I determine the fair value of
Ramtron as of the Merger date to be $3.07 per share. Counsel
for Petitioner shall submit, on notice, an appropriate final
order to that effect, including provisions for pre- and post-
judgment interest.
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protect them if they consummated the deal and they could be stuck with a whole bunch of product and, hence,
they just stopped buying.”). There is a potential hearsay problem with this testimony, but Respondent did not
press any such objection in its briefing.
69 A $70 million year would equate to weekly sales of, on average, $1.347 million.
70 Tr. 209.
71 Id. at 402-04 (Buss).
72 JS ¶ 15.
73 Id. ¶ 16.
74 Id. ¶ 17.
75 Id. ¶ 18.
76 Id. ¶ 23.
77 Dent v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., 2014 WL 2931180 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014).
78 E.g., In re Dole Food Co., 2014 WL 6906134, at *11 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2014) (“In appraisal proceedings,
the battling experts tend to generate widely divergent valuations as they strive to bracket the outer limits of
plausibility.”); Finkelstein v. Liberty Digital, Inc., 2005 WL 1074364, at *13 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2005) (“Men and
women who purport to be applying sound, academically-validated valuation techniques come to this court
and, through the neutral application of their expertise to the facts, come to widely disparate results, even
when applying the same methodology.”).
79 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
80 Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP, 11 A.3d 214, 218 (Del. 2010).
81 M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 525 (Del. 1999) (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996)).
82 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
83 Gholl v. eMachines, Inc., 2004 WL 2847865, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2004) (quoting Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983)).
84 M.G. Bancorporation, Inc., 737 A.2d at 520 (“In a statutory appraisal proceeding, both sides have the burden
of proving their respective valuation positions by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
85 Gholl, 2004 WL 2847865, at *5.
86 Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., 2004 WL 1152338, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2004).
87 Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 52-53 (Del. Ch. 2007).
88 Cf. Laidler v. Hesco Bastion Envt'l, Inc., 2014 WL 1877536, at * 8 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2014) (“Though DCF
is more prominently employed in Delaware appraisal litigation, both parties' experts opine that employing
a DCF is not feasible here because [the company's] management never made cash flow projections in the
ordinary course of its business.”).
- 420 - 
LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron International Corporation, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr....
2015 WL 4540443
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 24
89 Cede & Co. v. JRC Acq. Corp., 2004 WL 286963, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004).
90 Doft & Co., 2004 WL 1152338, at *5.
91 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 2003 WL 23700218, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003), revised (July 9, 2004),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005).
92 Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., 2012 WL 1569818, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012) (listing these four factors as
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*5-6 (finding management projections unreliable because: (1) management themselves did not regard them
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94 Id. at 60.
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101 E.g., JX 47 (forecasting, on April 19, 2012, $70 million in total 2012 revenue). On February 22, 2011, Ramtron
forecasted between $65 and $70 million in total 2011 revenue. JX 294. Actual revenues for 2011 were $66.4
million. JX 215 Ex. 3. The 2011 forecast likely was not made by exactly the same management team and
neither the 2011 nor the 2012 forecasts utilized a point-of-sale or a bottoms-up line-item methodology. Thus,
the relevance of the 2011 and 2012 forecasts, as predictors of the accuracy of the Management Projections,
is marginal, at best.
102 JX 39. This chart was included in a presentation to the Ramtron Board and is dated February 9, 2012. The
first two columns indicate the month and the quarter when each particular forecast was made. The remaining
columns are the quarters being forecasted. For unknown reasons, there are two sets of forecasts in the first
quarter of 2011. The bolded number represents the actual results in thousands of dollars for each quarter.
For example, the cell Q2 2010 by Q1 2011 represents management's forecast, as of the second quarter of
2010, for revenue in the first quarter of 2011. I have added the actual results for Q1 and Q2 2012, which
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103 Indeed, an earlier version of the same chart appeared in an October 18, 2011 board presentation entitled
“Financial Outlook.” JX 31. That chart similarly was entitled “Sales Forecast Waterfall Chart,” as in JX 39,
and it contained no indication that the figures presented were “stretch” goals.
104 JX 313 (Oct. 18, 2011); JX 314 (Feb. 13-14, 2012).
105 Tr. 209, 232.
106 JX 36.
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107 See Gholl, 2004 WL 2847865, at *9 (rejecting contention that management projections were unrealistic reach
goals and noting: “If the 2002 budget represented management's wildest dreams come true, it would be
illogical and callous to key the Bonus Plan to even higher targets that were not achievable”).
108 The February 2012 projections cumulatively estimate $67 million in revenue for 2012. This is the same
number used by Richards in a set of projections prepared to justify the Company's deferred tax assets to
its auditors. JX 40. Richards's use of the waterfall chart forecast numbers for projections provided to the
Company's auditors further supports my finding that these were not “stretch” goals.
109 Tr. 31-32 (Richards); id. at 320-21 (Rodgers: explaining that rigorous competition, technological change, and
macroeconomic factors make the industry difficult to forecast); id. at 378-80 (Buss).
110 JX 97.
111 Balzer candidly conceded the Company was mediocre at forecasting:
Q: What was the quality of those forward-looking projections when you took over as CEO?
A: Probably mediocre.
Q: Did you attempt to make improvements in the quality of the projections?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you succeed?
A: I'd say no.
Q: Why not?
A: ... [Y]ou need to understand the market.... And while we were working very hard on that, we weren't
there.
Balzer Dep. 50. These comments temper the reliability of Balzer's position that the Management Projections
“were the most likely of what would happen if Cypress walked away.” Id. at 83.
112 JX 170 native file.
113 See Gearreald, 2012 WL 1569818, at *5-6 (concluding that the requirement that a company be valued as a
going concern based on its operative reality at the time of the merger required the exclusion of “speculative
costs or revenues”); see also Huff Fund Inv. P'ship, 2013 WL 5878807, at *11 (finding the inclusion or
exclusion of significant contract revenues so speculative as to render the management projections unreliable).
114 JX 95.
115 Id.
116 E.g., Tr. 410 (Buss: commenting that, upon acquiring Ramtron, Cypress discovered that the Company still
had unpaid legal bills from the beginning of 2012). Indeed, Ramtron was on pace to go cash negative before
the end of October 2012. JX 151.
117 JX 170 native file (assumption of per part cost reductions).
118 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
119 Tr. 225.
120 Id. at 205.
121 Id. at 207-08 (Davenport: discussing ROHM's wafer yield of 20% to 60%, as against a “good” yield of 97%,
which TI could achieve, all of which bears on supply costs); id. at 348-51 (Rodgers: testifying that ROHM
lagged behind TI technologically, was not competitive in the marketplace against TI's products, and had a
very different technology than TI that would make the foundry transition difficult, all of which raised questions
about the economic viability of manufacturing microchips there); id. at 395 (Buss: stating that TI and IBM “are
probably two of the best, well-run, capable fabs in the world,” and that successfully introducing ROHM as a
second foundry “was definitely a long shot”). The testimony of Cypress' officers and employees is obviously
self-serving, but their remarks on the technological status of ROHM versus TI or IBM is not contradicted by
any other evidence and comports with Ramtron's own difficult history in transferring foundries.
122 JX 170 native file (year-over-year growth rates of -12%, 19%, 24%, 24%, and 24%, for 2012 through 2016,
respectively).
123 E.g. Tr. 415 (Buss: describing Ramtron's inventory problem).
124 JX 36.
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125 Id.
126 LongPath cites to statements by Balzer regarding other time periods that the Company should avoid stuffing
the channel. JX 10; JX 242.
127 The evidence suggests that many or most of Ramtron's products were “designed into” its customers' products.
This long-term supply nature of Ramtron's business reduces the likelihood of dramatic short-term demand
fluctuations.
128 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
129 Pet'r's Post-Trial Br. 34. My rather simplistic comparison of point-of-purchase versus point-of-sale revenue
recognition supra suggested that the use of one system over the other affects only the timing of the revenue,
not the amount. There are various reasons why using the point-of-purchase approach also may lead to over-
recognition of revenue. The distributors may return inventory because, for example, they ordered too much
or the products are obsolete. Distributors also may sell to the end-user for less than the list price, leading to a
reduction in the actual revenue received. See Tr. 299-302 (Rodgers: comparing the two revenue recognition
systems).
130 Moreover, because Ramtron's management moved to a new revenue-recognition approach for the
Management Projections, it is not clear what steps the Company took to avoid double counting revenue. As
of the end of January 2012, Ramtron had about $21 million in inventory in its distribution channels. JX 34
(Zimmer email). That is more than a quarter's worth of revenue. But, the Company apparently did track to
some extent the differences between point-of-sale and point-of-purchase revenues. JX 174.
131 The historical figures are drawn from Exhibit 8 of Jarrell's Report. These figures are for the years 2002 through
2011 and are in blue. The projected revenues are drawn from the native excel spreadsheet of JX 170, which
is the final iteration of the Management Projections. The projection period is 2012 through 2016 and those
numbers are displayed in red.
132 By 2012, the Company had experienced two consecutive years of revenue decreases. In fact, 2012 revenue
was forecasted as less than 2008 revenue. 2016 forecasted revenue, by contrast, nearly would exceed
Ramtron's 2010 and 2011 actual revenues combined.
133 The inputs are the same as the previous graph. CAGR provides the rate at which an initial value would need
to grow each year in order to achieve a final amount. It is a measurement that smoothes out swings in growth
over time. For CAGR, I use the formula: CAGR = ((End Value / Start Value)^(1 / Number of Years)) – 1. Note
that, while, for example, 2002-2011 is a period of ten years, the input for the CAGR formula would be nine,
because there are only nine periods of growth between year-end 2002 and year-end 2011. CAGR can be
a misleading measurement tool, as the selection of years can dramatically affect the implied annual return.
This is why multiple historical CAGR measurements are provided.
134 JX 199; Tr. 426-32 (Buss: explaining the various portions of JX 199, which is the PSP).
135 In 2017, for example, Cypress predicted a 22% market share.
136 Balzer Dep. 80–81.
137 JX 170.
138 Id. & native file.
139 JX 93 & native file.
140 JX 136 & native file.
141 Tr. 81.
142 My conclusion that the Management Projections are unreliable prevents me from using those inputs. It is
equally dubious to use either set of the SVB Projections, because they extend only for the 2012 calendar
year and one of the main problems with the Management Projections is that they forecast an unrealistic rate
of growth. Thus, even if the SVB Projections provided a reliable 2012 input, it still would not be clear what
rate of growth to apply for future years. The parties, perhaps, could have advised on this issue. Instead of
arguing that the Management Projections should be discounted a certain percentage, however, the parties
took the opposite tactic of wholesale adoption or rejection of the Management Projections. This has forced
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the Court to choose one of those routes. Adopting instead some sort of middle ground would require me to
engage in impermissible and unreliable speculation.
143 Huff Fund Inv. P'ship, 2013 WL 5878807, at *9.
144 Cypress prepared its own projections for Ramtron. JX 174. Those projections, however, predict Ramtron's
performance as a division of Cypress. Tr. 321–23 (Rodgers). Accordingly, they are not useful as a predictor of
Ramtron's stand-alone operating potential. Furthermore, Cypress predicted substantially more conservative
figures than Ramtron's management, even after accounting for improvements that Cypress anticipated
making to Ramtron.
145 JX 214 [hereinafter “Clarke Rpt.”] at 47; Jarrell Rpt. 84.
146 Clarke Rpt. 51.
147 Id. at 58.
148 Jarrell Rpt. 87, 91.
149 Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 54 (Del. Ch. 2007) (quoting In re U.S. Cellular Operating
Co., 2005 WL 43994, at *17 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2005)).
150 In re Orchard Enters., Inc., 2012 WL 2923305, at *9 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012).
151 Clarke Rpt. 50-51.
152 This is “forecasted revenue for the one-year period after the next 12 months.” Id. at 53.
153 JX 216 [hereinafter “Jarrell Rebuttal Rpt.”] at 38.
154 Id.
155 Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., 2013 WL 3793896, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013) (citing In re John Q.
Hammons Hotels Inc. S'holder Litig., 2011 WL 227634, at *5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 2011) and In re U.S. Cellular
Operating Co., 2005 WL 43994, at *18).
156 Id.
157 Clarke Rpt. 54.
158 The implied equity value is not an exact multiple, because Ramtron's debt of $8.8 million is subtracted out
and the Company's cash of $1.3 million is added into the calculation. This results in netting out $7.5 million
to obtain the implied equity value that is shown.
159 This calculation is derived by applying the comparable transaction multiples to Ramtron's financials,
subtracting $7.5 million, discounting by 13%, and then dividing by the number of shares, which I assume to
be Clarke's figure of 35,528,425. Jarrell contends that the latter figure understates the number of shares by
about four million units because of restricted stock and stock options.
160 These numbers are inconsequentially different from Jarrell's calculations. The deviation seemingly results
from his rounding of Clarke's determination of shares outstanding to 35,500,000.
161 Jarrell presents a colorable argument that Virage is not, in fact, a comparable transaction. If correct, that
provides yet another reason that the comparable transaction methodology is not reliable here, but I need not
decide that issue. If Virage is not comparable, the Court would be left attempting to value Ramtron on the
highly questionable basis of a single allegedly comparable transaction.
162 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010).
163 Id. at 217-18.
164 In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 WL 399726 (holding that the merger price was the most reliable
indication of fair value and performing confirmatory DCF analysis); Huff Fund Inv. P'ship, 2013 WL 5878807
(finding the merger price to be the best indication of fair value in light of the lack of other reliable methods); The
Union Illinois 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Gp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2004) (concluding that
the merger price offered the best indication of fair value and also performing a confirmatory DCF analysis).
165 Van de Walle v. Unimation, Inc., 1991 WL 29303, at *17 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 1991).
166 Union Illinois, 847 A.2d at 357.
167 Id. at 358.
168 Huff Fund Inv. P'ship, 2013 WL 5878807, at *13.
169 JX 322 (TI Mfg. Agreement); JX 324 (TI Mfg. Agreement Amendment No. 2) § 13.1.
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170 JX 322 § 14.8(b).
171 Tr. 287–90; id. at 289 (Rodgers: “They explicitly refused to say ‘we will support you’ to the point that I didn't
even try to get them to sign a document, but my inference was that they wouldn't harm us if we didn't attack
them.”).
172 JX 320.




176 Tr. 287 (Rodgers).
177 Id. at 286 (Rodgers: “They're a company with many divisions, like us, and they compete broadly in the
market.”); id. at 287 (“TI and Cypress have a history of conflict, and they sued us twice about 15 years ago.
We won both trials, but there's not good blood.”); id. at 237 (Kaszubinski: testifying that TI and Cypress
competed); id. at 389-90 (Buss: “So the challenge for us is that TI does not like Cypress. TI and T.J. [Rodgers]
do not get along.... I believe he had been in two prior lawsuits with them prior to my tenure, and I think he
beat them both times. So there is a lot of animosity between the two companies, and it was the number one
issue we wrestled with.”).
178 Id. at 65 (Richards); id. at 202 (Davenport).
179 Id. at 201.
180 Id.
181 JX 125 at 8.
182 The Management Projections were in the Company's data room. E.g., JX 84. Needham's call log shows that
five companies who had signed NDAs accessed the data room, though one company that executed an NDA







189 JS ¶ 5.
190 JX 109.
191 Clarke's report, for example, suggested that the average acquisition premium in the semiconductor industry
is about 30%, with roughly half of that amount attributable to a control premium and the remainder attributable
to synergies. Clarke Rpt. 56. An additional 15% on top of $3.00 would imply a minimum acquisition price of
$3.45, exclusive of synergies.
192 JX 109.
193 JX 126.
194 See Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001).
195 JX 88.
196 See JX 89 (“Wear them down and wait is working.”).
197 Union Illinois, 847 A.2d at 359.
198 Huff Fund, 2014 WL 2042797, at *2.
199 8 Del. C. § 262(h) (emphasis added).
200 Cf. Huff Fund, 2014 WL 2042797, at *5 (providing the example of the urban cornfield auction and the eccentric
farmer, and noting that, “In an auction setting, it makes little sense to determine whether a bid incorporates
information about the value of certain opportunities by considering only the idiosyncratic weight attached to
that information by any particular bidder, even the winning bidder”).
201 Jarrell Rpt. 43-44.
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202 JX 174.
203 Jarrell Rpt. 46.
204 JX 217 (Clarke Rebuttal Rpt.) at 26-27.
205 JX 217 (Clarke Rebuttal Rpt.) at 26-27.
206 Balzer Dep. 19.
207 JX 246 at 76.
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*1  This is the post-trial decision in an appraisal brought
pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 262 and arising out of a merger in
which a global technology conglomerate and its acquisition
subsidiary acquired a biometrics technology company at a
price of $10.50 per share. Relying upon a discounted cash
flow (“DCF”) analysis, the petitioners claim that each share of
the biometrics company's common shares was worth $16.26
as of the merger date. By contrast, the respondent contends
that the biometrics company's common shares were worth
only $10.12 apiece as of the merger date. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court concludes that, as of the merger date,
the fair value of the biometrics company was approximately
$963.4 million or $10.87 per share.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Parties
Respondent, 3M Cogent, Inc. (“3M Cogent”), formerly
known as Cogent, Inc. (“Cogent” or the “Company”),
is a Delaware corporation that provides biometric 1
technology. Specifically, Cogent offers automated fingerprint
identification systems (“AFIS”) technology and other
fingerprint biometrics solutions to government, immigration,
and law enforcement agencies.
Petitioners are Merion Capital, L.P., Magnetar Capital Master
Fund Ltd., Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund
Ltd., Magnetar SC Fund Ltd., Hipparchus Master Fund Ltd.,
Compass Offshore HTV PCC Limited, Compass HTV LLC,
and Blackwell Partners LLC (collectively, the “Petitioners”).
At the time of the merger, Petitioners beneficially owned
5,835,109 shares of Cogent common stock (the “Shares”). 2
Petitioners dissented from the merger and perfected their
appraisal rights.
Nonparty 3M Company (“3M”) is a diversified technology
conglomerate with a global presence in the following
businesses: industrial and transportation; health care;
consumer and office; safety, security, and protection services;
display and graphics; and electro and communications. 3  3M
acquired Cogent (or the “Company”) through its acquisition




Cogent was founded by Ming Hsieh in 1990. From 1990
until 2004, Cogent operated as a private company and was
profitable during that entire period. 4  Ultimately, Cogent went
public on September 23, 2004, and thereafter was publicly
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traded on the NASDAQ Global Select Market under the
symbol “COGT.” 5  At all relevant times, Hsieh was the
President, Chairman, and Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”)
of Cogent, and Paul Kim was the Chief Financial Officer.
Before the merger, Cogent's Board of Directors (the “Board”)
consisted of four members: Hsieh, John Bolger, John Stenbit,
and Kenneth Thornton.
2. The transaction
*2  In or around 2008, Cogent retained Credit Suisse to
assist in the investigation and evaluation of potential strategic
alternatives, including a sale of the Company. As part of
that engagement, Credit Suisse contacted over twenty-five
potential strategic and financial partners about the prospect of
acquiring Cogent. 6  Cogent also retained Goldman Sachs to
pursue potential strategic alternatives with NEC, a competitor
of Cogent. As a result of efforts by Cogent and its
advisers, in 2010, 3M, Danaher Corporation (“Danaher”),
Roper Industries (“Roper”), and NEC Corporation (“NEC”)
expressed interest in acquiring the Company. 7
Around that time, Cogent had direct meetings with executives
of 3M in which Cogent and its advisors informed 3M that
other potential suitors were in discussions with Cogent. 8
In May 2010, 3M expressed interest in pursuing a strategic
transaction with Cogent at a price range of $9.25 to $10.25
per share. 9
Shortly after 3M's verbal offer, Kim prepared financial
projections for 2010–2015 (the “Five–Year Projections”). 10
Up until that time, Cogent had not prepared projections
beyond one year. 11  Credit Suisse compiled the projections,
but relied on information supplied by Kim, Hsieh, and
Mary Jane Abalos, Cogent's vice president of finance. 12
According to Kim, the Five–Year Projections were “bottom-
up” projections that did not rely on industry analysts or
reports. 13
On July 2, 2010, after further discussions and due diligence
with potential acquirers, Cogent received two nonbinding
indications of interest: one from 3M to acquire Cogent for
$10.50 per share and the other from Danaher to acquire
Cogent at a range of $10.00 to $10.50. 14  Although Roper and
Danaher eventually dropped out of the process, NEC and 3M
remained interested in pursuing a strategic transaction with
Cogent. 15
In August 2010, 3M submitted a nonbinding written proposal
to acquire Cogent for $10.50 per share. 16  The Board met
on August 15, 2010, and instructed their advisor, Credit
Suisse, to inform 3M that its proposal was not acceptable
and to negotiate with 3M on price and terms. 17  Cogent also
leveraged the offer from 3M to pressure NEC to speed up its
bid. 18  Ultimately, NEC submitted a nonbinding indication
of interest to acquire Cogent within the range of $11.00 to
$12.00 per share. 19  In a letter dated August 19, 2010, 3M
advised Cogent that its bid would expire on August 20. 20
That day, the Board met to determine how to proceed. After
considering updates on the ongoing discussions with NEC,
the Board approved the negotiation of a definitive merger with
3M, rejected the condition of exclusivity requested in 3M's
letter, and instructed Credit Suisse to continue discussions
with NEC. 21
Finally, on August 29, 2010, the Board held another special
meeting at which it considered further updates on the
discussions with NEC. 22  Based on NEC's need to complete
its due diligence, the existence of antitrust and regulatory
issues with NEC, and Credit Suisse's opinion that the
proposed merger with 3M was fair, the Board unanimously
determined that it was in the best interest of Cogent to enter
into the proposed merger agreement with 3M, and resolved to
recommend that the shareholders approve the merger. 23
*3  The next day, Cogent and 3M publicly announced the
merger. On September 10, 2010, 3M commenced a tender
offer to acquire all of the issued and outstanding common
stock of Cogent for $10.50 per share. The initial tender offer
closed on October 7, 2010, after which 3M controlled a
majority of Cogent's outstanding shares. Because Cogent did
not have enough shares to complete a short-form merger,
on October 8, 2010, 3M commenced a subsequent tender
offering at the same price, $10.50 per share. On October 26,
2010, the subsequent offering closed, and 3M controlled 73%
of Cogent's outstanding common shares or approximately
64.9 million common shares. On December 1, 2010 (the
“Merger Date”), the stockholders of Cogent approved the
merger pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 251 (the “Merger”). As a
result, Cogent became a wholly owned subsidiary of 3M and
thereafter was renamed 3M Cogent, Inc.
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C. Procedural History
Following the Merger, Petitioners filed their Verified Petition
for Appraisal on March 4, 2011. From November 28 through
November 30, 2012, I presided over a three-day trial
in this action. After extensive post-trial briefing, counsel
presented their final arguments on March 19, 2013. This
Memorandum Opinion constitutes my post-trial findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
D. Parties' Contentions
Petitioners contend that the fair value of Cogent was $16.26
per share. In support of this valuation, Petitioners rely on
their expert, Dr. Bernard C. Bailey, a Ph.D. in management
and Chairman and CEO of Authentix Inc., a Carlyle
Group portfolio company and global leader in authentication
technology. 24  In valuing the Company, Bailey performed
a DCF analysis, a comparable companies analysis, and a
comparable transactions analysis. Bailey relied, however,
only on his DCF analysis in reaching his valuation opinion
because (1) Bailey believed there were no truly comparable
companies or transactions to compare to Cogent and (2), to
the extent there were any potentially comparable companies
and transactions, he lacked sufficient data from which to draw
comparisons.
3M Cogent claims that Cogent's fair value was $10.12 per
share. In support of its valuation contentions, Respondent
relies on the expert testimony and reports of Henry F. Owsley
and Stephen M. Schiller (collectively, the “Gordian Experts”),
a partner and managing director of Gordian Group, LLC
(“Gordian Group”), respectively. 25  The Gordian Experts
valued the Company using a DCF analysis, a comparable
companies analysis, and a comparable transactions analysis,
giving each analysis equal, i.e., one-third, weight.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard
Under Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law,
stockholders who meet certain requirements are entitled to an
appraisal by the Court of Chancery of the fair value of their
shares of stock. 26  During such an appraisal proceeding, the
Court of Chancery
shall determine the fair value of the
shares exclusive of any element of
value arising from the accomplishment
or expectation of the merger or
consolidation, together with interest,
if any, to be paid upon the amount
determined to be the fair value. In
determining such fair value, the Court
shall take into account all relevant
factors. 27
The Court's task is to perform an independent evaluation of
“fair value.” 28  “It is within the Court of Chancery's discretion
to select one of the parties' valuation models as its general
framework, or fashion its own, to determine fair value in
the appraisal proceeding.” 29  Fair value in the context of
an appraisal proceeding is the “value to a stockholder of
the firm as a going concern, as opposed to the firm's value
in the context of an acquisition or other transaction.” 30
“Only the speculative elements of value that may arise from
the ‘accomplishment or expectation’ of the merger,” that
is, any synergistic value, should be excluded from a fair
value calculation on the date of the merger. 31  “One of the
most important factors to consider is the very ‘nature of the
enterprise’ subject to the appraisal proceeding.” 32
*4  In an appraisal proceeding, both sides have the burden of
proving their respective valuations by a preponderance of the
evidence. 33  If neither party satisfies its burden, however, the
Court must use its own independent judgment to determine
the fair value of the shares. 34  The Court may consider
“proof of value by any techniques or methods which are
generally considered acceptable in the financial community
and otherwise admissible in court.” 35  Among the techniques
that Delaware courts have relied on to determine the fair value
of shares are the DCF approach, the comparable transactions
approach, and comparable companies analyses. 36
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B. Merger Price as Indication of “Fair Value”
Respondent seeks to have this Court rely on the merger price
as evidence of the fair value of Petitioners' shares. But, the
cases that Respondent cites in support of that proposition 37
pre-date the Supreme Court's statements on this issue in
Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP. 38
In Golden Telecom, the Supreme Court stated:
Section 262(h) unambiguously calls
upon the Court of Chancery to
perform an independent evaluation
of “fair value” at the time of a
transaction. It vests the Chancellor
and Vice Chancellors with significant
discretion to consider “all relevant
factors” and determine the going
concern value of the underlying
company. Requiring the Court of
Chancery to defer—conclusively or
presumptively—to the merger price,
even in the face of a pristine,
unchallenged transactional process,
would contravene the unambiguous
language of the statute and the
reasoned holdings of our precedent.
It would inappropriately shift the
responsibility to determine “fair
value” from the court to the private
parties. Also, while it is difficult for
the Chancellor and Vice Chancellors
to assess wildly divergent expert
opinions regarding value, inflexible
rules governing appraisal provide little
additional benefit in determining “fair
value” because of the already high
costs of appraisal actions. Appraisal
is, by design, a flexible process.
Therefore, we reject [respondent's]
contention that the Vice Chancellor
erred by insufficiently deferring to the
merger price, and we reject its call to
establish a rule requiring the Court of
Chancery to defer to the merger price
in any appraisal proceeding. 39
*5  More recently, Chancellor Strine refused to give any
weight to merger price, stating:
[Respondent] makes some rhetorical hay out of its search
for other buyers. But this is an appraisal action, not a
fiduciary duty case, and although I have little reason to
doubt [respondent's] assertion that no buyer was willing
to pay Dimensional $25 million for the preferred stock
and an attractive price for [respondent's] common stock in
2009, an appraisal must be focused on [respondent's] going
concern value. Given the relevant legal standard, the trial
record did not focus extensively on the quality of marketing
[respondent] by Dimensional or the utility of the “go shop”
provision contained in the merger agreement....
Instead, the testimony at trial focused mostly on the
question that is relevant under Cavalier Oil and its progeny,
which is the going concern value of [respondent] as of
the date of the [m]erger. In this opinion, I concentrate
on answering the key questions raised by the parties
relevant to determining that value, which are: (i) whether
the preferred stock should be valued at the $25 million
liquidation preference value or on an as-converted basis
in determining the value to subtract from [respondent's]
equity value to derive a value for its common stock; and
(ii) the enterprise value of [respondent] as a going concern
on the Merger date. 40
Here, both sides have presented expert testimony as to the
going concern value of Cogent on the Merger Date. Indeed,
Respondent did not seek to use the merger price of $10.50
per share, but instead relies on the Gordian Experts' analyses
to arrive at a lower price of $10.12. 41  Respondent and its
experts also did not attempt to adjust the merger price to
remove the “speculative elements of value that may arise
from the ‘accomplishment or expectation’ of the merger.” 42
In other words, Respondent asks this Court to rely on a
merger price that it has not relied on itself and that is not
adjusted to produce the going concern value of Cogent. Those
deficiencies render the merger price largely irrelevant to this
case. Accordingly, I focus primarily on the evidence presented
by the experts as to the going concern value of Cogent on the
Merger Date, i.e., the experts' technical analyses presented in
their expert reports and in their testimony at trial.
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C. Which Valuation Method?
As previously indicated, Petitioners relied solely on a DCF
analysis to support their argument that the fair value of a
Cogent common share on the date of the Merger was $16.26.
By contrast, 3M Cogent's experts gave nearly equal weight
to their DCF analysis, comparable companies analysis, and
comparable transactions analysis in coming to a per common
share value for Cogent of $10.12.
Generally speaking, “it is preferable to take a more
robust approach involving multiple techniques—such as a
DCF analysis, a comparable transactions analysis (looking
at precedent transaction comparables), and a comparable
companies analysis (looking at trading comparables/
multiples)—to triangulate a value range, as all three
methodologies individually have their own limitations.” 43
A comparable or market-based approach endeavors to
draw inferences about a company's future expected cash
flows from the market's expectations about comparable
companies. 44  “[T]he utility of a market-based method
depends on actually having companies that are sufficiently
comparable that their trading multiples provide a relevant
insight into the subject company's own growth prospects.” 45
When there are a number of corporations competing
in a similar industry, these methods are most reliable.
On the other hand, when the “comparables” involve
companies that offer different products or services, are
at a different stage in their growth cycle, or have vastly
different multiples, a comparable companies or comparable
transactions analysis is inappropriate. 46  Therefore, I must
examine the experts' respective selections of comparable
companies and transactions to evaluate their reliability.
1. Comparable companies analysis
*6  The comparable companies method of valuing a
company's equity involves several steps including: (1) finding
comparable, publicly traded companies that have reviewable
financial information; (2) calculating the ratio between the
trading price of the stocks of each of those companies and
some recognized measure reflecting their income such as
revenue, EBIT, or EBITDA; (3) correcting these derived
ratios to account for differences, such as in capital structure,
between the public companies and the target company being
valued; and, finally, (4) applying the average multiple of the
comparable companies to the relevant income measurement
of the target company, here Cogent. 47
The Gordian Experts conducted a comparable companies
analysis that began with the selection of ten companies. 48
The Gordian Experts then determined multiples by dividing
the enterprise value for each company by: (i) last twelve
months (“LTM”) revenue and EBITDA; and (ii) estimated
forward revenue and EBITDA, as determined by public
filings and other publicly available information. Next, the
Gordian Experts applied a range of multiples to Cogent's LTM
and estimated forward revenue and EBITDA to determine
an estimated enterprise value for Cogent. Ultimately, the
Gordian Experts' analysis yielded an estimated enterprise
value of Cogent of $296.3 million.
Here, Petitioners attack Respondent's first expert, Owsley,
and his comparable companies analysis, claiming the analysis
is “unreliable, unsupported and flawed.” 49  Specifically,
Petitioners note that the Gordian Experts' comparable
companies analysis suffers from: (1) a paucity of data; (2)
a selection of companies with either no profits, a different
risk profile, no government-focused customer base, or no
business in the biometrics industry; and (3) a generalized lack
of consistent methodology.
“The burden of proof on the question [of] whether the
comparables are truly comparable lies with the party
making that assertion,” here the Respondent. 50  I find that
Respondent and its Gordian Experts have not satisfied that
burden.
As an initial matter, six of the ten comparable companies
the Gordian Experts identified were significantly smaller
than Cogent. Those companies each had enterprise values
of less than $50 million, 51  while Cogent's enterprise value
was $398.5 million. 52  This Court has rejected the use of
companies as comparables where those companies were
significantly different in size than the appraised company. 53
That is because, as further discussed in Section II.D.2.d infra
concerning the equity size premium, greater risk is typically
associated with equity in a small company. 54  In that regard,
it would be inappropriate to compare a company with an
enterprise value of $14.7 million, as was the case with BIO–
Key International, Inc., to a company, such as Cogent, with
an enterprise value more than 25 times higher.
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*7  Moreover, not one of those same six “comparable”
companies had generated a profit. 55  At trial, Schiller, who
replaced Owsley as Respondent's expert, acknowledged that
the type of companies that have revenue multiples but not
EBITDA multiples tend to be “companies in the early stage of
their growth and maturity” and “companies that are growing
rapidly.” 56  In contrast, Cogent had been profitable from
1990 until 2005. 57  In that regard, Schiller acknowledged
that companies that had never turned a profit “are not close
comparables” to Cogent. 58
The Gordian Experts also failed to select comparable
companies from the same business or industry as Cogent. For
example, five of the companies selected by Owsley had no
biometrics business at all. 59  Bailey, Petitioners' expert, also
notes that of the ten comparable companies selected by the
Gordian Experts, only one—BIO-Key International—listed
Cogent as a competitor in its annual report. 60
Finally, the Gordian Experts' failure to identify L–1 as
a comparable company to Cogent before trial causes me
some concern. L–1 competed directly against Cogent in
a number of markets, including the LiveScan market. 61
Indeed, Schiller admitted that L–1 “was one of the closer
comparables to Cogent.” 62  Nonetheless, the Gordian Experts
excluded L–1 based on their mistaken belief that a roughly
contemporaneous L–1 transaction had closed before the
Merger. 63  Importantly, L–1 had very positive financials
that probably would have increased the values generated by
the Gordian Experts' comparable companies analysis. 64  In
that sense, therefore, the Gordian Experts' analysis likely
underestimates the value of Cogent.
Based on the problems identified in this subsection, I find
the Gordian Experts' comparable companies analysis to be
unreliable. Furthermore, because Respondent has not met its
burden of proof to show that the selected companies are truly
comparable, I accord no weight to that analysis.
2. Comparable transactions analysis
A comparable transactions analysis “involves identifying
similar transactions, quantifying those transactions through
financial metrics, and then applying the metrics to the
company at issue to ascertain a value.” 65  As with
the comparable companies analysis, “[t]he utility of the
comparable transactions methodology is directly linked to the
‘similarity between the company the court is valuing and the
companies used for comparison.’ ” 66
Here, the Gordian Experts began their analysis with the
selection of eighteen transactions. 67  They then calculated
multiples by dividing the enterprise value (as determined
by the terms of the relevant transactions) for each company
involved by: (i) LTM revenue and EBITDA; and (ii) estimated
forward revenue and EBITDA. 68  Next, the Gordian Experts
arrived at multiple ranges by eliminating the top and bottom
quartile. 69  Finally, they applied a 20% discount to the
multiples they obtained to take into account the need to
eliminate any control or synergy premiums. 70
*8  Petitioners' expert Bailey criticized the Gordian Experts
for using revenue multiples on the ground that they are less
reliable than EBITDA multiples. At trial, Bailey explained
that “it's inappropriate to use a revenue multiple as a
multiple for trying to value [Cogent], because it was a very
profitable cash-flow-positive company operating in a robust
industry.” 71
In an expert report he submitted in another case, Owsley
similarly criticized the use of revenue multiples, stating that
“[w]hile it is true that many analysts regularly examine
revenue multiples[,] I believe that such multiples are
inherently more suspect due to their relatively higher level
of variance (once low and negative earners are eliminated)
than EBITDA multiples.” 72  Owsley's inconsistent and
contradictory positions undermine the Gordian Experts'
credibility on this point, which they admitted was a “judgment
call.” 73  Based on these facts and Bailey's reasoning, I find
that Respondent has not met its burden of showing that
the Gordian Experts' use of a revenue multiples approach
is reliable. Therefore, I accord no weight to that part of
Respondent's analysis.
Petitioners contend that the remainder of the Gordian Experts'
comparable transactions analysis, i.e., the LTM and forward
EBITDA multiples, is flawed because there are insufficient
data points to support any meaningful conclusions. For
the thirty-six potential EBITDA multiples identified, the
Gordian Experts were able to provide only eight meaningful
multiples. That number is even smaller after one eliminates
the first and fourth quartiles. This Court has found comparable
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transactions analyses that used as few as five transactions
and two transactions to be unreliable. 74  Indeed, “[i]f it turns
out that very few data points are available for a particular
valuation multiple, that problem may lead to abandon[ing]
that multiple or [ ] put[ting] relatively little weight on it.” 75
The dearth of data points here undermines the reliability of
the EBITDA multiples.
This conclusion is buttressed by the high dispersion of the
data points the Gordian Experts did obtain. “The extent
to which the valuation multiples are tightly clustered or
widely dispersed tends to indicate the extent to which the
market focuses on that particular valuation multiple in pricing
companies in the particular industry.” 76  Here, the dispersion
was “extremely large.” 77  For example, while the mean of the
forward EBITDA multiple was 25.4x, the standard deviation
was 25.1x. 78  Thus, because there are so few data points and
the results are so widely dispersed, Respondent has failed to
show that its EBITDA multiples analysis is reliable.
*9  For all of these reasons, I accord no weight to
Respondent's comparable transactions analysis.
3. Delaware Rules of Evidence 702 and 705
Petitioners also raised an evidentiary challenge to Schiller's
testimony and rebuttal report. According to Petitioners,
Schiller's testimony lacks a factual basis and should be
excluded under D.R.E. 702(1) and 705(b). 79  Petitioners also
seek to exclude Schiller's testimony because an expert cannot
act as
a mere conduit or transmitter of the
content of an extrajudicial source.
An ‘expert’ should not be permitted
simply to repeat another's opinion
or data without bringing to bear on
it his own expertise and judgment.
Obviously in such a situation, the non-
testifying expert is not on the witness
stand and truly is unavailable for cross-
examination. 80
Finally, Petitioners note that an expert cannot materially
change his opinions after the expert discovery cutoff. 81
To put Petitioners' objections in context, I review briefly
the background of Schiller's participation in this case. In
late July 2012, Owsley unexpectedly became ill and went
on medical leave. 82  In October 2012, Respondent asked
Schiller to assume Owsley's role in this case by taking over
the partially prepared rebuttal report and preparing himself to
testify. 83  As part of that preparation, Schiller read Owsley's
expert report, spoke with members of the Gordian team, and
ultimately adopted Owsley's conclusions. 84  Schiller testified
that he “independently assessed the validity of the judgments
and conclusions of Mr. Owsley's report.” 85
On October 22, 2012, Schiller submitted a rebuttal report
that reflected his conclusions and judgments. 86  Two weeks
later, on November 5, Schiller sat for a deposition. At
that deposition, Schiller admitted that he did not “know
all the things that the team looked at as they evaluated
these comparables.” 87  Schiller was unable to say, among
other things, whether in selecting comparable companies the
Gordian team had considered whether those companies were
government contractors. 88  Nor was Schiller able to identify
the portion of each comparable company's business that was
involved in the biometrics business. 89
*10  At trial, Schiller admitted that he had no role in
preparing Owsley's initial report, never spoke to Owsley
regarding his opening report, and had not reviewed all of the
materials in Appendix C of Owsley's report. 90  Schiller also
changed some of his deposition answers to reflect work he
had done after the deposition. 91
Generally speaking, an expert can replace another expert who
must drop out as a result of illness. Here, Schiller was a logical
choice based on his understanding of the techniques that the
Gordian Group regularly applies in its valuations. Moreover,
Schiller apparently examined and relied on the judgments
Owsley and his team made. Given these circumstances, I do
not find Schiller's testimony inadmissible.
On the other hand, Schiller's deposition testimony
demonstrated that, as to some topics, Schiller barely
performed sufficient research to express an informed opinion,
and instead relied heavily on the opinions and data of Owsley.
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Because Schiller's statements regarding the comparability
of certain companies changed between his deposition and
trial and Respondent provided no prior notice of that change
to Petitioners, I have given no weight to Schiller's later
testimony.
These problems with the evidence adduced from Schiller
also undermine his reliability and credibility as a witness
and create an independent basis for according Schiller's
comparables analyses only minimal weight.
D. DCF Analysis of Cogent
The basic premise underlying the DCF methodology is
that the value of a company is equal to the value of its
projected future cash flows, discounted to the present value
at the opportunity cost of capital. 92  Calculating a DCF
involves three steps: (1) one estimates the values of future
cash flows for a discrete period, where possible, based on
contemporaneous management projections; (2) the value of
the entity attributable to cash flows expected after the end of
the discrete period must be estimated to produce a so-called
terminal value, preferably using a perpetual growth model;
and (3) the value of the cash flows for the discrete period and
the terminal value must be discounted back using the capital
asset pricing model or “CAPM.” 93  In simpler terms, the
DCF method involves three basic components: (1) cash flow
projections; (2) a discount rate; and (3) a terminal value. 94
The experts in this case relied on conflicting inputs and
assumptions as to all three elements of their respective DCF
analyses. I now turn to those disputed inputs and assumptions.
1. Cash flow projections
*11  A primary dispute between the parties is whether
the Court should rely on the Five–Year Projections
prepared by Kim and Credit Suisse. Petitioners would reject
management's projections and adopt two key scenarios: (1)
Bailey's “Industry Growth Scenario” that assumes an industry
growth rate through 2015 of 17%; and (2) Bailey's “Cash
Deployment Scenario” that assumes Cogent would spend
$396 million of its cash on acquisitions. 95  In contrast,
Respondent urges this Court to rely on management's
projections with only a few minor adjustments.
Generally, this Court “prefers valuations based on
contemporaneously prepared management projections
because management ordinarily has the best first-hand
knowledge of a company's operations.” 96  In Gearreald
v. Just Care, Inc., 97  however, I held that projections
prepared by management “are not entitled to the same
deference usually afforded to contemporaneously prepared
management projections” where “management had never
prepared projections beyond the current fiscal year,” “the
possibility of litigation, such as an appraisal proceeding,
was likely,” and the projections “were made outside of the
ordinary course of business.” 98  I also considered it relevant
in Gearreald that the projections at issue there were prepared
by directors and officers of the target company who “risked
losing their positions if the ... bid succeeded and were
involved in trying to convince the Board to pursue a different
strategic alternative in which [they] were involved.” 99
A number of the circumstances in Gearreald also are present
here: (1) Cogent had never prepared projections beyond the
current fiscal year; 100  (2) the management projections were
prepared after 3M communicated a verbal offer to Cogent,
and Hsieh communicated to 3M the price at which he was
willing to recommend selling; 101  and (3) the projections
were prepared with significant input from Credit Suisse. 102
On the other hand, Kim had no reason to believe his job
was in jeopardy, nor was he involved in any alternate bid.
This last factor is significant because neither this Court nor
the Delaware Supreme Court ever has adopted a bright-line
test under which management projections that were created
during the merger process are deemed inherently unreliable.
To the contrary, in a number of cases Delaware Courts have
relied on projections that were prepared by management
outside of the ordinary course of business and with the
possibility of litigation. 103  On the other hand, this Court
has expressed skepticism with respect to projections prepared
with the benefit of hindsight by testifying experts. 104
*12  Moreover, Bailey's “Cash Deployment Scenario,”
which assumes that Cogent would have spent $396 million
on potential targets and realized positive returns as a result of
those acquisitions, is too speculative. The record shows that
even though Cogent was open to acquiring companies and had
examined more than twenty companies, “none of them fit into
[Cogent's] acquisition target.” 105  Furthermore, even if I were
to assume that Cogent would have made an acquisition, which
I am not inclined to do, I would not be willing to speculate as
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to the rate of return on that hypothetical acquisition, because
it would amount to nothing more than mere conjecture and
supposition.
Similarly, the record does not support adopting Bailey's
“Industry Growth Scenario,” as opposed to management's
projections. 106  In his scenario, Bailey used industry growth
rates to assume a compound annual growth rate (“CAGR”)
through 2015 of 17%, while the CAGR implicit in
management's projections over the same period was only
12.1%. Notably, from 2006 to 2009, Cogent fell far short
of industry growth rates in the biometrics industry. 107
Similarly, in 2010, management projected Cogent's revenues
to grow by 8% (from $129.6 million in 2009 to $140 million in
2010). 108  In the first three quarters of 2010, however, Cogent
had earned only $78.2 million in revenues. 109  If Cogent had
maintained that pace for the final quarter of 2010, Cogent's
2010 revenues would have been just $104.3 million, 110
resulting in negative year-on-year revenue growth between
2009 and 2010.
Based on the evidence adduced at trial, Delaware's long-
standing preference for management projections, and the
absence of any persuasive evidence that Kim was at risk
of losing his job, involved in another bid, or entangled in
other extraordinary circumstances, I accept management's
projections here as a reliable starting point for the DCF
analysis in this case.
a. Free cash flow adjustments
In their respective DCF analyses, both Bailey and Owsley
made adjustments to the free cash flows. First, Owsley
deducted share based compensation (“SBC”) from Cogent's
projected cash flows, whereas Bailey did not. And second,
Owsley increased working capital based on an assumption
that Cogent would have working capital equal to 32.2% of
revenues. Bailey, on the other hand, assumed that Cogent
would need to retain only 22.9% of its incremental revenues
as working capital. I examine each of those proposed
adjustments next.
i. Treatment of SBC
Questions about the treatment of SBC often arise in this
Court when fairness opinions fail to disclose whether the
individual or entity rendering the opinion treated SBC as a
non-cash expense in its DCF analysis. In those cases, the
Court's standard practice has been to treat SBC as a non-cash
expense. 111  Valuation literature also supports the view that
a non-qualified stock option plan 112  is cash neutral or cash
flow positive. 113
*13  Respondent's authority to the contrary is inapposite.
3M Cogent relies on a blog post by Damodaran that states,
“It is absurd to add back stock-based compensation (it is an
operating expense ...).” 114  That blog post, however, deals
with the reporting of operating income, not the appropriate
treatment of SBC for cash flow purposes. 115  I agree with
Damodaran that it makes sense to adjust earnings to take
into account the dilutive effect of SBC. Respondent has made
no showing in this case, however, that SBC will have any
effect on the actual cash flows of the Company. Therefore, I
conclude that SBC should not be treated as a cash expense
here. 116
ii. Working capital adjustment
“Working capital is derived by subtracting current liabilities
from current assets and represents the capital the business
has at its disposal to fund operations.” 117  Both Petitioners
and Respondent included in their revenue categories
—i.e., current assets—“billed accounts receivable,” “unbilled
accounts receivable,” and “inventory and contracted related
costs.” They both also included in their liabilities category
—i.e., current liabilities—“accounts payable.” The parties
disagreed, however, as to the proper treatment of the
following asset and liability categories for purposes of their
working capital adjustment: “prepaid expenses,” “long-term
inventory and contracted related costs,” “accrued expenses,”
and “other liabilities.”
The Gordian Experts criticized Bailey for including those
accounts in his computation of working capital, describing
them as “long-term” accounts and “subject to random
movement.” 118  At least one treatise, however, supports
Bailey's view that working capital should include the disputed
categories. That treatise states:
Operating working capital equals operating current assets
minus operating current liabilities. Operating current assets
comprise all current assets necessary for the operation
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of the business, including working cash balances, trade
accounts receivable, inventory, and prepaid expenses.
Specifically excluded are excess cash and marketable
securities—that is cash greater than the operating needs of
the business. Excess cash represents temporary imbalances
in the company's cash position....
Operating current liabilities include those liabilities that
are related to ongoing operations of the firm. The
most common operating liabilities are those related to
suppliers (accounts payable), employees (accrued salaries),
customers (deferred revenue), and the government (income
taxes payable). 119
Rather than relying on any professional or academic valuation
literature, the Gordian Experts characterize their position as
a “judgment” based on their “experience in looking at many
companies and many projections.” 120
*14  Bailey's approach appears to be well supported and
generally accepted by the financial community. 121  The
explanation proffered by the Gordian Experts for their
approach, on the other hand, was essentially conclusory.
Based on the strong support for his view, I adopt Bailey's
approach and assume that Cogent will need working capital
equal to 22.9% of incremental revenues.
b. Unlevered free cash flows
The following table reflects the projections of unlevered free
cash flows that the Court intends to use in conducting a DCF
analysis here. These projections incorporate the SBC and
working capital adjustments discussed above.
Tabular or Graphical Material not displayable at this time
The preceding image contains the reference for footnote 122 .
2. Cogent's cost of capital
To discount the cash flow projections for the Company to
present value, the experts for both sides computed their
respective weighted average costs of capital (“WACC”). The
formula used to derive WACC is:
WACC = [K D × W D × (1 - t) ] + (KE × WE ) 123
Where KD = Cost of debt capital
WD = Average weight of debt in capital structure
t = Effective tax rate for the company
KE = Cost of equity capital
WE = Average weight of equity capital in capital structure
Where the capital structure is 100% equity and 0% debt, as
is the case here, WACC is equal to the cost of equity. 124
To calculate the cost of equity capital, the experts for both
Petitioners and Respondent used the Capital Asset Pricing
Model, or CAPM, which can be expressed as:
KE = R F + (β × R ERP ) + R ESP 125
Where KE = Cost of equity
R F = Risk-free rate
β = Beta
R ERP = Equity risk premium
R ESP = Equity size premium
In simpler terms, the cost of equity equals the risk-free rate
plus an equity size premium plus the company's beta times
the market risk premium.
*15  The following table summarizes the parties' respective
inputs for WACC or cost of equity:
Tabular or Graphical Material not displayable at this time
In the sections that follow, I discuss, in turn, the disputes
between the parties as to each of the listed variables.
a. Risk-free rate
Petitioners determined Cogent's risk-free rate using the 20–
year Treasury bond yield, which was 3.80% on November
30, 2010, whereas 3M Cogent used the 10–year Treasury
bond yield, which was approximately 2.96% on December 1,
2010. 126  Both sides acknowledged that either the 10–year or
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20–year Treasury bond yields would be appropriate metrics
for the risk-free rate. 127
In the appraisal context, this Court has used the 20–year
Treasury bond yield on numerous occasions in its calculation
of the risk-free rate. 128  It does not appear from these cases,
however, that the issue of a 10–year versus a 20–year bond
was disputed or that the Court based its use of a twenty-
year rate on professional or academic valuation literature. To
the contrary, the literature suggests that the 10–year Treasury
bond yield is the appropriate metric for the risk-free rate
in this case. For example, Damodaran states, “we believe
that using the 10–year bond as the risk-free rate on all cash
flows is a good practice in valuation, at least in mature
markets.” 129  Another well-known treatise on valuation also
suggests a 10–year time horizon. 130  And, yet another source
states: “[m]any analysts use the yield on a 10–year [Treasury
bond] as a proxy for the risk-free rate, although the yields
on a 20–year or 30–year [Treasury bond] are also reasonable
proxies.” 131  Based on the referenced literature and the fact
that Cogent is a mature firm—as evidenced by its history of
positive cash flows—I conclude that the 10–year Treasury
bond yield, i.e., 2.96%, espoused by Respondent is the
appropriate metric for the risk-free rate in this case.
b. Beta
*16  As a matter of valuation theory, “companies that are
more unstable and leveraged, less established and financially
and competitively secure, and in colloquial terms ‘riskier,’
should have higher betas.” 132  Betas also can take into
account considerations like political risk to the extent such
risks are priced by the market. 133  The experts' calculations of
beta diverge in significant respects and are the largest driver
of the price difference in their respective DCF calculations.
Petitioners advocate for a beta of 0.87, while Respondent
espouses a much higher beta of 1.52. 134  In this regard, the
parties clash over three main topics: (1) whether to use a
1–year Bloomberg weekly raw beta or a 2–year Bloomberg
weekly adjusted beta; (2) the order of operations; and (3)
whether to adjust for all cash or only excess cash.
The first issue is whether the Court should start with Bailey's
1–year Bloomberg weekly raw beta of 0.708 or the Gordian
Experts' 2–year Bloomberg weekly adjusted beta of 0.67. 135
At this point, the experts agree that the Court should use
an observation period of one week. They differ, however,
as to the sample period and whether the beta should be
adjusted or raw. 136  Bailey explained that he chose a 1–
year sample period to avoid the “significant noise associated
with movements in the market due to the impact of the
Global Financial Crisis through the period late 2007 through
early 2009.” 137  Owsley, on the other hand, provided no
explanation of the reasons for his selection of a 2–year sample
period. Accordingly, I adopt Bailey's selection of a 1–year
sample period for this case.
Turning to what I have referred to as the “order of operations”
issue, both Petitioners and Respondent agree that it is
necessary to adjust the beta of Cogent to reflect Cogent's large
cash position. To do that, Bailey cash adjusted the Bloomberg
raw beta. In contrast, the Gordian Experts cash adjusted the
Bloomberg adjusted beta, which is equal to (Raw Beta x 0.67)
+ [1.00 × (0.33) ]. In this context, it strikes me as inappropriate
to cash adjust a market-adjusted beta because it effectively
cash adjusts the market. Accordingly, I conclude that the
appropriate number to begin the development of beta with is
the 1–year Bloomberg weekly raw beta, i.e., 0.708.
The process for adjusting asset beta estimates for excess cash
and investments is outlined by Pratt and Grabowski:
The assets of the guideline public
companies used in estimating beta
often include excess cash and
marketable securities. If you do not
take into account the excess cash
and marketable securities, you can
arrive at an incorrect estimate of
the asset beta for the operating
business. This will lead to an incorrect
estimate of the beta for the subject
company. After unlevering the beta
for the guideline public companies,
you adjust the unlevered beta estimates
for any excess cash or marketable
securities held by each guideline
public company. This adjustment is
based on the principle that the
beta of the overall company is the
market-value weighted average of the
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businesses or assets (including excess
cash) comprising the overall firm. 138
The formula for that adjustment is as follows:
*17  βU or overall company unlevered or asset beta
= [Asset beta for operations × ( Operating Assets /Total Assets
) ]
+ [Asset beta for surplus assets × ( Surplus Assets /Total
Assets ) ]
If we assume that cash has a beta of zero, 139  the equation is
simply:
βU = Asset beta for operations ×
( Operating Assets /Total Assets )
That equation can be restated as:
Asset beta for operations = βU × ( Total
Assets / Operating Assets )
Here, Cogent's total assets were approximately $868.7
million. 140  Operating assets are calculated using the
following formula:
Operating assets = total assets -
surplus assets
Predictably, the parties disagree as to what proportion of
Cogent's large cash reserves should be considered “surplus.”
Bailey treats approximately $100 million as surplus, whereas
the Gordian Experts consider all of Cogent's cash, i.e., $533.2
million, to be excess. At the very least, the parties agree
that the $100 million the Cogent board announced it would
use to execute a share buyback is excess cash. As for the
remaining $433.2 million in cash, Bailey asserts that it should
be treated as an operational asset because Cogent's executives
signaled “to the market that Cogent intended to utilize their
cash balance to support the operations of the business in order
to take advantage of the significant growth opportunities
in the marketplace.” 141  Yet, that view of surplus cash
contradicts the Pratt and Grabowski treatise upon which
Bailey explicitly relied. Pratt and Grabowski define surplus
assets as “[a]ssets that could be sold or distributed without
impairing company operations.” 142  Using that broader view
and a simplifying assumption that Cogent would need $50
million in maintenance cash for operations, 143  its excess
cash would be $483.2 million. 144  The operational assets
of Cogent then would be just $385.5 million. 145  Thus, the
ratio of total assets to operating assets would be 2.253. 146
Applying previously mentioned formula, the asset beta for
operations equals the overall company unlevered or asset
beta (0.708) times the ratio of total assets to operating assets
(2.253) or 1.595.
*18  Empirical studies have shown that measures of risk,
including beta, “tend to revert towards the mean over
time.” 147  Where a good set of comparables for industry betas
do not exist, one can “smooth” beta by adjusting historical
beta by a market beta of 1, using a 1/3 weighting factor for the
market and a 2/3 weighting for the subject company's beta,
in this case Cogent. 148  Here, that would result in a forward
estimated beta of approximately 1.397. 149
The Respondent also calculated beta using a peer group
method, i.e., a comparable companies analysis. For the
reasons stated in subsection C above, I do not find the
Gordian Experts' comparable companies analysis reliable.
Accordingly, I rely solely on my calculation of a Cogent
forward beta of 1.397 for purposes of determining the
appropriate WACC here.
c. Equity risk premium
There is very little difference between the parties as to the
appropriate equity risk premium. Bailey supports the use of a
supply-side equity risk premium of 5.0% as published in the
2010 Ibbotson yearbook. 150  The Gordian Experts relied on a
5.2% equity risk premium, which they derived from multiple
sources, including Damodaran and Ibbotson. 151
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Bailey cited a number of treatises and articles in support of
his view that the Court should apply a supply-side equity
risk premium. 152  Owsley's report, on the other hand, did
not explain how he calculated equity risk premium (beyond
identifying sources). 153  In addition, Schiller testified that he
was unfamiliar with the distinction between a supply-side
equity risk premium and a historic equity risk premium. 154
Because Bailey demonstrated a stronger understanding of this
subject and explained his methodology more convincingly, I
conclude that the 5.20% equity risk premium used by Bailey
is the appropriate value to use in this case. 155
d. Equity size premium
*19  “In addition to the equity risk premium, an equity size
premium generally is added to the company's cost of equity in
the valuation of smaller companies to account for the higher
rate of return demanded by investors to compensate for the
greater risk associated with small company equity.” 156  “A
size premium is an accepted part of CAPM because there
is evidence in empirical returns that investors demand a
premium for the extra risk of smaller companies.” 157  The
opposing experts came to similar values in their determination
of an equity size premium: 1.73% for Petitioners and 2.0%
for Respondent. 158
Bailey selected his equity size premium of 1.73% based on
decile 7 of Ibbotson Associates' (“Ibbotson”) 2010 yearbook,
which encompasses companies with a market capitalization
between $685,129,000 and $1,063,308,000. 159  The Gordian
Experts, on the other hand, used Ibbotson's 2009 yearbook
and adjusted Cogent's market capitalization to exclude its
large cash reserves.
The Ibbotson table headings clearly state “market
capitalization.” 160  In addition, the relevant treatises focus
on the market value of common equity and do not
suggest making an adjustment to exclude cash reserves. 161
Consistent with Ibbotson's headings and the treatises, the
Court of Chancery consistently has used market capitalization
as the benchmark for selecting the equity size premium. 162
Despite those authorities and Schiller's awareness that
“the definition [for equity size premium] says market
capitalization,” the Gordian Experts chose a size premium
by “look[ing] at the size of the market value less cash of
Cogent.” 163  That adjustment was based on Schiller's view
that
*20  we're valuing ... Cogent absent
its cash. We're not valuing Cogent in
the DCF. Because the way the DCF
works is, we value the cash streams the
company throws off and then we add
the cash on top of it. So we split the
baby in two parts and look at the values
of each. 164
I am not persuaded, however, that Schiller's approach is
consistent with the proper use of the Ibbotson tables. The
Ibbotson tables were based on important research in 1981
by Rolf Banz, who found an empirical relationship between
the market value of stocks and higher rates of return. 165
Put differently, the Ibbotson tables look at the statistical
relationship between market capitalization and equity size
premium. The Gordian Experts failed to present a convincing
explanation as to why their use of a different metric—
enterprise value—more accurately reflects the correlation that
the equity size premium attempts to reflect.
While some studies—notably the Duff & Phelps Risk
Premium Report 166 —use a metric other than the market
value of equity, Respondent's expert chose to use Ibbotson's
Valuation Yearbook. In doing so, they effectively embraced
the view that there is a relationship between market
capitalization and rate of return.
Finally, the Gordian Experts' exclusion of cash is
counterintuitive. The Ibbotson tables are based on the insight
that smaller companies are more risky than larger companies.
The Gordian Experts' exclusion of cash decreases the “size”
of the company involved, thereby increasing its equity size
premium. Here, that would mean that Cogent would be more
risky as a result of its cash reserves. Intuitively, however, one
would expect that, all other things being equal, having cash
reserves, as opposed to debt, would decrease the riskiness of
a company.
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For all of these reasons, I adopt Bailey's selection of an equity
size premium of 1.73%.
e. Calculating Cogent's WACC
As previously discussed, the equation for CAPM is:
KE = RF + (β × RERP ) + RESP
Inputting my conclusions as to the risk-free rate, beta, equity
risk premium, and equity size premium into that equation
yields:
KE = 2.96 + (1.397 × 5.2) + 1.73 =
11.954%
Based on Cogent's capital structure of 100% equity, Cogent's
WACC would equal its cost of equity, or 11.954%.
f. The present value of Cogent's
unlevered free cash flows
Using the WACC of 11.954%, the following table represents
the present value (“PV”), as of the Merger date, of Cogent's
five-year projected unlevered free cash flows:
*21  Tabular or Graphical Material not
displayable at this time
The sum of the present value of the cash flows for 2010–2015
is $42 million.
3. Terminal value
“In a DCF analysis, future cash flows are projected for each
year during a set period, typically five years. After that time,
a terminal value is calculated to predict the company's cash
flow into perpetuity.” 167  “The two established methods for
computing terminal value are the exit multiples model (a
market approach) and the growth in perpetuity model [i.e., the
Gordon Growth Model].” 168  “Both approaches have been
accepted by this court in the past.” 169
Both Bailey and the Gordian Experts estimated the terminal
value of Cogent based on the perpetuity growth model or the
Gordon Growth Model. The Gordian Experts also used an exit
multiples approach that estimated a terminal value based on
the multiples of enterprise value to estimated forward 2011
EBITDA for the set of comparable companies. 170
a. The Gordon Growth Model
The Gordon Growth Model can be expressed as follows 171 :
TV = FCFt+1 /WACC - g
TV = Terminal value
FCFt+1 = Free cash flow in the first year after the explicit
forecast period
WACC = Weighted average cost of capital
g = Expected growth rate of free cash flow into perpetuity
To calculate terminal value using the Gordon Growth Model,
the Court must select a long-term growth rate, i.e., the
expected growth rate of free cash flows into perpetuity. “A
viable company should grow at least at the rate of inflation
and ... the rate of inflation is the floor for a terminal value
estimate for a solidly profitable company that does not have
an identifiable risk of insolvency.” 172  But, a terminal growth
rate should not be greater than the nominal growth rate for the
United States economy, because “[i]f a company is assumed
to grow at a higher rate indefinitely, its cash flow would
eventually exceed America's [gross national product].” 173
Relying on historical GDP and inflation data, economic
analysts projections, and the growth prospects of the
biometrics industry, Bailey selected a perpetuity growth rate
of 4.5%. 174  The Gordian Experts, on the other hand, used
a range of growth rates between 2% and 5%, and implicitly
selected the midpoint of 3.5%. 175  The Gordian Experts,
however, provided no analysis or explanation in support
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of the number they chose for the terminal growth rate. 176
Because Bailey was the only expert who sought to justify
his conclusion, and his conclusion is within the range of
rates identified by Respondent's expert and appears to be
reasonable based on the evidence, I adopt Bailey's estimate of
a 4.5% perpetuity growth rate.
*22  The parties also disagree as to whether the Court should
use a two-stage or a three-stage DCF model. The Gordian
Experts used a two-stage model whereby, at the end of the
management projections in 2015, they estimated a single
percentage figure that they would use as a proxy for Cogent's
perpetual rate of growth beyond that period. Bailey, on the
other hand, “gradually step[ped] down Cogent's growth rate
using a linear progression over the period from 2016 through
the terminal year, 2021,” before applying his terminal growth
percentage. 177
“As a general matter, neither approach is inherently
preferable.” 178  Damodaran notes, however, that the two-
stage model “is best suited for firms that are in high growth
and expect to maintain that growth rate for a specific
time period, after which the sources of the high growth
are expected to disappear.” 179  Damodaran provides two
examples where this might apply:
One scenario ... is when a company has patent rights to
a very profitable product for the next few years and is
expected to enjoy supernormal growth during this period.
Once the patent expires, it is expected to settle back into
stable growth. Another scenario where it may be reasonable
to make this assumption about growth is when a firm is in
an industry that is enjoying super-normal growth, because
there are significant barriers to entry (either legal or as a
consequence of infrastructure requirements), which can be
expected to keep new entrants out for several years. 180
The three-stage model, on the other hand, “is the most general
of the models because it does not impose any restrictions
on the payout ratio. This model assumes an initial period of
stable high growth, a second period of declining growth, and
a third period of stable low growth that lasts forever.” 181
Damodaran notes that the three-stage model is best suited
“for a firm whose earnings are growing at very high rates,
are expected to continue growing at those rates for an initial
period, but are expected to start declining gradually toward
a stable rate as the firm become[s] large and loses its
competitive advantages.” 182
Based on my assumptions, Cogent's earnings are expected to
grow at a high rate of 11.45% for the initial period before
moving to a stable growth rate of 4.5%. 183  I expect that
decline will occur gradually as Cogent loses its competitive
advantages in the field. Cogent is not in an industry where
there are significant barriers that will disappear after 2015.
Nor does Respondent identify any other reason to assume
a precipitous drop-off. Accordingly, I believe that Bailey's
three-stage model best reflects Cogent's expected growth over
time and adopt that approach.
The following table represents my calculation of Cogent's
unlevered free cash flow for the years 2016 through 2021,
using a linear progression to step Cogent's growth rate down
to 4.5% in 2021:
Tabular or Graphical Material not
displayable at this time
Discounting those values back to the Merger Date using the
WACC of 11.954% yields the following values:
Tabular or Graphical Material not
displayable at this time
Thus, the sum of the present values of the cash flows for
2016–2020 is $111.5 million.
*23  Finally, using in the Gordon Growth Model equation
for the third and final period, a WACC of 11.954%, a
perpetuity growth rate of 4.5%, and free cash flows in 2021
of $64.4 million, I calculated Cogent's terminal value to be
approximately $864 million. 184  Discounting that value using
a WACC of 11.954% leads to a present value of the terminal
value of $276.7 million.
b. EBITDA multiples
“Multiples approaches assume that a company will be worth
some multiple of future earnings or book value in the
continuing period.” 185  “[A] good industry comparison is
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crucial if a multiplier methodology is employed.” 186  Here,
the Gordian Experts selected a terminal EBITDA multiple
range of 6.5x to 8.5x using the companies in their comparable
companies analysis. Petitioners seek to exclude Respondent's
terminal multiples approach for many of the same reasons
they asserted in opposition to Respondent's other market
approaches. I agree with Petitioners' objections.
As discussed in Part II.C.1 supra, the comparable companies
selected by the Gordian Experts are not sufficiently
comparable to Cogent to support a reliable analysis and do not
provide a good industry comparison. There are also serious
evidentiary problems with Schiller's trial testimony on this
subject. 187  As with the EBITDA multiples analysis of the
comparable companies, here only four of the purportedly
comparable companies have data from which to calculate an
equity value to estimated forward EBITDA ratio. 188
Furthermore, Owsley's report on this issue is internally
inconsistent. At one point, the report states that its range
of 6.5x to 8.5x is “based on ... 1st and 3rd quartile 2011
EBITDA multiples.” 189  Elsewhere, the report indicates that
the 1st and 3rd quartile 2011 EBITDA multiples were actually
7.5x to 9.8x. 190  At trial, Schiller defended the selection of
multiples reflected in Owsley's report and described them as
a “judgment call” or an “educated estimate based on what
historical multiples have been adjusted for the sense that
growth will have slowed to something much closer to GDP
growth by that time.” 191  Beyond that, however, the Gordian
Experts did not provide any authorities or analysis to justify
their use of an EBITDA multiples approach to determine
terminal value.
For these reasons, I reject Respondent's use of terminal
EBITDA multiples and instead rely solely on the Gordon
Growth Model for my determination of terminal value.
4. DCF Valuation
The following table represents the Court's calculation of the
valuation of Cogent using essentially Bailey's model, the
aforementioned assumptions, and Cogent's cash balance of
$533.2 million as of September 30, 2010 192 :
($ millions)
 
























In sum, the equity value of Cogent as of the Merger Date was
approximately $963.4 million. Assuming shares outstanding
of approximately 88.6 million, 193  the price per share would
be $10.87. 194
E. Are Petitioners Entitled to
Statutory Interest at the Legal Rate?
*24  Section 262(h) of the Delaware appraisal statute
provides:
Unless the Court in its discretion
determines otherwise for good cause
shown, interest from the effective
date of the merger through the date
of payment of the judgment shall
be compounded quarterly and shall
accrue at 5% over the Federal Reserve
discount rate (including any surcharge)
as established from time to time during
the period between the effective date
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of the merger and the date of payment
of the judgment. 195
Nevertheless, “[a]dopting a different rate may be justified
where it is necessary to avoid an inequitable result, such as
where there has been improper delay or a bad faith assertion
of valuation claims.” 196
Here, Respondent argues that this Court should not apply the
statutory rate of interest because: (1) awarding prejudgment
interest to shareholders who acquired shares after the
announcement of the acquisition would be an inequitable
result; and (2) Petitioners improperly delayed the resolution
of this action.
1. Petitioners' post-merger acquisition of shares
3M Cogent emphasizes that Petitioners acquired shares
after the Merger was announced. In such circumstances,
Respondent contends, it would be inequitable to award
interest at the legal rate because Delaware law disfavors the
purchase of a lawsuit and statutory interest is not intended to
benefit purchasers of after-acquired shares.
In Salomon Brothers Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 197  this
Court addressed whether one who purchases stock after notice
of a transaction is entitled to seek appraisal pursuant to 8 Del.
C. § 262. The Court stated:
I find nothing in the purpose
or language of § 262 that
would defeat [petitioner's] entitlement
to an appraisal and I find
nothing inequitable about an investor
purchasing stock in a company after
a merger has been announced with
the thought that, if the merger is
consummated on the announced terms,
the investor may seek appraisal. 198
In other words, Delaware law does not disfavor the purchase
of shares after the announcement of a merger. Indeed, after
the trial in Salomon Brothers, the Court awarded an 11%
rate of interest to the petitioner. 199  As 3M Cogent correctly
notes, however, the Court in Salomon Brothers did not address
whether any reduction or elimination of prejudgment interest
might be appropriate.
In support of denying Petitioners an award of statutory
interest, Respondent avers that statutory interest was not
intended to compensate shareholders who acquired their
shares after the merger was announced. In Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 200  for example, the Delaware Supreme
Court stated that “[t]he underlying assumption in an appraisal
valuation is that the dissenting shareholders would be willing
to maintain their investment position had the merger not
occurred.” 201  In the same vein, Respondent relies on cases
that have recognized that the appraisal right was intended to
protect “stockholders—who by reason of the statute lost their
common law right to prevent a merger—by providing for the
appraisement of their stock and the payment to them of the
full value thereof in money.” 202
*25  I am mindful, however, that statutory interest also
serves to avoid an undeserved windfall to the respondent
in an appraisal action, who “would otherwise have had free
use of money rightfully belonging to” the petitioners. 203
Even though a respondent may have been cash-rich, “the
[respondent] derived a benefit from having the use of the
[petitioners'] funds at no cost.” 204
In sum, the plain language of the appraisal statute calls for
the payment of statutory interest unless the Court determines
otherwise for good cause shown. Respondent, 3M Cogent,
has not shown that it would be inequitable for Petitioners to
receive the legal rate of interest for shares acquired after the
merger. 205
2. Petitioners' purported “delay”
Respondent next argues that the Court should refuse to
award any interest for the period from April 28, 2011 to
February 2, 2012 because Petitioners unreasonably delayed
in prosecuting their case. Specifically, Respondent complains
that Petitioners failed to respond in a timely manner to certain
discovery requests, as well as to an inquiry by Respondent as
to whether Petitioners intended to proceed with this case.
- 443 - 
Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2013)
2013 WL 3793896
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 18
Petitioners counter that Respondent cannot complain about
Petitioners' purported delay because Respondent itself failed
to move with alacrity. On November 11, 2011, Petitioners
proposed a schedule that called for a trial in April 2012.
Notably, Respondent counter-offered, seeking a much later,
October 2012 trial date. In January 2012, after extensive
back-and-forth, I entered a stipulated scheduling order setting
the trial for September 5 through 7, 2012. As a result of
Owsley's unforeseen unavailability for medical reasons, I
later postponed the trial until late November 2012.
For a case of this size and complexity, the trial was
completed within a reasonable time period. 206  Even with
some excusable delay, the trial was conducted within 20
months of the initial petition. Accordingly, I find that
Respondent has not shown any unreasonable or improper
delay and, therefore, deny Respondent's request to limit the
award of interest on that basis.
III. CONCLUSION
*26  For the reasons discussed in this Memorandum Opinion,
I find that the fair value of Cogent as of December 1, 2010
was $963.4 million or $10.87 per share.
The parties should confer to verify that the Court accurately
has calculated Cogent's value based on the rulings herein and,
assuming that it has, present a final judgment using an amount
of $10.87 per share of Cogent, plus interest from December
1, 2010 to the date of the judgment at the statutory rate,
compounded quarterly. Petitioners shall submit, on notice,
a proposed form of final judgment within ten (10) business
days.
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that at least one of Cogent's stock option plans was a non-qualified plan. See JX 10 at 55.
113 See Conrad Ciccotello, C. Terry Grant & Gerry Grant, Impact of Employee Stock Options on Cash Flow, 60
Fin. Analysts J. 2, 39 (Mar.–Apr. 2004) (“Exercise of [non-qualified stock options] actually increases operating
cash flows.”).
114 JX 1 at 14 n.40 (quoting Aswath Damodaran, From revenues to earnings: Operating,
financing and capital expenses...., Musings on Markets (June 15, 2011), available at http://
aswathdamodaran.blogspot.com/2011/06/from-revenues-to-earnings-operating.html).
115 JX 4 at 24–25.
116 See Tr. 175–76 (Bailey).
117 Gholl v. Emachines, Inc., 2004 WL 2847865, at *14 n.97 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2004) (citing Shannon Pratt,
The Lawyer's Business Valuation Handbook 422 (2000)), aff'd,875 A.2d 632, 2005 WL 1413205 (Del.2005)
(ORDER).
118 Resp't's Answering Br. 26.
119 Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart & David Wessels, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies
137–40 (5th ed. 2010) (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter Koller et al., Valuation].
120 Tr. 614—15 (Schiller). In fact, Schiller admitted that he did not consult any treatises in determining what
accounts needed to be adjusted. Id.
121 This Court has relied on the fifth edition of Valuation in at least two other cases. SeeIn re Orchard Enters.,
Inc., 2012 WL 2923305, at *9 n.60, *17 n.111, & *19 n.122 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2013); Global GT LP v. Golden
Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 513 nn.91 & 94 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff'd,11 A.3d 214 (Del.2010). The Court also has
relied on other editions of Valuation.SeeRegal Entm't Gp. v. Amaranth LLC, 894 A.2d 1104, 1110 (Del. Ch.
2006). Respondent criticizes Petitioners for not offering that treatise into evidence or submitting it with their
papers. In an effort to reach the correct result, however, this Court regularly relies on authoritative treatises
that were not entered into evidence. SeeDuPont DCV Hldgs., Inc. v. ConAgra, Inc., 889 A.2d 954, 962 n.14
(Del. 2005) (“The Sellers argue that Mr. Freund's book cannot be relied on as persuasive authority, because
case law precludes Delaware courts from relying on books or treatises that are not introduced into evidence.
However, the cases the Sellers cite stand for the proposition that courts cannot rely on medical books not
placed into evidence. As the Buyer correctly notes, Mr. Freund's book has been relied on by this Court and
the Court of Chancery as secondary persuasive authority on several occasions.” (citation omitted)).
- 449 - 
Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2013)
2013 WL 3793896
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 24
122 In calculating Cogent's fourth quarter cash flows, Bailey “subtract[ed] Cogent's year-to-date financial metrics
from its 2010 projections to arrive at its 2010 cash flows for the valuation model.” JX 2 at 63.
123 SeeGholl v. Emachines, Inc., 2004 WL 2847865, at *12 n.79; Lane v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc.,
2004 WL 1752847, at *30 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2004).
124 I have not adjusted Cogent's forward capital structure because it has such a strong cash position and a
proven ability to generate significant positive cash flows.
125 SeeCede & Co. v. JRC Acq. Corp., 2004 WL 286963, at *8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004) (“Under CAPM the cost
of equity is equal to the risk-free rate (the yield on 20 year Treasury bonds) plus a large company equity risk
premium multiplied by the specific company adjusted beta.... Added to this figure is an equity size premium.”).
126 See JX 1 app. I n.4; JX 2 at 47–48; United States Department of the Treasury, Daily
Treasury Yield Curve Rates, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/
Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yieldYear&year=2010 (last visited May 16, 2013).
127 See JX 2 at 48 (Bailey's Rep.: “[T]he 10–year or 20–year Treasury bond yield is used as the risk-free rate of
return.”); Tr. 564–55 (Schiller) (“Q. Risk-free rate of return. You used the yield on the U.S. treasury ten-year
bond, as of December 1, 2010, came up with 2.95 percent. Mr. Bailey used the 20–year bond and reached
actually a higher rate, 3.8 percent. Is that a judgment call or is there something to disagree with there? A.
It's a judgment call.”).
128 See, e.g.,Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., 2012 WL 1569818, at *9 n.61 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012) (applying 20–
year risk-free rate); Cede & Co., Inc. v. MedPointe Healthcare, Inc., 2004 WL 2093967, at *18 (Del. Ch. Sept.
10, 2004) (“[U]sing the 20–year Treasury rate is more reasonable under the circumstances and in keeping
with the accepted practice.”); JRC Acq. Corp.,2004 WL 286963, at *8 (“Under CAPM the cost of equity is
equal to the risk-free rate (the yield on 20 year Treasury bonds)....”).
129 See Aswath Damodaran, The Dark Side of Valuation 149 (2d ed. 2010); Aswath Damodaran, What Is the
Riskfree Rate? A Search for the Basic Building Blocks, at 10 (Dec. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/papers/riskfreerate.pdf (“[T]his would lead to use [of] the 10–
year treasury bond rate as the riskfree rate on all cash flows for most mature firms.”). But cf. id. at 9–10 (“The
duration of equity will rise for higher growth firms and could be as high as 20–25 years for young firms with
negative cash flows in the initial years. In valuing these firms, an argument can be made that we should be
using a 30–year treasury bond rate as the riskfree rate.”).
130 Koller et al., Valuation, supra note 119, at 236–38 (“For U.S.-based corporate valuation, the most common
proxy is 10–year government STRIPS.”). But see Shannon Pratt & Alina Niculita, The Lawyer's Business
Valuation Handbook 24–25 (2d ed. 2010) (“As noted earlier, the risk-free rate usually is a yield-to-maturity
rate available on U.S. Treasury securities as of the effective valuation date. Analysts usually use one of three
maturities: 30–day, five-year, or 20–year. These maturities are used because they are the maturities for which
[Ibbotson] has developed matching general equity risk premium series.... Analysts generally prefer the 20–
year maturity. They recognize that it has an element of risk called horizon risk, or interest rate risk, meaning
that the value of the principal will fluctuate with changing levels of interest rates, but investors generally
accept this risk. The longer rates are preferable partly because they are more stable over time and less
subject to short-term influences. Also, the longer maturity more closely matches the assumed long life of
most businesses.”).
131 Eugene Brigham & Michael Ehrhardt, Financial Management 347 (12th ed. 2008).
132 Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 521 (Del. Ch. 2010).
133 Id.
134 JX 1 app. I; JX 2 at 54.
135 JX 1 app. I; JX 2 at 51. At his deposition and at trial, Schiller corrected an erroneous statement in Owsley's
report that beta was calculated on a monthly basis for five years. In particular, Owsley's report conflicted with
the appendix, which stated that beta was calculated on a weekly basis for two-years. JX 179 at 22–24.
136 Because the selection of adjusted versus raw beta is intertwined with the cash adjustment issue, I defer
discussion of that aspect of the beta dispute until later in this section.
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137 JX 2 at 51.
138 Shannon Pratt & Roger Grabowski, Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples 203 (4th ed. 2010).
139 See Pet'rs' Opening Br. 29 (“[T]he beta for cash should be zero.”); Resp't's Answering Br. 32 (stating that
Cogent's cash should have a beta of zero).
140 See JX 2 at 52–54 (multiplying average ending day price by average outstanding shares during the period).
141 Id. at 53.
142 Pratt & Grabowski, supra note 138, at 203.
143 This $50 million number is based on management's projections, which assumed a “minimum cash balance” of
$50 million for the years 2010–2015. See JX 1 at 60. Credit Suisse adopted that assumption in the preparation
of its financial analysis regarding the Merger. See JX 122 at 32 n.4. Finally, an examination of Cogent's
historical cash balance shows that of the $533.2 million in cash and cash equivalents only $32.99 million was
actual cash, with the other approximately $500.2 million being in either short term or long term investments
in marketable securities. See JX 3 at 43; JX 153 at 3, 9.
144 $533.2 million - $50 million = $483.2 million.
145 $868.7 million - 483.2 million = $385.5 million.
146 ($868.7 million / $385.5 million) = 2.253.
147 Marshall E. Blume, On the Assessment of Risk, 26 J. Fin. 1, 10 (1971); see also Pratt & Grabowski, supra
note 138, at 167.
148 See Pratt & Grabowski, supra note 138, at 203 (“An alternative adjustment that is used by Bloomberg and
Value Line adjusts the historical beta to a “forward” estimated beta by averaging the historical beta estimate
by two-thirds and the market beta of 1.0 by one-third.”); Koller et al., Valuation, supra note 119, at 253 (“For
well-defined industries, an industry beta will suffice. But if few direct comparables exist, an alternative is beta
smoothing.”).
149 #COGT = (# x 1) + (
2 /3 x 1.595) = 1.397.
150 JX 2 at 55–56.
151 JX 1 app. I.
152 JX 2 at 55–56.
153 JX 1 app. I.
154 Tr. 630 (Schiller) (“Q. Your equity risk premium used a rate of 5 percent; right? A. Yes. Q. Your report doesn't
explain how ... that [equity risk premium] was calculated, does it? A. No, it does not. Q. It doesn't explain
whether it's a historic equity risk premium or a supply-side equity risk premium, does it? A. No. Q. Do you
know which one it is? A. I'm not familiar with those analyses. The stuff I've seen does not draw a distinction
between those two.”).
155 Selection of a supply-side equity risk premium is consistent with prior decisions by this Court. See, e.g.,
In re Orchard Enters., Inc., 2012 WL 2923305, at *19 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012) (“I therefore find that the
Ibbotson Yearbook's supply-side equity risk premium of 5.2% is an appropriate metric to be applied in valuing
Orchard under the CAPM.”); Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., 2012 WL 1569818, at *10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012)
(“[A]lthough experts and this Court traditionally have applied the historical equity risk premium, the academic
community in recent years has gravitated toward greater support for utilizing the supply side equity risk
premium.”); Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 517 (Del. Ch. 2010) (referring to the Court's
adoption of a supply-side equity risk premium, the Court stated “when the relevant professional community
has mined additional data and pondered the reliability of past practice and come, by a healthy weight of
reasoned opinion, to believe that a different practice should become the norm, this court's duty is to recognize
that practice if, in the court's lay estimate, the practice is the most reliable available for use in an appraisal”).
156 Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., 2012 WL 1569818, at *10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012).
157 In re Orchard Enters., Inc., 2012 WL 2923305, at *21.
158 JX 1 at 29; JX 2 at 57, 84 n.6.
159 JX 2 at 57; Ibbotson SBBI, 2010 Valuation Yearbook, Market Results for Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation
1926–2009. Cogent's market capitalization at the time of the Merger was approximately $931 million.
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160 Ibbotson SBBI, 2010 Valuation Yearbook, Market Results for Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation 1926–2009.
161 See, e.g., Pratt & Grabowski, supra note 138, at 233 (“Morningstar, Inc. [the parent of Ibbotson], segregates
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stock returns into deciles by size, as measured by the aggregate market
value of common equity.” (emphasis added)); id. at 240 (“Traditionally, researchers have used market value
of equity as a measure of size in conducting historical rates of return research. For instance, this is the
basis of the small-company return series published in the SBBI Yearbooks.” (emphasis added)); James
R. Hitchner, Financial Valuation: Applications and Models 247 (3d ed. 2011) (noting that in the Valuation
Yearbook “Ibbotson presents index-based returns weighted on the market capitalization of each stock”).
162 See, e.g.,In re Orchard Enters., Inc., 2012 WL 2923305, at *21 (“The Ibbotson Yearbook divides the stock
returns of public companies into deciles by size, measured by the aggregate market value of the companies'
common equity.” (emphasis added)); Cede & Co. v. JRC Acq. Corp.,2004 WL 286963, at *8 (Del. Ch. Feb.
10, 2004) (selecting “market capitalization” as the benchmark over “fair value implied market capitalization”);
In re Sunbelt Beverage Corp. S'holder Litig., 2010 WL 26539, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2010) (“The Ibbotson
table assumes one already knows or has an estimate of a company's market capitalization. Based on
that knowledge or estimate, one can determine which decile the company falls into and then select the
corresponding premium from the Ibbotson table.”).
163 Tr. 565 (Schiller). Schiller also admitted that he was “not aware of any authority” that says that when looking
at a company's market capitalization, it's appropriate to adjust it based on its cash. Id. at 631.
164 Id. at 566.
165 See Tr. 201 (Bailey) (“Those tables were developed all from seminal work that was done by Professor Rolf
Banz back in 1981, in which Professor Banz did a seminal paper on adjusting the risk value of a company
based upon the market value of the company.”); Rolf Banz, The Relationship Between Returns and Market
Value of Common Stock, 9 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (1981) (“The results show that, in the 1936–1975 period, the
common stock of small firms had, on average, higher risk-adjusted returns than the common stock of large
firms.”).
166 See Duff & Phelps, Risk Premium Report 2013 (18th ed. 2013).
167 Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 511 (Del. Ch. 2010).
168 Gholl v. Emachines, Inc., 2004 WL 2847865, at *13 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2004).
169 Id.
170 JX 1 at 32.
171 Pratt & Grabowski, supra note 138, at 30–34.
172 SeeGolden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d at 511; see alsoLane v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 2004 WL
1752847, at *31 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2004) (“I find [the] assumption that no growth would occur beyond the
projected five-year period unreasonable; it must be assumed that [the company] would continue to grow at
least at the rate of inflation.”).
173 Bradford Cornell, Corporate Valuation: Tools for Effective Appraisal and Decision Making 146–47 (1993).
174 JX 2 at 58–60 (citing Ian Wyatt & Kathryn Byun, The U.S. Economy to 2018: From Recession to Recovery,
Monthly Labor Review (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2009/11/art2full.pdf; Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, The Livingston Survey (2010), available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/
research-and-data/real-time-center/livingston-survey/2010/livdec10.pdf).
175 JX 1 at 31–33, 50, 86.
176 Tr. 635–36 (Schiller) (“Q. And you don't have any specific explanation as to why the growth rate drops from
9.2 percent to 2 to 5 percent, do you? A. No.... Q. ... [Y]ou don't provide any analysis in connection with the
opinion that you're offering to the Court as to what GDP would be in the future, do you? A. No, we don't. Q.
And you didn't consult any authorities as to what terminal growth rate should be in 2015 or beyond, do you?
A. No. We see these numbers often, but we didn't consult any authorities, no.”).
177 JX 2 at 20.
178 Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005 WL 2045640, at *12 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005).
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179 Aswath Damodaran, Investment Valuation: Tools and Techniques for Determining the Value of Any Asset
329 (3d ed. 2012).
180 Id. at 331.
181 Id. at 340.
182 Id. at 342.
183 Using management's projections, Bailey calculated a CAGR of 11.45% for the period 2009 through 2015.
JX 2 at 21.
184 $64.4 /11.954% - 4.5 % = ~$864
185 Koller et al., Valuation, supra note 119, at 227.
186 Crescent/Mach I P'ship, L.P. v. Turner, 2007 WL 2801387, at *14 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007).
187 See supra Part II.C.3.
188 JX 1 at 44, 74.
189 Id. at 86 n.1.
190 Id. at 44.
191 Tr. 580, 636–37.
192 See JX 3 at 43; JX 153 at 3, 9.
193 There were 88.616 million shares issued and outstanding as of November 2, 2012. See JX 157 at 2.
194 $963.4 /88.6 = $10.87
195 8 Del. C. § 262(h); see alsoid. § 262(i) (“The Court shall direct the payment of the fair value of the shares,
together with interest, if any.”).
196 In re Appraisal of Metromedia Int'l Gp., Inc., 971 A.2d 893, 907 (Del. Ch. 2009).
197 576 A.2d 650 (Del. Ch. 1989), appeal refused,571 A.2d 787, 1990 WL 18152 (Del. 1990) (ORDER).
198 Id. at 654.
199 Solomon Bros. Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 1992 WL 94367, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 4, 1992).
200 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996).
201 Id. at 298 (citing Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1145 (Del. 1989)).
202 Schenley Indus., Inc. v. Curtis, 152 A.2d 300, 301 (Del.1959) (citing Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452,
455 (Del. Ch.1934)).
203 Lane v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 2004 WL 1752847, at *36 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2004); see
alsoGholl v. Emachines, Inc., 2004 WL 2847865, at *18 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2004) (“An award of interest
serves two purposes. It compensates the petitioner for the loss of use of its capital during the pendency of
the appraisal process and causes the disgorgement of the benefit respondent has enjoyed during the same
period.” (emphasis added)).
204 Ryan v. Tad's Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 682, 705 (Del. Ch. 1996), aff'd,693 A.2d 1082, 1997 WL 188351 (Del.
1997) (ORDER).
205 In a footnote, Respondent argues that in the current interest rate environment—where the statutory rate of
interest is more than seven times the federal discount rate—Petitioners have distorted incentives to seek
appraisal. There are risks to both sides in an appraisal proceeding, however, and the applicable interest rate
is only one of them. Moreover, “[i]t is beyond the province of courts to question the policy or wisdom of an
otherwise valid law. Rather, [I] must take and apply the law as [I] find it, leaving any desirable changes to the
General Assembly.” Sheehan v. Oblates of St. Francis de Sales, 15 A.3d 1247, 1259 (Del. 2011).
206 SeeIn re Appraisal of Metromedia Int'l Gp., Inc., 971 A.2d 893, 907 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“For example, petitioners
cannot point to unreasonable or improper delay, as this matter was tried before the Court roughly one year
after the first appraisal petition was filed, a remarkably short period of time by appraisal litigation standards.”).
Although the Court is working to reduce the average time to trial in the future, recent appraisal actions have
taken longer than this case. See, e.g.,Towerview LLC v. Cox Radio, Inc., 2013 WL 3316186 (Del. Ch. June
28, 2013) (39 months to trial); Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34 (Del. Ch. 2007) (30
months to trial).
- 453 - 
Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2013)
2013 WL 3793896
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 28
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
- 454 - 
S. Muoio & Co. LLC v. Hallmark Entertainment Investments Co., Not Reported in A.3d...
2011 WL 863007
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
2011 WL 863007
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.
Court of Chancery of Delaware.
S. MUOIO & CO. LLC, on behalf of itself
and the class and derivatively on behalf
of Crown Media Holdings, Inc., Plaintiff,
v.
HALLMARK ENTERTAINMENT INVESTMENTS
CO., a Delaware corporation, Hallmark
Entertainment Holdings, Inc., a Delaware
corporation, H C Crown Corp., a Delaware
corporation, H.A., Inc., a Delaware corporation,
Hallmark Cards, Inc., a Missouri corporation,
William J. Abbott, Dwight C. Arn, William
Cella, Glenn Curtis, Steve Doyal, Brian E.
Gardner, Herbert A. Granath, David E. Hall,
Donald J. Hall, Jr., Irvine O. Hockaday,
Jr., A. Drue Jennings, Peter A. Lund, Brad
R. Moore, Deanne R. Stedem, Defendants,
and
Crown Media Holdings, Inc., a Delaware
corporation, Nominal Defendant.
Civil Action No. 4729–CC.
|
Submitted: Dec. 31, 2010.
|
Decided: March 9, 2011.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Kevin G. Abrams, T. Brad Davey and Matthew F. Davis, of
Abrams & Bayliss LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; of Counsel:
Harvey Kurzweil, James P. Smith III and Corinne D. Levy,
of Dewey & Leboeuf LLP, New York, New York, Attorneys
for Plaintiff.
Martin P. Tully, Jon E. Abramczyk, Leslie A. Polizoti,
Pauletta J. Brown and Ryan J. Greecher, of Morris, Nichols,
Arsht & Tunnell LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for
Defendants Dwight C. Arn, Steve Doyal, Brian E. Gardner,
David E. Hall, Donald J. Hall, Jr., Irvine O. Hockaday, Jr.,
Brad R. Moore, Deanne R. Stedem, Hallmark Entertainment
Holdings, Inc., H C Crown Corp., H.A., Inc., and Hallmark
Cards, Inc.
Gregory P. Williams, Thomas A. Beck, Brock E. Czeschin
and Blake Rohrbacher, of Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A.,
Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendants Herbert A.
Granath, A. Drue Jennings, and Peter A. Lund.
Kurt M. Heyman, Patricia L. Enerio and Dominick T. Gattuso,
of Proctor Heyman LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys
for Nominal Defendant Crown Media Holdings, Inc. and
Defendants William Abbott, William Cella, and Glenn Curtis.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CHANDLER, Chancellor.
*1  This action challenges the fairness of the June 29, 2010
recapitalization (the “Recapitalization”) of Crown Media
Holdings, Inc. (“Crown” or the “Company”) orchestrated
by Crown's controlling stockholder and primary debt
holder, Hallmark Cards, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively
“Hallmark”). 1  For years, Crown was unable to make its debt
payments, and was forced to obtain extensions on the debt
from Hallmark. In the Recapitalization, Hallmark exchanged
its Crown debt for an increased percentage of Crown's Class A
common stock, new preferred stock and a new and far smaller
amount of debt with longer maturities, thereby permitting
Crown to avoid a debt default and bankruptcy.
Hallmark initially proposed a recapitalization on May
28, 2009. Crown's board immediately created a Special
Committee to consider the proposed recapitalization. Before
the Special Committee could even consider the proposed
recapitalization, S. Muoio & Co. LLC (a Crown stockholder)
filed this action on July 13, 2009, seeking to enjoin
the proposed transaction. The parties agreed to a stay
of the litigation while the Special Committee considered
Hallmark's proposal. They also agreed that Crown would not
consummate any transaction without providing seven week's
advance written notice to Muoio's counsel of the terms of
the transaction. The parties further stipulated that in the event
Muoio decided to pursue a preliminary injunction against
the transaction, the parties would establish a schedule for its
resolution during the seven week period.
Almost seven months later, on February 9, 2010, Crown
announced that Hallmark and Crown had approved and
executed a non-binding term sheet in connection with the
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Recapitalization. On March 1, 2010, Crown announced
it had entered into a Master Recapitalization Agreement
memorializing the terms of the Recapitalization. After
receiving that notice, however, Muoio eschewed any
preliminary injunction proceedings, and instead filed an
amended and supplemental complaint on March 11, 2010,
dropping its request for injunctive relief and seeking
rescission of the transaction. The Recapitalization closed on
June 29, 2010.
Plaintiff contends that the Recapitalization was consummated
at an unfair price and drastically undervalued Crown. In so
doing, plaintiff asserts that Crown should be valued based
on a discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analysis, and that a
properly conducted DCF analysis establishes that Crown's
stock is worth far more than the Recapitalization, which
is valued at $2.59 per share. Plaintiff also contends that
Hallmark imposed the Recapitalization on the Company
through an unfair process, that the Hallmark-dictated terms
of the new debt and preferred stock are unfair, and that
the Recapitalization unfairly transferred significant value
and voting power from the Crown minority stockholders to
Hallmark. In sum, plaintiff insists that the Recapitalization
substantially undervalued the Company, resulting in an
enormous, unjustified transfer of wealth and voting power
from the Crown minority stockholders to Hallmark, all
through an unfair process that included an ineffective Special
Committee and Hallmark's domination of the negotiation
process.
*2  This case was tried over a four-day period, from
September 21 through September 24, 2010. The parties
concede that the appropriate standard of review is entire
fairness. I have considered the parties' post-trial briefs, and
during trial I assessed the strength and credibility of the
testimony offered by the various witnesses. Ultimately, my
decision turns on the following factual findings: the Crown
board's process was not flawed; the Special Committee was
independent and negotiated at arm's length; and the record
clearly demonstrates that Crown was underwater at the time
of the Recapitalization—that is, it could not pay its debts as
they became due and absent the Recapitalization, default or
bankruptcy seemed inevitable. In addition (as is now quite
common in cases of this nature), the valuation question,
in part, resulted in a battle of the experts—and in this
case, plaintiff's expert lost. His proffered opinion was far
less credible and persuasive than defendants' experts. For
the reasons more fully explained below, I find in favor




Plaintiff Muoio is a New York securities advisory firm and a
holder of Crown's Class A common stock. Salvatore Muoio
is plaintiff's principal owner and manager.
Defendant Hallmark, a Missouri corporation headquartered
in Kansas City, Missouri, is engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of personal expression products. Immediately
before the Recapitalization proposal, Hallmark controlled
approximately 80.1% of Crown's outstanding shares;
following the proposal it now controls approximately 90.3
%. 3
Nominal Defendant Crown is a Delaware corporation with
its principal place of business in Studio City, California.
Crown's revenues are largely tied to advertising revenue,
which in turn is driven by the ratings and demographics of its
cable television channels. Crown competes for both ratings
and key demographics with large media companies that are
able to spread their costs across multiple cable channels.
Crown's board includes the Special Committee defendants
and defendants William J. Abbott, Dwight C. Arn, William
Cella, Glenn Curtis, Steve Doyal, Brian E. Gardner, David
E. Hall, Donald J. Hall, Jr., Irvine O. Hockaday, Jr., Brad R.
Moore, and Deanne R. Stedem.
The Special Committee consists of defendants Herbert A.
Granath, A. Drue Jennings, and Peter A. Lund. Granath
has been a Crown director since December 2004 and has
extensive experience in the broadcast and cable television
industries. He served as the chairman of Disney/ABC
International Television, and he also developed and was
the chairman of several cable networks for ABC, including
ESPN, A & E, the History Channel, and Lifetime. 4  He was
also the chairman of the National Academy of Television Arts
and Sciences and has won several awards for his work in
the industry. 5  Lund has been a Crown director since 2000,
and has extensive experience in the media sector. Lund had
a long career with CBS, serving as president and CEO of
CBS Television and Cable Networks and later, as president
and CEO of CBS Inc. 6  He is also currently a director of
DirecTV. 7  Jennings served for twelve years as the CEO
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of Kansas City Power & Light Company, a publicly traded
company on the New York Stock Exchange. As a prominent
leader in the Kansas City community, Jennings has been
actively involved with several civic associations, including
the Midwest Research Institute and the Bloch Endowment
Fund at the Greater Kansas City Community Foundation. 8
He also served on numerous advisory boards, including
the University of Kansas Medical Center and University of
Kansas Endowment Association. He has been “of counsel”
with the law firm Polsinelli Shughart P.C. since October
2004. 9  Jennings joined the Crown board in 2006 and he is
the chair of Crown's Audit Committee.
B. Crown's Formation and its Debt Crisis
*3  In 1991, Hallmark created the family entertainment
platform that became Crown following a review of its
business units, which also include Crayola and other
family oriented subsidiaries. 10  In the early 1990s, Hallmark
acquired an extensive production library of programming
that was designed to appeal to all ages. In 1998, Hallmark
partnered with the National Interfaith Cable Coalition
(“NICC”) to relaunch the Odyssey Network as a family-
friendly cable network. 11  The network was later renamed
as “Hallmark Channel.” Crown Media Holdings was created
in 2000 to effectuate an initial public offering of Crown,
providing the Company with additional capital to fund its
development.
In January 2001, Crown acquired a library of over 700
original television movies, representing over 3,000 hours
of programming, from a Hallmark subsidiary (the “Library
Transaction”). 12  This programming was used, among other
things, to populate the Hallmark Channel and the Hallmark
Movie Channel. With the Library Transaction, Crown
assumed $220 million of debt and ultimately issued 33.3
million shares of stock to Hallmark. 13  Over the years,
Hallmark supplied Crown with needed capital injections, and
agreed to extend maturities on the debts owed to it by Crown.
By spring 2009, however, Crown owed Hallmark over $1.1
billion in debt. 14  Crown also held a credit revolver with J.P.
Morgan (the “JPM Revolver”) guaranteed by Hallmark, and
it owed $25 million to NICC. 15
C. Crown's Attempts to Find a Buyer
In August 2005, the Crown board formed a special
committee composed of Granath and Lund (the “2005 Special
Committee”) to seek a buyer for the Company and also
consider other alternatives. The 2005 Special Committee
retained independent legal and financial advisors, Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz and Citigroup, to engage in an
extensive sales process involving key players in the cable
industry as well as private equity firms. The object was to help
identify a buyer for Crown. Not a single offer resulted from
the 2005 Special Committee process. Thereafter, Hallmark
itself engaged in discussions with several potential acquirers
or other sources of financing for Crown, but was similarly
unsuccessful. 16
In August 2006, Tim Griffith became Hallmark's interim
CFO and assumed responsibility for the management of
Hallmark's investment in Crown. At this point, Hallmark
held $1 billion of Crown's outstanding debt. 17  Crown's
financial situation was precarious because Crown had never
made a profit and (as stated above) efforts to sell the
Company had failed up to this point. To allow Crown
to continue operating as a going concern, Hallmark had
previously granted Crown a waiver and standstill on its
debt payments. 18  The waiver and standstill agreement was
revisited every quarter, with extensions being effective for
one year from the date Hallmark extended. Without the
waivers and extensions, Crown's auditors would have issued
a going concern qualification on Crown's financial statements
for one simple reason: Crown could not pay interest on its debt
(much less pay the principal of the notes due upon expiration
of the standstill).
*4  In 2006, Crown hired a new CEO, Henry Schleiff,
who was specifically recruited to find a buyer for Crown. 19
Schleiff had successfully sold another cable channel before
joining Crown. Schleiff contacted numerous parties but
ultimately failed to locate a buyer for Crown during his three
year tenure as CEO. In 2007, Schleiff's efforts produced
three prospective buyers: Liberty Media, Time Warner,
and Hearst. 20  Each potential buyer did due diligence and
spoke with management. Liberty Media expressed interest in
Hallmark's stake in Crown, valuing Crown at around $800
million. 21  Liberty Media continued to show its interest,
raising its enterprise value to $1 billion by 2008. 22  In other
words, Liberty Media viewed Crown's enterprise value to be
below the value of Crown's debt. Similarly, Time Warner did
not make an offer, but put an enterprise value on Crown of
$1 billion (again, below the value of its debt). Hearst never
formally made an offer. In 2008 and 2009, Schleiff also turned
up other potential buyers, including CBS, Hasbro, and Fox.
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None made an offer above Crown's debt to Hallmark. Fox
did make a proposal, in which it put the total enterprise value
of Crown at $500 million and which would have required
Hallmark to write off 85% of the Hallmark debt and give
Fox control of the Company. 23  Hallmark was unwilling to
accept those terms. Concurrently, Hallmark extended Crown's
waiver and standstill to May 2010. 24
In sum, despite continuous efforts to shop Crown since 2005,
no potential buyer had placed a value on Crown that exceeded
the Hallmark debt, and the most recent offer for Crown was
$500 million—less than half of its debt to Hallmark. At least
in Hallmark's view, given that refinancing Hallmark's debt
with a third party was impossible, a recapitalization was the
best path forward either to a future refinancing or a future sale.
Although plaintiff disputes this, it appears that Hallmark's
view was that if there was no recapitalization, bankruptcy or
foreclosure were the likely alternatives. 25
D. The Recapitalization Proposal
On May 28, 2009, Hallmark sent the Crown board a
proposal for recapitalizing the Hallmark debt (the “Hallmark
Proposal”). 26  Under the Hallmark Proposal, Hallmark's
equity ownership would increase from 67% to at least 90.1
% (possibly even up to 95%), while its voting power would
increase from 80.1% to 90.3%. 27  The Hallmark Proposal
included restructuring $500 million of principal amount of
the Hallmark debt into a $300 million cash-pay term loan
bearing an annual interest rate of 12% and a $200 million pay-
in-kind term loan with an annual interest rate of 15%, both
maturing on September 30, 2011. 28  The remaining Hallmark
debt, which is about $600 million, would be exchanged for
convertible preferred stock with a liquidation preference of
approximately $640 million and a conversion price of $1.00
per share. 29  Along with this proposal, Hallmark also advised
Crown that it would not continue to extend the waiver and
standstill. Hallmark was neither willing, nor legally obligated,
to invest further in Crown.
E. Creation of the Special Committee
*5  After receiving the Hallmark Proposal, the Crown board
on June 2, 2009, formed the Special Committee, composed of
independent directors Granath, Lund, and Jennings. Jennings
was chosen as chairman of the Special Committee. As
stated above, the Special Committee had two members with
industry experience (Lund and Granath), and its chairman
(Jennings) was a lawyer and former CEO of a publicly traded
utility company. According to the resolutions creating the
Special Committee, the Special Committee was empowered
to “consider such matters as it deems advisable with respect
to the Recapitalization Proposal,” and authorized to “take
such further action, at the Company's expense, as the Special
Committee deems appropriate in order to carry out the
intent and purposes” of the authorizing resolutions. 30  The
resolutions prohibited the Crown board from approving
or authorizing an agreement with respect to the Hallmark
Proposal “without a prior favorable recommendation of the
Recapitalization Proposal or the relevant part thereof by the
Special Committee.” 31
F. Process of the Special Committee
The Special Committee's first task was to select its
independent legal and financial advisor. The Special
Committee retained Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. (“RLF”)
as its independent legal counsel. After receiving presentations
from various firms, the Special Committee retained Morgan
Stanley as its financial advisor. 32  Once Morgan Stanley was
engaged, the Special Committee promptly authorized a press
release announcing the engagement, stating expressly that
the Committee was “considering Hallmark Cards' proposal as
well as the Company's other alternatives .” 33
After being retained by the Special Committee, Morgan
Stanley engaged in extensive due diligence of Crown,
including meetings with Crown's senior management to
discuss the Company's business plans and financial viability.
Morgan Stanley reviewed Crown's current financial condition
and provided the Special Committee with information
regarding comparable companies. Based on its analysis, on
September 11, 2009, Morgan Stanley advised the Special
Committee that it had determined a preliminary value of
Crown of between $500 million and approximately $1 billion,
with a mid-point at approximately $700 to $750 million—less
than the amount Crown owed to Hallmark. 34
Crown management also made presentations to the Special
Committee, updating the Committee on the cable industry
and on Crown's performance in 2008 and 2009. The Special
Committee was informed that the Company's performance
in its key demographic (women age 25 to 54) fell below
expectations and below 2008 results, and Crown's 2009
advertising sales were below 2008 sales by approximately
13% to 15%. 35  In November 2009, Crown's management
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revised the Company's five-year business plan by reducing
the forward-looking projections in light of current market
conditions and Crown's performance. Management discussed
the revised plan with the Special Committee. 36  Before the
Hallmark Proposal, Crown had not been able to meet its
debt service on the Hallmark debt; interest on the debt
alone was more than $100 million per year. 37  As a result,
Crown had been operating under a series of waivers and
extensions since 2006 that deferred nearly all of Crown's
payment obligations—without which waivers Crown would
have defaulted on the Hallmark debt. In short, Crown faced
significant hurdles going forward. To make matters worse, the
cable industry's gradual decline itself added more negative
pressure to Crown's bleak future. 38
*6  The Special Committee knew it had few options.
Those options included: (1) refinancing the Hallmark debt;
(2) pursuing a third-party sale; (3) accepting Hallmark's
Proposal; or (4) negotiating the Hallmark Proposal. The
Special Committee, with advice from Morgan Stanley,
acknowledged that none of those options were optimal, but
the status quo (i.e., doing nothing) was not feasible because
Crown simply could not service its debt burden and would
be unable to satisfy its debts on the maturity dates. 39
Morgan Stanley took the position (and so advised the Special
Committee) that Crown could not refinance the Hallmark debt
with a third party in light of Crown's capital structure and
debt market conditions in 2009. Moreover, given past failed
sales efforts, the Special Committee determined that a third-
party sale was unlikely. 40  The Special Committee reached
this decision based on its own members' extensive industry
experience as well as Morgan Stanley's advice.
Ultimately, the Special Committee determined that, absent
a recapitalization of its debt, Crown faced a potential
bankruptcy. Morgan Stanley advised that Crown's non-
Hallmark stockholders likely would not receive any value
in a bankruptcy proceeding. On the other hand, there were
potential downsides to Hallmark in a bankruptcy, and Morgan
Stanley considered it unlikely that Hallmark wanted to place
Crown into bankruptcy. 41  As stated above, Hallmark, with
its original proposal, had no intention of continuing to extend
the waiver and standstill, and it simply did not want to
invest further in Crown. Likewise, the Special Committee
and Morgan Stanley believed that further extending the debt
waivers and putting off Crown's significant capital structure
issues were not in the best interests of Crown or its minority
stockholders, because the debt owed to Hallmark would
continue to grow. Therefore, the Special Committee decided
not to pursue or to ask for further debt extensions. Given
the potential risks and costs of a bankruptcy, Morgan Stanley
believed Hallmark would be inclined to renegotiate a solution
to the debt issues for Crown; Morgan Stanley also considered
the Hallmark Proposal to have numerous deficiencies. 42  It
was against this background that Morgan Stanley advised the
Special Committee that a go-private transaction was the best
alternative for the non-Hallmark stockholders. In the event
Hallmark would not consider taking Crown private at a fair
price, Morgan Stanley believed the Special Committee should
try to negotiate for better terms in a recapitalization.
G. The Negotiations
Armed with Morgan Stanley's advice favoring a go-private
transaction, the Special Committee approached Hallmark
on this issue. On September 21, 2009, Jennings sent a
letter on the Special Committee's behalf to Don Hall, Jr.,
CEO of Hallmark, proposing a go-private transaction. 43
On September 23, 2009, on behalf of Hallmark, Griffith
responded that Hallmark was not interested in taking Crown
private. 44  After Hallmark rejected the go-private idea, the
Special Committee decided to negotiate the recapitalization.
To this end, it directed Morgan Stanley to meet with
Hallmark's financial advisor, Evercore Partners, to discuss a
counterproposal. The Special Committee's counterproposal
had several goals, including a significant reduction in Crown's
outstanding debt, an extension of Crown's debt maturities, and
an increase in the amount of equity retained by the unaffiliated
stockholders. 45  Morgan Stanley's proposed strategy, which
the Special Committee adopted, was to posit a low number for
Crown's value, give Hallmark new debt equal to that number,
and allow the minority stockholders to share in any upside
from that number.
*7  Morgan Stanley conveyed this counterproposal to
Hallmark through Evercore Partners on October 1, 2009. At a
meeting on October 15, 2009, Evercore Partners conveyed to
Morgan Stanley Hallmark's three concerns about the Special
Committee's counterproposal: (1) Hallmark would not write
off any portion of its $1.1 billion in loans to the Company;
(2) a “majority of the minority” vote condition could not be a
condition to closing; and (3) Crown had to pay off the NICC
debt at par in due course.
Hallmark's October 15 response had a slight change from its
original proposal. As a result, the Special Committee decided
not to bid against itself and refused to engage. As a result of
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this strategy, Hallmark made “a major economic concession”
and gave Morgan Stanley the perception of what could be
the “framework of a negotiated transaction.” 46  Hallmark
eventually submitted a revised proposal that, among other
things, allowed the equity to participate in Crown's value
above $500 million. 47  With that revision in hand, the Special
Committee had achieved one of its important goals. That
is, to the extent the value of Crown was more than $500
million, the minority stockholders' equity would have value.
Hallmark's revised proposal also extended the maturity of the
new debt and guaranteed a revolver in a sufficient amount. 48
Hallmark delivered a further revised term sheet to the Special
Committee on November 27, 2009. 49
Four days later, the Special Committee and Hallmark, along
with their advisors, held a meeting to discuss the open issues
leading up to Hallmark's most recent revised recapitalization
proposal. At that meeting, Hallmark made numerous
concessions, including agreeing to lower the interest rates on
the new Hallmark debt for the first two years; agreeing to
annual cash flow sweeps, 50  as opposed to quarterly sweeps;
and agreeing to use its best efforts to support Crown in
obtaining a $30 million revolver. 51  Hallmark refused to agree
to additional concessions, specifically refusing to agree to:
(1) a transaction after which it would own less than 90%
of Crown; and (2) a transaction subject to a majority-of-the-
minority vote. 52  Hallmark did offer terms for a standstill
agreement in which Hallmark would guarantee a floor, in a
purchase or third-party sale of Crown, of $1.00 per share to
the minority stockholders. 53  The Special Committee rejected
this offer by Hallmark. Despite the fact that the Special
Committee and its advisors walked out of the meeting at that
point, significant progress had been made, and the parties'
advisors continued their discussions, including the terms of a
binding standstill agreement.
H. The Special Committee Retains a Second Financial
Advisor
After the December 1 meeting, based on the advice provided
by Morgan Stanley, the Special Committee directed its
legal advisor, RLF, to submit a revised term sheet to
Evercore Partners setting forth the terms that the Special
Committee would be willing to recommend to the Crown
board. The Special Committee also discussed the possibility
of retaining a second financial advisor to provide additional
guidance on the remaining terms under consideration and,
if appropriate, to render a fairness opinion. The Special
Committee eventually retained Houlihan Lokey as its second
financial advisor to evaluate the Recapitalization and, if
possible, to provide an opinion that the Recapitalization was
fair to Crown from a financial point of view. Houlihan
explained that its analysis would “help bridge the gap between
the Committee's potential finding that the Recapitalization is
fair to the Company's stockholders (other than [Hallmark] )
and the opinion that the Recapitalization is fair to the
Company from a financial point of view.” 54
I. The Special Committee and Hallmark Negotiate a
Standstill Agreement
*8  On December 7, 2009, the Special Committee
determined that it would send a term sheet to Hallmark's
attorneys reflecting the terms the Special Committee was
willing to recommend to the Crown board. Included in
the terms was a stringent standstill agreement which
limited Hallmark's ability to buy or sell Crown's shares. 55
Throughout December 2009 and January 2010, negotiations
continued based on revisions to the Special Committee's
proposed term sheet. The Special Committee and Hallmark
ultimately reached an agreement on the final terms of a
standstill agreement—terms that prohibited Hallmark from
acquiring additional shares of Crown common stock from
the closing date of the recapitalization until December 31,
2013, unless expressly approved by a special committee
of the Crown board composed solely of independent and
disinterested directors. 56  As of January 1, 2012, however,
Hallmark will be able to acquire additional Crown shares if it
pays a $0.50 per share premium to the minority in conjunction
with a third-party sale or if it makes a tender offer for all
of Crown's shares with a majority-of-the-minority tender
condition. 57  The standstill agreement also limits Hallmark's
ability to sell its Crown shares to a third party. 58
J. The Special Committee Approves a Non–Binding Term
Sheet
On February 9, 2010, after consulting with and receiving
advice and recommendations from its advisors, the Special
Committee approved a nonbinding term sheet (the “Final
Term Sheet”), 59  setting forth the basic details of an
agreement on the terms of the Recapitalization. 60  The Final
Term Sheet was publicly filed with the SEC. 61  Morgan
Stanley believed that the Final Term Sheet represented
a better outcome for, and provided more value to, the
minority stockholders than any of the alternatives, including
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the status quo. 62  Houlihan also addressed the Special
Committee during the February 9, 2010 meeting. Houlihan
analyzed how the minority stockholders would fare pre-
recapitalization and post-recapitalization concluding that the
minority stockholders received significant benefits under the
Recapitalization (in the Final Term Sheet), as opposed to the
status quo, in which the minority stockholders would receive
no value for their shares. 63
There were a number of improvements in the Final Term
Sheet as compared to the initial Hallmark Proposal, including:
(1) the minority stockholders will begin to share in Crown's
upside once the value of Crown exceeds $525 million,
compared to $1.168 billion in the initial Hallmark Proposal;
(2) $315 million of post-Recapitalization debt (as compared
to $500 million in the initial Hallmark Proposal), with a
maturity date in December, 2013 (as compared to September,
2011 in the initial Hallmark Proposal); (3) reduced interest
rates on the debt and a higher conversion price on the
preferred stock; (4) inclusion of a $30 million revolver,
guaranteed by Hallmark for the term of the new debt as
compared to no revolver in the initial Hallmark Proposal;
(5) the Standstill Agreement; and (6) annual, rather than
quarterly, cash flow sweeps. 64  As mentioned above, the Final
Term Sheet was publicly disclosed, and the Company never
received any other offers to purchase the Company, even
though it was disclosed as a non-binding term sheet.
K. The Special Committee Approves the Recapitalization
*9  During a February 25–26, 2010 meeting, Morgan Stanley
reconfirmed its earlier advice to the Special Committee that
“it would be impossible to refinance with the Company's
current indebtedness,” and that it “did not think there
would be any return for the equity if the Company was
sold today.” 65  Morgan Stanley did not believe that other
strategic options would even be available to the Company.
Therefore, Morgan Stanley believed that the Recapitalization
was clearly the best option for Crown and recommended
that the Special Committee approve the Recapitalization.
Furthermore, the Special Committee received a fairness
opinion from Houlihan, and Houlihan's analysis indicated that
Crown's equity would have value after the Recapitalization,
as opposed to before the Recapitalization, in which it would
not. 66  Based on its own business judgment and the advice
from its independent legal and financial advisors, including
the recommendation from Morgan Stanley and the fairness
opinion by Houlihan, the Special Committee concluded that
the Recapitalization was in the best interests of Crown and its
minority stockholders, and recommended that the transaction
be approved by the full Crown board. Relying on the Special
Committee's recommendation, the full board approved the
Recapitalization, which closed on June 29, 2010.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review and Burden of Proof
A transaction between a majority stockholder and the
company in which it owns a majority stake is generally
reviewed under the entire fairness standard and the
controlling stockholder (or the party standing on both
sides of the transaction) bears the burden of proof. 67
Given Hallmark's role in the Recapitalization, the applicable
standard of review for this case under Delaware law is
therefore entire fairness. As its name implies, entire fairness
has two components: fair dealing and fair price. These prongs
are not independent and the Court does not focus on each
of them individually. 68  Rather, the Court “determines entire
fairness based on all aspects of the entire transaction.” 69
Fair dealing involves “questions of when the transaction was
timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed
to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the
stockholders were obtained.” 70  Fair price involves questions
of “the economic and financial considerations of the proposed
merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value,
earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect
the intrinsic or inherent value of a company's stock.” 71
“[T]he initial burden of establishing entire fairness rests upon
the party who stands on both sides of the transaction.” 72
If defendant can show that the challenged transaction was
negotiated and approved by “an independent committee of
directors” or an informed majority of the minority, however,
the burden of proof shifts to “the challenging shareholder-
plaintiff.” 73  To determine whether the burden shifts in this
case, I must consider “whether the special committee was
truly independent, fully informed, and had the freedom to
negotiate at arm's length.” 74  To establish that a director lacks
independence, plaintiff must “create a reasonable doubt that
a director is not so ‘beholden’ to an interested director ...
that his or her ‘discretion would be sterilized.’ “ 75  In order
“[t]o create a reasonable doubt about an outside director's
independence, a plaintiff must plead facts that would support
the inference that because of the nature of a relationship or
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additional circumstances ..., the non-interested director would
be more willing to risk his or her reputation than risk the
relationship with the interested director.” 76
*10  At trial, the evidence easily met this exacting standard,
demonstrating that the Special Committee was independent,
fully informed, and that it had negotiated with Hallmark at
arm's length. First, plaintiff made no arguments regarding the
independence of Lund and Granath, two of the three members
of the Special Committee. Second, plaintiff failed to convince
me that the other member, Jennings, lacked independence.
Plaintiff makes several arguments as to why Jennings lacks
independence, but none of them were enough to create
a reasonable doubt as to his independence. First, plaintiff
contends that because of his nomination by Hallmark to the
board of Crown, Jennings lacks independence. The mere
nomination of a director by a majority stockholder, however,
is insufficient to demonstrate lack of independence. 77  It was
established at trial that aside from his service on the board
of Crown, Jennings has no business or personal relationship
with any of the other Crown directors. 78  Next, plaintiff
points to Jennings's service for various charitable and civic
organizations, and his involvement with the University of
Kansas (which receives financial support from Hallmark) to
challenge his independence. Although Jennings has served on
the boards of numerous nonprofit organizations in the Kansas
City area, none of the positions raise reasonable doubts about
his independence. Moreover, plaintiff asserts that several
members of the Hall family attended the University of
Kansas and that the Hall family made significant donations
to the University of Kansas. Plaintiff also contends that
Jennings's fundraising efforts for the University of Kansas
are themselves sufficient to undermine his independence.
Jennings, however, has never solicited from Hallmark or
the Hall family on behalf of the University of Kansas.
Furthermore, Jennings does not receive any compensation
for his service on University of Kansas-affiliated boards.
Although he did receive a salary for his three month job as the
University of Kansas's interim athletic director, he returned
his salary to the University when his term was up. 79
All these facts illustrate that cases like In re Oracle Corp.
Derivative Litigation 80  (which involved a special litigation
committee) do not apply here. For example, in Oracle and
other similar cases, the special committee members were paid
a salary by the university that received the donations, and they
personally solicited donations from (or had other substantial
dealings with) the donors. In short, plaintiff failed to persuade
me that Jennings was beholden to or under the domination of
Hallmark or the Hall family, or that Jennings was “disabled
from exercising independent judgment.” 81
Accordingly, I find that all three members of the Special
Committee were independent, and approved the transaction
after an arm's length negotiation. Thus, plaintiff bears the
burden of showing that the Recapitalization was unfair given
the undisputed evidence that the transaction was approved
by an independent and disinterested special committee of
directors. I now begin my analysis by examining the issue of
fair dealing and then turn to the related issue of fair price.
B. Fair Dealing
*11  Along with the board's composition and independence,
“fair dealing addresses the timing and structure of
negotiations as well as the method of approval of the
transaction.” 82  Considering theses factors, for the reasons set
forth below, I find that the process followed here was entirely
fair.
1. Hallmark's Timing of the Recapitalization
Plaintiff argues that Hallmark opportunistically timed its
original Recapitalization proposal to burden Crown with debt
as the initial step in a devised plan in which it could exercise
leverage over Crown to maneuver a “perfect storm” and
force recapitalization at a critical moment in Crown's life
cycle. 83  Given the fact that Hallmark had all along sought a
meaningful solution to Crown's crumbling capital structure, I
do not accept plaintiff's contention that Hallmark had devised
an elaborate scheme to unfairly time the Recapitalization. To
begin with, Hallmark did not have any legal obligation to
continue to waive Crown's debt obligations. Like the majority
stockholder and creditor in Odyssey Partners, L.P v. Fleming
Companies, Inc., 84  Hallmark did not have an obligation
to defer payments or to make other financial concessions
for the sake of Crown, or its minority stockholders. 85  As
former Chancellor Allen observed in Thorpe v. CERBCO,
Inc., “controlling shareholders, while not allowed to use
their control over corporate property or processes to exploit
the minority, are not required to act altruistically towards
them.” 86  Moreover, the evidence at trial indisputably showed
that there was no tangible way that Crown would be able
to meet its debt obligations when they were due, and that
Crown had no real options other than a recapitalization
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or bankruptcy. Given the fact that Crown's debt crisis had
developed over the years with unprofitable and not-promising
operations, it is evident that Crown did not have a solution
that would provide a better opportunity for future value than a
recapitalization. Thus, I find that plaintiff's evidence falls far
short of demonstrating Hallmark's having unfairly timed the
Recapitalization.
Unfortunately that is not all of the bad news for the plaintiff.
There are other reasons why plaintiff's unfair timing theory
fails as well. Plaintiff's unfair timing theory is premised
almost entirely on the approximately $3 billion valuation of
Crown by plaintiff's expert witness, Daniel R. Schechter. I
am not able to accept this theory, however, when Schechter's
valuation cannot explain why no potential buyer or valuation
expert (other than Schechter himself) ever perceived Crown's
value to exceed its debt. First, if plaintiff's theory were correct,
Hallmark would have accepted the Special Committee's
offer to take Crown private (because Hallmark would have
benefited from Schechter's additional $2 billion of value had
it in fact existed). Second, during the nine months between the
Hallmark Proposal (May 2009) and the Special Committee's
approval of the Recapitalization (February 2010) in which
plaintiff argues that Crown was in the “sweet spot” on the
“proverbial hockey stick,” none of the potential buyers tried
to capture this purported upside by offering terms better
than Hallmark's proposal. Third, when Hallmark saw the
upside in Crown's “life cycle,” surely at least one of the
other sophisticated industry players and private equity buyers
(players that Schechter noted regularly advise on potential
cable acquisitions) would have attempted to take advantage
of the purported “sweet spot” as well by offering to pay
more than the value implied by the conversion price in the
Recapitalization. No one did. Lastly, plaintiff argues that
Hallmark proposed the Recapitalization at a critical time
in Crown's life cycle, during a brief period after Crown
had turned the EBITDA positive but before it shot up the
curve to profitability. On this specific point, I agree with
and fully credit Hallmark's expert witness (Professor Jerry
A. Hausman) that absent a material change in expected cash
flows, a short interval in time between two DCF valuations
will not produce the type of dramatic change in value that
plaintiff's theory posits. Hausman explained that only “new
(unexpected) information” (the type of information that could
materially affect Crown's cash flows)—not changes in the
timing of a valuation—would be required to explain the
dramatic change in values. 87  Unless something changes that
would materially affect the expected future cash flows (and
no such change occurred here), the timing of the valuation
should not produce the type of change in value that plaintiff
assumes. Thus, it is clear to me that plaintiff's unfair timing
theory is flawed.
2. The Special Committee's Formation and Selection of
Counsel
*12  The members of the Special Committee have extensive
business and industry experience, including Lund's and
Granath's experience in the television and cable industries.
Plaintiff alleges that Hallmark improperly controlled the
Special Committee's formation and operation, and in
particular that Jennings was not independent. 88  Plaintiff
attempts to show this by pointing to preliminary discussions
that Jennings had with Brian Gardner, General Counsel of
Hallmark and Secretary of Crown. Plaintiff insists these
discussions somehow were improper, but does not allege
that any of these preliminary discussions involved the
substance of the Hallmark Proposal or the Recapitalization.
Furthermore, no evidence exists of any discussions between
Gardner and members of the Special Committee once the
Special Committee was formed, other than in connection with
meetings of the full Crown board. 89
Finally, I do not recognize any legitimate issue that can be
raised concerning the Special Committee's independence or
the integrity of its process in its selection of one of the
attorneys, Mark Gentile of RLF, identified by Gardner. Lund
independently suggested Gentile, because he had previously
worked with Gentile on a special committee assignment with
another board. 90  At this time, Jennings also asked Gardner
to see if Hallmark's Delaware counsel could suggest other
Delaware counsel with experience in representing special
committees (and with no Hallmark conflict). 91  Among the
counsel identified by Gardner's Delaware counsel was Gentile
of RLF. Then, Lund recommended Gentile to the Special
Committee. 92  Based on Lund's recommendation, and the
firm's reputation, the Special Committee retained RLF as
its counsel. Thus, the record is clear that it was Lund's
recommendation of Gentile that led the Special Committee
to retain RLF. Finally, no evidence exists that Gentile had
any ties to Hallmark or had any reason to favor Hallmark's
interests over those of the Special Committee and Crown's
minority stockholders. Based on this record, I find that the
Special Committee (including its members, formation, and
selection of counsel) is independent of Hallmark.
3. The Special Committee's Mandate
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As respected practitioners have noted, “in the context of
a conflict transaction, the importance of the committee's
charter cannot be overstated.” 93  In addition to being
independent, a well-constituted special committee must have
a “clear mandate setting out its powers and responsibilities
in negotiating the interested transaction.” 94  This Court
has stated that “this mandate should include the power to
fully evaluate the transaction at issue, and, ideally, include
what this court has called the ‘critical power’ to say ‘no’
to the transaction.” 95  Here, the members of the Special
Committee interpreted their clear mandate broadly to include
the power to consider the Hallmark Proposal, negotiate its
terms, consider alternatives to the transaction, and ultimately
recommend or reject the Hallmark Proposal. 96  Each member
of the Special Committee understood that his role was
to represent the interests of the minority stockholders of
Crown. 97  Moreover, the Crown board could not approve the
Hallmark Proposal without a favorable recommendation from
the Special Committee. 98
*13  Plaintiff contends that the Special Committee was
“hamstrung by its narrow mandate” 99  (which according to
plaintiff was limited to negotiating the Hallmark Proposal)
and was thus unable to consider alternatives to the
Hallmark Proposal. This argument is meritless as it is
contrary to the evidence described above and set forth
at trial. First, plaintiff selectively omits quotations from
the Resolutions themselves, which broadly empowered the
Special Committee to “consider such matters as it deems
advisable with respect to the Recapitalization Proposal” and
“take such further action, at the Company's expense, as
the Special Committee deems appropriate in order to carry
out the intent and purpose” of the resolutions. 100  Second,
as noted above, each member of the Special Committee
viewed the committee's mandate broadly as allowing it
to consider the Hallmark Proposal, negotiate its terms,
recommend (or not recommend) the Hallmark Proposal, and
also to consider any and all alternatives to the Hallmark
Proposal. 101  For example, the Special Committee had
initially proposed a go-private transaction to Hallmark, which
was rejected. Third, Morgan Stanley repeatedly advised the
Special Committee on alternatives to the Hallmark Proposal.
Fourth, the Special Committee encouraged and incentivized
Morgan Stanley to pursue alternatives, such as a sale, in
its engagement letter. 102  Lastly, the Special Committee
commissioned a press release announcing to the world that
the Special Committee was “considering Hallmark Cards'
proposal as well as the Company's other alternatives.” 103
Finally, plaintiff alleges that Hallmark drafted the Special
Committee's Resolutions. Plaintiff, however, overlooks the
fact that the Special Committee's counsel completely revised
the Resolutions. 104  Therefore, I find that the Special
Committee was well aware of its mandate, interpreted that
mandate broadly, understood that it had the power to reject
the Hallmark Proposal and understood that its role was to
represent the interests of Crown's minority stockholders.
4. The Special Committee's Financial Advisors
The Special Committee retained Morgan Stanley as one of
its two independent financial advisors. As a second financial
advisor, the Special Committee retained Houlihan based on
the firm's reputation and on the strength of previous work
that Houlihan had done for Crown. Morgan Stanley was
independent from both Hallmark and Crown, and Houlihan
was independent of Hallmark. Morgan Stanley and Houlihan
did not work together, and neither saw the other's work. 105
Houlihan provided the Special Committee with an analysis of
the pro forma impact of the Recapitalization on the minority
stockholders, as well as a fairness opinion as to Crown. 106
Morgan Stanley did not provide a fairness opinion, but did
advise the Special Committee to approve and recommend the
Recapitalization. 107  The recommendation was an essential
part of Morgan Stanley's retention at the outset. 108
*14  Pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 141(e), the Special Committee
was entitled to rely on the “information, opinions, reports or
statements” 109  presented by Morgan Stanley and Houlihan.
Morgan Stanley's recommendation was supported by months
of work and an understanding of the cable industry
and Crown's business. 110  Morgan Stanley and Houlihan
were selected with reasonable care, the Special Committee
reasonably believed that the task was within their professional
or expert competence, and their analyses were “not so
deficient that the [special] committee would have reason to
question [them].” 111  In addition, under Delaware law, there
is no requirement that the Special Committee obtain a formal
fairness opinion as to the minority stockholders, particularly
in light of the strength of the advice it received. 112  Thus,
I find that the recommendation from Morgan Stanley, the
fairness opinion from Houlihan, and the analysis of the pro
forma impact on the minority stockholders from Houlihan
were sufficient to satisfy the Special Committee's duty of care.
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5. The Special Committee's Process and Arm's–Length
Negotiations
Another critical issue in the fair dealing inquiry is “whether
the Special Committee functioned as an effective proxy for
arms-length bargaining, such that a fair outcome equivalent
to a market-tested deal resulted.” 113  That is, a special
committee “must function in a manner which indicates
that the controlling shareholder did not dictate the terms
of the transaction and that the committee exercised real
bargaining power ‘at an arms-length.’ “ 114  After reviewing
all the evidence that was produced at trial and the parties'
written submissions, I find that the Special Committee
functioned independently of Hallmark and reached the
best deal possible through intense negotiations that were
appropriately adversarial.
The Special Committee met formally twenty-nine times
over a period of nine months. The Special Committee's
legal advisors were present at each one of them. After
Morgan Stanley was retained, representatives of Morgan
Stanley (usually including Robert Kindler, the Global Head
of Mergers and Acquisitions at Morgan Stanley) attended
every one of the Special Committee's meetings. The members
of the Special Committee relied on the professional advice
provided by their legal and financial advisors. Notably,
each member of the Special Committee assumed an active
role in the process (outside its internal meetings) including
speaking with a third party regarding potential interest in
Crown (Lund), meeting with Muoio to discuss his concerns
(Granath), actively facilitating negotiations (Jennings), and
negotiating face-to-face with Hallmark (Lund). 115
As stated earlier, the Special Committee evaluated and
actively searched for alternatives to the Hallmark Proposal,
including a third-party sale, a third-party refinancing, a
potential bankruptcy, and continuing the status quo. After
reviewing the alternatives, Morgan Stanley advised the
Special Committee that neither a sale nor a refinancing was
a viable option. 116  Indeed, at trial, Kindler was resolute
about Morgan Stanley's views on the alternatives. 117  It also
is undisputed that the Special Committee initially refused to
negotiate the Hallmark Proposal and instead made its own
proposal that Hallmark take Crown private, even though
Hallmark had previously indicated that it was not interested
in such a transaction. 118  In light of Morgan Stanley's
involvement in the process of evaluating the Hallmark
Proposal and considering the alternatives, as well as Morgan
Stanley's deep familiarity with the market, I reject plaintiff's
assertion that Morgan Stanley somehow failed to comprehend
the opportunities in the market and that the Special Committee
erred in relying on Morgan Stanley.
*15  After Hallmark refused to consider a go-private
transaction, the Special Committee started to contemplate
and address the terms and conditions for recapitalizing the
Company. The Special Committee, with advice from Morgan
Stanley, pushed back against the Hallmark Proposal and
pursued a negotiating strategy designed to provide as much
benefit as possible to the minority stockholders. 119  Morgan
Stanley's proposed negotiating strategy was to choose a value
for Crown at the low end of Morgan Stanley's range ($500
million), give Hallmark new debt equal to that number,
and allow the minority stockholders to share in the upside
above that number. 120  The Special Committee adopted this
strategy, which eventually worked. In the Recapitalization,
Hallmark received credit for $500 million of its debt, and
Crown's minority stockholders were given the opportunity to
share in Crown's value above $500 million. 121  Given this
result, in which Crown's minority stockholders would have
some opportunity to realize value as opposed to none, it is
clear that the Special Committee's arm's-length negotiating
strategy ultimately resulted in a benefit to the minority.
The Special Committee initially suggested the go-private
transaction to counter Hallmark's recapitalization proposal,
and when it determined that Hallmark had not made
adequate concessions in response to its first counterproposal,
the Special Committee refused to negotiate altogether,
thereby forcing Hallmark to bid against itself and to make
additional concessions. This adversarial conduct bespeaks
independence, and confirms the arm's-length nature of the
bargaining process.
Although the Special Committee eventually acceded to
Hallmark's proposal that Hallmark own more than 90%
of Crown's common shares after the Recapitalization, the
Special Committee secured a binding standstill agreement
that requires, among other things, independent director
approval for a future short-form merger or third-party sale
until December 31, 2011, and a potential $0.50 per share
premium to the non-Hallmark stockholders in the event of
a third-party sale until December 31, 2013. Furthermore,
the Special Committee insisted on a majority-of-the-minority
condition. 122  Kindler thought it unlikely that Hallmark
would ever agree to such a condition, 123  but he nonetheless
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advised the Special Committee to maintain its position “if,
for nothing else, for negotiating leverage.” 124  The Special
Committee eventually dropped the majority-of-the-minority
condition near the end of the negotiations, in exchange for
other favorable concessions from Hallmark. 125
In the end, the Special Committee got a great result for
Crown's minority stockholders. Its advisors believed and
advised the Special Committee that the Recapitalization
was a more attractive and viable option for Crown's
minority stockholders than any other alternatives available
to the Company. Accordingly, I find that the negotiated
Recapitalization terms were the product of a thorough,
effective, and independent Special Committee.
C. Fair Price
*16  Fair price “relates to the economic and financial
considerations of the proposed [transaction], including all
relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future
prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or
inherent value of a company's stock.” 126  “When conducting
a fair price inquiry as part of the entire fairness standard of
review, the court asks whether the transaction was one ‘that a
reasonable seller, under all of the circumstances, would regard
as within a range of fair value; one that such a seller could
reasonably accept.’ “ 127  Here, the answer is yes, it was.
For purposes of determining whether the Recapitalization
fairly valued Crown, I will first discuss the terms of
the Recapitalization and then briefly review the various
methodologies employed by the parties' experts in their
determination of Crown's value at the time of the transaction.
On the basis of that review, I then assess which methodologies
are most appropriate under Delaware law and in light of the
particular circumstances of this case.
1. Terms of the Recapitalization
The “range of fairness” aspect of the fair price inquiry
“has most salience when the controller has established a
process that simulates arm's-length bargaining, supported by
appropriate procedural protections.” 128  That is, “[a] strong
record of fair dealing can influence the fair price inquiry,
reinforcing the unitary nature of the entire fairness test.” 129
Here, the Special Committee's process, its demonstrated
independence and arm's-length negotiations, the advice it
received from its financial advisors, and the result it achieved
all lend support to the conclusion that the Recapitalization was
entirely fair. Crown was saddled with debt; it was essentially
insolvent, seeking another extension of the Hallmark debt
waiver, and faced a real threat of bankruptcy. Those
are the brute facts concerning this company. The Special
Committee, based on advice from its advisors, determined
that the Recapitalization was the best alternative for Crown's
minority stockholders. 130  As one of the Morgan Stanley
representatives stated at trial: “Going into this, if you were
a non-Hallmark stockholder, what you owned was equity
in a company with about $1.2 billion worth of debt. And
the only way you could ever achieve any value is if the
company was worth more than $1.2 billion, which it wasn't.
Here, by lowering the threshold to [$]500 million, we felt
you were giving the equity, which started out with no value,
something that had real value.” 131  In addition, plaintiff's own
expert, Schechter, conceded that absent the Recapitalization,
Crown would not have survived long enough to realize any
future value, much less value above the level of Hallmark's
debt. 132  Thus, without a recapitalization, Crown was facing
insolvency and its equity was worthless.
Two decisions by this Court are instructive—In re Vision
Hardware Group, Inc., 133  and In re Hanover Direct, Inc.
S'holders Litigation. 134  In Vision Hardware, Better Vision
“was an insolvent company that was in default on substantial
obligations, with even greater obligations falling due in its
immediate future,” and with no other realistic alternative to
bankruptcy. 135  TCW, a creditor of Better Vision, agreed
to purchase all of Better Vision's outstanding senior and
subordinated debt and sought to cash out the minority of
Better Vision. Although Vision Hardware was a statutory
appraisal action (which this is not), the Court (as here) was
faced with how to value a company's debt where the company
itself was on the brink of bankruptcy and had no ability
to refinance its debt. Former Chancellor Allen noted that
a corporation's long-term, “going concern” value becomes
irrelevant and instead its value in bankruptcy becomes the
relevant metric for determining fair value. 136  Thus, the
Vision Hardware Court recognized that when a company's
going concern value comes close to its liquidation value
(with the increasing risk of bankruptcy) its equity value may
approach zero. 137
*17  Now consider Hanover, which involved a go-
private merger without a special committee. Hanover's debt
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commitments exceeded the value of its common stock and,
thus, the company was heading towards insolvency. The
controlling stockholder increased its holdings of Hanover
debt and preferred stock. Then it proposed a recapitalization
that eliminated Hanover's minority stockholders. The
Hanover Court found that the value of Hanover's equity was
“already below sea level,” and concluded that “a merger price
above $0.00 (in [that] case, $0.25 per share) was entirely
fair.” 138
Crown would have faced bankruptcy without a
recapitalization or further forbearance by Hallmark. Plaintiff
here asks me to disregard the economic reality which Crown
faced. But treating Crown as if it had no liquidity crisis
would require me to ignore the credible evidence adduced
at trial. 139  This I cannot do. Thus, I conclude that the
Recapitalization was entirely fair on its face. Nonetheless, in
the interest of completeness, I will review the expert opinions.
2. The Experts
As has become common in entire fairness proceedings of
this sort, the parties presented the testimony of competing
valuation experts in an effort to convince me that their
valuation was the most accurate. 140  At trial, plaintiff
presented the expert testimony of Daniel R. Schechter from
L.E.K. Consulting, LLC, and Professor Robert Hamada
from the University of Chicago Booth School of Business.
Schechter, abjuring all other valuation methods, only relied
on a DCF analysis. Hamada, who was presented as a rebuttal
expert in response to Hallmark's valuation expert, primarily
identified alleged mistakes in Morgan Stanley's valuation of
Crown.
As for defendants, the Special Committee presented the
testimony of Christopher Lee, the Executive Director of
Morgan Stanley and Richard De Rose, the Managing Director
of Houlihan, to rebut Schechter's expert testimony. Hallmark
presented the expert testimony of Jerry A. Hausman, the
MacDonald Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. In contrast to plaintiff's valuation
experts (Schechter and Hamada), Hausman is an expert on
the cable television industry and the economic trends in that
industry. And unlike Schechter, Hausman believes that a
DCF analysis is more reliable when it can be verified by
alternative valuation methods. Importantly, plaintiff did not
cross-examine Hausman at trial.
This case (as earlier noted) is similar to In re Hanover Direct,
Inc. S'holders Litigation, where the Court found that a merger
price of $0.25 per share was entirely fair because the subject
company's equity actually had zero value. 141  In Hanover,
plaintiffs' expert rejected management's projections and relied
solely on a single valuation methodology, while defendant's
expert used a more robust approach involving multiple
methodologies to support his valuation conclusions. 142  For
that and other reasons, the Hanover Court assigned full
weight to the trial testimony of defendant's expert and no
weight to the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert. 143  In this
case, Schechter's single methodology valuation of Crown is
roughly three times higher than any of the other valuations.
The more robust approaches taken by defendants' experts and
advisors, however, used multiple valuation methodologies
and independently reached results that fell within the same
range. 144  Although there certainly may be circumstances
where using only one valuation methodology is appropriate
and reliable, this is not such a circumstance. Schechter's
failure to incorporate other valuation methods into his
analysis makes his valuation far less credible.
3. Schechter's Analysis
*18  Schechter valued Crown nearly three times higher
than all the other valuations at $2.946 billion. 145
This result, which Schechter derived from his own
DCF analysis, was an obvious outlier from the other
valuations presented at trial. Schechter conducted two
other valuations, comparable companies analysis ($803
million) and comparable transactions analysis ($1.3 billion),
and rejected those conclusions because those valuation
conclusions were “absurdly low” in comparison to his DCF
analysis, which valued Crown at almost $3 billion. 146
Such an outlier valuation has caused credibility concerns
in other cases before this Court. 147  The chart reproduced
below visually demonstrates just how far off Schechter's
single methodology valuation was as compared to the
multiple valuations of Crown that had been performed by the
various financial advisors engaged by the Special Committee
and Hallmark, as well as other industry players who had
previously looked into acquiring Crown. 148
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As the chart plainly reveals, Schechter's sole valuation of
Crown using his own DCF methodology was wildly divergent
from all other valuations. Hausman, 149  on the other hand,
recognized the economic reality that real-world valuations
done by potential buyers are “often the best source of
economic information” about the value of a company. 150
Even if the generally-preferred DCF valuation approach
is used, it is only reliable when it can be verified by
alternative methods to DCF or by real world valuations,
including especially, valuations performed by potential third-
party buyers. 151
As described earlier, Crown had been “on the market” since
2005 and management had vigorously pursued a sale. Crown's
CEO, Schleiff, had a significant financial incentive to find
a buyer. In the end, however, Crown was not successful in
locating a buyer willing to pay even the value of Crown's
debt, let alone above its debt. Hausman opined that the
offers and expressions of interest in Crown by potential
buyers are relevant indicators of Crown's value, especially
the most recent offer by Fox in 2009 that valued Crown at
approximately $370–500 million and an earlier analysis by
Liberty Media in 2007 that valued Crown at approximately
$466–997 million. 152  Thus, in assessing the reliability of
Schechter's valuation, Hausman noted that “no observed
market valuation, in either the pre-recession period or more
recently (where Schechter is doing his valuation) came
anywhere close to Mr. Schechter's claimed amount of $2.95
billion.” 153  I agree with Hausman. If Crown was really worth
$2.95 billion (as Schechter claims), the most knowledgeable
and sophisticated buyers in the industry would not have
readily passed on an opportunity to obtain substantial returns
on an investment in Crown. 154  Because Crown's own
financial statements and projections indicated that Crown had
insufficient cash flow to support its debt service, Hausman
reasonably determined that Crown's value was less than its
debt. 155  Hausman's conclusion that the equity value was
“zero ” was in line with Morgan Stanley's analyses and was
consistent with Evercore Partner's $1.025 billion valuation of
Crown. 156  And again, it was consistent with earlier offers
and valuations by sophisticated players in the industry, all
of whom independently concluded that Crown's value is less
than its debt.
*19  I am convinced that the way in which Schechter arrived
at a value nearly three times that of any other valuation is
flawed. Below are a few of the specific reasons that cause me
to reject Schechter's opinion:
• Schechter's DCF analysis ignored management's
contemporaneous projections and used his own
hypothetical and overly optimistic set of projections.
This Court has consistently recognized the importance
of management's contemporaneous projections because
“the outcome of a DCF analysis depends heavily on
the projections used in the model.” 157  Valuations that
have ignored or altered management's contemporaneous
projections are “sometimes completely discounted.” 158
Here, Schechter had no legitimate reason for abandoning
management's projections in favor of his more optimistic
estimates developed in only a short period of time and
without access to Crown's management or its data. And
it was unreasonable to substitute his personal judgment
for “the non-litigation business judgment of [the
Company's] management.” 159  Schechter disapproved
management's projections for simply being too low. 160
In addition, Brian Stewart, former CFO of Crown,
explained in detail that management's five year
projections are created with significant input and
involvement from management. 161  After an extensive
review process, the five year projections are approved
by the CEO and finance committee, and are presented to
the full board of directors for approval. 162  Thus, I am
convinced that management's projections are carefully
crafted and reasonable. This kind of reliable information
(i.e. reasonable management projections) should have
been used by Schechter in his valuation instead of his
own Panglossian views.
• Schechter unreasonably extended his optimistic
projections to 2024. Crown's management, well aware of
Crown's economic reality and its day-to-day operations,
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considers it problematic to project out more than
five years. 163  Hausman explained in his rebuttal that
uncertainty increases with the length of projections. 164
The Special Committee's advisors used the 2013
projections provided by Crown's management. 165
Schechter provides no explanation why he is in a
better position than Crown's management (which has
consistently used three to five year forecast periods) to
make projections extending out fourteen years. Tellingly,
plaintiff's other expert, Hamada, did not opine that
Crown's management projections were of inappropriate
or insufficient length for a proper DCF analysis. 166
• Schechter's valuation disregards all the contemporaneous
evidence of Crown's value, as well as the economic
reality facing Crown. Indeed, Hausman believed
that Schechter's “valuation fails an economic reality
test.” 167  Not one of the many (at least eighteen)
valuations of Crown done between 2008 and the time
of the Recapitalization was even close to Schechter's
DCF valuation. As Vice Chancellor Laster recently
noted, “what you actually like to see when you're
doing a valuation is some type of overlap” between
the various methodologies. 168  Well, as the chart on
page 51 comparing the various valuations of Crown
shows, Schechter's DCF analysis does not “overlap”
with anything. But as Kindler and the Special Committee
members testified at trial, every media company knew
that Crown had been for sale since 2005. Three
sophisticated industry players had considered Crown
around the time of the Hallmark Proposal, and none of
their views on value were remotely close to Schechter's
DCF-they all pegged Crown's enterprise value at less
than Crown's debt to Hallmark. This Court in Gray
v. Cytokine Pharmasciences, Inc. looked to offers
made by potential buyers in the three years before a
transaction and found that those valuations supported
the conclusion that the plaintiff's “off the charts”
expert was not credible. 169  There, then-Vice Chancellor
Lamb concluded that the expert's valuation was an
“extreme variation from the pack” as compared to all
other valuations and was thus an unreliable outlier. 170
Schechter, here, is similarly “off the charts” and I find his
valuation to be unreliable. Even more oddly, Schechter
ignores the Hallmark debt. He valued the Company
disregarding this financial reality and did not consider
Crown as a “financially distressed” company. Although
Schechter baldly states that the possibility of bankruptcy
was “wildly implausible and somewhat ridiculous,” I
find it quite plausible that bankruptcy would have been
Crown's future if it had maintained the status quo. 171
*20  • Schechter rejected both of his own market-
based analyses because he was not satisfied with
the results. 172  He thus relied on only one valuation
methodology to support his conclusions-his “off the
charts” DCF analysis. This Court has recognized that
“the DCF valuation has featured prominently in this
Court because it ‘is the approach that merits the
greatest confidence within the financial community.’
“ 173  Notwithstanding that general statement, the Court
also gives more credit and weight to experts who
apply “multiple valuation techniques that support one
another's conclusions” and that “serve to cross-check
one another's results.” 174  Although it is true that a DCF
valuation is certainly a dependable and commonly used
valuation methodology, practitioners, academics, and
the experts in this case acknowledge that it has its own
limits and weaknesses. 175  Thus, it is preferable to take
a more robust approach involving multiple techniques
—such as a DCF analysis, a comparable transactions
analysis (looking at precedent transaction comparables),
and a comparable companies analysis (looking at trading
comparables/multiples)—to triangulate a value range,
as all three methodologies individually have their own
limitations. 176  Here, under Schechter's comparable
companies analysis, Crown had a value of $803 million,
and under his comparable transactions analysis, Crown
had a value of $1.2 billion. 177  Both of those numbers
fall within the ranges found by Morgan Stanley and
Houlihan. Schechter, however, rejected each of those
valuations as “absurdly low” and “unreasonably low,”
respectively, and he gave them “no weight.” 178  Like
petitioners' expert in Hanover, because Schechter failed
to clearly and persuasively provide any acceptable
reasons for his outlier result, his methodology leaves me
with little confidence in his valuation. 179
4. Hamada's Analysis
Hamada's expert opinions, proffered as rebuttal to Hausman's
expert report, were less a “rebuttal” to Hausman's opinions
than Hamada's (and plaintiff's) effort to attack Morgan
Stanley's valuation. 180  Hamada's opinions, however, are
without any basis and ignore all the significant and relevant
economic realities of Crown.
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First, Hamada did not criticize Hausman's opinions that the
offers and expressions of interest for Crown by key market
players are important economic indicators to be considered
in determining Crown's value. 181  Thus, it is not surprising
that Hamada did not examine the offers by Liberty Media or
Fox. 182  After all, he is not an expert in the cable television
business, and was not in a position to adequately evaluate the
contents of those offers. 183
Second, Hamada did no analysis regarding Crown's
sustainable capital structure growth, with or without the
Recapitalization. 184  Hamada did not know that Hallmark, in
connection with its Hallmark Proposal, would not extend its
waiver and standstill beyond May 1, 2010. 185  He also was
not aware that “Crown's auditors had issued a going-concern
opinion for the year ended 2009,” and that its revolving credit
line was set to expire in 2010. 186  Indeed, Hamada did no
analysis of Crown's liquidity situation in 2010 or any other
year. 187
*21  Third, Hamada's argument that Morgan Stanley mixed
“apples and oranges” in its DCF valuation was misguided
as well as based on Hamada's misapprehension of the facts.
Specifically, Hamada argued that Morgan Stanley mixed
firm-specific costs of equity and debt with an industry-
average capital structure, and that this error led to an
exaggerated WACC and deflated valuation of Crown. 188
Apparently, there was confusion over what each expert
(Hamada and Lee) said and heard, but the evidence is clear
that Morgan Stanley used a post-recapitalization cost of
equity and a post-recapitalization cost of debt, along with a
post-recapitalization target capital structure. 189  As a result,
Hamada ultimately conceded that Morgan Stanley's approach
(using a post-recapitalization cost of equity and debt,
and target capital structure) would be an “apples-to-apples
comparison,” and at trial he confirmed this concession. 190
Fourth, Hamada's criticism of Morgan Stanley's terminal
value calculation is without merit. Morgan Stanley conducted
two different terminal value calculations: a perpetuity growth
rate and an exit multiple. Hamada argued that Morgan Stanley
unjustifiably used low perpetuity growth rates (1–3%) and
terminal multiples (or exit multiples) (6.5–8.5) to calculate
Crown's terminal value. 191  He theorized that both methods
adopted by Morgan Stanley contributed to an unreasonable
decline in future growth rates, all of which resulted from
Crown management's truncated projections. 192  At trial,
however, Lee (for Morgan Stanley) testified that the purported
decline between the explicit forecast period and the terminal
period is typical. 193  In addition, the undisputed testimony
showed that Morgan Stanley's exit multiple calculation
had no precipitous decline in growth rates. 194  Ultimately,
therefore, Hamada failed to convince me that Morgan
Stanley's perpetuity growth rate was unreasonable or that its
exit multiple calculation created a “cliff-like drop.”
Finally, Hamada is not a restructuring expert and has never
been paid to advise on a corporate restructuring. 195  As
Hamada admitted, he has not offered an opinion as to
whether the Recapitalization is fair to Crown or to its non-
Hallmark stockholders—either in his rebuttal report or his
trial testimony. In short, Hamada's opinions do not establish
that the Recapitalization was unfair.
In sum, because Crown's outstanding debt exceeded the
value of its equity before the Recapitalization, and because
defendants' proffered expert testimony persuasively and
thoroughly supported their valuation conclusions (and
plaintiff's experts failed to convince me otherwise), I conclude
that the Recapitalization was entirely fair.
III. CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, I find in favor of defendants
and conclude that the process and the price of the
Recapitalization were entirely fair. An Order consistent with
this Memorandum Opinion has been entered.
All Citations
Not Reported in A.3d, 2011 WL 863007
Footnotes
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1 The relevant affiliates are defendants Hallmark Entertainment Investment Co., Hallmark Entertainment
Holdings, Inc., H C Crown Corp., and H.A., Inc.
2 I have considered the parties' briefing regarding numerous outstanding objections to the admissibility
of testimony, reports, exhibits, documents, demonstrative exhibits, rebuttal exhibits and testimony, and
handwritten notes. I overrule all of the objections and admit all of the items which are the subject of these
continuing objections. I will accord each item the weight and credibility that it appropriately deserves.
3 See JX 145 (Crown Schedule 13D/A); JX 85 (Crown Form 8–K (June 29, 2010)).
4 Trial Transcript (“Tr.”) 583–87 (Granath).
5 Tr. 588–89 (Granath).
6 Tr. 428–30 (Lund).
7 Tr. 431 (Lund).
8 See, e.g., Tr. 663–64, 673, 734–37 (Jennings).
9 Pre–Trial Stipulation and Order (“PTO”) ¶ 26.
10 Joint Ex. (“JX”) 99 (Crown Corporate History).
11 Tr. 597 (Granath).
12 JX 99 (Crown Corporate History).
13 See JX 305.
14 PTO ¶ 28.
15 JX 84 (Crown Form 14C (May 21, 2010)).
16 Tr. 434–35 (Lund).
17 Tr. 745 (Griffith).
18 Tr. 747–48 (Griffith).
19 Schleiff's employment contract provided a substantial incentive, a bonus of at least $6 million ($6–9 million),
if he was successful in selling the Company. He used his extensive industry contacts and connections to
constantly pitch Crown to all players in the industry. See Tr. 433 (Lund); 594 (Granath); 748 (Griffith); JX 312
(Crown Form 8–K (Oct. 6, 2006)).
20 Tr. 749 (Griffith).
21 Tr. 749–50 (Griffith).
22 Tr. 756–58 (Griffith).
23 Tr. 760–61 (Griffith).
24 In the midst of these attempts and processes, in 2007, Crown was negotiating its agreements with the major
cable service providers that provided Crown's programming to cable television subscribers. Crown's contracts
with Comcast, Time Warner, DirecTV and Echostar (which together control about 70% of Crown's cable
distribution) were set to expire during 2007. Accordingly, Hallmark extended the waiver and standstill on
Crown's debt because Hallmark recognized that failing to extend could negatively impact the negotiations
and any sale prospects. Thus, in late 2007 and early 2008, Schleiff successfully negotiated Crown's multi-
year contracts with major cable service providers: Comcast, extended to 2022, DirecTV to 2017, and Time
Warner and Echostar to 2012. See Tr. 746–47 (Griffith).
25 Tr. 763–64 (Griffith); 818 (Hall).
26 PTO ¶ 29; JX 23 (Crown Form 8–K (May 28, 2009)).
27 JX 48 (Sept. 28, 2009 Minutes) at 3.
28 PTO ¶ 29; JX 24 (May 28, 2009 Proposal Letter).
29 Id.
30 JX 423 (Resolutions for the Appointment of a Special Committee (“Resolutions”)).
31 Id.
32 In its engagement letter, the Special Committee sought to give Morgan Stanley an incentive to find a sale
transaction as an alternative to the Hallmark Proposal. See JX 431 (Morgan Stanley Engagement Letter)
at SC00000707 (“[A]t its sole discretion, the Committee will consider paying Morgan Stanley an additional
‘Discretionary Fee’ in connection with any Recapitalization or Sale Transaction, as the case may be, which will
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be based upon the performance of Morgan Stanley during the course of the engagement.”); Tr. 837 (Kindler)
(“My expectation was if there was a sale transaction, that we would get a higher fee than for recapitalization.”).
33 JX 612 (Press Release (July 14, 2009)); Tr. 672–73 (Jennings).
34 Tr. 259, 262–63(Lee); 604 (Granath); 683–84 (Jennings); JX 43 (Sept. 11, 2009 Minutes); JX 448 (Morgan
Stanley Sept. 11, 2009 Presentation).
35 JX (Sept. 11, 2009 Minutes); Tr. 446–47 (Lund).
36 JX 56 (Nov. 23, 2009 Minutes).
37 Tr. 768 (Jennings); 745, 796 (Griffith).
38 Tr. 424–25(Lee); 888–89 (Kindler).
39 Morgan Stanley also did not view the status quo as a viable alternative because, even if Hallmark agreed,
contrary to its public statements, to continue to waive the defaults on its debt, there would be increasing
uncertainty in the markets and “no assurance that the shareholders would ever get any value.” See JX 43
(Sept. 11, 2009 Minutes).
40 Even though Crown had been shopped continuously and was seen as still for sale, Crown had not received
any offers or even an expression of interest valuing the Company above its debt. See Tr. 450 (Lund); see
also Tr. 602 (Granath) (“We just finished four years of constant activity trying to sell the thing. If Peter [Lund]
and I were not successful with our contacts, certainly Henry [Schleiff], who was in the trade press, as I say
every second day, made known to the world that the Hallmark Channel was up for sale. So, you know, unless
somebody came out of the woodwork, [a sale] was not a real possibility.”).
41 In fact, the Special Committee's legal counsel, RLF, advised the Special Committee that there was a “high
risk” of equitable subordination to Hallmark in the event of a bankruptcy. Tr. 639 (Granath). The Committee
members agreed it would be “anathema” to Hallmark to force a bankruptcy. Tr. 499–501 (Lund).
42 For example, Hallmark's proposal would extend the maturity of the Crown debt by only five quarters and
failed to address the maturity of the JPM Revolver in March 2010 or the mandatory redemption of NICC's
debt in December 2010. Under the Hallmark proposal, Crown would be facing another liquidity crisis in less
than a year. See Tr. 262; JX 43 (Sept. 11, 2009 Minutes).
43 PTO ¶ 33; JX 449 (Special Committee Letter to Hallmark); Tr. 682–83 (Jennings).
44 PTO ¶ 34; JX 47 (HCC Letter to the Special Committee (Sept. 23, 2009)); Tr. 682–83 (Jennings).
45 JX 49 (Morgan Stanley Oct. 1, 2009 Presentation).
46 Tr. 280–81(Lee).
47 Tr. 853 (Kindler) (“They basically accepted our position, and it was the best outcome we could have
imagined.”).
48 JX 55 (Morgan Stanley Nov. 18, 2009 Presentation).
49 JX 84 (Crown Form 14C (May 21, 2010)).
50 As I understand it, a cash flow sweep is a debt covenant that requires a certain amount of available cash
flow to be used for debt service in the event of excess cash flow.
51 JX 58 (Dec. 1, 2009 Minutes); JX 473 (Morgan Stanley Dec. 7, 2009 Presentation).
52 Tr. 283(Lee); 466–67 (Lund); JX 58 (Dec. 1, 2009 Minutes).
53 JX 58 (Dec. 1, 2009 Minutes).
54 JX 73 (Feb. 9, 2010 Minutes).
55 JX 475 (Email from J. Zeberkiewicz (Dec. 10, 2009)).
56 JX 84 (Crown Form 14C (May 21, 2010)) at Ex. D.
57 Id.
58 Special Committee Defs.' Post–Trial Answering Br. 26 (“Until December 31, 2011, Hallmark cannot sell its
Crown common stock to a third party without prior approval of a special committee of the board composed of
solely independent, disinterested directors. From January 1, 2012, to December 31, 2013, however, Hallmark
can effect a third-party sale in a ‘Premium Transaction,’ in which the minority receives an additional $.50
per share premium, or in certain limited public offerings. Beginning January 1, 2014, through December 31,
2020, Hallmark is also restricted in its ability to sell a majority of the Crown stock to a third party.”). The
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standstill agreement defines a Premium Transaction as a transaction in which all stockholders unaffiliated
with Hallmark are entitled to participate and are entitled to receive both: (1) consideration equivalent in value
to the highest per-share consideration received by Hallmark in connection with the transaction, and (2) a
premium, in cash, equal to $0.50 per share of common stock. JX 84 (Crown Form 14C (May 21, 2010)) at
Ex. D.
59 Before the Special Committee approved the term sheet, in January 2010, the Special Committee learned of a
possible deal between Crown and Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. (the “MSLO Transaction”). See JX
497 (MSLO Transaction Agreement). The Special Committee discussed the business and financial impact
of the MSLO Transaction with Crown management. Given the anticipated modest impact on the Company's
projected financial performance, and the Committee's evaluation of the inherent risks in the transaction, the
Special Committee determined that the MSLO Transaction did not provide the Special Committee with a
credible basis on which to extract improved terms from Hallmark. See Tr. 468–69 (Lund).
60 PTO ¶ 35; JX 73 (Feb. 9, 2010 Minutes).
61 JX 510 (Crown Form 8–K (Feb. 10, 2010)).
62 See Tr. 314(Lee) (“We thought in our view this really was and really is the best alternative that was available to
all stakeholders. We went from having a company that had a billion-two of senior secured debt on its balance
sheet and having equity, not having any value until liability was satisfied, to having equity controlling—only
non-affiliated equity owning 10 percent of the company roughly after only $500 million of value.”); see also
Tr. 869–70 (Kindler) (“I felt, I was actually quite certain, that we had pushed this as far as we could possibly
push it. And you know, our job was to do the best job we could do for the non-Hallmark stockholders. And
sitting there, looking at all the alternatives, it was very, very clear to us that there was absolutely no way of
getting this company refinanced. Or the status quo, where, basically, we just kept on going on with waiver
after waiver after waiver. That would have been an awful result for the non-Hallmark shareholders.”).
63 See Tr. 185–86 (De Rose).
64 See JX 73 (Feb. 9, 2010 Minutes).
65 JX 76 (Feb. 25–26, 2010 Minutes).
66 See JX 77 (Houlihan Lokey Fairness Opinion).
67 Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del.1997) ( “Ordinarily, in a challenged transaction involving self-
dealing by a controlling shareholder, the substantive legal standard is that of entire fairness.”); Kahn v. Lynch
Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del.1994).
68 Valeant Pharms. Int'l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 746 (Del.Ch.2007) (“[T]he fair dealing prong informs the court
as to the fairness of the price obtained through that process.”).
69 Id.; William Penn P'ship v. Saliba, 2011 WL 440615 (Del. Feb.9, 2011).
70 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 97 (Del.2001) (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
711 (Del.1983)).
71 Id. (quoting Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711).
72 Kahn v. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1117 (Del.1994) (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710–11).
73 Id. “If the controlling stockholder permits the use of both protective devices [an independent special committee
and an informed majority of the minority], then the transaction could avoid entire fairness review. Reis v.
Hazelett Strip–Casting Corp., 2011 WL 303207, at *10 (Del.Ch. Jan.21, 2011) (citing In re CNX Gas Corp.
S'holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 400 (Del.Ch.2010); In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S'holder Litig., 2009
WL 3165613, at *12 (Del.Ch. Oct.2, 2009); In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 606
(Del.Ch.2005)). Here, as there was no majority of the minority vote, avoiding entire fairness review completely
is not a possibility.
74 Kahn v. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1120, 1121.
75 Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del.2004).
76 Id. at 1052.
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77 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del.1984) ( “[I]t is not enough to charge that a director was
nominated by or elected at the behest of those controlling the outcome of a corporate election. That is the
usual way a person becomes a corporate director.”).
78 Tr. 665, 675–76, 735–36 (Jennings).
79 Tr. 676–77 (Jennings).
80 824 A.2d 917 (Del.Ch.2003).
81 In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S'holder Litig., 906 A.2d 808, 821 (Del.Ch.2005). In addition to being
independent and disinterested, the individual committee members impressed me as directors willing to
assume the task of the committee “in a rigorous and independent manner.” G. Varallo, S. Raju & M. Allen,
Special Committees: Law and Practice 32–33 (2011).
82 Kahn v. Lynch Commc'ns Sys., Inc., 669 A.2d 79, 84 (Del.1995).
83 Pl's Opp'n Post–Trial Br. 42 (“The Recap Proposal was opportunistically timed by Hallmark to coincide with
a perceived ‘perfect storm’ of events that would allow it to increase its controlling stake above 90% at a
bargain price, to wit, the confluence of (a) the impending expiration of the Standstill and Waiver, (b) near-
frozen capital markets that would allow Hallmark to claim to be [the] ‘only game in town,’ and (c) a company
that had finally turned EBITDA positive, but had not yet shot up the curve of the proverbial ‘hockey stick.’ ”).
84 735 A.2d 386 (Del. Ch.1999).
85 Id. at 411 (“Fleming was under no obligation to agree to any of these things, either as a stockholder, a supplier
or a creditor.”); see Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 598 (Del.1986) (“[T]he law does not
require more than fairness. Specifically, it does not, absent a showing of culpability, require that directors or
controlling shareholders sacrifice their own financial interest in the enterprise for the sake of the corporation
or its minority shareholders.”).
86 1993 WL 443406, at *7 (Del.Ch. Oct.29, 1993).
87 JX 87 (Hausman Report) ¶ 18 (“[M]arket prices only change when there is new (unexpected) information.”).
88 Plaintiff focuses on Jennings because it is crystal clear that Lund and Granath are independent of Hallmark.
Lund has no relationship with anyone in the Hall family, and he has no personal or business affiliation with
any Hallmark entity (other than as a director of Crown). Granath is also disinterested in the Recapitalization
and independent of Hallmark and the Hall family. He was asked by Lund to join the Crown board, and he did
not know any of the other members of the Crown board or any members of the Hallmark board of directors.
Like Lund, Granath has no personal or business relationships with any members of the Hall family, other than
as a director of Crown. Again, plaintiff made no arguments regarding the independence of Lund and Granath
at trial or in its written submissions. Furthermore, as I have stated above, plaintiff offered no evidence of
any financial dealings between Jennings and any member of the Hall family. In Oracle and other analogous
cases, the committee members were paid salaries by the universities that received the donations. That is
not the case here.
89 Tr. 670–71 (Jennings).
90 Tr. 441 (Lund).
91 See JX 414 (Email chain regarding Crown Media (May 28, 2009)); Tr. 667 (Jennings).
92 See Tr. 441–42 (Lund); 613 (Granath); 668 (Jennings).
93 G. Varallo, S. Raju & M. Allen, Special Committees: Law and Practice 41(2011).
94 Gesoff v. IIC Indus., Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1146 (Del.Ch.2006).
95 Id.
96 See, e.g., Jennings Dep. 92–94 (“[I]t has always been our understanding as a committee that we had the
broadest of authorities to review alternatives available to the company.”); Lund Dep. 92–93 (“Q. Mr. Lund,
did you view the scope of the Special Committee's mandate to include exploration of alternatives other than
the proposed recapitalization? A.... Yes.”); Granath Dep. 59.
97 See Tr. 439 (Lund) (“The special committee's responsibilities were to protect the rights of the minority
stockholders.”); 671 (Jennings).
98 See JX 423 (Resolutions).
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99 Pl.'s Opp'n Post–Trial Br. 43.
100 JX 423 (Resolutions).
101 See, e.g., Tr. 473–74 (Lund); 601–02 (Granath); 671–73 (Jennings).
102 See JX 431 (Morgan Stanley Engagement Letter); Tr. 837 (Kindler) (“My expectation was if there was a sale
transaction, that we would get a higher fee than for recapitalization.”).
103 JX 612 (Press Release (July 14, 2009)) (emphasis added); Tr. 672–73 (Jennings); 841–42 (Kindler) (“This
kind of reference, looking at all alternatives, is very well understood on Wall Street; that the company is for
sale, and that, basically, we'll look at everything, not just a recapitalization, but also any other alternative,
including a sale.”).
104 Compare JX 115 (original draft of the Resolutions), with JX 423 (Resolutions as approved by the Crown
board).
105 See, e.g., Tr. 181–82 (De Rose) (“We did not work with them together.”); 890 (Kindler) (“I don't know anything
about the Houlihan presentation.”).
106 See JX 77 (Houlihan Lokey Fairness Opinion); JX 78 (Houlihan Lokey Feb. 26, 2010 Presentation); Tr. 202
(De Rose).
107 See, e.g., Tr. 871 (Kindler) (“That is basically Morgan Stanley as an institution telling the special committee
that they affirmatively recommend that they do the recap. That is just far stronger than a fairness opinion.”).
108 JX 431 (Morgan Stanley Engagement Letter).
109 8 Del. C. § 141(e) (“A member of the board of directors, or a member of any committee designated by the
board of directors, shall, in the performance of such member's duties, be fully protected in relying in good faith
upon the records of the corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports or statements presented to
the corporation by any of the corporation's officers or employees, or committees of the board of directors, or by
any other person as to matters the member reasonably believes are within such other person's professional
or expert competence and who has been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.”).
110 The recommendation by Morgan Stanley was also approved by its internal fairness committee. See Tr. 872
(Kindler) (“Q. Morgan Stanley has a committee that approves the issuance of fairness opinions, doesn't it?
A. Yes. Q. And did that same committee approve Morgan Stanley's recommendation in this matter? A. Yes,
it did.”).
111 In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 770 (Del.Ch.2005) (holding that the compensation committee
was protected by 8 Del. C. § 141(e) in relying upon the advice of its compensation expert).
112 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del.1985) (“We do not imply that an outside valuation
study is essential to support an informed business judgment; nor do we state that fairness opinions by
independent investment bankers are required as a matter of law.”); Crescent/Mach I P'rs, L.P. v. Turner,
846 A.2d 963, 984 (Del.Ch.2000) (“[F]airness opinions prepared by independent investment bankers are
generally not essential, as a matter of law, to support an informed business judgment.”).
113 In re Loral Space & Commc'ns Inc. Consol. Litig., 2008 WL 4293781, at *22 (Del.Ch. Sept.19, 2008).
114 Kahn v. Tremont, 694 A.2d at 429.
115 See, e.g., Tr. 433–35 (Lund); 628–29 (Granath); 682–83 (Jennings); 463–64 (Lund).
116 Tr. 260–61(Lee) (“We also evaluated the capital markets alternative as well as sale alternative, and in our
view, in conjunction with discussions with our ratings advisory group and our capital markets group, ... they
did not believe that the company could raise enough to take out the $1.2 billion of senior secured Hallmark
debt. Likewise, on the sale side, we did not believe that in the current market, or based on the company's
forecasted projections, that the company was likely to achieve a sale value of greater than $1.2 billion.”).
117 Tr. 839 (Kindler) (“[Reaching out to third parties about refinancing] would have been a pointless exercise.
We have one of the premier leverage finance businesses on Wall Street. We're in the market every day.
And the concept that anyone would lend this company, it just was not going to happen, so it would have
been a pointless exercise to do that.”); 842–43 (Kindler) (“[Considering a third party sale was] much like the
refinancing. From [Morgan Stanley's] perspective as investment bankers ... the asset was for sale but the key
was at what price could it possibly be sold. We're in this business. We knew what every other cable channel
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was sold for. [W]e knew that it could not be sold for anywhere near what the debt was. This was just one of
those circumstances where it was absolutely clear to us as investment bankers that there would be no buyer
for this channel at anything near what the debt was.”).
118 Tr. 261(Lee) (“We thought a go-private transaction in which Hallmark would tender for the shares of the
unaffiliated shareholders was a ... good alternative, arguably the best alternative that was available, but we
didn't think it was actually going to be available.”).
119 Kindler explained at trial that the Hallmark Proposal provided no return to the minority stockholders. See Tr.
847–48 (Kindler) (“[T]he original proposal that was made by Hallmark was basically that the equity wouldn't
share in anything until the company was worth over [$] 1.15, $1.2 billion.”). Because both Hallmark and
Morgan Stanley agreed that Crown was worth less than $1 .15 billion, the equity would have received no
value under the Hallmark Proposal.
120 Tr. 270–71(Lee); 847–49 (Kindler).
121 With $500 million of debt, only $315 million of Crown's debt was converted into new debt, and $185 million
of Crown's debt was converted into Crown preferred stock. PTO ¶ 37. Eventually, non-Hallmark equity
ownership turned out to be the amount that exceeded Crown's aggregate value of $525 million, because
of the issue with the preferred stock. Non–Hallmark stockholders were to retain 8.2% of the common stock
assuming the preferred stock converted. JX 74 (Morgan Stanley Feb. 25, 2010 Presentation) at 19–20. At
trial, Kindler testified “[w]e were going to be sharing at over 500 million, essentially sharing at over 525 million,
because this is preferred stock at issue that we had.” Tr. 855 (Kindler).
122 JX 50 (Oct. 27, 2009 Minutes).
123 Tr. 865–66 (Kindler) (“If I was in Hallmark's position, I would never agree to a majority-of-the-minority
condition. It makes absolutely no sense from Hallmark's perspective, because then they're in the impossible
position of having negotiated with the special committee only to find that, now, they've got to go to public
stockholders to get the majority of the minority to approve. They don't even know who the public stockholders
are because it changes every day.”).
124 Id.
125 Tr. 866 (Kindler) (“[W]e kept it to negotiate. We were strong on it, right from the beginning of the transaction;
and toward the end of the transaction, we were able to extract a lot of things ... all in the context of agreeing
not to have the majority-of-the-minority condition.”).
126 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
127 Reis v. Hazelett Strip–Casting Corp., 2011 WL 303207, at *15 (Del.Ch. Jan.21, 2011) (citing Cinerama, Inc.
v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1143 (Del.Ch.1994), aff'd, Technicolor Plenary, 663 A.2d 1156; accord
Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 1996 WL 145452, at *1 (Del.Ch. Mar.21, 1996) (“A fair price is a price that is within
a range that reasonable men and women with access to relevant information might accept.”), rev'd on other
grounds, 694 A.2d 422 (Del.1997)).
128 Reis v. Hazelett Strip–Casting Corp., 2011 WL 303207, at *17 (Del.Ch. Jan.21, 2011).
129 Id.
130 See, e.g., JX 76 (Feb. 25–26, 2010 Minutes) (“Mr. Kindler stated that he does not view the decision to approve
the Recapitalization as being a close call and that he believes approval of the Recapitalization is clearly the
right thing for the Committee to do. The Committee members unanimously approved and accepted the report
of Morgan Stanley.”).
131 Tr. 853 (Kindler).
132 See Tr. 53–55 (Schechter).
133 669 A.2d 671 (Del.Ch.1995), aff'd sub nom. Young v. Vision Hardware Group, Inc., 676 A.2d 909 (Del.1996).
134 2010 WL 3959399 (Del.Ch. Sept.24, 2010).
135 Id. at 677.
136 Id. at 677 (“[T]he evidence shows conclusively that but for the TCW proposal and its effectuation, Better
Vision was a going concern heading immediately into bankruptcy and, unless new credit was made available,
liquidation. This fact has very basic importance in determining the fair value of Better Vision stock.”).
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137 Id. (“As a company to be appraised moves closer to the lip of liquidation, the line between going concern
basis and liquidation basis becomes ever finer. That is, financial differences between the results of these
different types of analysis will grow smaller as the company moves close to forced liquidation.”).
138 2010 WL 3959399, at *3.
139 See Finkelstein v. Liberty Digital, Inc., 2005 WL 1074364, at *12 (Del.Ch. Apr.25, 2005) (finding that plaintiffs'
“Fantasy Island approach” to DCF valuation ignored the company's “hard economic realities.”).
140 See In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S'holder Litig., 2011 WL 227634, at *3 (Del.Ch. Jan.14, 2011).
141 2010 WL 3959399, at *3 (Del.Ch. Sept.24, 2010) (“[T]he company was in fact ‘under water’ at the time of the
merger. Accordingly, a merger price above $0.00 (in [Hanover], $0.25 per share) was entirely fair.”).
142 Id. at *2.
143 Id. (“If a discounted cash flow analysis reveals a valuation similar to a comparable companies or comparable
transactions analysis, I have more confidence that both analyses are accurately valuing a company. If an
expert witness clearly and persuasively explains why he or she has included or omitted an outlier from his
or her data set, I have more confidence that the expert witness's data set is less likely to lead to a biased
or skewed valuation.”).
144 Morgan Stanley and Houlihan used multiple valuation methodologies, and they both arrived at values for
Crown less than the amount of Crown's debt. Also, third-party indications from other players in the industry
valued Crown at between $500 million and $1 billion. See JX 31 (June 24, 2009 Minutes). Furthermore,
Hallmark's financial advisors ran thirteen different valuation exercises, and only one reflected a value above
the Hallmark debt. See JX 401 (Email from A. Shakir) at HLMK00008502 (deriving Crown's enterprise value
at $1.391 billion); see also Tr. 186–87 (De Rose) (“It's our view, and I believe the view of practitioners in the
valuation area, that valuations are best when they are supported by multiple legs, when there are different
analyses from which you can triangulate a value, and that each of the analyses are confirmatory of the other....
So it really is the sense that more methodologies are better than just relying on a single one.”); 298(Lee) (“In
our view, each valuation methodology has its limitations, so in order to have the best result in a valuation,
we believe it makes sense, and most practitioners, I believe, and most academics, recommend that you use
multiple valuation methodologies to triangulate a valuation.”).
145 JX 86 (Schechter Report) at 58.
146 Tr. 9–11 (Schechter).
147 See, e.g., Gray v. Cytokine Pharmasciences, Inc., 2002 WL 853549, at *8 (Del.Ch. Apr.25, 2002) (“In sum,
when compared to other indications of value, Davis's valuation is such an outlier that it casts doubt on its
reliability, quite apart from its exact assumptions and methodologies.”).
148 Hallmark Defs.' Post–Trial Answering Br. 35. As the chart demonstrates, Schechter's own two rejected
valuations are located at the very bottom of the chart and his $2.946 billion DCF value is on the far right in the
circle. The chart shows the valuation numbers from the potential buyers in the past, and the valuation ranges
by methodologies from defendants' financial advisors (Morgan Stanley, Houlihan and Evercore Partners).
149 In contrast to Schechter and Hamada, Hausman is an expert on the cable industry and the economic trends
in that industry. He has extensive experience as a consultant to cable and satellite TV providers, and cable
TV channels. JX 87 (Hausman Report) ¶ 3; Hausman Dep. 10–16. In addition, in contrast to Schechter,
Hausman has testified as an expert in the cable industry in court proceedings and has written academic
papers about that industry. Id. at 30–31. Hausman submitted an expert rebuttal report explaining the flaws
in Schechter's valuation, and as previously noted, plaintiff did not cross-examine Hausman at trial.
150 JX 91 (Hausman Rebuttal) ¶ 2 (finding Schechter's valuation fails an economic reality test, Hausman states,
“[s]ince economists typically find market outcomes to be among the best sources of economic information, I
analyze whether his valuation is consistent with observed market outcomes. Market outcomes are often the
best source of economic information since individuals and firms spend real money and attempt to achieve
the best outcome possible.”).
151 Id. at ¶ 8.
152 See JX 87 (Hausman Report) ¶ 16; JX 91 (Hausman Rebuttal) ¶ 3; Tr. 660 (Hausman).
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153 JX 91 (Hausman Rebuttal) ¶ 2; see id. at ¶ 3 (“I find it remarkable that Mr. Schechter makes no reference
in his report to these prior market valuations. The market knew Crown was for sale and Hallmark was a
‘motivated seller.’ Yet no offer came within a factor of three of Mr. Schechter's valuation.”); see also id. at n.
9 (“Fox made the only actual offer, and its offer is only about 1/6 of Mr. Schechter's valuation.”).
154 Id. at ¶ 12 (“[T]he discrepancy between Crown's market valuation and Mr. Schechter's valuation implies
that a potential buyer could earn over $1.8 billion by buying Crown (the difference between Mr. Schechter's
$2.95 billion valuation and the $1.13 billion market valuation). This type of opportunity is rarely missed by
Wall Street. Thus, even given the characteristics of Hallmark owning a substantial share of Crown, I do
not find it plausible that a buyer would miss the opportunity of an expected return of approximately 160%
if Mr. Schechter's valuation was accurate. This analysis makes his valuation especially implausible given
Hallmark's demonstrated willingness to sell Crown over the 2005–2009 period.”).
155 JX 87 (Hausman Report) ¶ 16 (“Given the value of the debt at $1.1 billion before the recent recapitalization,
and reviewing the above approaches and outcomes, I do not find that the value of the Crown common stock
was positive. That is, after the debt is paid off there would not be any residual value for common equity
owners.”).
156 Id. at n. 9 (“My conclusion is also consistent with the Evercore valuation of Crown as of December 2009 of
$1.025 billion.”).
157 Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., 1995 WL 376911, at *5 (Del.Ch. June 15, 1995); see, e.g., Doft &
Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., 2004 WL 1152338, at *5 (Del.Ch. May 20, 2004) (“Delaware law clearly prefers
valuations based on contemporaneously prepared management projections because management ordinarily
has the best first-hand knowledge of a company's operations.”); In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders
Litig., 2004 WL 1305745, at *14 (Del.Ch. May 3, 2004) (“This Court has consistently expressed a preference
for the most recently prepared management projections available as of the merger date. The Court has also
been skeptical of ex post adjustments to such projections.”).
158 Cede & Co. v. JRC Acquisition Corp., 2004 WL 286963, at *2 (Del.Ch. Feb.10, 2004) (“[T]his Court prefers
valuations based on management projections available as of the date of the merger and holds a healthy
skepticism for post-merger adjustments to management projections or the creation of new projections entirely.
Expert valuations that disregard contemporaneous management projections are sometimes completely
discounted.”); see, e.g., Taylor v. Am. Specialty Retailing Group, Inc., 2003 WL 21753752, at *2 (Del.Ch.
July 25, 2003) (“Significantly, Kern's valuation lacks credibility because, ... he ignored a contemporaneous
set of projections prepared by Dunham's management, choosing instead to rely on far more pessimistic
assumptions of Dunham's future prospects that he prepared on his own.”).
159 In re Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 WL 1305745, at *15 (explaining that “[e]xperts who ... vary from management
forecasts should proffer legitimate reasons for such variance” and finding that the expert in that case had
failed to provide “legitimate reasons” for modifying management's projections).
160 JX 86 (Schechter Report) at 37–39 (“I found several areas of the forecasts to be lower than I would expect;” “I
find this estimate to be very low;” “The forecasts used in the Morgan Stanley valuation are very low.”). Using
his own approach, Schechter calculated the revenues to surpass management's projections by $26 million
(8%) in 2011, $69 million (19%) in 2012, and $75 million (18%) in 2013. Compare JX 86 (Schechter Report)
at Ex. 4, with JX 559 (Crown 5 Year Plan) at SC0000018.
161 See Tr. 508–09 (Stewart).
162 Id. at 520.
163 Id. at 509–510 (“[L]ike any business, it's very difficult to predict the forecasted performance of the
organization ... forward-looking forecasts are obviously dependent on advertising revenue which is driven by
ratings, and those ratings are very difficult to predict for extended periods beyond three to four years.”).
164 JX 91 (Hausman Rebuttal) ¶ 20 n. 32 (“An example might be useful to demonstrate how uncertainty increases
the further one predicts into the future. The prediction for 2024 has approximately 4.7 times as much
uncertainty (variance) as the prediction for 2010. Now values further into the future have less weight in
the DCF because of discounting. But even after discounting, the predictions for 2022–2024 will contribute
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approximately the same amount to the DCF valuation as the 2010 prediction. Yet, the discounted prediction
from 2022–2024 will still have over 4 times as much uncertainty as the 2010 prediction since the ratio of the
variance is approximately 4.3.”).
165 See, e.g., Tr. 187 (De Rose) (“We used the projections provided to us by management at Crown. It's our
customary practice to rely on management projections.”); Tr. 255(Lee) (“We rely on management's judgment
and believe that as the operators of the company, they are in the best position to evaluate how the company
will perform and are in the best position to prepare a business plan .”).
166 Tr. 963 (Hamada) (“Q. [Y]ou didn't give any opinion at all on the appropriate lengths of a projection period
for a DCF analysis of Crown; did you? A. What would be an appropriate length of time or optimal length of
time? No, I did not.”).
167 JX 91 (Hausman Rebuttal) ¶ 2.
168 In re Zenith Nat'l Ins. Corp. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 5296–VCL, Tr. at 117 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 2010); see also
Gray v. Cytokine Pharmasciences, Inc., 2002 WL 853549, at *7 (Del.Ch. Apr.25, 2002) (“Davis's valuation
reached conclusions as to value that are so high that they draw into question both his qualifications and his
independence. Davis's valuation is off the charts. Davis's valuation, ..., more than doubles the results reached
by Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers. Davis's going concern value is also more than four times higher than
any offer PSI's board received when attempting to sell the Company.”).
169 Gray, 2002 WL 853549, at *7–8 (finding that “the extraordinary variance from [earlier] indications of value”
the board had received when attempting to sell the company was “unexplained”).
170 Id. at 8 (“In sum, when compared to other indications of value, [plaintiff's expert's] valuation is such an outlier
that it casts doubt on its reliability, quite apart from its exact assumptions and methodologies.”).
171 Tr. 50 (Schechter); but see 763 (Griffith) (“[W]e wouldn't have extended the standstill. I think we would have
no choice but to pursue bankruptcy or foreclosure.”); 819–20 (Hall) (“Q. So bankruptcy was an option? A. It
was an option, and probably the only option, and we were prepared to take forward if this did not take place.”).
172 Tr. 12–13 (Schechter).
173 Cede & Co. v. JRC Acquisition Corp., 2004 WL 286963, at *2 (Del.Ch. Feb.10, 2004) (quoting Ryan v. Tad's
Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 682, 702 (Del.Ch.1996)).
174 Hanover, 2010 WL 3959399, at *2 (“Although there is no single preferred or accepted valuation methodology
under Delaware law that establishes beyond question a company's value, there are commonly accepted
methodologies that a prudent expert should use in coordination with one another to demonstrate the reliability
of its valuation. If a discounted cash flow analysis reveals a valuation similar to a comparable companies
or comparable transactions analysis, I have more confidence that both analyses are accurately valuing a
company.”).
175 JX 89 (Lee Rebuttal Report) at 6 (“While DCF valuation is a theoretically sound and commonly used valuation
methodology, it is highly sensitive to the numerous underlying assumptions, including but not limited to
the cash flow projections, terminal value calculation, and WACC. Furthermore, a DCF valuation values the
‘fundamental’ or ‘intrinsic’ value of an enterprise and as such, may not reflect certain market dynamics or
synergies that an acquirer may enjoy. Consequently, the theoretical DCF valuation analysis may misrepresent
what a buyer would actually pay for a business.”); JX 92 (De Rose Rebuttal Report) at 5 (“Though the DCF
is a generally accepted valuation methodology, it is typically general industry practice to employ the use of
several methods—based on available data—in order to triangulate a conclusive valuation opinion.”).
176 Hanover, 2010 WL 3959399, at *2; JX 89 (Lee Rebuttal Report) at 7 n. 11 (citing Niso Abuaf, Valuing Illiquid
Equity Securities in Light of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, 20 Journal of Applied Finance 110, 113 (2010)
(“Most practitioners triangulate among the three approaches. Triangulation shows scientific humility and legal
prudence. That is, if we do not know what the truly correct approach is, we might as well be non-dogmatic and
consider all the reasonable approaches, cross-check them against each other, and estimate the final result
by quoting a range and not a point estimate.”); Conroy & Harris, Valuing Assets in Financial Markets 5 (2007)
(“Triangulation of value estimates is common in practice and also very useful as any method has its flaws.”)).
Trading comparables/multiples in the comparable companies analysis informs “what equity investors were
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willing to pay for similar assets, based on facts and circumstances at the time of the analyses .” Id. Precedent
transaction comparables in the comparable transactions analysis reflects “the value buyers were willing to
pay for similar assets, including potential synergies, control premia, and other factors relevant to the period
when such assets were acquired.” Id. In sum, this market approach is premised on the concept that “the
value of a business can be determined by reference to ‘reasonably’ comparable guideline companies for
which values are known because either (i) they are publicly traded (comparable companies analysis), or (ii)
they were recently bought or sold in a transaction, the terms of which were publicly disclosed (comparable
transactions analysis).” JX 92 (De Rose Rebuttal Report) at 5.
177 JX 86 (Schechter Report) at 31–32.
178 Id.
179 2010 WL 3959399, at *2.
180 Hamada, in his deposition, admitted that he could have offered his rebuttal report before the opening expert
report was filed. Hamada Dep. 18–20, 23–25. Hamada had not read the Hausman Rebuttal Report before
his deposition although he conceded at trial that “it was certainly important enough for me to read.” Tr. 937
(Hamada). Moreover, Hamada's cross-examination revealed that he had not discovered any real flaw in
Hausman's criticism of Schechter's DCF analysis. Tr. 950–52 (Hamada).
181 Id. at 940.
182 Id.
183 Id. (“But in this assignment they would have never hired me as an expert in the cable television industry. So
I would not be able to adequately evaluate the contents of those offers and so forth because I don't know
that industry well enough.”).
184 Tr. 974 (Hamada).
185 Tr. 942 (Hamada).
186 Id.
187 Tr. 943 (Hamada).
188 Hamada explained there are two accepted approaches to calculate a firm's WACC—an industry approach
and a firm-specific approach. Tr. 904–05 (Hamada); JX 88 (Hamada Rebuttal) ¶¶ 6–8. Hamada opined that
the correct calculation of WACC under the industry approach requires that a cost of equity and a cost of
debt based on industry inputs must be weighted with an industry-average capital structure. Under the firm-
specific approach, the firm-specific cost of equity and the firm-specific cost of debt must be weighted with
a firm-specific capital structure. Hamada insists that calculating a firm's WACC using an industry-average
capital structure with firm-specific costs of equity and debt is methodologically inappropriate and results in
an incorrect WACC calculation. Id. at ¶¶ 6–10; Hamada Dep. 151–56.
189 See Tr. 914 (Hamada), 324(Lee); see also Special Committee Defs.' Answering Post–Trial Br. 60 n. 39.
190 Hamada Dep. 159; Tr. 977 (Hamada).
191 JX 74 (Morgan Stanley Feb. 25, 2010 Presentation) at 35–37.
192 Hamada explained that the “cliff-like drop” in the terminal year is evident with Morgan Stanley's selected
perpetuity growth rates—22.3% free cash flow growth in the final year of the projections going out only 3½
years and then dropping immediately to only 1–3% growth in perpetuity. JX 88 (Hamada Rebuttal) ¶¶ 15–16.
193 See, e.g., Tr. 312(Lee) (“[I]t's typical to have a difference, a spread between the growth rate that's implied by
management's projections and then the perpetual growth rate that you apply using the perpetual growth rate
methodology. I think that's the case in every DCF that I've done, so it wasn't unusual and wasn't something that
we viewed as highly suspect.”); Kindler Dep. 67 (“Having reviewed many of these I cannot imagine a single
case where the perpetuity growth rate is not significantly below the growth rate in the last years.”). Moreover,
Morgan Stanley's perpetuity growth rates were consistent with industry practice. JX 89 (Lee Report) at 17.
194 Perpetuity growth rates implied by Morgan Stanley's exit multiple calculation actually were higher than the
perpetuity growth rate Schechter used. Hamada, however, altered the WACC Morgan Stanley estimated
and then argued that Morgan Stanley's exit multiples created a cliff-like drop. Morgan Stanley estimated a
WACC nearly 50% higher than the WACC that Hamada assumed in his criticisms of Morgan Stanley's exit
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multiple calculation. Tr. 966–69 (Hamada) (“Q. [I]n your report, your analysis of the cliff-like drop assumes
that Morgan Stanley estimated Crown's WACC to be 9 percent; doesn't it? A. Just the same as the number
right above 13.2 percent on page 34. Q. But Morgan Stanley did not estimate Crown's WACC to be 9 percent;
did it? A. They should have.”).
195 Tr. 948 (Hamada).
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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*1  THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon the
following motions: (1) Plaintiff's Daubert Motion to Exclude
the Opinion and Testimony of John J. Huber (“Huber”)
(hereafter, “Huber Motion”) [D.E. 148]; (2) Plaintiff's
Daubert Motion to Exclude the Opinion and Testimony of
Christopher M. James (“James”) (hereafter, “James Motion”)
[D.E. 155]; (3) Plaintiff's Daubert Motion to Exclude
the Testimony of Linda A. MacDonald (“MacDonald”)
(hereafter, “MacDonald Motion”) [D.E. 159] (collectively,
“Plaintiff's Daubert Motions”); and (4) Defendants' Motion
in Limine to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of
Expert Witness Lynn E. Turner (“Turner”) (hereafter, “Turner
Motion” or “Defendants' Daubert Motion”) ( [D.E. 156] ). 1
Plaintiff's Daubert Motions and Defendants' Daubert Motion
were referred to the undersigned by the Honorable Robert
N. Scola, Jr., United States District Judge, “to be heard and
determined in accordance with [ ] 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)
and Rule 1(c) of the Local Magistrate Judge Rules” [D.E.
169]. The undersigned held an evidentiary hearing on the
motions, which took place on September 23-25, 2013. For
the reasons stated below, the undersigned hereby DENIES
the Huber Motion, the MacDonald Motion and the Turner
Motion; and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the
James Motion.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2
Defendant BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. (“Bancorp” or
“BBX”) is a publicly traded company. During 2006 and
2007, Bancorp was the holding company for BankAtlantic,
a federal savings bank offering consumer and commercial
banking and lending services throughout Florida. Bancorp's
common stock is listed on the New York Stock Exchange
and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC” or “Plaintiff”) under Section 12(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 (hereafter, “Exchange Act”), 15
U.S.C. § 78o(b). Defendant Alan Levan (“Levan”) is the
Chairman of the Board and CEO of Bancorp, and in 2007 he
was also the Chairman of BankAtlantic.
In 2007, BankAtlantic was one of Florida's largest
commercial banking and lending institutions with $1.5
billion in its commercial real estate loan portfolio.
Approximately $533 million of this portfolio consisted of
loans in BankAtlantic's commercial residential real estate
land acquisition and development portfolio (“Commercial
Residential Portfolio” or “Portfolio”). The loans in the
Portfolio consisted of Builder Land Bank (“BLB”) loans
and non-BLB loans. 3  In managing the Portfolio, Bancorp
assigned to the loans, and reassigned as necessary, internal
grades of 1 to 13, based on their individual creditworthiness.
Grades 10-13 were considered non-passing grades.
*2  The SEC brings this action against Bancorp and
Levan (collectively, “Defendants”) for alleged securities laws
violations, arising from: (1) Defendants' public disclosures
regarding the health of the Commercial Residential Portfolio;
(2) Bancorp's accounting treatment of a portion of the
Portfolio; and (3) Bancorp's maintenance of internal controls.
The SEC alleges the following as to each of these three
violation categories.
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1. Public Disclosures:
The SEC alleges that Defendants failed to provide appropriate
disclosures in the Management Discussion and Analysis
(“MD&A”) section of Bancorp's Forms 10-Q for the first
and second quarter of 2007. 4  The SEC also alleges
that Defendants made material misrepresentations during
Bancorp's first and second quarter earnings conference calls
in 2007. 5  According to the SEC, Defendants had knowledge
of serious problems within BankAtlantic's Commercial
Residential Portfolio during the first two quarters of 2007,
yet did not disclose those problems until the third quarter
of 2007. The SEC further alleges that Defendants, by
misrepresentations and omissions, failed to alert investors to a
known trend of loan extensions and internal loan downgrades
in the Commercial Residential Portfolio.
2. Accounting:
The SEC alleges that Defendants committed accounting fraud
violations in connection with Bancorp's 2007 Form 10-K. 6
According to the SEC, Bancorp engaged an investment bank,
JMP Securities, Inc. (“JMP”), in 2007 to sell some of the
problem loans in the Commercial Residential Portfolio (the
“JMP Loans”), yet Bancorp did not reclassify the JMP Loans
from “held-for-investment” to “held-for-sale” in accordance
with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”).
As a result, Bancorp avoided writing down the JMP Loans
to the lower of cost or fair value and reporting a materially
significant loss for 2007 in the Form 10-K.
3. Controls:
The SEC alleges that Bancorp failed to maintain or
follow adequate internal Disclosure Controls and Procedures
(“DC&P”) in violation of Section 13(b)(2) of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2). According to the SEC, the DC&P
that were maintained by Bancorp were usurped by Levan,
were never properly in place, or failed.
Defendants have retained MacDonald, James and Huber,
all of whom are nonscientific expert witnesses, to testify
at trial concerning these allegations of securities laws
violations. The SEC has retained a single nonscientific
expert witness, Turner, for the same purpose. In their
respective Daubert Motions, Plaintiff and Defendants do
not challenge the overall professional qualifications of these
expert witnesses. 7  However, each side argues that the other's
proposed expert testimony raises serious concerns about: the
reliability of the testimony; whether the testimony will assist
the trier of fact; and whether the testimony will invade the
province of the Court to instruct the jury.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
*3  A party who seeks to admit expert testimony bears the
burden of laying the proper foundation for its admissibility
by a preponderance of the evidence. Allison v. McGhan Med.
Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, before
expert testimony may be admitted as evidence at trial pursuant
to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the district court
must act as a gatekeeper and screen the proffered evidence.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597
(1993). In the Eleventh Circuit, this gatekeeping function
must be performed as follows:
[I]n determining the admissibility of
expert testimony under Rule 702, [the
court must] engage in a rigorous
three-part inquiry [and] must consider
whether: (1) the expert is qualified
to testify competently regarding the
matters he intends to address; (2)
the methodology by which the expert
reaches his conclusions is sufficiently
reliable as determined by the sort
of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and
(3) the testimony assists the trier
of fact, through the application of
scientific, technical, or specialized
expertise, to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue.
United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004)
(citing City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d
548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998)). Seealso, McCorvey v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002) (The
gatekeeping function requires the trial court “to conduct an
exacting analysis of the proffered expert's methodology” to
ensure it meets the standards of admissibility under Daubert.).
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However, a “district court's gatekeeper role under Daubert
is not intended to supplant the adversary system or the role
of the jury.” Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 666 (11th Cir.
2001) (citing Allison, 184 F.3d at 1311). Rather, “[v]igorous
cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional
and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence.” Allison, 184 F.3d at 1311.
A. First Daubert Inquiry – Expert's Qualifications
“While scientific training or education may provide possible
means to qualify [an expert], experience in a field may offer
another path to expert status.” United States v. Masferrer,
367 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (citing Frazier,
387 F.3d at 1260-61). “[I]f the witness is relying solely
or primarily on experience, then the witness must explain
how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why
that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and
how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.” United
States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1125 (11th Cir. 2011)
(citing Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1261). In this case, all of the
proffered experts are nonscientific and rely primarily on
their experience in their respective professional fields to
justify their opinions. Therefore, although the experts' overall
professional qualifications have not been challenged, those
qualifications are a factor to take into consideration when
assessing the reliability of their opinions. Augustin, 661 F.3d
at 1125; Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1261.
B. Second Daubert Inquiry – Reliability of Expert's
Opinion
“For nonscientific expert testimony, the trial judge must have
considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to
go about determining whether particular expert testimony is
reliable.” Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Schoenthal Family, LLC,
555 F.3d 1331, 1338 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Kumho Tire Co.,
Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999)). Thus, “[a]
district court may decide that nonscientific expert testimony
is reliable based upon [the expert's] personal knowledge or
experience.” Schoenthal, 555 F.3d at 1338 (citing Kumho,
526 U.S. at 150). In the context of nonscientific experts,
therefore, the main purpose of the Daubert reliability inquiry
is to determine whether the expert who is “basing testimony
upon professional studies or personal experience, employs
in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”
McClain v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1255 (11th
Cir. 2005) (citing Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152).
C. Third Daubert Inquiry – Helpfulness/Relevance of
Expert's Testimony
*4  “To be admissible, expert testimony must assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue. This condition goes primarily to relevance.”Johnson
v. Bush, Case No. 00-3542-CIV, 2002 WL 34355950, at *1
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2002). Put another way, the proposed
testimony must “fit” the case. Id. Seealso, Allison, 184 F.3d at
1312 (“[T]he court must ensure that the proposed testimony
is relevant to the task at hand, i.e., that it logically advances a
material aspect of the proposing party's case.”).
“[E]xpert testimony is admissible if it concerns matters that
are beyond the understanding of the average lay person.”
Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262. However, “[p]roffered expert
testimony generally will not help the trier of fact when it offers
nothing more than what lawyers for the parties can argue in
closing arguments.” Id. at 1262-63.
“An opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an
ultimate issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 704(a). In the Eleventh Circuit,
“an expert may offer opinion testimony on an ultimate issue
of fact, Fed. R. Evid. 704, [but] an expert may not [ ] merely
tell the jury what result to reach.” United States v. Caro, 454
Fed.Appx. 817, 843 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Montgomery v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir. 1990)).
Further, “ ‘while an expert may testify as to his opinion on
an ultimate issue of fact, [he or she] may not testify to the
legal implications of conduct; the court must be the jury's only
source of law.’ ” Dubiel v. Columbia Hosp. (Palm Beaches)
Ltd. P'ship, Case No. 04-80283-CIV, 2005 WL 5955691, at
*5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2005) (citing Montgomery, 898 F.2d at
1541).
While an expert may opine “as to whether one party or another
acted in compliance with industry standards, an expert cannot
permissibly opine on whether a party had a right to do what it
did under legal standards. Instead, this area is reserved for the
Court.” R&R Int'l, Inc. v. Manzen, LLC, Case No. 09-60545-
CIV, 2010 WL 3605234, at *19 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2010).
Seealso, United States v. Long, 300 Fed.Appx. 804, 814-16
(11th Cir. 2008) (finding it admissible for a forensic expert
witness to testify that the actions of the defendant “bore the
hallmarks of a Ponzi Scheme” because it “was a factual, and
not a legal conclusion,” but excluding an expert who used the
language “artifice or scheme to defraud”).
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III. THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING
On September 23-25, 2013, the undersigned heard the
testimony of MacDonald, James, Huber and Turner
regarding their proposed expert opinions. Defendants
tendered MacDonald on the subject of Defendants' alleged
failure to reclassify the JMP Loans from “held-for-
investment” to “held-for-sale pursuant to GAAP;” James
on the subjects of Defendants' alleged failure to provide
appropriate disclosures in the MD&A section of Bancorp's
2007 first and second quarter Forms 10-Q and Defendants'
alleged misrepresentations during the 2007 first and second
quarter earnings conference calls; and Huber on the subjects
of Bancorp's allegedly inadequate DC&P and misleading
public disclosures. 8  The SEC tendered Turner as its sole
expert witness with respect to all of these issues.
By agreement of the parties, the initial and rebuttal report
of each expert were deemed to constitute that expert's direct
examination. See Order Setting Evidentiary Hearing [D.E.
216]. Thus, the live testimony at the evidentiary hearing
was limited to cross-examination and re-direct examination
of each witness. Having considered the expert witnesses'
proposed trial testimony (as expounded at the Daubert
Evidentiary Hearing), the pertinent portions of the record
and the applicable law, the undersigned concludes with
regard to Defendants' experts that MacDonald and Huber
satisfy the Daubert requirements and that James also satisfies
them, except for two of his opinions. The undersigned also
concludes that the SEC's expert, Turner, passes muster under
Daubert.
IV. MACDONALD
*5  At trial, MacDonald would offer the following opinions:
(1)Defendants were not required by GAAP to reclassify the
JMP Loans from “held-for-investment” to “held-for-sale;”
and (2) even if the loans had to be reclassified as “held-
for-sale,” the resulting write down of the loans should not
be calculated using the fair value approach proposed by the
SEC's expert. McDonald Expert Report [D.E. 171-20 at ¶ 10].
A. Reclassification of the JMP Loans
MacDonald began her analysis by evaluating the relevant
GAAP principles applicable to determining whether the
JMP Loans should have been reclassified from “held-for-
investment” to “held-for-sale.” Id. at ¶¶ 11-17. The first
GAAP source she consulted was the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants' Statement of Position 01-6
(“SOP 01-6”). See Transcript of Daubert Evidentiary Hearing
on September 23, 2013 (hereafter, “Trans. 9/23”) [D.E. 243 at
10, 24-25]. According to MacDonald, SOP 01-6 provides that
loans previously classified as “held-for-investment” should
be reclassified as “held-for-sale” at the lower of cost or fair
value only after a decision has been made to sell them.
MacDonald Expert Report [D.E. 171-20 at ¶ 12]. Because
SOP 01-6 does not explain how to determine whether “a
decision to sell” has been made, Trans. 9/23 [D.E. 243 at 11],
MacDonald then turned to Financial Accounting Standard
144 (“FAS 144”) for further guidance. MacDonald Expert
Report [D.E. 171-20 at ¶ 13]. 9
Although FAS 144 does not pertain to loans, Trans. 9/23
[D.E. 243 at 15], MacDonald, as the primary author of FAS
144, reasoned by analogy from that source because there
was a void in GAAP with respect to loans, and FAS 144
supplied guidance for long-lived assets, the most analogous
asset to loans. Id. at 56-60. According to MacDonald, FAS
144 provides that intent to sell is not sufficient to classify a
long-lived asset as “held-for-sale.” MacDonald Expert Report
[D.E. 171-20 ¶ 14].
In MacDonald's opinion, the factual record did not reflect that
Bancorp, through Levan or otherwise, had made a decision
to sell the JMP Loans. Id. at ¶ 18. Specifically, MacDonald
opined that Bancorp's engagement with JMP regarding the
JMP Loans constituted a market test and not a decision to sell.
Id. at ¶¶ 19-50. 10  MacDonald testified that, under FAS 144,
when “there [are] indicia that you are test marketing [ ] long-
lived assets, you will not call it Held-for-Sale even if all of the
other conditions [for a sale] are met.” Trans. 9/23 [D.E. 243 at
60]. When asked whether a jury could just as easily undertake
the same review of the record that she had conducted to
reach her conclusions, MacDonald responded that her review
had been conducted through the lens of her understanding of
GAAP, and based on her professional experience. Id. at 23.
B. The SEC's Expert's Fair Value Approach
According to MacDonald, even if the JMP Loans should
have been reclassified as “held-for-sale,” the fair value
approach utilized by the SEC's expert was not valid under
GAAP. MacDonald Expert Report [D.E. 171-20 at ¶¶ 51-83].
MacDonald looked to FAS 157, which addresses fair value
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measurements, for guidance on determining fair value. Id.
at 53-54. 11  FAS 157 defines fair value as “the price that
would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability
in an orderly transaction between market participants at the
measurement date.” Trans. 9/23 [D.E. 243 at 64]. Thus, an
orderly transaction is one of the bases for determining fair
value. Id. at 65.
*6  In MacDonald's opinion, bids in a proposed sales
transaction that reflect distressed pricing cannot qualify as a
measurement of fair value under FAS 157 because the sale
would not constitute an “orderly transaction.” MacDonald
Expert Report [D.E. 171-20 at ¶ 75]. MacDonald further
testified that, for purposes of reclassifying the JMP Loans
as “held-for-sale,” the applicable fair value “measurement
date” under FAS 157 would have been December 31, 2007.
Trans. 9/23 [D.E. 243 at 30]. However, all of the bids relied
upon by the SEC were received at some point after that date,
MacDonald Expert Report [D.E. 171-20 at ¶¶ 55-63], and, in
any event, an unaccepted offer cannot form the basis for a
transaction date. Trans. 9/23 [D.E. 243 at 65-66], 12
MacDonald testified that the SEC's proposed approach for
determining fair value of the JMP Loans was missing
a number of steps required under GAAP. Id. at 38-39.
Though MacDonald admitted that she did not undertake these
steps herself, including reviewing the underlying appraisals,
performing a discounted cash flow analysis or confirming the
findings of Bancorp's external auditors, id. at 40-44, she saw
no signs that the SEC's expert, Turner, who actually valued
the JMP Loans, carried out any of these tasks when computing
their fair value. Id. at 66-68. 13  According to MacDonald, the
only two bids upon which Turner relied, which were received
after the measurement date in a disorderly transaction, could
not provide a legitimate basis to determine fair value under
GAAP. Id.
C. Challenges to MacDonald's Opinions
The SEC challenges the reliability and helpfulness/relevance
of MacDonald's opinions. As to reliability, the SEC argues
(i) that MacDonald's first opinion on GAAP compliance is
not reliable because she applied no real methodology and did
nothing more than weigh the factual evidence, which is a task
solely reserved to the jury, and (ii) that her second opinion is
not reliable because she failed to carry out her own valuation
of the JMP Loans. MacDonald Motion [D.E. 159 at 3]. As to
helpfulness/relevance, the SEC argues (i) that MacDonald's
first opinion on GAAP compliance is ultimately a legal
conclusion, which is improper and intrudes on the Court's
role; and (ii) that in rejecting the SEC's expert's determination
of fair value in her second opinion, MacDonald reached
an improper legal conclusion and provided no coherent
alternative theory of her own. Id.
1. Reliability
Because MacDonald is a nonscientific expert, consideration
of her qualifications is part of the inquiry into the reliability
of her methodology. Augustin, 661 F.3d at 1125; Frazier, 387
F.3d at 1261. MacDonald is a Certified Public Accountant
with over thirty years of professional experience in financial
accounting and reporting, including her present position as
a Senior Managing Director in the forensic and litigation
consulting practice of FTI Consulting, Inc. and as a past
Director of the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(“FASB”). MacDonald Expert Report [D.E. 171-20 at ¶¶ 4-8].
MacDonald also worked at the SEC's Enforcement Division
on investigations into fraud and GAAP violations associated
with public companies' financial statements. Id. at 6.
(i) MacDonald's first opinion on GAAP compliance
*7  The SEC contends that MacDonald applied no real
methodology and did nothing more than a jury would do
with respect to this opinion. However, as discussed above,
MacDonald testified that she consulted the GAAP guidance
that she found to be relevant to the classification of loans
as “held-for-sale;” applied that guidance, viewed through
the lens of her extensive experience in financial accounting
and reporting, to the factual record; and opined that the
JMP Loans were correctly classified under GAAP as “held-
for-investment” rather than “held-for-sale.” Because her
methodology was informed by and conducted in accordance
with her professional experience, MacDonald's opinion as
a nonscientific expert meets the Daubert reliability prong.
Schoenthal, 555 F.3d at 1338; McClain, 401 F.3d at 1255.
Moreover, because she applied her professional experience to
formulate her opinion, MacDonald did not just weigh the facts
as a lay jury would.
(ii) MacDonald's second opinion on fair value
The SEC challenges MacDonald's second opinion as
unreliable because, while criticizing the SEC's expert's
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valuation, she did not perform one herself. However, the
impact of such failure simply goes to the weight to be given by
the jury to MacDonald's opinion, rather than its admissibility.
Rosenfeld v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., 654 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th
Cir. 2011) (“[I]n most cases, objections to the inadequacies of
a study are more appropriately considered an objection going
to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.”).
2. Helpfulness/Relevance
The SEC also seeks to exclude both of MacDonald's opinions
under the helpfulness/relevance inquiry as improper legal
conclusions.
(i) MacDonald's first opinion on GAAP compliance
The SEC argues that MacDonald's first opinion constitutes
an impermissible legal opinion because the “clear risk here
is the jury will likely confuse MacDonald's opinion that the
Defendants followed GAAP as a determinative conclusion, if
not exactly the same as, finding the Defendants did not violate
the federal securities laws.” MacDonald Motion [D.E. 159
at 7]. However, expert testimony as to the interpretation of
GAAP and its application to the facts of a case is permissible
and does not, without more, constitute improper legal
conclusions. Seee.g., In re Novatel Wireless Sec. Litig., Case
No. 08cvl689, 2011 WL 5827198, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17,
2011) (admitting expert testimony of “whether Defendants
complied with SEC and GAAP requirements” but excluding
testimony about what their contracts permitted); S.E.C. v.
Leslie, Case No. C 07-3444, 2010 WL 2991038, at *7-9
(N.D. Cal. July 29, 2010) (admitting expert's interpretation
of GAAP but excluding testimony about judicial opinions
and Securities Exchange Rule quotations); S.E.C. v. Retail
Pro, Inc., No. 08cv1620, 2011 WL 589828, at *4 (S.D. Cal.
Feb. 10, 2011) (finding that evidence regarding GAAP and
revenue recognition was a proper basis for expert testimony).
Therefore, so long as MacDonald's testimony does not veer
into the subject of securities laws violations, her opinion
that GAAP did not require Defendants to reclassify the JMP
Loans from “held-for-investment” to “held-for-sale” is not
impermissible, even if GAAP compliance is an element of the
securities laws violations alleged by the SEC.
Further, the Eleventh Circuit has “recognized that an
instruction may be used to prevent a jury from placing too
much weight on an expert's legal conclusions.” Maiz, 253
F.3d at 667. Seealso, United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800,
817 (11th Cir. 1984) (upholding the district court's decision
to admit expert testimony about an ultimate legal issue in
the case because the court was “careful to instruct the jury
about the weight that should be given expert testimony such
as [this]”). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that in such
instances “[i]f the district court takes a curative measure,
[the appellate] court will reverse only if the evidence is so
prejudicial as to be incurable by that measure.” United States
v. Pacheco, 426 Fed.Appx. 832, 835 (11th Cir. 2011). Thus,
the SEC may seek an appropriate curative instruction to
alleviate its concerns regarding the weight the jury may place
on MacDonald's opinion regarding GAAP compliance.
(ii) MacDonald's second opinion on fair value
*8  The SEC argues that MacDonald's second opinion
“attempts to ‘rule’ on the adequacy of support for the [SEC]’s
‘held-for-sale’ claim, and, in doing so, seeks to reach an
impermissible legal conclusion.” MacDonald Motion [D.E.
159 at 10]. However, MacDonald's criticism of Turner's
approach to computing the fair value of the JMP Loans is
neither a “ruling” nor an “impermissible legal conclusion.”
Novatel, 2011 WL 5827198, at *3; Leslie, 2010 WL 2991038,
at *7; Retail Pro, 2011 WL 589828, at *4. Moreover, the
SEC may seek an appropriate curative instruction to alleviate
its concerns regarding the weight the jury may place on
MacDonald's opinion regarding the SEC's proposed fair value
calculation. Maiz, 253 F.3d at 667; Gold, 743 F.2d at 817;
Pacheco, 426 Fed.Appx. at 835.
Therefore, the MacDonald Motion is denied.
V. JAMES
At trial, James would offer the following opinions relating
to Defendants' public disclosures: (1) the credit market
crisis unexpectedly and negatively impacted real estate prices
and market conditions for lenders beginning in the third
quarter of 2007; (2) The MD&A disclosures in Bancorp's
2007 first and second quarter Forms 10-Q were consistent
with regulatory requirements and industry practice; (3)
Bancorp's loan performance during that time was consistent
with Defendants' specific disclosures as well as the market
trends they disclosed; and (4) several analysts thought that
Bancorp was conservative in disclosing negative trends and
addressing problem loans. James Expert Report [D.E. 155-1
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at 2-4]. James testified that, in preparing his expert report, he
“followed the same procedures that [he] does in his research ...
[and] that are commonly used by economists” and that those
procedures are the same as “the scholarly standard and the
scientific standard that [are] applied when [he does his]
own published research.” Transcript of Daubert Evidentiary
Hearing on September 24, 2013 (hereafter “Trans. 9/24”)
[D.E. 244 at 187, 196]. 14
A. The credit market crisis
According to James, the credit markets dramatically and
unexpectedly declined in August 2007 and the real estate
sector deteriorated significantly amid this crisis. James Expert
Report [D.E. 155-1 at ¶¶ 19-46]. James opined that Florida
was more affected by the real estate downturn than almost
all other states. Id. at ¶ 39. When asked why he focused on
trends in the Florida real estate market when the SEC did
not allege such a trend in its complaint, James responded
that Defendants' “disclosing their business and its exposure
to the real estate market [was], in [his] opinion, disclosing an
important trend that is common to their business model and
the loans they make.” Trans. 9/24 [D.E. 244 at 168-69].
B. Consistency of disclosures with regulatory
requirements and industry practice
According to James, Defendants' public disclosures were
adequate in that they disclosed: (1) known trends in the real
estate market and the risks in BankAtlantic's loan portfolio;
(2) the fact that problem loans existed throughout the
portfolio; (3) risks consistent with regulatory requirements;
and (4) risks that were more comprehensive than those of
most comparable banks. James Expert Report [D.E. 155-1 at
¶¶ 47-84], The SEC asked James whether he was aware of any
evidence supporting Defendants' non-disclosure of Bancorp's
internal loan grades. Trans. 9/24 [D.E. 244 at 172-77]. James
responded that he relied on the deposition testimony of bank
employees, id., and his own experience as a director of a bank
for 16 years in concluding that this type of information is
not commonly disclosed because such level of disclosure is
discouraged by bank regulators. Id. at 197-98. The SEC also
questioned whether James had actually compared Bancorp's
disclosures with the other banks' disclosures in terms of what
was happening in their loan portfolios, and, in particular, their
own internal loan grades. Id. at 176-77. James responded that
he did look at the other banks' disclosures, but acknowledged
that, because internal loan grades are not generally publicly
available, he was not able to review them. Id. 15
C. Consistency of Bancorp's loan performance with
Defendants' specific disclosures and the market trends
they disclosed.
*9  According to James, Bancorp's actual loan performance
was consistent with Defendants' specific disclosures as well
as the market trends they disclosed. James Expert Report
[D.E. 155—1 at ¶¶ 85-91]. In formulating this opinion, James
reviewed the deterioration of BankAtlantic's Commercial
Residential Portfolio through the fourth quarter of 2008. Id. at
¶¶ 85-86. James also looked to performance data for the loan
portfolios of other, purportedly similarly situated Florida and
non-Florida banks through the fourth quarter of 2008. Id. at
¶¶ 87-91. After noting that Defendants reported worse than
average losses in the third quarter of 2007, James observed
that most of the other banks he considered eventually reported
similar losses to Bancorp's and caught up to Bancorp's
reported losses by the end of 2008. Id. at ¶¶ 86-91. Based
on these observations, James concluded that, “throughout the
first half of 2007 [Defendants] warned about the negative
market trend” and that “[t]he losses [Bancorp] reported in
[the third quarter of 2007] therefore can be described as the
realization of a disclosed risk, the magnitude of which was
unforeseeable by most market[ ] participants” and “in line
with that experienced by comparable banks.” Id. at ¶ 85. To
put it in simpler terms, the gist of this third opinion by James is
that the events that occurred after the first and second quarters
of 2007, both with respect to Bancorp's and other banks' loan
performances, show that Defendants' public disclosures in
those two quarters were “par for the course.”
D. Analysts' Reports
According to James, several analysts indicated that Bancorp
was conservative in disclosing negative trends and problem
loans in 2007, that Bancorp recognized the negative trend
in Florida real estate, and that Bancorp was one of the most
proactive banks in addressing and disclosing market concerns
and regarding the deterioration of Bancorp's real estate loan
portfolio. Id. at ¶¶ 92-100. In support of these observations,
James quoted and summarized the underlying analysts'
reports. Id. When challenged regarding his “expertise in
reading an analyst's report and providing a one-sentence
summary” of it, Trans. 9/24 [D.E. 244 at 186], James
acknowledged that he did not possess such expertise, but
explained that those reports are of the same type as those on
which he would rely in his published research. Id.
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E. Challenges to Janies' Opinions
The SEC objects to James testifying on the grounds that:
(1) James' opinion that the credit crisis unexpectedly and
negatively impacted real estate prices and market conditions
for lenders beginning in the third quarter of 2007 is irrelevant,
based on flawed methodology, and will confuse the jury; (2)
James' opinion that Defendants' disclosures appear consistent
with regulatory requirements and industry practice is a legal
opinion that improperly invades the province of the Court
and jury, and is also irrelevant and unreliable; (3) James'
opinion that Bancorp's loan performance was consistent with
Defendants' specific disclosures and the market trends they
disclosed is irrelevant and unreliable; and (4) James' opinion
reporting the contents of analysts' reports regarding Bancorp's
disclosures is hearsay. James Motion [D.E. 155 at 5-18].
Thus, the SEC's challenges to James' opinions fall into
three categories: the reliability of James' methodology; the
helpfulness/relevance of his opinions; and, as to the fourth
opinion, that it is hearsay.
1. Reliability
Because James is a nonscientific expert, consideration of
his qualifications is part of the inquiry into the reliability
of his methodology. Augustin, 661 F.3d at 1125; Frazier,
387 F.3d at 1261. James is the William H. Dial/Sun Bank
Eminent Scholar and Professor of Finance and Economics
at the University of Florida, as well as a visiting scholar at
the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. James Expert
Report [D.E. 155-1 at 1]. James has authored or co-authored
numerous peer-reviewed articles on economics and banking.
Id. at App. A. In 1995 and 1998, James served as a
consultant to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Id.
Additionally, from 1989 to 2006, James served on the Board
of Directors and the Advisory Board to SunTrust Banks of
Florida. Id. James testified that the methodology for all of
his opinions was grounded in the same level of intellectual
rigor that undergirds the work of professional economists
in the field. Trans. 9/24 [D.E. 244 at 187, 198]. Hence,
the SEC's challenge to the reliability of James' methodology
fails. SeeMcClain, 401 F.3d at 1255 (an expert basing
testimony upon professional studies or personal experience
must employ in the courtroom the same level of intellectual
rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant
field); Maiz, 253 F.3d at 665-66 (finding an economists'
theories and methodology sufficiently reliable where his
model was not unusually complex and his use of a broad-
based index to estimate the performance of U.S. real estate
was not without foundation).
2. Helpfulness/Relevance
*10  The SEC challenges the helpfulness/relevance of James'
first three opinions.
(i) James' first opinion on the credit market crisis
The SEC argues that this opinion is not relevant because it
will not help the trier of fact understand a fact in issue, as
there is no requirement for the SEC to prove loss causation.
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Daubert
Motion to Exclude the Opinion and Testimony of Christopher
M. James (hereafter, “James Reply”) [D.E. 201 at 4], In order
to prevail on its securities fraud claims, the SEC must show
that Defendants knowingly, willingly or recklessly made
untrue statements or omissions of material fact. See Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule
10b-5 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 16  Significantly,
the SEC must show that the allegedly misleading statements
or omissions made by Defendants were material.Basic, Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988). A fact is material
where there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of
the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of
information made available.” Basic, 485 U.S. at 231-32. The
credit market crisis' impact on real estate prices and market
conditions for lenders would arguably have been part of the
“total mix” of information considered by reasonable investors
in the first half of 2007. Therefore, James' first opinion is not
unhelpful or irrelevant.
(ii) James' second opinion on consistency of disclosures
with regulatory requirements and industry practice.
The SEC argues that James' second opinion is an
impermissible legal opinion and that disclosures made by
other banks are irrelevant to whether Defendants made
adequate disclosures. James Motion [D.E. 155 at 9]. However,
in addition to materiality, the SEC must prove scienter by
showing that Defendants acted with, at a minimum, severe
recklessness, when making the alleged misleading statements
or omissions in their public disclosures. Mizzaro v. Home
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Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 2008). Severe
recklessness is “not merely simple or even inexcusable
negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of
ordinary care, and that present[s] a danger of misleading
buyers or sellers which is either known to the defendant or
is so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of
it.” Id. Adherence to, or departure from, industry standards
can be probative of whether ordinary care was observed
in conducting business. Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 847
F.2d 673, 677-78 (11th Cir. 1988). Because James' opinion
on regulatory requirements and industry standards goes to
an element of the SEC's securities fraud claims, it is not
irrelevant. Allison, 184 F.3d at 1312. 17
*11  Moreover, expert testimony on regulatory requirements
and industry practices is permissible and does not, without
more, constitute improper legal conclusions. Novatel, 2011
WL 5827198, at *3; Leslie, 2010 WL 2991038, at *7; Retail
Pro, 2011 WL 589828, at *4. Therefore, so long as James'
testimony does not veer into the subject of securities laws
violations, his second opinion is not impermissible. And the
SEC may seek an appropriate curative instruction to alleviate
its concerns regarding the weight the jury may place on James'
second opinion. Maiz, 253 F.3d at 667; Gold, 743 F.2d at 817;
Pacheco, 426 Fed.Appx. at 835.
(iii) James' third opinion on consistency of Bancorp's
loan performance with Defendants' specific
disclosures and the market trends they disclosed.
As noted above, James' third opinion is, essentially, that
the events that occurred after the first and second quarters
of 2007, both with respect to Bancorp's and other banks'
loan performances, show that Defendants' public disclosures
in those two quarters were “par for the course.” The
SEC contends that this opinion is irrelevant and unreliable.
According to the SEC, the opinion would mislead or
confuse the jury because the performance of other banks
is not relevant to the SEC's claims, and because, without
access to the other banks' internal loan portfolios, any
such comparisons would be unreliable. James Motion
[D.E. 155 at 15-16]. Defendants counter that the fact that
comparable banks eventually reported the same types of
losses as Bancorp, demonstrates that Bancorp responded
more aggressively to the crisis by reporting those losses in
the third quarter of 2007, and that “[s]uch evidence undercuts
any claim that there was any intention to mislead investors,”
which is critical for the establishment of scienter. Defendants'
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Daubert Motion to
Exclude the Testimony of Christopher M. James (hereafter,
“James Response”) [D.E. 178 at 20, 23]. Defendants also
argue that specific knowledge of the comparable banks'
internal loan portfolios was unnecessary since the loans in
question were not an “exotic type of loan only made by
[Bancorp].” Id. at 24.
The undersigned fails to see how James' third opinion, which
is wholly predicated on after-the-fact events involving not
only Bancorp but other banks, would be relevant to rebutting
the element of scienter in the SEC's securities fraud claims.
Additionally, Defendants failed to meaningfully address the
SEC's contention that the data from other banks utilized by
James is incomplete, given his lack of access to those banks'
internal loan portfolios. Therefore, the undersigned agrees
that James' third opinion is both irrelevant and unreliable and
finds that it should be excluded. 18
3. Hearsay Objection
The SEC argues that James' fourth opinion does nothing
more than recite the contents of analysts' reports regarding
Bancorp's disclosures, hence is inadmissible hearsay. James
Motion [D.E. 155 at 16-18]. Defendants contend that James'
opinion and the analysts' reports are admissible under Fed. R.
Evid. 703, which provides:
An expert may base an opinion on
facts or data in the case that the expert
has been made aware of or personally
observed. If experts in the particular
field would reasonably rely on those
kinds of facts or data in forming an
opinion on the subject, they need not
be admissible for the opinion to be
admitted. But if the facts or data
would otherwise be inadmissible, the
proponent of the opinion may disclose
them to the jury only if their probative
value in helping the jury evaluate the
opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect.
- 490 - 
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Bankatlantic..., Not Reported in Fed....
2013 WL 12009694
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10
*12 Fed. R. Evid. 703. Seealso, Royale Green Condo. Ass'n,
Inc. v. Aspen Specialty Ins. Co., Case No. 07-CIV-21404,
2009 WL 2208166, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2009) (admission
of hearsay evidence through an expert creates a danger that
the testifying expert will serve as a conduit for the opinions
of others).
Defendants argue that, James, as an expert, was entitled to
rely on the analysts' reports in forming his own opinion
notwithstanding their hearsay status. James Response [D.E.
178 at 19]. Defendants further argue that the reports may
be disclosed directly to the jury “because...they are a
contemporaneous assessment...that directly undercut[s] the
SEC's theory of fraud.” Id. at 19-20. As noted above, James
did testify that these analysts' reports are of the type that he
would rely on in his own research. However, James' purported
fourth opinion consists of nothing more than a summary of
the analysts' reports. James Expert Report [D.E. 155-1 at ¶¶
92-100]. Because James did not actually render an opinion,
the probative/prejudicial prong of Rule 703 does not come
into play and Defendants' attempt to gain admissibility of the
hearsay analysts' reports through Rule 703 to rebut the SEC's
securities fraud claims fails.
Therefore, the James Motion is denied as to his first and
second opinions but granted as to the third and fourth ones.
VI. HUBER
At trial, Huber would offer the following opinions: (1) during
the relevant period, Bancorp's relevant DC&P were adequate
under the circumstances; and (2) Bancorp's disclosures in
its 2007 first and second quarter Forms 10-Q concerning
known trends or uncertainties were adequate under the
circumstances, and the statements made during the 2007
first and second quarter earnings conference calls were not
misleading. Huber Expert Report [D.E. 148-1 at 13].
A. Adequacy of Bancorp's relevant DC&P.
According to Huber, during the period in question, Bancorp's
relevant DC&P were adequate under the circumstances.
Huber Expert Report [D.E. 148-1 at ¶¶ 22-69], Huber further
opined that adjustments made by Bancorp to its DC&P
during the period from January 1 through November 9, 2007
enabled Bancorp to respond to evolving market conditions,
id. at ¶¶ 27-52; that Bancorp's DC&P incorporated reviews
conducted by external third parties, id. at ¶¶ 53-58; that
Bancorp's public disclosures were drafted in an atmosphere
of open communication and cooperation, id. at ¶¶ 59-62;
and that Bancorp's internal certification process by its senior
management provided an additional check to ensure that its
DC&P were complete and accurate. Id. at ¶¶ 63-68. Huber
also opined that Bancorp had adequate DC&P in place before
the credit crisis, and that Bancorp was proactive in adjusting
and adapting its DC&P to address the downturn in the Florida
real estate market. Id. at ¶¶ 27-52. “As conditions deteriorated
in 2007, [Bancorp] enhanced its processes ... and senior ...
executives were proactive and ordered measures to refine
[Bancorp's] disclosure, controls and procedures as conditions
deteriorated.” Id. at ¶ 15. In concluding that the DC&P were
adequate throughout the crises, Huber thoroughly analyzed
Bancorp's formal and informal credit approval and loan
monitoring functions. Id. at ¶¶ 53-68.
B. Adequacy of Defendants' disclosures
*13  Huber testified that the existence of adequate DC&P
would also be relevant to determining whether there
was intent to deceive or mislead by Defendants in their
public disclosures, and that, in this case, the DC&P
“facilitate[d]...disclosure being made.” Transcript of Daubert
Evidentiary Hearing on September 25, 2013 (hereafter
“Trans. 9/25”) [D.E. 245 at 61-62]. Huber further testified, in
response to various examples posed by Defendants' counsel,
that the public disclosures made by Defendants matched the
internal commentary at Bancorp. Id. at 68-81, 85.
According to Huber, Bancorp's disclosures in the 2007
first and second quarter 10-Q's regarding known trends
or uncertainties in BankAtlantic's Commercial Residential
Portfolio were adequate under the circumstances. Huber
Expert Report [D.E. 148-1 at ¶¶ 68-87], Huber further opined
that, considering the total mix of information, Defendants'
disclosures in the 2007 first and second quarter earnings
conference calls were not misleading, id. at ¶¶ 88-103, and
that “disclosing downgraded and extended loans could have
confused, rather than informed, investors.” Id. at ¶ 17. Huber
clarified that his opinion reflects how he, as a professional
who works in the field of disclosure, would have advised
management to disclose the trend it identified, and such level
of disclosure would have been preferable because it was more
general and easily understood by investors than “complex
specifics that might be included within the general.” Trans.
9/25 [D.E. 245 at 43-46]. 19
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The SEC asked Huber to confirm his opinion that
management did not appear to believe that extensions or
downgrades in the first and second quarters constituted a
known trend requiring disclosure, id. at 52, and his opinion
that the total mix of information indicated that Levan did not
intentionally mislead investors during the first and second
quarter earnings conference calls. Id. at 53. Huber confirmed
his opinions, and indicated that they were based on his
experience as an expert in the field of securities disclosure,
combined with his review of the record. Id. at 52-55.
C. Challenges to Huber's Opinions
The SEC objects to Huber's methodology based on how
Huber structured his team of assistants, how he divided
the work, and for “not analyzing much of the material he
purported to base his conclusions on.” Huber Motion [D.E.
148 at 9]. The SEC further contends that Huber offers
no sound methodology for his conclusions and that those
conclusions are nothing more than a biased recitation of facts.
Id. at 1, 4. Finally, the SEC argues that Huber's testimony will
confuse the jury as it is nothing more than a legal opinion. Id.
at 1. As with MacDonald and James, the SEC challenges the
reliability and helpfulness/relevance of Huber's testimony.
1. Reliability
Because Huber is a nonscientific expert, consideration of
his qualifications is part of the inquiry into the reliability
of his methodology. Augustin, 661 F.3d at 1125; Frazier,
387 F.3d at 1261. Huber is currently a Senior Managing
Director at FTI Consulting, Inc. Huber Expert Report [D.E.
148-1 at App. A]. Huber previously served as Deputy
Director and Director of the SEC's Division of Corporation
Finance and was responsible for the Division's rule-making
program. Id. 20  Huber was also a senior partner at Latham
& Watkins, LLP, where he advised clients on securities
regulation issues, including compliance with securities laws
and internal control over financial reporting. Id. Huber is an
editor of ThePractitioner's Guide to theSarbanes-Oxley Act,
published by the American Bar Association in 2004. Id.
*14  With regard to Huber's use of assistants, how he divided
the work between himself and his staff, and the extent of
his own personal analysis of the materials underlying his
opinions, Huber testified at his deposition that he closely
supervised the work of his team of two certified public
accountants, that he did his own review of the documents
as needed, that he conducted research independently of his
team, and that he and his team generated over twenty drafts
of his expert report. Huber Deposition pp. 29-32 [D.E. 171-1
at 30-33]. This testimony refutes the SEC's contention that
Huber's expert work was not his own.
The SEC's argument that Huber simply recites the facts in
the record and provides no explanation for his conclusions
is similarly refuted by Huber's testimony. At the Daubert
Evidentiary Hearing, Huber explained his reasoning for
extensively quoting portions of the record in his expert
report as being in keeping with his methodology for writing
disclosures in his professional practice. Seee.g., Trans. 9/25
[D.E. 245 at 20-21] (explaining that in writing disclosures
he balances “yes or no with respect to putting out all of
the facts in a true, accurate, and complete fashion”). At his
deposition, Huber testified that his opinion regarding the
adequacy of the changes in Bancorp's DC&P was based
on his experience in private practice doing DC&P and
restatement work, participating in panels with SEC officials,
and testifying at SEC hearings. Huber Deposition pp. 104-05
[D.E. 171-2 at 27-28]. Huber also laid out the twelve factors
that he used in deriving his conclusions regarding Bancorp's
DC&P. Huber Deposition pp. 122-28, 145-46 [D.E. 171-2
at 45-51, 68-69]. Further, with respect to his opinion on the
adequacy of Defendants' disclosures in the 2007 first and
second quarter Forms 10-Q, Huber described in his expert
report his analysis of the SEC regulation on MD&A and its
application to the facts of this case. Huber Expert Report
[D.E. 148-1 at ¶¶ 69-75]. Similarly, with respect to his opinion
regarding the first and second quarter earnings conference
calls, Huber outlined his familiarity and experience with the
informality of those calls and the importance of considering
their content in light of the total mix of information, and
explained how he considered these factors in forming his
opinion. Id. at ¶¶ 89-103.
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds sufficient
record support for Huber's methodology of applying his
professional experience to the facts of this case. Because his
methodology was informed by and conducted in accordance
with his experience, Huber's opinion as a nonscientific expert
meets the reliability prong. Schoenthal, 555 F.3d at 1338;
McClain, 401 F.3d at 1255.
2. Helpfulness/Relevance
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The SEC seeks to exclude Huber's opinions under the
helpfulness/relevance inquiry as improper legal conclusions
on the grounds that they embrace an ultimate legal issue
and would tell the jury how to decide the case. Huber
Motion [D.E. 148 at 15-17]. However, expert testimony as
to the interpretation of the SEC's requirements relating to
DC&P and public disclosures and the application of those
requirements to the facts of a case, does not, without more,
constitute improper legal conclusions. Novatel, 2011 WL
5827198, *3; Leslie, 2010 WL 2991038, at *7; Retail Pro,
2011 WL 589828, at *4. Therefore, so long as Huber's
testimony does not veer into the subject of securities
laws violations, his opinions regarding the adequacy of
Bancorp's DC&P and Defendants' public disclosures are
not impermissible legal opinions. And the SEC may seek
an appropriate curative instruction to alleviate its concerns
regarding the weight the jury may place on Huber's opinions.
Maiz, 253 F.3d at 667; Gold, 743 F.2d at 817; Pacheco, 426
Fed.Appx. at 835.
*15  Therefore, the Huber Motion is denied.
VII. TURNER
At trial, Turner would provide the following opinions: (1)
during the first and second quarters of 2007, a material
downward trend related to loan quality existed within
BankAtlantic's Commercial Residential Portfolio that was
not adequately disclosed in the MD&A section of Bancorp's
10-Q's and the earnings conference calls for those quarters;
(2) Bancorp's lack of disclosure of this trend failed to
inform the investing public of the negative developments; (3)
Bancorp incorrectly categorized certain loans as “held-for-
investment;” and (4) due to the failure to appropriately report
certain loans at market value, Bancorp's assets and income
before taxes were overstated by $53 million for the year ended
December 31, 2007. Turner Expert Report [D.E. 162-3 at ¶¶
19-24, 113-16],
A. Turner's Methodology.
At the Daubert Evidentiary Hearing, Defendants questioned
the number of hours that Turner devoted to the preparation
of his expert report and asked him to confirm the fact that 8
days before his expert report was due, he had billed only 3
hours to the SEC. Trans. 9/24 [D.E. 244 at 20, 56-57], Turner
confirmed this fact, id., and the additional fact that, in total,
he only billed the SEC 38 hours for the preparation of his
expert report. Id. at 21. Turner explained that he worked many
additional hours that he did not bill out of “a notion of public
service.” Id. 21
Defendants also questioned Turner's independence, given
that he was donating time to one party in the case. Trans.
9/24 [D.E. 244 at 21]. Turner responded that “just because
you don't bill for all your hours doesn't mean that you're
not independent” and that other members of his accounting
profession do not see providing this type of public service
to be in conflict with their independence. Id. at 22. Turner
also stated that he makes it clear on any engagement that
his opinions are his own, and that he also takes his ethical
responsibilities seriously. Id. at 103-05. 22
In response to an inquiry as to how many hours he actually
spent on the engagement, Turner testified, “I don't recall.... I
can tell you it was a fair amount of hours.” Id. at 22-23. Turner
further testified that he approaches the task of providing an
expert opinion in the same manner as preparing for an audit.
Id. at 24-25, 106-07. Turner explained that “[y]ou plan it up
front. You direct the staff as to what you want... and then it
becomes an iterative process.... At the end of the day ... the
audit is signed by the audit partner. It is [his] opinion, ... not
the opinion of the staff.” Id. at 25. 23
B. Defendants' disclosures.
*16  At the Daubert Evidentiary Hearing, Turner agreed with
the proposition that a “collapsing Florida real estate market”
was a negative trend, but explained that “if you've got, in
a particular part of your loan portfolio ... some significant
positive or negative trends ... you would need to say that ... the
disclosure needs to run to the particulars of the company, not
a broad general [statement of] what's happening to everyone.”
Id. at 43, 45. Turner opined that Defendants' disclosure of
the real estate market trend was not sufficient for MD&A
purposes because one has “to put [the disclosure] in the
context of what's going on in that particular bank so that the
investors can see the bank through the eyes of management.”
Id. at 121. 24  Turner stated, “The cause of [Bancorp's loss]
was ... I wouldn't say just the Florida real estate market.
Certainly that might have been part of the cause.” Id. at 53.
According to Turner, the disclosure in Bancorp's 2007 first
quarter 10-Q that non-BLB Loans were “of relatively lower
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risk than the [BLB] loans” did not correctly identify the trend
with respect to the non-BLB loans, albeit he acknowledged
that he had not reviewed Bancorp's 2007 third quarter losses
to determine if they matched Defendants' earlier disclosures
with respect to both the BLB and the non-BLB Loans.
Id. at 48-49, 52. Defendants' counsel asked Turner whether
Bancorp had to disclose individual internal loan downgrades
and extensions. Id. at 57. In response, Turner explained that,
though trends of downgrades or extensions in a portfolio
should be described, it was not necessary to mention specific
loans. Id. at 58. Finally, Defendants' counsel asked Turner if
he was aware that banking regulators “unanimously objected
to disclosure of internal loan grades.” Id. at 60. Turner
confirmed his understanding that bank regulators “didn't like
to see the loan grades disclosed,” id. at 61, but added that
companies would still need to disclose the general trend of
these occurrences. Id. at 116.
C. Reclassification of the JMP Loans
In his testimony, Turner explained his reliance on two offers
for establishing his valuation of the JMP Loans. Id. at 75.
Turner clarified that there were actually 6 bids and that he
used the 2 highest ones in computing the fair value of the JMP
Loans, but could not recall whether these two bids were oral
or written or when they were received. Id. at 75-76.
Defendants' counsel asked Turner whether the market was
“orderly” at the December 31, 2007 measurement date. Id.
at 81. Turner did not respond directly, but opined that, under
FAS 157, an orderly transaction is a transaction in which
information is available to the buyer and seller to make
an informed bid at a fair price. Id. at 82. In response to
Defendants' contention that one of the bids he relied on was
from a vulture fund looking for distressed sales in a market
under duress, id. at 83-84, Turner disagreed with Defendants'
understanding of the term “duress,” and explained that, in the
context of a FAS issued by the FASB, duress is a term of
art that refers only to involuntary sale or liquidation, as in
bankruptcy. Id. at 84.
Turner testified that, in opining that Bancorp had made a
decision to sell the JMP Loans, he relied, as would an
auditor in private practice, on the engagement letter between
Bancorp and JMP because it was a legal agreement. Id. at 86.
Defendants' counsel asked Turner if someone else could read
the contract language of the engagement letter as meaning
something other than that Bancorp was offering the JMP
Loans for sale. Id. at 92. Turner responded that, as a former
CFO and corporate executive, he could only read it as a
decision to sell loans. Id.
*17  Turner testified that he was not asked to opine regarding
the fact that Bancorp still failed to properly account for
the JMP Loans in the first quarter of 2008 because “[w]hat
[Bancorp] did in the first...quarter [of 2008], at least in [his]
mind, [wasn't] relevant to whether they did the accounting
right at the end of the fourth quarter of [2007].” Id. at 74-75.
D. Challenges to Turner's Opinions
Defendants argue that Turner must be precluded from offering
expert testimony at trial on several grounds. First, Defendants
argue that Turner did not employ any intellectual rigor
in reaching his conclusions. Turner Motion [D.E. 156 at
2]. Specifically, Defendants contend that Turner lacks the
qualifications to opine regarding the Florida real estate
market; that he billed only 38 hours for the generation of
his expert report; that he improperly relied on unqualified
assistants to conduct the underlying research and draft the
report; and that he used his team's research to support his
preconceived conclusions in favor of the SEC. Defendants'
Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Their Motion in
Limine to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Lynn E.
Turner (hereafter, “Turner Reply”) [D.E. 211 at 1-3].
Second, with respect to the “held-for-sale” issue, Defendants
argue that Turner's opinions that Bancorp intended to sell the
JMP Loans in the fourth quarter of 2007 and that a sufficiently
orderly market existed for Bancorp to sell loans at that time;
and his calculation of the fair value of the JMP Loans in the
fourth quarter of 2007, must all be excluded because they are
unreliable. Turner Motion [D.E. 156 at 2].
Third, Defendants argue that Turner's opinions on what a
law or regulation says or means cannot be presented to a
jury because they are improper legal conclusions and it is
the exclusive function of the Court to address, resolve, and
instruct on matters of law. Id.
Fourth, in challenging Turner's opinions that during the
first and second quarters of 2007, a material downward
trend related to loan quality existed within BankAtlantic's
Commercial Residential Portfolio that was not adequately
disclosed in the MD&A section of Bancorp's 10-Q's and
the earnings conference calls for those quarters and that
Bancorp's lack of disclosure of this trendfailed to inform the
investing public of the negative developments, Defendants
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parse these two opinions into the following list of sub-
opinions, which they argue must be excluded as a matter of
law:
a. His opinion that BBX violated securities laws by
failing to disclose changes in internal loan grades (it
is an undisputed fact that the vast majority of publicly
reporting banks declined to publish loan grades at the
urging of all federal bank regulators and it is undisputed
that disclosing the substance of what would be learned
from internal loan grades, which BBX did, is perfectly
appropriate);
b. His opinion that changes in internal loan grades for some
land loans constituted a trend requiring disclosure;
c. His opinion that BBX was required to disclose the
number and amount of loan extensions in the first and
second quarter of 2007 (the vast majority of financial
institutions do not make such disclosures and Turner has
no knowledge of the condition of the loans that were
extended thus he fails to provide any connection between
a loan extension and an increased risk of loss);
*18  d. His opinion that non-BLB commercial real estate
loans were just as risky as BLB loans and that the
market should have been told as much (it is indisputable
that the risk was not the same and the Company
correctly weighed the relative risks and advised the
market accordingly and timely);
e. Any opinion that the Company failed to disclose
“crumbling creditworthiness of the loans within
BankAtlantic's commercial real estate land acquisition
and development portfolio in Q 1 and Q2 of 2007”;
f. His opinion that a company can be guilty of violating
securities laws for failing to include in a Form 10-Q
information disclosed in an earnings conference call
(Turner's opinion is nothing but a legal conclusion and
an incorrect one at that); and,
g. His opinion regarding BBX's and Levan's alleged intent
to defraud or deceive (another's intent is not a proper
subject of expert testimony).
Id. at 3-4.
In their first and second arguments, Defendants challenge
the reliability of Turner's opinions. In their third argument,
they challenge their helpfulness/relevance. Defendants' fourth
argument is predicated on parsing Turner's opinions that
Defendants failed to disclose a material downward trend
in the quality of BankAtlantic's Commercial Residential
Portfolio and that the lack of disclosure of this trend failed to
inform the investing public of the negative developments.
1. Reliability
Because Turner is a nonscientific expert, consideration of his
qualifications is part of the inquiry into the reliability of his
methodology. Augustin, 661 F.3d at 1125; Frazier, 387 F.3d at
1261.Turneris currently a Managing Director at LitiNomics.
Turner Expert Report [D.E. 162-3, Ex. C, at 60]. Turner has
over thirty-five years of business, regulatory and academic
experience concerning accounting, auditing and financial
reporting matters. Id. From 1996 to 1998, Turner was Vice
President and CFO of a high-technology semiconductor and
storage systems manufacturing company. Id. From July 1998
to August 2001, he served as Chief Accountant for the SEC.
Id. From 2001 until 2003, he was as a professor at Colorado
State University where he taught courses in accounting and
auditing, including MBA-level classes, Id.
(i) Turner's intellectual rigor
Defendants first challenge Turner's lack of qualifications to
opine regarding the Florida real estate market. In response,
the SEC argues that Turner's expertise in the Florida
housing market is irrelevant because the “true trend at
issue in this case” is not the Florida real estate market,
but the “crumbling creditworthiness within the [Commercial
Residential] Portfolio as reflected by the multiple loan
downgrades and extensions.” Response in Opposition re
Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude the Opinions and
Testimony of the SEC's Expert Witness Lynn B. Turner
(hereafter, “Turner Response”) [D.E. 186 at 15]. However,
as discussed above with respect to James, the collapse of the
Florida real estate market is not irrelevant to the SEC's claims.
Further, at the Daubert Evidentiary Hearing, Turner testified
that, while he did not believe that Bancorp's loss was just
due to the downturn in the Florida real estate market, that
factor might have been part of the cause. But the fact that
Turner is not versed in the Florida real estate market does
not merit striking him as an expert as Defendants contend;
it simply goes to the credibility and weight of his testimony.
Rosenfeld, 654 F.3d at 1193 (“[I]n most cases, objections to
the inadequacies of a study are more appropriately considered
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an objection going to the weight of the evidence rather
than its admissibility.”). Defendants also challenge Turner's
reliability based on his having billed the SEC for only 38
hours of his time and for the way he utilized his assistants in
rendering his expert report. But Turner testified extensively
as to the hours he billed, the independence of his opinion,
and the preparation of his expert report in the same fashion
as he would conduct an audit. Based on the foregoing,
the undersigned finds sufficient record support for Turner's
methodology of applying his professional experience to the
facts of this case. Because his methodology was informed by
and conducted in accordance with his experience, Turner's
opinion as a nonscientific expert meets the reliability prong.
Schoenthal, 555 F.3d at 1338; McClain, 401 F.3d at 1255.
(ii) The held-for-sale issue
*19  Defendants argue that Turner's opinions with respect
to this issue are unreliable. At the same time, Defendants
are attacking those opinions through their own expert on this
issue, MacDonald. Therefore, rather than exclude Turner's
opinions as Defendants propose, the Court should defer to
the jury the task of weighing the testimony of these two
opposing experts. Allison, 184 F.3d at 1311 (“Vigorous cross-
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking debatable but admissible
evidence.”).
2. Helpfulness/Relevance
Defendants argue that Turner's opinions on what a law or
regulation says or means cannot be presented to a jury as
it is the exclusive function of the Court to address, resolve,
and instruct on matters of law. However, expert testimony
on legal and regulatory requirements is permissible and does
not, without more, constitute improper legal conclusions.
Novatel, 2011 WL 5827198, *3; Leslie, 2010 WL 2991038,
at *7; Retail Pro, 2011 WL 589828, at *4. Additionally,
because securities laws constitute a complex topic that
is outside the understanding of the average juror, courts
have allowed the testimony of experts in this area. Seee.g.,
S.E.C. v. Big Apple Consulting U.S., Inc., No. 6:09-cv-1963-
Orl-28GJK, 2011 WL 3753581, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 25,
2011) (acknowledging that testimony by securities experts is
often admitted to assist the jury in understanding complex
securities terms, practices and regulations); S.E.C. v. Sky Wav
Global, LLC, Case No. 8:09-cv-455-T-23TBM, 2010 WL
5058509, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2010) (attorneys can testify
in securities cases and offer opinions on securities industry
customs and practices).
Therefore, so long as Turner's testimony does not veer into
the subject of securities laws violations, his opinions are
not impermissible legal opinions. And the SEC may seek
an appropriate curative instruction to alleviate its concerns
regarding the weight the jury may place on Turner's opinions.
Maiz, 253 F.3d at 667; Gold, 743 F.2d at 817; Pacheco, 426
Fed.Appx. at 835. Moreover, given that MacDonald, James
and Huber will be permitted to testify regarding Defendants'
conduct vis-a-vis SEC laws and regulations, it would be unfair
to exclude Turner. United States v. Lankford, 955 F.2d 1545,
1552 (11th Cir. 1992) (“It is an abuse of discretion to exclude
the otherwise admissible opinion of a party's expert on a
critical issue, while allowing the opinion of his adversary's
expert on the same issue.”).
3. Parsing of Turner's Disclosure Opinions
As noted above, Defendants' fourth argument is predicated on
parsing Turner's opinions that Defendants failed to disclose
a material downward trend in the quality of BankAtlantic's
Commercial Residential Portfolio and that the lack of
disclosure of this trend failed to inform the investing public
of the negative developments.
With regard to trends in the Commercial Residential Portfolio,
Defendants challenge the following: Turner's purported
opinion that Bancorp violated securities laws by failing
to disclose changes in internal loan grades; his opinion
that changes in internal loan grades for some land loans
constituted a trend requiring disclosure; and his opinion
that Bancorp was required to disclose the number and
amount of loan extensions in the first and second quarter of
2007. However, Turner explained at the Daubert Evidentiary
Hearing that, though trends of downgrades or extensions in a
portfolio should be described, it was not necessary to mention
specific loans. Turner also confirmed his understanding that
bank regulators did not like to see loan grades disclosed, but
opined that companies would still need to disclose the general
trend of these occurrences. To the extent that Defendants
disagree with these opinions, they will have the opportunity to
challenge them at trial. Allison, 184 F.3d at 1311 (“Vigorous
cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional
and appropriate means of attacking debatable but admissible
evidence.”).
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*20  Defendants also challenge Turner's opinion that non-
BLB commercial real estate loans were just as risky as
BLB loans and that the market should have been told as
much because, according to Defendants, it is indisputable that
the risk was not the same and Bancorp correctly weighed
the relative risks and advised the market accordingly and
timely. Here, Defendants are simply disagreeing with Turner's
opinion and they will be able to do so at trial. Allison, 184
F.3d at 1311.
Defendants seek to exclude any opinion that Bancorp failed
to disclose “crumbling creditworthiness” of BankAtlantic's
Commercial Residential Portfolio. However, this argument
has been forestalled by Judge Scola's ruling that “crumbling
creditworthiness” does not constitute a new and unpleaded
claim. See Omnibus Order on Pending, Non-Referred
Motions in Limine [D.E. 242 at ¶ 6].
Defendants argue that Turner should not be allowed to opine
that a company can be guilty of violating securities laws
for failing to include in a Form 10-Q information disclosed
in an earnings conference call because this is nothing but a
legal conclusion and an incorrect one at that. Initially, it is
not clear from Turner's expert report that he intends to opine
on violations of securities laws. In any event, as more fully
discussed above, expert testimony on legal and regulatory
requirements is permissible, particularly in such a complex
area as securities laws.
Finally, Defendants seek to exclude Turner's purported
opinion regarding BBX's and Levan's alleged intent to
defraud or deceive because another's intent is not a proper
subject of expert testimony. However, Defendants have not
pointed to any particular statement by Turner indicating that
he is intending to proffer any such testimony.
Therefore, the Turner Motion is denied.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Having considered the parties' arguments and the applicable
law, the undersigned concludes that MacDonald, James,
Huber and Turner may provide expert testimony at trial within
the parameters discussed herein. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1. The MacDonald Motion [D.E. 159] is DENIED.
2. The James Motion [D.E. 155] is DENIED as to James' first
and second opinions and GRANTED as to James' third and
fourth opinions.
3. The Huber Motion [D.E. 148] is DENIED.
4. The Turner Motion [D.E. 156] is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this
14 th  day of November, 2013.
All Citations
Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2013 WL 12009694
Footnotes
1 The undersigned will issue a separate Order on Plaintiff's Daubert Motion to Exclude the Testimony of David
Friedman and Jeff Mindling [D.E. 149].
2 A detailed factual recitation is found in Judge Scola's Omnibus Order on Summary Judgment [D.E. 234 at
2-11].
3 BLB loans were loans made to land investors after they had sold to homebuilders options to purchase lots in
the land holdings. For non-BLB loans, the land investors did not have pre-loan option contracts.
4 Form 10-Q is a report that must be filed by publicly traded companies for each of their first three fiscal year
quarters. Seehttp://www.sec.gov/answers/form10q.htm (last visited on October 31, 2013). “The Form 10-Q
includes unaudited financial statements and provides a continuing view of the company's financial position
during the year.” Id.
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5 “The earnings conference call is a way for companies to relay information to all interested parties,
including institutional and individual investors, as well as buy– and sell-side analysts.” Seehttp://
www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/04/052104.asp (last visited October 31, 2013).
6 Form 10-K is an annual report that must be filed by publicly traded companies. Seehttp://www.sec.gov/
answers/form10k.htm (last visited on October 31, 2013). “The annual report on Form 10-K provides a
comprehensive overview of the company's business and financial condition and includes audited financial
statements.” Id.
7 Defendants do object to Turner's lack of expertise in a particular area, as more fully discussed below.
8 Judge Scola has ruled that certain statements made by Levan during the second quarter earnings conference
call were false as a matter of law. See Omnibus Order on Summary Judgment [D.E. 234 at 12-15],
9 The FAS promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) were the highest GAAP
authority in 2007 and 2008. Trans. 9/23 [D.E. 243 at 54].
10 In MacDonald's view, the following are indicia of a decision to sell: “the plan of sale must be approved by
management having the authority to take such action;” the “actions needed to complete the plan of sale ...
must be initiated;” and “the actions needed to complete the plan of sale must indicate that it is unlikely that...
the plan will be withdrawn.” [Id. at ¶ 14].
11 MacDonald testified that she had led the team that developed FAS 157 and that she was the primary author
for the final rule. Trans. 9/23 [D.E. 243 at 64],
12 Additionally, MacDonald opined that, while an orderly transaction is fundamental to a determination of fair
value, there would be no orderly transaction where only six out of fifty potential bidders responded to JMP's
solicitation and at least three of those bids contemplated distressed debt pricing. Id. at 65-66.
13 While MacDonald conceded on cross-examination that there is no mathematical formula to determine
fair value, Trans. 9/23 [D.E. 243 at 34], she clarified that, under GAAP, one is expected to conduct a
comprehensive approach and that, while a certain amount of artistry is involved in the process, it has more
to do with the precision of the valuation rather than the methodology used in conducting the valuation. Id.
at 67-68.
14 In response to repeated inquiries into the methodology underlying his market observations, James explained
that methodology in detail and occasionally corrected SEC's counsel's articulation of it. Trans. 9/24 [D.E.
244 at 150-68].
15 Judge Scola has ruled that evidence that the Office of Thrift Supervision prohibits the disclosure of internal
loan grades in the MD&A section of 10-Q's is admissible because it is relevant and material to Defendants'
overall state of mind. See Omnibus Order on Pending, Non-Referred Motions in Limine [D.E. 242 at ¶ 10(F) ].
16 Thus, the SEC's burden here is different from that of plaintiffs in a private securities class action that was
based on the same events, namely, Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 688 F.3d 713 (11th Cir. 2012).
There, in addition to the foregoing elements, plaintiffs needed to prove loss causation and damages. Id. at
725.
17 Judge Scola has ruled that testimony comparing Bancorp's disclosures and performance to that of other
banks will only be admissible at trial to rebut scienter to the extent that Levan or anyone else at Bancorp
knew of the disclosures and performance of other banks and relied upon that knowledge in their activities
and decision-making process. See Omnibus Order on Pending, Non-Referred Motions in Limine [D.E. 242
at ¶ 10(E) ]. Logically, James' second opinion is subject to this same restriction.
18 Although the undersigned has found that James utilized an acceptable overall methodology, this particular
opinion is unreliable due to the lack of complete data.
19 Huber repeatedly characterized Defendants' disclosures regarding Bancorp's loan exposure in the
deteriorating Florida real estate market as “putting up a flare,” that is, warning the market of a serious issue.
Trans. 9/25 [D.E. 245 at 64-66, 78].
20 The Division of Corporation Finance is the division that: drafts the SEC's rules concerning disclosure
by companies that report to the SEC; provides interpretive guidance concerning disclosure by public
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companies; and reviews and comments on filings by public companies. Seehttp://www.sec.gov/divisions/
corpfin/cfabout.shtml (last visited on October 31, 2013).
21 Turner testified that public service is “near and dear to [his] heart” and “an important thing in this
country.” Trans. 9/24 [D.E. 244 at 109]. Furthermore, Tuner provided a sworn declaration attesting to the
appropriateness of the time billed and the reliability of his methodology. [D.E. 186-1 at ¶¶ 4-13].
22 Turner further explained that he doesn't care about his billable hours because he has done “very well in life”
and “just enjoy[s] what [he's] doing.” Id. at 108.
23 Turner added that, for professional accountants practicing in the field, in a typical audit staffing, only “about
five percent” of the total time billed by the team on the project is billed by the audit partner. The rest of the
time is billed by an “audit manager” and “by other staff.” Id. at 106.
24 According to Turner, a bank should disclose in its MD&A concerns about creditworthiness within the
respective subsections of its loan portfolios. Id. at 115.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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Opinion
HUNTER, JR., ROBERT N., Judge.
Adrian Lee Bullock (“defendant”) was convicted of statutory
rape and taking indecent liberties with a child and appeals
on numerous grounds. For the following reasons, we find no
reversible error.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Defendant was indicted for statutory rape or sexual offense of
a person who is fifteen years old, second-degree kidnapping,
and taking indecent liberties with a child. At trial, the State
first offered the prosecuting witness, Sarah, who was fifteen
at the time of the alleged crime. 1  She testified as follows.
On Wednesday, 18 July 2007, she was walking her dog when
she saw defendant, her neighbor, spraying for ants in his yard.
Defendant stated he was out of ant killer, and Sarah traveled
to her residence where she obtained some ant killer for
him. When she returned to defendant's residence, defendant
grabbed Sarah's arm, pulled her into his residence, and led
her to his bedroom. There, defendant forced Sarah onto his
bed, and inserted his penis into her vagina over her objections.
Sarah did not mention oral sex during her testimony. She saw
and heard the Jerry Springer Show on defendant's television
during the encounter. She stated defendant had black sheets
on his bed, there was a Playstation video game console on his
floor, and there were several pictures on the table next to his
bed. Sarah testified that when the sexual encounter was over,
she walked out of defendant's bedroom, out of the residence,
and returned to her own residence where she immediately
took a shower. After the shower, she called her friend Jessica,
who suggested Sarah tell her parents about the incident. Sarah
also called her grandmother who demanded she do the same
by Saturday. Sarah told her father about the incident that
Friday.
Sarah's father called the Durham County Sheriff's
Department, and Sarah was taken to the emergency room.
At the hospital, she was interviewed by Dr. Anne–
Caroline Norman. After meeting with Dr. Norman, she was
interviewed and examined by Dr. Karen St. Claire. Dr. Aditee
Narayan testified for the State at trial because Dr. St. Claire
was out of town. Dr. Narayan testified she had examined
Dr. St. Claire's medical evaluation report; she discussed the
findings, stating the report revealed a bruise to the hymen and
abrasions extending from the outer part of the hymen through
the floor of the vagina. Dr. Narayan testified these injuries
were “consistent with an injury that happened a few days
prior [to the examination].” She also testified the injuries were
consistent with the “history of the sexual assault that [Sarah]
provided.”
*2  Donna Stanley, a licensed clinical social worker who
had been Sarah's therapist for fourteen months following the
incident, testified about Sarah's mental state following the
encounter with defendant. She stated Sarah had exhibited
various symptoms, such as flashbacks and depression, but
had gradually improved. She also testified that Sarah had
experienced crying spells and dreams about the alleged rape.
Stanley commented that Sarah had an impressive memory:
“She had an amazing memory. The details were consistent
over the whole fourteen months, which is almost like a
photographic memory.”
Defendant testified and denied raping or assaulting Sarah,
but admitted her description of his bedroom was correct.
His wife, who was not home during the incident, testified
she telephoned and spoke with defendant on the day of the
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incident around 11:20 a.m. for at least twenty to twenty-five
minutes and that nothing seemed out of the ordinary. She
also testified that after being notified of Sarah's allegations,
defendant appeared to be shocked, upset, and puzzled.
A biologist testified Sarah's undergarments, as well as tests
taken from Sarah's person, did not reveal the presence of
semen. Another expert could find no transfer of hair from
defendant to Sarah. Dr. Norman testified that, when she
interviewed Sarah at the emergency room, Sarah stated
defendant had performed oral sex on her. Scott Bradsher, the
coordinator for the local television station, testified the Jerry
Springer Show ran in the area from 12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.
on the date of the encounter, but conceded the footage Sarah
claimed to have seen and heard could have been a recording.
The jury found defendant guilty of statutory rape and taking
indecent liberties, but not guilty of second-degree kidnapping.
He was sentenced to a concurrent active term of 316 to 389
months on the statutory rape conviction and 25 to 30 months
on the indecent liberties charge. He gave oral notice of appeal
in open court and appealed to this Court.
II. Jurisdiction
Defendant appeals as a matter of right pursuant to N.C.
Gen.Stat. § 15A–1444(a) (2009). We have jurisdiction over
his appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7A–27(b) (2009).
III. Analysis
Defendant appeals both convictions. His argument can be
summarized as follows: (1) it was plain error to admit
portions of Dr. Narayan's and Dr. St. Claire's expert testimony
and portions of Stanley's and Dr. St. Claire's non-expert
testimony; (2) the trial court committed reversible error by
denying defendant's motions to dismiss at the close of all the
evidence; and (3) the trial court committed reversible error by
failing to intervene ex mero motu during the State's closing
argument. After careful review, we conclude the trial court
did not commit reversible error.
A. The Testimonial Evidence
Defendant argues the admission of Dr. Narayan's expert
testimony, Dr. St. Claire's expert testimony, Dr. St. Claire's
non-expert testimony, and Stanley's non-expert testimony
impermissibly bolstered Sarah's credibility. Defendant failed
to object at trial, so we review for plain error. N.C. R.App.
P. 10(a)(4).
*3  When a defendant fails to object at trial, plain error
review requires him to meet a heavy burden on appeal:
[T]he plain error rule ... is always to be applied cautiously
and only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing
the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a
“fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so
lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done,”
or “where [the error] is grave error which amounts to a
denial of a fundamental right of the accused,” or the error
has “ ‘resulted in a miscarriage of justice or in the denial to
appellant of a fair trial’ “ or where the error is such as to
“seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings” or where it can be fairly said “the
instructional mistake had a probable impact on the jury's
finding that the defendant was guilty.”
State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983)
(alteration and footnotes omitted in original) (quoting United
States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir.1982)). To
amount to plain error, the error in question must have “tilted
the scales,” causing the jury to rule against the defendant.
State v. Black, 308 N.C. 736, 741, 303 S.E.2d 804, 807 (1983).
1. The Expert Testimony
North Carolina Rule of Evidence 702(a) addresses the
admissibility of expert testimony:
If scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion.
N.C.R. Evid. 702(a). However, expert testimony is not
admissible to vouch for a witness's credibility. State v. Heath,
316 N.C. 337, 342, 341 S.E.2d 565, 568 (1986). This
limitation on expert testimony is derived from the application
of North Carolina Rules of Evidence 608(a) and 405(a). Rule
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608(a) states that the credibility of a witness may be attacked
or supported by reputation or opinion evidence as provided
by Rule 405(a). N.C.R. Evid. 608(a). Rule 405(a) states that
“[e]xpert testimony on character or a trait of character is not
admissible as circumstantial evidence of behavior.” N.C.R.
Evid. 405(a). Our courts have concluded that, when read
together, Rules 608 and 405 prohibit experts from testifying as
to a witness's credibility. Heath, 316 N.C. at 342, 341 S.E.2d
at 568; see also, e.g., State v. Bailey, 89 N.C.App. 212, 219,
365 S.E.2d 651, 655 (1988) ( “[T]he testimony of an expert
to the effect that a prosecuting witness is believable, credible,
or telling the truth is inadmissible evidence.”).
In sexual abuse cases, there is an inherent conflict between
(1) the need for expert medical testimony that tends to
establish whether abuse has occurred and (2) the prohibition
on admitting that very testimony for the purpose of bolstering
a victim's credibility. Our courts have developed a significant
body of case law attempting to reconcile these competing
interests. An expert may not testify that sexual abuse has “in
fact ” occurred without a foundation of physical evidence
supporting that opinion. State v. Stancil, 355 N.C. 266,
266–67, 559 S.E.2d 788, 789 (2002) (per curiam). Nor
may an expert rely solely on interviews with a child as a
basis for testifying that the child was “sexually abused.”
State v. Grover, 142 N.C.App. 411, 419, 543 S.E.2d 179,
183–84 (citing State v. Dick, 126 N.C.App. 312, 315, 485
S.E.2d 88, 90, (1997)), aff'd per curiam, 354 N.C. 354, 553
S.E.2d 679 (2001). But “it is ... well-settled that testimony
based on the witness's examination of the child witness and
expert knowledge concerning the abuse of children in general
is not objectionable because it supports the credibility of
the witness or states an opinion that abuse has occurred.”
Dick, 126 N.C.App. at 315, 485 S.E.2d at 89; accord In
re Butts, 157 N.C.App. 609, 617, 582 S.E.2d 279, 285
(2003) (“[O]therwise admissible expert testimony is not
rendered inadmissible merely because it enhances a witness's
credibility.”). Furthermore, “an expert witness may testify,
upon a proper foundation, as to the profiles of sexually abused
children and whether a particular complainant has symptoms
or characteristics consistent therewith.” Stancil, 355 N.C. at
267, 559 S.E.2d at 789 (citing State v. Hall, 330 N.C. 808,
818, 412 S.E.2d 883, 888 (1992); State v. Aguallo, 322 N.C.
818, 822–23, 370 S.E.2d 676, 678 (1988); State v. Kennedy,
320 N.C. 20, 32, 357 S.E.2d 359, 366 (1987)).
*4  Defendant contends the physical evidence was
insufficient to support Dr. Narayan's testimony. He argues
that, “in effect,” Dr. Narayan testified that “the physical
examination of [Sarah] was consistent with her being pulled
into the defendant's house and raped by him.” Defendant also
claims Dr. Narayan's testimony “indicated that defendant was
the very one who had assaulted [Sarah].”
Defendant's account mischaracterizes the record. Dr.
Narayan's opinion was based on Dr. St. Claire's report, so
before giving her opinion, Dr. Narayan related the details
of that report. The report contained Sarah's case history,
including the allegations of rape. After discussing the results
of the physical examination Dr. St. Claire had performed, and
describing the general symptoms of child sexual abuse, the
following exchange occurred:
Q. Based on your review of the medical record in this case
and Dr. St. Claire's interview and examination, are you able
to form an expert opinion regarding the cause of the genital
injury?
A. Yes.
Q. What is your expert opinion?
A. Based on the information documented, it is most
consistent—it is determined that her physical exam
findings, which we discussed already, are consistent with
the history of sexual assault that she provided.
Dr. Narayan's reference to “the history of sexual assault ...
[Sarah] provided” clearly refers to the sexual act itself. She
was testifying as to “the cause of the genital injury”—not the
events leading up to the cause of the genital injury. She did
not testify that Sarah's account of the sexual assault, or the
events surrounding it, were accurate. Nor did she state that
she believed Sarah or that Sarah's story was credible.
This reading falls in line with our Supreme Court's decision
in State v. Aguallo. There, the expert witness testified the
victim's hymen had been lacerated. Aguallo, 322 N.C. at 822,
370 S.E.2d at 678. When asked whether the victim's injuries
were consistent with what the victim had told her, the expert
replied, “I felt it was consistent with her history.” Id. The
Court provided the following analysis:
Essentially, the doctor testified that
the physical trauma revealed by
her examination of the child was
consistent with the abuse the child
alleged had been inflicted upon her.
- 502 - 
State v. Bullock, 207 N.C.App. 749 (2010)
701 S.E.2d 403, 2010 WL 4290134
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4
We find this vastly different from
an expert stating on examination that
the victim is “believable” or “is not
lying.” The latter scenario suggests
that the complete account which
allegedly occurred is true, that is, that
this defendant vaginally penetrated
this child. The actual statement of
the doctor merely suggested that the
physical examination was consistent
with some type of penetration having
occurred. The important difference
in the two statements is that the
latter implicates the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime by affirming
the victim's account of the facts. The
former does not.
Id.
Considering Dr. Narayan's testimony in context, it is apparent
defendant's reliance on several post-Aquallo decisions, is
misplaced. In State v. O'Connor, this Court held it was error
to admit a portion of an expert's written report that explicitly
stated a victim's allegations of sexual assault were credible.
150 N.C.App. 710, 712, 564 S.E.2d 296, 297 (2002). The
mistake by the trial judge constituted plain error “because
there was no physical evidence of abuse and the State's case
was almost entirely dependent” on the victim's credibility.
Id. Here, Dr. Narayan did not explicitly endorse Sarah's
allegations as credible.
*5  Defendant also relies on State v. Couser, which
is distinguishable. There, a physician testified “that her
diagnosis of the victim was ‘probable sexual abuse.’ “ State
v. Couser, 163 N.C.App. 727, 729, 594 S.E.2d 420, 422
(2004). We held the trial court erred by admitting that
testimony because there was an insufficient basis for the
expert's conclusion. On cross-examination, the testifying
expert admitted the abrasions forming the basis of her opinion
“were not diagnostic nor specific to sexual abuse.” Id. at 730,
594 S.E.2d 420, 549 S.E.2d at 422. We held it was plain
error because the State's only direct evidence was the victim's
testimony, which was corroborated by other witnesses. Id .
at 731, 594 S.E.2d at 423 (distinguishing Stancil ). Unlike
the physician in Couser, Dr. Narayan did not state Sarah was
the probable victim of sexual abuse—only that the physical
evidence was consistent with the sexual penetration described
by Sarah. There was plenty of evidence for that conclusion.
Therefore, Couser does not provide a basis for us to conclude
the trial court below committed error.
Defendant's reliance on State v. Streater is also misplaced. In
that case, the expert testimony amounted to an impermissible
opinion regarding the victim's credibility because there was
no physical evidence supporting the expert's conclusion that
his findings were consistent with the victim's account of the
sexual assault. State v. Streater, 197 N.C.App. 632, ––––,
678 S.E.2d 367, 374 (2009) (explaining the expert “testified
that there was no physical evidence of anal penetration”). We
concluded the trial court committed plain error because the
victim's testimony was the only direct evidence implicating
the defendant on the charge of first-degree sexual offense.
Here, there was physical evidence supporting Dr. Narayan's
conclusion. We find no error, let alone plain error, in the
admission of Dr. Narayan's testimony.
Defendant contends the admission of the following expert
testimony by Dr. St. Claire amounted to plain error:
I had a detailed history from [Sarah],
with her telling me what had happened.
I felt that these genital injuries
were consistent with trauma and with
the history that she had provided.
Although they are not specific for
sexual trauma, they certainly are
consistent with that, in particular, the
bruising on the hymen[,] and felt that
these [injuries] were consistent with
the history of a sexual assault that she
provided.
In addition to making the same arguments we have already
discussed above, which we reject in this context as well,
defendant claims this testimony is baseless because there was
no evidence of vaginal intercourse. This contention, of course,
ignores the substantial physical evidence of recent bruising
and abrasions. Furthermore, Dr. St. Claire's testimony that
the genital injuries could be caused by other sources does
not conflict with her testimony that the injuries are consistent
with a history of sexual assault. Cf. State v. Ewell, 168
N.C.App. 98, 103, 606 S.E.2d 914, 918 (2005) (stating that
testimony indicating a child exhibits characteristics consistent
with abuse is admissible “ ‘to inform the jury that the lack of
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physical evidence of abuse is not conclusive that abuse did
not occur’ “ (quoting State v. Bush, 164 N.C.App. 254, 258,
595 S.E.2d 715, 718 (2004))). Therefore, we conclude it was
not error, and certainly not plain error, to admit Dr. St. Claire's
expert testimony.
2. The Non-expert Testimony
*6  Defendant next argues admitting Donna Stanley's and Dr.
St. Claire's non-expert testimony was plain error because it
impermissibly bolstered Sarah's testimony. Stanley, a licensed
social worker who was Sarah's therapist for fourteen months
after the offense occurred, testified as a non-expert witness.
In an attempt to explain why Sarah did not immediately
report the encounter with defendant, and to gauge the
effect of the incident on Sarah, the State questioned Stanley
regarding Sarah's interaction with her parents. In the course
of that discussion, Stanley indicated Sarah's parents had been
supportive since the incident. When asked whether this was
“clinically significant,” Stanley replied as follows: “Yes. It's
extremely helpful in healing a rape victim to be believed.
If her parents did not doubt [her story], they believed, and
showed it in action by going to the police and doing what they
needed to do to address it.” Defendant argues this testimony
amounted to plain error, not because it skirted the line between
lay and expert opinion, but because it conveyed a message
that Stanley and Sarah's parents believed Sarah's account of
the incident. Defendant also contends the admission of similar
remarks on the subject of Sarah's memory made by Dr. St.
Claire and Stanley constituted plain error. Stanley stated that
over the course of fourteen months, the details of Sarah's story
had remained the same, remarking that “she had an amazing
memory.” Dr. St. Claire made similar comments.
Lay witness opinion testimony must be limited to “those
opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on
the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact
in issue.” N.C.R. Evid. 701. Therefore, a non-expert witness is
prohibited from vouching for the veracity of another witness.
See State v. Robinson, 355 N.C. 320, 334–35, 561 S.E.2d
245, 255 (2002) (applying Rule 701). Of course, lay opinion
testimony is not automatically inadmissible simply because it
also favorably reflects on the credibility of another witness.
See Dick, 126 N.C.App. at 315, 485 S.E.2d at 89 (stating
this rule in the context of expert testimony); In re Butts, 157
N.C.App. at 617, 582 S.E.2d at 285 (same).
We express no opinion as to whether the admission of
each of these three pieces of evidence was error, because
even assuming it was, it would not rise to the level of
plain error. There were numerous witnesses whose testimony
permissibly bolstered Sarah's credibility. As discussed above,
the expert testimony, which was properly admitted, likely
had an incidental benefit to Sarah's credibility. Furthermore,
defendant admitted Sarah had accurately described his
bedroom. Thus, the jury had numerous occasions to judge
Sarah's credibility independent of the allegedly improper
testimony. Consequently, defendant has failed to establish
either Stanley's or Dr. St. Claire's non-expert testimony “tilted
the scales,” causing the jury to rule against him.
B. Defendant's Motions to Dismiss
*7  Defendant next argues the trial court erred by failing to
grant defendant's motions to dismiss the charges of statutory
rape and indecent liberties. We disagree. The denial of a
motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence is reviewed de
novo on appeal. State v. Bagley, 183 N.C.App. 514, 523, 644
S.E.2d 615, 621 (2007) (citing Shepard v. Ocwen Fed. Bank,
FSB, 172 N.C.App. 475, 478, 617 S.E.2d 61, 64 (2005)).
When confronted with a motion to dismiss, the trial court
must determine whether there is substantial evidence of each
essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant
being the perpetrator. State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472
S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996) (citing State v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231,
236, 400 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1991)). Substantial evidence has been
defined as the amount of relevant evidence reasonably needed
to support a conclusion. Vause, 328 N.C. at 236, 400 S.E.2d
at 61. The evidence, which may be direct or circumstantial,
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State, giving
the State the benefit of every reasonable inference. State v.
Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 351, 572 S.E.2d 108, 131 (2002)
(citing State v. Lucas, 353 N.C. 568, 581, 548 S.E.2d 712, 721
(2001); State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358, 368 S.E.2d 377,
382–83 (1988)).
1. The Statutory Rape Charge
A person is guilty of statutory rape if he or she “engages
in vaginal intercourse or a sexual act with another person
who is 13, 14, or 15 years old and the defendant is at least
six years older than the person, except when the defendant
is lawfully married to the person.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–
27.7A(a) (2009). Defendant claims his motion should have
been granted because the district attorney failed to address
whether defendant was married to the victim. He concedes,
however, that he testified he was married to his wife,
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Kitoria Downey, for approximately five years, which overlaps
with the date of the crime. Therefore, there was substantial
evidence that defendant and Sarah were not married.
Defendant also argues there was insufficient evidence that
he engaged in vaginal intercourse with Sarah. As a general
rule, the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to defeat a
motion to dismiss. State v. Vehaun, 34 N.C.App. 700, 704, 239
S.E.2d 705, 709 (1977). This rule does not apply, however,
“when the only testimony justifying submission of the case
to the jury is inherently incredible and in conflict with the
physical conditions established by the State's own evidence.”
State v. Wilson, 293 N.C. 47, 51, 235 S.E.2d 219, 221 (1977)
(citing State v. Miller, 270 N.C. 726, 731, 154 S.E.2d 902, 905
(1967)). Defendant contends the exception applies because
there was conflicting testimony as to whether Sarah could
have seen and heard the Jerry Springer Show on defendant's
television. A representative of the local television station with
exclusive rights to run the Jerry Springer Show testified that
the program was not scheduled to run until an hour after the
time Sarah testified she was forced into defendant's residence,
although the representative admitted the show could have
been a recording. Sarah accurately described defendant's
room, correctly testifying there were black sheets on his bed,
a Playstation video game console on his floor, and several
pictures on his table. Viewed in the light most favorable to
the State, the potential misidentification of a daytime talk
show during a forced sexual encounter does not make Sarah's
testimony “inherently incredible.” We find no error in the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss.
2. The Indecent Liberties Charge
*8  A person that is at least sixteen years old and at least
five years older than the victim is guilty of taking indecent
liberties with a child if he “[w]illfully takes or attempts to
take any immoral, improper, or indecent liberties with any
child of either sex under the age of 16 years for the purpose
of arousing or gratifying sexual desire.” N.C. Gen.Stat.
§ 14–202.1(a)(1) (2009). Defendant first argues there was
not substantial evidence that he acted for the purpose of
arousing or gratifying a sexual desire. His argument lacks
merit because a jury may infer from a defendant's actions
that his purpose was to arouse himself or gratify his sexual
desire. See State v. Rogers, 109 N.C.App. 491, 505–06, 428
S.E.2d 220, 228–29 (1993) (permitting an inference that the
defendant intended to arouse himself or gratify his sexual
desire); State v. Slone, 76 N.C.App. 628, 631, 334 S.E.2d
78, 80 (1985) (same). Sarah testified defendant grabbed her,
forced her into his home, and then raped her. This testimony
alone is sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss, even without
corroboration.
Defendant also argues his motion to dismiss should have been
granted because a conviction on statutory rape and indecent
liberties charges arising from the same transaction violates
the double jeopardy clause. Defendant has abandoned this
argument because he failed to raise double jeopardy in his
assignments of error. See State v. Bell, 359 N.C. 1, 27–28,
603 S.E.2d 93, 111–12 (2004) (declining to review a double
jeopardy argument when defendant failed to object on double
jeopardy grounds at trial and failed to address double jeopardy
in his assignments of error); State v. Wiley, 355 N.C. 592, 615,
565 S.E.2d 22, 39 (2002) (“It is well settled that an error,
even one of constitutional magnitude, that defendant does not
bring to the trial court's attention is waived and will not be
considered on appeal.”); State v. Hamilton, 351 N.C. 14, 22,
519 S.E.2d 514, 519 (1999) (“Our scope of appellate review
is limited to those issues set out in the record on appeal.”).
C. The State's Closing Argument
Finally, defendant argues the trial court should have
intervened ex mero motu during the State's closing argument
when his trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's
credibility-related statements and allegedly emotionally
charged argument. We conclude the trial court's failure to
intervene does not necessitate a new trial. To constitute
reversible error, “the prosecutor's remarks must be both
improper and prejudicial. Improper remarks are those
calculated to lead the jury astray.” State v. Jones, 355
N.C. 117, 133, 558 S.E.2d 97, 107–08 (2002). But when a
defendant fails to object during the State's closing argument,
he has a heavier burden of persuasion on appeal:
[The] defendant must show that the
alleged impropriety was so gross that
the trial court abused its discretion in
not correcting the arguments ex mero
motu. Under this standard, only an
extreme impropriety on the part of
the prosecutor will compel this Court
to hold that the trial judge abused
his discretion in not recognizing and
correcting ex mero motu an argument
that defense counsel apparently did
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not believe was prejudicial when
originally spoken.
*9  Wiley, 355 N.C. at 620, 565 S.E.2d at 42 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Generally, “counsel possesses wide latitude to argue facts
in evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from those
facts.” Id. at 620, 565 S.E.2d at 42. While attorneys may
not express their personal opinions, they may argue the jury
should not believe a particular witness. State v. Augustine, 359
N.C. 709, 725, 616 S.E.2d 515, 528 (2005) (citing State v.
Jones, 358 N.C. 330, 350, 595 S.E.2d 124, 137 (2004); State
v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 455, 533 S.E.2d 168, 227 (2000));
see also N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1230(a) (2009) (forbidding
attorneys from expressing “personal beliefs as to the truth or
falsity of evidence”). A prosecutor may give the jury “reasons
to believe the state's witnesses,” Wiley, 355 N.C. at 622, 565
S.E.2d at 43, and may “argue that the State's witnesses are
credible,” Augustine, 359 N.C. at 725, 616 S.E.2d at 528.
Statements during closing argument “must be considered in
the context in which the remarks were made and the overall
factual circumstances to which they referred.” Id. (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendant argues a litany of the prosecutor's comments
were grossly improper because the prosecutor impermissibly
inferred and explicitly stated defendant and his wife were
lying. These statements include the following: “Frankly,
unless you choose to believe the made-up testimony of the
defendant and his wife, then the testimony is uncontradicted”;
“Now, then we spoke to Kitoria Downey, the co-master
conspirator, with her husband, who's been practicing every
day, engaged in a dialogue to try to thwart you and try to hide
the truth from you”; and, “That's part of the lie, part of the
misrepresentation.”
We recently found it was not reversible error when a trial
judge failed to intervene ex mero motu after the following
prosecutorial comments:
You can look at that statement and when you do you know
that when Detective Ward got up there on the stand and
said we didn't believe him, you can see why, because it's in
that statement. He was lying.... But later he found out that
this statement means he's guilty of kidnapping, robbery, sex
offense and murder. What can he do? Well, somehow he's
got to get rid of this statement, this statement that he gave
of his own free will.
...
He's had four year[s], ladies and gentlemen, to think about
what he would say. He's had access to all the [d]iscovery,
the complete investigation. And he used that to craft this
story because that's what he told you when he took the
stand, he told you a story.
State v. Sanders, 201 N.C.App. 631, ––––, 687 S.E.2d
531, 538, disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 858, 695 S.E.2d
106 (2010). After reviewing the record and the context in
which the prosecutor's statements were made, we conclude
that while the prosecutor's credibility-related statements
certainly bordered on impropriety, they were not so grossly
improper that the trial court committed reversible error by
failing to intervene ex mero motu. Cf. State v. Roache, 358
N.C. 243, 300, 595 S.E.2d 381, 418 (2004) (admonishing
“counsel to refrain from suggesting that the expert's opinion
testimony has been bought or is perjured for compensation,”
but nevertheless determining counsel's comments were not
grossly improper).
*10  Defendant also contends the following statement was
improper because it invited the jurors to decide the case based
on emotion and sympathy: “You really didn't need but one
witness, and she's the first one I called to the stand. Do not tell
[Sarah] that you do not believe her.” Defendant argues this
case is distinguishable from several North Carolina Supreme
Court cases where there was significant evidence against
the defendants and the Court suggested the prosecutors'
comments were inappropriate, but did not justify new trials.
See id. at 297–98, 595 S.E.2d at 416 (ruling prosecutor's
comments were improper but did not necessitate a new trial
given the overwhelming evidence against defendant); State
v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 224–25, 433 S.E.2d 144, 152–
53 (1993) (ruling defendant was not denied due process by
prosecutor's comments asking jurors to imagine the victim
was their child when the evidence against defendant was
overwhelming); State v. Boyd, 311 N.C. 408, 418, 319 S.E.2d
189, 197 (1984) (expressing displeasure with the prosecutor's
comments, but concluding they were not grossly improper
and noting there was substantial evidence against defendant).
He claims this case is distinguishable because there is not
overwhelming evidence against him.
His argument fails because the prosecutor's comments were
not improper in this respect as they did not invite the jurors
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to decide the case based on emotion and sympathy. The
prosecutor's comments were not a blatant appeal to the
juror's emotions; rather, the prosecutor suggested the jury was
confronted with conflicting accounts of what transpired and
encouraged the jury to side with Sarah's version. A closing
argument is not impermissible merely because it may provoke
an emotional response. Cf., e.g., In re Butts, 157 N.C.App.
at 617, 582 S.E.2d at 285 (2003) (stating that otherwise
admissible expert testimony is not inadmissible because it
incidentally enhances a witness's credibility). Therefore, the




Judges HUNTER, ROBERT C., and WALKER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
All Citations
207 N.C.App. 749, 701 S.E.2d 403 (Table), 2010 WL
4290134
Footnotes
1 Pseudonyms are used to conceal the identity of the victim.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES
BEFORE CITING.
Superior Court of North
Carolina, Mecklenburg County,
Business Court.
SUNBELT RENTALS, INC., a North
Carolina corporation, Plaintiff,
v.
HEAD & ENGQUIST EQUIPMENT, L.L.C.,
d/b/a Hi-Lift, Robert Hepler, Douglas
Kline, Michael Quinn, Gregg L. Christensen,
Patrick C. Muldoon, Michele U. Dougherty




{1} This case highlights a basic duality in our economic
system and the business laws which govern that system.
Our system is dependent on both competition and ethics.
The preservation and promotion of fair competition is one
of the primary goals of our business laws. Competition
fuels the engines of our economic system. Without it,
productivity gains, innovation, efficiency and economy
would be severely diminished; employees would have fewer
opportunities for betterment; investors would receive smaller
returns on their capital; and consumers would pay more
for their purchases. Competition, like any fuel not properly
contained and utilized, can become destructive. To insure
that competition is beneficial instead of destructive, our
business laws impose certain constraints on competition.
One of the key mechanisms for imposing those constraints
is state unfair competition laws. In this case, the Court is
called upon to determine whether certain conduct of the
defendants is outside the bounds of fair, ethical competition,
and thus violates North Carolina's Unfair and Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (“U.D.T.P.A.”), N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1. The Court
concludes that in certain instances the competitive actions of
the defendants have exceeded the bounds of fair and ethical
competition and thus violated that statute. Plaintiffs have been
damaged in the amount of five million dollars, which amount
is trebled pursuant to the statute.
{2} Drawing that boundary and determining appropriate
damages for the out of bounds activity has been difficult in
this case. The primary difficulties arise from (1) the failure
of the plaintiff corporation to take even the most rudimentary
steps to protect itself from the very competition about which it
now complains, (2) the highly competitive nature of the aerial
work platform leasing industry, (3) the key role service and
people play in an industry characterized by a uniformity of
physical product, (4) the failure of the defendants to testify
fully and truthfully, and (5) the overlapping impact of both
fair and unfair competition on the damages issues.
{3} The Court has previously granted summary judgment
in favor of all defendants on the plaintiff's claims for
breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty. See Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Head & Engquist
Equipment, L.L.C., 2002 NCBC 4 (No. 00 CVS 10358,
Mecklenburg County Super. Ct. July 10, 2002) (Tennille,
J.) Additionally, at the close of plaintiff's evidence the
Court granted Defendants Patrick Muldoon and Michele
Dougherty's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims against them
pursuant to Rule 41(b).
Attorneys and Law Firms
Parker, Poe, Adams & Bernstein, L.L.P., by Edward B. Davis,
Deborah L. Edney, William L. Rikard, Jr., and Eric D. Welsh,
for plaintiff.
Helms Mulliss & Wicker, P.L.L.C., by Marna M. Albanese,
Irving M. Brenner, and Paul M. Navarro, for defendants.
ORDER AND OPINION




*1  {4} The following Findings of Fact are entered after
10 days of trial without a jury, hearing 28 live witnesses,
reviewing deposition designations for 47 other witnesses
covering thousands of pages, and reviewing written discovery
responses and over 600 exhibits.
Parties
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{5} Plaintiff Sunbelt is a North Carolina corporation that
rents construction and industrial equipment. It does business
throughout the United States, including Mecklenburg County,
North Carolina, where it has a place of business. On April 20,
2000, Sunbelt announced the purchase of BET Plant Services,
Inc. (“Plant Services”), including its division BPS Equipment
Rental and Sales (“BPS”). The purchase was consummated on
June 1, 2000. BPS had been in the business of renting, selling
and installing construction and industrial aerial work platform
equipment and scaffolding since 1939. Prior to its acquisition
by Sunbelt, BPS was headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida,
and operated 24 branches located throughout the southeast
and south central United States.
{6} Defendant Head & Engquist Equipment, L.L.C. (“H &
E”) is a Louisiana corporation doing business in various
states throughout the United States, including North Carolina,
where one of its divisions, Hi-Lift (“Hi-Lift”), has a branch.
Hi-Lift competes with Sunbelt in the AWP leasing business.
{7} Defendant Robert Hepler (“Hepler”) is a citizen and
resident of Florida and served as president of BPS and as
a director and officer of Plant Services from 1992 until his
employment ended on December 14, 1999. After leaving his
position at BPS, Hepler was employed as president of H & E's
Hi-Lift division. Hepler performs essentially the same duties
and responsibilities as president of the Hi-Lift division as he
did as president of BPS.
{8} Defendant Douglas Kline (“Kline”) is a citizen and
resident of Florida, and from 1992 until the end of his
employment on December 14, 1999, Kline served as vice
president of finance and chief financial officer of BPS. Kline
joined the Hi-Lift division as its executive vice-president and
chief financial officer as part of a package agreement he and
Hepler made with H & E. Kline performs essentially the
same duties and responsibilities for Hi-Lift as he did as chief
financial officer for BPS.
{9} Defendant Michael Quinn (“Quinn”) is a citizen and
resident of Georgia. From 1989 until January 5, 2000, he
was a member of the BPS senior management team, acting
primarily as product manager for BPS and its predecessor
companies. At one time he was branch manager of the
BPS Atlanta branch. On January 5, 2000, Hi-Lift employed
Quinn as its product manager and as vice president for its
Eastern region. Quinn performs essentially the same duties
and responsibilities for Hi-Lift as he performed for BPS.
{10} Defendant Gregg Christensen (“Christensen”) is a
citizen and resident of Texas. Christensen was director of
operations at BPS's Western division from approximately
1992 until he left that position on January 14, 2000. He
also was branch manager for the BPS Dallas branch until
November 1999. After leaving BPS, Christensen became Hi-
Lift's vice president for its Western division. Christensen
performs essentially the same duties and responsibilities for
Hi-Lift as he performed for BPS.
*2  {11} Defendant Brian W. Pearsall (“Pearsall”) is a citizen
and resident of Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. He was
the branch manager for BPS in Charlotte, North Carolina until
June 2000 and assumed the same position with Hi-Lift when
he left BPS. He is Rob Hepler's brother-in-law.
{12} Rentokil Initial plc (“Rentokil”) is a British company
which obtained ownership of Plant Services in connection
with a hostile takeover in approximately 1997. James Wilde
(“Wilde”) was the manager of Rentokil responsible for
oversight of BPS after the Plant Services acquisition. Hepler
and Kline reported to Wilde when Rentokil owned Plant
Services and they were employed by BPS. Rentokil is not a
party to this litigation.
The Equipment Rental Industry
{13} Before providing an overview of this case, it is helpful to
outline the challenges and general practices in the equipment
rental industry. This action is concerned principally with
equipment rentals of aerial work platforms (“AWP”). AWP
equipment consists of boom lifts, scissor lifts, push-around
lifts (smaller non-motorized lifts) and reach forklifts. Boom
and scissor lifts come in a wide range of models, sizes and
functions; they are substantial pieces of equipment that cost
thousands of dollars each and encompass a broad variety
of devices designed to lift workmen off the ground to do
work on jobs that otherwise would be very difficult to
reach. Sometimes included within this class of equipment are
“swing stages” and “mast climbers,” equipment used to climb
alongside buildings and other structures. Hi-Lift purports to
operate exclusively in the AWP business.
{14} The business is highly specialized. If not delivered,
handled or operated properly, AWP equipment can cause
substantial injury and even death. Thus, the nature of the
industry is such that its workmen and sales people must be
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highly trained in the mechanics, applications and operations
of the equipment.
{15} The larger equipment rental companies typically
purchase or lease equipment from a limited number of
manufacturers. As of the fall of 1999, the two primary
manufacturers of AWP equipment in the United States
were JLG Industries (McConnellsburg, Pennsylvania) and
Genie Industries (Redmond, Washington). JLG and Genie
(and other secondary manufacturers) sell boom lifts, scissor
lifts and other AWP equipment in certain standard sizes
with various options such as two-wheel drive or four-wheel
drive. Thus, the competitors in this industry offer, for all
practical purposes, the same or very similar equipment to
potential customers. As a result, prices tend to be set by
the marketplace, and service and equipment availability
have become significant factors affecting the success of the
businesses in the area.
{16} AWP managers and salespeople know, from experience
or simply by asking their customers, what type of equipment
is needed by the different types of contractors for particular
jobs. For example, electrical contractors will often use smaller
scissor lifts or push-around lifts that can fit through interior
doorways, while glass manufacturers working on the outside
of buildings need taller boom lifts which can range up to
120 feet in height. Knowledge of the company's customer
base contributes to higher utilization of equipment and better
selection of the “fleet mix” for a particular market. Such
information allows a business to invest in certain machines
that yield better rates and profits. A new market entrant has a
significant advantage if it has access to that information. With
such information, a new entrant can maximize its initial fleet
investment with little risk, perhaps saving millions of dollars,
and can accurately project an operating budget.
*3  {17} The potential customers for AWP equipment
are general construction contractors, subcontractors (such
as electrical, glass and painting companies) and other
industrial or commercial businesses that need equipment to
work “in the air.” These customers are typically identified
through numerous public sources-including the yellow pages,
business directories and publications (such as Dodge Reports
and PEC Reports that list various pending construction sites
and related contractors)-and through on-jobsite trailers and
direct contacts with contractors. It may be more difficult to
determine which industrial customers are in the rental market,
although the types of users-airlines, for example-are easy to
determine.
{18} These public directories, reports and other sources not
only provide the name of potential customers but also the
customer's address, phone number and the name of the person
to contact. The Dodge Reports and PEC Reports go further,
providing detailed information about construction projects
(Dodge) and industrial plants (PEC).
{19} Long-term rental contracts are rare. Companies typically
rent for periods ranging from a day to a month, with weekly
rentals being the most common. Even with longer term
rentals, the customer is given the opportunity to return the
equipment prior to the end of the rental period, paying only
for the time rented.
{20} Rental companies primarily use outside sales
representatives to sell and rent AWP equipment. These
salesmen typically visit job sites or company offices to
attempt to rent equipment. Customer rental decisions are
made on varying factors, including price, the relationship
between the customer and the sales person, availability of
equipment on the customer's schedule, customer service,
perceived dependability of the equipment and other
considerations particular to the customer. Many customers
do business with more than one company to maintain
the flexibility and price competitiveness offered by having
multiple sources of equipment.
{21} The personal relationship between the outside salesman
and the customer is particularly important for success in
this industry. Many salesmen have been calling on the
same customers for many years and naturally develop close
personal and/or professional relationships that increase the
likelihood that the customer will rent from the salesman's
company, other factors being equal. The hiring of salesmen
from competitors to take advantage of these customer
relationships is not unusual in the industry. It would be
unusual, however, for an entire sales force to leave an office
at the same time and go to the same competitor and unusual
for the majority of salespeople in a number of offices to leave
and go to work for the same competitor at the same time.
{22} Nothing in the history of the industry is indicative
of mass departures of personnel from one branch to a
competitor's branch. The departure of a number of core-
positional people at various levels of the branch organization,
at approximately the same time, to a competitor, has a major
detrimental impact on a branch and can adversely affect the
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performance of the branch. Personnel changes usually occur
as one- or two-person departures at a time.
*4  {23} In terms of price, historical prices have limited
value. Prices are quoted and then negotiated between the
outside sales representative and the customer or over the
telephone with inside sales coordinators. While salesmen
would like for prices to remain “confidential,” they
understand and expect that prices will become known in
the market. Customers do not consider quoted prices to
be confidential and often reveal price sheets and quoted
prices of competitors to obtain more favorable terms. AWP
rental companies occasionally quote good customers a fixed
price for a job or period of time; these arrangements
would constitute confidential information. “Sealed bids”
or other formal bidding processes are rarely used. Recent
consolidation in the industry has made pricing extremely
competitive and has created several large competitors.
{24} Well-run companies in the equipment rental business
study their markets and customers and gather various
financial, sales and marketing information. This information
includes average rental rates, construction information, fleet
mix records, revenue per employee, utilization rates and
other measures of operations. This information is shared with
employees to improve their performance. It is not generally
shared with competitors. Most of the information is based on
a company's experience and is the type of information that
employees would have some general knowledge about and
retain. Such information takes some time to accumulate.
{25} Efforts to protect that information exists in the AWP
rental industry include obtaining covenants not to compete,
placing a general confidentiality policy statement in an
employee handbook and limiting access to the information.
{26} The industry has grown considerably over the last five
to seven years through “greenfield” startups-startup branches
in a market where there has been no prior presence-and,
more significantly, through consolidation. As part of the
industry consolidation, larger companies have expanded by
purchasing smaller companies rather than through greenfield
operations. In these acquisitions, the tangible and intangible
assets of a branch or multiple branches are acquired,
including, importantly, the entire human resource components
and goodwill of the company. Consolidation has caused
competition to increase and margins to fall. In the year 2000,
acquiring companies were paying multiples of five to seven
times EBITDA for the acquired company or branch.
{27} The industry has historically been in short supply of
trained, qualified branch managers, sales persons, mechanics,
inside sales coordinators, drivers and other related positions.
Businesses that are able to retain those personnel develop a
considerable competitive advantage based on the investment
those businesses make in the employees' training, experience
and customer relationships.
{28} In a typical mature AWP business, the human
resource component includes a branch manager, outside sales
representatives, an inside sales coordinator, credit manager,
service manager, branch administrator, mechanics (both
inside as well as field mechanics) and drivers. In a typical
greenfield situation, hiring all these personnel and achieving
a satisfactory level of competent employees takes months.
The employment of a number of experienced trained people
for these positions within a short time frame (30 days or
less) is atypical for this industry. In fact, such employment is
inconsistent with normal marketplace employment activity.
*5  {29} In the industry, the most important business
component is the branch office. Consequently, the branch
manager position is one of critically important leadership in
that this person is responsible for the total operation of each
branch. He or she is also responsible for the development
of confidential information about branch operations, its
equipment fleet, its customers and employees and other
related branch activities. Significantly, a branch manager
must be sufficiently familiar with the branch's customers to
be able to deal with customers upon the departure of a sales
person and thus ensure continuity in the relationship between
the branch and its customers.
{30} A branch manager has “very unique, very useful
knowledge” of all personnel in the branch: competency levels,
work ethics, salary/compensation, customer relationships and
other personnel related matters. He or she is intimately
involved in supervising a branch's sales force and in effect
operates as a sales manager for each sales force. He or she
must also supervise the service side of the branch, including
the service manager, the mechanics and drivers.
{31} The individuals working for the branch manager-sales
personnel, mechanics and other service related personnel-
must act interdependently to deliver the equipment and
service to customers. Sales personnel are the conduit
through which businesses (branches) have relationships with
customers. As stated by a customer called by defendant
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as a witness, sales personnel are the “face person” for
the relationship with the customer. The service manager,
mechanics and drivers all support the relationship with
the customer by initial delivery of the equipment, training
a customer in the operation of the equipment, regular
maintenance of the equipment and prompt field repair of the
equipment in the event of breakdowns. Service personnel
have frequent and close contact with customers. The AWP
business requires a high service component and the presence
of a strong team effort.
{32} All AWP personnel undergo regular training. Sales
personnel, for example, have to know the uses of the
equipment and the most advantageous applications of
it. Inside sales coordinators need to know equipment
applications to provide appropriate advice to customers. The
mechanics and service personnel have to be able to maintain
and deliver the equipment to the satisfaction of customers,
including OSHA-required familiarization.
Overview
{33} Before discussing the detailed Findings of Fact, a
general overview of the core facts is helpful.
{34} Defendants Hepler and Kline were employed by BPS.
They played significant roles in the creation of a successful
business at BPS renting aerial work platforms to construction
companies and industrial users both before and during the
time it was owned by Rentokil. BPS had rental locations
in several key markets in the Southeast, including Atlanta,
Charlotte, Tampa-Fort Myers, Orlando, Dallas and Houston.
When Rentokil decided to sell BPS in 1999, it did not consult
with or inform Hepler and Kline of the decision and did
not offer them any inducement to stay with the company
through consummation of any sale. Neither had a contract that
restricted his employment by a competitor.
*6  {35} Accordingly, Hepler and Kline devised a business
plan that envisioned competing directly with BPS in its key
branches in the Southeast. A successful AWP leasing business
required two key ingredients: capital and the right people.
{36} At the heart of the plan was the conversion of the
employee base of the targeted BPS branches and key BPS
management in addition to Hepler and Kline. With the
conversion of those key employees came all the information
necessary to ramp up a greenfield operation more rapidly than
would normally occur. The branch managers were thoroughly
knowledgeable about the business of each branch, including
the employee base, competition and pricing in the local
market, the fleet mix, the customer base, and every other
aspect of the local operation. The service employees were
already trained and knew the equipment, customers, job sites
and safety requirements. The salesmen knew the customers,
the locations of current and upcoming jobs, and the prevailing
market prices for the equipment to go on the jobs. The credit
managers knew the credit history of the customer base. Each
employee brought with him or her the knowledge of the
systems, information and records necessary to the smooth
functioning of an AWP rental operation. Concomitantly, the
departure of each of those employees left BPS with a void,
which impacted its ability to compete in the local market in
the short term. Significantly, not one of the employees hired
by H & E, including Hepler and Kline, had any form of
contract containing a restrictive covenant or a covenant not
to compete.
{37} Capital was required to purchase or lease the significant
amounts of large and expensive equipment that constituted
the lease products of the business and to fund other startup
costs. H & E provided the capital and financial backing to
bring the business plan to fruition. During the six-month
period between their departure from BPS and the closing
of its sale to Sunbelt, Hepler and Kline together with the
other defendants successfully enticed significant numbers of
the key management and skilled employees of the targeted
branches to leave and join the new venture with H & E. That
six-month period was one of extreme vulnerability for BPS,
but a vulnerability of BPS's own creation.
{38} Three factors, discussed more fully below, have entered
into the determination that defendants' actions-which when
taken alone or in isolation might not have been outside the
bounds of fair competition-when viewed collectively crossed
over the boundary. First is the use of then BPS managers
to accomplish the raid on BPS employees. Second is the
magnitude of the raid. Third is the coordinated timing of the
departures.
BPS and Its Operations
{39} Five companies acquired by Plant Services were
consolidated into BPS in approximately 1993 to 1994. These
included Hepler Hi-Lift, which Defendant Hepler founded,
and four other companies: Able Equipment Company, Safe-
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T-Green, Booms and Scissors, and Florida Contractor Rentals
and Sales.
*7  {40} Defendant Kline was the chief financial officer for
Safe-T-Green and in 1994 was moved to BPS headquarters in
Jacksonville, Florida to become the chief financial officer for
BPS, working directly under Hepler.
{41} Under Hepler and Kline, BPS had a senior management
team which included: Doug Guy, director of Eastern
operations; Christensen, director of Western operations; Jeff
Stachowiak, director of marketing, sales and safety; John
McGraw, director of scaffolding; and Mike Quinn, product
manager.
{42} During Hepler's tenure as president, the senior
management team met regularly, at least once per month.
At its meetings, the senior management team discussed
customers, mechanic availability, sales personnel, equipment
utilization, safety, marketing, product mix, average rental
rates, planning and other matters. Branches were regularly
evaluated branch-by-branch. Senior management regularly
shared BPS marketing, customer and internally developed
information. This information included head counts, salary
information, pricing, organizational structure, financial
projections and forecasts, cost information, branch budgets
and customer information, including the identity, contacts and
requirements of its rental customers, pricing in effect for those
customers and fleet utilization information by branch. Senior
management knew that this information was confidential.
{43} Defendants Hepler and Kline managed the day-to-
day affairs of BPS, made strategic decisions, developed and
implemented budgets and hired and fired employees. Hepler
was involved in all levels of the business. He frequently
visited branches, discussed up and coming job sites and sales
personnel and was actively involved with customers. Kline
was involved in all aspects of the business as the result of
his financial responsibilities. In particular, he was extensively
involved with branch managers in budgeting. Hepler and
Kline were highly compensated. Hepler was paid a salary of
$260,000 in 1999, and Kline was paid a salary of $160,000
to manage 24 branch operations throughout the Southeast
and South Central United States. They had access to and
knowledge of BPS's confidential business information.
{44} Defendant Christensen, as Western regional manager
for BPS, was closely involved in personnel issues, budgets,
fleet mix and management of the branches for which he
was responsible. He was directly involved in the BPS Texas
branches and, in fact, managed the Dallas branch for several
years. He had access to all of BPS's confidential business
information related to his geographic area of responsibility.
{45} Defendant Quinn was involved in a variety of senior
management issues, including budgets and, most importantly
for him, fleet management. He was intimately involved with
fleet utilization, equipment ordering, scheduling delivery
dates, and equipment movement. Transferring equipment
between branches facilitated utilization. He had access to and
knowledge of BPS's confidential business information.
*8  {46} BPS placed special emphasis on its branches
and branch managers. Among its most experienced branch
managers at the end of 1999 were: Mark Alexander
(“Alexander”) (9 years, 7 months) (Atlanta); Duke Drennan
(“Drennan”) (18 years, 7 months) (Orlando); Beare Jones
(“B.Jones”) (20 years, 5 months) (Tampa/Fort Myers); Abe
Farrington (“Farrington”) (5 years, 3 months) (Dallas); David
Hobbs (“Hobbs”) (4 years 3 months) (Charleston, South
Carolina); and Defendant Pearsall (13 years) (Charlotte).
These branch managers dominated their branches, recruited,
hired, reviewed and fired employees, set salaries, trained
and certified employees, set prices and rates for customers
in their markets, developed confidential information for
their respective markets, prepared budgets for their branches
and carried out the multiple other business and leadership
duties and responsibilities expected of a branch manager.
The branch managers were in continuous contact with senior
management.
{47} Branch managers regularly made presentations to their
peers about their branch operations with emphasis on the keys
to success they had found in operating their branches. For
example, Alexander made a presentation to the BPS branch
managers in June 1999, in which he emphasized:
(a) the longevity and experience of his sales staff (“60 years
of combined experience”);
(b) the branch's interdependence of its personnel and its
emphasis on team work; and
(c) the Atlanta branch's success in retaining customers.
(“WE DON'T LOSE CUSTOMERS.”)
{48} In order to protect its information, BPS implemented
an employee handbook containing a section on confidential
information. In fact, developing the handbook was the direct
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responsibility of Defendant Kline, who rewrote, in his own
handwriting, that section of the handbook dealing not only
with confidentiality but also with employee loyalty. Each
BPS employee was required to acknowledge receipt of
the handbook in writing. Virtually all of the BPS/Sunbelt
employees who left to become employed by H & E signed
such an acknowledgment. Hepler and Kline have both
separately acknowledged the presence of trade secrets in this
industry. Additionally, some defendants and many of their
H & E employees also admitted that certain information is
confidential and is not to be shared with competitors.
{49} BPS's business information was treated as confidential
when discussed by senior management. Efforts were made to
protect it at the branches. For example, the war rooms had the
information taken down from the walls when outside people
came in. Pricing was kept in special books. Branch managers
(e.g.Pearsall) had specific rules about file removal from the
branch office. Passwords were required and given to only
certain personnel with respect to the BPS computer system.
Salesmen's information was limited to customers for which
they had responsibility. Only branch managers had access to
information on all branch customers. Salary information was
kept under lock and key at the branches.
*9  {50} Based on senior management discussions, the
individual defendants were acutely aware that BPS lacked
depth in a number of its human resource requirements.
BPS senior management had frequently discussed that it did
not have sufficient human resource reserves for its sales
people. The individual defendants were acutely aware of the
intense competitive pressures regarding qualified experienced
mechanics and drivers and knew that those positions were in
short supply in all of their markets. As a result, Defendants
Hepler, Kline, Quinn, Christensen and H & E knew that
the branches from which they successfully recruited BPS
personnel en masse would be seriously harmed by those
departures and that those branches would not have sufficient
human resources to compete effectively with H & E until the
departed employees could be replaced and trained.
{51} Over the years at BPS, the branch managers developed
close personal and professional relationships with many
of their long-time employees, who in turn formed close
relationships among themselves; there are examples of shared
family relationships as well, with fathers, wives, sons or
brothers working in the same branch. These relationships
often mirrored those more commonly found in a family-run
business.
{52} Outside sales representatives usually reported directly
to the branch manager, as did the inside sales coordinators.
The inside sales coordinators were responsible for taking
orders over the phone from customers, both those who had
been solicited by the outside salesmen and others who called
in to shop for prices over the telephone. The inside sales
coordinators were also responsible for scheduling deliveries
and dispatching drivers to deliver and pick up equipment
which had been called “off rent.” Larger branches had
service managers who reported to the branch manager.
The service managers were responsible for supervising the
mechanics (both shop mechanics and field mechanics), the
parts department, the shop foreman and, to a limited extent,
the drivers.
{53} The branch administrative personnel-i.e., the branch
administrator, credit department employees and receptionist-
also ultimately reported to the branch manager. Each of
the branch employees served an important function at the
branch and participated in training appropriate to his or
her position. Training for mechanics was handled primarily
through on-the-job experience and training classes provided
by the manufacturers. The safety concerns surrounding use
of the equipment made trained mechanics critical. Salesmen,
to the extent they were not already experienced in the
industry, were trained through experience and advice from the
branch manager and fellow sales representatives. Drivers with
no experience were trained through manufacturer classes,
training videos and practice at the branch location. The
process of training drivers typically took no more than two to
three weeks.
{54} In addition to routine sales efforts, sales duties
at the branch level consisted of assigning salesmen to
territories, identifying target customers, creating “war rooms”
to further identify ongoing and potential jobsite and customer
opportunities, and discussing competitive pressures. Sales
meetings among the sales representatives and the branch
manager were sometimes held to discuss sales efforts
throughout the branch.
*10  {55} Rental contract records were maintained both in
the company's computer database and in “hard copy” files
maintained at the branches. The rental contracts typically
included the name, address and telephone number of the
customer; the name and contact information of the customer
who had rented the equipment; the price at which the
equipment was being rented; the expected term of the rental;
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and often directions to the job site where the equipment was
to be used. Sometimes hand tickets were prepared which
included varying amounts of the information found on the
typical printed rental contract. The rental contracts were
delivered to the job site with the equipment, and a contract
copy was left with the customer.
{56} As of the end of 1999, BPS included the following
among its southeastern and Texas branch locations: Atlanta,
Tampa, Fort Myers, Orlando, Miami, Jacksonville, Charlotte,
Raleigh, Charleston, Richmond, Dallas, Houston and Austin.
BPS had additional branches in Arizona, California and
Nevada. By virtue of his presidency at BPS and prior
experience with his own business, Hepler had extensive
knowledge of the AWP market in each of these cities.
{57} Hepler also had long-standing personal relationships
with many of the BPS branch managers. As of January
2000, the branch manager of the Atlanta branch was
Mark Alexander. Hepler had known Alexander, either as a
competitor or as one of the BPS branch managers, since the
early 1990's. They were personal friends in addition to their
professional relationship. Alexander was also close to Quinn.
{58} The branch manager of the Tampa and Fort Myers,
Florida branches as of January 2000 was Beare Jones
(“Jones”). Hepler and Jones were extremely close friends.
Jones has worked for either Hepler or Hepler's father in the
equipment rental business for nearly forty years. At the age
of seven or eight, Hepler, now 46 years old, began working
in his father's business with Jones.
{59} The long-time BPS branch manager for Charlotte was
Defendant Brian Pearsall. Pearsall is, as noted above, Hepler's
brother-in-law. Hepler and Pearsall had worked together for
over ten years as of January 2000.
{60} The BPS branch manager for Charleston, South Carolina
in January 2000 was David Hobbs (“Hobbs”). Hobbs started
as a BPS employee in the BPS Jacksonville office and
developed a close relationship with Hepler as he was
promoted through various positions at the Jacksonville branch
and later to the position of branch manager in Charleston.
{61} The branch manager for the BPS Orlando branch at the
beginning of 2000 was Duke Drennan (“Drennan”). While not
as close personally to Drennan as he was to the other branch
managers discussed above, Hepler had known and worked
with Drennan for over ten years as of January 2000.
{62} Hepler also had close personal relationships with BPS
employees below the branch manager level and frequently
played golf with the salesmen.
*11  {63} In summary, Hepler and Kline were in an ideal
position to recruit BPS employees to go to work with H & E.
No BPS employee was restrained by a restrictive covenant.
{64} The announcement that Plant Services was for
sale caused uncertainty and insecurity among the BPS
employees. When it had previously attempted to sell Plant
Services, Rentokil had purchased some protection against this
vulnerability by contracting with Hepler and Kline to stay
on through a transition with a new owner. In 1999 Rentokil
elected not to purchase that same protection, leaving Hepler
and Kline to go to work for a competitor at the time BPS
would be most vulnerable. Rentokil was either unaware or
unconcerned about the close relationship between Hepler and
Kline and the branch managers.
{65} Insecurity among the BPS employees was
understandable. The possibility existed that BPS would be
purchased by a large competitor who would close branches
and consolidate management practices. Four of the key
managers who had guided the company to success had left
abruptly and without explanation.
{66} Not until the problems posed by Hi-Lift were apparent
did Sunbelt/BPS offer “loyalty contracts” to some of the BPS
managers. Sunbelt's president, Bruce Dressel (“Dressel”),
visited nine BPS branches and discussed with BPS branch
managers Sunbelt's desire that they stay with BPS and work
for Sunbelt. Drennan assured Dressel he was “on board” with
the Sunbelt acquisition. Jones did not commit but gave no
indication that he would not be staying. Defendant Pearsall
accepted Sunbelt's invitation to attend Vendorfest.
{67} Rentokil elected not to spend any money to protect itself
against loss of employees during the period of time BPS was
for sale, despite the fact that its two key employees had left to
join a company that would compete with BPS. That fact was
clearly known to Sunbelt when it elected to purchase BPS. In
fact, Dressel chided Wilde for his failure to keep Hepler and
Kline on board during the transition.
H & E and Hi-Lift and Its Operations
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{68} H & E has been in existence since the 1960's and built a
reputation in the Gulf region in the crane and dirt movement
business. At some point in the 1990's, H & E entered the rental
business by acquiring a small fleet of equipment from Grove
Manufacturing (“Grove”), another but smaller manufacturer
of equipment. H & E was not very successful with its fleet.
It apparently had a fleet of approximately 1,000 to 1,200
units spread across at least five locations, including Gonzales,
Louisiana; Memphis, Tennessee; and Houston, Dallas and
San Antonio, Texas. The fleet in Dallas was only about
250 units, and the fleet in Houston approximately 300 units.
Engquist himself described H & E's fleet, which operated out
of locations that also had the crane and dirt moving business
intermixed, as a problem and “struggling.” The Memphis and
Gonzales branches, even though in “major markets,” were
later closed. The Court notes that, during the events of this
litigation, H & E provided no evidence that it opened any
branch under the Hi-Lift name in any location other than
those in which BPS had an existing branch, and that it closed
the Memphis and Gonzales AWP operations, two markets in
which BPS had no presence.
*12  {69} While H & E had a minor AWP presence in Dallas,
Houston and San Antonio, the evidence that the fleet was
struggling suggests that H & E's efforts were not formed or
based on any highly developed business information. Hi-Lift
had no market presence and no market information of its
own about Atlanta, Charlotte, Tampa/Fort Myers or Orlando.
The Grove AWP equipment these branches used was not
nearly as widely used as the Genie and JLG equipment.
Thus, customers were more familiar with and wanted Genie
and JLG equipment. Quinn was exceptionally knowledgeable
with respect to the purchasing of that equipment.
{70} In mid-1999, H & E was purchased in part by
an investment group, Bruckmann, Rosser and Sherrill
(“BRS”). 1  At about the same time, ICM (located in Salt
Lake City) was also purchased by BRS, thus linking H & E
and ICM. In fact, this common owner considered from the
outset merging the two companies. The Court further notes
that the boards of directors of ICM and H & E met jointly, and
Gary Bagley (“Bagley”), C.E.O. and president of ICM, was a
member of H & E's board of directors in part of 2000 and part
of 2001. Further, Hepler testified that he and Kline spent a day
in Jacksonville with Earl Rose, branch manager, conferring
about business plans to open locations in the Northwest based
on the Hi-Lift plan he and Bagley had been discussing.
{71} The broader picture for Hi-Lift and its investors is clear.
H & E and ICM each had an AWP business that would benefit
from the experienced management that Hepler, Kline, Quinn
and Christensen could provide. When Hepler and Kline were
hired, a plan was in place pursuant to which H & E would
open AWP rental operations in Charlotte, Atlanta, Orlando
and Tampa Bay-Fort Myers, and the former Grove-dominated
AWP operations in Dallas and Houston would be converted
to Genie and J & G equipment and run similar to the BPS
branches in those locations. It is also apparent that there was at
a minimum the likely prospect of some combination of the H
& E and ICM AWP business so as to produce a company with
coast-to-coast branches capable of competing with the largest
players in the market. That likelihood has come to fruition
with the merger of H & E and ICM and the creation of an AWP
division encompassing the branches of both ICM and H & E.
{72} If carried out in a fair manner, it was a well-conceived
and perfectly legitimate business plan. H & E had every right
to compete with BPS Sunbelt in a fair manner, and, given the
experience of its management and the capital resources of its
financial backers, it would have been a formidable competitor
under any circumstances. The Court does not find that the
existence of such a plan was an unfair trade practice. The plan
was a perfectly proper competitive strategy. The defendants
were free to compete fairly with BPS in any market. BPS and
its owners had the ability to provide some protection against
that competition and elected not to pay the price to do so.
*13  {73} The implementation of the consolidation and
expansion plan is where the activities occurred which give
rise to liability in this action. In their testimony, defendants
contended that no plan existed to raid BPS at specific
locations and that the defections which occurred were
unsolicited and unplanned. The Court, as finder of fact, does
not find that testimony credible.
{74} Hi-Lift hired Hepler, Kline, Quinn and Christensen at
salaries that were commensurate with the development of a
large organization such as has been developed by Hi-Lift.
Quinn provided the necessary purchasing expertise for such a
large operation and expansion, and Christensen provided the
West Coast management necessary since Hepler and Kline
wanted to stay on the East Coast.
{75} Hepler and the branch managers testified that there were
no prior discussions or solicitation of personnel. The Court
finds that testimony is not credible and that those activities
did take place. What actually happened is a clear indication
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that these activities occurred. In the cases of the Charlotte,
Atlanta, Orlando, and Tampa-Fort Myers branches, a pattern
of lining up salesmen and other key employees to leave at the
same time is apparent.
{76} In each instance, the branch manager was offered
compensation, including a signing bonus that was in excess
of his or her BPS compensation or covered the bonus he
or she would have gotten from BPS/Sunbelt for signing
a loyalty contract. The branch manager then recruited the
key or skilled employees (sometimes referred to as the
“A Team”) needed to open quickly. These key employees
included the most experienced outside sales people, the inside
sales person, the service manager, experienced mechanics and
drivers, and the administrative or credit manager. While the
detailed information about the branches was useful, it was
not necessary because the recruited employees brought all
their knowledge and skills with them. Had H & E opened
a greenfield office in one of the locations, many employees
might have switched over in time. It is also possible that
BPS could have made them counter offers from which they
would have benefited and for which they would have stayed.
That did not happen because of the wrongful conversion of
employees by Hepler and the branch managers.
{77} The fact that there was no effort to fill these new
positions outside BPS is a strong indicator that the branch
managers knew who was lined up to leave. The ability of Hi-
Lift to begin operations at a level and at a speed far in excess
of those normally associated with a greenfield is indicative
of the value these key, skilled, core employees brought with
them.
{78} The fact that each of the new H & E locations at former
BPS branches were opened before Sunbelt consummated its
purchase of Plant Services is a clear indication that H & E
rushed to open these branches while BPS was in the transition
period and most vulnerable to a raid on its employees. 2  The
timetable contributed to the need to use the branch managers
as recruiters prior to the establishment of a Hi-Lift branch.
*14  {79} Most of the individual acts standing alone would
not have risen to the level of unfair competition or an unfair
trade practice. For example, if BPS salesman Ken Farris had
voluntarily left BPS and gone to work for United Rentals in
Atlanta, he could have called on his old customers, used his
past knowledge and experience with respect to the type of
equipment they used and even promised to meet or beat BPS
prices, knowing full well the BPS price structure, including
specific prices for particular customers on a known job site.
{80} Hepler and Kline were free to go to work for a
competitor. In doing so, they were not restricted from
directing the sales people of the new employer to call on
customers whom Hepler and Kline knew to be former BPS
customers or from using the knowledge and skills they gained
while working in the industry.
{81} The critical issues arise from both the expansive
nature and the cumulative effects of the H & E actions.
In the context of an industry in which service may be
the significant business determinant and trained employees
are not plentiful, the consequences of a secret wholesale
raid on a competitor's employees are clearly discernable in
advance. The competitor's revenue is likely to be impacted
by the inability to service customers in a normal businesslike
manner.
{82} The Court finds that defendants used the BPS branch
managers, while they were still employed by BPS, to
recruit employees to leave BPS branches in a concerted and
orchestrated manner, which had the dual effect of temporarily
immobilizing the BPS branch and permitting Hi-Lift to fill
the void so created to appropriate BPS's business to Hi-Lift,
at least temporarily.
Hepler/Kline Decision to Leave BPS
{83} The past history of the first attempted sale of Plant
Services is instructive. Plant Services had been put on the
market for sale in 1998. During the process of that potential
sale, Hepler and Kline were intimately involved in the
preparations for sale. Pursuant to an agreement with Rentokil,
Plant Services' parent, Hepler stood to make as much as
four times his salary if the sale was completed-Kline, a
lesser amount. As a result, Hepler and Kline did not consider
departing BPS in 1998.
{84} As part of the process, Hepler and Kline made
confidential presentations for Plant Services about BPS. One
of those presentations was made to Bagley, a representative
of ICM, a business in the Northwest that had some AWP
operations.
{85} No sale was made in 1998, although Ripplewood/ICM
was discussing offering $800 million for Plant Services.
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{86} Rentokil decided in 1999 to put Plant Services back on
the market; however, they handled the matter very poorly.
In August 1999, Hepler and Kline learned of the proposed
sale before they were informed of it by Rentokil management.
Hepler and Kline reacted negatively to the proposed sale of
BPS. In fact, Hepler described himself as being quite angry
about the sale. Their reaction was understandable, given the
1998 arrangement and the contribution they made to BPS and
the way they found out about the sale.
*15  {87} After learning of the proposed sale of Plant
Services, Hepler and Kline communicated with each other
about their dissatisfaction and their intention to leave BPS.
However, they did not communicate their displeasure and
desire to leave to their superiors at Rentokil.
{88} Hepler worked out a potential consultancy with Genie
Industries, one of the principal suppliers of equipment to BPS.
Kline had no such prospects, and only had an interview lined
up which did not get past a video interview. Hepler apparently
made inquiry of Genie during this time as to whether it would
support a new venture put together by Hepler and Kline.
{89} According to Hepler, he received a call from a potential
investor named Bob Williams (“Williams”) in August 1999,
in response to which he and Kline developed a very specific
business plan for Aerial Equipment Specialists (the “AES
Plan”). This business plan:
(a) Stated that the management of BPS was committed to
the plan:
“The majority of the management
team is committed to AES.... The
five senior managers (CEO, CFO,
Director of Operations, Product
Director and Director of Marketing)
have worked together as a team for
over six years....”
(b) Stated that specific fleet mixes for the specifically
identified markets:
“We have developed a fleet mix
for each of the proposed branches,
which will coincide with the needs
of the local rental market.... The
equipment mix, as well as the
option list, was formulated by
experience in each of these markets
to maximize utilization.”
(c) Emphasized customer targeting as BPS had done in the
past:
“[W]e target ... those customers for the following
reasons:
• [T]hey ... understand the added value concept of
providing exactly what the customer needs.
• [T]hey are more responsible and less abusive to our
products.
• These customers tend to be established and will pay for
services rendered promptly....”
(d) Identified seven geographical locations where the
company would do business;
(e) Specified employee compensation and other equipment
formulae for the branches;
(f) Set forth specific operating ratios (e.g. AWP's per
delivery driver, sales person and mechanic);
(g) Made projections and forecasts for each location; and
(h) Included average monthly rental rates for each of the
seven branches cited, which were then used to develop the
rental revenue in the financial model.
{90} The branch locations, employee compensation and
other aspects of the AES Plan are strikingly similar to the
plan defendants actually implemented at H & E. The Court
concludes that Kline must have used BPS information in
formulating the AES plan. The information in the AES Plan
was accessible to Kline from BPS information. It is not
information that anyone could carry in his head. For instance,
the average monthly rental rates set forth for each market
and for each product group in the AES Plan are different,
and as the AES Plan itself states, “[were] formulated by
experience in each of these markets to maximize utilization.”
More specifically, there are 20 products listed (12 booms
and 8 scissors) and 7 markets; in other words, 140 different
individualized average rental rates were quoted in the AES
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Plan. Thus, inclusion of such information in the AES Plan
manifests defendants' intentions, from at least August 1999,
to take advantage of information developed by BPS. Kline
admitted that at the time the AES Plan was prepared, he
had access to average rental rates for the BPS branches in
Atlanta, Charlotte, Orlando, Dallas, Houston and Tampa, and
that gross margins were based upon his experience at BPS.
However, given the commodity nature of the equipment and
the highly competitive market, it was probably not difficult to
project margins.
*16  {91} In testifying at trial about the AES Plan, Hepler
gave very contradictory testimony. On one day, he testified
he knew nothing about the information contained under
operating ratios, contending that Kline alone had put together
that information. The next day, however, Hepler testified that
he did know about those ratios and that they were just generic.
{92} After the development of the AES Plan, Hepler and
Kline sent the plan to Williams and made presentations of it
to at least two other investors, one involving a trip to South
Bend, Indiana. In those presentations, Hepler and Kline did
not qualify the specific declarative representations contained
in the plan.
{93} At least as early as October 19, 1999, Defendants
Hepler and Kline began consulting with attorneys about
their activities. Hepler and Kline gave their attorneys earlier
employment agreements for review. On October 25, 1999,
they submitted the BPS Employee Handbook and the AES
Plan for review. They specifically conferred with their
attorneys regarding “potential litigation issues.”
{94} According to Hepler, he and Kline had decided to resign
from BPS on the evening of November 10th in Houston.
Because this dinner with James Wilde was canceled, however,
they did not resign.
{95} According to Hepler, sometime before November 11,
1999, he received a call from Gary Bagley at ICM inquiring
about his status. Bagley was aware that Plant Services was
again for sale, but ICM was not approaching Plant Services.
As a result of this and follow-up calls, Hepler arranged to meet
Bagley in Dallas, Texas on November 11, 1999, after having
a budget meeting in Houston with Hepler's BPS superiors
on November 10, 1999. Bruckmann and Bagley traveled to
this meeting from California and Utah, respectively, to meet
Hepler. Conversations between Bagley and Hepler indicate
that there would be no need for ICM to bid for Plant Services.
By hiring Helper and Kline, ICM would be able to benefit
from their implementation of the AES Plan at much less cost
than an acquisition of Plant Services.
{96} Bruce Bruckmann, whose investment group owned H &
E, attended the November 11, 1999 meeting between Hepler
and Bagley in Dallas. Kline was not present. Defendants
characterized the meeting as an “employment interview.”
Hepler testified at his deposition that, even though he had
not discussed the proposition with Kline, he told Bagley and
Bruckmann that he was not interested in a position unless
Kline was also offered a position. Hepler and Kline had
consulted their attorney about the interview in advance of it.
{97} Immediately after the November 11, 1999 Dallas
meeting, Defendants Hepler and Kline both called James
Wilde, chairman and president of Plant Services and
regional managing director of Rentokil, to resign from BPS.
Defendants said nothing about their competitive plans and
activities. Wilde would not accept their resignations without
meeting with them. Defendants Hepler and Kline, without
Wilde's knowledge, proceeded to tell other BPS senior
management that they intended to leave.
*17  {98} Shortly after the November 11, 1999 meeting with
Bagley and Bruckmann, Hepler began a series of telephone
calls with Bagley. These telephone calls led to a meeting in
Dallas on November 23, 1999, attended by Hepler, Kline,
Bruckmann, Bagley, Hal Rosser of Bruckmann Rosser, and
others. The meeting took place at the Admiral Club at the
Dallas Airport. Engquist met Helper and Kline for the first
time at this meeting. After approximately two hours of
discussion, Hepler and Kline were offered employment at
H & E at salaries of $300,000 and $200,000, respectively.
These salaries were more in line with salaries for managing a
nationwide AWP operation, not just H & E's AWP operation.
{99} Engquist testified that he hired Hepler and Kline in
order to address problems with H & E's fleet, which consisted
of Grove equipment. Thus, Hepler and Kline were offered
a $500,000 compensation package, an amount greater than
their BPS compensation, to take over an aging fleet that was
approximately a tenth the size of the BPS fleet.
{100} Significantly, Engquist was concerned about the
availability of personnel in the business and at this meeting
specifically “questioned” whether Hepler and Kline would
be able to obtain the “right people” to grow the business.
Hepler responded that he was confident that he could. Hepler
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and Kline's disproportionate compensation for the H & E
fleet, Engquist's statements regarding the “right people,”
Bruckmann's repeated involvement in meeting with Hepler
and the large contingency of personnel in attendance at the
November 23 meeting in Dallas, the AES Plan and the
subsequent hiring of Quinn and Christensen at salaries in
excess of $100,000 each confirm that defendants intended
to expand H & E with BPS personnel, and on a scope with
the AES plan. Engquist remained involved in the decision-
making process that led to the hiring of Christensen, Quinn,
Alexander and Hobbs and signed off on the employment of
numerous other BPS employees, including Abe Farrington,
Beare Jones, Duke Drennan, Brian Pearsall, Steve Mathews,
Ken Moon and Dan Franz.
{101} Hepler and Kline did not accept the job offers
on the spot, contending that they had agreed to meet
in person with Wilde before anything happened on their
resignations. Eight days later, on December 1, 1999, when
James Wilde was again in the United States in Jacksonville,
they officially resigned and at Wilde's request submitted
written resignations. Wilde asked Hepler and Kline to stay on
to sell BPS, or stay at least for a longer notice period. Hepler
and Kline, after conferring with Engquist, refused. They gave
BPS only two weeks' notice. A public announcement was
made of their resignations on December 1, 1999.
{102} During the notice period, Hepler and Kline had several
discussions with their attorneys. On December 14, 1999,
before flying to Baton Rouge that night to begin their
employment at Hi-Lift, they consulted with their attorney
about litigation risks, solicitation of BPS employees, and
consultations with H & E concerning the same. Defendant
Kline testified in his deposition that on December 15th, after
discussion of BPS solicitation of employees came up, Hepler
and Kline and Engquist had a conversation with H & E's
attorney, Ashley Moore.
*18  {103} Hepler and Kline both have testified in deposition
and Hepler at trial about going to Baton Rouge on December
15th. On the afternoon of December 15, 1999, Engquist
suggested that they fly to Dallas the next day to review the H
& E AWP fleet at Martin Equipment. After that suggestion,
according to Engquist, Hepler and Kline began conversations
with Engquist about the employment of Defendants Quinn
and Christensen.
{104} As described by both Hepler and Kline in deposition,
and by Hepler at trial, Hepler and Kline raised the issue of
employment of Quinn and Christensen with Engquist because
they needed Quinn to “manage the fleet” and Christensen to
manage the western operations, particularly the branches in
Texas for H & E where Christensen had worked for BPS.
They further testified that on December 15th they discussed
compensation in excess of $100,000 each for Christensen and
Quinn and that Engquist was agreeable to that compensation.
In their testimony, they suggested that Engquist meet Quinn
and Christensen in Dallas the next day before making any
final decision.
{105} Hepler testified that he had had no contact with
Christensen and Quinn about getting together in Dallas until
after the December 15th discussion with Engquist. In this,
Kline's deposition testimony and Hepler's trial testimony
directly conflict with the testimony of their co-defendant,
Quinn. Quinn testified in his deposition that when he was
first contacted by telephone by Hepler to tell him that Hepler
was going to work for H & E, Hepler wanted to talk to
him about employment at H & E, and would be contacting
him again. Quinn further testified that shortly thereafter he
received another call from Hepler setting up a meeting in
Dallas “within the next week or so.” Quinn's travel itinerary
shows that on December 9th he had already booked a flight
from Florida to Dallas arriving in the Dallas airport at 2:30
p.m. December 16th. This timing supports Quinn's testimony
that the Dallas meeting was arranged several days in advance.
Further evidence that Quinn was conspiring with Hepler is
found in Quinn's testimony that he accepted employment with
H & E without a specific compensation offer even though
Quinn expressed doubts about Hi-Lift.
{106} Defendants did not present Defendant Quinn for
testimony at trial. Nor did they call Defendant Pearsall,
Drennan, Jones, Shelly Parnell, or others whose deposition
testimony contradicted Hepler, Kline or Engquist.
{107} Immediately upon Hepler's return from Christmas
vacation, he proceeded to recruit additional BPS employees.
{108} Hepler and Quinn traveled to Atlanta on January 6,
2000 to meet with Alexander; Alexander was the Atlanta
branch manager, BPS's largest branch and among its most
successful. Notwithstanding Hepler's testimony that H & E
had no definite plan at this time to open in Atlanta, Hepler and
Quinn sought assurances that Alexander would be “available
when it came time to leave.” Hepler's testimony about this
meeting is not credible.
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*19  {109} The very next day, Hepler and Quinn had
breakfast with Gary Maner, BPS's national service manager.
At that time, they offered him employment to head up the
rebuild facility for H & E, the same initiative that BPS
was supposed to have achieved as a strategic initiative in
1999. This is another example of Hepler and Quinn's use of
knowledge of BPS's business plan for the immediate benefit
of Hi-Lift.
{110} On January 9, 2000, Hepler, Kline and Quinn flew to
Seattle, Washington to meet with Genie Industries, the major
supplier of AWP equipment and according to the AES Plan
the “preferred supplier.” According to Hepler and Engquist,
who later joined the other defendants, the purpose of this
meeting was to become acquainted with Genie, with whom
H & E had nothing but a casual business relationship at that
time. According to Hepler, H & E was able to convince Genie
that it was a sufficient size player to obtain very favorable
pricing and terms on equipment. Even though it was only
three days after his Atlanta recruiting efforts, Hepler testified
that an Atlanta branch was not discussed as a real possibility
at that point with Genie. Engquist, however, testified that they
had committed to Genie that Hi-Lift would open a branch in
Atlanta. For this reason and other reasons, the Court again
finds Hepler's testimony not to be credible.
{111} Thereafter, H & E set about communicating with JLG,
another major AWP equipment manufacturer, about orders to
be placed with JLG. Hepler testified that with respect to both
entities, they were able to achieve contracts that would allow
them to move equipment around freely, cancel and substitute
orders and do other things that minimized the financial risks
of purchase orders to either manufacturer. There were serious
discrepancies between Hepler's testimony and the contracts
themselves.
{112} Based on the quantity of equipment ordered by Quinn
on behalf of H & E, substantial thought had to go into
the ordering of the right kind of units. Utilization reports
constitute a substantial competitive advantage and are based
on knowledge of different marketplaces and their respective
needs. A review of plaintiff's exhibit 522 shows that an
Atlanta fleet does not fit Charlotte and a Charlotte fleet does
not fit Atlanta. For example, Charlotte has 3 times (19) more
90-foot booms than Atlanta (6). Thus, the Court concludes
that this type of information about fleet mix is a significant
competitive advantage and gives a competitor an advantage
if it knows the requirements of specific markets in general
and specific customers in particular. Accordingly, allocation
of dollars to purchases of specific equipment is indeed critical.
The immediate, high utilization rates and profits achieved
by H & E as its branches opened confirm that H & E used
confidential information from BPS to establish and set up
their fleets in each of the markets in which it opened, just as
Defendants Hepler and Kline stated in the AES plan and as
Quinn and Christensen did every day for BPS.
*20  {113} Examples of the Court's concern with respect
to credibility include, but are not limited to, the following
examples:
(a) Hepler specifically testified that at the January 6, 2000
dinner in Atlanta he did not solicit or recruit the BPS
personnel present for H & E. He is flatly contradicted by
Quinn on several points, including the following:
Q: Did Mr. Hepler tell each of these gentlemen [Messrs.
Alexander, Leavell, Cornett, Franz and Brown] that he
would like to employ them in his new venture?
A: I don't know that it was told specifically to each on
individually. I don't recall how he worded it other than
he would like to have all of them with this to be part of
this new venture. (Emphasis added.)
(b) Engquist testified:
Q. Mr. Engquist, in your experience, how quickly could
JLG deliver equipment to the H & E branch?
...
Q. For example if you ordered something on Thursday
when would it get there?
A. It would probably get there Monday, Tuesday. They
had availability of equipment.
Defendants' order log sets forth the order date and the receipt
date for all of H & E's AWP equipment orders to JLG
and Genie. A casual review shows that occasionally each
manufacturer did deliver on a few days' notice. However,
a more thorough review reveals that Engquist grossly
exaggerated delivery times. The average time from order date
to actual receipt based on Defendant H & E's own documents
shows that the average delivery time of Genie was 28.9
days and JLG 44.5 days-vastly different than “Thursday” to
“Monday or Tuesday.” Additionally, H & E's initial orders for
Atlanta, for the period from February 25 through April 15,
2000, totaled 467 units comprised of over 30 different product
models (including options)-a very large order, apparently
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intended for more branches than just Atlanta. Approximately
1650 rental items were ordered as reflected by the log,
comprised of approximately 58 different JLG models and 42
different Genie models (including options). The two most
popular such models appear to be models 1932E2 (208 were
ordered) and 2032E2 (121 were ordered). These models'
popularity suggests that they are staples in a fleet, yet their
average delivery times were each 54 days from the date of
order. These delivery times, based on H & E's order log,
confirm the testimony of Guy Ramsey, the industry expert, on
lead times.
(c) Hepler's expense reports
concerning the February 22, 2000
breakfast in Fort Myers directly
contradict his testimony about
soliciting salesmen with Jones.
{114} The defendants used their knowledge of BPS
information in the hiring and recruitment of personnel. In
virtually all cases, employees hired from BPS by H & E
occurred after salary increases were offered. Hepler, Kline,
Quinn, Christensen and Pearsall used their knowledge of
the skills, training, experiences and relationships of BPS
employees in selecting and hiring those employees.
{115} BPS's accumulated confidential information
concerning its average rental rates, average rental rates per
type of equipment, utilization reports per type of equipment,
salary information, employee revenue by headcount and
similar information had significant value to BPS was
developed over several years, was not readily available in
the marketplace and could not be easily obtained through
legitimate means without great cost. Defendants used their
knowledge of that BPS information in the Hi-Lift business
plan.
The H & E Branches
*21  {116} The Court will now review each H & E branch in
the order that evidence was presented. The Court finds that the
evidence confirms a common pattern in H & E's opening of
a number of the branches that had known intentional adverse
consequences on the corresponding BPS branch. The pattern
can be summarized as follows:
(a) Hepler, Kline and Engquist decide to open a branch in
a particular market.
(b) Hepler, using his past relationship with, and knowledge
of, BPS's branch managers, and with the assistance
of Quinn and/or Christensen, recruits the BPS branch
managers.
(c) Hepler, with Engquist's approval, employs the BPS
branch manager and directs that he recruit and employ on
behalf of H & E the best BPS personnel from his branch.
(d) The BPS branch manager, using his prior relationship
and knowledge of BPS employees' skills, salary,
relationships and training, recruits selected BPS employees
to come to work for H & E. The branch manager
first recruits the branch's top sales personnel and service
manager, and may recruit mechanics and drivers, although,
this is usually done by the recruited service manager. Based
upon the timing and nature of the departures, the Court
finds that many of the employees were recruited by branch
managers while the branch managers were still employed
by BPS.
(e) Hepler, either meets directly, or communicates by
telephone, with many of those BPS employees in the
recruiting process, especially the salesmen.
(f) The branch manager, sales personnel, service manager
and some of the branch personnel all leave at about
the same time to open an H & E branch in the same
geographical area, with little or no notice to BPS. Shortly
thereafter, the departing BPS employees are followed by
other recruited mechanics, drivers and other personnel.
(g) The H & E branch opens based on financial and fleet
information put together by Kline, Quinn and Christensen
and has immediate business. The financial and fleet
information is based on confidential information gained
during their employment with BPS.
(h) On behalf of H & E, the sales representatives are
immediately in the market and soliciting customers, but
do not have H & E pricing information or H & E
promotional materials. Notwithstanding that, they are able
to secure significant numbers of rental contracts for H &
E immediately.
(i) The BPS branch is left in a weakened state. The branch
does not have sufficient trained, knowledgeable human
resources to respond to H & E's competition, address
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relationships with customers, or perform the routine service
necessary to support the branches relationships with
its customers. BPS is required to rush other personnel
resources to the branches to react to the emergency.
{117} Based on this pattern, and as will be shown more
explicitly in the following findings for each branch, the Court
makes these summary findings:
(a) Hepler's testimony as to the circumstances of his
meetings and communications with BPS personnel are
contradicted by the recruited employees' testimony, further
discrediting Hepler's credibility. Hepler is not a credible
witness.
*22  (b) The fact that each new branch had “80%”
utilization within weeks of opening is circumstantial
evidence that H & E used BPS's confidential information
to tailor its branches' rental fleets without spending
the necessary time, money and effort to develop the
information itself. The utilization rate is also circumstantial
evidence that a higher percentage of the BPS customer base
was converted to H & E in the short term.
(c) In view of the circumstances of this pattern, the
Court finds, in the short term, that were it not for H
& E's interference with BPS employer relationships, and
subsequent solicitation of BPS customers, those customers
would have continued doing business with Sunbelt, or, at
least, that Sunbelt would have been able to fairly compete
for those customers' business, an opportunity they were
not afforded after H & E's orchestrated conversion of BPS
employees, customers and information.
(d) BPS, under Hepler and Kline, had built very strong
customer relations at the branch level. It would have been
natural for those customers to continue doing business
with BPS, subject to normal competitive pressures. A new
start-up such as H & E could have been expected to take
some customers or some business of some customers over
time. The mass exodus of key sales employees in each
branch with intimate knowledge of the BPS customer base
permitted H & E to effectively solicit the business of that
customer base while BPS was trying to rebuild its sales
force. Organized defection of service people, mechanics,
drivers, inside sales reps and credit manager adversely
impacted BPS's ability to service its existing customers,
thereby facilitating the conversion of their short term
business by H & E. The loss of each branch manager left
the branch leaderless and adversely impacted the branch's
ability to recover from the other defections. The combined
departure of the key employees both took from BPS and
transferred to H & E a vast amount of collective knowledge
about the business and customers of the branch. That
combination gave H & E a competitive advantage it would
not have possessed without the organized and orchestrated
defections.
Charlotte
{118} The Charlotte Hi-Lift branch opened on or before June
5, 2000, with the following staff from BPS: a branch manager
(Brian Pearsall); an inside sales coordinator (William
Huntley); a service manager (Pat Muldoon); a branch
administrator (Michele Dougherty); a sales representative
(Ken Farris); and a driver (Frank Evans). Within a week the H
& E Charlotte branch added a BPS master mechanic (Lennie
Merrington). Each of these employees came from BPS.
{119} Although the possibility of a Charlotte greenfield was
part of the original AES Plan and was discussed at the H
& E board meeting on February 10, 2000, and although a
pro-forma was drawn up for Charlotte by May 9, 2000 and
Pearsall was Hepler's brother-in-law, the defendants claim
that there was no plan to open the Charlotte branch in 2000
until a “chain of events” took place in late May 2000 with
Pearsall wanting to leave BPS. Defendants' position is not
credible. Although defendants made plans as early as May
to open a Charlotte branch, it was the last branch opened.
Clearly, defendants felt they could rely on Pearsall to convert
himself and other employees to H & E. It was obviously
completed in a rush so that it was done before Sunbelt took
over and had an opportunity to create a relationship with the
employees.
*23  {120} Defendants' documents and their own witness
show that:
(a) Engquist testified that a decision to open was made by
May 9, 2000, because a branch manager, specifically Brian
Pearsall, was available;
(b) Delores Kline, a real estate agent and the wife of Doug
Kline, flew to Greensboro, North Carolina on May 9, 2000
(coincidentally the same day Engquist, Hepler and Doug
Kline were in Atlanta discussing the Charlotte pro forma),
and spent May 9-11, 2000 in Charlotte looking for a site for
the H & E Charlotte branch;
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(c) Delores Kline's notes indicate she was looking for
licensing reciprocity in North Carolina in October or
November 1999;
(d) Engquist signed the certificate to do business in North
Carolina on February 25, 2000;
(e) Hepler discussed opening in Charlotte with Earl Rose
on April 17, 2000; and
(f) 159 pieces of AWP equipment, ordered as early as May
22, 2000, arrived in Charlotte between June 6, 2000 and the
end of June 2000.
{121} Meanwhile, Pearsall, Hepler's brother-in-law and
BPS's Charlotte branch manager, denied in his deposition
knowing about the plan to open an H & E branch in Charlotte
until Saturday or Sunday, May 27-28, 2000. Hepler claimed in
his deposition that Pearsall called him at home after Pearsall
had a discussion with Bruce Dressel at Sunbelt's Vendorfest,
which was held over Memorial Day weekend in May 2000,
and that this call, which occurred on either May 27 or 28,
2000, was the beginning of the chain of events which led to
the opening of H & E's Charlotte branch-eight days later with
a facility and a full staff.
{122} Pearsall, although a resident of Charlotte, did not
testify at trial and was present in Court several days. In his
deposition, he stated that he called Hepler and “told him that I
wasn't going to, I couldn't work for Sunbelt and at that time he
[Hepler] asked me if I could, if I wanted to work with, with H
& E.” Hepler, on the other hand, testified at trial that Pearsall
called Hepler “and said could you hire me? I would like to
come to work for you.”
{123} In fact, Pearsall and Hepler had been in regular
communication from as early as January 14, 2000. Between
January 14, 2000 and March 18, 2000, Hepler called Pearsall
at least eight times, including three phone calls Hepler
made to the BPS Charlotte office totaling approximately 37
minutes. In view of the events occurring by May 9, it is highly
improbable that Hepler and Pearsall had no discussion of a
Charlotte branch before May 27 or 28.
{124} The Court does not find the testimony, by deposition,
or in person, of either Hepler or Pearsall to be credible
when taken in light of the totality of the evidence. Moreover,
Pearsall's failure to testify calls into question his ability to
rebut the testimony of several Charlotte branch witnesses
about his statements and activities.
{125} Pearsall turned in an oral resignation on May 30, 2000
and a written resignation on May 31, 2000. Pearsall said he
talked to Hepler again on the night of May 30, 2000, but not
again until at least June 5, 2000. In his written resignation,
Pearsall agreed to work a two-week notice.
*24  {126} As part of, or in lieu of, that notice, Pearsall
agreed to help manage the inventory of the Charlotte branch,
which was to be conducted in conjunction with the acquisition
of BPS by Sunbelt, during the week and weekend, following
Memorial Day. Traditionally, James “Rocky” Busic was
in charge of the inventory for the scaffolding side of the
Charlotte branch. Although the May 2000 inventory was not
a regularly scheduled inventory and Busic had scheduled
vacation during that time, Busic approached Pearsall and
asked to reschedule his vacation for the July 4, 2000 weekend
so that he could participate in the inventory. Pearsall insisted
that Busic take his scheduled vacation and said to Busic
“[W]hy do you care about this inventory? They [Sunbelt]
don't care anything about you.”
{127} At Pearsall's insistence Busic took his vacation, only
to return 8 days later on June 5, 2000, to find the branch in
a state of “chaotic disorder.” Pearsall did not help with the
inventory as promised and left inexperienced BPS employees
to do the inventory. Busic was forced to re-do the inventory
a few months later, spending three days rather than the usual
four hours doing the inventory because it had not been done
accurately in May 2000.
{128} Pearsall also incited the BPS employees, apparently in
an effort to rally them to the H & E side, or any side other
than BPS, by repeatedly disparaging Sunbelt to other BPS
employees. Pearsall told BPS employees, while he was still
employed at BPS, that Sunbelt “was not a company you want
to work for,” were “dirt bags,” “didn't have a good reputation
about their people,” that the BPS employees might “want to
find another job,” that the branch would be run into the ground
within “30 to 60 days,” and that Sunbelt “was buying all the
assets [of BPS] and not necessarily the people.”
{129} Defendants hired at least five BPS/Sunbelt employees
for the H & E branch in Charlotte immediately before
the date of Sunbelt's acquisition; they solicited and tried
to hire several more. Pearsall directed many of the “key”
Charlotte BPS employees to leave BPS immediately. While
still a BPS branch manager and on site at the BPS Charlotte
branch, Pearsall offered jobs at H & E to two salesmen
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(Farris and Huntley), the service manager (Muldoon) and the
branch administrator (Dougherty), all of whom claim to have
accepted on the spot, and three of whom Pearsall immediately
sent to work for H & E. Engquist and Hepler testified that this
very conduct would be improper.
{130} Farris and Muldoon, the top salesman of the entire BPS
organization and the Charlotte branch manager respectively,
turned in their resignations on May 30, 2000. Pearsall
directed Farris to leave the same day he resigned. He told
Muldoon to leave on the morning of June 1, 2000, prior
to Muldoon working a two-week notice and the same day
Sunbelt acquired BPS.
{131} Likewise, although Huntley's resignation letter offered
a notice period, Huntley never returned to BPS after May
31, 2000. Instead, he showed up for work at H & E on June
5, 2000, and immediately began calling on BPS customers.
Pearsall testified in his deposition that he told Huntley to
make a clean break and leave immediately a discussion
Engquist admitted was improper, particularly for a manager
who was also departing for the same competition.
*25  {132} Bruce Funderburgh was approached by Pearsall
approximately 2 to 2½ weeks prior to the acquisition of
BPS by Sunbelt. This solicitation was well before Pearsall
claims to have called Hepler regarding a job at H & E (on
May 27 or 28, 2000), and in fact coincides more logically
with Ms. Kline's visit to Charlotte to secure a location for
the Charlotte H & E branch in early May 2000. In that
conversation, Pearsall told Funderburgh that he was going
to start a new H & E branch and that several other BPS
employees, including Muldoon, Dougherty, Frank Evans, and
Ken Farris, would be going with Pearsall to H & E. The Court
finds Mr. Funderburgh's testimony to be credible.
{133} At trial and in his deposition, Hepler testified that he
had no discussion with Pearsall about hiring any other BPS
employees until Pearsall worked out his notice and came on
board with H & E, despite the fact that Pearsall did not come
on board with H & E until at least June 5, 2000. By that time,
at least four other BPS employees had been recruited and put
to work as H & E employees by Pearsall and Hepler.
{134} The Court finds that, contrary to his testimony, Hepler
knew of and was involved with Pearsall's recruitment of
BPS employees. Hepler spoke to Farris on the day Farris
resigned and was fully aware that Pearsall was recruiting BPS
employees at that time, which was long before Pearsall left
BPS on June 5, 2000. Specifically, the Court finds that on May
30, 2000, after instructing Farris to leave BPS immediately,
Pearsall instructed him to call Hepler. Furthermore, Farris
spoke to Hepler in Jacksonville at that time for the purpose of
organizing the start up of the Charlotte branch six days later.
{135} Further undermining Hepler and Pearsall's testimony
concerning the timing of the opening of the Charlotte H &
E branch and their recruitment efforts, Patrick Muldoon, the
BPS service manager for Charlotte, was also involved in
helping to solicit employees for H & E long before he left
BPS. Muldoon solicited Rick Bailey, the BPS shop foreman
at the time, well before the end of May 2000:
Q: “You had been talking about H & E moving into the area
with Mr. Bailey over a period of weeks prior to the time
you left, hadn't you?”
A: “It may have been weeks because we knew about H &
E coming to the area opening branches. It may have been
weeks before that, yes.”
{136} Muldoon told Bailey that Pearsall and several others
would be starting a new H & E branch in Charlotte and that
it was going to be a smaller operation but that “basically,
everything would stay the same ... [that they] would be doing
the same thing in a different place.” Muldoon also suggested
that Bailey go look at the H & E branch a week or so before
he left.
{137} Muldoon also solicited Lennie Merrington, a master
mechanic, on behalf of H & E. Merrington came to work
at H & E on June 9, 2000, despite the fact that his official
termination date from BPS was not until June 19, 2000.
*26  {138} Later, Muldoon, on his last day of work at BPS,
solicited Ron Chambers, a road mechanic who worked on
customer owned machines, to come and work at H & E.
Muldoon asked Chambers for his phone number and told him
that they were “going to try and keep ... the A Team together.”
Muldoon subsequently called Chambers at home, offered him
a position at H & E, and told him that they were going to pick
up two service trucks for the Charlotte H & E branch.
{139} Pearsall also, either directly or indirectly, solicited the
employment of BPS road mechanics Milton Turner and Ron
Chambers, and shop mechanics Reggie Gill and Bill Mann.
{140} Plaintiff called a number of Sunbelt BPS employees
who testified, and demonstrated by the fact that they stayed on
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and gave Sunbelt an opportunity to compete for their talents,
that the timing of the recruitment had significance.
{141} All in all, when the smoke from Pearsall's departure
had cleared, at least nine of the BPS employees had left and
gone to H & E before the first week of Sunbelt's ownership of
BPS was over. If Pearsall had been successful in employing
each of the employees he solicited or who were solicited on
his behalf, the AWP side of the Charlotte BPS branch would
have lost more than 15 employees.
{142} The Court finds that Pearsall used his position and
influence over the employees of BPS and his knowledge as
to their skills, salary and training to sow the seeds of fear
and doubt with respect to Sunbelt and use that fear and doubt
to solicit them for the new H & E branch and interfere with
their relationships with BPS and Sunbelt. The Court further
finds that without Pearsall's disparagement of Sunbelt and
his insistence that the employees leave immediately, before
Sunbelt could come in and fairly compete and bargain for their
continued employment, some, if not all, of the employees
who left for H & E would have remained in the employ of
Sunbelt, at least for a sufficient period of time for Sunbelt
to compete for their employment on a level playing field or
assist in training their replacements. Their continued presence
would have eliminated many customer problems.
{143} Further, without his “inside” position with respect to
the employees, the Court doubts that Pearsall would have
been able, particularly without any increase in salary, and in
the guise of a “lateral” move, to convince so many long-term
employees to leave BPS.
{144} The impact of the departure of these employees on the
Charlotte branch was significant, as the remaining employees
were required to take on additional responsibilities and work
long hours to try to compensate for the departures. The
branch was unable to get equipment out to customers on
a timely basis because of the lack of trained personnel,
including mechanics and drivers; equipment out on rent sat
for prolonged periods after it was off rent because of the lack
of availability of truck drivers to pick up the equipment.
*27  {145} Customer complaints increased significantly.
Sunbelt did not have a viable sales force in the field to counter
H & E's sales effort in Charlotte. This situation exacerbated
customer confusion.
{146} Once Pearsall had taken a full complement of
employees and information to start the H & E branch, he
left the BPS office in a state of chaos and disorder, without
proper documentation, without a proper inventory having
been conducted, and without enough information for the
remaining BPS employees and new Sunbelt employees to
service and deal with BPS customers. These actions of
defendants caused BPS/Sunbelt to lose customers. The Court
finds his actions, and the actions of H & E and Hepler in their
support, were intended to put the BPS branch in a state where
it could not properly compete for either its employees or its
customers in the early days of the H & E Charlotte branch.
{147} Having left the branch in a state of disorder, Pearsall
and the other former BPS employees immediately targeted
BPS customers.
{148} Farris and Huntley called on, and solicited orders
from, BPS customers within the first 48 hours of their
resignations from BPS. Both acknowledged that they were
put immediately back into their former BPS territories by
H & E, that they had no literature, equipment, or pricing
information for H & E, but that they were able to secure
orders for H & E immediately. Huntley immediately called
on Universal Drywall, a BPS customer; Freeman Mechanical,
a BPS customer; Davis Erecting, a BPS customer; Delta
Electric, a BPS customer; and Drywall Carolina, a BPS
customer.
{149} The Court finds that much of Huntley's testimony
was not credible. His trial testimony was contradicted by his
deposition testimony, and both were contradictory at times.
{150} Farris immediately went to BPS Charlotte's largest job
site-Corning in Midland, North Carolina, and began calling
on customers of BPS at that site. Mr. Farris obtained orders
from BPS customers, on behalf of H & E, as early as June 1,
2000, before the H & E branch was open. In fact, Kline's June
2000 e-mail to Bruckmann confirms that defendants' expected
Farris to switch over the Corning customers.
{151} Farris also acknowledged that he had no pricing or
other H & E information when he went to call on BPS
customers. In fact, Farris called on BPS customers on behalf
of H & E while he was still employed by BPS. Farris testified
that he began his employment with H & E on May 31, 2000,
and he submitted his letter of resignation to BPS on May 31,
2000, but he also acknowledged that he solicited customers at
the Corning site on behalf of H & E on May 30, 2000.
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{152} Further, Farris's acknowledgment of receipt of the H
& E policy handbook is dated May 31, 2000 and is signed by
Brian Pearsall as Farris's H & E supervisor, despite the fact
that Pearsall was still employed by BPS on May 31, 2000.
{153} Farris obtained orders from the following BPS
customers within a week of H & E's opening: Interstate
Electric (order date 6/6/00); Rental Supply (order 6/7/00);
Capital City Steel Erectors Supply (price quoted was “off the
seat of [his] pants); Gulf State Electric, Supply (order 6/6/00);
Environmetrics (order 6/7/00); Howard Brothers Electric.
Farris's relationships with these customers were developed
while he was employed at BPS.
*28  {154} The Court finds that many of these customers
from which BPS lost business had long standing relationships
with BPS. These customers would have given Sunbelt the
opportunity to compete fairly for their business with H & E,
an opportunity that H & E's actions may have prevented in
some cases.
{155} H & E's new Charlotte employees could not, at least
in the beginning, have used the “Dodge” reports to find and
secure new customers for H & E. The new H & E branch
did not have credit applications and related paperwork when
it began taking rental contracts. Credit information is an
essential part of doing business when dealing with expensive
equipment like the kind at issue here. The only way H & E
could have done business was in reliance on the BPS credit
information known to the former BPS employees hired by H
& E.
{156} Therefore, the Court finds that H & E used customer
information brought to it by the BPS employees it brought on
board immediately-including pricing information, customer
information, credit information and information related to
prospective and upcoming jobs-in order to solicit and secure
jobs.
{157} The Court finds that there was sufficient evidence to
show that BPS considered the compilation of its customer
information, which took considerable time, money and
effort to compile, to be confidential. Further, the Court
finds that BPS took reasonable efforts to maintain the
confidentiality of that information, including maintaining
passwords on the computer system, not giving each employee
a password, shredding of confidential documents, and
requiring each employee to sign an employee handbook with
a confidentiality provision.
{158} Finally, the Court also finds that the BPS employees
who left en masse and went to H & E had an opportunity to
acquire and know the confidential information and to use it
at H & E.
Orlando
{159} The Orlando Hi-Lift branch opened on or about May
22, 2000, with the following staff from BPS: a branch
manager (Wellington “Duke” Drennan); BPS's complete
AWP outside sales staff (Jay Kiefer, Mark Stuckie and Jeff
Hansen); a shop foreman (Michael Waldrop); mechanics
(Todd Chesser and Scott Waldrop); a credit manager (Patricia
Uddo); a branch administrator (Brenda Drennan); and a
driver (Henry Garver). Shortly thereafter, the H & E Orlando
branch added an inside sales coordinator (Andrea Ussery) and
another driver (Donald Henderson).
{160} After a conversation with Hepler at the 1999 national
sales meeting in Dallas, Duke Drennan (“Drennan”), the BPS
Orlando branch manager, told some of his employees that
Hepler might start a company of his own and that this might
be a possibility for future employment. The employees to
whom Drennan made these comments-Jay Kiefer (“Kiefer”),
Mark Stuckie (“Stuckie”), Jeff Hansen (“Hansen”), Patty
Uddo (“Uddo”), Peter Casey (“Casey”), Brenda Drennan
(“B.Drennan”), Steve Hicks (“Hicks”) and Andrea Ussery
(“Ussery”)-all later left BPS to work for H & E.
*29  {161} Hepler called Drennan at the BPS Orlando
branch in March 2000. Drennan testified that he likely
informed Kiefer, Stuckie, Hansen, Uddo, Casey and Hicks
of this conversation with Hepler. Hepler's telephone records
reflect an eight-minute telephone call to the BPS Orlando
branch on March 29, 2000.
{162} Drennan resigned from BPS on April 29, 2000 and
left BPS on May 4, 2000. Drennan's employment offer from
Hepler included a salary of $105,000, higher than his salary
at BPS, as well as a $25,000 signing bonus.
{163} Hepler's H & E expense records reflect meetings with
Drennan in April 2000 to discuss H & E, including Tampa
and Orlando branch locations and operations. These records
reflect such meetings prior to Drennan's resignation from
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BPS. For example, Drennan, while still employed by BPS,
again had dinner with Hepler on April 13, 2000 at Christine's
restaurant in Orlando along with Delores Kline and Mike
Quinn. Hepler, Quinn and Delores Kline were in Orlando to
look at potential properties for an H & E facility in the area.
{164} All of the employees that Drennan solicited on behalf
of H & E in April, May or June of 2000 were BPS employees.
{165} While still a BPS Orlando branch manager, Drennan
did the following:
(a) In April 2000, Drennan, after conferring with Hepler,
invited BPS employees Kiefer, Stuckie, Hansen, Uddo and
Ussery to have dinner with him and Hepler. Drennan met
with these employees separately at BPS, informed them of
his intent to leave BPS if Hepler offered him a job at H &
E, and invited each individual to attend the dinner at the
Orlando Ale House.
(b) Drennan testified that at this dinner Hepler discussed
the prospect of H & E opening a facility in the Orlando
area. Hepler ended the dinner by saying he would further
explore the possibility and it was agreed that they would
continue the discussion in the future. Of course, Hepler
testified that they did not discuss the possibility of an H
& E Orlando branch at this dinner. Drennan's testimony
contradicts Hepler's testimony about this dinner. The Court
finds that Hepler's testimony is not credible and he used this
meeting to recruit BPS employees to H & E with Drennan's
assistance.
(c) Prior to the Orlando Ale House dinner, Ussery never
heard anyone at the BPS branch express a desire to leave
BPS. He testified: “[W]e all loved working there.” The
pending sale of BPS was a subject of curiosity, but not a
great concern: “We had already gone through a sale one
time, and nothing changed. It was just curiosity. Everybody
was just curious.”
(d) Drennan admits that he openly criticized BPS in
conversations with his employees and discussed his plans
with regard to Rob Hepler.
(e) Drennan, following the April 2000 meeting with Hepler,
assisted BPS employees Kiefer, Stuckie, Uddo, Hansen
and Ussery in communicating with Hepler regarding
employment with H & E and the details of such
employment. Hepler authorized Drennan, prior to Drennan
leaving BPS, to offer employment with H & E to BPS
employees and set their H & E salaries. Drennan did just
that, discussing H & E employment with BPS employees
while still the BPS Orlando branch manager of. The salaries
Drennan offered on behalf of H & E were consistently
higher than the salaries Drennan paid such employees at
BPS. Defendants, with the assistance of Drennan, recruited
and hired 12 BPS employees required for H & E's start up
(17 total).
*30  (f) Drennan talked to Kiefer, who already had
resigned from BPS, about setting up a boom for an H &
E customer and contacting the necessary personnel to help
place the boom on the job site for the customer. Drennan
gave Kiefer the authority to get help with the boom and
referred Kiefer to Mike Quinn. The boom was on the
customer's job site before Drennan left BPS.
(g) Drennan, upon being asked by one of his BPS
employees if he would hire her boyfriend to come work for
H & E, told her that he could not approach any employees
but it was all right if employees approached him. The BPS
employee in question subsequently approached Drennan at
BPS, and Drennan offered him a job at H & E. Clearly,
Drennan knew that recruiting for his employer's competitor
was wrong.
{166} Drennan took confidential business files of BPS with
him to H & E, including BPS monthly goals, rental revenue
information, salary/wage reports and a spreadsheet reflecting
average salaries, and returned those files only after the lawsuit
was filed.
{167} Not only did Drennan take confidential files and solicit
other BPS employees while he was employed at BPS, he
also encouraged at least one employee to bring valuable,
confidential BPS information and documents with him.
{168} In late March 2000, Drennan solicited Rick Breinlinger
(“Breinlinger”) at the BPS branch. Drennan first approached
Breinlinger at the BPS branch and told Breinlinger that he was
moving to another company where he would be working with
Hepler and wanted Breinlinger to come with him. Drennan
said that other BPS employees were also going with him and
that Breinlinger was not to say anything to anybody. Drennan
said that he would get back to Breinlinger about the details,
which he did. He called Breinlinger at home and invited
Breinlinger to his house to discuss the details of the H & E
offer. Breinlinger met with Drennan at his house on a Sunday
afternoon, at which time they discussed the position, salary
and vacation time H & E, through Drennan, was offering
Breinlinger. At this meeting they also discussed the location
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of the H & E facility and other BPS employees who Drennan
had solicited from BPS. Drennan asked about Breinlinger's
BPS service log book, which contained detailed information
about customer contact information, how such customers
conducted business, and repairs performed for customers. He
told Breinlinger to bring the service log book with him to H &
E. Drennan reiterated at this time the importance of keeping
the matter quiet and not discussing it with anyone. Drennan
ultimately retracted the H & E offer when Breinlinger refused
to leave BPS without giving a two week notice. Drennan
admits he solicited Breinlinger to leave BPS to work for H
& E.
{169} Defendants did not call Drennan as a witness to rebut
or deny Breinlinger's testimony.
{170} H & E salesmen in Orlando were not provided any
guidance or parameters with regard to pricing on behalf of
H & E. H & E Orlando did not even compile price lists
until 2001. Prior to that time, H & E salesmen were expected
to quote prices to customers based on “information in their
head.” Drennan has never spoken with Hepler or anyone else
in Hi-Lift's corporate office about pricing. He has always set
the prices for his branch.
*31  {171} The territories covered by H & E salesmen were
territories that they had covered on behalf of BPS, and they
immediately called on the customers and job sites based on
information acquired while employed by BPS. For example,
as soon as Kiefer resigned from BPS, he called on R.C.
Aluminum, a BPS customer at the Hard Rock Café job site, a
major project that he covered for BPS. Regarding the order he
received from R.C. Aluminum that first day, Kiefer testified,
“I didn't write it up at all. I mean, I knew the account and knew
R.C. Aluminum, the job.” He did not even ask for a credit
application from R.C. Aluminum, despite H & E's alleged
policy of obtaining a credit application from every customer.
On behalf of H & E, Kiefer called on every trailer on the Hard
Rock job site, each of which he had called on for BPS.
{172} Drennan admits, and H & E business records show,
that he has personally entertained and solicited former BPS
Orlando customers on behalf of H & E.
{173} The departure of Drennan and other BPS employees
in such a short period of time left the BPS Orlando
branch understaffed, lacking experienced personnel, unable to
service customers as it had prior to H & E's raid on the branch,
and caused the branch to lose considerable business from
longstanding customers. Further, without Kiefer, Stuckie and
Hansen, its entire AWP sales force, the branch's business
slowed considerably, and many of its high volume customers
began calling BPS equipment off rent and stopped renting
equipment from BPS.
Tampa-Fort Myers
{174} Prior to May 2000, H & E did not have a presence in the
Tampa-Fort Myers market. The H & E branches established
in Tampa-Fort Myers were greenfields.
{175} The Tampa and Fort Myers Hi-Lift branches opened
on or before May 8, 2000 and June 5, 2000, respectively,
and were staffed with the following BPS personnel: a
branch manager (Beare Jones); sales reps (John Andrachak,
John Breadmore, Wade Bercaw, Scott Strawn, Jason Jones
and Brian Ditoro); a service manager (Doug Ashmore);
inside sales coordinator (Bonnie Quasnick); drivers (James
George, Jonathan Brunelle, and Charles Heim); an officer
manager (Belinda Harrison); a shop foreman (Ronald Good);
field mechanics (Timothy Poole, Billy Marshall, and John
Clark); an erector superintendent (Nicholas Cooper); a shop
mechanic (John Taylor); erector foremen (Leon Beebe, Scott
Price, and Mark Roesler); and erectors (Larry Brown, Charles
Cansdale, and Eric Ruzycki). Each of these employees were
hired from BPS.
{176} The market for trained and experienced drivers,
mechanics and salesmen in Fort Myers and Tampa in 2000
was very tight. Trained and experienced employees were then
difficult to locate in these markets.
{177} BPS had existing branches in Tampa and Fort Myers
in January 2000. BPS had opened up the Tampa branch in or
about 1996 as a greenfield. Hepler testified about the steps
undertaken at the time to create that greenfield. None of
those steps were repeated when H & E opened up its Tampa
branch in May 2000. Instead of placing advertisements in the
newspaper for employees, H & E used secret meetings with
Hepler, branch manager Beare Jones and service manager
Doug Ashmore to solicit employees. Instead of building
slowly as business warranted, H & E opened with a full
complement of employees.
*32  {178} Jones claims that when he learned of Defendant
Hepler's December resignation he was “shocked” by the
news, that it “stopped [his] heart,” and that, despite the fact
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that Hepler was like a brother to him, he did not speak to him
at all for 60-90 days after Hepler departed.
{179} The evidence shows that contrary to his sworn
testimony, Jones spoke with Hepler repeatedly throughout the
time period prior to Hepler leaving BPS for H & E, including
three times on January 3, 2000, a thirteen minute conversation
on January 13, two conversations on January 18 (4 and 6
minutes respectively), an eleven minute call on February 17,
three calls on February 21, two calls on March 29 (including a
seven minute call), an April 4 call for twelve minutes, a thirty-
five minute call on April 11 and three calls on April 12. For
this and other reasons stated below, the Court does not find
Jones's testimony credible and notes that he did not testify at
trial. Jones, Hepler and Hepler's father had been close friends
and business associates for decades.
{180} On February 22, 2000, a meeting occurred in Fort
Myers attended by Hepler, Jones and the BPS sales staff in
Fort Myers and Tampa. H & E's business records reflect that
the purpose of the meeting was to “discuss H & E employment
offer with Jones and sales staff.” Hepler submitted that receipt
for his breakfast to his employer and was reimbursed for
the expenditure as a proper business expense. Moreover,
Hepler's attempt to excuse the clear statements on the H &
E expense report for this meeting by laying blame on his
secretary is not credible. Ms. Parnell's testimony is clear that
she always tried to be accurate, took the information that
was given to her by Hepler to place on the report, did not
add her own musings, and had no reason to believe that
the information was inaccurate. Hepler also admitted that he
never called anyone in Baton Rouge and told them anything
was inaccurate or needed to be changed in the report.
{181} Jones admitted that he invited BPS employees to
attend the meeting with Hepler on February 22, 2000. Former
BPS employees Wade Bercaw, Scott Strawn, John Andrachak
and John Breadmore all met at this early morning breakfast
meeting in Fort Myers. Their claim that it was a casual, non-
business breakfast among old friends is not credible. Kevin
White, branch manager of Sunbelt in Fort Myers, testified
that Bercaw stayed with him in Fort Myers the previous
night and explicitly told him that he would be meeting with
Jones, Hepler, Andrachak, Breadmore and Strawn the next
day about starting a new business in Florida. White was
credible, and his testimony is confirmed by H & E's business
records. His testimony is also confirmed, in part, by Bercaw,
who testified that he knew the night before the meeting that
Hepler, Jones, Andrachak and Strawn would be there and that
it would be held at the Shoney's. White also testified that
in a later conversation he was told by Bercaw that he was
offered a job by Hepler at that breakfast. White's testimony
is also confirmed by the fact that Bercaw telephoned him
some months later, after learning that White had disclosed
this meeting to Sunbelt's CFO, to express his displeasure with
the fact that he had disclosed this clandestine meeting. The
Court finds White's testimony credible. Bercaw's testimony,
denying that the purpose of the meeting was for employment,
is not credible.
*33  {182} The testimony of Hepler and Jones regarding this
February 22 meeting is inconsistent in significant respects.
Hepler testified several times that he knew nothing about the
fact that others would attend this breakfast meeting until the
morning when Jones picked him up. Jones testified, however,
that he discussed having these people attend when Hepler first
called him to tell him he would be traveling to Fort Myers,
several days before the breakfast meeting occurred. Hepler
and Jones are not credible in their denials as to the purpose
of the meeting. Hepler recruited Jones to H & E, and then,
with Jones's assistance while Jones was still a BPS employee,
readily recruited other BPS employees for H & E.
{183} Jones had knowledge of Hepler's efforts to start new
branches in Tampa and Fort Myers for H & E and was an
active participant in a plan to hire BPS employees to go to H &
E in Tampa and Fort Myers and to start-up the new branches.
{184} In the span of thirty days, Jones, Bonnie Quasnick
(the Tampa inside sales coordinator) and Hepler solicited and
hired 25 experienced BPS employees from BPS's Tampa and
Fort Myers branches; over 90 percent of the H & E work force
came from the Tampa and Fort Myers BPS branches. Jones
testified that as the H & E branch manager, he would have a
say in the employees and structure of the branch and admitted
that outside sales persons, inside sales persons and the service
manager are essential to a new branch. Jones reviewed these
employees while at BPS, was knowledgeable of their BPS
salaries and knew these employees to be good performers
These employees were hired for similar positions at H & E
and offered a salary increase to leave BPS. As of January
1, 2001, twenty-six of H & E's 35 employees in Tampa/Fort
Myers were former BPS employees.
{185} Jones's denials of knowledge and involvement in the
defendants' plan to recruit employees en masse from BPS to
H & E and switch customers are not credible.
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(a) Evidence shows that at the time Jones filled out his
application for employment with H & E he listed the
position as branch manager for Tampa and Fort Myers
and he also indicated that he would not relocate from Fort
Myers.
(b) Jones also claimed to have been dissatisfied with BPS
after Hepler left. Nevertheless, H & E gave him a $14,000
salary increase and a $25,000 sign-on bonus to leave BPS
to go to work for H & E.
(c) Jones claims that at the time he resigned there was
no BPS plan to open a Fort Myers branch, only a Tampa
branch. In addition to the admission on his H & E
application, Jones hired two employees, Andrachak and
Breadmore from the BPS Fort Myers branch-both of whom
indicated in their H & E employment application that they
would not relocate from Fort Myers.
(d) Jones testified that he had no involvement in the
location of the H & E branch in Tampa. Kline also
denied having spoken with Jones when he went to Tampa
in February 2000. Evidence shows, however, that Jones
was in contact with Defendant Kline right before Kline'
February 27 trip to Tampa and signed a letter of intent for
the rental of property for the H & E Hi-Lift branch.
*34  (e) While still a BPS employee, Jones also met with
Hepler on April 26, 2000, to discuss “Tampa operations,”
and he met with Hepler on May 17, after he had resigned,
to finalize the recruitments of Breadmore, Andrachak and
Quasnick.
(f) Moreover, defendants' action in ordering AWP
equipment for Tampa confirms the prearranged plan. On
March 31, 2000, defendants placed an order for 99 units
for Tampa with JLG. As confirmed by the events in almost
each location, defendants would not have placed such an
order without the branch manager (Jones) in place.
{186} BPS employees in Tampa were also recruited by
Doug Ashmore, the former BPS service manager under
Jones. Billy Marshall, Ron Good and Timothy Poole, all
experienced service mechanics, worked under Ashmore.
Ashmore testified that it was important to the business to
have experienced mechanics. All three of these mechanics
were hired the same day by H & E; Good and Poole left BPS
without notice in the early morning hours on June 1. Sunbelt
did not have the opportunity to speak with these employees
about continued employment at the branch.
{187} Ashmore denied, under oath, that he solicited any
employees to leave BPS for H & E while employed at BPS.
Billy Dobbs, who Ashmore claims is a trusted friend and
worked under Ashmore, testified that Ashmore solicited him
as part of the “chosen few” for H & E while Ashmore
was still with BPS. Dobbs also testified that the mechanics
agreed that they would leave early in the morning, Monday,
June 1, without notice. Libby Oleson, an assistant to the
inside sales coordinator and Quasnick, also testified that she
had conversations with Ashmore during the time he was
employed by BPS. These conversations show that he had been
coordinating with Jones regarding the solicitation of BPS
employees for the new H & E branch.
{188} The testimony of other former BPS employees in
Tampa and Fort Myers, now H & E employees, is not
credible, and further supports a finding that the defections
were planned and orchestrated while the current H & E
employees were still BPS employees.
(a) Andrachak and Breadmore, former BPS sales
representatives from the BPS Fort Myers branch, and now
H & E employees, testified that they resigned from BPS
without a job offer from defendants. Breadmore was the
sole breadwinner for the family, and he and his wife
required insurance through his work. Both testified that,
although they did not know the purpose of their trip to
Tampa, they traveled two and half hours from Fort Myers
to Tampa to meet with Jones and Hepler and while in
Tampa they were offered a job, which they accepted. At the
time they accepted the offer, they supposedly did not know
anything about the job or where it would be located, even
though they were not willing to move from Fort Myers.
Finally, although testifying that when they left BPS they did
not have an offer in hand, their employment applications
with H & E state that the reason they left BPS was for a
“new” or “better” job.
*35  (b) Andrachak's employment termination date with
BPS was May 26, yet Andrachak submitted an expense
report to H & E for reimbursement of expenses incurred
beginning May 15.
(c) Similarly, Quasnick's last day of work at BPS was
May 22, 2000 (with a termination date of June 2), yet
she signed her both her W-4 and H & E employment
application on May 19, 2000. The May 19 date on her
employment application was crossed out and changed to
May 22. Quasnick testified that she did not start at H & E
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until May 23, 2000. She also testified that when she spoke
with Hepler and Jones at dinner prior to her resigning, there
was no discussion of Strawn and Bercaw. Jones testified
that he told Quasnick at that dinner that he had been
speaking with Strawn and Andrachak.
(d) Ashmore filled out his H & E application for
employment on May 22 and signed his H & E employee
handbook acknowledgment on May 25. Ashmore,
however, continued working at BPS until two days after
Jude Yimin of Sunbelt had arrived at the branch, all the time
soliciting BPS employees to leave the branch for H & E.
{189} After successfully bringing over the BPS employees,
defendants immediately began building a revenue stream
by targeting longstanding customers of BPS in Tampa and
Fort Myers and “switching” them over to H & E. Evidence
shows, and Jones admits, that efforts were made by H & E
to switch customers from BPS to H & E almost immediately
following the departure of the BPS employees to H & E. The
evidence also shows that BPS had longstanding customers
in Fort Myers (customers of BPS as early as 1994 and 1995
when White was employed at BPS) and Tampa and that
relationships between sales representatives with customers
was fostered by BPS. In May and June 2000, the BPS
branches experienced a decline in AWP lease contracts while
H & E experienced a concurrent rise in contracts with these
same customers.
{190} Substantial evidence shows that pricing and customer
contact information at the branches was confidential
information, although customers themselves did not treat
pricing as confidential. White testified that he understood
that the BPS branch had special or preferred pricing for
customers, based on a number of factors, including volume
of business given by that customer, and that this information
was confidential when he was an outside salesman at the
BPS Fort Myers branch under Jones in 1994-95. Bercaw
admitted to using special pricing at BPS, which was exclusive
for the customer and maintained for at least six months. In
addition, the BPS employees who went to H & E signed
acknowledgments of the BPS, and later the H & E handbooks,
which contained confidentiality sections.
{191} In 2000, BPS was the largest rental company in Fort
Myers. By taking BPS employees and leaving the BPS branch
in disarray, H & E was able to rapidly gain market share in
the Fort Myers' market and BPS lost market share in Tampa
at a fast rate.
{192} The massive departure of employees from BPS to H &
E in such a short period of time left the BPS (now Sunbelt)
branches in Fort Myers and Tampa in a total state of disarray.
The H & E employees involved in the solicitation of these
employees were indifferent to the impact of their actions on
the BPS branches.
*36  {193} The evidence shows that at the time that H & E
was contacting BPS customers, BPS was not in a position to
compete in the marketplace. Salesmen are vital to the business
and act as the company representative with the customer. With
the mass exodus of employees from the BPS Fort Myers and
Tampa branches, BPS did not have experienced outside sales
representatives who knew the customer base and contacts
to call on customers and present the facts concerning the
acquisition. At the same time, however, H & E had their sales
force (the former BPS sales team) in the field immediately
calling on customers.
{194} Defendants' conduct was undertaken for the purpose
of harming BPS/Sunbelt and gaining a competitive advantage
over Sunbelt in the Tampa/Fort Myers markets. In summary,
the Court finds the following facts:
(a) Over 90 percent of the H & E employees in
Tampa and Fort Myers came from BPS and were hired
in a thirty-day period, leaving the BPS branches with
virtually no employees. Given Hepler's experience and past
involvement in starting up a greenfield branch in Tampa
and his knowledge of BPS personnel vulnerabilities,
Hepler knew that defendants' actions would have a
debilitating effect on the Sunbelt's ability to compete.
(b) Hepler arranged a meeting in February 2000 for the
purpose of discussing the opening of branches in Tampa
and Fort Myers This meeting was attended by the same
BPS employees who became the first employees of H &
E. Defendants' and their witnesses' denials that the meeting
was for the purpose of recruitment are not credible.
(c) The speed by which H & E established itself in Fort
Myers and Tampa, a market in which BPS had significant
market share, demonstrates that H & E's actions were
calculated as part of a plan. By year-end 2000, H & E had
profitable branches in Tampa and Fort Myers.
(d) Just as Sunbelt was undertaking efforts to recover in
Fort Myers by hiring Kevin White as the branch manager,
Jones made a threatening comment to him to discourage his
taking a job with BPS. Hepler telephoned White to offer
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him a position in Texas. White had not spoken with Hepler
in six years and had not been talking with him about a
position in Texas. In fact, White had had no experience
in Texas. The only apparent reason for offering him a job
was to keep experienced employees from going to work for
Sunbelt in Fort Myers.
(e) Jones denied that he did anything intentional to harm
Sunbelt. He testified that proof of his contention was that
he had not gone after ICM, the largest industrial customer
of BPS in Tampa and a customer that Bercaw described as
having a verbal, exclusive partnership with BPS/Sunbelt.
In fact, not more than a week after Bercaw started at H & E,
he was calling on ICM trying to obtain their business with
the full knowledge and support of Jones. When shown his
deposition testimony at trial, Bercaw reluctantly admitted
that he was trying to establish the same type of verbal,
exclusive partnership with ICM that BPS/Sunbelt enjoyed.
Contrary to his sworn testimony, Jones personally went
after ICM's business; he just wasn't successful in his efforts.
*37  {195} As a direct and proximate result of defendants'
actions, the BPS/Sunbelt branches in Tampa and Fort Myers
were left in a debilitated state.
(a) Experienced employees in the branches, such as
Andrachak (outside sales), Breadmore (outside sales),
Strawn (outside sales), Bercaw (outside sales), Jason Jones
(inside sales), Bonnie Quasnick (inside sales), Brian Ditoro
(inside sales), Doug Ashmore (service mechanic), Ron
Good (mechanic) and Tim Poole (mechanic), were gone to
H & E within days of each other.
(b) In Fort Myers, the only remaining outside salesman,
Tim Kennedy, was moved to the branch manager position,
leaving no outside sales staff until the branch hired Scott
Williams, who had no experience with AWP rentals,
and Frank Hight, who was later terminated for poor
performance.
(c) In Tampa, the only remaining AWP outside salesman,
Dennis Carpenter, had only recently moved into that
position from his prior position as a driver, and he had no
AWP sales experience. BPS/Sunbelt filled the inside sales/
dispatch position in Fort Myers with a person who sold
copiers and had no AWP experience.
(d) Drivers and mechanics were hired with no AWP
experience.
(e) As Billy Dobbs testified, positions were filled with
just “warm” bodies, sometimes by family members who
had no training or experience with AWP's. Libby Oleson
moved into the inside sales coordinator position, to replace
Quasnick, although at the time Ms. Oleson had no
experience in crucial aspects of the job such as setting
prices and giving advice regarding the type of AWP
equipment best suited to a customer's job. Jeff Brown, who
was hired in July 2000 to act as an AWP outside salesman
in Tampa, could not take on his sales responsibilities
for the first several months because he had to assume
other responsibilities-such as assisting Ms. Oleson with the
inside sales function, handling field service problems and
advising customers on rental needs-caused by the rapid
departures of BPS employees for the H & E branches.
(f) It took the Sunbelt Tampa branch two and a half years
to rebuild its sales staff with experienced sales people.
{196} As a direct and proximate result of the massive
departure of BPS employees to H & E in May 2000, the Fort
Myers and Tampa branches experienced significant problems
with the operation of its business that caused it to lose
customers.
(a) Response time for servicing equipment in the field
increased from a matter of hours before the departures to
sometimes days. Similar difficulties were encountered in
Tampa.
(b) AWP equipment was not serviced or timely delivered,
and customers called in to order equipment off rent when
the jobs had not been completed.
(c) AWP equipment in Fort Myers could not be located for
months.
(d) Due to the absence of drivers, equipment was not
picked up in a timely manner in Tampa, causing additional
customer complaints and loss of business.
(e) Employees in the BPS/Sunbelt branch in Tampa worked
long shifts, sometimes 14 to 15 hour days, to keep the
branch open.
Dallas
*38  {197} As of the beginning of 2000, Defendant H & E
did not have a branch in Dallas, Texas that specialized in the
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sale or rental of equipment. In establishing the budget for the
Dallas branch, H & E employees treated it as a greenfield.
{198} The Dallas Hi-Lift branch opened no later than
March 20, 2000 and, within two days of the opening,
had the following staff from BPS: a branch manager (Abe
Farrington), a service manager (Jeff Billups), outside sales
reps (Steve Matthews and Ken Moon), mechanics (Tim Green
and Tony Herriage) and a driver (Darrell Herriage). Within
two weeks, H & E added another BPS mechanic (Allen
Green) and in the next two months, another BPS mechanic
(Curtis Billups) and a BPS driver (Chris Brown).
{199} Christensen, a senior member of the BPS management
team, worked out of the Dallas branch and worked closely
with Abe Farrington (“Farrington”), who in 1999 became the
BPS Dallas branch manager. Christensen left his employment
with BPS on January 14, 2000.
{200} In January 2000, BPS had many experienced and
trained employees in the key positions in its Dallas branch.
Farrington had been employed by BPS since December
1994 and had been the branch manager since early 1999.
Farrington oversaw the other employees of the branch. Jeffrey
Billups had been employed at BPS since May 1996. Steve
Matthews, an outside AWP sales representative, and Ken
Moon, the outside AWP sales representative for industrial
accounts, had been employed by BPS since April 1997 and
January 1999, respectively. Thomas Green, Allen Green and
Tony Herriage were trained AWP mechanics that had been
employed at BPS since May 1997, October 1996 and April
1997, respectively. Darrell Herriage, an experienced AWP
driver, had been employed at BPS since May 1997. Each
of these BPS employees was solicited by Christensen or
Farrington and left BPS for employment at H & E in March
or April 2000.
{201} In a span of 35 days, all of these BPS employees were
on the payrolls at H & E. With one exception, each BPS
employee was offered more money to go from BPS to H &
E. For example, Farrington, who accepted employment with
H & E no later than March 4, received a $5,000 increase
to join H & E as its Dallas branch manager. The fact that
H & E had to pay more for these employees to go to H
& E belies defendants' contention that these employees left
out of concern over their future employment at BPS. Indeed,
Matthews testified that he was satisfied with his job at BPS.
All of these BPS employees were placed in positions at H &
E that were similar to those they held at BPS.
{202} Christensen also attempted to recruit other BPS
employees who did not leave BPS for H & E. For example,
Christensen attempted to create a suspended scaffolding
department by recruiting Monty Huffman of BPS to join H &
E. Christensen intended Huffman to then recruit the two other
employees that worked under him at BPS, Robert Landry and
Larry Sible. Huffman, Landry, nor Sible left BPS for H & E.
H & E did not thereafter, independently, develop a suspended
scaffolding business because, as Christensen testified, Mr.
Huffman declined his offer and stayed with BPS/Sunbelt. The
team of Christensen and Farrington solicited and hired other
BPS employees to join H & E during the period of April
through September 2000. During that period, they hired six
additional BPS employees for the new H & E Branch.
*39  {203} Hepler and Christensen had conferred with
respect to planning a new venture. For example, following
Hepler's trip to meet with Rentokil personnel in the United
Kingdom in August 1999, the National Sales Meeting
occurred for BPS. Christensen and Hepler attended this
meeting. During a break at this meeting, Christensen and
Hepler took Linda Gomez, an outside AWP salesperson, to
the side and asked her about the largest projects going on in
the Dallas market and for her thoughts on where to locate
a new branch. At the time, Hepler was aware that Rentokil
was putting BPS up for sale and BPS was not opening a new
branch in Dallas. Hepler's comment about a new branch could
only relate to a new business venture and one about which
Christensen knew.
{204} At the same time Hepler and Kline were taking steps
to market their new company to prospective investors and
meeting with Bruce Bruckmann, John Engquist and Gary
Bagley, operations in the Dallas branch began to suffer,
providing some circumstantial evidence that attention was
diverted from operating the business to the development of
a new company. These operational problems increased in
December 1999.
{205} Hepler announced his resignation to BPS employees
on December 1, 1999 and continued his employment with
BPS until December 14, 1999. In his testimony, Christensen
attempted to minimize his contacts with Hepler, but telephone
records show that Christensen called BPS headquarters in
Jacksonville and had lengthy conversations during this period
in which Hepler was still employed at BPS. Beginning on
December 15 (after Hepler left BPS), Christensen directed
his calls to Hepler's cell phone, calling him on numerous
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occasions leading up to Christensen's termination of his
employment with BPS. Telephone records also show that
at the same time Christensen was calling the Jacksonville
headquarters following Hepler's announced resignation, he
also made calls to Farrington and Quinn.
{206} Hepler met with Christensen on December 16, 1999
in Dallas, Texas with John Engquist, purportedly to discuss
his employment with H & E. Christensen received a $20,000
salary increase to $125,000 to join H & E and a $25,000 sign-
on bonus. Telephone records show that after this meeting,
Christensen, Hepler and Quinn had numerous telephone calls
with each other and that Christensen continued to call the
BPS branch in Dallas. Again, Christensen in his testimony
attempted to minimize these contacts. Telephone records
show at least 18 calls between Hepler and Christensen during
the period of December 15 to January 14, the date Christensen
left his employment with BPS.
{207} On January 11, 2000, prior to his January 14
termination date, Christensen telephoned Delores Kline and
then began working with her to identify suitable properties
in Dallas for the new Hi-Lift branch. These efforts led to
Defendant Kline signing a letter of intent for the rental of
property in Dallas on February 11, 2000.
*40  {208} No later than January 18, 2000, Defendant Hepler
had directed Christensen to begin soliciting experienced
BPS employees for the new Hi-Lift branch in Dallas. It
was “challenging” to find skilled employees in the Dallas
marketplace. Christensen quickly looked to the BPS Dallas
branch for these employees. Christensen and Farrington had
access to confidential salary information for employees in the
BPS Dallas branch.
{209} Christensen never obtained the services of headhunters
or placed advertisements in newspapers, but instead used BPS
as his primary source for employees. On several occasions in
February and March 2000, Christensen met with groups of
BPS employees for lunch and dinner recruitment meetings.
One such meeting was attended by six BPS employees.
Another lunch was attended by three of BPS's outside sales
personnel. No persons other than these BPS employees
and Christensen were invited or attended these exclusive
meetings. The exclusive nature of these group recruitment
efforts strongly supports the finding that these meetings were
not open to the general public but were part of a plan to
seek mass departures of employees from BPS. Christensen
interviewed no “candidates,” other than Farrington, for
the Dallas branch manager slot. Through Christensen and
Farrington, defendants recruited and hired nine key BPS
employees in Dallas, including its branch manager, service
manager, several mechanics and two of its outside salesmen.
During at least at one of these meetings, Christensen
expressed his negative view of Rentokil's ownership of BPS.
All of this conduct is outside the norm of recruitment effort
in this industry.
{210} Pricing appeared to have more significance in the
Texas market than in other BPS markets. In January
2000, BPS had customers with whom it had longstanding
relationships, including Potter Concrete, Mills Electrical,
Barnsco, Term Sheetmetal, Walker Engineering, Oak Cliff
Glass and Electric, Drywall Interiors, Haley Greer, North
Star Fire Protection and Ram Steel. Prior to that time,
BPS personnel, including Christensen and Farrington,
made presentations to BPS customers to establish special
relationships whereby preferential pricing would be provided
to these customers and, in return, the customer would
provide 100 percent of its business to BPS. One example
of such a presentation was that made to Mills Electric.
These presentations led to the formation of a “gentleman's
agreement” between the customer and BPS. BPS had
every expectation that based on these agreements that it
would continue to do business with these customers in the
future. Among the customers for which these “gentleman's
agreements” were established was Mills Electric and Ram
Steel, both of which were in the top five customers for the
BPS branch in rental volume in 1999.
{211} The preferential pricing set by BPS for these
customers was considered confidential at BPS. Customer
contact information was also considered confidential at the
BPS branch and gave BPS a competitive advantage over
the competition. Christensen told Linda Gomez on various
occasions that the pricing was to be hand delivered to
insure that the customers understood that the pricing was
to be held in confidence. Linda Gomez testified that in her
experience customers honored that request and did not share
this preferential pricing with BPS competitors under this
“gentleman's agreement.” Preferential pricing remained in
place for a year and then was reviewed to determine whether
it should be adjusted. Gomez testified that the special pricing
gave BPS a competitive advantage over the competition.
Christensen admitted that he would not share any information
with a competitor and would not disclose BPS customer
information so that it loses its confidentiality and Farrington
admitted that he encouraged sales representatives not to
- 535 - 
Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Head & Engquist Equipment, L.L.C., Not Reported in S.E.2d...
2003 WL 21017456, 2003 NCBC 4
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 29
disclose pricing to the competition. Christensen, Farrington
and Matthews each acknowledged their receipt of the BPS
handbook which contained the confidentiality section.
*41  {212} The Court finds Ms. Gomez's testimony to be
credible. The Court also notes that Christensen and Farrington
did not testify at trial to rebut plaintiff's evidence.
{213} Evidence shows that the defendants engaged in
improper conduct intended to gain unfair advantage over
BPS. After Farrington and other BPS employees left for H &
E, BPS discovered confidential information missing from the
branch. Farrington maintained a binder of preferential pricing
in his office. Following his departure, that binder could not
be located. Matthews produced in discovery customer contact
information that he took with him from BPS-despite being
told by Christensen not to take any BPS documents with
him. Matthews left binders containing only blank pieces of
paper when he was required to leave information concerning
customer contacts and new job starts. Customer profiles
maintained by Gloria Silva could not be located at BPS within
a week after she left BPS for H & E. In addition, Matthews'
cell phone, paid for by BPS, was programmed to forward
incoming calls to him when employed at H & E. The cell
phone could not be disabled because the phone had been
locked out and the access code was unknown.
{214} Mathews resigned from BPS without giving any notice
on March 20 and joined a sales meeting with Farrington
at H & E that day. Matthews also that day called on BPS
customers, including Drywall Interiors, and admitted that he
had no pricing information from H & E. Christensen called on
Mills Electric and Haley Greer after the H & E branch opened,
and Matthews immediately sought after other BPS customers,
such as Oak Cliff Glass.
{215} Following the departures of Farrington and the other
BPS employees to H & E in March 2000, longtime customers
of BPS, including Potter Concrete, Ram Steel, Mills Electric,
Cherry Paint, Gorman & Associates, Williams Insulation, and
Oak Cliff Glass, stopped doing business with BPS and instead
placed their AWP rental orders with H & E. The speed at
which H & E switched long time customers of BPS to H
& E is shown by the decline in contracts with Oak Cliff
Mirror & Glass, Potter Concrete and Williams Insulation in
March and April 2000 and the concurrent rise in contracts
with those customers at H & E. The evidence shows that
BPS had “gentleman's agreements” with these customers and
reasonable expectations of continuing to do business with
these customers prior to defendants' solicitation of the BPS
employees to H & E and related conduct. Indeed many of the
BPS customers that were lost to H & E were customers with
whom Linda Gomez, not Mathews or Moon, had established
relationships belying the suggestions that customers simply
followed the sales representatives to H & E.
{216} The rapid departures of Farrington, Billups and the
other BPS employees to H & E's Hi-Lift branch in Dallas had
a debilitating effect on the BPS branch in Dallas, including
the loss of longstanding customers. With the departure of
Farrington, Matthews and Moon, the outside AWP sales
presence was reduced to one experienced and trained
AWP salesperson, Ms. Gomez. Mr. Lane, an outside AWP
salesman, had to assume duties as the new branch manager.
Besides Gomez, the only other AWP outside salesman
was Scott Douglas, an apprentice with little experience.
Equipment was not serviced and delivered in a timely
manner, leading to customer dissatisfaction. As a result of
the defendants' conduct, some longtime customers of the BPS
Dallas branch stopped placing orders with BPS/Sunbelt.
*42  {217} While BPS business was suffering, the Dallas
Hi-Lift branch grew rapidly. It was profitable in 2000.
Christensen and Farrington received bonuses for their
performance in 2000 because the company exceeded the plan
for 2000.
{218} There is evidence that the same pattern of conduct
found at other branches existed at the Dallas branch. The
Court finds the following:
(a) Telephone records indicate that Hepler and Christensen
called the BPS Dallas branch after Christensen tendered his
resignation, but prior to his leaving BPS, at a time when
Farrington was employed at BPS. Farrington did not deny
that he spoke with Christensen on the telephone at the BPS
branch at the time in question.
(b) Christensen met with Farrington on at least two
occasions before Farrington left BPS. On the first such
known occasion, they discussed when Farrington would
need to leave BPS, which suggests that the preliminary
discussions had long passed.
(c) Christensen used BPS as his primary personnel source
for the Hi-Lift Dallas branch.
(d) Christensen testified that risk and uncertainty exist
with starting a new company and that he considered that
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uncertainty in deciding to accept employment with H & E.
One of those risks was establishing itself by reputation, “the
new-guy-on-the-block syndrome.” Christensen admitted
that he brought employees from BPS to make the company
profitable and that that gave him greater comfort with his
decision to go to H & E.
(e) Farrington testified that he reviewed the property then
used by Martin Equipment, another division of H & E,
to determine whether it could be used for the Hi-Lift
operations, and that his assessment was that it would
not work. He further testified that afterward he met with
Delores Kline to identify another location for the branch,
which turned out to be the branch that Hi-Lift operates out
of in Dallas. Farrington testified that none of this occurred
while he was employed by BPS. Farrington's last day with
BPS was either March 14 or 17, 2000. If Farrington were
correct, then work on identifying this new property would
had to have occurred after March 14. H & E, however,
signed a letter of intent with respect to the lease of this
property on February 11, 2000.
{219} Farrington testified that prior to resigning on March
4, he did not know that Christensen was meeting with
other BPS employees, and he denied having any role in
the recruitment of BPS employees while he was himself
employed by BPS. Indeed, Farrington admitted that it would
have been improper for him to solicit employees while
employed by BPS. Yet, an H & E expense record filled out
by Christensen shows that Farrington met with Christensen
and Billups together on March 3, 2000 (while Farrington
was the branch manager of BPS). When confronted with this
document, Farrington admitted that maybe he was “in the
same building” with Billups but that he had nothing to do with
his recruitment. Reluctantly, Farrington admitted that he was
aware that Christensen was discussing Billups going to H &
E. Christensen testified that he met with both Farrington and
Billups together and it was at this lunch that they discussed
when Farrington would leave BPS for H & E.
Houston and San Antonio
*43  {220} Houston. As with Dallas, Christensen was
intimately involved in the solicitation of employees for the
new H & E Hi-Lift branch in Houston, Texas.
{221} H & E had a small fleet in Texas at its South
Texas Equipment subsidiary. South Texas was better known
as a crane and earth moving equipment company than a
AWP rental company. Prior to 2000, the South Texas fleet
consisted largely of aging Grove equipment. Utilization of
the Grove fleet did not meet Engquist's expectations. Because
of its Grove fleet, the South Texas AWP mechanics had not
attended special training by Genie or JLG prior to January
2000. Christensen testified that when he first met with John
Engquist he was told that H & E had not been very successful
in the rental market and that is why they were looking to bring
on Hepler, Kline, Quinn and himself: to develop a new H &
E rental division.
{222} The Houston branch manager, Rodriguez, testified that
Engquist did not speak to him prior to November 1, 1999
about expanding the operations in Houston or opening up
in other markets. Rodriguez's testimony confirms that the
creation of the H & E Hi-Lift division was only explored
after Hepler and Kline approached Bruckmann, Bagley and
Engquist.
{223} In February and March 2000, Christensen met with
BPS employees in Houston for the purpose of soliciting them
to H & E. Christensen, later with the assistance of Rodriguez,
solicited and hired eight experienced BPS employees to the
Houston branch, nearly one-third of the H & E work force in
Houston. The former BPS employees were hired for similar
positions at H & E and, with one exception, were given pay
increases to go to H & E. No headhunters nor advertisements
in newspapers were used for building the new Hi-Lift branch.
{224} H & E expanded its customer base rapidly in
2000 concurrent with its hiring of employees from BPS.
Significantly, no contracts were produced by H & E for many
customers at the branch until the period after April 2000. H
& E's business with Brown & Root nearly tripled between
January and April 2000. By October 2000, after hiring eight
employees from BPS, H & E doubled its rental revenue in
Houston from the same time the prior year.
{225} San Antonio. Hepler, with Christensen's assistance
and input, solicited David Hobbs, BPS's branch manager in
Charleston, South Carolina for a new Hi-Lift branch in Texas.
Hobbs received a substantial pay increase-$20,000, plus a
$27,000 moving expense payment-to leave BPS for H & E.
The day after Christensen left BPS, he traveled to Jacksonville
to meet with Hepler and Rodriguez and then traveled to
Savannah, Georgia to meet with Hobbs and Alexander. Hepler
had given Christensen responsibility for soliciting Hobbs.
Following the meeting with Hobbs in Savannah, Hepler and
Christensen continued their conversations with Hobbs to
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solicit him to H & E, and Christensen kept Hepler abreast of
his progress. Hobbs was on board quickly though, and signed
H & E employment forms in late January 2000 indicating
his acceptance of employment at that time. Then Christensen,
with Hobbs' assistance, solicited Gloria Silva (Ysassi) from
BPS to H & E.
*44  {226} The recruitment of Hobbs is a good example
of the difficult interplay of fair and unfair competition. If
nothing else had happened, the hiring of David Hobbs to
leave BPS in Charleston and move to a new Hi-Lift branch
in San Antonio would not be a problem. The same could
be said of the hiring of Gloria Silva (Ysassi) to be credit
manager in San Antonio. Standing alone, each hire would not
provide grounds for an unfair trade practices claim. When
put in the context of the overall raid of BPS employees, the
two hires provide additional evidence of a deliberate effort
to orchestrate mass defections from BPS to H & E and to
appropriate the intellectual knowledge base of Sunbelt.
{227} While having some minor impact, the defendants'
actions in the Houston-San Antonio market were not as
devastating as the actions taken in the other BPS branch
markets targeted by H & E. They are evidence, however, of
the pervasive effort of H & E to siphon off most of the key
employees of BPS.
Atlanta
{228} The Atlanta Hi-Lift branch opened on or about March
15, 2000. The following BPS personnel were either on-board
at the opening or working with Hi-Lift within two weeks of
opening: a branch manager (Mark Alexander); a full AWP
outside sales staff (David Leavell, Bill Kenyon, Dan Franz
and James Cornett); a service manager (James Brown); a
shop foreman (Dan McMahan); mechanics (Paul Fredrickson,
Michael Mullen and Roger Dempsey); a credit manager
(Andrew Warshaw); a parts coordinator (Clinton McMahan);
and drivers (Nathaniel West and David Waddell). Shortly
thereafter, the Atlanta Hi-Lift branch added an administrative
assistant (Rhonda Rathel). Each of these employees was hired
from BPS.
{229} Hepler and Quinn arranged to meet with Alexander,
the nine-year existing manager of the BPS Atlanta branch, on
January 6, 2000 to begin the plan leading to the opening of
the H & E Atlanta branch. At lunch, Hepler told Alexander
he wanted to open an H & E branch in Atlanta and
wanted assurance that Alexander would consider becoming
the branch manager. Alexander was given responsibility for
hiring employees at the new H & E branch.
{230} A dinner was arranged that night with four long-term
BPS employees that worked under Alexander at the Atlanta
branch: Atlanta's two most successful salesmen, David
Leavell (“Leavell”) and Jim Cornett (“Cornett”), the Atlanta
service manager James Brown (“Brown”) and Alexander's
“right-hand man at the branch,” Dan Franz (“Franz”), the
scaffolding manager. Hepler and Alexander claim that the
dinner was Alexander's idea to get old friends together and
deny that recruitment was. This testimony sharply conflicts
with co-defendant Quinn's testimony that Hepler set this
dinner up to recruit these BPS employees for H & E. Once
again, Hepler's credibility is at issue, and for the multiple
contradictions between Hepler and other sworn testimony, the
Court again finds Hepler is not credible.
*45  {231} Quinn testified that the dinner was arranged for
the express purpose of recruiting BPS employees to come
work for H & E. Hepler's only explanation when confronted
at trial with Quinn's testimony was that Quinn's recollection
was inaccurate. Alexander admits that he falsified his expense
report for this Atlanta dinner (to hide the fact that Hepler and
Quinn attended) and submitted it to BPS for payment. The
fact that similar meetings were held with the key employees
in other branches with the branch managers present indicates
a pattern of using the branch managers to solicit, plan and
organize the defections.
{232} H & E business records show that employee benefits
information was requested for Mark Alexander on January 7,
2000, and that insurance networks were already in place for
the Atlanta employees.
{233} Hepler subsequently arranged a meeting with
Alexander in Savannah on January 20, 2000, at which time
Hepler showed Alexander a detailed business plan for the
Hi-Lift division that contained projections for all branches.
Regarding the plan he reviewed with Hepler on January
20, Alexander testified: “[Hepler] and Doug [Kline] had put
together a one-year-I believe a one-year, three-year, five-
year growth plan and that the return on investment was very,
very achievable. I asked to look at it. He showed it to me,
pulled it out of his briefcase, and the numbers I saw were
achievable in my opinion.” Hepler denies showing Alexander
a business plan that night and, when confronted at trial with
Alexander's testimony, claimed that Alexander's recollection
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was inaccurate. Defendants did not call Alexander as a
witness.
{234} Hepler assured Alexander on January 20 that the
necessary capital was available for the H & E start-up. With
respect to capital, Hepler explained to Alexander “that it
was all arranged, that not all of it was one hundred percent
secured yet and some of that was contingent upon the fact the
we come out-that Hi-Lift come out of the box pretty strong.
But that he was confident that that wasn't going to be a
problem.” (Emphasis added.) That evidence confirms at least
the need for swift conversion of the necessary BPS employee
base.
{235} At the Savannah meeting, Hepler offered Alexander a
job as the Atlanta branch manager, which Alexander accepted
at that time. Alexander's salary would increase from $103,500
at BPS to $105,000 at H & E, and he also received a
$25,000 signing bonus. Alexander assured Hepler that he
could hire the necessary people for the branch. When asked at
deposition who he had in mind that night to recruit, Alexander
immediately responded with eleven names, all of whom he
hired from BPS for the Atlanta startup.
{236} The next day, January 21, 2000, Alexander resigned
from BPS and immediately spoke with Brown about his
resignation. Alexander used Brown as an inside source to set
up meetings and solicit BPS employees. Brown expressed to
at least one BPS employee (Galvond) his intent to harm BPS
by gutting the BPS branch to the ground. Brown not only
solicited BPS employees on behalf of H & E he also, while
still employed by BPS, encouraged at least one BPS employee
to take confidential BPS files and information home with him
in anticipation of leaving BPS to work for H & E. Brown also
indicated to Galvond that his reason for taking his BPS laptop
computer home with him each night was for the purpose of
compiling confidential BPS information for use at H & E.
*46  {237} Alexander arranged a lunch with Brown on
February 8, 2000, prior to Brown's resignation from BPS. At
this lunch Brown showed Alexander a list of BPS employees
Brown wanted to recruit from BPS to work for H & E. Brown
told Alexander at this lunch that the instability at BPS caused
by Alexander's resignation would help his efforts to recruit
BPS employees for H & E. Alexander testified in deposition
that it would be improper for Brown to recruit BPS employees
for H & E while still employed at BPS.
{238} While still employed by BPS, Alexander spent time
with Doug and Delores Kline trying to locate a facility for H
& E to open its Atlanta branch. A factor Alexander considered
in locating a facility for H & E was to find a location that
would make it easier to recruit BPS employees.
{239} When Brown began his employment with H & E,
he told Alexander that he had already been in contact with
several BPS employees he was recruiting for H & E and
undertook the role of overseeing recruitment of employees for
H & E. Alexander gave him authority to make employment
offers on behalf of H & E.
{240} Between late February and early April 2000, at least
13 more BPS employees solicited by Alexander and Brown
left BPS and began work with H & E. On opening day, every
employee of H & E's Atlanta branch had been hired from BPS.
{241} The H & E branch in Atlanta was virtually identical to
the former BPS Atlanta branch with respect to its employees,
customer base and structure. In addition to all employees
being former BPS employees, employees' responsibilities at
H & E were virtually the same as at BPS. Former salesmen
were assigned the same territories at H & E that they had
at BPS, called on BPS customers and based pricing on
information and experience acquired at BPS. In effect, H &
E's Atlanta branch operated as the former BPS branch-used
the same employees to conduct the same business with the
same customers.
{242} Only ninety days after Hepler and Kline departed from
BPS, on or about March 23, 2000, H & E opened a greenfield
branch in Atlanta, where it previously had no operations,
with all the necessary employees to sell, service and deliver
equipment.
{243} In building a fleet for H & E's Atlanta branch, Quinn
placed orders based on information and knowledge acquired
at BPS concerning the Atlanta market instead of conducting
market studies and evaluations, a process that Hepler testified
is necessary for any greenfield operation.
{244} Cornett testified in deposition that he covers the same
territory for H & E that he covered for BPS and is still using
his BPS customer list at H & E. Cornett admitted that he
likely called on BPS's biggest customers first, with no pricing
information or marketing materials from H & E. Alexander
admitted that he did not establish rental rates for H & E's
Atlanta branch until July 2000, four months after the branch
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opened. Prior to that point, salesmen priced equipment based
on past experience, with no guidance from H & E. When
Leavell began his employment with H & E, there were no
meetings in which the sales staff discussed rental rates, sales
strategy or marketing strategy-Alexander simply instructed
the salesmen to go do their jobs. Leavell took with him to H
& E, however, notes that he had taken at BPS regarding BPS
customers, including contacts.
*47  {245} Further evidence that H & E's Atlanta branch
as well as other AWP branches operated as the former BPS
branch is a June 12, 2000 H & E memo from Mark Alexander
to “All branch managers,” copied to Defendants Kline, Quinn
and Christensen, in which Alexander, stated:
Last Tuesday I had a meeting with Jeff
Farmer with MLS & Assoc. I know the
entire former BPS crowd remembers
that MLS was our printing supplier
for many years.... The good news for
us is that ... [MLS] has all of the
marketing brochures we ever produced
and none of this is copyrighted or
trademarked.... Jeff and I have another
meeting tomorrow at which time he
is going to bring the first draft of the
monthly order form we were receiving
every month from MLS. By the end of
the week you should be receiving this
form by fax at your branch.
{246} The loss of its branch manager and key personnel to
H & E in such a short period of time caused turmoil in the
BPS Atlanta branch. BPS was forced to bring in personnel
from other branches in order to deal with the situation; they
were unable to respond to customer needs and requests in
a timely fashion; the condition of equipment in the yard
suffered; and customers began calling BPS equipment off rent
at a high rate. As a result, BPS lost a significant amount of
business, and the volume of equipment being rented slowed
considerably because BPS lacked qualified people to rent
it, lacked qualified people to repair it, and lacked qualified
people to deliver it.
{247} Despite being a greenfield operation in a market in
which H & E previously had no presence, the H & E start-
up branch in Atlanta did not struggle but was profitable by
July 2000, exceeding the budgets that had been set for it by
year-end. Reflecting the existence of and execution of the
Plan, while Sunbelt's revenue at the Atlanta branch from the
BPS customers was dropping dramatically (often to zero), H
& E's revenue from these same customers rose from zero to
hundreds of thousands of dollars.
H & E Today
{248} As the result of the employment activity by Defendants
Hi-Lift, Hepler, Kline, Quinn and Christensen, Hi-Lift is
substantially different today than H & E's aerial work platform
division was as of December 31, 1999. Not only was the H
& E AWP fleet aging, it had not been very productive for H
& E. As of December 31, 1999, H & E's AWP fleet had only
generated rental revenue of $7.2 million, a gross profit of only
$2.5 million and a pre-tax loss of $289,000. The results of H &
E's employment of Hepler, Kline, Christensen and Quinn and
their conspiratorial activities, were that Hi-Lift realized $23.4
million dollars in rentals by December 31, 2000, a gross profit
of $16.9 million and a pre-tax profit of $3.4 million. This
profit occurred notwithstanding that two of the branches in the
Hi-Lift division did not open until the middle of March 2000,
followed by two more in May and one in June. Thus, through
the opening of branches where Hi-Lift had no prior presence
and the employment of BPS personnel at those branches and
the “struggling” branches which H & E operated in Texas, Hi-
Lift achieved over three times the rental revenues it previously
had and turned a loss into a substantial profit. The turnaround
totaled $3.7 million in one year.
*48  {249} Even more remarkable is the speed at which
Hi-Lift achieved profit before taxes (and before corporate
allocations) and exceeded budget/projections. By July 14,
2000, Defendant Kline reported that Hi-Lift had $153,000
profit before taxes in June (before corporate allocations)
and had exceeded the budget/projection for the time-frame.
Further, Kline reported that Charlotte utilization, which was at
58 percent, was not alarming because of Hi-Lift's expectation
that the “Corning job would utilize most of the remaining
equipment very shortly.”
{250} Similarly, a month later, Kline further reported that the
Hi-Lift division had achieved $613,000 in profit before taxes
(and before corporate allocations) and that “all branches were
profitable in July.” As significantly, as Kline had reported
in June, utilization by branch and across the entire fleet was
extraordinarily high. By July 26, the Charlotte fleet, six weeks
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after opening, was at a 74 percent utilization level and quickly
moved to 80 percent. Hi-Lift had 2,746 units in the fleet as of
August 9th and a 79 percent utilization for the entire fleet.
{251} Hi-Lift rentals increased by $30.8 million, or 130
percent, to $55.4 million in fiscal year 2001 over fiscal year
2000. Thus, in fiscal year 2001, Hi-Lift had almost eight times
the revenue it had as of December 31, 1999. As stated by
an industry expert, such results are “astounding.” Moreover,
the Court finds that these results confirm a number of points
including:
(a) The mass departures severely injured Sunbelt, a result
that could only have been intended by defendants or the
product of callous disregard for the consequences.
(b) Sunbelt/BPS confidential business information was
used by defendants; otherwise, their personnel could not
have been assembled so much business so quickly and
efficiently.
(c) Sunbelt's expected repeat business was quickly and
effectively appropriated by defendants.
(d) Defendants' activities were unfair, unethical and
anticompetitive.
(e) The actions resulted in a dramatic $3.7 million




{253} To the extent there may have developed in the business
community a sense that in business litigation it is acceptable
to render less than truthful testimony, that trend is one
which must be reversed. The primary business of the courts
is ascertaining the truth. Those who impede that work by
providing less than complete, honest testimony should not
be surprised to find their conduct unrewarded by the legal
system. Every witness who takes an oath is compelled to tell
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Those
who fail to honor that oath leave all their credibility on
the courthouse steps. A healthy economic system requires
a strong legal system that permits, promotes and protects
fair competition while prohibiting and punishing conduct that
threatens the vitality of that competitive system. Finding the
truth is an essential part of the work of our legal system. Every
witness is compelled to cooperate fully and truthfully in that
search.
*49  {254} The Court, as Finder of Fact, had the opportunity
to judge the testimony of the live witnesses firsthand. That
is significant in this case where the testimony of defendants
and the inferences to be drawn from their actions are in
conflict. Defendants chose not to present live testimony from
Defendants Kline, Christensen, Quinn and Pearsall, nor did
branch managers Jones, Drennan and Alexander appear live.
The Court has reviewed their proffered deposition testimony.
The Court finds credibility issues as to defendants' witnesses
with respect to two key subject areas: the existence of a plan to
raid BPS at its key branches in an orchestrated manner and the
use of the branch managers to do so. In both subject areas, the
uncontroverted actions speak louder than words of denial. On
numerous occasions, Mr. Hepler's testimony was contradicted
by his own employees, his own documents or the credible
testimony of others.
{255} Sunbelt has the burden on each of its claims of proving
by “the greater weight of the evidence” that defendants'
actions caused the damages that Sunbelt claims were the result
of the massive departure of its employees and consequent
conversion of customers and trade secrets. Sunbelt need not
have a particular quantity of evidence in order to prove
its claims; it must simply show that, considering all of the
evidence, the facts necessary to find in its favor are more
likely than not to exist. See, e.g., Joyner v. Garrett, 279 N.C.
226, 236, 182 S.E.2d 553, 560 (1971) (holding that the law
relating to burden of proof is equally applicable to jury and
non-jury trials).
{256} As a general matter, the Court notes that the failure
of four defendants, and a number of H & E employees who
figure prominently in defendants' plan and conspiracy, to
testify at trial in a civil matter is a “pregnant circumstance” for
the Court to consider. Jacobs v. Locklear, 65 N.C.App. 147,
150, 308 S.E.2d 748, 750 (1983); see also Ledford v. Emerson,
141 N.C. 596, 54 S .E. 433 (1906) (finding that failure of
defendant to testify was legitimate subject of comment before
the jury); Allred v. Demuth, 890 S.W.2d 578, 581 (Ark.1994)
(holding that failure to testify gives rise to presumption that
the testimony would have been against the party's interest);
Keith v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 889 S.W.2d 911,
918 (Mo.Ct.App.1995) (permitting an unfavorable inference
against party who fails to testify).
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{257} In this case, considering the totality of the evidence,
the Court may and does draw an adverse inference from the
fact that Defendants Kline, Christensen, Quinn, Pearsall (who
sat through several days of testimony in this Court), and other
prominent H & E employees failed to testify at trial. However,
that adverse inference was but one factor considered by the
Court in reaching its decision, which would have been the
same without the inference.
{258} Because the law makes no distinction between the
weight to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence,
and no greater degree of certainty is required of circumstantial
rather than direct evidence, the Court has also afforded equal
weight to direct and circumstantial evidence presented at trial
and through depositions and exhibits. See, e.g., N.C.P.I.-Civil
101; Patton v. Dail, 252 N.C. 425, 428, 114 S.E.2d 87, 90
(1960) (holding that a fact in controversy may be established
by circumstantial evidence); Byrd's Lawn & Landscaping,
Inc. v. Smith, 142 N.C.App. 371, 377, 542 S.E.2d 689, 693
(2001) (finding that circumstantial evidence was sufficient to
support finding of trade secret misappropriation).
*50  {259} Additionally, certain behaviors which may
be benign or innocuous when standing alone, but which
acquire a different meaning when placed in a larger
context, may allow the Court, in light of the totality
of the facts and circumstances, to reasonably infer that
illegal conduct occurred in this case. See Terry's Floor
Fashions, Inc. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 568 F.Supp. 205, 210
(E .D.N.C.1983).
{260} In summary, the Court finds that the tortious
interference claims are subsumed in the U.D.T.P.A. claim,
and that defendants (1) violated N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1,
(2) misappropriated trade secrets, and (3) committed
civil conspiracy. Damages for tortious interference,
misappropriation, and civil conspiracy are subsumed under
the U.D.T.P.A. damages. Plaintiff has been damaged by
defendants' unfair and deceptive behavior in the amount of
five million dollars; these damages are to be trebled under
N.C.G.S. § 75-16.1.
U.D.T.P.A.
{261} To establish a violation of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, a plaintiff
must show: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive
act or practice; (2) the action in question was in or affecting
commerce; and (3) the act proximately caused injury to
plaintiffs. E.g., Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 656, 548
S.E.2d 704, 711 (2001); Becker v. Graber Builders, Inc., 149,
N.C.App. 787, 794, 561 S.E.2d 905, 910 (2002). Plaintiff has
fulfilled each of those requirements.
{262} Whether an act is unfair or deceptive is a question of
law for the Court to determine. Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting
Ass'n, 352 N.C. 61, 68, 529 S.E.2d 676, 681 (2000).
{263} Although certain acts, standing alone, may evoke
the action, a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 is an independent claim that
stands alone as a distinct action and is not derivative. See,
e.g., Bhatti v. Buckland, 328 N.C. 240, 400 S.E.2d 440 (1991)
(finding that proof of fraud alone would establish that unfair
and deceptive trade practices have occurred, no finding of
“substantial aggravating circumstances”); The Country Club
of Johnson County v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 150
N.C.App. 231, 563 S.E.2d 269 (2002) (noting that a claim
under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 is independent of other claims and
affirming judgment on claim of unfair and deceptive trade
practices alone); Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper
Services, Inc., 108 N.C.App. 169, 423 S.E.2d 324 (1992)
(holding that if a violation of the North Carolina Trade Secrets
Protection Act satisfies the three prong test, then it would
be a violation of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1), appeal dismissed and
review denied, 333 N.C. 344, 427 S.E.2d 617 (1993); Bernard
v. Central Carolina Truck Sales, 68 N.C.App. 228, 230, 314
S.E.2d 582, 584 (1984) (“As previously stated, an action
for unfair and deceptive acts or practices is a distinct action
[and] ... creates a cause of action broader than traditional
common law actions....”).
*51  {264} Whether an act or practice is unfair is
determined on a case-by-case basis, and “the fair or unfair
nature of particular conduct is to be judged by viewing it
against the background of actual human experience and by
determining its intended and actual effects upon others.”
United Laboratories v. Kuykendall, 102 N .C.App. 484, 491,
403 S.E.2d 104, 109 (citations omitted), aff'g, 335 N.C.
183, 437 S.E.2d 374 (1993); see Johnson v. Phoenix Mut.
Insurance, 300 N.C. 247, 262-63, 266 S.E.2d 610, 621 (1980)
(finding that whether a trade practice is unfair or deceptive
depends on the facts of each case.).
{265} A practice is unfair when it offends established
public policy as well as when the practice is immoral,
unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious
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to consumers. Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Ins., 300 N.C.
247, 266 S.E.2d 610. The U.D.T.P.A. is “directed toward
maintaining ethical standards in dealings between persons
engaged in business, and [intended] to promote good faith at
all levels of commerce. Unfair methods of competition [ ... ]
would not promote good faith....” Kuykendall, 102 N.C.App.
at 491, 403 S.E.2d at 109 (citations omitted).
{266} One method of determining if actions are unfair or
unethical is to look at those actions through the lens of equity.
Faced with an ex ante rather than ex post review of the
actions, what would a court of equity do faced with a request
for injunction? Would a court enjoin defendants from using
a competitor's branch managers to secretly hire away the
competitor's employees and orchestrate their departure in a
manner designed to impair the competitor and benefit the
defendants? See, e.g., Global Telesystems, Inc., v. KPNQwest,
151 F.Supp.2d 478 (2001) (S.D.N.Y.); Thal v. Polumbaum,
196 Misc. 897, 900, 96 N.Y.S.2d 226, 230 (1949); The
Monitor Stove Co. v. The Williamson Heater Co ., 18 Ohio
App. 352 (1923). Surely a court would not ex ante condone
such behavior. If so, it should find the same behavior ex post
to be unfair and unethical.
{267} BPS/Sunbelt and Hi-Lift were in competition in the
AWP rental business, and the conduct which the Court has
found to violate the U.D.T.P.A. was in and affected commerce
as required by the statute.
{268} The surreptitious and intentional use of BPS employees
to solicit other key employees while both the soliciting
and solicited employees were still employed by BPS is an
unfair trade practice. Defendants' attempts to conceal their
mendacious behavior have failed. Their lack of credibility on
this issue is a factor for the Court to consider in determining
whether their actions constituted unfair trade practices. It
is precisely the conduct which the Court has found to be
unfair that was the subject of defendants' untruthful testimony.
Defendants' lack of candor with respect to the solicitation
of other employees by Hepler and the branch managers
while the branch managers were still employed by BPS
demonstrates their belief that such conduct was legally and
ethically unacceptable. Indeed, Mr. Engquist and others so
testified.
*52  {269} Defendants admit that they gave no consideration
to the impact of their actions on the BPS branches at issue.
In addition, defendants have admitted that they were in a
position to understand the dire consequences of their actions
on the raided branches. John Engquist admitted that the
behavior of a branch manager in soliciting employees who
reported to him and telling them to leave immediately would
be improper behavior. Rob Hepler likewise admitted that
such conduct was unethical. Undermining the entire structure
of a branch by secretly soliciting key employees at various
levels of the organization to leave en masse to H & E
with the inevitable consequence of crippling the branch, and
then using the same employees to blitz BPS customers for
business with H & E is not ethical competitive behavior.
Building fully functional and profitable greenfield branches
in a matter of days, rather than months, through orchestrated,
en masse, secret recruitment efforts by key insiders is not
ethical behavior in competition.
{270} Competitor A may not use existing management
employees of Competitor B to secretly solicit en masse
defections to Competitor A's business while those managers
or key employees are still employed by Competitor B,
particularly where Competitor A knows that the coordinated
en masse defections will impair Competitor B's ability
to function and provide at least a temporary competitive
advantage to Competitor A in the marketplace. Competitor A
could openly solicit any employee of Competitor B who was
not bound by a contract containing a restrictive covenant so
long as the new employee does not use confidential business
information and trade secrets of Competitor B. The employee
could be offered more money. There would be no limit on
the number hired. Here it is the surreptitious recruitment
of en masse defections timed to disrupt Competitor B's
business and take advantage of the employees' knowledge of
confidential business information which crosses over the line
of fair competition.
{271} The Court also considered the deliberate acts of
disruption committed by the departing employees as well
as the derogatory comments made by the branch managers
and other key employees. Further, the manipulation of the
employee departures in the form of mass resignations was
also unfair and calculated to handicap BPS in such a way that
Hi-Lift could take competitive advantage of the situation it
had unfairly created. It eliminated the opportunity for BPS to
compete for the employees on a level playing field.
{272} The Court is not holding that Hi-Lift could not hire BPS
employees, be they executives, branch managers, salesmen
or mechanics. Had Hi-Lift opened a branch office prepared
for business and then advertised for employees, any BPS
employee could have been solicited and hired. Prior to
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opening a branch office, Hi-Lift could have advertised in
trade publications that it was seeking experienced employees.
Any BPS employee could have chosen to respond to that
advertisement. Indeed, many BPS employees may have
applied for employment with Hi-Lift. In its haste and its
effort to take advantage of BPS before Sunbelt could close its
purchase, Hi-Lift overstepped the bounds of ethical and fair
competition.
*53  {273} An example of activity by Hi-Lift that would
not fall into the category of unfair trade practice was the
hiring of David Chapman. He ran the Charleston branch
for BPS and was a friend of Hepler. He was hired away
from BPS to run the Houston branch for Hi-Lift. He did not
hire any Charleston employees and was contractually free to
work wherever he desired. Hi-Lift did not commit any unfair
trade practice by hiring him, and his hiring had no adverse
impact on the Charleston branch other than the loss of his
personal experience. Hi-Lift did not have a competing branch
in Charleston.
{274} The appellate court decisions dealing with unfair
competition and conversion of business and employees
demonstrate an awareness that competition is healthy and not
to be unduly discouraged. Those decisions also evidence a
desire to permit employees the greatest freedom of movement
in order to maximize their job opportunities. See, e.g., Dalton,
353 N.C. 647, 548 S . E.2d 704; Hiatt v. Burlington Industries,
Inc., 55 N.C.App. 523, 529, 286 S.E.2d 566, 569, disc. rev.
denied, 305 N.C. 395, 290 S.E.2d 365 (1982); Long v. Vertical
Technologies, Inc., 115 N.C.App. 598, 439 S.E.2d 797 (1994);
Fletcher, Barnhardt & White, Inc. v. Matthews, 100 N.C.App.
436, 397 S.E.2d 81(1990), disc. rev. denied, 328 N.C. 89,
402 S.E.2d 411(1991). Nothing in this opinion should be
read to depart from the trends evident in those decisions.
Hepler and Kline were free to compete fairly, and each
employee of BPS/Sunbelt was free to work for the employer
he or she selected. The surreptitious way in which the BPS
employees were solicited may have actually deprived them of
the opportunity to see what Sunbelt would offer them to stay.
None of the converted employees had the right to use BPS/
Sunbelt confidential business information, but they could use
the experience and contacts they had gained from years in the
AWP business.
{275} The manner in which the branch managers were used
was deceptive. That deception prevented fair competition
for both employees and customers. The deceptive, secretive
nature of defendants' actions differentiates this case from
others where courts have found the hiring of competitor's
employees to be acceptable.
{276} In Peoples Sec. Ins. Co. v. Hooks, our Supreme Court
affirmed the 12(b)(6) dismissal of plaintiff employer's claim
that its former employee had unlawfully interfered with the
employment contracts of other employees. 322 N.C. 216, 367
S.E.2d 647 (1988). After quitting, defendant employee hired
away many of his co-workers and subsequently assigned them
to develop the same territory as they had worked with the
plaintiff. Our Supreme Court looked to other jurisdictions for
the proposition that “[t]he free enterprise system demands that
competing employers be allowed to vie for the services of
the “best and brightest” employees without fear of subsequent
litigation for tortious interference.” Id. at 222, 367 S.E.2d at
651 (citing McCluer v. Super Maid Cook-Ware Corp., 62 F.2d
426 (10th Cir.1932); Vincent Horwitz Co. v. Cooper, 352 Pa. 7,
41 A.2d 870 (1945); Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 260 Cal.App.2d
244, 67 Cal.Rptr. 19 (1968); Coleman & Morris v. Pisciotta,
107 N.Y.S.2d 715, 279 A.D. 656 (1951)).
*54  {277} The clearest differences between the Hooks case
and the case before this Court are the timing, subterfuge, and
wrongful purpose. In United Lab. v. Kuykendall, the North
Carolina Supreme Court clarified its ruling in Hooks.
[I]n a recent decision, [this Court] held that in some
situations a competitor may hire an employer's former
employees without being liable for tortious interference
with contract. In Hooks, plaintiff's employees had
terminable at will contracts with plaintiff, had signed
covenants not to compete, and subsequently went to work
for one of plaintiff's competitors. This Court held that
hiring the competitor's former employees and assigning
them to the same territory they had worked in their prior
employment was not a tortious interference with contract.
We held in Hooks that a claim for tortious interference with
contract would not lie where a defendant had only “offered
the plaintiff's employees job opportunities which induced
them to terminate their terminable at will contracts and,
by locating these employees in their previously assigned
territories, induced them to breach the non-competition
clauses contained in their contracts with the plaintiff.” We
concluded that the fact that the plaintiff and defendant were
in competition was sufficient to justify the defendant “in
offering the plaintiff's employees new jobs and locating
them in their previously assigned territory.” In Hooks,
however, we also emphasized that “ ‘[t]he privilege [to
interfere] is conditional or qualified; that is it is lost if
exercised for a wrong purpose. In general a wrong purpose
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exists where the act is done other than as a reasonable and
bona fide attempt to protect the interests of the defendant
which is involved.’ “
322 N.C. at 662, 370 S.E.2d at 387 (internal citations
omitted).
{278} Defendants would like to avail themselves of the
notion that competition justifies their actions. See Childress
v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954). However,
defendants should have used lawful means to pursue their
ends. See, e.g., id .; Hooks, 322 N.C. 643, 370 S.E.2d 375.
{279} Based on the above findings of fact, and pursuant
to North Carolina law, there is extensive evidence showing
that the actions of defendants were unfair, unethical, and
immoral; those actions proximately caused Sunbelt's injury;
those actions were of and affecting commerce; and, thus, the
Court finds that these actions constitute unfair trade practices
or unfair methods of competition under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.
Tortious Interference
{280} The Court will not deal with the tortious interference
claims separately, as each is subsumed in the holding of unfair
competition. If an appellate court were to find that defendants'
conduct was not barred as unfair competition, it would be
difficult to find that it was “tortious interference” since there
would have been a determination that the competitive actions
were fair and protected.
Trade Secrets
*55  {281} The application of the law of misappropriation
of trade secrets is difficult to apply in this case because of the
nature of the industry, the vast experience of the BPS/Sunbelt
employees hired away by Hi-Lift and the difficulty of proving
specific use of the information. Here, the use of confidential
business information by Hi-Lift would have been coextensive
with the unfair competition that the Court has found to exist
by virtue of the unlawful en masse appropriation of the
employee base. The damages for misappropriation would be
included in the unfair trade practice damages for all practical
purposes. See Drouillard, 108 N.C.App. 169, 423 S.E.2d 324.
{282} Under the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act
(“Trade Secrets Act”),
“Trade secret” means business or technical information,
including but not limited to a formula, pattern, program,
devise, compilation of information, method, technique, or
process that:
1. Derives independent actual or potential commercial
value from not being generally known or readily
ascertainable through independent development or
reverse engineering by persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use; and
2. Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
N.C.G.S. § 66-152 (2001).
{283} The factors which trial courts should apply in
determining whether information is properly classified as a
trade secret have been clearly enunciated by the appellate
courts. The six primary factors are: (1) the extent to which
the information is known outside the business, (2) the extent
to which it is known inside the business, (3) the measures
taken to guard the secrecy of the information, (4) the value of
the information to the business and to the competitor, (5) the
expenditure of time and money in developing the information
and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could
properly be acquired or duplicated by others. See Byrd's, 142
N.C.App. at 375, 542 S.E.2d at 692; State ex rel. Utilities
Comm'n v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 132 N.C.App.
625, 634, 514 S.E.2d 276, 283 (1999); Wilmington Star News,
Inc. v. New Hanover Regional Medical Center, 125 N.C.App.
174, 182, 480 S.E.2d 53, 57, appeal dismissed, 346 N.C. 557,
488 S.E.2d 826 (1997).
{284} Applying these factors in specific factual situations,
our courts have found a variety of information to constitute
a trade secret. See Byrd's, 142 N.C.App. at 371, 542 S.E.2d
at 689 (cost history information); Wilmington Star News Inc.,
125 N.C.App. at 174, 480 S.E.2d at 53 (price lists); Barr-
Mullin Inc. v. Browning, 108 N.C.App. 590, 424 S.E.2d 226
(1993) (computer software); Drouillard, 108 N.C.App. 169,
423 S.E.2d 324 (customer lists, pricing formulas and bidding
formulas).
{285} Under the Trade Secrets Act, “misappropriation” is
defined as the “acquisition, disclosure, or use of a trade secret
of another without express or implied authority or consent,
unless such trade secret was arrived at by independent
development, reverse engineering, or was obtained from
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another person with a right to disclose the trade secret.”
N.C.G.S. § 66-152(1). Plaintiff bears the initial burden
of showing a prima facie case of misappropriation by
introducing substantial evidence that the defendant: “(1)
knows or should have known of the trade secret; and (2)
has had a specific opportunity to acquire it for disclosure or
use or has acquired, disclosed, or used it without the express
or implied consent or authority of the owner.” N.C.G.S. §
66-155. There is no specific requirement that plaintiff show
that defendants have disclosed or used the trade secrets, only
that they had a specific opportunity to acquire the trade secrets
for use or disclosure. Once plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case, the burden shifts to defendants to show that the trade
secret was acquired properly.
*56  {286} There is seldom direct evidence of the use
of confidential business information. There is evidence in
this record that some documents containing confidential
information were removed from branch offices. Certainly, the
defendants in this case had access to all of BPS's business
information; they built the business. In this instance it may be
more important to look at what was not done and the business
results. There is no evidence of a unified pricing structure
for Hi-Lift. Many salespeople testified that they did not have
prices when they began calling on customers. There were
no restrictions placed on the sales people concerning use of
BPS information. The sales people began calling on the same
customers within days of leaving BPS and in some cases went
after business that was based on special pricing arrangements.
Credit decisions had to be based upon knowledge obtained at
BPS, as there is no evidence of the independent development
of credit information for the customers called upon at the
outset. Indeed, there is little evidence of the independent
development of information by Hi-Lift that one would expect
in a normal greenfield operation. As previously noted, there
was an advantage to Hi-Lift to get the new Hi-Lift branches
open in the BPS markets before Sunbelt could close its
transaction. The rapidity with which the old BPS customers
were identified, called upon and converted to Hi-Lift, despite
the lack of business information and guidance from Hi-Lift
management, provides strong circumstantial evidence that at
least some of BPS confidential information was used to solicit
customers.
{287} The evidence shows that the individual defendants
knew BPS/Sunbelt's trade secrets and had access to them,
and each had the opportunity to acquire them for disclosure
and use. Prior to appropriating BPS employees, en masse,
H & E had no customers in North Carolina, Georgia, or
Florida. Despite this fact, the “new” H & E operations
made a significant profit in their first year of operation-
based on their taking of BPS/Sunbelt employees, trade
secrets and customers-and the BPS branches experienced a
concurrent, substantial decrease in business. This occurrence
alone is circumstantial evidence of the defendants' use
and disclosure of BPS trade secret information. See, e.g.,
Byrd's, 142 N.C.App. at 377, 542 S.E.2d at 693 (finding
that evidence defendant acquired several of plaintiff's
customer contracts after opening a competing business was
“sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain a finding that
defendant knew of the confidential information, had the
opportunity to acquire it for his own use and did so.”) Here,
testimony supports that Defendant Pearsall misappropriated
confidential customer information of BPS-testimony that
Pearsall never rebutted. In addition, testimony of witnesses
located in Tampa/Fort Myers, Dallas and Atlanta supports
that confidential customer information was misappropriated
by BPS employees who left and went to H & E. Indeed,
in Tampa, identical confidential pricing was used by Ms.
Quasnick after she went to H & E, and in Dallas, Steve
Mathews took sales notes with him, even though he was
purportedly instructed not to do so by Christensen.
*57  {288} Based on the above the Court finds that
(1) BPS/Sunbelt's compilation of information, including its
special pricing information, customer information (identity,
contacts and requirements of its rental customers), personnel
and salary information, organizational structure, financial
projections and forecasts, utilization rates, fleet mix by
market, capital and branch budget information, and cost
information, when taken together constitutes trade secrets and
(2) that the defendants misappropriated BPS/Sunbelt's trade
secret information unlawfully.
Civil Conspiracy
{289} A claim for civil conspiracy “requires the showing of
an agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful
act or to do a lawful act in an unlawful way that results
in damage to the claimant.” See, e.g., Dalton v. Camp, 138
N.C.App. 201, 213, 531 S.E.2d 258, 266 (2000), rev'd on
other grounds, 353 N.C. 647, 548 S.E.2d 704 (2001).
{290} Sunbelt must also show an “overt act' committed by at
least one conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at
212, 531 S.E.2d at 267.
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{291} Circumstantial evidence is sufficient, in many cases,
to prove an action for conspiracy. See, e.g., id. at 214, 531
S .E.2d at 267.
{292} In this case, the evidence presented at trial shows
more than a mere suspicion or conjecture of an overarching
unlawful plan for en masse departures of BPS employees and
customers, the use of trade secrets, and the consequent stifling
of BPS/Sunbelt's ability to effectively compete with H & E in
the early stages of H & E's entrance into the markets at issue.
The considerable shift of BPS employees and customers to
H & E within a very short time period, the almost “instant”
H & E greenfield branches that sprung up, and the use of
certain BPS confidential information constitutes significant
circumstantial evidence that the “raid” of BPS was planned
and agreed to long in advance of its actual implementation.
{293} Plaintiff has shown sufficient circumstantial and direct
evidence of an overall plan by H & E and Hepler, Kline and
the other individual defendants, to cripple or eliminate BPS/
Sunbelt as a competitor in the AWP business in at least seven
markets. Many of the actions against BPS by the individual
defendants were taken while each was still employed there.
The strikingly similar pattern of taking the human resources
from the branches through a “pyramid” scheme and the
“secret” meetings held with Sunbelt employees supports
a finding that there was an agreement. These actions are
unlawful and constitute a conspiracy in furtherance of the acts
as described above.
{294} In light of the Court's findings of fact, and the laws
of North Carolina with respect to civil conspiracy, the Court
finds that defendants agreed among themselves, while most
were still employed by BPS, to do a lawful act-to compete and
solicit employees-in an unlawful way, and that defendants'
actions have caused significant damages to the plaintiff.
U.D.T.P.A. Damages and Attorney Fees
*58  {295} The Court concludes that BPS was damaged by
conduct that the Court has found to violate the U.D.T.P.A.
statute. Such conduct includes unfair actions of defendants
in using the BPS/Sunbelt branch managers and other BPS/
Sunbelt employees to recruit others to leave BPS/Sunbelt in
a coordinated departure to staff new offices of Hi-Lift.
{296} The amount of damages plaintiff has proven was
proximately caused by defendants' unlawful actions. See,
e.g., Process Components, Inc. v. Baltimore Aircoil Co., 89
N.C.App. 649, 652, 366 S.E.2d 907, 910 (1988) (finding that
where plaintiff proves damage, amount of damages is for jury
to decide).
{297} Sunbelt must show that the amount of damages it seeks
is based upon a standard that will allow the Court to calculate
the amount of damages with reasonable certainty, although
it is not required to prove them to a mathematical certainty.
McNamara v. Wilmington Mall Realty Corp, 121 N.C.App.
400, 407, 466 S.E.2d 324, 329 (1996) (citing Olivetti Corp. v.
Ames Business Sys., Inc., 319 N.C. 534, 547, 356 S.E.2d 578,
586 (1987)); see also Byrd's, 142 N.C.App. at 377, 542 S.E.2d
at 693 (finding that law requires that the evidence establish
a basis for the assessment of damages with a fair degree of
probability, but lost profits are to be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis).
{298} Plaintiff is entitled to receive damages that are the
natural and probable result of the defendant's illegal actions,
but they need not be exact. See Roane-Barker v. Southeastern
Hospital Supply Corp., 99 N.C.App. 30, 40, 392 S.E.2d 663,
669 (1990). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has said
that:
Where the [wrongful conduct] itself
is of such a nature as to preclude
the ascertainment of the amount of
damages with certainty, it would be a
perversion of fundamental principles
of justice to deny al. relief to the
injured person, and thereby relieve the
wrongdoer from making any amend
for his acts. In such case, while the
damages may not be determined by
mere speculation or guess, it will be
enough if the evidence shows the
extent of the damages as a matter of
just and reasonable inference, although
the result by only approximate. The
wrongdoer is not entitled to complain
that they cannot be measured with
the exactness and precision that would
be possible if the case, which he
alone is responsible for making, were
otherwise.
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Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Co., 282 U.S.
555 (1931).
{299} This is a unique fact situation unlikely to be replicated.
It is factually distinguishable from Dalton v. Camp and other
similar cases. See, e.g., Combs & Assocs. v. Kennedy, 147
N.C.App. 362, 555 S.E.2d 634 (2001); Dalton, 353 N.C.
647, 548 S.E.2d 704; Fletcher, Barnhardt & White, Inc. v.
Matthews, 100 N.C.App. 436, 397 S.E.2d 81. Defendants'
behavior was closer to that of the employees in Long v.
Vertical Technologies, Inc., 115 N.C.App. 598, 439 S.E.2d
797, than it was to the employee's behavior in Dalton.
*59  {300} In Long, an employer fired two employees after
discovering those employees had founded two companies
while employed. The employees did not fully disclose their
use of the employer's property to further the business of their
new companies. Plaintiff employees sued the employer for,
inter alia, wrongful discharge. After a bench trial, the trial
court found for the employer as to the wrongful discharge
claim and the employer's counterclaim for breach of loyalty
and fiduciary duty. When our Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's judgment, it stated:
Manifestly, when a servant becomes
engaged in a business which
necessarily renders him a competitor
and rival of his master, no matter how
much or how little time and attention
he devotes to it, he has an interest
against his duty. It would be monstrous
to hold that the master is bound to
retain the servant in his employment
after he has thus voluntarily put
himself in an attitude hostile to his
master's interests. (Citations omitted.)
Long, 115 N.C.App. at 604, 439 S.E.2d at 802 (quoting In re
Burris, 263 N.C. 793, 795, 140 S.E.2d 408, 410 (1965)).
{301} In the case before this Court, defendants deliberately
used key inside managers to orchestrate a plan of conversion
of employees that would have the known and desired impact
of disrupting BPS/Sunbelt's operations in a way that would
provide a competitive advantage for Hi-Lift as it jump-started
its new branches. The evidence in this record shows that,
pursuant to their unlawful plan, defendants used BPS's time,
resources, and trade secrets while they were still employees
of the plaintiff.
{302} One of the keys to profitability in the AWP business
is reaching a critical mass of business that can support
the overhead and maximize fleet usage. Hepler and Kline
were well aware of the need to get to that critical mass
quickly because BPS had commissioned a specific study
which showed the critical usage and revenue points at its
branches. They referenced that target point in their business
projections. Slowly building business through the usual
methods associated with greenfield operations would have
meant a significant delay in reaching the revenue and usage
targets necessary for profitability. The secret wholesale raid
on the BPS/Sunbelt employee base using the branch managers
was designed to and did minimize the time required to reach
the critical mass and was a key component in defendants' plan.
As a result, profitability was achieved at a rate far swifter
than the industry norm. The rapid achievement of high levels
of revenue also facilitated borrowing and negotiating with
equipment suppliers. Those factors provided the motivation
to secretly use the branch managers and others to carry out
the plan to convert the employee base and customer business
quickly and by surprise.
{303} The focus on hitting the key BPS branches before
a new owner could take control and make efforts to retain
the employees and customers explains the need to use the
branch managers to pre-position the departures. Nowhere was
that more evident than the last minute actions relating to
the Charlotte branch which occurred just before the Sunbelt
closing. It is a fair inference that Charlotte was left until
last because Mr. Hepler had the most confidence in the
commitment of his brother-in-law to make the changeover.
*60  {304} Plaintiff's damages are based in part on the
incremental profits it lost as a result of defendants' unethical
and unlawful conduct and in part on the expenses resulting
from the mass departures orchestrated by defendants. It is also
based in part on the benefit Hi-Lift received.
{305} BPS/Sunbelt was damaged by the conduct the Court
has found to violate the unfair trade practices statute. That
conduct took place in commerce. BPS/Sunbelt lost employees
it may not have otherwise lost. As a result, BPS/Sunbelt
incurred expense in hiring and training new employees. It lost
efficiency in its operation and lost business as a result of the
disruption to its business and the advantage created for Hi-
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Lift by having the old BPS salesmen out soliciting business
when BPS/Sunbelt had its sales force suddenly depleted. BPS/
Sunbelt thus experienced a loss of efficient use of its fleet for
a period of time until it could get trained sales people and
trained mechanics and drivers who could service its accounts.
BPS/Sunbelt lost business, incurred expenses and thus lost
profits as a result of defendants' unfair conduct. The majority
of the damage occurred at the Atlanta, Charlotte, Orlando
and Fort Myers-Tampa branches. The impact of the unfair
competition was minimal at the Texas branches but existed to
some extent.
{306} If the actions of the branch managers were not taken
with the intent of disrupting Sunbelt's business, they were
taken with the knowledge and callous disregard of the harm
they would cause. The Court finds the actions were intended
to disrupt Sunbelt's business.
{307} Conversely, Hi-Lift derived a substantial benefit
from its unfair conduct. It's acquisition of a trained work
force eliminated training costs and a learning curve for
new employees and produced a safer operation. It obtained
market information in the presence of the sales force,
customer contacts and relationships, information on customer
credit history, current pricing information, current fleet mix
information, and an instant “team” useful to the efficient
operation of an AWP rental business.
{308} Because of defendants' unlawful actions, Hi-Lift was
able to start greenfield operations at a significantly faster pace
and to appropriate the short-term business customers of BPS/
Sunbelt because of the disability created by the coordinated
mass departures. Hi-Lift created a profit of approximately
$3.4 million in its first year, a unique and remarkable result
attributable in large part to the wholesale appropriation of key
BPS/Sunbelt employees and the knowledge base they brought
with them.
{309} The damages which were proximately caused by
those actions included loss of trained employees, the cost of
replacing those employees, loss of customers and business
due to inefficient service resulting from the loss of staff, loss
of efficient use of its fleet in the affected branches, and general
business disruption.
{310} BPS/Sunbelt was a sufficiently large organization that
it could and did replace the lost employees, and its new
employees were trained and had the equipment and tools to
compete with Hi-Lift in the long run. Hi-Lift was entitled
to compete fairly with BPS/Sunbelt. The success that the
management team had at BPS was a clear indication of their
capability, and they had sufficient capital backing. In the
long term, it was clear that Hepler and Kline would provide
stiff competition. BPS could have protected itself against that
competition but did not. Accordingly, the Court finds that the
compensable damages are limited to the short-term period
of time and expenses it took BPS /Sunbelt to compensate
for the actions which the Court has found to be unfair. For
most of the positions, six months was an adequate period
of time to hire and train new employees and have them on
the job with competitive capabilities. Many could be hired
and trained quicker. At that point the companies were on a
fair competitive basis and it would not be unexpected that
Hi-Lift would take some market share from BPS/Sunbelt.
Therefore the Court has not attributed all lost customers to
unfair competition.
*61  {311} There has been significant evidence that many
of defendants' rentals made in its “new” markets were made
to the same customers and in the same geographic areas as
plaintiff's rentals would have been. See Roane-Barker, 99
N.C.App. at 40, 392 S.E.2d at 670. Since it could compete
lawfully, at least some of those sales would have been made
in any event. Accordingly, the Court has not accepted in full
the damage calculation proffered by plaintiff's expert.
{312} The clear prospect that Hi-Lift would have taken
some market share from BPS in their overlapping markets
combined with the overlap of unfair competition and trade
secret misappropriation makes the damage assessment more
complicated. As a matter of public policy, the Legislature
has endorsed that concept that damages can be determined
by actual loss to the plaintiff or unjust enrichment of the
defendant in the case of misappropriation of trade secrets. See
N.C.G.S. § 66-154. That policy is equally applicable where
the unfair trade practice and misappropriation claims: (1)
intermingle, (2) support both claims, and (3) cause damage.
For that reason, the Court has considered the profit derived by
Hi-Lift from its unusually rapid expansion and achievement
of profitability in the first year in determining damages.
{313} The plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of five
million dollars by the unfair trade practices of defendants.
This is the amount to be trebled in this case; it is the amount
the Court concludes represents the actual damages in this case
directly flowing from the Chapter 75 violations, including the
use of confidential business information. The damages are
based upon the number of employees unfairly appropriated
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by Hi-Lift, their value and the disruption and expense their
coordinated departures inflicted on BPS/Sunbelt, as well as
the benefit received by Hi-Lift. The damages result from
actions in the Atlanta, Charlotte, Orlando and Tampa-Fort
Myers markets for the most part, with some smaller allocation
for the Texas markets. The extent of the appropriation is set
out above in the Findings of Fact. The damages resulted from
the coordinated efforts of all the defendants which were part
of an overall strategy designed to hit BPS/Sunbelt during the
transition period before a transaction could be closed between
Rentokil and Sunbelt and to convert customers quickly to take
advantage of profitable fleet utilization.
{314} Plaintiff is also entitled to its attorney fees pursuant
to N.C.G.S. § 75-16.1 and § 66-152, and to treble damages
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 75-16 to -16.1 (“the presiding judge
may, in his discretion, allow a reasonable attorney fee to the
duly licensed attorney representing the prevailing party ...
upon a finding ... that: (1) The party charged with the violation
has willfully engaged in the act or practice, and there was an
unwarranted refusal by such party to fully resolve the matter
which constitutes the basis of such suit ....”); § 66-152 (“if
willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the court may
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party”); §
75-16 (“If any person shall be injured or the business of any ...
corporation shall be broken up ... or injured by reason of any
act or thing done by any other person, firm or corporation in
violation of the provisions of this Chapter, ... if damages are
assessed in such case judgment shall be rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the amount
fixed by the verdict.”).
Trade Secrets and Damages
*62  {315} The Court has also not dealt separately with
the damages for theft of trade secrets. There are several
reasons for that omission. First, while there is some direct
evidence of the purloining of documents or other written
confidential information, the reality is that Hi-Lift hired the
people from BPS/Sunbelt who had the expertise to run an
AWP business effectively and they hired the salesmen who
knew the customers and the market. Pricing information
was of fleeting long-term value as the market was intensely
competitive. Short-term pricing or special account pricing
was of more value. Most of the information about fleet usage
was in the heads of the key management people hired away.
They knew the essential needs to get up and running, and, if
they did not, the salesmen who were hired knew the customer
requirements. Undoubtedly there were instances in which Hi-
Lift salesmen simply charged what they knew the customer
was paying BPS/Sunbelt, but the customer was free to provide
them with that information in any event.
{316} The damages resulting from the use of trade secrets
also were subsumed in the damages the Court has found to
flow from the unfair competition. It was the orchestrated
and deceptive solicitation of the employees who possessed
the key information and value that caused the damages. The
information on utilization rates by market, average rental
rates by market, and customer information, including credit
worthiness, constituted information which one or more of
the individuals hired by Hi-Lift carried in their heads and
were a part of their work experience. The total usurpation of
that knowledge base by unfairly using insiders created the
specific liability and damage. The use of the branch managers
and department heads to recruit other “A Team” players
could only have been accomplished by the use of confidential
information about their skills and pay levels. Each employee
unfairly solicited by defendants brought with him or her a
piece of the BPS information bank needed to convert the
customer base to Hi-Lift, at least on a short-term basis.
It is clear that defendants did not “independently develop”
the information used when each branch was started. There
is no evidence that market surveys, pricing trend analyses,
trade information, employee interviews, advertisements for
employees or upcoming construction work information was
gathered by anyone at H & E in any of the new markets.
Rather, all that information was readily available because of
the orchestrated changeover of BPS employees to Hi-Lift.
Laches
{317} The Court must also examine the defendants' defense
of laches, as presented in this case.
{318} The Court finds plaintiff's claims are not barred by
laches.
{319} The doctrine of laches requires a showing that: (1)
the petitioner negligently failed to assert an enforceable right
within a reasonable period of time, and (2) the propounder
of the doctrine was prejudiced by the delay in bringing the
action. Costin v. Shell, 53 N.C.App. 117, 120, 280 S.E.2d 42,
44 (1981) (citing Builders Supplies v. Gainey, 282 N.C. 261,
192 S.E.2d 449 (1972); Rape v. Lyerly, 287 N.C. 601, 215
S.E.2d 737 (1975)).
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*63  {320} Laches is an equitable defense and is not
available in actions at law; therefore plaintiff's legal claims
should not be barred by laches. Coppersmith v. Upton, 228
N.C. 545, 548, 46 S .E.2d 565, 566 (1948) (quoting U.S. v.
Mack, 295 U.S. 480 (1935)) (“The doctrine of laches ... is
ordinarily regarded as an equitable defense, and it has been
held that the plea is not tenable in a court of law and on
a legal demand, ‘the court being governed by the statute of
limitations.’ ”)
{321} Laches is an affirmative defense and the burden of
proof is on the party who pleads it. Taylor v. Raleigh, 290 N.C.
608, 622, 227 S.E.2d 576, 584 (1976).
{322} The facts and evidence show that the effects of
defendants' plan did not emerge until months after Hepler and
Kline's departure.
{323} Plaintiff did not delay in initiating its lawsuit; it did
so as soon as defendants' plans were clear and when Sunbelt
took over at a closing of the purchase transaction. Defendants,
fully aware of BPS's transitional period between execution of
the contract and closing, took full advantage of it.
{324} Defendants cannot show that they were prejudiced by
plaintiff's alleged delay in the initiation of the lawsuit.
{325} The statute of limitations applicable to a
misappropriation of trade secrets claim is three years.
N.C.G.S. § 66-157. Plaintiff commenced this action well
before the expiration of this period. See, e.g., Creech v.
Creech, 222 N.C. 656, 663, 24 S.E.2d 642, 647 (1943).
Counterclaims
{326} In its counterclaim, Defendant H & E has alleged
among other things that Sunbelt “resented H & E's lawful
success,” “wanted to avoid having to compete with H & E
for employees and customers,” that “[Sunbelt's complaint]
allegations are patently false,” and that therefore this action is
a “sham, filed solely for purposes of interfering with H & E's
relationships with its employees, customers and vendors.”
{327} H & E further alleges that Sunbelt, by filing a lawsuit,
“unlawfully sought to intimidate, harass and scare smaller
H & E into wasting its resources and ceasing to lawfully
recruit and hire Sunbelt's employees, pursue customers and
otherwise compete with Sunbelt.”
{328} Defendant H & E's allegations in its counterclaims are
not supported by the evidence. The findings of fact recited
above are more than sufficient to justify the filing of a lawsuit.
Moreover, Defendant H & E has not produced evidence that it
was prevented from pursuing, recruiting and hiring Sunbelt's
employees, pursuing customers and otherwise competing
with Sunbelt. To the contrary, the significant evidence is
that Defendant H & E in fact continued and continues to
hire Sunbelt employees, has enjoyed remarkable success with
customers and has been extraordinarily profitable in short
order.
{329} The Court must also determine the fate of Defendant
H & E's counterclaim against plaintiff, which alleges that the
filing of this lawsuit by Sunbelt is a “sham,” and was done
solely for the purpose of interfering with H & E's relationships
with its employees, customers and vendors in violation of
N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.
*64  {330} Initially, the Court notes that Sunbelt's claims
are immunized by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which
is derived from the First Amendment right to petition the
government and immunizes legislative, executive and judicial
activity from antitrust liability, even if the activity is designed
to eliminate competition. See, e.g., United Mine Workers
of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (holding that
exercising the right to seek redress from the courts is immune
from claims under state and federal anti-competitive statutes
alleging injury resulting from the mere prosecution of the
lawsuit).
{331} Sunbelt has a constitutional right to seek judicial
redress of its injuries. Sunbelt's allegations in the Complaint
were well grounded in law and fact, and the evidence
presented at trial has shown that defendants orchestrated
mass resignations of managers and employees of BPS and
diverted business to H & E's new offices using confidential
and proprietary information of BPS. Sunbelt has stated valid
claims and, as a matter of law, cannot be held liable under
Chapter 75 for any incidental effects the lawsuit may have
had on H & E Hi-Lift's business. See, e.g., Static Control
Components, Inc. v. Darkprint Imaging, Inc., 2001 WL
293661 (M.D.N.C., Feb. 9, 2001); Merck & Co., Inc. v.
Lyon, 941 F.Supp. 1443, 1447 (M.D.N.C.1996); Byrd's, 142
N.C.App. 371, 542 S.E.2d 689.
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{332} Therefore, in light of the findings of fact as set forth
above, the Court concludes that Sunbelt brought this suit with
the realistic expectation that its claims would succeed against
the defendants, that the suit was “reasonably calculated
to elicit a favorable outcome,” and that therefore the suit
is immunized under the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. See
Baltimore Scrap Corp. v. The David Joseph Co., 237 F.3d
394 (4th Cir.2001) (“If an objective party can conclude that
the suit is reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable outcome,
the suit is immunized under Noerr, and an antitrust claim
premised on the sham exception must fail.”).
{333} Nevertheless, the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine does
contain a “sham” exception, and, in order to determine
whether Defendant H & E can succeed on its counterclaim,
the Court must determine if it has met the two prongs of that
exception: (1) whether H & E has shown that no reasonable
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits of the
claims involved here; and (2) whether H & E has shown that
Sunbelt subjectively lacked a reasonable belief that it could
succeed on the merits and brought this case for an improper
or malicious purpose. See Professional Real Estate Investors,
Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993)
(“PRE ”).
{334} Defendants have presented no facts or evidence to
show that Sunbelt subjectively believed the lawsuit was
anything but a valid and legal claim for damages caused by
the defendants. Certainly there has been no evidence that
this lawsuit was brought for any improper purpose. See also,
United States v. Ward, 618 F.Supp. 884 (E.D.N.C.1985) (“A
party to a lawsuit has a right to use the procedures of the courts
to advocate its position, even if such activities cause direct
injuries to competitors.... Only actions undertaken without a
genuine intent to influence the outcome of the dispute being
adjudicated are a sham.”)
*65  {335} Furthermore, defendants have not presented
evidence showing that the lawsuit is objectively baseless, or
a “sham.” Sunbelt's evidence of H & E's wrongful actions has
been detailed and specific. As set forth above in the Court's
findings of fact, Sunbelt has shown sufficient evidence for
the Court to find defendants liable to Sunbelt for damages on
its claims. Therefore, it follows that Defendant H & E has
shown no evidence that Sunbelt's allegations are objectively
baseless. PRE, 508 U.S. at 60. As such, H & E's counterclaim
must be dismissed.
{336} For the reasons set forth above, Defendant H & E's
counterclaim fails and is therefore dismissed.
III.
CONCLUSION
{337} The Court concludes that the application of treble
damages is appropriate in this case. It is necessary to prevent
defendants and others from profiting from unfair practices.
Defendants' actions were deliberate and taken to gain business
advantage. Rather than compete in a fair manner, defendants
orchestrated the clandestine raid of BPS by the branch
managers while the sale to Sunbelt was still pending. The
massive nature of the raid facilitated the achievement of
the critical mass necessary for profitability. Defendants
have benefited from their actions, establishing a viable
and profitable business overnight. While they would likely
have been successful in the long run, their unfair practices
accelerated and enhanced their success. The imposition of
treble damages where unfair actions are taken to maximize
profits serves the specific purpose for which the treble
damage provisions were enacted. The fact that defendants
tried to hide their actions by providing less than truthful
testimony has also contributed to the Court's decision.
{338} Final judgment will not be entered in this matter until
any motion for attorney fees has been heard. Plaintiff will
have thirty days from today's date to file a motion for attorney
fees with supporting documentation, and defendants will have
thirty days after service to respond. The Court will then enter
a judgment.
All Citations
Not Reported in S.E.2d, 2003 WL 21017456, 2003 NCBC 4
Footnotes
1 Bruckman, Rosser and Sherrill (“BRS”) is an equity investment partnership.
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2 The sale of Plant Services is discussed more fully elsewhere in this opinion.
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Opinion
ROCHE, J.
*1  In this appraisal action, the court is asked to determine
the “fair value” of certain shares of common stock pursuant
General Statutes §§ 33–855(4) and 33–871.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 4, 2006, the plaintiff, Torrington Research
Company (hereinafter the company), a closely held
corporation, commenced this appraisal action against the
defendants, Michael D. Marvin, Lee Newberg, Heidi
Newberg and Nancy Lawson, by filing a petition with this
court. In its petition, the company alleges the following. On
April 8, 2006, and at all pertinent times, Heidi Newberg, Lee
Newberg, Michael Marvin and Nancy Lawson owned 51,200,
51,200, 204,167 and 5000 shares of the company's common
stock, respectively. The company notified its shareholders on
April 8, 2006, of a meeting that was to be held on April
19, 2006, “for the purpose of considering and authorizing
the company to sell substantially all” of its assets pursuant
to a written asset purchase agreement with the Bergquist
Torrington Company (hereinafter Bergquist), a wholly owned
subsidiary of the Bergquist Company. In that notice, the
company provided its opinion that the proposed action would
give rise to appraisal rights. As a result, the defendants and at
least two other parties gave notice of their intention to seek
appraisal rights. 1  At the special meeting, the shareholders
approved the sale of “substantially all” of the company's
assets to Bergquist, and on April 21, 2006, the sale occurred.
On approximately May 1, 2006, the company served each
defendant with an appraisal notice, and on July 12, 2006,
it paid the defendants a sum equal to its estimate of the
fair value of each share of the common stock. The company
estimated the fair value at one cent, and thus, Heidi Newberg,
Lee Newberg, Michael Marvin and Nancy Lawson were
paid $524 .80, $524.80, $2092.72 and $51.25, respectively.
The company also provided the defendants with financial
information when it paid out its estimation of the fair value
of the common stock.
On July 24, 2006, the defendants gave notice of their
“dissatisfaction with the amount of the payment, rejected the
offer and demanded payment of their stated estimate of the
fair value of the shares,” which they allege is $1.75 per share.
As of the date of the filing of this petition, the parties were
unable to agree upon the fair value of the company's common
stock. 2  Thus, pursuant to General Statutes § 33–871, the
company instituted this action and petitioned the court to
determine the fair value of the shares pursuant to General
Statutes §§ 33–855 through 33–872 and to enter a judgment
for the “amount, if any by which the court finds the fair value
of the defendant shareholders' shares, plus interest, exceed[s]
the amount” already paid to the defendants.
Pursuant to § 33–871(d), this case was tried to the court
without a jury on September 16, September 17, September
18 and October 29, 2009. 3  At trial, the parties submitted
numerous exhibits, and the court heard testimony from
Peter Turner, James Plewacki, Roger Dickinson and Heidi
Newberg. 4  Neither the company nor the defendants called
expert witnesses to testify as to appropriate valuation
methods. On November 20, 2009, and November 23, 2009,
respectively, the company and the defendants filed proposed
findings of fact and post-trial memoranda. On December
11, 2009, the defendants filed a reply to the company's
proposed findings of fact and supporting memorandum, and
on December 16, 2009, the court heard post-trial arguments.
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*2  In Welsh v. Independent Bank & Trust Co., 1 Conn.App.
14, 467 A.2d 941 (1983), cert. denied, 192 Conn. 801, 470
A.2d 1218 (1984), the only appellate level case in Connecticut
that discusses the fair value of stock in an appraisal action, the
court noted: “The basic concept of value under the appraisal
statute ... is that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for
that which has been taken from him ... his proportionate
interest in a going concern. This is the true or intrinsic
value of this stock which has been taken by the merger ...
In determining fair value, a court may rely on a legally
recognized measure of value which is supported by the
subordinate facts. No single method of valuation will control
in all cases ... It is within the discretion of the trier of fact
to select the most appropriate method of valuation under the
facts properly found by him ... Valuation is a matter of fact
to be determined by the trier's independent judgment of what
is just compensation. Thus, valuation rests largely within the
discretion of the lower court.” 5  (Citations omitted; emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 16–17, 467
A.2d 941.
Although the Appellate Court decided Welsh before the
legislature adopted the definition of fair value, in § 33–855(4),
the current statutes provide discretion to the trier of fact as
it determines fair value. Section 33–871 provides in relevant
part: “(a) If a shareholder makes demand for payment under
section 33–868 which remains unsettled, the corporation shall
commence a proceeding within sixty days after receiving the
payment demand and petition the court to determine the fair
value of the shares and accrued interest ... (d) The jurisdiction
of the court in which the proceeding is commenced ... is
plenary and exclusive. The court may appoint one or more
persons as appraisers to receive evidence and recommend a
decision on the question of fair value. The appraisers shall
have the powers described in the order appointing them, or
in any amendment to it ... There shall be no right to a jury
trial. (e) Each shareholder made a party to the proceeding
is entitled to judgment (1) for the amount, if any, by which
the court finds the fair value of the shareholder's shares, plus
interest, exceeds the amount paid by the corporation to the
shareholder for such shares, or (2) for the fair value, plus
interest, of the shareholder's shares for which the corporation
elected to withhold payment under section 33–867.”
The applicable definition of fair value is found in § 33–
855(4) and provides: “Fair value means the value of the
corporation's shares determined: (A) Immediately before the
effectuation of the corporate action to which the shareholder
objects, (B) using customary and current valuation concepts
and techniques generally employed for similar businesses in
the context of the transaction requiring appraisal, and (C)
without discounting for lack of marketability or minority
status except, if appropriate, for amendments to the certificate
of incorporation pursuant to subdivision (5) of subsection (a)
of section 33–856.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
*3  The Supreme Court has identified at least two valuation
methods of closely held businesses in other contexts. “While
there are several different methods by which to determine
the value of a closely-held corporation, these methods, and
their variants, are of two general types: (1) capitalization of
earnings, or the net present value of a future income stream;
and (2) net asset value, or the present sale price of the business
assets less its liabilities ... While these alternate methods of
valuation frequently yield different results ... they purport
at least in theory to obtain the same object, i.e., the market
value of the business. That different methods of valuation may
yield different results, depending upon what exactly is being
valued, does not mean that the results of the alternate methods
can simply be summed to determine total value. One or the
other, or the combined weighted average of each, will produce
the best approximation of market value.” (Citations omitted.)
West Haven Sound Development Corporation v. West Haven,
201 Conn. 305, 329–30, 514 A.2d 734 (1986).
Connecticut's definition of fair value is derived from the
Model Business Corporation Act's definition of fair value,
which was adopted in Public Acts 2001, No. 01–199, §
15. The act's official comments indicate that its drafters
endorse similar, if not identical, valuation approaches to those
recognized by the Supreme Court. The comments provide in
relevant part: “[F]air value is to be determined immediately
before the effectuation of the corporate action, rather than, as
is the case under most state statutes that address this issue, the
date of the shareholders' vote. This comports with the purpose
of this chapter to preserve the shareholder's prior rights as a
shareholder until the effective date of the corporate action,
rather than leaving the shareholder in an ambiguous state with
neither rights as a shareholder nor [perfected] appraisal rights.
The corporation and, as relevant, its shares are valued as they
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exist immediately before the effectuation of the corporate
action requiring appraisal. Accordingly, [the definition of fair
value] permits consideration of changes in the market price
of the corporation's shares in anticipation of the transaction,
to the extent such changes are relevant. Similarly, in a two-
step transaction culminating in a merger, the corporation is
valued immediately before the second step merger, taking into
account any interim changes in value ... The new formulation
in paragraph ii [which corresponds with § 33–855(4)(B)
], which is patterned on section 7.22 of the Principles of
Corporate Governance promulgated by the American Law
Institute, directs courts to keep the methodology chosen
in appraisal proceedings consistent with evolving economic
concepts ...
“Modern valuation methods will normally result in a range
of values [rather than a] particular single value. When a
transaction falls within that range, ‘fair-value’ has been
established. Absent unusual circumstances, it is expected
that the consideration in an arm's length transaction will
fall within the range of ‘fair value ’ ... Section 7.22 of the
ALI Principles of Corporate Governance also provides that
in situations that do not involve certain types of specified
conflicts of interest, the aggregate price accepted by the
board of directors of the subject corporation should be
presumed to represent the fair value of the corporation,
or of the assets sold in the case of an asset sale unless
the plaintiff can prove otherwise by clear and convincing
evidence. That presumption has not been included in the
definition of fair value ... because the framework of defined
types of conflict transactions which is a predicate for the ALI's
presumption is not contained in the Model Act. Nonetheless ...
a court determining fair value should give great deference
to the aggregate consideration accepted or approved by a
disinterested board of directors for an appraisal-triggering
transaction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis
added.) Model Business Corporation Act (American Bar
Association) § 13.01(4), official comment (2008).
II
THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
*4  The company argues, inter alia, that the definition
of fair value in § 33–855(4) precludes the court from
considering the value of any appreciation or depreciation
arising out of the transaction to which the dissenting
shareholders object. The company argues that the statute
precludes any adjustment for appreciation or depreciation
because the definition of fair value is based on the time
period “immediately before” the transaction to which the
dissenting or minority shareholders object, which, in this
case, is Bergquist's purchase of substantially all of the
plaintiff's assets. Moreover, the company argues, “value must
be taken to mean what the shares would be worth if the
proposed change in the corporation had not occurred.” Thus,
the dissenting shareholders are entitled to the fair value of
their interest in the specific “going concern” that existed
before the transaction to which they object and no more.
Although the company recognizes that the court has broad
discretion in choosing a valuation method, it notes that
the following factors are generally considered appropriate
when determining the fair value of shares: earnings record,
earnings prospect, capitalization of its earnings, dividend
record, rate of dividends, probability/likelihood of future
earnings and dividends, accumulated surplus earnings, the
“basic condition” of the corporation, the market value of its
stock, reserves for contingencies and requirements for and
availability of working capital, value of assets, book value,
liabilities, net asset value and liquidation value.
Additionally, the company argues, a threshold issue for the
court is whether it was a “going concern.” Since Connecticut
has adopted the “going concern” standard, the company
argues that “those methods of valuation geared to valuing
a going business rather than those geared to valuing assets
and liabilities in a theoretical liquidation circumstance would
seem most appropriate.” Moreover, the company argues,
it was not a “going concern” as of April 21, 2006, since
evidence and testimony reveal that it was insolvent and
without significant earnings, but for the asset sale with
Bergquist. In fact, the company argues, it would have filed for
bankruptcy if the asset sale had not occurred. Even if there is
evidence to support the fact that the company was a “going
concern,” the company argues that the “generally accepted
factors” used in going concern valuations “negate any claim
that [the company] had a positive value.” 6  Thus, if the court
finds that the company was a “going concern,” the company
suggests that a “reliable factor” upon which the court may use
to determine the fair value of the stock is “the price paid by
[Bergquist] for substantially all of the assets of [the company]
plus the value of the assets retained by [the company] less the
total amount of liabilities that [the company] had on April 21,
2006.”
In the defendants' post-trial memorandum, they also note that
the trial court has the discretion to accept certain testimony
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and valuation methods. Regarding the company's case, the
defendants note that the company failed to provide any expert
opinion on valuation and instead relied on “self-serving
testimony of ‘insiders' who benefitted from the dilution of
value in the asset sale to justify the penny a share valuation.”
In contrast, the defendants rely on “historical prices” to
estimate the fair value of the stock. The defendants also rely
on General Statutes § 33–900 to argue that the court may
take wrongful conduct into account when determining “fair
value.” The defendants claim that the company cannot refute
the historical trend of the stock prices and suggest that Peter
Turner's testimony that the company would have filed for
bankruptcy in lieu of the asset sale is nothing more than “rank
speculation.” The defendants also claim that the company
chose to ignore over six million dollars in assets allegedly
reported to the Internal Revenue Service in 2006, which it had
before the asset sale. Moreover, the defendants claim that the
one cent valuation is “simply unrealistic” because it suggests
that the company “could be purchased in its entirety for less
money at that value than the price paid for the assets actually
sold.” Additionally, the defendants claim, the company failed
to produce evidence at trial to justify “why Bergquist would
overpay so much for its assets,” and there is “no objective
evidence ... that the company faced bankruptcy in 2006 any
more than it did in 2004, when it sold its shares for [sixty-five
cents per share].”
*5  The defendants also characterize the company's
bankruptcy claim as an “obvious and disingenuous attempt to
distract the court from the fact that [the company] chose to
structure a sales transaction that assured it lacked liquidity to
pay the defendants ‘fair value’ for their shares after the asset
sale, which explains the penny valuation.” The defendants
claim that the company had “no intention of raising sufficient
funds to avoid the asset sale” as of January 2006, the
company did not seek out buyers other than Bergquist, and
the fair value of the stock was “diluted” as a result of
“dealing with an insider like Bergquist beginning in 2005, as
opposed to a neutral buyer in the open market place.” The
defendants argue that the company's officers let Bergquist
control the terms of the asset sale because those officers would
receive substantial benefits as a result of the sale, unlike the
defendants. Although the defendants' assertion that the one
cent valuation is inconsistent with the historical trend of the
share prices, they argue that even if the company's internal
balance sheet is accurate, there is no reasonable basis for the
one cent valuation, which they claim is thirteen cents a share
under the net asset valuation methodology. 7  The defendants
also allege that the company's transaction with Bergquist “has
all the indicia of a fraudulent transfer” under General Statutes
§ 52–552e.
In a post-trial rebuttal memorandum dated December 11,
2009, the company argues, inter alia, that there is no evidence
to support claims that any alleged, “self-serving” transactions
impacted the fair value of the stock. On December 15,
2009, the defendants filed a reply memorandum in which
they argue, inter alia, that the company ignores central
concepts of “fairness” and “equity” that are essential to
Connecticut's appraisal right statutes. The defendants urge the
court to reject the company's various accounting principles
because those methods were not explained through expert
witness testimony, which the defendants claim is required.
The defendants note: “In essence, [the company] is asking
this court to do what no court has done in the past
twenty years; find that minority shareholders' stock had
no value immediately before the asset sale where the
majority shareholders reaped valuable hidden benefits in the
transaction.” The defendants urge the court to find that the fair
value of the stock is not less than eight cents per share, before
accounting for the company's alleged wrongful conduct.
III
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & FINDINGS OF FACT
A
Going Concern
Based on the applicable legal standards, the court agrees with
the company's conclusion that a threshold determination is
whether the company was of a “going concern” immediately
before the effectuation of the corporate action to which
the defendants object. Given that the Supreme Court has
recognized that a “going concern value ... has been sometimes
used to broadly encompass all those factors which contribute
to the value of the enterprise apart from its physical assets”;
Gray Line Bus Co. v. Greater Bridgeport Transit District,
188 Conn. 417, 422, 449 A.2d 1036 (1982); the court
concludes that the company was of a “going concern.”
This conclusion is based on various testimony adduced at
trial. Peter Turner, who was involved in the asset sale,
testified that the company was a “synergistic” counterpart
to Bergquist and that Bergquist saw potential value in the
company's developing technology, which is one of the reasons
- 557 - 
Torrington Research Co. v. Marvin, Not Reported in A.2d (2010)
2010 WL 1667580
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5
Bergquist was interested in acquiring the company's assets.
Specifically, Turner testified that “Bergquist had a strong
interest in our technology ... because of the synergies of
the two products. They had, prior to these discussions,
made an investment in the company, because they liked the
technology substantially.” Additionally, Turner testified that
“Bergquist, just like [the company's] officers and directors
and employees, realized that there was a technology that had
a lot of potential, but we had not been able to capitalize
or commercialize that potential. Bergquist didn't know if
they could capitalize on commercializing that potential, but
they were willing to take that risk.” James Plewacki testified
that Bergquist was “purchasing the business ... with the
assumption that we were going to run it forward as a going
concern.” Plewacki also testified that there may have been
some “nominal value” in the company's patents, and that the
licensing agreement that Bergquist had with the company,
which dated back to August, 2005, “tapped the expertise
of the [company's] employees.” Finally, Plewacki responded
affirmatively when asked whether the primary reason or
asset that Bergquist was interested in was the company's key
employees. All of this testimony collectively establishes that
the company had value apart from its physical assets. As a
result, the company was of a “going concern” immediately
before the asset sale.
B
Fair Value
*6  Since the court has concluded that the company was
of a “going concern,” the next question is the appropriate
valuation method and the fair value of the stock at issue.
Both parties concede that the court has the discretion to
choose the most appropriate valuation based on the facts
found at trial. Although the parties spend a great deal of
time arguing as to whether either side was required to put
on expert testimony at trial, nothing in the applicable statutes
requires either party to put on expert testimony. Moreover,
although the company argues that the defendants have the
burden of proving that the fair value of the stock is contrary
to the company's determination, it does not advance binding
legal authority to support such a conclusion. Furthermore, the
applicable statutes do not support this theory. Accordingly,
the court is left to determine the fair value of the stock based
on the evidence and testimony submitted at trial and the facts
found. 8
At the outset, it is noted that regardless of the valuation
method chosen, the court will not take §§ 33–900 and 52–
552e into account in determining the fair value of stock
in this appraisal action, despite the defendants' arguments
otherwise. The defendants rely on these statutes to argue that
the court should take the company's “wrongful conduct” into
account when determining fair value. Appraisal actions are
governed by §§ 33–855 through 33–872. Section 33–900
governs fair value in the context of a dissolution action, not
an appraisal action. Moreover, that section does not include
a definition of fair value, unlike the appraisal section of the
General Statutes. Additionally, § 52–552e, which pertains
to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, is also irrelevant
in the present matter. The defendants presented minimal,
if any, evidence from which the court can conclude that
fraudulent activity was behind or implicated in the valuation
or the asset sale. Aside from Heidi Newberg's testimony,
during which she suggested that the company's valuation was
suspect and questioned the motivations behind the asset sale,
the defendants never presented documentation or any other
evidence from which the court may find that self-dealing or
fraudulent activity was involved in the company's valuation
of its stock or the asset sale. Instead, the defendants discussed
these concepts in their post-trial memoranda. The court will
not infer fraud or self-dealing in the absence of credible
evidence.
Even if the court refuses to find wrongful conduct in the
company's assessment of fair value, this does not mean that
the court must accept the company's conclusion as to the
stock's fair value. As already noted by the parties, the court
has the discretion to chose the most appropriate valuation
based on the facts found in this case. 9  Thus, based on the
following exhibits, as well as supporting Connecticut case
law, the official comments to the Model Business Corporation
Act and the parties' recognition of this valuation method,
the court concludes that the “net asset value” method, or
the sale price of the business assets less its liabilities, is the
most appropriate valuation method in the present matter. In
determining the company's “net asset value,” the court relies
on the following exhibits, which are probative: plaintiff's
exhibit 1 (the February 8, 2006 letter from Bergquist to the
company outlining the terms of the asset sale), plaintiff's
exhibit 4 (the asset purchase agreement between the company
and Bergquist), plaintiff's exhibit 9 (the July 12, 2006 letters
from the company to the defendants), plaintiff's exhibit
20 (the company's income statement for periods ending
December 31, 2004, December 31, 2005 and April 21, 2006;
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the company's balance sheets for the same period; and a
statement of changes in the shareholders' equity from January
1, 2005 through April 21, 2006), and the defendant's exhibit Y
(the 2006 corporate tax return). Additionally, the court relies
on I.R.S. form 8594, which is included in defendant's exhibit
Y, in which the plaintiff asserts that the total value of the assets
transferred from the company to Bergquist was $6,881,851.
The court concludes that this sale price includes the value
of the earnout provision in the asset purchase agreement.
Moreover, the court relies on the balance sheet contained
within the plaintiff's exhibit 9 (the July 12, 2006 letters from
the company to the defendants) in which the company's total
liabilities are stated at $6,306,411. It is undisputed that the
number of outstanding shares of stock immediately before the
sale to Bergquist was 6,838,531 shares. Thus, the asset value
coincides with the sale price as indicated in I.R.S. Form 8594.
CONCLUSION
*7  As a result of these probative exhibits, the court
concludes that the sale price ($6,881.851) of the company,
less its liabilities ($6,306,411) before the sale date and divided
by the number of outstanding shares (6,838,531) results in a
per share price of $.084 dollars per share. Thus, the value of
Heidi Newberg's 51,200 shares is $4300.80, the value of Lee
Newberg's 51,200 shares is $4300.80, the value of Michael
Marvin's 204,167 shares is $17,150.028 and the value of
Nancy Lawson's 5000 shares is $420. See addendum. Finally,
the court must include 8% statutory interest for each year, per
General Statute § 37.1. The asset sale occurred on April 21,
2006, almost four years ago. As a result, this adds: $1376.29
in interest to Heidi Newberg's shares, bringing her total stock
value to $5677.80; $1376.29 in interest to Lee Newberg's
shares, bringing his total stock value to $5677.80; $5488.01
in interest to Michael Marvin's shares, bringing his total stock
value to $22,638.04; and $134.40 to Nancy Lawson's shares,
bringing her total stock value to $554.40. See addendum. It
is noted that the company has already paid Heidi Newberg,
Lee Newberg, Michael Marvin and Nancy Lawson, $524.80,
$524.80, $2092.72 and $51.25, respectively. Thus, the fair
value, as found here, must be reduced by these amounts.
As a result, Heidi Newberg, Lee Newberg, Michael Marvin
and Nancy Lawson are entitled to an additional $5152.29,
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Footnotes
1 The other parties were: 1) John Haller; and 2) the estate of Stephen Marks and Abbie Marks. The estate of
Stephen Marks and Abbie Marks filed a timely withdrawal of its intention to exercise its appraisal rights. The
company paid John Haller $358.60 for the fair value of his stock. Haller is not named as a defendant because
he “has given no notice of dissatisfaction with the amount of payment received, not rejected the offer of July
12, 2006, nor demanded payment of any sum other than that tendered.”
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2 Specifically, the company alleges, the parties were unable to agree on the fair value of the stock immediately
before “and independently of the sale of substantially all of its assets to [Bergquist],” thereby suggesting that
the court should not take the Bergquist sale into account, in any way, in determining fair value.
3 Section 33–871(d) provides in relevant part: “There shall be no right to a jury trial.”
4 Turner was called as a witness by both the company and the defendants. Turner testified that, at the time of
trial, his only relationship with the company was as a shareholder. During the asset sale, however, Turner
was the company's president, chief operating officer and chief financial officer. Turner left the company in
2008 and sold his shares for seventy-five cents per share. The company called Plewacki as a witness, and
he testified that he is a senior vice president and the chief financial officer of Bergquist. The defendants
called Dickinson as a witness, and he testified that he was the chief executive officer, chairman and one of
the founding members of the company. The defendants also called Heidi Newberg, one of the defendants.
Newberg testified that she never worked for the company or Bergquist and that she is employed as a professor
of physics and astronomy. Newberg testified that she and the other defendants invested in the company
because her brother, Russell Marvin, was the company's chief technology officer at one point in time.
5 “[G]oing concern value, [is] a term which has sometimes been used broadly to encompass all those factors
which contribute to the value of the enterprise apart from its physical assets.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Gray Line Bus Co. v. Greater Bridgeport Transit District, 188 Conn. 417, 422, 449 A.2d 1036 (1982).
6 Specifically, the company argues: 1) it had no earnings for the years preceding April 21, 2006; 2) there is no
evidence that it ever paid a dividend to its shareholders; 3) since no dividend was paid, there is no evidence
of a rate that can be utilized to establish any value; 4) actual earnings were less than the expenses incurred
throughout the five-year period preceding April 21, 2006; 5) in the first quarter of 2006, the company was
without the financial resources to raise capital, make payroll, pay rent or to fund the performance of its then
outstanding contracts; 6) in the absence of actual positive earnings, there is no capitalization factor that,
applied to positive earnings, can produce a positive value; 7) the likelihood of accumulated surplus earnings
as of April 21, 2006, was negative if that likelihood was to be based on actual past earnings and dividends
paid; 8) the accumulated surplus earnings for the company were negative between 2002, and December 31,
2005; 9) the company's ability to sustain its operation for the five-year period prior to April 21, 2005, was
dependent upon its ability to obtain loans and equity investments, and the company was unable to raise any
equity from its January 6, 2006 stock offering, which also precluded the company from borrowing; 10) the
company's current liabilities exceeded its assets, and the company had no reserves for contingencies; and
11) the “basic condition” of the company from December 31, 2003 through April 21, 2006, was that it was on
the verge of “going under,” which the defendants allegedly concede.
7 The defendants define the “net asset value” from Black's Law Dictionary, as “the market value of a share in a
mutual fund, computed by deducting any liabilities of the fund from its total assets and dividing the difference
by the number of outstanding fund shares.” Black's Law Dictionary (9th Ed.2009).
8 Although Connecticut courts have not addressed the burden of proof in appraisal actions, one Delaware court
has noted that: “In a statutory appraisal proceeding, both sides have the burden of proving their respective
valuation positions by a preponderance of the evidence ... If neither party satisfies its burden, however, the
court must then use its own independent judgment to determine fair value.” Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular
Holding Co., Inc., 2004 WL 2271592 (Del.Ch. Sept.30, 2004), aff'd, 880 A.2d 206 (Del.2005).
9 It is interesting to note, however, that in their briefs, both the company and the defendants identify a valuation
method that is akin to the Supreme Court's “net asset value.” The company recognizes that “the market value
of its stock ... [the] value of assets, [the] book value, liabilities, [and the] net asset value” are all factors that
the court may consider in valuing the stock of a closely held business in an appraisal action. Additionally,
the company suggests that a “reliable factor” upon which the court may use to determine the fair value of
the stock is “the price paid by [Bergquist] for substantially all of the assets of [the company] plus the value of
the assets retained by [the company] less the total amount of liabilities that [the company] had on April 21,
2006.” Likewise, the defendants identify the “net asset value” method, as defined in Black's Law Dictionary,
in their post-trial memorandum.
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* The interest owed was calculated by multiplying the total amount of the shares at $.084 by 8% over four
years (April 2006–April 2010).
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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ORDER
Robert E. Payne, Senior Judge
*1  Having reviewed EQT ENERGY, LLC'S MOTION
TO EXCLUDE OPINIONS OF GEORGE BRIDEN AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT (Docket No. 36), the
response and the reply briefs, and having reviewed the report
at issue, the Court finds as follows:
(1) The report is difficult to analyze because it lumps together
factual assertions and opinions;
(2) The last sentence of the first paragraph and the entirety of
the second paragraph under the heading “2. The LOI” express
opinions on the intent of the parties and that is an improper
subject for expert opinion evidence;
(3) The first paragraph under the heading “3. Opinions” is
argument and will not be helpful to the finder of the fact in
deciding a fact in issue or in understanding the evidence;
(4) The second paragraph under the heading “3. Opinions”
expresses opinions on the intent of the parties and that is an
improper subject for expert opinion evidence;
(5) The third paragraph under the heading “3. Opinions”
expresses the witnesses' opinions on matters as to which the
jury needs no assistance and as to which the opinion does
not help the finder of the fact determine a fact in issue or
understand any of the other evidence;
(6) The fourth paragraph under the heading “3. Opinions”
expresses an opinion on the issue of good faith and is not a
proper subject for expert opinion evidence. Nor would such
an opinion assist the finder of fact to determine a fact in issue
or to understand the evidence;
(7) The fifth paragraph under the heading “3. Opinions”
discusses what the parties were aware of and draws
conclusions and essentially makes arguments and comments
upon bad faith in a way that is impermissible; and, for the
foregoing reasons, the opinions therein will not assist the
finder of the fact to determine a fact in issue or to understand
the evidence and, in addition, the opinions therein are not the
proper subject for expert opinion evidence;
(8) The sixth paragraph under the heading “3. Opinions”
comments upon the materiality of the 4¢ rate differential
which is an appropriate subject for expert opinion evidence;
(9) The penultimate paragraph under the heading “3.
Opinions” is a comment upon the opinion of another expert
and is nothing more than vouching for the opinion of the other
expert (Guy Davis) and therefore is not a proper subject for
expert opinion evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that EQT
ENERGY, LLC'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE OPINIONS OF
GEORGE BRIDEN is granted in part and denied in part.
The last sentence of the first paragraph and the entire second
paragraph of the “The LOI” section will be excluded. All
of the opinions expressed in the “Opinions” section, with
the exception of the opinion in paragraph six relating to the
materiality of the rate differential, will be excluded.
It appears that the section entitled “1. Background” and
the remainder of the first paragraph of the “LOI” section
contain some information which may be pertinent to the
understanding of the industry and, if properly circumscribed
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and presented in a non-advocacy manner, might be admissible
as industry practice evidence.
*2  It is further ORDERED that the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the Court and oral argument would not aid the decisional
process.
It is so ORDERED.
All Citations
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